The German 10th Infantry Division: Tactical Combat Operations on the Western Front in August 1914 [1 ed.] 9783737012775, 9783847112778

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Bartosz Kruszyn´ski

The German 10th Infantry Division Tactical Combat Operations on the Western Front in August 1914

With numerous illustrations

V&R unipress

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available online: https://dnb.de. Printed with the support of the Wydział Historii – Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu. © 2021, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, 37073 Göttingen, Germany All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Cover image: A company of a German infantry regiment getting soldier’s pay. The Western Front, summer 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection (detail). Translated from the Polish by Ewa Dratwa Proof-read by Graham Crawford Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISBN 978-3-7370-1277-5

To cannoneer Jan Kroll, my great-grandfather (pictured), born on 6 Oct.1898 in Lusówko near Poznan´; in 1916–1918 he served as a soldier of the German 56th Field Artillery Regiment of the 10th Infantry Division; To musketeer Andrzej Kroll, my great-grandfather’s eldest brother born on 24 Nov.1895 in Jankowice near Poznan´; in 1914–1916 he served as a soldier of the German 230th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 50th Reserve Division. He was killed on 10 Feb.1916 near Vimy in France (his remains have never been found); To all the soldiers of Polish origin from the former Province of Posen who during WWI fought for a foreign cause in the German army, especially those who were killed and buried far from their homeland …

Contents

List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

List of Map Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Chapter 1. Organisation and Traditions by 1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

Chapter 2. Organisation, Cover Operations, Mobilization and Transport in the Concentration Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

Chapter 3. Approach March and the Battle of Éthe . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157

Chapter 4. Pursuits, and the Battles of Charency and Marville . . . . . .

293

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

355

Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

363

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

423

List of Organizational Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

439

Lists of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

441

Lists of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

451

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

453

Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

455

Geographical Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

465

List of Abbreviations

AFGG 1/1

AFGG 1/1/1

AFGG 1/2

AFGG 10/1

AFGG 10/2

APP AVDV BGBI BNF BNUS CAGDG CHEM CRH DIIT JMO OdeB OHL RAC RI SHD WIG

Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, vol. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923). Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, vol. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923). Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre, vol. 1: La guerre de movement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 2: La manoeuvre en retraite et les préliminaires de la bataille de la Marne, (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923). Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 1: Avant-propos, index géographique, abréviations, grands quartiers généraux, groupes d’armée, armées, corps d’armée (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923). Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, vol. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unités, vol. 2: Divisions d’Infanterie, Divisions de Cavalerie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1924). Archiwum Pan´stwowe w Poznaniu Deutsche Verlustlisten 1914–1918, “Armee-Verordnungsblatt” Brigades et groupes de bataillons d’infanterie Bibliothèque Nationale de France Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg Corps d’arme´es, groupes de divisions et groupements Le Centre des Hautes Études Militaires Cavalerie-Régiments de hussar Divisions d’infanterie et d’infanterie territorial Journaux des marches et operations Ordre de Bataille Oberste Heeresleitung Régiments d’artillerie de campagne Régiments d’infanterie Le Service Historique de la Défense Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny

List of Map Symbols

Introduction

In the second half of the 19th century, the western part of the former Polish state with its regional capital in Posen (Poznan´) was a part of Prussia. In 1848, the Prussian authorities changed the region’s name to Provinz Posen (Province of Posen). As the Prussian administration established itself in the area, the organization of military structures ensued. This meant that the local Polish population which represented a majority in the province, became a part of the Prussian (German) military system. Forced to be loyal to Prussia, Poles contributed to the military successes of a country which in the late 19th century was the world leader in military effectiveness. After 1815, Poznan´ was the seat of the headquarters of the V Army Corps and, after 1820, of the 10th Infantry Division subordinate to the Corps1. In 1866–1871, the Poznan´ division took part in Prussia’s unification wars. In 1866, during the Austro-Prussian war and the Franco-Prussian war (1870–1871), these soldiers (including Poles) demonstrated great gallantry. The units of the V Army Corps, including the 10th Infantry Division, gained a considerable reputation in the German Great General Staff of being effective and reliable in battle: “(…) of regiments always involved in the solid, violent military profession wherever they are”2.

Definition of the Subject In the course of this book’s narration, the history of the German 10th Infantry Division has been presented on several levels: 1) the tactics and function in the structure of the V Army Corps and the V Army; 2) in the realm of tactical 1 Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “Dowództwo V Korpusu Armijnego, jego siedziba i generałowie w latach 1889–1918,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2015): 99–121. 2 Leon Prauzin´ski and Adam Ulrich, W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstan´ców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920 (Poznan´: Ksie˛garnia S´w. Wojciecha, 1939), 13.

14

Introduction

activities on the part of the specific brigades in the division – the 19th Infantry Brigade, the 20th Infantry Brigade and the 10th Brigade of Field Artillery; 3) on the tactical level of regiments which formed parts of the aforementioned brigades: the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the 46th Infantry Regiment, the 47th Infantry Regiment, the 50th Infantry Regiment, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, two companies of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and division units, as well as the battalions and companies of the before mentioned regiments3. The military operations and the organization of the 10th Infantry Division have been presented in the context of: 1) cover of mobilization on the eastern border of the German empire in late July and early August 1914; 2) the course of mobilization in specific garrisons; 3) transport of units to the Western front; 4) concentration in the formation of the V Army Corp; 5) transition to the attack positions; 6) march to and combat on the Belgian-French borderland: the battles of Éthe, Charency and Marville; 7) transition to the Oberste Heeresleitung reserve [OHL]4. The book’s chronology encompasses the time between late July and 1 September 1914. Only the first chapter goes back to the period before 1914, where I present the origin of the infantry division in question after 1820, the organizational changes up till the outbreak of WWI, the fighting traditions, the course of service of selected commanders of the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps who largely affected the shape of this tactical formation until 1914.

Why the 10th Infantry Division? Undoubtedly, the German 10th Infantry Division deserves to be called “Poznanian”5 because between 1820 and 1918, it was related to the city of Poznan´, where the division’s headquarters, its brigades and the barracks of the majority of 3 When mobilization finished in August 1914, the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division consisted of Poles; only in the 5th Pioneer Battalion, stationed in Głogów and recruiting from the northwest part of the Province of Silesia, the number of soldiers of Polish nationality was very small. Garnison-Karte der Deutschen Armee 1914, GED-21408, Bibliothèque Nationale de France [further referred to as the BNF]; Karte Provinze Schlesien 1907, Maßstab 1:500.000, in Meyers grosses konversationslexikon, Bd. 14 (Berlin: Bibliographisches Institute, 1906). 4 Oberste Heeresleitung – during WWI it was the highest command organ in the German army in charge of planning operations and command on the operational level. Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg. ed. Gerhard, Hirschfeld and Gerd, Krumeich and Irina Renz (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004), 754–755. 5 In the second half of the 19th c., the Poznan´ garrison hosted over a dozen units while the recruits, including Poles, came from the Province of Posen. However, by 1914, as a result of frequent reorganization, some of the regiments were transferred to other garrisons outside the Province of Posen. Consequently, the supply districts changed while the number of the drafted

Introduction

15

regiments were located. In the time in question, it was the very core of the Poznan´ garrison. On the other hand, the remaining regiments and battalions reporting to the 10th Infantry Division were stationed in garrisons in the Province of Posen. In the history of this tactical formation, WWI was a breakthrough: the division’s units fought in many key battles on the western front. However, in Germany and Poland alike, the 10th Infantry Division has not been the subject of an academic monograph where an attempt has been made to recreate and analyse the unit’s traditions, the organization and fighting in 1914 and the subsequent years of WWI. The national aspect is of great importance. As the area of the V Army Corp was inhabited mainly by Poles, the history of the 10th Infantry Division in the context of the German unification wars and WWI is the history of soldiers of both Polish and German origin. The Germans acknowledged this fact. After 1871, the units of this tactical formation were colloquially referred to in the army as KatschmarkenRegimenten6 which translates into the Kaczmarek Regiments. Kaczmarek, a very popular Polish family name in the Province of Posen, became synonymous with Polish soldiers from the 10th Infantry Division. The Polish inhabitants of the region started to use the term Kaczmarek Regiments with reference to the 10th Polish soldiers was very small. Due to their origins, four of the above regiments were referred to by the Prussians as “Poznanian” (German Posensches). In August 1914, two of them were a part of the structure of the 9th Infantry Division: 2. Posensches Infanterie-Regiment von Coubière Nr. 19 and 3. Posensches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 58. On the other hand, two other regiments: 1. Posensches Infanterie-Regiment von Grolman Nr. 18 and 4. Posensches Infanterie Regiment Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen Nr. 59 represented the 72nd Infantry Brigade which was a part of the 41st Infantry Division from the XX Army Corp (8th Army). For this reason, despite the historical relations with the Poznan´ garrison, it is a mistake to refer to these regiments as Kaczmarek-Regiments. Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 2: Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie Regimenter sowie Jäger und MG Bataillone, Wehrbezirkskommandos und Ausbildungsleiter von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis 1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1992), 88–89, 90–92, 169–172. More on the history of these regiments: Werner Meyer, Das Infanterie-Regiment von Grolman (1. Posensches) Nr. 18 im Weltkriege (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929); Max Schubert, Infanterie-Regiment von Courbiére (2. Posensches) Nr. 19 (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1922); Jaspar Kundt and Walter Raschke, Das Infanterie-Regiment von Courbiere (2. Posensches) Nr. 19 im Weltkriege 1914–1919 (Go¨ rlitz: Boka¨ mper, 1935); Walter Schmidt, Das Königlich Preußische 3. Posensche Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 58 im Weltkriege (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1934); Wilhelm Reichert, Das Infanterie-Regiment Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen (4. Posensches) Nr. 59 im Weltkriege 1914/18 (Potsdam: Stein, 1930). 6 This phrase was mentioned many times in memoirs of Poles drafted to the German army in WWI. The phenomenon was defined by Adam Ulrich, a veteran from the 6th Grenadier Regiment – one of the Kaczmarek-Regiments. It was also mentioned by Arkady Fiedler who served during WWI in the Ammunition Column of the V Army Corp. Prof. Ryszard Kaczmarek from the University of Silesia in Katowice reminisced how popular this colloquial phrase was during WWI. Prauzin´ski and Ulrich, W marszu, 13; Arkady Fiedler, Mój ojciec i de˛by (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Miejskie, 2006), 149; Ryszard Kaczmarek, Polacy w Armii Kajzera. Na frontach pierwszej wojny ´swiatowej (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2014), 55.

16

Introduction

Infantry Division. The phrase acquired a new meaning in August 1914 when, during mobilization of the V Army Corp and the V Reserve Corp, numerous reserve soldiers of Polish nationality were drafted. Consequently, to many Polish families whose fathers, sons and brothers were mobilized, it was a harbinger of wartime tragedy. Although they were Poles, they were also citizens of Prussia and took the military oath of loyalty to the German empire7.

Research Goals The preliminary stage of military manoeuvres on the Western front in August 1914 is a source of information used in the military historian’s research and analyses. At the time in question, two doctrines: the French and the German, collided. On the tactical, operational and strategic levels, each party considered attack an efficient warfare method. However, in August 1914, for French generals attack was associated with a “war of attrition”, conducted at any cost, including massive losses in one’s own troops. In August 1914, the German 10th Infantry Division was involved in the first battles with French troops, the Parisian 7th Infantry Division at Éthe, Charency and Marville. It was a time when the battlefield verified the assumptions adopted in peace time by both parties. The assumptions included the tactics, soldiers’ training, quality and efficacy of the military equipment and armour, tactical and operational command, the supply system and medical care. Bearing this in mind, I decided to carry out a detailed analysis of the operations of the German 10th Infantry Division, in the preliminary stage of the military manoeuvres on the Western front in August 1914. An analysis of warfare is preceded by presenting the origin of the Poznan´ division and its specific regiments and the organizational changes of 1820–1914, the fighting traditions and the commanders who were of key importance to the military developments. I have also set myself a goal of recreating the level of training the specific regiments received in late July 1914, the equipment, weaponry, the tactical and operational doctrines advocated at that time, accompanied by a detailed analysis of the issues at hand. I need to assume that, on top of the commanders and the soldiers, these factors affected the quality of the military unit. Equally important to the subject in question was defining the course of mobilization in the Poznan´ garrison in August 1914, predominantly hosting units of the 10th Infantry Division as well as cover activities undertaken by some units on 7 G.A. Wron´ski, Pamie˛tniki nieznanego z˙ołnierza. Przez˙ycia wojenne na froncie zachodnim 1914–1919 (S´rem 1934), 6.

Introduction

17

the German-Russian border (the eastern border of the Province of Posen), preparation of the specific regiments’ transport to the concentration area and organization of infantry units. Another goal adopted for this book is the recreation of the tactics of the 10th Infantry Division on the level of its specific regiments and units, coupled with presentation of their cooperation. If I had decided to limit the division’s actions to the tactics, failing to present it in the structure of the V Army Corps, it would be difficult for the readers to understand a broader context of the events. This is the reason why I decided to present the warfare of the 10th Infantry Division in close relation to the tactics and operations of the V Army Corps and the operations of the 5th Army. In August 1914, the tactical success of the division in question (and the Poznan´ Corps as such) conditioned the operational success of the right wing of the German 5th Army. At the same time, I assumed that an analysis of the operations of the German 10th Infantry Division would be complete only if at the same time I presented the course of French operations. The more so because one of the determinants of the Division’s fighting efficiency were the losses suffered by the French army. The human factor – the soldierly dimension of the war – was of great importance to the history of the 10th Infantry Division. For this reason, I made an attempt at analysing how the soldiers (Poles and Germans) survived the war emotionally. How did they react to the outbreak of WWI? How did they perceive the course of mobilization and the trip to the battle area? How did they feel about the war? How did they experience the injury and deaths of their brothers in arms? How did they respond to the cruelty of the war? Did their attitude towards death change in the face of the dramatic events of the war? How were the wounded taken care of ? How did the soldiers approach the enemy and the civilians in Belgium and France? Finally, what factors could have influenced morale in the units of the 10th Infantry Division? During the battles of Éthe, Charency and Marville, soldiers of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division were killed, wounded or went missing. The losses suffered during the first battles in August 1914, stemming from the military condition of the specific battalions, batteries and squadrons, were a good indication of their operational performance. This is the reason why I set myself the goal of the detailed analysis of the losses suffered by all the units of the 10th Infantry Division, including identifying the number of soldiers of Polish nationality. The source material was the German list of casualties (Verlustliste) published in the “Armee-Verordnungsblatt” [AVDV] and the lists of causalities published in regimental ledgers.

18

Introduction

Theses The German 10th Infantry Division proved superior to the French 7th Infantry Division in the battles of Éthe, Charency and Marville in August 1914 predominantly owing to better armament and equipment, better tactical training, more efficient tactics and better arms. Notably, when soldiers were under severe stress in battle, the legendary Prussian drill, so hated by soldiers in time of peace, was an effective tool for maintaining battle discipline. The quality of the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division was also affected by the features of the Polish inhabitants of the Province of Posen: diligence, resourcefulness, resistance to the hardships of war and persistence in battle. In August 1914, Poles living in the Province of Posen as subjects of Wilhelm 8 II , German Emperor, were drafted together with Germans to the V Army Corps, of which a part was the 10th Infantry Division. The initial experiences of the privates on the front forged bonds between the brothers in arms. This process did not stem from an enforced ideology or regiment-level politics, but rather the sense of camaraderie in the platoon or company. Bonds among soldiers from the same subdivision have accompanied warfare since time immemorial. Soldiers from the same platoon, company or battalion face the same danger and constant threats to their lives; what connects them is their uniforms and sense of belonging to a division. In battle they can only count on each other, rely on their skills and military training. Good cooperation within a subdivision affects the execution of orders and survival on the battlefield. The phenomenon of Polish-German brotherhood in arms during WWI, accompanied by the difficult historical Polish-German relations from the 19th century to WWII, may today seem politically incorrect. In 1914, the relations between privates of Polish nationality and their German superiors (NCOs and officers in charge of the 10th Infantry Division) were quite different. Besides, throughout WWI there were cases of German superiors treating Polish subordinates with contempt or openly persecuting them for their nationality, referring to them disdainfully as “Polacks”. Polish soldiers would not be promoted or presented with medals, especially the Iron Cross 1st Class. This phenomenon was commented on by the then battalion physician Wojciech Jacobson, Ph.D., from the 49th Infantry Regiment from Gniezno, Arkady Fiedler from the Ammunition Column of the V Army Corp and G.A. Wron´ski from the 37th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 10th Reserve Division. 8 More on Wilhelm II Hohenzollern, German emperor, in: The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, ed. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Piotr Szlanta, Wilhelm II: ostatni z Hohenzollernów (Warszawa: Ksia˛z˙ka i Wiedza, 2015).

Introduction

19

However, directly behind the front, German and Polish officers from the same units often had friendly relations, as reminisced by Tadeusz Szulc, Ph.D. and Wojciech Jacobson, Ph.D. Notably, in 1914 there were few officers of Polish origin in the German army and they were typically physicians9. During WWI, in the eyes of German officers and NCOs, the subordinate Polish soldiers were an “uncertain Polish element” and Poles were suspected of disloyalty throughout the war. This was why Poles serving in the German army would often decide not to disclose their nationality. This was particularly true for the units where Germans prevailed. There was no difficulty involved, because a large part of Poles from the Province of Posen, especially the younger ones, were fluent in oral and written German10. Arkady Fiedler, a one-year war volunteer from Poznan´, serving in 1914 in the Ammunition Column of the V Army Corps where a majority of the soldiers were of German descent (farmers from the north of the Silesia Province, now Lower Silesia), reminisced about the Polish-German relations: In the new quarters, the comrades would keep a keener eye on me; even the officers sometimes seemed to cast me a curious look. I made an effort not to stand out from this mass of tough, bearded peasants but it was an impossible task. One day a second lieutenant asked me which university I had attended. I said, truthfully, that it was Krakow. “How so?” he cried, disappointed. “It is a Polish university, right?!” “Yes, Herr Leutnant! I studied Polish literature…” He looked at me with horror as if I were a leper and I realised that I should have lied. A few days later I talked in my sleep in Polish and I was heard by the soldiers lying nearby. “Du bist ja ein Pollacke!”, several of them yelled with indignation as if they had discovered a murderer among them. I was a 19-year-old kid and I had not believed before that I could be hated so much only for being a Pole. The next day one of the bearded men, a squadron shoemaker, shook my hand secretly and whispered in Polish: “Hold on, brother! I’m a Pole, too! There’s only two of us here…”. He was from Zgorzelec. After that time, we would often whisper slyly to one another and it was something we both needed11.

9 Wojciech Jacobson, Z Armja˛ Klucka na Paryz˙. Wspomnienia lekarza Polaka. Edition: Bartosz Kruszyn´ski (Os´wie˛cim: Napoleon V, 2015); Fiedler, Mój ojciec; “Pierwsza wojna s´wiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918. Ze wspomnien´ poznan´skiego lekarza wojskowego Tadeusza Szulca, introduction and edition Piotr Grzelczak,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 166–192. 10 Polish veterans of WWI reported some German officers’ and NCOs’ distrust of their subordinates of Polish origin. The interesting thing here is the fact that German officers mentioned it in the books of the Kaczmarek-Regiments, published after WWI in the 1920s and 1930s. About Polish-German relations on the front see also Jacobson, Z Armja˛; Wron´ski, Pamie˛tniki. 11 Fiedler, Mój ociec, 148.

20

Introduction

Research Methods While working on this book, I adopted the following fundamental research methods: the monograph method, the critical method of written, iconographic and cartographic sources. In order to evaluate the casualties, I turned to statistical and comparative methods. and to define the percentage of soldiers of Polish origin in the specific units of the 10th Infantry Division, I employed the representation method. In my considerations of the social origin of the soldiers in the division in question, I also turned to the sociological method. To analyse the phenomena affecting the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division, the method of individual cases was used. The geographic method made it possible to identify the itinerary of the specific units, the course of combat in a tactical dimension, the tactics and operations of the V Army Corps and the operations of the 5th Army. The geographic method was also used to identify the places of birth of selected soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps. Of key importance to the research was identifying the losses of the units of the 10th Infantry Division suffered in August 1914, including soldiers of Polish origin. The German military authorities did not distinguish in any way Polish soldiers in the Army Journals of Ordinances – Lists of War Casualties (AVDV). Polish family and Christian names were spelled without Polish diacritics, sometimes even phonetically. For this reason, I have adopted several criteria for identifying soldiers of Polish nationality listed in the AVDV. The first criterion was Polish spelling/wording of a family name, e. g. Olszewski, Kalinowski, Biskup, Paczkowski, Szymanski, Walkowiak etc. Another determinant was the name’s wording/spelling but here things were slightly more complicated. In German, there are no equivalents of some Polish Christian names and for this reason these names were not given in German families. In the AVDV, they would be recorded in their Latin form: Boleslaus – Bolesław, Stanislaus – Stanisław, Wladislaus – Władysław, Kasimir – Kazimierz, Valentin – Walenty, Albertus – Albert. In other cases, Christian names would be recorded in the AVDV in their Polish wording, e. g. Stefan, Julian, Edmund, Joachim. Another category was represented by names shared in both languages, and these were numerous: Johann – Jan, Johannes – Janusz, Franz – Franciszek, Ludwig – Ludwik, Joseph – Józef, Emil – Emil, Heinrich – Henryk, Paul – Paweł, Richard – Ryszard, Erich – Eryk, Paul – Paweł, Thomas – Tomasz, Andreas – Andrzej, Max – Maksymilian, Alfred. Some Christian names, used by both nations, were typical of soldiers of Polish nationality, namely Vinzent – Wincenty, Alois – Alojzy, Michael – Michał, Ignatz – Ignacy, Lucas – Łukasz, Silvester – Sylwester, Anton – Antoni, Jacob – Jakub, Martin – Marcin. There were also typically German Christian names not given in Polish families in the Province of Posen, e. g. Hugo, Wilhelm, Siegfried, Otto, Oswald, Gustav, Edgar, Bruno, Willy. On the other

Introduction

21

hand, if writers in the companies, battalions or regiments who were of German origin, could not handle the spelling of Polish Christian or family names or places of birth, they would frequently spell them phonetically or at their discretion, e. g. Hypolit – Hipolit, Narziß – Narcyz, Ponidzialeck – Poniedziałek. The third method of verifying Polish nationality was the place of birth in the Province of Posen – each village/town spelled by a German had to be checked in an index or its contemporary name and location had to be found. The above described method, adopted to verify the Polish nationality of soldiers who served in the units of the 10th Infantry Division in 1914 and their names were included in the AVDV, may not be 100% precise. This is because some of the Polish soldiers could have had German-sounding family names or Christian names given in either language. The analysed material gives reason to believe that these cases were rare, while the adopted method of verifying soldiers of Polish nationality was the only available one. Therefore, bearing in mind the small margin for error, the resulting data should be viewed as representative. As for the names of tactical formations, I have turned to Arabic numbers and the rules of using capital letters in proper names, e. g. 10th Infantry Division; names of corps – Roman numerals and capital letters, respectively, e. g. V Army Corps; in the names of armies, I have used Arabic numerals and capital letters, e. g. the 5th Army. Capital letters are also used in references to names of regiments, e. g. the 6th Grenadier Regiment. Names of battalions, squadrons, companies or platoons are written in small letters and preceded by an appropriate Roman or Arabic numeral, e. g. the I battalion, the 1st squadron, the 1st campaign, the 2nd platoon. Independent battalions are an exception here, e. g. the 5th Pioneer Battalion where capital letters are used. Wherever it was justified for narration reasons, I have also used German or French units. With reference to battalions and the campaign of the French 7th Infantry Division, especially during the battle of Éthe, I also recall the commanders’ names, e. g. the 9th campaign of Captain Vincent.

Structure The structure of this book consists of an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion, where the issues have been presented in chronological order. The analysis has been supplemented by an attachment containing fragments of the memoirs of the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division. The author has subjected these fragments to critical edition. Chapter one, entitled “The organization and traditions up to 1914” is devoted to the origin of the forming, in 1820, in Poznan´ of the 10th Infantry Division, the history of each of the division’s units, changes to the organization of the division

22

Introduction

and its brigades and regiments by late July 1914 i. e. just before mobilization. I have also presented the military successes (by 1914) of selected commanders of the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps, who in 1864–1914 played an important role in affecting the organizational and combat ethos of the division in question. In chapter two “Cover activities, mobilization, transport to concentration area”, I discuss operations of separate units of the 10th Infantry Division on the Russian-German border during mobilization in August 1914, the course of mobilization in the specific regiments, the wartime division organization, weaponry, equipment and uniforms, the then regulations as well as the tactical and operational doctrines, the educational levels in specific units, preparation for departure as well as transport to the German part of Lorraine, to the area of concentration of the V Army Corps and the 5th Army. Chapter three “Proximity march and the battle of Éthe” presents the operations of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division in the structure of the V Army Corps – since the beginning of the march to the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914. This engagement was of prominent importance to the Poznan´ division because it was the regiments’ first combat test during that war. In order to present a broader aspect of the developments and to show the results of the operations of the 10th Infantry Division, the course of combat is also shown from the French perspective. On the basis of analyses of the German lists of casualties in the battle of Éthe, I have identified the number of casualties, wounded and missing soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division, including soldiers of Polish nationality. In chapter four, entitled “Hunting operations and the battles of Charency and Marville” I discuss the 10th Infantry Division hunting French units of the IV Army Corps, defeated at Éthe. The hunt resulted in the battles of Charency and Marville where the units of the French 7th Infantry Division were again defeated by the German 10th Infantry Division. All the chapters include maps and tactical sketches which help us to better understand the discussed events. The narration is supplemented by unique iconographic material and charts of the organisational structure of the corps and divisions. The last part of the book consists of the conclusions and an annex, including the establishment of the positions of the German 10th Infantry Division and the French 7th Infantry Division. Of special importance is a fragment of the memoirs of General Edgar de Trentinian, the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division from 1927, provided in an annex. This part is autobiographical in nature and, at the same time, an interesting and instructive analysis of the warfare in which the French 7th Infantry Division was engaged in August 1914, the reasons for the errors made by the French commanders and the disastrous assumptions underlying the French combat regulations. The attached fragments of General

Introduction

23

Edgar de Trentinian’s memoirs, subjected to my critical edition, provide a better understanding of the events discussed. The book finishes with a bibliography, a list of photographs and maps, as well as an index of geographic locations and people.

Archive, Library and Museum Resources After 1918, the documentation produced by the German V Army Corps and the units of the German 10th Infantry Division during WWI was taken over by the Reichsarchive in Potsdam. The German documents prepared in that time and related to the staff of the corps, divisions, the specific regiments and even battalions, were on a high clerical level. Unfortunately, a majority of the resources of the Reichsarchive was burnt in 1944 when Potsdam was bombed by the British army. The documents which survived the bombing, related to the above presented issues, are now stored in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg. This archive became key in my search of source materials used to write this book. Lamentably, the search query in Freiburg showed that the rosters dedicated to the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps from August 1914 did not survive the fire of 1944. On the other hand, the Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg and the Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart in Germany provided materials about general Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach12 and personal documents of general Oskar Freiherr von Watter13. Due to the scarcity of German archive resources, I decided it was imperative to resort to sources provided by the French units who in August 1914 fought against the German 10th Infantry Division, the V Army Corp and the 5th Army. The materials related to the French units from WWI are gathered in the Le Service Historique de la Défense [further referred to as the SHD] seated in Château de Vincennes in suburban Paris. In the context of this book, of greatest value proved journals of marches and operations: Journaux des marches et operations [further referred to as the JMO]. During WWI the French army kept the JMOs on the level

12 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, General der Infanterie, Kommandeur des V Armeekorps und des Niedersächsischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 46, M703 R958N8, Bezeichnung des Bestands: Militärhistorische Bildersammlung, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 13 10. Inf. Division, Abtlg. Ia 1869 geh., Gefechtsbericht für den 12. 9. 1918, PH 8-I/141, InfanterieDivisionen der Preußischen Armee, 10. Infanterie-Division: Abschriften aus Kriegstagebu¨ chern und Anlagen 1918, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv.

24

Introduction

of battalions (squadrons), regiments14, brigades, divisions, army corps and division groups, fortified camps, armies, army groups and the Supreme Commander15. In staffs of large units, including infantry divisions, the JMOs were written also by specific services and division commanders, e. g. the medical service or commander of the division artillery. As for the content, the quality varied from one JMO to another and to a large extent depended on the writer keeping the journal and his superior supervising the process. Some JMOs contain text as well as tactical sketches, pieces of maps in various scales with tactical and operational situations drawn on the maps, tables of casualties, quotations from captured German documents or POWs’ statements. Equally valuable were references to operational orders. For this reason, in the context of the 10th Infantry Division, the JMOs contain extremely valuable information which made it possible to verify the facts obtained from German sources and add a new dimension to the presented events. As for the SHD resources, several dozen JMOs were subjected to analysis, during which I came across facts of value to this book’s narration. However, the process necessitated several months of search queries and painstaking translation from French handwriting, often hard to decipher. From the SHD resources, I have used one JMO from the corps level16, one – from the level of a division17, two – from the level of a brigade18, four – from infantry regiments19, two – from artillery regiments20 and one – from a cavalry regiment21. In the context of evaluating (commander of the French 7th Infantry Division) General Edgar de Trentinian’s warfare experience and professionalism, his 14 The unit from the Le Service Historique de la Défense which I used to write this book was the JMO of the infantry, artillery and cavalry regiments, kept in the Journaux des marches et opérations des corps de groupe, ref. no. 26 N from 571 to 1370. More on the unit – see inventory: Jean Nicot, Inventaire des journaux des marches et opérations des grandes unites (Paris: Imprimerie La Renaissance, 1967). 15 In the SHD archive, the journals of warfare operations and ones of army corps, division groups and fortress regions are stored in the archive complex of large units: Journaux des marches et opérations des grandes unités, ref. no. 26 N from 1 to 570. A part of the unit are JMOs of the army, army corps and division groups: Corps d’armées, groupes de divisions et groupements. More on the unit – see inventory: Jean Nicot, Inventaire des journaux. 16 In the case of army corps, division groups and fortified regions, it was a 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, SHD. 17 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, SHD. 18 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, SHD; 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, SHD. 19 101e régiment d’infanterie (7. 08. 1914–16. 08. 1915), 26 N 674/1, JMO, SHD; 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, SHD; 104e régiment d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–24. 03. 1915), 26 N 675/15, JMO, SHD. 20 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, SHD; 44e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (6. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 984/1, JMO, SHD. 21 14e régiment de hussards (2. 08. 1914–1. 04. 1917), 26 N 898/21, JMO, SHD.

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25

personal files in the SHD resources have proven helpful22. From the point of this book’s narrative, of equal importance were the SHD files of the staff of the French IV Army Corps23 and the staff of the French 7th Infantry Division24. One should assume that the quality of the stored staff files of both large units, especially the files from the second half of August 1914, is evidence of the extremely chaotic work being done at that time. In my analysis of the experience of warfare of the French commanders prior to WWI, I have also studied the personal files of the recipients of the Legion of Honour stored in the Archives Nationales – Site de Paris, made available online by the French Ministry of Culture25. It would be extremely difficult to write about warfare on a tactical level, in this case the German 10th Infantry Division in 1914, without using the topographic maps from that time. To this end, I decided to make use of the biggest possible number of German, French, Belgian and American maps. These cartographic sources, priceless from the point of view of the narration, made it possible to verify various pieces of information from the German and French written sources. They also allow us to trace back the itineraries, to analyse tactical as22 Edgar Louis de Trentinian, GR1 YD 40, Officiers généraux. Généraux de division (coloniale) (1880–1932), SHD. 23 4e Corps d’Armée, 1er Bureau, 22 N 146–148, Corps d’Armee, Des Archives De La Guerre 1914–1918, SHD. 24 7e Division d’Infanterie, 3e Bureau – Opérations, 24 N 117, Divisions et Brigades, Des Archives De La Guerre 1914–1918, SHD. 25 Augustin Gregoire Arthur Gérard, LH/1117/51, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 2, 2020, http://www2.culture.go uv.fr; Victor René Boëlle, LH/266/20, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 2, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Raoul Julien François de Lartigue, LH/1488/73, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.cul ture.gouv.fr; Paul François Grossetti, LH/1210/13, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.cul ture.gouv.fr; Charles Louis Marie Lanrezac, L1473046, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.cul ture.gouv.fr; Fernand Louis Armand Marie Langle De Cary De, LH/1469/62, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Paul André Marie Maistre, LH/1699/52, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Georges Lacotte, LH/1426/62, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Henri François Felineau, LH/952/68, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http ://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Walleranda de Hauteclocque, LH/1272/46, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Léon Gaston Jean Baptiste Farret, LH/934/43, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr.

26

Introduction

sumptions in the 10th Infantry Division, the tactical and operational assumptions in the V Army Corp and operational in the 5th Army. Finally, an analysis of the maps provided an answer to the question how the terrain impacted completion of the tasks. The cartographic search query therefore comprised resources stored in archives, special library collections, French maps of the General Staff from 1912 and topographic maps which I obtained from private antiquarian collections in France26, maps included in the German multi-volume source series Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, published in the Interwar period by the Reichsarchive27 coupled with maps and sketches published in regimental ledgers and the works of Colonel Alphons Grasset published in the 1920s. In my work on the narration, I also made use of the maps included in a book by General Otto von Moser28. As for the State Archive in Poznan´, I made use of a map of Poznan´ from before 1914 – Neuesterplan der Provinzial Haupt- und Residenzstadt Posen from 1913 in a scale of 1:12 50029 which made it possible to analyse the distribution of the barracks infrastructure of the 10th Infantry Division and the units of the V Army Corps in the city. As for the cartographic collections of Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, of special value for the book was a map Garnison-Karte der Deutschen Armee 1914 which helped me to verify the units stationed in Poznan´ and the area subordinated to the V Army Corps, the composition of the units of the Metz fortress and the XVI Army Corps30. The special collections of Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg proved useful for the book’s narration because of the maps of Alsace and Lorraine: Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen im Auftrage

26 Carte d’ Etat-Major, Echelon 1:80.000. Edition du Service géographique de l′Armée Après 1912, avant 1918. Réunion de 2 cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz), format: 75 × 51 cm – a French command map from 1912 (updated in 1918) which resulted from combining two sheets of German maps: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) and N° 568 (Metz) which encompassed the German part of Lorraine; Levee par les Officiers du Corps d’Etat-Major, et publiée par le Dépôt de la Guerre en 1835. Revisée en 1912. Carte 1:80.000: 36 – Metz. 27 Including Karte 3: Operation der deutsche 4. und 5. Armee, in Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Bd. 1: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925); Karte 3: Der Kampf der Deutschen 5. Armee um den Maasu¨bergang vom 29. August bis 1. September 1914, in Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Bd. 3: Der Marne Feldzug. Von der Sambre zur Marne (Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1926). 28 Among others, Karte: XIII. Armee-Korps an der Maas 1914, in Otto von Moser, Die Württemberger im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser A.G., 1928). 29 Neuesterplan der Provinzial Haupt- und Residenzstadt Posen, 1:12.500, Posen 1913, APP: Pl.m.Poz.12a, Najstarsze mapy Poznania do 1938 roku, Archiwum Pan´stwowe w Poznaniu. 30 Garnison-Karte der Deutschen Armee 1914, GE D-21408, BNF.

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27

des Kaiserlichen Ober-Präsidiums zu Strassburg from 187931, Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen from 191432 and Karte der Sprachverteilung, Bevölkerungsdichte und Bodenschätze von Elsass-Lothringen: auf Grund von Heinrich Kieperts Spezialkarte from 191933. I have also made use of the digital collections of the Archive of Military Maps of the Institute of Geography [further referred to as WIG]. This collection provided German maps from the area of Wrzes´nia – TUDR 94: Wreschen, Landesaufnahme 1901 on a scale of 1:200 00034 as well as Miłosław and Pyzdry on a scale of 1:100 000 – A33: Miloslaw – Pyzdry, 191435 which proved helpful in discussing the cover activities of the 10th Infantry Division on the border between Germany and Russia in late July and early August 1914. In the course of writing this book, I approached iconography as a full-value historical source and, in accordance with the historian’s art, I subjected it to a critical source analysis. The related query took more than 10 years and encompassed private archives and antiquarian collections in Germany, France, UK, US, Australia and Poland. As for institutional queries, these were conducted in the Library of Congress in the US, the Imperial War Museum in London and the Special Collections of the Poznan´ University Library. I managed to come across an absolutely unique collection of photographs of the soldiers of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division during a query in Lorraine and in private collections in Germany. The considerable photographic resources helped me to verify many aspects of the organization of the 10th Infantry Division. This was possible because of the varied iconographic sources in which the soldiers were immortalised shortly before leaving for the front, together with their uniforms, weaponry and equipment. The fact that during WWI photography became a part of mass culture is well reflected in the photographs of the division in question. The photographs taken in 1914 include both works of professional photographers and the soldiers themselves, as owners of private cameras. However, they all are of great value for 31 Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen im Auftrage des Kaiserlichen Ober-Präsidiums zu Strassburg nach amtlichen Quellen bearb. von Heinrich Kiepert; Schriftst. v. C. Bischoff; Terrainst. v. J. Sulzer, 1:250 000, Berlin 1879, Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg [further referred to as the BNUS] 32 Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, Strassburg i. E, R. Schultz & Company (1914), BNUS. 33 Karte der Sprachverteilung, Bevölkerungsdichte und Bodenschätze von Elsass-Lothringen: auf Grund von Heinrich Kieperts Spezialkarte, Échelle: 1:250.000, Date d’édition: 1919, MCARTE1333, BNUS. 34 Königlich-Preussische Landesaufnahme, Topographische Übersichtskarte des Deutschen Reiches 1:200.000 – TUDR 94: Wreschen, Landesaufnahme 1901, Auflagedruck 1914, WIG Map Archive, accessed: July 13, 2017, http://www.mapywig.org. 35 Karte des Deutschen Reiches 1:100.000, A33: Miloslaw – Pyzdry, 1914, WIG Map Archive, accessed: July 13, 2017, http://www.mapywig.org/.

28

Introduction

the issues discussed here. The iconographic sources also made it possible to verify the records of the then regulations and to provide information about the equipment and the uniforms of French soldiers in August 1914. When it comes to the iconography of German troops in WWI, I gained valuable insight during the process of arranging an exhibition in the Wielkopolska Military Museum, Poznan´ Branch of the National Museum, entitled “‘Fate took a hand in the uniform we wore’ – the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI. Poles from the Prussian Partition in the German Army in 1914–1918”. I was invited as a consultant on the source analysis of the iconography and I made my family collection available. Ultimately, the exhibition attracted several hundred unique photographs and artefacts from that time36. The iconographic query also encompassed the legacy of the French units; my goal was to analyse the uniforms, the weaponry and equipment of the French troops in August 1914 and to confront it with other written sources. During the query, I found photographs of locations in Belgium and France visited by the 10th Infantry Division from Poznan´ in 1914. These photographs, juxtaposed with maps, let me to better understand the nature of the specific operations. Of equal importance were queries in museums where I could analyse artefacts (including weaponry and uniforms) from WWI. The query included the Imperial War Museum in London (UK), the Royal Armouries Museum in Leeds (UK), Imperial War Museum – Duxford (UK), Mémorial de Verdun (France), Citadelle Souterraine de Verdun (France), Museum of the Polish Army in Warsaw, Wielkopolska Military Museum – Poznan´ Branch of the National Museum, the Armament Museum – Poznan´ Branch of the Museum of Independence in Poznan´ and the Opalin´ski Castle Museum in Sieraków. I would like to take the opportunity of thanking the employees of these institutions for the numerous and long conversations on the subject. My visits to the burial sites of the soldiers of the WWI Western front, including the 10th Infantry Division, were very emotional. The Douaumont Ossuary is a particularly shocking site, as France’s biggest cemetery where 16,142 identified soldiers of both sides of the conflict are buried. The ossuary holds the remains of 130,000 unidentified soldiers. The German Verlustliste, published as part of the “Armee-Verordnungsblatt” with typical Prussian accuracy throughout WWI, has proven an extremely valuable and unique source for this book. Since August 1914, the German military 36 The exhibition “‘Fate took a hand in the uniform we wore’ – the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI. Poles from the Prussian Partition in the German Army in 1914–1918” was held between 21 September 2014 and 1 March 2015. Information about the exhibition on the basis of the website of the National Museum in Poznan´, accessed: August 25, 2017, http://www.mnp.art.pl/.

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authorities used the list to announce the casualties. The entries were arranged in accordance with the organizational structure: the battalions or divisions which were further divided into companies, batteries or squadrons. In 1914, the units were often accompanied by a chronological range and the operations’ location37. In order to identify the losses of the units of the 10th Infantry Division in 1914, I also made use of the lists of casualties of WWI, published in the Interwar Period in the regimental ledgers of the 10th Infantry Division38. I used the works of General William Balck, an eminent theoretician of the art of war, employed in the Poznan´ garrison, to analyse issues related to the tactical doctrine and organization of the armed forces in the German army as of 1914. These publications, published in volumes before 1914, pertained to the tactics of the infantry39 as well as the cavalry, field artillery and infantry support40. Following WWI, the general supplemented the records with his own war experience. They are available in a single volume, translated into Polish and entitled Rozwój taktyki w cia˛gu wielkiej wojny [Development of tactics in the Great War]41. Also of use was a work of Pascal Marie Henry Lucas, a French officer and veteran of WWI42. In my analysis of the German art of command in 1914, the tactical doctrine, the organization of the specific types of forces and armament, weapons and 37 As it was an excellent intelligence source for the British or the French, which made it easy to calculate the losses of the specific German units in a battle, this way of publishing losses was abandoned. After the autumn of 1916, the German military authorities gave up on dividing the losses into units and started to publish names in chronological-alphabetic order. 38 Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935); Gerhard Loosch, Das Königl. preuβ. Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932); Max Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935); Otto Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914–1920 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931); Konrad Angerstein and Paul Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: Druck and Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1927); Paul Koch, Das Niederschlesische PionierBataillon Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsverbände im Weltkrieg 1914/18 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1928). 39 William Balck, Taktik, Volume 1: Einleitung und formale Taktik der Infanterie (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1908). 40 Idem, Taktik Volume 2: Kavallerie, Feld- und Fußartillerie im Feldkriege (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1910). 41 William Balck, Rozwój taktyki w cia˛gu wielkiej wojny, translated by Tadeusz Róz˙ycki (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1921). 42 Pascal-Marie-Henri Lucas, Rozwój mys´li taktycznej we Francji i w Niemczech podczas wojny 1914–1918 r., translated by Jerzy Biernacki, (Warszawa: Tetragon, 2013). The book was first published in France in the Interwar Period – P.M.H. Lucas, L’Evolution des idées tactiques en France et Allemagne pendant la guerre de 1914–1918 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1923). 1st Polish edition – 1925.

30

Introduction

uniforms, I also turned to the German regulations of the time. The most important ones were the regulations of the field forces (Felddienst Ordnungs43). The Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai. 190644, updated and published in 1913 provided information about the organization of the infantry. On the operational and tactical levels, the German doctrine is presented with respect to the regulations for higher echelons of the army: Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung from 191045. I present issues related to the weapons with respect to the regulations, tactical manuals and instructions. On the other hand, the structure and principles of use of the MG-08 Maxim machine gun is presented here based on works by Braun46, Friedrich von Merkatz from 190947, a subsequent edition from 191748 and the English (American) translation from 191649. I also used the Polish user’s manual for the MG-08 Maxim written in the Interwar Period and another one by Józef Kwaciszewski50. As for the arms of the German infantry, I used an instruction written by Tadeusz Felsztyn51 and Regulamin: Karabin Mauzera M. 9852 [Regulations: the Mauzer M.98]. In order to show the garrison and field service of German soldiers, I used the following handbooks: Transfeldts’ Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/191553, Eckart von Wurmb’s54, Wernigk’s55 and Carl Siwinna’s56.

43 D.V.E. Nr. 267, Felddienst Ordnungs (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1908). 44 D.V.E. Nr. 130, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1913). 45 D.V.E. Nr. 53, Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1910). 46 Hauptman Braun, Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1906). 47 Friedrich von Merkatz, Unterrichtsbuch für die Maschinengewehr-Kompagnien Gerät 08 (Berlin: Mittler, 1909). 48 Idem, Unterrichtsbuch für die Maschinengewehr-Kompagnien. Gerät 08 (Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1917). 49 Idem, New methods of machine-gun fire (Washington D.C.: The United States Infantry Association, 1916). 50 Józef Kwaciszewski, Karabin maszynowy Maxim 08 (Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy, 1924). 51 Tadeusz Felsztyn, Karabin piechoty Mauser (wzór 98) (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1921). 52 Sztab Generalny Oddział VII (Naukowy), Regulamin: Karabin Mauzera M. 98 (Warszawa: Nakładem M. Arcta, 1919). 53 Adolf Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915 (Berlin: Mittler, 1914). 54 Eckart von Wurmb, Major Max Menzels Dienstunterricht des deutschen Infanteristen. Jahrgang 1914–1915 (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1914). 55 Hugo Wernigk, Wernigks Handbuch für die Einjährig-Freiwilligen Offizier-Aspiranten und die Offiziere des Beurlaubtenstandes der Feldartillerie (Berlin: Mittler, 1914).

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As for an analysis of the weapons and the tactics of the French army, I used both tactical-level regulations and handbooks including Manuel du chef de section d’infanteries57, L’ecole du commandant du batterie, I partie: Canon 7558, Règlement sur les sections de mitrailleuses d’infanterie dotées de mitrailleuses sur affûts trépieds ou sur affûts trépieds 1907 type C et 1915 type omnibus59, an English translation of a French instruction manual published in the US: Manual for The Battery Commander Field Artillery 75-mm. GUN60 and Trench Mortar Emplacements Drawings. Specifications for No. 58-2 Emplacements type I and II61. In order to recreate the establishment of command positions in the 10th Infantry Division in 1914, I used German officer annuals62 which include various decorations as well as the dates of assuming positions. The Poznan´ address book: Adress-Buch der Residenzstadt Posen 191463 provided information on the commanders of the 10th Infantry Division who lived in Poznan´ at that time. Of key importance to the above mentioned subject were source publications written in the Interwar Period on the basis of German archive materials destroyed during WWII. One of them is a multi-volume work Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, edited and published by the Reichsarchive. The first volume: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen64 proved extremely helpful. In my analysis of the French operations in 1914 (opponents of the German 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corp.) of great assistance was a monumental source series Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, published in France in 1922–1939 and encompassing in total 107 volumes. It offers French 56 Carl Siwinna, Das Kommandobuch. Exerzierreglement für die Infanterie in Verbindung mit Felddienstordnung und Schießvorschrift. Nach besonderer Methode bearbeitet und durch 92 Zeichnungen, davon 61 mehrfarbige, und 2 Tafeln bildlich veranschaulicht nebst praktischen Winken für jüngere Offiziere, Offiziere des Beurlaubtenstandes, Offiziers-Aspiranten und Einjährig-Freiwillige (Berlin: Phönix-Verlag 1914). 57 Grand Quartier Général, Manuel du chef de section d’infanterie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1916). 58 Ecole militaire de l’artillerie, L’ecole du commandant du batterie, Ire Partie, Canon 75, 2e edition (Paris: Libraeirie Militaire Chapelot, 1916/1917). 59 Ministère de la Guerre, Règlement sur les sections de mitrailleuses d’infanterie dotées de mitrailleuses sur affûts trépieds ou sur affûts trépieds 1907 type C et 1915 type omnibus, Vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1916). 60 US Army War College, Manual for The Battery Commander Field Artillery 75-mm. GUN (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917). 61 US War Department, Manual for Trench Artillery United States Army (provisional), Part V, The 58 no. 2 Trench Mortar (Washington D.C.: War Plans Division, 1918). 62 Rangliste der Königlich Preußischen Armee und des XIII. (Königlich Württembergischen) Armeekorps für 1914 – Nach dem Stande vom 6. Mai 1914 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1914); Rangliste der Königlich Preußischen Armee und des XIII. (Königlich Württembergischen) Armeekorps für 1914 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1914). 63 Adress-Buch der Residenzstadt Posen 1914 (Posen: Verlag der Hofbuchdruckerei W. Decker, 1914). 64 Der Weltkrieg 1914, Bd. 1.

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documents from WWI including orders issued by staff of regiments, divisions, corps, division groups, fortified camps, armies, army groups and the French Headquarters. From this series, I made use of volume 1 – La guerre de movement (operations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 165; vol. 2: La manoeuvre en retraite et les préliminaires de la bataille de la Marne66; vol. 3: La bataille de la Marne, Annexes: vol. 267; volume 10 – Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 2: Divisions d’Infanterie, Divisions de Cavalerie68. In my analysis of the organisation, weapons and equipment at the disposal of the German infantry before 1914, I found B. Friedag’s work69 very useful together with Hermann Cron’s70 flagship work based on materials from the Reichsarchive. In the course of identifying the organisation of the German troops, including the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps, I turned to works of Martin Lezius, published in Germany in the Interwar Period and written on the basis of the documents collected in the Reichsarchive71. Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Grosse Krieges 1914–191872, published by the German Great General Staff in 1919, is a unique piece of work. It contains the chronology of the WWI battles and the structure of the German units involved (up to the level of a division). The publication also presents the composition of the specific operational relations in 1914–1918. The book proved extremely helpful in recreating the composition of the specific armies and affiliations of

65 Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre [further referred to as the AFGG], t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923). 66 AFGG, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 2: La manoeuvre en retraite et les préliminaires de la bataille de la Marne (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1925). 67 AFGG, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 3: La bataille de la Marne, Annexes: vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1927). 68 AFGG, t. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 2: Divisions d’Infanterie, Divisions de Cavalerie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1924). 69 Führer durch Heer und Flotte. Elfter Jahrgang 1914. Ausführliche Beschreibungen der Friedens- und der feldgrauen Ausmarschuniformen des Jahres 1914, Tabellen über die Bewaffnung der einzelnen Kontingente, Schiffslisten der Flotte, ed. B. Friedag (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Alfred Schall, 1913). 70 The first edition was published in 1923: Hermann Cron, Die Organisation des deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege. Dargestellt auf Grund der Kriegsakten, (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1923). I turned to the English edition from 2012: idem, Imperial German Army 1914–1918 (Solihull: Helion, 2012). 71 Martin Lezius, Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee, Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs (Berlin: Militär-Verlag, 1927); idem, Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee, Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs, Bd. 1 (Berlin: Militär-Verlag, 1932). 72 Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Großen Krieges 1914–1918. Quellenwerk, nach den amtlichen Bezeichnungen zusammengestellt vom Großen Generalstab (Berlin: H. Sack, 1919).

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33

army corps in 1914 as well as in tracing the careers of the commanders of the 10th Infantry Division. Equally unique is an analysis of the US military intelligence into 251 German divisions in WWI published in 192073. It contains the origins of the specific divisions, the course of the combat route and its chronology, the changes to the organizational structure, the key data on the subject obtained in the course of interrogating the POWs and an evaluation of the units’ fighting value. The work was useful in analysing and evaluating the German 10th Infantry Division and the units of the V Army Corps and the 5th Army. In the category of diaries and memoirs, I made use of Adam Ulrich’s unique records from 1914–1920, enriched by poems and sketches by Leon Prauzin´ski74. In 1914, the author was drafted into the 6th Regiment of Grenadiers; as a soldier of the 10th Infantry Division, he was a part of its combat route in the first year of the war. Of value were Adam Ulrich’s references to soldiers of Polish nationality serving in the German 10th Infantry Division, and to the soldiers’ perception and experience of the war. Arkady Fiedler was among the Poles who served in the V Army Corps during WWI. His memories of service in the Ammunition Column of the V Army Corps from 191475 and his account of the war experience as well as the Polish-German relations proved valuable for this book’s narration. Tadeusz Szulc was a physician in the 3rd Field Hospital of the V Army Corps in 1914. His memoirs76 from WWI, especially the part related to the first year of the conflict, are a valuable source of information about the Polish-German relations and the work of a frontline physician. Of special value are the memories of Doctor Wojciech Jacobson who, in August 1914, served as a battalion physician in the 49th Infantry regiment in the 4th Infantry Division. The regiment’s Gniezno garrison was already located in the area of the II Army Corps, which was a part of the 1st Army fighting in August 1914 in the northern part of the Western front. These memoirs, written on a high content-related level, proved to be a valuable source in the analysis of the relations between the German commanders and privates of Polish origin. A large number of them served in 1914 in the 49th Infantry Regiment. Doctor Wojciech Jacobson also presented in detail his work as a battalion physician on the front

73 Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918). Compiled from Records of Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces at General Headquarters (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920). 74 Prauzin´ski and Ulrich, W marszu. 75 Fiedler, Mój ojciec. 76 “Pierwsza wojna s´wiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918.”

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line in August 1914, which allowed me to analyse these issues with reference to the 10th Infantry Division77. G.A. Wron´ski’s78 memoirs are slightly less informative; the author showed the fate of a Polish soldier during WWI. He failed to state precisely which German unit of infantry the text pertained to. Following an analysis of the content and the described combat route, I deduced that the memoirs refer to the 2nd battalion of the 37th Reserve Infantry Regiment from the 10th Reserve Division of the V Reserve Battalion. While the text does not pertain to the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division, it was helpful in analysing the situation of the soldiers of Polish nationality in the German army in August 1914. A book by Erwin Rommel79 proved invaluable; in August 1914 he was commander of the 124th platoon of the Infantry Regiment in the 26th Infantry Division which at that time was a part of the Württemberg XIII Army Corps. On 22 August 1914, the regiment cooperated with the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division near E´the. As a result, it was possible to analyse the attempts of both divisions at cooperation in the battle. Rommel’s work can be approached both as memoirs and as a tactical handbook written on the basis of his own war experiences. Of key importance to the structure of this book were the regimental ledgers of the 10th Infantry Division encompassing WWI operations. Since in 1914–1918 these units made a name for themselves for bravery, in the Interwar Period the regimental ledgers were published in Germany of all the units of the 10th Infantry Division. These voluminous publications, often exceeding 600 pages, were written by the regiments’ officers who described also their own experiences. The authors made use of now non-existent documents from the pre-WWII resources of the Reichsarchive related to the specific regiments and the staff of the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps. They quoted many times archive documents and made use of their friends’ memoirs, diaries, accounts and letters. What is more, each volume is accompanied by maps and sketches of warfare operations, photographs and a list of casualties. All the regimental ledgers referred to below are well-written and rich sources of information. In the case of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the source was a book by Franz Döring von Gottberg80; Max Zunehmer81 devoted his work to the 46th Infantry Regiment. A ledger of the 47th Infantry Regiment was written by Gerhard Loosch82 while Otto Vogt83 de77 Jacobson, Z Armja˛. 78 Wron´ski, Pamie˛tniki. 79 Erwin Rommel, Infanterie greift an. Erlebnis und Erfahrung (Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter, 1942). 80 Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment. 81 Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment. 82 Loosch, Das Königl. 83 Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches.

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scribed the 50th Infantry Regiment. The units of the 77th Infantry Brigade which during peacetime was a part of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division were described by Hans von Altmann (the 37th Fusiliers Regiment84) and Walter Arens (the 155th Infantry Regiment85). In the case of the units of the 10th Artillery Brigade which in 1914 was a part of the 10th Infantry Division, Albert Benary86 described the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. Two authors: Konrad Angerstein and Paul Schlemm87 wrote a book on the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. In the Interwar Period, a book was written by Paul Koch88 for the 5th Pioneer Battalion whose two companies were included into the Poznan´ division. During the 1914 operations of the V Army Corps, the I division of the 5th Immobile Artillery Regiment was frequently included into the 10th Infantry Division; the regiment did not have a ledger in WWI. An anonymous author89 only provided a list of units which were parts of the regiment in 1914–1918. During the queries, I found numerous publications related to the history of the French units which fought against the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division in 1914. In this group, of greatest value is a tactical study carried out by general Edgard de Trentinian, commander of the French 7th Infantry Division90 which fought against the German 10th Infantry Division on 22 August 1914 at E´the and on 25 August 1914 at Marville. In 1923, colonel Alphons Grasset presented a five-part analysis of the battles of Éthe and Virton in the prestigious “Revue Militaire Francaise” published at that time in France91. In the Interwar Period, Grasset also published a detailed analysis of the fights in the form of a ledger – in 1927 about the battle of Éthe92 and in 1925, about the battle of Virton93. 84 Hans von Altmann, Das Füsilier-Regiment v. Steinmetz (Westpreußisches) Nr. 37: im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931). 85 Walter Arens, Das Königlich Preußische 7. Westpreuß. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 155 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1931). 86 Albert Benary, Königlich Preußisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1932). 87 Angerstein and Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche. 88 Koch, Das Niederschlesische. 89 Das Niederschlesische Fussartillerie-Regiment Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsformationen im Weltkrieg 1914/18, Berlin 1924. 90 Edgard de Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914 et la 7e Division du 4e Corps (10 Août au 22 Septembre 1914) (Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle, 1927). 91 Alphonse Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – I” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 25 (1923): 248–266; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – II” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 25 (1923): 390–412; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – III” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 5–26; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – IV” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 145–167; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – V” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 322–341. 92 Alphonse Grasset, La guerre en action: Le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Éthe (Paris: Berger-Levrault 1927).

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Of far smaller informative value are outlines of the history of the French 26th Field Artillery Regiment94, the 14th Hussar Regiment95 and the 315th Infantry Regiment96 which in August 1914 fought against the German 10th Infantry Division. Despite the strict censorship of the German military authorities imposed in the Province of Posen during WWI, I managed to include in this book several texts and obituaries published in Poznan´ newspapers: “Kurier Poznan´ski” and “Dziennik Poznan´ski”. In order to present the combat traditions of the division in question and the units of the Poznan´ V Army Corps from the time of the Prussian-French war (1870–1871), I turned to a valuable work authored by Stieler von Heydekampf 97. In my presentation of the strategic and operational dimensions of military activities in 1914 with respect to the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps, I made use of publications by Peter Hart98 and Erich Otto Volkmann99. An analysis of the French operational assumptions in 1914 was carried out with reference to a book by A.R. Doughty100. The border battle of August 1914 was presented in an interesting way by Erhard von Mutius101, Terence Zuber102 and E.B. Palat103. The cooperation between the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division with the Wurttemberg units is described in a book by Otto von Moser104. Julius Rebold’s105 work on the German troops taking fortresses and forts during WWI proved very

93 Idem, La guerre en action: le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Virton, vol. 2 (Paris: BergerLevrault, 1925). 94 Historique du 26e Régiment d’Artillerie de Campagne (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920). 95 Historique sommaire du 14e régiment de hussards. Campagne de 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918 (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920). 96 Boumier, Notice historique. Le 315e Régiment d’Infanterie (dans la Grande Guerre) (Mamers: 1920). 97 Stieler von Heydekampf, Das V. Armes-Corps im Kriege gegen Frankreich 1870–1871 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1872). 98 Peter Hart, I wojna ´swiatowa 1914–1918. Historia militarna. Polish translated by Jan Szkudlin´ski (Poznan´: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, 2014). First edition: Peter Hart, The Great War 1914–1918 (London: Profile Books, 2013). 99 Erich Otto Volkmann, Wielka wojna 1914–1918 (Os´wie˛cim: Napoleon V, 2013). 100 Robert A. Doughty, “French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own,” The Journal of Military History, no. 67 (2003): 427–454. 101 Erhard von Mutius, Die Schlacht Bei Longwy (Oldenburg: Verlag Stalling, 1919). 102 Terence Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914 (Brimscombe Port: The History Press, 2013). 103 Barthelémy Edmond Palat, La Grande guerre sur le front occidental, vol. 3: Batailles des Ardennes & de la Sambre (Paris: Chapelot, 1918). 104 Otto von Moser, Die Württemberger im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser A.G., 1928). 105 Julius Rebold, Die Festungskämpfe im Weltkriege (Zu¨ rich: Ges. f. militär. Bautechnik, 1938).

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valuable. In the context of the German cavalry during WWI, Alfred Satter’s106 publication was equally informative. As for the crimes of German troops in Belgium in August 1914, I turned to publications by Gunter Spraul107, Larry Zuckerman108, John Horne and Allan Kramer109 as well as Jeff Lipkes110. The service of soldiers of Polish nationality in the German army is well presented in works by Prof. Alexander Watson111, Prof. Waldemar Rezmer112, Prof. Ryszard Kaczmarek113 and Jens Boysen114. When reconstructing the organisation of the German troops during WWI, I turned to a collection of several volumes by Jürgen Kraus and others on the infantry units115, reserve units and Landwher116, secondary troops and field recruit centres117, machine-gun units118 and field artillery units119. As for the organisation of the German army during WWI, valuable information was provided in a three-volume collection on the higher echelons of

106 Alfred Satter, Die deutsche Kavallerie im ersten Weltkrieg: Fachbuch zur Neueren Geschichte (Norderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH, 2004). 107 Gunter Spraul, Der Franktireurkrieg 1914: Untersuchungen zum Verfall einer Wissenschaft und zum Umgang mit nationalen Mythen (Berlin: Frank und Timme Verlag, 2016). 108 Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I (New York: New York University Press, 2004). 109 John Horne and Allan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 2001). 110 Jeff Lipkes, Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914 (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2007). 111 Alexander Watson, “Fighting for Another Fatherland: The Polish Minority in the German Army, 1914–1918,” English Historical Review, no. 126 (2010): 1138–1139. 112 Waldemar Rezmer, “Polacy w korpusie oficerskim armii niemieckiej w I wojnie s´wiatowej (1914–1918),” in Społeczen´stwo polskie na ziemiach pod panowaniem pruskim w okresie I wojny ´swiatowej (1914–1918): zbiór studiów, ed. Mieczysław Wojciechowski (Torun´: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1996), 137–148. 113 Kaczmarek, Polacy w Armii Kajzera. 114 Jens Boysen, Preußische Armee und polnische Minderheit. Royalistische Streitkräfte im Kontext der Nationalitätenfrage des 19. Jahrhunderts (1815–1914) (Marburg: Herder-Institut, 2008). 115 Jürgen Kraus, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VI: Infanterie, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2007). 116 Jürgen Kraus and Gerhard Bauer, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VI: Infanterie, Bd. 2: Reserve- und Landwehr-Infanterie (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2012). 117 Idem, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VI: Infanterie, Bd. 3: Ersatztruppen und Feld-Rekrutendepots (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2013). 118 Jürgen Kraus, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VII: Maschinengewehrtruppen, Bd. 2 (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2014). 119 Jürgen Kraus and Gerhard Bauer, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil IX: Feldartillerie, Bd. 1: Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918 (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2007).

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commanders120, active infantry regiments121 and active units of the artillery, cavalry, pioneers and supply trains122 written by Günter Wegner. Edward Buat123 wrote a book about the organization of German troops before 1914 and in the course of mobilization; it was extremely helpful in analysing the categories and modes of service. Here I have also made use of a book by Steven E. Clemente124. Steven D. Jackman125 has written an article on the famous “Prussian drill” and offensive tactics of the German infantry in 1871–1914; the text proved useful in analysing the training and tactics in the 10th Infantry Division. Equally interesting was an article by Prof. Alexander Watson on volunteers in the German army during WWI126. Two monumental works by Prof. Alexander Watson, analysing German troops during WWI127 were extremely inspiring in the area of battle and morale. In the course of analysing the careers of the generals, commanders of the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps I turned to a two-volume work by Hans Möller, published in 1935, on the winners of the Pour le Mérite order128. Equally valuable was a three-volume publication of Karl Friedrich Hildebrand

120 Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 1: Die höheren Kommandostellen 1815–1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1990). 121 Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2. 122 Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 3: Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Regimenter, Bataillone und Abteilungen von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis zum 26. August 1939 Kavallerie, Artillerie, Pioniere, Train, Kraftfahr und Fahr Abteilungen, Panzertruppe, Ver⌐kehrstruppen und Nachrichten Abteilungen (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1993). 123 Edward Buat, Wojsko niemieckie podczas wojny ´swiatowej 1914–1918. Chwile wielkos´ci i upadku. Działania na liniach wewne˛trznych, translated by: Edmund, Waliszewski (Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy, 1923). The first French edition: Edmond Buat, L’Armée allemande pendant la guerre de 1914–1918, grandeur et décadence, manœuvres en lignes intérieures (Paris: Librairie Chapelot, 1920). 124 Steven E. Clemente, For King and Kaiser! The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860– 1914 (Greenwood Press: New York, 1992). 125 Steven D. Jackman, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and “Old Prussian Drill” in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871–1914,” The Journal of Military History, no. 68 (2004): 73–104. 126 Alexander Watson, “For Kaiser and Reich”: The Identity and Fate of the German Volunteers 1914–1918,” War in History, no. 1 (2005): 44–74. 127 Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 128 Hans Möller, Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens “Pour le Mérite” im Weltkrieg, Bd. 1–2 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935).

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and Christian Zweng129. Hugo Sommer’s130 book provides also valuable information on the commanders of the V Army Corps. In explaining issues related to the German troops during WWI of value was an encyclopaedia edited by Gerhard Hirschfeld, Georg Krumeich and Irina Renz131. While describing the equipment and uniforms of German soldiers in 1914, I made use of a large iconographic publication by Jürgen Kraus132 in which he analysed the uniforms and equipment of German troops on the basis of the artefacts displayed in German museums133. In my analysis of the German artillery I used information from a book by Herbert Jäger134; information on machine guns was provided in a book by Frederick Victor Longstaff and Atteridge A. Hilliard135. In my analysis of the structure of the Mauser Gewehr 98, a German infantry machine gun, I relied on a book by Martin Helebrant136. Infantry mortars are thoroughly covered in an article by Hans Rudolf von Stein137 while the French artillery is well described by Bruce Gudmundsson138. In the realm of German awards from the time of the Prussian reunification wars of 1864–1817 and WWI, I relied on works by Louis Schneider139, Jörg Nimmergut140, Werner Otto Hütte141 and Wiesław Bon´czy-Tomaszewski142. 129 Karl Friedrich Hildebrand and Christian Zweng, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 1: A–G (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1999); Idem, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 2: H–O (Bissendorf: Biblio-Verlag, 2003); Idem, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 3: P–Z (Bissendorf: Biblio-Verlag, 2011). 130 Hugo Sommer, Das Generalkommando in Posen von 1815–1918 (Posen: Verlag der Hiftorifchen Gefellfchaft für Pofen, 1930). 131 Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg. 132 Jürgen Kraus, Die deutsche Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg. Uniformierung und Ausrüstung – 1914 bis 1918 (Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2004). 133 Laurent Mirouze, World War I Infantry in Colour Photographs (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press Ltd, 1999). 134 Herbert Jäger, German Artillery of World War One (Ramsbury: Crowood, 2001). 135 Frederick Victor Longstaff and Hilliard A. Atteridge, The Book of the Machine Gun (London: H. Rees ltd., 1917). 136 Wolfgang Fleischer, Deutsche Handgranaten 1914–1945 (Wölfersheim–Berstadt: PodzunPallas Verlag, 1998). 137 Hans Rudolf von Stein, “Die Minenwerfer-Formationen 1914–1918,” Zeitschrift für Heeres und Uniformkunde, no. 165 (1959): 90–96. 138 Bruce Gudmundsson, “The French Artillery in the First World War”, in King of Battle: Artillery in World War I, ed. Sanders, Marble (Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2015), 62–100. 139 Louis Schneider, Der Königliche Kronen-Orden (Berlin: Duncker, 1871). 140 Jörg Nimmergut and Anke Nimmergut, Deutsche Orden und Ehrenzeichen 1800–1945 (Regenstauf: Battenberg, 2019). 141 Werner Otto Hütte, Die Geschichte des Eisernen Kreuzes und seine Bedeutung für das preußische und deutsche Auszeichnungswesen von 1813 bis zur Gegenwart (Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1967). 142 Wiesław Bon´cza-Tomaszewski, Kodeks orderowy. Przepisy obowia˛zuja˛ce posiadaczy orderów, odznaczen´, medali i odznak (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1939).

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Introduction

Professors Witold Jakóbczyk143, Witold Molik144, Janusz Karwat145, Antoni Czubin´ski146, Stanisław Borowski147, Lech Trzeciakowski148 and Stanisław Wachowiak149 provided background information of value to the narration on the situation of Polish citizens during WWI in the Poznan´ Province. In my analysis of the barracks infrastructure of the garrisons of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division before 1914 I appreciated the work by Jacek Biesiadka, Andrzej Gawlak, Szymon Kucharski and Mariusz Wojciechowski150 and the book by Miron Urbaniak151. As for the history of the Poznan´ garrison during WWI, I have published texts in “Kronika Miasta Poznania” and “Bellona” quarterly. The texts were related to the building of the headquarters of the V Arms Corps and its generals in 1889– 1918152, military activities on the part of the V Army Corps in 1914–1918153 and the participation of the 10th Infantry Division in the battle of Éthe154. These texts were the starting point of further detailed analyses which led to writing this monograph. *** I am much obliged to Prof. Alexander Watson from Goldsmiths, University of London, an eminent researcher and expert in WWI, author of the monumental

143 Witold Jakóbczyk, Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski, vol. 3: 1890–1914 (Poznan´: Pan´stwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1967). 144 Witold Molik, Z˙ycie codzienne ziemian´stwa w Wielkopolsce w XIX i na pocza˛tku XX wieku: kultura materialna (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 1999). 145 Janusz Karwat, Od idei do czynu. Mys´l i organizacje niepodległos´ciowe w Poznan´skiem w latach 1887–1919 (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 2002). 146 Antoni Czubin´ski, Powstanie Wielkopolskie 1918–1919. Geneza – charakter – znaczenie (Wydawnictwo Kurpisz S. A.: Poznan´, 2002). 147 Stanisław Borowski, “Ludnos´c´” in Dzieje Wielkopolski, vol. 2: Lata 1793–1918, ed. Witold Jakóbczyk (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 1973) 148 Lech Trzeciakowski, “Zabór pruski na przełomie epok,” Dzieje Najnowsze, no. 3 (2004), 79– 94. 149 Stanisław Wachowiak, Polacy w Nadrenii i Westfalii (Poznan´: Nakładem Zjednoczenia Zawodowego Polskiego, 1917). 150 Jacek Biesiadka and Andrzej Gawlak and Szymon Kucharski and Mariusz Wojciechowski, Twierdza Poznan´. O fortyfikacjach miasta Poznania w XIX i XX wieku (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Rawelin, 2006). 151 Miron Urbaniak, Leszczyn´skie koszary z lat 1901–1905 na planach budowlanych Archiwum Pan´stwowego w Lesznie (Leszno: Archiwum Pan´stwowe, 2012). 152 Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “Dowództwo V Korpusu Armijnego, jego siedziba i generałowie w latach 1889–1918,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2015): 99–121. 153 Idem, “V Korpus Armijny na froncie zachodnim I Wojny S´wiatowej,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 95–117. 154 Idem, “10 Dywizja Piechoty w bitwie pod Éthe (22–23 sierpnia 1914 roku),” Kwartalnik Bellona, no. 4 (2016): 68–83.

Introduction

41

works Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914–1918155 and Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918156 for his academic inspiration and consultation on archive sources. Equally valuable, especially in the realm of operations, tactics, military terminology and topography were reflections and comments of the Polish Army officers: Colonel Grzegorz Kaliciak, Colonel Wojciech Fiderek and Lieutenant Colonel Waldemar Kwiatkowski. I am extremely grateful to them for reading painstakingly the entire text and indicating elements which needed correction. I would also like to thank Prof. Przemysław Matusik, Ph.D., for a discussion of the research method adopted in the book aimed at evaluating the casualties in the 10th Infantry Division in 1914. His opinion was confirmation that I had taken the right path in my research. I am also very grateful to Prof. Łukasz Róz˙ycki, Ph.D. and Dariusz Rodziewicz, Ph.D., for numerous hours of conversation and reflections on the episodes related to the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division in 1914–1918, their careful reading of the text and comments on it. I am equally grateful to Prof. Józef Dobosz, Ph.D., head of the Faculty of History of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan´, sponsor of the book’s translation into English. I am also very grateful to my family, who demonstrated understanding and patience while I faced the challenges typical of researchers and writers. This book is a result of many years of research and analysis, as well as considerable expenditure. I am therefore hopeful that the effect of my efforts will fulfil the readers’ expectations.

155 Watson, Ring of Steel. 156 Idem, Enduring the Great War.

Chapter 1. Organisation and Traditions by 1914

In 1820, the Prussian 10th Infantry Division was formed in Poznan´; the city was expected to remain its garrison until December 1918. During the conflicts accompanying German unification (the Second Schleswig War of 1864, the AustroPrussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871), the regiments of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division made a name for themselves for bravely and effectively carrying out orders. Charismatic Prussian commanders like General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, led German and Polish soldiers to victory. After the Austro-Prussian War, the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division were officially referred to as the “Náchod Lions” or, casually, the Kaczmarek-Regiments due to their large number of soldiers of Polish origin. Due to the location of the Province of Posen on the eastern outskirts of the German Empire and the city of Poznan´ as a front garrison, the units of V Army Corps including the 10th Infantry Division faced the task of ensuring safety in this strategic area. One could entertain the hypothesis that this was the reason why the most talented (Prussian) colonels and generals were sent to Poznan´, which hosted the headquarters of the V Army Corps, the headquarters and the staff of the 10th Infantry Division, as well as four out of five brigades of the division. Among the officials were Generals Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, Friedrich von Bernhardi157, William Balck158, Hermann von Strantz and Robert Kosch. 157 Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849–1930) was a German officer, a cavalry general, military historian and writer. In 1898–1901 he was in charge of the Division of Military History in the Great General Staff where he co-devised the operational plan for an attack on France, known predominantly as Schlieffen’s Plan. He was involved in historical and military studies in the realm of strategy and Germany’s international security. In 1912, he published a famous book entitled Germany and the Next War (German: Deutschland und der nächste Krieg). There, he supported the thesis that in order to become a world power, Germany needed to defeat France, establish a Central European Alliance of countries under the leadership of Germany and acquired new colonies. A war was imperative for accomplishing these goals as a tool shaping the future. His book was widely discussed and translated into French and English; it was published in France, Great Britain and the US (1914). Before 1914, the assumption was that these opinions set the direction of Germany’s strategic policy. As war broke out in

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This hypothesis may be confirmed by the fact that all the commanders in charge of the German 10th Infantry Division during WWI were decorated with the most prestigious German order: the Pour le Mérite. Notably, it was awarded very rarely: between 1914 and 1918, barely 687 soldiers received it (including 122 orders with oak leaves)159.

August 1914, Bernhardi came out of retirement and was appointed deputy chief commander of the V Army Corps headquartered in Poznan´. He occupied this position until 4 September 1915 when he was relocated to the Eastern front. On 20 August 1916 he was awarded the Pour le Mérite for commanding the Army Group during the Brusilov Offensive in the summer of 1916 and for stabilizing the frontline. Walther Hubatsch, “Friedrich Adam Julius von Bernhardi,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, Bd. 2 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1955), 122; Karl Friedrich Hildebrand and Christian Zweng, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 1: A–G (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1999), 101–103; Hans Möller, Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens “Pour le Mérite” im Weltkrieg, Bd. 1 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 81–83; Hugo Sommer, Das Generalkommando in Posen von 1815–1918 (Posen: Verlag der Hiftorifchen Gefellfchaft für Pofen, 1930), 100–101; I presented the career of Friedrich von Bernhardi, cavalry general, for the first time in the article Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “Dowództwo V Korpusu Armijnego, jego siedziba i generałowie w latach 1889–1918,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2015): 109–112. 158 William Balck (1858–1942): a German officer, general lieutenant, prominent military theoretician and writer. As a military major, he was appointed on 16 October 1906 in Poznan´ staff commander of Graf Kirchbach’s 46th Infantry Regiment; on 27 January 1907, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and on 27 January 1910 to lieutenant. For his wartime merits, on 9 March 1918 he received the Pour le Mérite medal. He published 16 original works on military science and he co-authored 8 other books (according to the Deutschen Nationalbibliothek). His most important works include a 10-volume series devoted to tactics. In 1906–1910, during his military service in Poznan´, he wrote a volume on infantry tactics, published in Belin in 1908. In 1910 the book, like most of his works, was translated into English and published in the US. After WWI general William Balck published his considerations on war tactics in Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege (Development of Tactics in the World War), translated into Polish and published in Warsaw in 1921 The preface to the Polish edition was written by Tadeusz Kutrzeba, lieutenant colonel of the General Staff. In 1922, the second edition of the work was published in Berlin; the English translation was published in Fort Leavenworth, a doctrinal laboratory of the US Land Forces. William Balck, Taktik, Volume 1: Einleitung und formale Taktik der Infanterie (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1908); Idem, Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1922). Polish translation: Idem, Rozwój taktyki w cia˛gu wielkiej wojny, translated by Tadeusz Róz˙ycki (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1921). Idem, Development of Tactics – World War (Fort Leavenworth: General Service Schools Press, 1922); Balck, Hermann. “Balck, Konrad Friedrich August Henry William”, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, ed. Bd. 1 (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1953), 547; Karl Friedrich Hildebrand and Christian Zweng, Bd. 1, 34–36. 159 The Pour le Mérite order was established in 1740 by King Frederick II of Prussia as the most prestigious Prussian military medal (after 1871, also in the German Empire) which is awarded as a military class and civilian class. The left side of the cross bears blue-coloured enamel. For this reason, during WWI the order was informally referred to as “The Blue Max”. Oak leaves marked a higher class of the order. Following the abdication of Wilhelm, German Crown Prince, the military class of the medal became extinct. Enzyklopädie Erster

Organisation of the Division

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Organisation of the Division Before 1914, the administrative borders of the Province of Posen were marked differently than the limits of the military administration of the V Army Corps. This is because only a part of the Province of Posen, namely the Posen region (German Regierungsbezirk Posen), was located within the V Army Corps area with headquarters in Poznan´ where units of the 10th Infantry Division were stationed160. The northern part of the Province of Posen, i. e. the Bydgoszcz region (German Regierungsbezirk Bromberg), encompassing Gniezno and Wa˛growiec, reported to the II Army Corps with headquarters in Szczecin (German Stettin)161. On the other hand, the western outskirts of the V Army Corps area was occupied by the Legnica region (German Regierungsbezirk Liegnitz), the northwestern part of the Silesia Province (German Provinz Schlesien) i. e. Lower Silesia. In the Legnica region the 9th Infantry Division was stationed, the second large tactical formation of the Poznan´ V Army Corps162. The shift of area of the V Army Corps to the south of the limits of the Province of Posen was anything but accidental; it was a well-thought move of the Prussian military authority, with the aim of reducing the number of soldiers of Polish origin in the Poznan´ V Army Corps. This may be explained by presenting the nationality structure of the Province of Posen, inhabited in 1910 by 2.1 million people; Poles represented 61.5% of them, Germans only 38.5%163. If the civil and the military limits had been the same, the percentage of the Polish soldiers in the V Army Corps (most of them privates) would have amounted to over 50%, after excluding officers and non-commissioned officers of German nationality. Therefore, the aim of excluding the Bydgoszcz region from the Corps and including the Legnica area was one of depolonisation. As a result, following mo-

160 161 162

163

Weltkrieg, ed. Gerhard, Hirschfeld and Gerd, Krumeich and Irina Renz (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004), 757. Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 1: Die höheren Kommandostellen 1815–1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1990), 52–55, 103–104. Rangliste der Königlich Preußischen Armee und des XIII. (Königlich Württembergischen) Armeekorps für 1914 – Nach dem Stande vom 6. Mai 1914 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1914), 4, 66–69, 133–134. Erhard von Mutius, Die Schlacht Bei Longwy (Oldenburg: Verlag Stalling, 1919), 75; Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “V Korpus Armijny na froncie zachodnim I Wojny S´wiatowej,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 95–117; Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918). Compiled from Records of Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces at General Headquarters (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 167; Hermann Cron, Imperial German Army 1914–1918 (Solihull: Helion, 2012), 314–315. Stanisław Borowski, “Ludnos´c´” in Dzieje Wielkopolski, vol. 2: Lata 1793–1918, ed. Witold Jakóbczyk (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 1973), 361–373.

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bilisation in August 1914, the percentage of Poles in the Poznan´ V Army Corps amounted to 30–40%164. Due to the strategic location of the Province of Posen, a polygonal fortress was built in Poznan´ in 1828–1869. Consequently, it gained strategic importance in the Prussian military system and, together with the fortresses of Królewiec and Torun´, it represented the first line of defence against Russian troops. Following the dynamic growth of artillery in the second half of the 19th century, the defence potential of the polygonal fortress was seriously limited. As a result, in 1871–1910 a large part of it was taken down and replaced by a modern fortress made up of 18 forts coupled with modern artillery equipment and nearly 200 bunkers. However, Fort Winiary, built in 1828–1842 as part of the polygonal fortress and located on Winiary hill, remained the heart of the Poznan´ fortress. To its south was located a retrenchment (German Kernwerk) containing barracks for the infantry battalion and a warehouse towering majestically over the city. In the late 19th century, the Poznan´ fortress was among the biggest fortifications in Europe165. In 1815, Poznan´ welcomed the staff of the V Army Corps, one of eight army corps in Prussia formed in that time. The importance of the Poznan´ garrison grew gradually, and with it the number of soldiers, which in 1848 amounted to 3,000. Shortly before announcing mobilisation in August 1914, the number reached 15,000166. After 5 November 1816, a Prussian brigade was stationed in Poznan´ which served as the core of the 9th Infantry Division, formed on 5 September 1818. On 26 June 1820, the unit was renamed the 10th Infantry Division, with headquarters and staff in Poznan´. The history of the division, until the outbreak of Wielkopolska uprising in December 1918, was intrinsically connected with the Poznan´ garrison. In 1820–1914, the organisational structure of the 10th Infantry Division was changed five times. The battalions of the specific regiments were scattered through the cities of the Poznan´ region until August 1914. The Prussian military authorities faced a considerable logistical challenge of providing suitable accommodation conditions for the privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. This held true also for the training infrastructure: fire ranges for the infantry and artillery, riding arenas, riding halls and exercise quarters. The condition of the barracks in the Poznan´ garrison was satisfactory a few years prior to the outbreak of WWI. In remote regions the situation was worse. The barracks of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment in Wrzes´nia (stationed there from 164 I established this following an analysis of casualties in the 10th Infantry Division in 1914. 165 Jacek Biesiadka and Andrzej Gawlak and Szymon Kucharski and Mariusz Wojciechowski, Twierdza Poznan´. O fortyfikacjach miasta Poznania w XIX i XX wieku (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Rawelin, 2006), 20–32, 45–49. 166 Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 60–61.

Organisation of the Division

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1 October 1902) was a case of accommodation shortages; the barracks were constructed in stages, where brick buildings coexisted with structures made from corrugated iron167. In 1820–1852, the composition of the Poznan´ division was as follows: the 10th Infantry Brigade (soon after renamed the 19th Infantry Brigade), the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 10th Infantry Brigade of Landwehr. After 1852, the 10th Infantry Division encompassed the 19th Infantry Brigade, the 20th Infantry Brigade and the 10th Cavalry Brigade168. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division consisted of the 19th and the 20th Infantry Brigades. The 19th Infantry Brigade included the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the 46th Infantry Regiment. The 20th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 50th Infantry Regiment and the 37th Fusilier Regiment. The division cavalry was represented by the 14th Dragoon Regiment. During WWI, the 10th Infantry Division did not have an organic artillery brigade; this type of firearms was represented by the III division of the 5th Field Artillery Regiment consisting of two batteries of heavy cannons and two batteries of light cannons. The division’s support units included also the 2nd Medical Unit consisting of the 3rd and the 4th Field Hospitals, the 2nd Food Supplies Column and the sapper and mine columns169. In 1897–1899, the 77th Infantry Brigade was incorporated into the division. After 1899, the 10th Infantry Division assumed its ultimate organisation which survived until mobilisation in 1914170. Among the units of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division was the 10th Infantry Brigade which, after 1820, included the 6th and the 19th Infantry Regiments171. After 1822, the brigade consisted of the 18th Infantry Regiment172 and the 19th Infantry Regiment. Since the origin of the 10th Infantry Division, its regiments attracted a large number of Poles from the Grand Duchy of Posen (after 1848, the Prussians illicitly changed the name to the Province of Posen). Among these units was the 19th Infantry Regiment, whose three battalions were stationed for 167 Idem, Pruskie garnizony wojskowe w Poznan´skiem, Prusach Zachodnich i na Górnym S´la˛sku, edition and translation Jarosław Pawlikowski (Os´wie˛cim 2011), 6. First german edtion: Hugo Sommer, Preussische militärische Standorte im Posener Lande, in Westpreussen und Oberschlesien (Posen: Verlag der Historischen Gesellschaft für Posen, 1933). 168 Wegner, Bd. 1, 103–104. 169 Stieler von Heydekampf, Das V. Armes-Corps im Kriege gegen Frankreich 1870–1871 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1872) 235–237. 170 Wegner, Bd. 1, 103–104. 171 Hugo Sommer, Die Stadt Posen als preußischer Truppenstandort von 1815 bis 1918 (Poznan´: Drukarnia Concordia, 1928), 4, 7. More on the regiment in Max Schubert, Infanterie-Regiment von Courbiére (2. Posensches) Nr. 19 (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1922). 172 More on the regiment in Werner Meyer, Das Infanterie-Regiment von Grolman (1. Posensches) Nr. 18 im Weltkriege (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929).

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many years in Poznan´. When the November Uprising broke out in 1830, the Poznan´ 19th Infantry Regiment was ordered to immediately march out to Saxony. The Prussian staff were afraid that the Polish soldiers would desert and join the Polish uprising. In order to reduce the threat, in August 1831 the regiment was ordered to transfer from Saxony to the Rhineland. The unit returned from “exile” in Koblenz to Poznan´ as late as on 12 November 1836. In 1848, during the Revolutions of 1848, the commanders of the V Army Corps were yet again dubious about the loyalty of the soldiers of Polish nationality serving in the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division. For this reason, the location of the regiments was temporarily changed173. After 1849, the structure of the 10th Infantry Brigade was changed again by incorporating the 5th and the 8th Infantry Regiments. In 1851, the 10th Infantry Brigade included the 6th and the 11th Infantry Regiments. On 29 April 1852, the 10th Infantry Brigade was renamed the 19th Infantry Brigade; by 1854 it included the 6th Infantry Regiment and the 18th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr. In 1855– 1859, the organisational structure of the brigade consisted of the 7th Infantry Regiment and the 18th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr. In 1860–1867, when reforms were introduced to the Prussian army, the composition of the 19th Infantry Brigade changed. As part of the aforementioned reforms, on 4 July 1860 the 6th Infantry Regiment was transformed into the 6th Grenadier Regiment, whose full name was the 1st Western Prussian Grenadier Regiment no. 6 (1. Westpreuβisches Grenadier–Regiment Nr. 6)174. On 5 May 1860, the 46th Infantry Regiment was formed, which in early July was named the 1. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 46175. Thereafter, the 19th Brigade consisted of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the 46th Infantry Regiment and the 18th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr (1. Posensches Landwehr-Regiment Nr. 18). In 1868–1889, the brigade was reinforced by the 58th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr (3. Posensches 173 Biesiadka, Gawlak, Kucharski, Wojciechowski, 240. 174 Before the outbreak of WWI, double numbers and regional names prevailed in the names of German infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments. A case in point is the 6th Grenadier Regiment. Since 1899, the unit’s full name was 1. Westpreusiches Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf Nr. 6. The first digit indicated the number of the regiment in the federal state and referred to its historical origin: 1. Westpreusiches (1st West-Prussian) while the second digit was the regiment’s number in the general military system of the German Empire, in this case no. 6. The system was complicated and not very clear. For this reason, when the war broke out, the system was abandoned and new general military numbers were introduced. Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 34; Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 2: Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie Regimenter sowie Jäger und MG Bataillone, Wehrbezirkskommandos und Ausbildungsleiter von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis 1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1992), 58; Rangliste, 168; Sommer, Die Stadt Posen, 15. 175 Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 149–150; Sommer, Die Stadt Posen, 15.

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Landwehr-Regiment Nr. 58)176. As of 16 June 1871, the 46th Infantry Regiment’s chief 177 was Graf Hugo von Kirchbach, General of the Infantry178. In 1889, the 6th Grenadier Regiment stationed in Poznan´, was appointed a chief – Graf Kleist von Nollendorf. From then on, the official full name of the regiment was the Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6. In 1889, the name of the 46th Infantry Regiment was changed to the InfanterieRegiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46179.

176 More on the regiment in Walter Schmidt, Das Königlich Preußische 3. Posensche InfanterieRegiment Nr. 58 im Weltkriege (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1934). 177 The regiment’s chiefs – in the second half of the 19th century and during WWI – were honorary functions in the infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments of the Prussian (German) army. Regiment chiefs were monarchs: Prussian (German) and of other countries, both the ruling and historical monarchs. Regiment chiefs were also distinguished Prussian (German) generals. Epaulettes of uniform jackets and coats of the specific regiments sported monograms referring to the chief; in the case of a monarch, a crown was placed above the monogram. 178 Max Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 35; Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 99–100; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 149. 179 Friedrich Graf Kleist von Nollendorf was born on 9 April 1762 in Berlin into a Prussian Junker family (von Kleist). In 1778, he joined the Prussian army where he served during the Wars of the Bavarian Succession and the French revolution wars. For his military merits, on 4 December 1792 he was awarded the Pour le Mérite when he was barely 20 years old. In 1799, he was promoted to major and was commander of a battalion in the 13th “von Arnim” Infantry Regiment. In the Prussian army, he fought in the Napoleonic Wars and fought in the battle of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806. In 1808 he was promoted to general major and was appointed commander of the Lower Silesian Infantry Brigade in Frankfurt (Oder). In 1809 he was commandant of Berlin. He took part in the campaign against Russia in 1812. In 1813, as lieutenant general, he was in charge of a corps and fought in the battles of Kulm and Leipzig. In 1814, he was awarded the hereditary title of count “von Nollendorf” for his key role in the battles of Kulm and Nollendorf (now Naklérˇov in the north-western part of the Czech Republic). He was in charge of the Prussian II Army Corps during the blockade of the Erfurt Principality. In early 1914, he and his corps entered France, where he was allocated to von Blücher’s Army. Later on, he was in charge of the corps in the battle of Laon and the storming of Paris. After the war he was promoted to infantry general. During the Hundred Days War he was appointed corps commander in Lower Rhineland. In 1821 he was promoted to field marshal (German Generalfeldmarschall). He died in Berlin on 17 February 1823. Wilhelm II decided to commemorate Friedrich Graf Kleist von Nollendorf: on 27 January 1899 the 6th Grenadier Regiment was named “Graf Kleist von Nollendorf”. Günter Richter, “Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich Graf,” in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Bd. 12 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot): 27–28; Ferdinand Freiherr von Meerheimb, “Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, ed. Rochus Freiherr von Liliencron, Bd. 16 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1882), 124–127; More on field marshal. Friedrich Graf Kleist von Nollendorf in Georg von Kleist, Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Grafen Kleist von Nollendorf.Geschichte des Geschlechts von Kleist, Part 3: Biographien bis 1880 (Bergisch Gladbach: 2015); Gottberg, 16; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 1, 242–243.

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Organisation and Traditions by 1914

When on 4 May 1852, the headquarters and the staff of the 20th Infantry Brigade were established in Poznan´, by 1854 they included the 11th Infantry Regiment and the 19th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr. In 1855–1859, the composition of the brigade included the 10th Infantry Regiment and the 19th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr. In 1860–1864, changes were made to the organisational structure of the Poznan´ 20th Infantry Brigade. It was made up of the 12th Grenadier Regiment (2. Brandenburgisches Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 12), the 59th Infantry Regiment (4. Posensches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 59)180 and the 19th Infantry Regiment of the Landwehr (2. Posensches Landwehr-Regiment Nr. 19). In the course of the military reforms, on 5 May 1860 the 47th Infantry Regiment was formed and on 4 July 1860 it was officially named the 2. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 47. After 1864, all three battalions of the regiment were stationed alternately in the Poznan´ Garrison. Together with the 47th Infantry Regiment, the 50th Infantry Regiment was formed and soon incorporated into the structure of the 20th Infantry Brigade. After 4 July 1860, the regiment’s official name was the 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50181. Following the reforms, in 1865–1866 the 20th Brigade included the 47th Infantry Regiment, the 52nd Infantry Regiment (6. Brandenburgisches InfanterieRegiment Nr. 52), the 59th Infantry Regiment and the 19th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr. In 1867, the 20th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 37th Fusiliers Regiment (Westfälisches Füsilier-Regiment Nr. 37), the 50th Infantry Regiment and the 19th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr. The subsequent changes to the structure of the 20th Infantry Brigade took place in 1868–1881, when it consisted of the 37th Fusiliers Regiment, the 50th Infantry Regiment, the 19th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr and the 59th Infantry Regiment of Landwehr (4. Posensches Landwehr-Regiment Nr. 59). While in 1881–1887 the brigade was supported by the 99th Infantry Regiment, in 1887–1889 the regiment was excluded from the brigade. On 18 September 1886, the chief of the 47th Infantry Regiment was Luitpold, Prince Regent of Bavaria, General of the Infantry. On 6 November 1913, field marshal Ludwig III of Bavaria was appointed its commander. From then on, the full official name of the regiment was Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 47. In 1889–1890, the 20th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 37th Fusiliers Regiment and the 47th Infantry Regiment. After 1899, the 20th Brigade included only the 47th and the 50th Infantry Regiments182.

180 More on the regiment in Wilhelm Reichert, Das Infanterie-Regiment Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen (4. Posensches) Nr. 59 im Weltkriege 1914/18 (Potsdam: Stein, 1930). 181 Sommer, Die Stadt Posen, 17. 182 Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 151–152, 155–157; Idem, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 1, 244–245.

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The staff and the headquarters of the 10th Brigade of the Field Artillery were formed on 23 December 1867 as the 10th Artillery Brigade. In 1872, its name was changed to the 10th Field Artillery Brigade. In 1872–1874 it consisted of the 5th Regiment of Field Artillery (Niederschlesisches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 5) and the 5th Regiment of Fortress Artillery (Niederschlesisches FestungsartillerieRegiment Nr. 5)183. In 1872, the batteries of the 5th Regiment of Field Artillery formed in Poznan´ the 20th Regiment of Field Artillery. Its I division was stationed in Poznan´, the II in Głogów and, since 1890, the III and IV divisions were stationed in Leszno. After 1874, the 10th Brigade consisted of the 5th Regiment of Field Artillery and the 20th Regiment of Field Artillery which from then on was referred to as “Poznanian” while its official name was Posensches FeldartillerieRegiment Nr. 20. After 1893, the brigade was merged with the 5th Supply Train Battalion (Niederschlesisches Train-Bataillon Nr. 5). On 25 March 1899, the III and IV divisions of the 20th Regiment of Field Artillery, stationed in Leszno, formed the 56th Regiment of Field Artillery. In 1889, the 10th Field Artillery Brigade was incorporated into the 10th Infantry Division consisting of the 20th and the 56th Field Artillery Regiments. On 27 January 1902, following incorporation of the 10th Infantry Division, both regiments received Prussian numbers and the “Poznanian” designation. The new name of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20, and of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment – 2. Posensches Feld-Artillerie-Regiment Nr. 56184. In 1816, Poznan´ saw the formation of a cavalry brigade which on 22 February 1820 was named the 10th Cavalry Brigade. In 1820–1832, it consisted of the 7th Hussar Regiment (Westpreuβisches 7. Husaren-Regiment) and the 6th Uhlan Regiment (2. Westpreuβisches 6. Ulanen-Regiment). After 1833, the 6th Uhlan Regiment was replaced by the 1st Uhlan Regiment until 1851 when further changes occurred to the organisational structure of the 10th Cavalry Brigade: only the 1st Uhlan Regiment remained, supplemented by the 2nd Garde du Corps Regiment (2. Leib-Husaren-Regiment Nr. 2), the 2nd Hussar Regiment of Landwehr (2. Landwehr-Husaren-Regiment) and the 1st Uhlan Regiment of Landwehr (1. Landwehr-Ulanen-Regiment). This composition of the Poznan´ brigade of cavalry survived until 1866. A year later, the brigade was reinforced by the 14th Dragoon Regiment (Kurmärkisches Dragoner-Regiment Nr. 14). In 1868–1869, the remaining units of the 10th Cavalry Brigade included the 14th Dragoons regiment, the 2nd Garde du Corps Regiment and the 1st Uhlan Regiment. In 1871–1901, the number of regiments in the brigade was limited to two: 183 Sommer, Die Stadt Posen, 22–23. 184 Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 1, 498; Jürgen Kraus and Gerhard Bauer, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil IX: Feldartillerie, Bd. 1: Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918 (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2007), 201–203, 259–260.

52

Organisation and Traditions by 1914

the 2nd Garde du Corps Regiment and the 1st Uhlan Regiment with Alexander III of Russia in the lead (the full version of the regiment in the Prussian terminology was Westpreußisches Ulanen-Regiment Kaiser Alexander III von Rußland Nr. 1). On 1 October 1901, the 2nd Garde du Corps Regiment was renamed to the Combination Regiment of Mounted Rifles which in 1905 adopted the name of the 1st Mounted Rifles Regiment; as of 8 August 1905 it was headed by the king of Prussia and was named “king’s”: the full name was Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1185. In late July 1914, the German Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division kept operating as a peacetime organisation and included three infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and an artillery brigade, the 19th Infantry Brigade under the command of General Paul Heinrich Liebeskind (in the position since 1 April 1913) with headquarters and staff in Poznan´, the 20th Infantry Brigade with General Arnold Freiherr von der Horst in command (since 3 February 1914) with headquarters and staff in Poznan´186 and the 77th Infantry Brigade with General Emmo von Dewitz in command (since 27 March 1914) with headquarters and staff in Bydgoszcz187. The 19th Infantry Brigade encompassed the 6th Graf Kleist von Nollendorf Grenadier Regiment with colonel Kurt von Gallwitz, genannt Dreyling in charge since 22 March 1912 and the 46th Graf Kirbach Infantry Regiment whose commanders and staff, the I and II battalions, were stationed in the Kernwerk barracks in Fort Winiary while the III battalion was stationed in Wrzes´nia (German Wreschen). After 4 May 1914, the commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment was colonel Victor von Arent188. The 20th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 47th Infantry Regiment of Ludwig III of Bavaria, whose headquarters and staff, the I and the III battalions were stationed in Poznan´, while the II battalion was in S´rem (German Schrimm). After 22 March 1914, the regiment’s commander was colonel Ernst Trieglaff 189. An185 Eduard Senftleben, Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Kriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1937), 3–19; Biesiadka, Gawlak, Kucharski, Wojciechowski, 241; Sommer, Die Stadt Posen, 12–13, 21–22. 186 Rangliste, 69. 187 Führer durch Heer und Flotte. Elfter Jahrgang 1914. Ausführliche Beschreibungen der Friedens- und der feldgrauen Ausmarschuniformen des Jahres 1914, Tabellen über die Bewaffnung der einzelnen Kontingente, Schiffslisten der Flotte, ed. B. Friedag (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Alfred Schall, 1913), 105; Garnison-Karte der Deutschen Armee, neunundzwanzigste Auflage. Échelle 1:2.335.000, Éditeur: Moritz Ruhl (Leipzig) 1914, GE D21408, Département Cartes et plans, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, [further referred to as Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF]. 188 Zunehmer, 96–97; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 150; Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF; Rangliste, 213. 189 Kruszyn´ski, “V Korpus Armijny”, 10–11; Jürgen Kraus, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VI: Infanterie, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter

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53

other unit in the 20th Brigade was the 50th Infantry Regiment under the command of colonel Karl Diestl (as of 19 June 1912)190 whose headquarters and staff, the I and II battalions were stationed in Rawicz (German Rawitsch) and the III battalion in Leszno (German Lissa)191. The 77th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 37th von Steinmetz192 Fusiliers Regiment193 stationed in Krotoszyn (German Krotoschin)194 under the command of Colonel Oskar Haevernick and the 155th Infantry Regiment195 with Colonel Arnold von Heise-Rotenburg in the lead; its headquarters and staff, the I and II battalions were stationed in Ostrów (German Ostrowo) and the III battalion was stationed in Pleszew (German Pleschen)196. The division’s horsemen were represented by the 10th Cavalry Brigade under the command of General Eduard Hubert Maria Neven Du Mont197; the unit consisted of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles stationed in Poznan´198 under the command of colonel Victor von Rosenberg-Lipinsky199 and the 1st Emperor Alexander III of Russia Uhlan Regiment led by colonel Ewald von Koß; its 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th squadron and the alternate squadron were stationed in Milicz (German Militsch) and the 3rd squadron in Ostrów200.

190 191

192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199

200

(Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2007), 98–99; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 105; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 152; Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF; Rangliste, 214. Rangliste, 217. Otto Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914– 1920 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931), 8–14; Kraus, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter, 102–103; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 105; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 150; Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF. General Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz was in charge of the V Army Corps during the AustroPrussian War in 1866. “Steinmetz, Karl Friedrich von,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 25 (New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911), 874–875. The full name of the unit was Füsilier-Regiment von Steinmetz (Westpreußisches) Nr. 37; Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF. Hans von Altmann, Das Füsilier-Regiment v. Steinmetz (Westpreußisches) Nr. 37: im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931), 17–18; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 132. The full name of the unit was Infanterie-Regiment (7. Westpreußisches) Nr. 155. Walter Arens, Das Königlich Preußische 7. Westpreuß. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 155 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1931), 8–12; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 363; Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF. Wegner, Bd. 1, 440. Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF. Kruszyn´ski, “V Korpus Armijny”, 191; G. Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 3: Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Regimenter, Bataillone und Abteilungen von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis zum 26. August 1939 Kavallerie, Artillerie, Pioniere, Train, Kraftfahr und Fahr Abteilungen, Panzertruppe, Verkehrstruppen und Nachrichten Abteilungen, Osnabrück 1993, 191. More on General Oskar Freiherr von Watter in Chapters 1 and 2. Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 151–153; Idem, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 3, 153; GarnisonKarte, GE D-21408, BNF.

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Organisation and Traditions by 1914

Beside the two infantry brigades, the peacetime organization of the 10th Infantry Division included the 10th Field Artillery Brigade under the command of General Oskar Freiherr von Watter201 (as of 18 April 1913) consisting of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment stationed in Poznan´, under the command of lieutenant colonel Otto von Schleicher (as of 16 June 1913)202 and the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, stationed in Leszno, under the command of colonel Hans Lepper (as of 18 February 1913)203. In the late 19th and the early 20th century, until the outbreak of WWI, Poznan´ and the cities scattered in the area of the V Army Corps witnessed intense expansion of numerous barracks complexes. After 1880, the barracks for the 6th Grenadier Regiment were built in Poznan´, in the quarter formed by Buker Strasse, Kleis Strasse, Auguste-Victoria Strasse and Kaiser-Friedrich Strasse (now Bukowska, Grunwaldzka and Szylinga streets). On top of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the barracks hosted the headquarters and staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade204. In 1880, across the street from the grenadiers, barracks for the 47th Infantry Regiment were raised in the quarter of Buker Strasse, Kaiser-Friedrich Strasse, Nollendorf Strasse and Hedwig Strasse (now Bukowska, Kraszewskiego and Wawrzyniaka). These barracks were also the seat of the staff of the 20th Infantry Brigade205. Several years before WWI, construction of new barracks was completed west of the grenadier barracks on Buker Strasse, where a part of the 47th Infantry Regiment was relocated together with the headquarters and staff of the 19th and the 20th Infantry Brigade, as well as the 6th Fortress Machine Gun Unit206. The Kernwerk barracks of Winiary Fort hosted the headquarters and staff, the I and II battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment. In 1850, hussar barracks were built on Magazin Strasse (now Ul. Solna), shaped like a horseshoe with open arms. The horseshoe was closed by a building constructed along Magazin Strasse. In the late 19th century, the buildings were used by the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. In the first decade of the 20th century, across Magazin Strasse, in the quarter of Magazin Strasse, Mühlen Strasse and Kohleist Strasse (now Kos´ciuszki, Solna, Młyn´ska and Nowowiejskiego Streets), the so-called New Artillery Barracks were built. They accommodated the headquarters and staff of the 20th Artillery Bri201 Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 3, 498. 202 Rangliste, 438. 203 Rangliste, 460; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 105; Wegner, Bd. 1, 278; Garnison-Karte, GE D21408, BNF. 204 Adress-Buch der Residenzstadt Posen 1914 (Posen: Verlag der Hofbuchdruckerei W. Decker, 1914), 220–221. 205 Ibidem, 220–221. 206 In 1913 in Poznan´ was formed the 6th Fortress Machine Gun Unit, subordinated to the 47th Infantry Regiment with respect to food provision.

Organisation of the Division

55

gade and the II division of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. The barracks of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were located in a quarter of Auguste-Victoria Strasse, Cavallerie Strasse, Liebig Strasse and Garten Strasse (now Ul Grunwaldzka, Ułan´ska, Grottgera and Matejki). Next to the mounted rifles, the barracks of the 5th Supply Train Battalion were built and, opposite them, the corps’ storehouse of river crossing equipment. In 1909–1913, the barracks for the 5th Infantry Artillery Regiment were built in the Sołacz district located on the north-western outskirts of the city207. In 1914, the population of Poznan´ amounted to 168,700 people. Despite the construction and architectural limitations enforced by the fortress, the large garrison together with the extended military utility infrastructure greatly affected the growth of the city and the region, generating income from supplies of food, construction materials and handling horses. In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, barracks were also built for the specific units of the 10th Infantry Division stationed outside of Poznan´, in Wrzes´nia, Leszno, S´rem and Rawicz208. The barracks built in 1901–1905 by the city of Leszno for the III battalion, the 50th Infantry Regiment and the 56th Field Artillery Regiment209, were very impressive. By July 1914, Poznan´ had been the seat of the headquarters of V Army Corps for almost a hundred years; the structures had become an inseparable part of the city’s Prussian military traditions, as reflected in the magnificent building of the headquarters of V Army Corps built in the Neo-Renaissance style in 1889 at the northern closure of Wilhelm Strasse (now Aleje Marcinkowskiego), on the corner of Kanonen Platz (Plac Działowy which has not survived, now next to Ul. Działowa) and Seeckt Strasse210 (now Ul. Solna)211. 207 Wegner, Bd. 1, 52–55, 103–104; Kurt Milde, Neorenaissance in der deutschen Architektur des 19. Jahrhunderts: Grundlagen, Wesen und Gültigkeit (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1981); Rangliste, 4, 66–69, 133–134; Kruszyn´ski, “V Korpus Armijny”, 95–117; Biesiadka, Gawlak, Kucharski, Wojciechowski, 240–241; In 1914, the regiments of fortress artillery operated on the basis of regulations from 1911. D.V.E. Nr. 201, Exerzier-Reglement für die Fußartillerie (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1911). 208 The iconographic material on the Prussian barracks before 1914 in Wrzes´nia, S´rem and Rawicz is far less copious than in the case of the Poznan´ barracks and is available mainly from private collections. 209 More on the barracks for German units in Leszno in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries in Miron Urbaniak, Leszczyn´skie koszary z lat 1901–1905 na planach budowlanych Archiwum Pan´stwowego w Lesznie (Leszno: Archiwum Pan´stwowe, 2012). 210 Seeckt-Strasse was an elongation of Magazin-Strassse and it ran along the headquarters of the V Army Corps to the east to Wrenker Platz. Seeckt Strasse was named after Richard von Seeckt (1833–1909), a Prussian infantry general, commander of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division and, between 27 October 1890 and 23 January 1897, commander of the V Army Corps. 211 I have analysed the architecture of the headquarters of the V Army Corps on the basis of iconographic sources stored in the Special Collection of the University Library in Poznan´. I published my findings in the article. Kruszyn´ski, “Dowództwo V Korpusu”, 99–107.

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As of 7 April 1911, General Hermann von Strantz was appointed commander of the V Army Corps and was promoted to infantry general212. For the next 3 years, the officer was highly committed to commanding the V Army Corps (including the 10th Infantry Division) as head of preparations for the war. After its outbreak, he was in command of these units in the initial stages of combat on the Western front. Von Strantz was born on 13 February 1853 in Nakel an der Netze in the Province of Posen; his mother was Alexandra Friederike born von Münnich. Because his father, Hans Friedrich von Strantz, was an officer (a major at that time), his son – a representative of Prussian nobility – also decided to become a career soldier.

Figure 1. Portrait of General Hermann von Strantz taken after 1916 with a caption; visible the Pour le Mérite, the highest German order of merit awarded to the General in 1915, and the Iron Cross 2nd class. Photograph from the author’s collection.

In 1870 he joined the Cadet Corps in Culm (now Chełmno) from which he was relocated to the Cadet Corps in Berlin. Following his promotion to PortepeeFähnrich (officer candidate), he joined the 8th Garde du Corps Grenadier Reg212 General Hermann von Strantz replaced General Günther Emanuel von Kirchbach, son of General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach. Rangliste, 176.

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iment of King Frederick William III of Prussia and with this unit, he fought in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–1871. As early as in 1871, he was promoted to second lieutenant. For his contribution in the Franco-Prussian war he received the Iron Cross 2nd Class. In 1876, he was sent to the Military Academy in Berlin where he studied until 1880. In the course of his studies, in 1879 he was promoted to Premierleutnant213 (senior lieutenant). After graduation, he joined the staff of the 27th Infantry Brigade in the 14th Infantry Division, later on a fusiliers battalion in the elitist 1st Infantry Guard Regiment in Potsdam, where in 1886 he was promoted to captain214. Following his promotion to major in 1891, von Strantz enjoyed the privilege of joining the Great General Staff in Berlin. Next, he was transferred to the elitist 2nd Guard Division where he served as staff officer. In 1893, he served again in the 8th Garde du Corps Grenadier Regiment of King Frederick William III of Prussia. Following his promotion to second lieutenant in 1897, he joined the elitist 1st Infantry Guard Regiment and, in 1899, he assumed a position in the Landwehr District in Berlin. After a year, he was promoted to colonel and commander of the 2nd Infantry Guard Regiment. Following his promotion to general in 1903, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Infantry Guard Brigade in Potsdam. In 1906, he was promoted to general lieutenant and commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Darmstadt. After 4 years he was promoted to corps commander in Poznan´215. As of 4 June 1912, in command of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division was General Robert Kosch. For two years after assuming the position, i. e. until the outbreak of WWI, he managed to learn about the regional specificity of the unit and the Poznan´ garrison. At the same time, as a division commander, he had a great influence on his troops. What was his military experience before 1914? He was born on 5 April 1856 in Kłodzko (German Glatz); his father was Hermann Kosch, his mother Agnes, born Heinrich. It is hard to say what influenced his decision to embark on a military career. One thing is sure: at that time it was one of the more attractive careers for young Prussians. For this reason, Robert Kosch joined the Cadet Corps; upon graduation, on 23 April 1874 he was appointed second lieutenant and joined his first formation, the 51st Infantry Regiment216. 213 Premierleutnant – by 1899 in the Prussian army an equivalent of the Oberleutnant, the German equivalent of a lieutenant. 214 Karl Friedrich Hildebrand and Christian Zweng, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 3: P–Z (Bissendorf: Biblio-Verlag, 2011), 378–379; Hans Möller, Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens “Pour le Mérite” im Weltkrieg, Bd. 2 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 387–389. 215 Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 3, 378–379; Möller, Bd. 2, 387–389; Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 100; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 155. 216 Möller, Bd. 1, 607–609; K.F. Hildebrand, Ch. Zweng, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 2: H–O, Bissendorf 2003, 254–255; Cron, Imperial, 88–89.

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Figure 2. General Robert Kosch, in 1912–1914 commander of the Poznan´ 10. Infantry Division, the Library of Congress.

In 1877, he started education at the Military Academy where he studied for 3 years. Upon graduation, he was sent again to a line unit, and on 1 April 1881 he joined the 132nd Infantry Regiment in Glatz where he started as an aide-de-camp to the I battalion and was aide-de-camp to the regiment. On 16 May 1885, he was promoted to Premierleutnant and on 1 April 1887 he joined the prestigious Great General Staff in Berlin. Following promotion to captain on 22 March 1889, he went back to a line position in the 85th Infantry Regiment yet his service was brief: soon he was transferred (in a supernumerary mode) to the Great General Staff with an assignment (without a full-time job) to the 85th Infantry Regiment. In 1894, Kosch was appointed commander of a campaign in the 54th Infantry Regiment. Following promotion to major, on 22 December 1887 he was appointed Railways Commissioner in Cologne. Later, on 23 March 1901, he was appointed commander of the II battalion in the 173rd Infantry Regiment. He was then promoted to second colonel on 17 May 1902 and, automatically, assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the 28th Infantry Regiment. In a subsequent stage of his career, second colonel Robert Kosch was appointed commander of the II Landwehr District in Berlin as of 24 March 1904. On 22 March 1904 he was promoted colonel, while on 16 February 1907 he was appointed commander of the 64th Infantry Regiment. On 19 August 1909, he was appointed general major and, later on, appointed commander of the 78th Infantry Brigade. After three

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Figure 3. General Oskar Freiherr von Watter, commander of the 10th Artillery Brigade from the 10th Infantry Division in 1914–1915, M 707 Nr. 1658 Bild 2, Landesarchiv Baden-Wu¨ rttemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

years of service as brigade commander he was transferred to Poznan´ as commander of a division217. Before mobilisation in 1914, General Oskar Freiherr von Watter was in charge of the 10th Field Artillery Brigade (a part of the structure of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division). The officer was in command of the division artillery also in the preliminary phase of WWI in 1914. He was born on 2 September 1861 in Ludwigsburg (Württemberg). Following his graduation from the Cadet Corps in 1879 and promotion to second lieutenant, he was assigned to the 13th Field Artillery Regiment. There he occupied various positions: chief of battery, battery commander at the Field Artillery Firing School. In 1901, he was appointed aidede-camp in the Staff of the XIII Army Corps and promoted to major. Later on he 217 Rangliste, 66; Möller, Bd. 1, 607–609; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 254–255.

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was commander of a division in the 29th Field Artillery Regiment, the 52th Field Artillery Regiment and the 11th Field Artillery Regiment. In 1907, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. In 1909 he was assigned commander of the 34th Field Artillery Regiment and in 1911 he was promoted to colonel. In 1913, colonel Oskar Freiherr von Watter was assigned to Poznan´ as commander of the 10th Field Artillery Brigade. In the same year, he was promoted to general major218.

Fighting Traditions During the the Franco-Prussian War and the battle of Náchod fought on 27 June 1866, the units of the V Army Corps including the 10th Infantry Division proved their battle worth219. When the conflict finished, the then division commander, General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach and his soldiers, German and Polish alike, were referred to as the “Lions of Náchod”220. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, the V Army Corps also lived up to the expectations of the Prussian General Staff. On 1 September 1870, in the battle of Sedan, two units of the Corps: the 9th and the 10th Infantry Divisions closed the ring surrounding the French troops in the northern section. On 19 September 1870, the units of the V Army Corps occupied Versailles and took part in fighting near Paris. On 19 January 1871, the Corps fought the battle of Mont Valérien. In February 1871, the V Army Corps marched to Orleáns and in March to Vesoul221. The campaign was fierce as testified by the losses of the V Army Corps: 391 casualties, 8,233 wounded, 400 missing soldiers and 368 killed horses222. 218 Möller, Bd. 2, 469–471. More on General Oskar Freiherr von Watter also in: Personalakten Watter Oskar Freiherr von, M 743/2 Bü 562, Materialsammlung zu Biographien II/1916–1944 – “W”, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; Rangliste, 69. 219 In the battle of Náchod of 27 June 1866, fought in what is now the Czech Republic, the Prussian V Army Corps operating as part of the 2nd Army lost 1,200 soldiers. On the other hand, the losses suffered by the enemy – the Austrian VI Army Corps – amounted to 5,700 soldiers which means that 1/5 of the Austrian soldiers were either killed or wounded. On the one hand, it was an effect of the modern equipment used by the Prussian infantry – the Dreyse M1841 needle gun, a breechloader. On the other hand, it resulted from the excellent training and bravery of the soldiers from the V Army Corps. Christopher M. Clark, Prusy. Powstanie i upadek 1600–1947, translated by Jan Szkudlin´ski (Warszawa: Bellona, 2011), 473. 220 B. Poten, “Steinmetz, Karl Friedrich von,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, ed. Rochus Freiherr von Liliencron, Bd. 36 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1893), 10–19. 221 More details on the combat trail of the Poznan´ V Army Corps during the Franco-Prussian wars of 1870–1871 in Heydekampf, 69 et seq. 222 On 8 August 1870, the combat readiness of the 6th Grenadier Regiment amounted to 2,877 soldiers; 237 of them were killed, 1,193 were wounded and 67 missing. In total, the losses of

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Figure 4. General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, commander of the Poznan´ (German) 10th Infantry Division in 1865–1870, then commander of the V Army Corps in 1870–1880; since 16 June 1871 until the end of WWI chief of the 46th Infantry Regiment, M703 R958N8, Landesarchiv BadenWu¨ rttemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv.

During the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 the 10th Infantry Division was commanded by General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach who, during the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–1871, was appointed commander of the V Army Corps. Therefore, the success of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps during the Prussian unification wars should be attributed to this officer. At that time the division displayed its fighting spirit for the first time. Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach was born on 23 May 1809 in Neumarkt in Silesia in a family with military traditions. For this reason, his military inclinations came naturally, inherited from his father, Franz Karl Helmut von Kirchbach, an active service captain. His mother was Babette, born Weiland. Like many sons of the Prussian nobility, he the 6th Grenadier Regiment during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871 amounted to 1,497 soldiers i. e. 52% of the initial state. Verlust-Listen der Königlich Preußischen Armee und der Großherzoglich Badischen Division aus dem Feldzuge 1870–1871 (Decker: Berlin, 1871), 1, 839, 1303; Heydekampf, 243.

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started his military career in the Cadet School in Culm and continued education in the Cadet School in Berlin. Promotion to Portepée-Fähnrich223 on 5 April 1826 was a breakthrough in his military career, followed by his first assignment to a line unit: the 10th campaign of the 26th Infantry Regiment in Magdeburg224. He became an officer and was promoted to second lieutenant on 29 March 1827. In 1831–1834, he was a student of the Prussian War Academy and, upon graduation, on 1 January 1835 he was appointed aide-de-camp in the II battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment in Magdeburg. In June 1838, he was assigned to the Topographic Bureau. After March 1841, already as Premier-Leutnant, for four years he was an aide-de-camp in the 7th Infantry Division. Following his promotion to captain on 22 March 1845 roku, he was relocated to serve as an aide-decamp in the 8th Infantry Division225. On 11 March 1844, von Kirchbach married Anna Schwartz and had four children by her (including Günther Emanuel, the subsequent General and commander of the V Army Corps in Poznan´). In 1845, he took leave, taking a 7-month-long trip to France, southern Germany, Italy and Austria. During the Revolutions of 1848, in Erfurt he took part in street fighting against the revolutionaries, for which he received an Order of the Red Eagle 4th class226. He was promoted to major on 28 December 1850, while on 21 June 1851 he was assigned as an aide-de-camp in the staff of the Guard Corps in Berlin, where he stayed for 6 months. In 1855–1858, he was a tactics teacher in the Prussian Military Academy; in the meantime, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel (15 October 1856). In 1856– 1857, he was head of a unit in the General Staff. On 10 December 1857, he obtained 223 Portepée-Fähnrich – there is no English equivalent of this term. A senior NCO in the Prussian army; in the hierarchy of military ranks it lies between Vizefeldwebel and Feldwebel. The rank fell into disuse in the German army before WWI. 224 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, General der Infanterie, Kommandeur des V Armeekorps und des Niedersächsischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 46, M 703 R958N8, Militärhistorische Bildersammlung, Abt. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg; Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 99–100; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 197–199. 225 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, M 703 R958N8, LBWAHS; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 197–199. 226 The Order of the Red Eagle (German Roter Adler-Orden) was a Prussian and German order founded in 1705; it was both a civil and a military order. In 1919, the Order of the Red Eagle (like the remaining orders awarded in the German Empire) fell into disuse; at that time it had as many as 47 varieties. Handbuch über den Königlich Preußischen Hof und Staat (Berlin: Decker, 1907), XV–XVI; Louis Schneider, Das Buch vom Rothen Adler-Orden das GrossKreuz (Berlin: Hayn, 1863), 97–114; Wiesław Bon´cza-Tomaszewski, Kodeks orderowy. Przepisy obowia˛zuja˛ce posiadaczy orderów, odznaczen´, medali i odznak (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1939), 444–445; More on the Order of the Red Eagle see also Felix Lehmann, Der Rote Adlerorden (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002); Jörg Nimmergut and Anke Nimmergut, Deutsche Orden und Ehrenzeichen 1800–1945 (Regenstauf: Battenberg, 2019).

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the prestigious position of chief of staff of the Guard Corps. On 3 June 1858 he was appointed chief of staff of the III Army Corps and in the course of his service he was promoted to colonel (31 May 1859). Another key stage in Colonel von Kirchbach’s career was his appointment on 13 October 1859 as commander of the 36th Infantry Regiment in Halle. He did not hold the position for a long time, however, because on 8 May 1860 he was appointed commander of the newly-formed 26th Combination Infantry Regiment which as of 4 July 1860 was named the 66th Infantry Regiment (von Kirchbach was appointed the unit’s commander on 1 July 1860)227. He obtained his first position in Poznan´ on 29 January 1863, in the à la suite228 mode, in the Staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade from the 10th Infantry Division. Subsequently, on 17 March 1863, he was promoted to his first general rank: General major. On 6 April 1864 he was appointed military commander of the Prussia-Russia border229. Before the war with Denmark, on 14 July 1864, he was assigned commander of the 21st Infantry Brigade; he was in charge of its mobilisation and headed it in the Second Schleswig War. When it finished, on 13 August 1864 he was appointed commander of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division230. On 8 June 1866, he was promoted to General lieutenant colonel; during the preparations for war with Austria, as part of the V Army Corps he was in charge of mobilisation of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division. In the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 he successfully commanded a division in the battles of Náchod on 27 June, Skalica (German Skalitz) on 28 June, Schweinschädel on 29 June and Sadová (German Königgrätz) on 3 July. During this campaign, the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division demonstrated outstanding bravery. Its commander, General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, received the Pour le Mérite for leading the 10th Infantry Division in the battles of Náchod and Skalitz. He also received the Military Merit Cross (Mecklemburg-Schwerin) 2nd class and the War of 1866 Commemorative Cross. On 20 September 1866, the units of the 10th Infantry Division triumphantly entered their home garrison231. Following the end of the Austro-Prussian War, on 17 September 1866 von Kirchbach completed demobilisation of the 10th Infantry Division. However, he 227 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, M 703 R958N8, LBWAHS; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 197–199. 228 À la suite nomination: before 1914, an assignment in the Prussian army to a specific regiment with the right to wear the unit’s colours but without the right to assume a position. Monarchs, princes and other aristocrats received honorary nominations. 229 Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 99–100; Zunehmer, 35. 230 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, M 703 R958N8, LBWAHS; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 197–199. 231 Bon´cza-Tomaszewski, 451.

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soon left the Poznan´ garrison and headed for the front. During the mobilisation of the V Army Corps and preparations for the war with France, on 18 July 1870, he was provisionally appointed commander of the corps232. During the fighting in France, in the battle of Weissenburg, von Kirchbach was shot in his left armpit. Despite the wound, he did not leave his post and continued to command the V Army Corps. In recognition of his merits, he was appointed General of the Infantry. For fighting in the Franco-Prussian War, he received the highest Prussian military decorations: the oak leaves of the Pour le Mérite, the Iron Cross 2nd Class and 1st Class233. On 16 May 1871, General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach was appointed commander of the V Army Corps (previously he occupied the position provisionally). For his outstanding achievements in the 46th Infantry Regiment of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division he was promoted to its chief 234. In April 1873, during the Poznan´ celebrations of the 100th anniversary of forming the 6th Grenadier Regiment, von Kirchbach received the Great Cross with oak leaves of the Order of the Red Eagle. In order to honour his military merits, on 2 September 1873 Fort no. 10 of the Strasburg stronghold was named “Fort Kirchbach”. Next, he was sent to Sankt Petersburg, where on 7 December 1873 he took part in celebrations in honour of St. George, during which he received the Imperial Order of Saint Alexander Nevsky. After nearly 54 years of military service, on 3 February 1880 Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, General of the infantry, retired. He died on 6 October 1887 in Niesky (now Niska in Upper Lusatia in the Free State of Saxony, Germany)235. Two monuments were raised in Poznan´ to commemorate the victories of the units of the V Army Corps (including the 10th Infantry Division) during the Prussian unification wars of 1864–1871. One was the majestic Sculpted Lion (German Löwendenkmal) unveiled on 27 June 1870 in Wilhelmplatz (now Plac Wolnos´ci). It was sponsored by the V Army Corps soldiers to honour their brothers in arms killed in the Austro-Prussian war in 1866. A monument to

232 He replaced General Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz who was in command of the V Army Corps between 18 August 1864 and 17 July 1870. Poten, 10–19. 233 At that time he also received the Russian Order of Saint George 3rd class, the Bavarian War Order of Maximilian Joseph, the Commander’s Cross of the Military Merit Order (Württemberg), the Grand Cross of the Military Merit Cross (Mecklenburg-Schwerin) 1st class, the Military Merit Order (Schaumburgu-Lippe) and a Medal for the 1870/71 war. Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, M 703 R958N8, LBWAHS; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 197–199; Zunehmer, 35; Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 99–100; Heydekampf, 22. 234 Zunehmer, 35; Sommer, Das Generalkommando, 99–100; Wegner, Stellenbesetzung, Bd. 2, 149. 235 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, M 703 R958N8, LBWAHS; Hildebrand and Zweng, Bd. 2, 197–199.

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William I, German Emperor (German Kriegerdenkmal)236 was erected to commemorate the soldiers of the Poznan´ corps fighting in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–1871. The monument’s location was anything but accidental: in front of the headquarters of the V Army Corps in Poznan´. The unveiling ceremony took place on 22 September 1899237. The two monuments placed in urban space were a tribute to the soldiers of the V Army Corps and became symbols of the PrussianPolish brotherhood of arms. However, the sponsors may not have quite followed this line of reasoning. The seeming brotherhood was controversial to Germans and Poles alike, as it was in opposition to the Prussian authorities’ anti-Polish policy. The Polish elites in the Province of Posen interpreted it as yet another attempt at Germanisation of the region, and turning Polish soldiers into “cannon fodder” in the name of Prussian interests238. *** In 1820–1918, the headquarters and staff of the German 10th Infantry Division were seated in Poznan´. As a result, the unit’s history is intrinsically related to the history of the city, its inhabitants and the region – the Province of Posen. A symbol of the division was its regiments of soldiers of German and Polish origin serving continuously since the formation of the regiments. Following an analysis of the history of the V Army Corps and the 10th Infantry Division in 1866–1871 and 1914, the hypothesis could be put forward that the high professional level of the commanders and leaders, combined with good soldiers provided by the Province of Posen, attributed to the quality of the division. Before WWI, the mode of training in the German army was specified by regulations. However, the commanders of corps, divisions and specific regiments had their influence on the training. The process was controlled by the commanders-superiors and inspectors of the specific weapons and services. Yet it was the charisma of the commander, stemming from a combination of his 236 I have analysed the monument to William I (German Kriegerdenkmal) on the basis of iconographic sources provided by the Special Collection of the University Library in Poznan´ and I published my findings in Kruszyn´ski, “Dowództwo V Korpusu”, 102–103. Witold Molik, “Poznan´skie pomniki w XIX i pocza˛tkach XX wieku,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 2 (2001): 7–40. 237 Waldemar Karolczak, “Poznan´ska Unter den Linden,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2015): 86; Molik, Poznan´skie pomniki, 15–16. 238 This issue was the starting point for Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novella Bartek zwycie˛zca (Bart the Conqueror) first published in 1882. It depicts a tragic story of the protagonist, a farmer from the Province of Posen who, enchanted with the propaganda of Prussian militarism, during the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–1871 demonstrated bravery in fighting against the French. Upon return to the Province of Posen, despite being a veteran of merit of the KaczmarekRegiments, he was again affected by Prussia’s anti-Polish policy.

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knowledge, experience and talents, that affected a unit’s fighting quality. For this reason I agree with General Erich Ludendorff, an outstanding German commander in WWI, born in 1865 in Kruszewnia near Poznan´, who said: While commanding troops requires strong will and an ability to predict developments, it also takes an ability to manage the huge military machinery, and this is impossible to achieve or maintain without hard work. There is another element, too: an understanding of the psyche of the soldier and the enemy’s features. This cannot be learnt; like an infinite number of other things, it is a function of the personality. The imponderable gain in importance as the size of the task grows. Trust and faith in victory forge a bond between the commander and his army239.

239 Erich Ludendorff, Moje wspomnienia, cz. 1: 1914–1916 (Warszawa: Tetragon, 2014).

Chapter 2. Organisation, Cover Operations, Mobilization and Transport in the Concentration Area

On 1 August 1914, following Wilhelm II’s order, a general mobilization was announced in Germany, starting on 2 August. The mobilization order reached the general headquarters of the V Army Corps in Poznan´ on 1 August at 18h00. On behalf of the Emperor, the mobilization notice was published in both German and Polish by Infantry General Hermann von Strantz – commander of the V Army Corps240. It was also printed in local newspapers. The mobilization posters were placed on advertising columns. The first hours of mobilization in Poznan´ were described by Oberarzt (senior physician) Tadeusz Szulc – a doctor of Polish nationality from Field Hospital no. 1 from the V Army Corps: The atmosphere in the city was unusually busy and nervous. The posters announcing mobilization were placed on columns all over the city and – unbelievable as it sounds – they were printed also in Polish. Now, when they wanted to save their skin, even the Prussian military authorities thought it was suitable to address Poles in their native language and to promote fulfilling their “duty to the (German) mother country”241.

The officers in charge of mobilization in their respective units took out mobilization calendars from sealed strongboxes to read detailed instructions and deadlines for completing the specific tasks. Once more, since the unification wars of 1864–1871, soldiers of Polish nationality from the Province of Posen were mobilised on a mass scale to the 10th Infantry Division242. Soon, Infantry General Hermann von Strantz was to depart for the front as commander of the V Army

240 More on the seat and the commanders of the V Army Corps in Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “Dowództwo V Korpusu Armijnego, jego siedziba i generałowie w latach 1889–1918,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2015): 99–121. 241 “Pierwsza wojna ´swiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918. Ze wspomnien´ poznan´skiego lekarza wojskowego Tadeusza Szulca, introduction and edition Piotr Grzelczak,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 169. 242 About Poles serving in the German army before 1914 see also Jens Boysen, Preußische Armee und polnische Minderheit. Royalistische Streitkräfte im Kontext der Nationalitätenfrage des 19. Jahrhunderts (1815–1914) (Marburg: Herder-Institut, 2008).

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Corps. Cavalry General Friedrich von Bernhardi, formerly retired and reactivated, was appointed deputy commander of the Corps headquartered in Poznan´. In Germany, soldiers from the military reserve force followed the mobilization announcement to the letter and visited the army units in great numbers. Wartime volunteers, sometimes as young as 17, would come to enlistment points243. Interestingly, Poles followed suit – in a group of 77 volunteers from Berger Secondary School in Poznan´, 3 students were of Polish nationality244. Volunteers Gustaw Biskupek245, Paweł Grochoteska246, Stanisław Niechciałkowski247 and Paweł Gutowski248 approached the 46th Infantry Regiment with its staff in Poznan´. The units of the 10th Infantry Division included Poles who had reported as one-year volunteers (German Einjährig-Freiwilliger) before the war. In the 6th Grenadier Regiment, Bronisław Wadzyn´ski249 and Gefreiter Tadeusz von Maciejowski250 chose this form of service. At the same time, Polish newspapers in the Province of Posen appealed to stay calm and follow the military authorities’ commands. In accordance with the mobilization appointments, reservists of Polish nationality obediently turned up in German units. This loyalty stemmed from the awareness that any form of resistance would be ruthlessly punished251 although the German military au243 In August 1914, in the first 10 days of the mobilization, 143.922 German volunteers approached military units. Alexander Watson, “For Kaiser and Reich”: The Identity and Fate of the German Volunteers 1914–1918,” War in History, no. 1 (2005): 44–74; Idem, Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 84. 244 Lech Trzeciakowski, “Zabór pruski na przełomie epok,” Dzieje Najnowsze, no. 3 (2004), 84. 245 War volunteer Gustaw Biskupek from the 10th company of the 46th Infantry Regiment of the 19th Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division died of typhoid fever on 7 December 1914 in Field Lazaretto no. 3 in Bruville (5 km to the north-west off Mars-la-Tour). Deutsche Verlustliste, Armee-Verordnungsblatt [further referred to as the AVDV], 285/1914. 246 War volunteer Paweł Grochoteska from the 46th Infantry Regiment died of typhoid fever on 21 December 1914 in Field Lazaretto no. 7 in Jonville. AVDV, 316/1914. 247 War volunteer Stanisław Niechciałkowski from the 7th company of the 46th Infantry Regiment died of typhoid fever on 18 December 1914 in the Field Lazaretto in Montigny, AVDV, 316/1914. 248 War volunteer Paweł Gutowski from the 10th company of the 46th Infantry Regiment died of typhoid fever on 19 December 1914 in the Reserve Lazaretto in Saargemünd. AVDV, 316/ 1914. 249 One-year volunteer Bronisław Wadzyn´ski, born in Tursko, Pleszew county (German Kreis Pleschen) from the 12th company of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment was killed on 25 August 1914 in the battle of Marville. AVDV, 21/1914; Bronisław Wadzyn´ski’s obituary published by his sister and brothers. “Dziennik Poznan´ski” no. 205, August 8, 1914. 250 One-year volunteer, Gefreiter Tadeusz von Maciejowski, born in Polanowo village, county Witkowo (now Polanowo, Wielkopolska province, county Słupca, commune Powidz), was wounded in the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914. AVDV, 17/1914. 251 The source of Polish loyalty in the Province of Posen was explained by medical doctor Wojciech Jacobson, conscripted as physician of the III battalion of the 49th Infantry Regi-

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Chart 1. Organisational structure of the German V Army Corps, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. ment from Gniezno. Wojciech Jacobson, Z Armja˛ Klucka na Paryz˙. Wspomnienia lekarza Polaka. Ed. Bartosz Kruszyn´ski (Os´wie˛cim: Napoleon V, 2015), 36–37.

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Chart 2. Organisational structure of the German 10th Infantry Division, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

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thorities were quite surprised that there were no incidents related to Polish reservists during the mobilization252. Despite the official declarations of the Polish community living in the V Army Corps area (including the Province of Posen), German officers continued to observe Poles incorporated into German regiments on a mass scale with concern. However, the cogs of the mobilization machinery, oiled for years on end, kept turning, and every hour they gained momentum. The atmosphere of the time was very well described by Adam Ulrich, a reservist of Polish nationality, conscripted to the 6th Grenadier Regiment: Seized by the unrelenting, machine-like war organisation of imperial Germany, a reservist or a private (Landwehr – country defence, Landsturm – mass mobilization), a Pole collected a Prussian gun because he had to. Nobody would ask or explain why. Once he put on a soldier’s uniform, he would follow the orders and do nothing else. His rights were defined by state legal acts, his responsibilities were stipulated in the hard words of war articles. When mobilization was announced, duty orders and regulations were effective. Once a soldier stepped into the barracks, he simply had no time to think: assemblies, roll-calls and reviews, the regiment commander’s brief speech and departure to the station where long trains were waiting to take the soldier into the unknown253.

Organisation According to the mobilization regulations, the ration strength (German Verpflegungsstärke) of the V Army Corps was calculated for 41,000 soldiers and 14,000 horses while the fighting strength (German Gefechtsstärke) amounted to 36,000 soldiers, 9,000 horses and 1,200 vehicles. In the course of mobilization, the V Army Corps put up two large units: the 10th Infantry Division and the 9th Infantry Division254. Both were active divisions and for the specific units to get into a mobilization state, they consisted of recruits and reservists255. 252 Of course there were cases of Poles avoiding mobilization in August 1914 and during the war. Some of these males decided to self-mutilate or to simulate the symptoms of illness. It is difficult to come up with any specific numbers because the cases were few. More on Poznan´ youth in WWI in Janusz Karwat, Od idei do czynu. Mys´l i organizacje niepodległos´ciowe w Poznan´skiem w latach 1887–1919 (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 2002), 288–341. 253 Leon Prauzin´ski and Adam Ulrich, W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstan´ców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920 (Poznan´: Ksie˛garnia S´w. Wojciecha, 1939), 12. 254 Following mobilization in August 1914, the 9th Infantry Division with commander General. Eduard von Below consisted of the 17th Infantry Brigade (the 19th von Courbiére Infantry Regiment and the 58th Infantry Regiment) and the 18th Infantry Brigade (the 7th King Wilhelm I Grenadier Regiment and the 154th Infantry Regiment). During mobilization, the 9th Cavalry Brigade was dissolved; it consisted of two regiments of the 4th von Bredow Dragoons Regiment and the 10th Prince August of Württemberg Uhlan Regiment, a part of

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In the case of the 10th Infantry Division, food was allocated for 17,000 soldiers grouped in 12 infantry battalions, 4 regimental machine-gun companies, 4 cavalry squadrons, 12 field artillery batteries, 2 pioneer companies, a division pontoon column, a sanitary company and supply trains. Out of 17,000 soldiers conscripted after mobilization into the 10th Infantry Division, 12,960 served in infantry companies. The division also included 4,000 horses and 600 vehicles (canons, howitzers, wagons and different types of vehicles)256. Apart from mobilising its own units, the V Army Corps simultaneously mobilised the V Reserve Corps257 (non-existent in peacetime) with retired Infantry General Erich von Gündell258 appointed its commander. At that time some officers and career NCOs together with recruits from the regiments of the V Army

255

256 257

258

the division in time of peace. The 1st Emperor Alexander III of Russia Uhlan Regiment was incorporated into the division. On top of two infantry brigades, the division also included the 9th Artillery Brigade (the 5th von Podbielski Field Artillery Regiment and the 41st Field Artillery Regiment). The engineer troops of the division consisted of the 1st field pioneer company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and the 9th Division Pontoon Column. The medical service of the division was represented by the 1st and 3rd sanitary companies. Erhard von Mutius, Die Schlacht Bei Longwy (Oldenburg: Verlag Stalling, 1919), 75; Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914– 1918). Compiled from Records of Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces at General Headquarters (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 167; Hermann Cron, Imperial German Army 1914–1918 (Solihull: Helion, 2012), 314– 315; Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “V Korpus Armijny na froncie zachodnim I Wojny S´wiatowej,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 95–117. The differences between peacetime and mobilization states of the German active Infantry Division in 1914 can be traced by following the example of an infantry company. In 1914, the organisation of a German infantry company in peacetime amounted to a maximum of 5 officers, 17 NCOs, 4 musicians and 142 privates and minimum 4 officers, 15 NCOs, 4 musicians and 128 privates. Therefore, the difference between the minimum organisation of an infantry company in peacetime and during mobilization amounted to: 1 officer, 5 NCOs and 103 privates, i. e. in total 109 soldiers. The ration strength for an infantry company following mobilization amounted to 255 soldiers. Thus, peacetime staffing levels for an infantry company represented 43% of the wartime allocation. William Balck, Taktik, Volume 1: Einleitung und formale Taktik der Infanterie (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1908), 35. D.V.E. Nr. 267, Felddienst Ordnungs (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1908), 187. Following mobilization, the V Reserve Corps consisted of two large units: the 9th Reserve Division and the 10th Reserve Division. The 9th Reserve Division included the 17th Reserve Infantry Brigade (the 6th Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 7th Reserve Infantry Regiment) and the 19th Reserve Infantry Brigade (the 19th Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 5th Jäger Battalion). The 10th Reserve Division included the 77th Infantry Brigade (the 37th Fusilier Regiment and the 155th Infantry Regiment), the 18th Reserve Infantry Brigade (the 37th Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 46th Reserve Infantry Regiment). The division’s cavalry was represented by the 6th Reserve Uhlan Regiment, a support unit of the 10th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment. The division units included two reserve companies of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, the 10th Reserve Pontoon Column, supply and communication units. Cron, Imperial, 316. Karl Friedrich Hildebrand and Christian Zweng, Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges, Bd. 1: A–G (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1999), 378–379.

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Corps were transferred to the units of the V Reserve Corps. They were replaced by officers, NCOs and reserve privates. Furthermore, 12 positions of junior officers (second lieutenants and lieutenants) had to be staffed in regiments on the level of a company, in line with the war regulations. The scale of operations is best reflected in the staffing of the units of the 10th Infantry Division. Following mobilization, in the 6th Grenadier Regiment 25 out of 42 officers (second lieutenants and lieutenants) were reservists259. In the 46th Infantry Regiment which mobilised the 46th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 16 out of 45 officers (second lieutenants and lieutenants) were reservists260. In the 50th Infantry Regiment, 27 out of 52 second lieutenants and lieutenants were reservists261. According to the mobilization plan, the V Reserve Corps was significantly reinforced when an active brigade was transferred from the 10th Infantry Division to the 10th Reserve Division. This was the 77th Infantry Brigade (with staff in Ostrów)262, consisting of the 37th Fusiliers Regiment263 (the staff, I and II battalions – Krotoszyn, III battalion – Jarocin) and the 155th Infantry Regiment264 (the staff, I and II battalions – Ostrów, III battalion – Pleszew)265. General second lieutenant Robert Kosch, commander of the 10th Infantry Division, was in charge of the course of mobilization; he occupied the position as of 4 June 1912. His considerable experience in commanding, charisma, authority among the subordinates, organisational skills coupled with tactical and operational talents were undoubtedly helpful in handling the task. Before mobilization, General Kosch was also Commander of the City of Poznan´. The experienced officers from the staff of the 10th Infantry Division played a significant role in effective mobilization. 259 Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 30–31. 260 Max Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 32–33. 261 Otto Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914– 1920 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931), 2–3. 262 Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 1: Die höheren Kommandostellen 1815–1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1990), 170. 263 The full name of this unit was the Füsilier-Regiment von Steinmetz (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 37; in the course of mobilization it was in charge of forming the 37th Reserve Infantry Regiment for the 10th Reserve Division. Hans von Altmann, Das Füsilier-Regiment v. Steinmetz (Westpreußisches) Nr. 37: im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931), 16–18. 264 The full name of this unit was the 7. Westpreußisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 155. In 1913 the III battalion of the regiment was relocated from Ostrów to Pleszew. Walter Arens, Das Königlich Preußische 7. Westpreuß. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 155 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1931), 40–42. 265 Garnison-Karte der Deutschen Armee, neunundzwanzigste Auflage. Échelle 1:2.335.000, Éditeur: Moritz Ruhl (Leipzig) 1914, GE D-21408, Département Cartes et plans, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, [further referred to as Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF].

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According to the mobilization regulations, the staff of the Infantry Division had in total 100 soldiers, 80 horses and 14 vehicles and consisted of a division commander, a staff commander, 2 aide-de-camps, an orderly officer, a supply trains commander, a division quarters commander, a division intendant commander with 5 intendants and 7 supply service officials, 2 court martial officials, a division medical officer and his assistant, 2 chaplains (Protestant and Catholic), 5 military mail officials and 80 NCOs and military officials. Following mobilization in August 1914, in charge of the staff of the 10th Infantry Division was Major Franz Aubert266; Major Bielfeld was a commander of the adjutancy and Generaloberarzt Vollbrecht was the major physician in the division267. When mobilization finished in August 1914, the 10th Infantry Division included the 19th Infantry Brigade under the command of Major General Paul Heinrich Liebeskind268 and the 20th Infantry Brigade with Major General Arnold Freiherr von der Horst269 in the lead. The war structure of the 19th Infantry Brigade was based on two infantry regiments: the 6th Graf Kleist von Nollendorf Grenadier Regiment consisting of the I and II grenadier battalions, a fusiliers battalion and a machine gun company270. The other unit was the 46th Graf Kirbachv Infantry Regiment271 (the staff, the I and II battalions – Poznan´, the III battalion – Wrzes´nia) under the command of Colonel Victor von Arent272. The 20th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 47th Ludwig III of Bavaria Infantry Regiment (the staff, I and III battalions – Poznan´, the II battalion – S´rem) under the command of Colonel Ernst Trieglaff 273 and the 50th Infantry Regiment (the staff, I and II battalions – Rawicz, III battalion – Leszno) commanded by Colonel Karl Diestel274.

266 Rangliste der Königlich Preußischen Armee und des XIII. (Königlich Württembergischen) Armeekorps für 1914 – Nach dem Stande vom 6. Mai 1914 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1914), 68; AVDV 28/193. 267 Rangliste, 68; Adress-Buch der Residenzstadt Posen 1914 (Posen: Verlag der Hofbuchdruckerei W. Decker, 1914), 220; D.V.E. Nr. 267, 186; Cron, Imperial, 96. 268 Rangliste, 69; Wegner, Bd. 1, 243. 269 Rangliste, 69; Wegner, Bd. 1, 244. 270 Gottberg, 28, 34. 271 Graf Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, General der Infanterie, Kommandeur des V Armeekorps und des Niedersächsischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 46, M 703 R958N8, Militärhistorische Bildersammlung, Abt. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg. 272 Rangliste, 213; Jürgen Kraus, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VI: Infanterie, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2007), 96–97. 273 Kraus, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter, 98–99; Rangliste, 214. 274 Rangliste, 217; Kraus, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter, 102–103; Garnison-Karte, GE D-21408, BNF.

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Chart 3. Organisational structure of the German 6th Grenadier Regiment Kleist von Nollendorf, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

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Chart 4. Organisational structure of the German 46th Infantry Regiment Graf Kirchbach, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

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Chart 5. Organisational structure of the German 47th Infantry Regiment King Ludwig III of Bavaria, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski

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Chart 6. Organisational structure of the German 50th Infantry Regiment, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

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The mobilization allowance for the Infantry Regiment was calculated for 86 officers and 6 physicians (officers), 3,304 NCOs and privates, 233 horses and 72 vehicles. The Infantry Regiment consisted of the staff, three infantry battalions and a machine-gun company. The staff of the Infantry Regiment consisted of 12 officers: the regiment commander, 4 staff officers, an aide-de-camp ( second lieutenant or lieutenant) and 6 medical officers plus 43 NCOs and other soldiers including 37 musicians from the regimental orchestra (and their commander)275.

Figure 1. Colonel Otto Heyn (in his gala uniform), appointed commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in the course of mobilization in August 1914. He was killed on 22 August 1914 in E´the during the first battle of the 10th Infantry Division, on the French- Belgian border in the southern Ardennes. Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935).

Each battalion consisted of four companies – they were numbered continuously in all three battalions: the I battalion – companies 1 to 4, II battalion – companies 5 to 8, III battalion – companies 9 to 12. The staffing of an infantry battalion was 275 During fighting, the members of the regimental orchestra served as paramedics. Führer durch Heer und Flotte. Elfter Jahrgang 1914. Ausführliche Beschreibungen der Friedens- und der feldgrauen Ausmarschuniformen des Jahres 1914, Tabellen über die Bewaffnung der einzelnen Kontingente, Schiffslisten der Flotte, ed. B. Friedag (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Alfred Schall, 1913), 36–37.

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26 officers (4 company commanders, 18 lieutenants, a medical officer of the battalion and his assistant, a purser), 83 NCOs and 972 privates (including 30 supply train soldiers), 58 horses, 19 vehicles, 4 ammunition trains, a medical wagon, 4 field kitchens, 5 military camp trains and 5 supply carts276. According to the mobilization regulations, an infantry company had 255 soldiers: 5 officers, 20 NCOs, 4 musicians and 226 privates. In line with the German organisational doctrine, a company was a fundamental infantry unit commanded by an officer (captain)277; it was further divided into ten teams (German Korporalschaft) of 25 soldiers each. A team was commanded by a Gefreiter (corporal) who was the first (and often the only) authority in the command line for an infantry private. A Gefreiter’s responsibility included compiling the team list, assembling the soldiers, reviewing the weapons, the uniforms and equipment, ensuring that the soldiers’ feet were not affected by intertrigo following strenuous marches. Each company consisted of three platoons (Zug) with a second lieutenant or sergeant in command. A platoon was made up of three sections (Sektion) of 8 people each, commanded by an NCO or a Gefreiter. A section was the smallest fighting unit in a regiment278. The organisational structure of all four regiments in the 10th Infantry Division also included a machine-gun company consisting of 2 officers and 95 NCOs and privates plus 45 horses. Each company had at its disposal 6 carts drawn by two horses to transport 6 Maxim MG-08 machine guns279; the carts were similar to those used by the artillery. The cart consisted of a limber280 with two horses harnessed to a drawbar and a box seat for two soldiers. To the limber was attached a transport gear carrying the MG-08 machine gun placed horizontally on the mount, two water containers made of steel, rubber steam hoses, spare barrels in a holster (German Ersatzlaufbehälter), spare locks, a small stock of taped ammunition in wooden boxes and tools. 4 large and wooden wheels undoubtedly

276 Kraus, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter, 4–6; Cron, Imperial, 112. 277 As a result of combat losses in the first months of the war in 1914, companies were frequently commanded by lieutenants. 278 Cron, Imperial, 112; Prauzin´ski and Ulrich, W marszu, 15, 21. 279 Friedrich von Merkatz, Unterrichtsbuch für die Maschinengewehr-Kompagnien Gerät 08 (Berlin: Mittler, 1909), 241 (since 1909 many editions of the book have been published in German and translated into other languages including English). 280 Limber – in German field artillery regiments in 1914, it was a single-axis horse-drawn cart to which a field canon, a light howitzer or an artillery waggon were attached (transporting ammunition). Three pairs of horses were harnessed to the limber of a field canon; each pair had its own outrider (German Vorreiter). The limber’s transport box held tools required to handle the canon and a small ammunition stock. When a cart with a 7.7 cm field canon marched, three team members would sit in the limber’s seat. More on the subject in D.V.E. Nr. 224b, Das Feldartilleriegerät 96 n/A (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1909).

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Figure 2. Colonel Victor von Arent, commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment from the 19th Brigade Infantry of the 10th Infantry Division, August 1914. Max Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935).

hindered the machine gun transport cart as they would get stuck in unbeaten sandy tracks or in boggy areas, significantly hindering the march281. A crew of six operated a machine gun (including the battalion leader) – 2 soldiers would sit in the box seats while 4 walked alongside the cart. In combat 1) the gun commander would appoint the firing post and, following the platoon commander’s orders, manage fire; 2) the gunner fired and transported the MG08; 3) the assistant gunner supported the gunner in firing, propping up the belt and carrying the gun’s mount; 4) the first ammunition bearer (German Munitionsschützen) supplied ammunition, was in charge of the steam hose and the water container. In battle, he would lie down behind the commander and the gunner, providing communication with the platoon commander; 5) the second ammunition bearer – a reserve operations soldier who observed the target and supplied ammunition; 6) the third ammunition bearer supplied ammunition, cold water for the gun’s cooler and he drove the cart transporting the gun. In 281 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 187; Merkatz, 187–188.

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Figure 3. Colonel Ernst Trieglaff, commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment from the 20th Brigade Infantry of the 10th Infantry Division. Gerhard Loosch, Das Königl. preuβ. InfanterieRegiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932).

machine-gun companies, 3 ammunition carts, a field kitchen, a storage cart, a forage cart and a luggage cart were used to transport ammunition, forage for the horses and supplies. A company would also typically have a spare MG-08 gun282. When in early August 1914 the units of the 10th Infantry Division arrived at the concentration area, the number of the soldiers differed slightly from the regulated numbers. In the 46th Infantry Regiment food was prepared for 81 officers and 3,209 NCOs and privates. The fighting strength amounted to 73 officers and 2,920 NCOs and privates283. As for the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the ration strength was calculated for 87 officers and 3,286 NCOs and privates284. In an Infantry Regiment, the transport system consisted of first and second line transport. In the regiment staff, first line transport included 4 pack horses; second line transport consisted of a staff luggage cart pulled by two horses. In a 282 In the German literature on the subject published in the Interwar Period, a regiment’s number was frequently placed before a specific machine-gun unit, e. g. the 50th machinegun company. D.V.E. Nr. 267, 187; Cron, Imperial, 121; Merkatz, 187–188. 283 Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment, 32. 284 The staff of the 6th Grenadier Regiment consisted at that time of 4 officers and 41 other soldiers; each battalion had 26 officers, 1,050 NCOs and privates; a machine-gun company consisted of 5 officers and 95 NCOs and privates. This leads to a conclusion that the then food allowance for the 6th Grenadier Regiment (87 officers and 3,286 NCOs and privates) was slightly different from the food allowance for an infantry regiment as specified by mobilization regulations (86 officers and 6 physicians-officers, 3,304 NCOs and privates). Gottberg, 29.

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Figure 4. Colonel Karl Diestel, commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment from the 20th Infantry Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, August 1914. Otto Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches InfanterieRegiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914–1920 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931).

battalion, first line transport had at its disposal 8 pack horses, 4 two-horse company ammunition carts, 4 two-horse field kitchens and a two-horse sanitary infantry cart. A battalion’s second line transport equipment included a two-horse luggage cart, 4 two-horse company luggage carts, 5 two-horse supply carts (including the canteen cart). In a company, first line transport equipment included a pack horse, a two-horse ammunition cart and a two-horse field kitchen. Second line transport consisted of a two-horse company luggage cart and a two-horse company supply cart. In a regiment, second line transport encompassed also a four-horse cart with earth work tools. In a machine-gun company, first line transport consisted of 5 pack horses and 6 spare ones while second line was equipped with a four-horse storage cart, a two-horse luggage cart, a two-horse supply cart and a two-horse forage cart285. Before war activities even started in 1914, the number of mine warfare devices in the infantry was supplemented by a tool cart which transported 230 spades with long handles. However, as was discovered in late 1914, infantry regiments lacked wire-cutting and carpenter’s tools. Typically, an infantry regiment’s structure included a telephone unit consisting of 6 telephone sections which had

285 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 121.

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Figure 5. The Maxim MG-08 machine-gun section, August 1914. In the foreground the servicing soldiers with the gun (visible telescopic sight mounted on the gun, but no water container or steam hose), to the left of the machine gun are four boxes with spare ammunition. The four servicing soldiers are equipped with leather belts with buckles to carry the gun. A protective shield is next to the soldier first on the right. In the background, a gun-transporting cart with two water containers at the front. Photograph from the author’s collection.

at their disposal 12 km of fixed cord (German Armee-Kabel). Another 12 km of cord was transported in infantry ammunition carts286. During mobilization, in each infantry regiment, a 1st Ersatz Division (1. Ersatz Bataillon) was formed that was in charge of training recruits and dispatching reserves to the parent regiments at the front. The reserve divisions of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the 46th and 47th Infantry Regiments, were stationed in the Training Grounds on the river Warta (German Truppenübungsplatz Warthelager)287 and the 50th Infantry Regiment was stationed throughout the war in Rawicz.

286 William Balck, Rozwój taktyki w cia˛gu wielkiej wojny, translated by Tadeusz Róz˙ycki (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1921), 22. 287 On top of the training in the Warta area, there was a large V Army Corps proving ground established in 1904 to the north of Poznan´ (now Biedrusko) named Truppenübungsplatz Posen (later Truppenübungsplatz Warthelager) with modern infrastructure: brick and corrugated iron barracks, wattle and daub buildings (including a canteen), a water tower and observation points. The barracks infrastructure could host an infantry brigade. In the proving ground, exercises were organised for the infantry, field artillery and foot (fortress) artillery as well as the technical units including pioneers. The river Warta which flows through the proving ground offered an opportunity to build pontoon bridges and practice river crossing. The staff was seated in the imposing Schloss Weissenburg (Schloss Treskow) mansion. Jacek Biesiadka and Andrzej Gawlak and Szymon Kucharski and Mariusz Woj-

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Chart 7. Organisational structure of the German 20th Field Artillery Regiment, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

ciechowski, Twierdza Poznan´. O fortyfikacjach miasta Poznania w XIX i XX wieku (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Rawelin, 2006), 252–253; Histories of Two Hundred, 486, 545, 586, 649.

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Chart 8. Organisational structure of the German 56th Field Artillery Regiment, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

In addition, in the course of mobilization in a brigade, reserve divisions were formed (Brigade-Ersatz-Bataillon): the Ersatz Division of the 19th Infantry Brigade (the 1st and 2nd companies of the Ersatz Division of the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the 3rd and 4th companies of the Ersatz Division of the 46th Infantry Regi-

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ment) as well as the Ersatz Division of the 20th Infantry Brigade (the 1st and 2nd companies of the Ersatz Division of the 47th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd and 4th companies of the Ersatz Division of the 50th Infantry Regiment)288.

Figure 6. Lieutenant colonel Hans Lepper, commander of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment from the 10th Artillery Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, August 1914. Konrad Angerstein and Paul Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: Druck and Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1927).

The war staffing for the 10th Infantry Division included also the 10th Field Artillery Brigade289 under the command of Major General Oskar Freiherr von Watter (also in charge of the division’s artillery); captain von Cleve was the aidede-camp290. The 10th Field Artillery Brigade consisted of the 20th Field Artillery 288 The Ersatz Division of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in 1914–1915 was stationed in the Training Grounds on the river Warta in Biedrusko, in 1915 in Krotoszyn, in 1917–1918 in Poznan´. In 1915, the Ersatz Division of the 47th Infantry Regiment was stationed in the Training Camp on the Warta; in 1915–1918 in Ostrów; in 1915 the Ersatz Division of the 46th Infantry Regiment was stationed in the Training Camp on the Warta, in 1915–1918 in Jarocin. Jürge Kraus and Gerhard Bauer, Handbuch der Verbände und Truppen des deutschen Heeres 1914–1918, Teil VI: Infanterie, Bd. 3: Ersatztruppen und Feld-Rekrutendepots (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2013), 102–128, 58. 289 In 1914, field artillery operated by virtue of regulations from 1907 updated in February 1914: D.V.E. Nr. 414, Exerzier-Reglement für die Feldartillerie. Vom 26. März 1907. Neuabdruck mit Einfügung der bis Februar 1914 ergangenen (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1914). 290 Rangliste, 69.

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Regiment (Poznan´ garrison) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher291 and the 56th Field Artillery Regiment (Leszno garrison) with Lieutenant colonel Hans Lepper in charge292. The staff of a field artillery regiment consisted of 6 officers (regiment commander, aide-de-camp, an orderly officer, a commander of a transport column, a regimental medical officer, a regimental veterinary officer) as well as 16 NCOs and privates293. Each of the regiments had two divisions which were further divided into three batteries. A division consisted of 480 soldiers, 400 horses and 49 vehicles (including canons or howitzers and limbers). Following mobilization, an artillery battery had 150 soldiers (including 5 officers), 130 horses, 6 canons/howitzers (each drawn by 6 horses) and 9 carts. Each artillery regiment had allocated two light ammunition columns consisting of 190 soldiers, 180 horses and 24 carts294.

Figure 7. Lieutenant colonel Otto von Schleicher, commander of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment from the 10th Artillery Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, the Meuse Hills, autumn 1914. Albert Benary, Königlich Preußisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1932).

291 Adress-Buch der Residenzstadt, op. cit., 221; Rangliste, 438; Albert Benary, Königlich Preußisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard & Graefe, 1932), 7–19. 292 Rangliste, 460. 293 Cron, Imperial, 134–135. 294 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 186.

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In a field artillery regiment, transport included first and second line vehicles and horses. The staff of a first line regiment was equipped with 5 pack horses and a two-horse luggage cart in second line. The staff of a first line field artillery brigade had 5 pack horses, second line staff had a two-horse luggage cart. A field artillery battery and a light field howitzer battery had in total 5–10 pack horses, 4–8 spare horses and a six-horse storage cart. A second line battery consisted of a six-horse storage cart, a two-horse supply cart and a four-horse forage cart. In the first line, the transport of a light ammunition column of an artillery battery consisted of 4 pack horses and, in the second line, a six-horse storage cart, a two-horse supply cart and a four-horse forage cart295. According to the mobilization plan, the 10th Cavalry Brigade, which in time of peace was a part of the 10th Infantry Division, was dismantled and its regiments incorporated into two divisions of the V Army Corps Infantry. Consequently, the 1st Emperor Alexander III of Russia Uhlan Regiment was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division. The 1st King’s Mounted Rifles Regiment under the command of Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels296 stayed in the 10th Infantry Division, serving as the division’s cavalry297. First line transport in the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles included 58 pack horses, 2 riding horses for soldiers leading the pack horses, 2 pack horses for transporting sanitary stocks, a two-horse cavalry medical cart, 2 four-horse pontoon carts and a two-horse telegraph cart. In the second line, transport in a cavalry regiment consisted of a four-horse staff luggage cart, 4 two-horse squadron luggage carts, 5 two-horse supply carts (including a canteen cart) and 5 four-horse forage carts. In a squadron, first line transport had 12 pack horses while the second line transport had at its disposal a two-horse squadron luggage cart, a two-horse supply cart and a four-horse forage cart298. Engineer and pioneer units of the 10th Infantry Division were mobilised by the 5th Pioneer Battalion from Głogów299; they consisted of the 2nd Field Pioneer 295 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 123. 296 Major Otto Graf Solms Wildenfels, commander of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles in 1914– 1918, came from nobility with military traditions. His father, Karl August Adalbert Graf zu Solms-Wildenfels, was a career cavalry officer in the Prussian army where he was Lieutenant General. He was in the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870– 1871. Kurt von Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, Bd. 9 (Hanseat. Verl. Anst.: Hamburg 1941), 186–187. 297 Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 2: Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie Regimenter sowie Jäger und MG Bataillone, Wehrbezirkskommandos und Ausbildungsleiter von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis 1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1992), 440. 298 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 122. 299 For the V Army Corps, the 5th Pioneer Battalion mobilised the 5th Bridge Column and the 5th Searchlight Pioneer Platoon. Paul Koch, Das Niederschlesische Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsverbände im Weltkrieg 1914/18 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1928), 42.

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Figure 8. Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels, commander of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles (wearing civilian clothes, photo taken after 1918). Eduard Senftleben, Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Kriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1937).

Company, the 3rd Field Pioneer Company and the 10th Division’s Bridge Column300. Within an hour, supported by a pioneer company, a division’s bridge column could build a light pontoon bridge 60 m long, or a bridge for all weapons, 35 m long, or a heavy bridge for all weapons, 20 m long. A division’s bridge column of 60 soldiers had at its disposal 3 rowing boats, 80 horses and 11 carts301. Interestingly, in August 1914, an infantry division did not have a communication unit which negatively affected the information flow between the staffs of the cooperating divisions and between the division’s staff and the corps’ staff 302. Of great importance to the firepower of a German infantry division were the ammunition and supply services. As the need arose, on top of the regimental light ammunition columns, four more artillery ammunition columns could be relocated from a corps to a division (the first three columns were dedicated to field canons, the fourth one to light field howitzers) and two infantry ammunition columns. According to the staffing regulations, each artillery ammunition col300 In 1914, the pontoon units followed the following regulations: D.V.E. Nr. 202, PontonierVorschrift (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1910). 301 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 194. 302 W. Balck, Rozwój taktyki, op. cit., 27.

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umn had 190 soldiers, 190 horses and 26 carts. An infantry ammunition column consisted of 200 soldiers, 200 horses and 37 carts. A division’s supply service consisted of three supply parks, each with 110 soldiers, 160 horses and 62 carts plus three supply columns of which each had 130 soldiers, 180 horses and 30 carts303. The medical service in the 10th Infantry Division was represented by the 2nd Sanitary Company and four field hospitals. The division’s sanitary company had 310 soldiers (including hospital orderlies and paramedics), 50 horses and 13 carts including sanitary carts for transporting the wounded (on stretchers). Every hospital’s staffing level amounted to 60 soldiers, 30 horses and 9 carts304. Of equal importance was the division’s system of evacuating the wounded, defined in field service regulations from 1908305; it was very well organised and, following the first fighting in August 1914, it proved its efficiency. In a battlefield, the wounded were given first aid by their colleagues from the unit and then the hospital orderlies took over; they tried to stop the bleeding and dressed wounds. Later on, the medical personnel evacuated the wounded on stretchers and in sanitary carts, also referred to as ambulances. According to wartime law, the carts’ sides were marked with red crosses while the orderlies were equipped with a flag bearing a cross. Due to the large numbers of wounded, they were frequently evacuated in confiscated farmers’ carts. Further on, the wounded were transported in carts to the regimental first aid stations and were taken care of by battalion and regimental physicians supported by orderlies. In these circumstances, the physicians operated on less severely wounded soldiers, taking out splinters and rifle cartridges, sewing and cleaning the wounds. From the battlefield, the wounded could also be taken to a division’s first aid station, where they were attended by the division physicians. If the wounds were superficial, the soldiers were soon sent back to their original units. In the case of more serious wounds or diseases (including infectious diseases), the soldiers were sent from first aid station to the field hospital. When the wounds were serious and the treatment required longer hospitalisation, the soldiers were transported from the field hospital to the collecting station for the wounded from where they were dispatched in a special sanitary train to medical treatment facilities in Germany306. 303 304 305 306

D.V.E. Nr. 267, 186. Histories of Two Hundred, 180; Cron, Imperial, 314–315. D.V.E. Nr. 267, 142–150. Before the outbreak of WWI, in the German army great emphasis had been placed on taking care of wounded soldiers in a modern war and on organising medical help and medical units. This was reflected in numerous relevant regulations: D.V.E. Nr. 139, Ausrüstungsnachweisung für die Trainkolonne eines Etappen-Sanitätsdepots (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1903); D.V.E. Nr. 21, Kriegs-Sanitätsordnung (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1907); D.V.E.

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Service Modes and Military Ranks Before the outbreak of WWI, the course of military service in Germany included active service, defence of the country (Landwehr) and the standing army (Landsturm). Males aged 17 to 20 could be conscripted to the first call up of the Landsturm. Males aged 21 to 23 were subjected to active service of two years (infantry) or three years (artillery and cavalry). At the age of 24, recruits joined the military reserve force for 4.5 years. At the age of 27, they reported to the first calling of the Landwehr for 5 years. From the age of 32, for 2 years they reported to the first calling of Landsturm. Frome the age of 35, for 8 years they were a part of the second calling of Landwehr. Men aged 43 and older were subjected for 5 years to the second calling of Landsturm. Some males aged 18–31 did not qualify for military service and were transferred to the Replacement Reserves (German Ersatzreserve) for 12.5 years and did not undergo military training. Another group was the first calling of Landsturm where men aged 18+ were recruited for 19.5 years and at the age of 41 were transferred to the second calling of Landsturm for 5 years. While the system was fairly complicated, it was efficiently managed. However, before 1914 it was a grave mistake to have trained only 4.5 age groups of reserve soldiers, while in France the reserve force encompassed 11 age groups. This is why, in the case of an armed conflict that was much more serious than the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), the German army had more problems with replenishing those killed-in-action. At the same time, not all soldiers from a specific age group were conscripted because of various delays. In 1911 alone, out of 461,000 qualified males only 300,000 were conscripted. Every year, 135,000 males who qualified for military service avoided conscription. Before mobilization, in August 1914, the Replacement Reserve amounted to as many as 900,000 men who had not undergone military training. On the other hand, the active army had 870,000 soldiers (including 36,000 senior officers, 4,000 junior officers, 110,000 NCOs and 18,000 one-year volunteers) while the military reserve force consisted of 1,180 ,000 men307. Nr. 21a, Anlagen zur Kriegs-Sanitätsordnung (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1907); D.V.E. Nr. 317, Bekleidungsvorschrift für Offiziere, Sanitätsoffiziere und Veterinäroffiziere des Königlich Preußischen Heeres (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1911); D.V.E. Nr. 5, Vorschrift für die Behandlung der Sanitätsausrüstung (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1909); D.V.E. Nr. 5, Behandlung der Sanitätsausrüstung (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1913); D.V.E. Nr. 21a, Anlage XII und XIII der Kriegssanitätsordnung: mit Anhang: Jahresverzeichnisse, Packordnungen (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1914). The medical care provided by a doctor in a battalion of the 49th Infantry Regiment on the Western front in 1914 was described by Captain Wojciech Jacobson in his diaries. Jacobson, Z Armja˛. 307 Edward Buat, Wojsko niemieckie podczas wojny ´swiatowej 1914–1918. Chwile wielkos´ci i upadku. Działania na liniach wewne˛trznych, translated by: Edmund, Waliszewski (Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy, 1923), 7–14.

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In 1914, the system of military ranks in the German army was complicated. While it was underpinned by upholding the historical traditions of the Prussian army, there was a desire to precisely place a soldier in the military structure and take him to a higher level of competence. For this reason, the military rank specified the type of formation and the military specialty. Equally complex was the system of marking the military rank, the type of the arms, the formation and the specialisation on the German uniform, which dated back to the 19th century308. In the German army, the following military ranks were held by enlisted personnel (German Mannschaften), depending on the type of the arms or unit: musketeer (German Musketier), fusilier (German Füsilier), grenadier (German Grenadier), jaeger (German Jäger) and pioneer (German Pionier). The units of military guard consisted of guards (German Gardist), guard fusiliers (German Garde-Füsilier) and guard grenadiers (German Garde-Grenadier); in the artillery there were cannoneers firing the cannons (German Kanonier) and coachmen pulling horse-drawn cannon (German Fahrer), supply train soldiers with oneyear’s experience (German Trainsoldat), supply train soldiers with two-year’s experience (German Gemeiner); in the cavalry, depending on the type of cavalry, there were dragoons (German Dragoner), hussars (German Husar), cuirassiers (German Kürassier), uhlans (German Ulan) and mounted riflemen (German Jäger zu Pferde). The rank immediately following a private was a Gefreiter (corporal). A volunteer who approached a unit or a recruitment office during mobilization in 1914 was referred to as a wartime volunteer (German Kriegs-Freiwillige). Following military service, before 1914 (2–3 years), a reserve private was referred to as a reservist (German Reservist). Before a reserve NCO or an officer received an actual rank, he was additionally referred to as “reserve”, e. g. reserve lieutenant (German Oberleutnant der Reserve) or reserve second lieutenant (German Leutnant der Reserve)309. A volunteer serving for a year (German Einjährig-Freiwilliger) followed a special course available to secondary school graduates following a successful leaving exam (with a stipulation that the recruits could not be older than 25). Men volunteered for this type of service for one year310. One-year volunteers in the army had the privilege of choosing their formation, garrison and unit. However, they had to bear the total cost of the equipment required. For this reason, in the 308 More on marking military ranks, types of arms and specialities on German uniforms during WWI in Ottomar von der Osten-Sacken und von Rhein, Deutschlands Armee in feldgrauer Kriegs- und Friedens-Uniform (Berlin: Wolfenbüttel Melchior-Verlag, 1916). 309 Kleines Kriegslexikon (Stuttgart: Wegner, 1914), 24–25; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 262. 310 B. Thoss, “Einjährig-Freiwilliger,” in Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, ed. Gerhard, Hirschfeld and Gerd, Krumeich and Irina Renz (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004), 452.

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Province of Posen, they typically came from affluent families of merchants and landowners. After one year of military service, the volunteers would take an NCO exam; when they left the army, they started tertiary education. Following training as reservists, they had an opportunity to be promoted to first-degree reserve officers. Before 1914, in the German Empire this path was chosen by students and university graduates. Following the mobilization in August 1914, the time of service was extended for one-year volunteers. During the mobilization in 1914, Arkady Fiedler who lived in Poznan´ followed this path and joined the 5th Supply Train Battalion stationed in his hometown. This is how he reminisced about his service: […] Service in the supply train units in Poznan´, referred to as “Einjährig-Kriegsfreiwillige”, was chosen by many Poles, even more Jews and a few faint-hearted Germans. Treated like partners in crime, we had to carry out horse dung by hand and we would run around the barracks’ yard like crazy. The Wachtmeister (technical sergeant) set his mind on me and shouted in my face that I was smiling while standing to attention, when my face was actually twisted in a grimace of tension rather than a smile. The barracks were full of recruits, which is why I was allowed to sleep at home; in the evening, in my parents’ house, I was so tired that I would fall asleep over dinner; the next day, at 4:00 in the morning, I would rush, half-asleep, to the barracks. When I didn’t stand guard on a Sunday, I slept at home for a day and two nights on end311.

The NCOs (German Unteroffiziere) were higher in the military hierarchy; most of the ranks do not have English equivalents. NCOs were at the heart of the German army, because the training and command systems in the sub-divisions relied on their authority. The lowest echelon in the hierarchy was an NCO (German Unteroffizier), an Oberjäger and a senior baker (German Oberbäcker). Next was a sergeant (German Sergeant), an oboe player from the regiment orchestra (German Hoboisten), a trumpeter (German Trompeter), a senior 1st class baker (German Oberbäcker I Klasse) etc. These ranks were followed by an Obergefreiter, a Vizefeldwebel in the infantry, a Vizewachtmeister in the cavalry, a flag bearer (German Fähnrich), a regiment drummer (German Regimentstamboure) and a battalion drummer (German Bataillonstamboure), a Sanitätsfeldwebel etc. The highest echelon in the NCO hierarchy in the infantry was occupied by a Feldwebel, a Wachtmeister in the cavalry and artillery, an Unterarzt, an Oberfeuerwerker, a Wall-meister, a Zahlmeisteraspirant, a Stabshoboist, a Stabshornist, a Stabstrompeter, a Gendarmerie-Oberwachtmeister, a Schirrmeister der Pioniere etc. The highest NCO rank, considered a staff NCO, was deputy officer (German Offizierstellvertreter)312.

311 Arkady Fiedler, Mój ojciec i de˛by (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Miejskie, 2006), 141. 312 Kleines Kriegslexikon, 24–25; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 262.

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The officer corps was divided into four groups: subalterns (German Subalternoffiziere), senior officers (German Hauptleute), staff officers (German Stabsoffiziere) and generals (German Generäle). Junior officers were represented by second-lieutenants (German Leutnant) and interns (German Assistenzarzt), followed by Lieutenant (German Oberleutnant) and physician (German Oberarzt). Senior officers included captains (German Hauptmann) and second class staff physicians (German Oberstabarzt II Klasse). In the cavalry, the equivalent of a captain was a rittmeister (German Rittmeister). The group of staff officers consisted of a major (German Major), first class staff physician (German Oberstabsarzt I Klasse), lieutenant colonel (German Oberstleutnant), chief physician (German Generaloberarzt), colonel (German Oberst), second class supreme physician (German Generalarzt II Klasse) and first class supreme physician (German Generalarzt I Klasse)313. The third and last group was represented by generals, namely brigadier general (German Generalmajor), first class (med.) brigadier general (German Generalarzt I Klasse), major general (German Generalleutnant) and (med.) major general (German Generalstabsarzt). Depending on the type of formation, there were equivalent ranks: infantry general (German General der Infanterie), cavalry general (German General der Kavallerie) and artillery general (German General der Artillerie). The two highest ranks were general (German Generaloberst) and field-marshal (German Generalfeldmarschall)314.

Equipment, Uniforms and Weapons Since in 1914 all the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division were active units, the soldiers’ weapons and equipment represented the latest achievements of German military technology. While developing new types of uniforms and equipment, the German military authorities drew on the most recent experiences of global conflicts and original research. It was assumed that a German infantry soldier who weighed on average 84 kg and was 167 cm tall, should carry equipment not weighing more than 28 kg. According to German army regulations, the clothing of an infantryman weighed 5.397 kg, the equipment 3.964 kg including tent equipment weighing 1.620 kg, other kit (including an iron ration weighing 2.388 kg), weapons and ammunition at 8.507 kg, food rations, including bread, at 3.238 kg, and an entrenching tool with case – 0.89 kg. Instead of the shovel, a 313 Kleines Kriegslexikon, 24–25; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 263. 314 Kleines Kriegslexikon, 24–25; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 263; Steven E. Clemente, For King and Kaiser! The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860–1914 (Greenwood Press: New York, 1992), 27–54.

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soldier might have an axe weighing 1.09 kg, a mattock weighing 1.48 kg, a ladder or wire-cutting shears. Therefore, the total weight of an infantryman’s equipment exceeded 27 kg. Instead of the infantry shovel, the soldiers were equipped with spades with long wooden handles. The steel part of the spade came in a leather casing attached to the main belt in the back, on the left side while the wooden handle was placed along the left edge of the knapsack, pointing up. Shorter pioneers frequently marched with the wooden handle protruding above their helmets315. Before the outbreak of WWI, drawing on the experience of the wars from the late 19th century, and following Wilhelm II’s order of 23 February 1907, the German Ministry of War introduced on 18 March 1907 a new, camouflage colour for the army’s uniforms, referred to as field grey (German feldgrau)316. Its introduction was accompanied by new, more practical uniforms. These new field uniforms were handed to the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division during mobilization in August 1914317. An infantryman (a private or an NCOs) wore a service coat Feldbluse M1907. An officer would wear a service coat Feldbluse M1910318. The trousers for privates and NCOs (Hosen M1907) and for officers (Hosen M1910) had the same colour as the uniform jacket. The cavalrymen from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles wore the infantry uniform jackets and the cavalry jodhpurs (Reithosen M1908)319. In the case of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, privates and NCOs would wear the same model of service coats as infantrymen, but the trousers and boots with spurs were copied from those of the cavalry320. To infantry privates and NCOs, combat boots with high calves (Marschstiefel M1866) were of special importance. The new boots, distributed in the army straight from the mobilization warehouses, would painfully chafe feet and, fol-

315 Balck, Taktik, Vol. 1, 39–40. 316 Introduction of the camouflage feldgrau colour in the field uniforms of the German army did not put an end to the wearing of ornamental, historical symbols. They survived till the end of WWI, when tactical pragmatism displaced the impractical ornaments which frequently posed a danger to the soldiers’ lives from the field uniform. Rhein, Deutschlands Armee, 6; Jürgen Kraus, Die deutsche Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg. Uniformierung und Ausrüstung – 1914 bis 1918 (Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2004), 12–17. 317 The uniform regulations for the German army, effective in 1914, were included in the regulations from 1908 and 1910: D.V.E. Nr. 122, Vorschriften für die Felduniform der Mannschaften (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1910); D.V.E. Nr. 317a, Zusammenstellung der Uniformen und Abzeichen der Beamten des Königlich Preußischen Heeres (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1908). 318 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 138–151; Tafel 4 in: Rhein, Deutschlands Armee. 319 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 170–176, 427; Tafel 2–5 in: Rhein, Deutschlands Armee. 320 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 328, 415–419.

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lowing long marches, led to intertrigo. In early August 1914, to many soldiers in the German army these ailments were a symbol of war fatigue321.

Figure 9. A properly packed knapsack of an infantry private, August 1914. Adolf Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915 (Berlin: Mittler, 1914).

An infantryman’s knapsack contained a different pair of shoes – laced-up ankle boots Schnürschuhe M1901 which proved more suitable in the mud, because they would not fall off the soldiers’ feet322. Laced-up boots also came in a special variant for officers (Schnürschuhe für Offiziere M1912). Their structure was different from that of the boots for privates (with a hard hobnailed sole); they were of much higher quality and were suitable for getting about in difficult terrain323. According to the infantry’s regulations, boots worn by officers and 321 The Marschstiefel M1866 boots were made from three layers of natural tan colour, thick matt leather. In 1914, in line with infantry regulations, the boots’ leather was not dyed black; this changed in 1915. The Marschstiefel M1866 boots, if looked after well by the soldiers, were resistant to long marches and extreme service conditions. The boots’ soles consisted of 2 layers of thick leather glued together and the heel was made from 8 layers of leather. The sole was extra reinforced by 33 studs; the heel was reinforced by a small hoof and nails. An infantryman had to take regular care of his boots, cleaning and lubricating the leather, plus supplementing lost studs or hoofs. The boots’ condition was checked by team commanders. Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 198–199. For an analysis of the structure of the German combat boots on the basis of a specimen stored in the Imperial War Museum in London, see: Boots, M1866 Marschstiefel (tan), Department Exhibits, Category uniforms and insignia, inscription UNI 10094. 322 Laced-up shoes (Schnürschuhe M1901) were made of much thinner, and therefore more flexible leather than that used in the Marschstiefel M1866. Still, the sole was also reinforced with hobnails and small hooves. Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 200. 323 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 201.

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other soldiers had to come with puttees (Gamaschen) made from cotton fabric in the feldgrau324 colour. In 1914, the officers from the 10th Infantry Division wore high horse-riding boots (Stiefel für Offiziere325) in the field, made from hard leather dyed black. Soldiers from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles wore boots called Einheits-Kavalleriestiefel326. In 1914, soldiers in the German army, including the 10th Infantry Division, wore three specimens of caps. The privates’ uniforms included the mandatory Feldmütze M1907: a flexible, round, peakless garrison cap327. Another type of headwear was a peaked cap – Dienstmütze mit Schrim für Mannschaften M1908328. The officers wore garrison caps called Feldmütze für Offiziere M1910329. The front of a garrison cap, in the version for privates and officers alike, sported two vertically arranged ribbons (Mützenkokarden M1898): a ribbon of the German Empire above and a ribbon bearing Prussian colours on the cap band below330. Theoretically, an infantryman’s head was to be protected by the Pickelhaube M1895 helmet. It was made of hardened embossed leather, sewn and given a glossyblack finish. A spike was placed at the crown, on a round base fixed with four rivets, to symbolise the infantry. Both the base, the rivets and the spike were made of copper sheet. At the front of the helmet was the Prussian eagle embossed in copper sheet. The helmet’s peak was reinforced and hardened by a band of copper sheet. On either side of the helmet, where the bearing belt was fixed, were metal ribbons in the colours of Prussia. The spike was slightly longer on top of the helmets worn by infantry officers. In order to mask the helmet’s shiny elements, a textile cover (Überzug M1892) in the feldgrau colour was introduced. In the infantry and cavalry, the unit’s number was sewn on the front, made of red or green felt. The helmet worn by artillery soldiers, with a globe on top made of polished pressed sheet symbolizing a cannonball, was called the Kugelhaube M1895331. 324 The prescribed puttees distributed from the mobilization warehouses in August 1914 were affixed to the boot with a small hook; once they were strapped, the soldier would affix the upper part by a belt or another hook. Each reservist soon learnt how to strap on the puttees to stop them from sliding down the leg. 325 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 205. 326 Alfred Satter, Die deutsche Kavallerie im ersten Weltkrieg: Fachbuch zur Neueren Geschichte (Norderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH, 2004), 50. 327 The Feldmütze M1907 was made of cloth in the feldgrau colour and a band in colours indicating the formation, e. g. red for the infantry. Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 24, 112–121. 328 The Dienstmütze mit Schrim für Mannschaften M1908 had a semi-circular peak and a chinstrap made of leather dyed black. Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 122–123. 329 The Feldmütze für Offiziere M1910 had a semi-circular peak and a chinstrap made of hardened leather dyed black. The band was hardened and higher than in the cap for privates and NCOs, and there was a leather sweatband at the bottom. The hardened crown of the cap was raised in the front part. Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 124–136. 330 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 33, 50. 331 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 270–271.

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Figure 10. An infantryman in a walking uniform and equipment, August 1914. Adolf Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915 (Berlin: Mittler, 1914).

Mounted riflemen wore cuirassier-type helmets made of steel. The elongated body of the helmet protected the nape of the neck; the neck-guard was made of a single sheet of metal. Mounted riflemen would place masking covers in the feldgrau colour on their helmets. The officer version of the helmet for mounted riflemen was made of polished, silver-coloured metal and its spike was much longer than in the version for NCOs or privates332. Following the development of the artillery and firearms, in 1914 the structure of the Pickelhaube M1895 and Kugelhaube M1895 helmets, as well as the version for mounted riflemen was fairly obsolete and could no longer protect a German soldier’s head in modern warfare. Every uniform had an inner pocket with personal dressing and a prayer book. On their necks (underneath the uniform jacket), the soldiers wore an ID tag (German Erkennungsmarke) commonly referred to as a dog tag. It was made of

332 As for the helmets worn by German cuirassiers, in 1914 the neck-guard was provided by armour made of horizontally arranged and overlapping bands of steel. Ibid., 328, 415–419.

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zinc and attached to a thin leather band. The information on the ID included the soldier’s full name, date and place of birth, unit and ID number in the unit333. In the case of privates and NCOs from the Prussian contingent, the main leather belt (Koppel M1895) had a brass buckle (German Koppelschloß) with a circular shield of white metal bearing the caption God is with us (German Gott Mit Uns) and the centrally located royal crown of Prussia334. According to the regulations from 1914, officers had to wear a main belt (Feldbinde M1910) whose round brass buckle had an embossed crown and a monogram – the capital letter “W” and “II” underneath as a symbol of Wilhelm II, German Emperor335. An infantryman equipped with the Mauser Gewehr 98 rifle would place on the belt, to the left and the right of the buckle, two leather cartridge pouches (Patronentaschen M1909) with three chambers each. In accordance with field service regulations, each chamber held 15 cartridges in charger clips (3 clips holding 5 cartridges each). The ammunition stock in the pouches amounted to 90 cartridges. 30 more cartridges in cardboard boxes (2 boxes holding 15 pieces each) were stored in a haversack, 30 more pieces in a knapsack (2 boxes holding 15 pieces each). According to the regulations, the ammunition stock carried by a single infantryman amounted to 150 cartridges336. To the right of the pouches on the main belt was a leather bayonet scabbard (Seitengewehrtasche M1898337) holding a bayonet (Seitengewehr M1898/05i) (without serrated edge) in a steel oxidised scabbard. The Seitengewehr M1898/05 bayonet with the pioneer serrated edge weighed 505 g and was allocated to a team to cut fascines and smaller trees338. 333 Laurent Mirouze, World War I Infantry in Colour Photographs (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press Ltd, 1999), 7; Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 36–56, 58–65. 334 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 590–593. 335 The obverse side of an officer’s belt (Feldbinde M1910i) was made of a silvery galloon with two dark-grey stripes located at equal distances from the belt’s edge. At either end of the belt, a single galloon sleeve was placed, bearing the same pattern. The inner side of the belt was covered in dark blue cloth. The buckle was round, made of golden metal, sawn onto a leather belt with two rows of notches to match the buckle’s prongs Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 596; An analysis of the structure of the Feldbinde M1910 officer’s belt on the basis of a specimen offered by Helmut Weitze Military Antiques KG – Hamburg, as on www.weitze.net [access 12. 07. 2017]. 336 A loaded 5-cartridge charger clip weighed 126 g. Unlike a private in an infantry regiment whose hand ammunition stock amounted to 150 cartridges, a trumpeter had 90 and a drummer had 30 cartridges. Balck, Taktik, Vol. 1, 475; Kleines Kriegslexikon, 24–25; Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 603–605. 337 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 593. 338 The M1898/05 bayonet was commonly referred to by German soldiers as a butcher blade due to the blade widening up at the top (leaf-shaped) the way it was in butcher blades. During WWI, the French press broadcast propaganda that during trench warfare, German soldiers purposefully used the serrated Seitengewehr M1898/05 bayonets to inflict lacerated wounds which would not heal easily. The myth resulted in the opinion that a German soldier

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Privates and NCOs had a Trodell (sward knot) fixed to the bayonet handle. The complicated system of shapes and colours indicated the type of formation, the campaign and battalion. A sward knot worn by officers was referred to as the Portepee and was affixed to the hilt of a broadsword, sabre or – in late 1914 – bayonet339. Under the bayonet, in a leather casing (Feldspatenhülle M1909) was an infantry shovel (Feldspaten M1887) with a short wooden handle pointing down. On the main belt, to the right, was affixed a haversack (Brotbeutel M1893) with 30 cartridges (2 cardboard boxes with 15 cartridges each) and a food ration340. On the left side of the haversack was an aluminium canteen (Feldflasche M1907) in a textile casing in the feldgrau colour341. Table 1: Prescribed content of a German infantryman’s knapsack (Tornister 07/13) during mobilization in August 1914. Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915 (Berlin: Mittler, 1914); Eckart von Wurmb, Major Max Menzels Dienstunterricht des deutschen Infanteristen. Jahrgang 1914–1915 (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1914). English name (German name of the equipment) Knapsack without contents (Tornister 07/13) Leather strap to hold the canteen Leather straps to attach it to the coat (Mantelriemen) Bag for tent accessories (Zeltzubehörbeutal): 1) three tent poles, 2) three tent stakes, 3) rope, Rolled-up coat (Mantel M1907) and the shelter-half (Zeltbahn M.1892) The mess kit (Kochgeschirr M1910) Cutlery – spoon and fork (Eßbesteck) Canned meat 400 g (Fleischbüchse) Hardtack – 2 packs x 500 g (Zwiebacksäcken) Roasted grain drink – 2 cans x 50 g = 100 g

Iron ration

captured with a Seitengewehr M1898/05 bayonet with the pioneer serration should be instantly executed. However, serrated bayonets were used for work and were not suitable in hand-to-hand fighting (i. e. in stabbing). Despite this fact, the OHL (the Supreme Army Command) withdrew serrated bayonets. There were, however, cases of soldiers on the front receiving this version of bayonet. For practical reasons, German soldiers serving in trenches filed off the incisions on the blade to make hand-to-hand fight much easier. This was confirmed in the memoirs of Wojciech Jacobson who was a physician in the German army throughout WWI. Jacobson, Z Armja˛, 65. 339 I carried out an analysis of several hundred photographs of the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division from 1914. Consequently, I can conclude that in 1914, the M1898/05 was the most popular bayonet in the infantry. 340 Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 608–609; Uzbrojenie z˙ołnierza niemieckiego, “Dziennik Poznan´ski” no. 207, August 10, 1914. 341 Mirouze, World War I Infantry, 7.

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Salt sack made of white cloth and 3 salt boxes = 50 g Canned vegetables, 2 cans x 300 g (Gemüsekonserve) Bread fat container (Fettbüsche) Laced shoes (Schnürschuhe) / puttees (Gamaschen) Shirt (Hemd) Pair of woollen socks (Strumpfe) Handkerchief (Taschentuch) Long johns (Unterhosen) Scarf (Halstuch) Garrison cap (Feldmütze) Toiletries (Waschzeug): 1) toothbrush, 2) toothpowder, 3) razor, 4) small mirror, 5) soap, 6) comb, 7) razor sharpener, 8) sewing kit. Rifle cleaning kit (Gewehrreinigungsbeutal): 1) 60 g rifle oil in a double steel can, 2) rifle cleaning cloth, 3) wire brush with a rifled end to clean the barrel and a thin line, 4) a brush with a weight to clean and lubricate the barrel, 5) a brush to lubricate the rifle, 6) tows to clean the rifle. A can of dubbin (Lederfett) A clothes brush (Kleiderbürste), a shoe brush (Stiefelbürste) Pay book and wallet (Soldbuch) Song book (Feldgesangbuch) Rifle ammunition – 2 cardboard boxes x 15 cartridges = 30 cartridges placed on either side of the knapsack

An indispensable element of an infantryman’s equipment was a knapsack (Tornister 07/13) with characteristic cow or horse hair on the front. The knapsack’s two leather straps ended in hooks affixed to rings on the rear of the pouches on the left and right side of the main belt, serving as suspenders holding up the belt with the pouches. To the knapsack was affixed a rolled-up coat (Mantel M1907) with a folded shelter-half (Zeltbahn M1892) on top; it could also be used as a raincoat. A mess kit (Kochgeschirr M1910) was affixed to the front side of the knapsack. On top of the ammunition stock, every soldier carried in his knapsack the so-called iron ration, which consisted of tinned meat (400 g) and hardtack (500 g); the ration could be eaten only following a superior’s direct order. On top of that, in each team one soldier had a canvas water sack. The knapsack with the prescribed content weighed 14 kg342. A soldier from the 10th Infantry Division had at his disposal the most technologically advanced rifle in the German army, the repeatable bolt action Mauser Gewehr 98, calibre 7.92 mm. The cartridges were type “S” spire point bullets 7.92 342 Adolf Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915 (Berlin: Mittler, 1914), 85–98; Kraus, Die deutsche Armee, 614–615, 620–623.

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× 57 mm (M1905) weighing 10 g. The cartridges were fed from a 5-bullet box magazine embedded in a chamber and loaded by means of a 5-cartridge stripper clip. The cartridge’s muzzle velocity amounted to 900 m/s. The smallest sight setting in the rifle was 400 m, the biggest 2,050 m. While several models of bayonet were affixed on the Gewehr 98, in 1914 the 10th Infantry Division used the Seitengewehr M1898/05 bayonet without serration, and a pioneer version with serration. The Mauser Gewehr 98 rifle with 5 cartridges weighed 4.1 kg, with a bayonet – 4.605 kg. The knife-type bayonet was affixed to the rifle by means of the bayonet’s base; owing to a latch on the bayonet’s handle, it was safely secured. It was possible to fire with bayonet fixed, but it changed the centre of gravity, which had to be taken into account when aiming. The length of the Gewehr 98 was 1.25 m, and with a bayonet it increased to 1.77 m. Together with the British LeeEnfield SMLE, the German Mauser Gewehr 98 was among the most effective infantry rifles in WWI343. The cavalrymen and maintenance soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division were equipped with the Mauser Karabiner 98 short rifle 7.92 mm calibre which used the same cartridges as the infantry’s rifles. It was a short rifle, 1.10 m in length, 1.55 m with a bayonet. The short rifle weighed 3.88 kg, with a bayonet 4.47 kg. As its barrel was shorter, the bullet’s muzzle velocity was lower and amounted to 845 m/s; the recoil momentum was greater. It had sight adjustments of 100– 2,000 m, while its foresight was equipped with a cover. The rifle’s front swivel had a stacking rod rather than a hook, to arrange the rifles in a stocking pyramid. The breech handle was arched downward to prevent hooking and accidental unlocking. The same bayonet could be used with the Mauser Karabiner 98 and the Mauser Gewehr 98344. Apart from rifles and short rifles, according to the equipment regulations from 1914, the units of the 10th Infantry Division had at their disposal a sidearm in the form of the semi-automatic, 9 × 19 mm calibre Parabellum 08, commonly known as the Luger in reference to its designer, Georg Luger345. In infantry campaigns, the pistol was used by officers as well as higher-bracket NCOs, ma-

343 The Gewehr 98 rifle was used on a large scale by Polish insurgents during the Wielkopolska Uprising (1918/1919) and the Silesian Civil Wars, by soldiers of the Wielkopolska Troops, and during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1920; after 1921 it was the major rifle of the Polish Army. D.V.E. Nr. 257a, Gewehr 98 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1912); Sztab Generalny Oddział VII (Naukowy), Regulamin: Karabin Mauzera M. 98 (Warszawa: Nakładem M. Arcta, 1919); Tadeusz Felsztyn, Karabin piechoty Mauser (wzór 98) (Warszawa: Główna Ksie˛garnia Wojskowa, 1921); Kleines Kriegslexikon, 24–25; Transfeldts, 85–95. More on the benefits and drawbacks of both rifles and comparative firing in Martin Helebrant, “Mauser kontra Enfield: pojedynek gigantów,” Strzał – Magazyn o Broni, no. 8 (2007): 10–16. 344 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 117; D.V.E. Nr. 257a. 345 The Parabellum 08 was replaced in the German army by the Reichsrevolver M1879.

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chine-gun campaign soldiers346 and functional soldiers including orderlies347. Infantry officers and higher-bracket NCOs were also equipped with the Infanterie-Offiziersdegen M1889 backsword. Similar cold weapons were used in pioneer campaigns – higher-bracket NCOs were equipped with the InfanterieOffiziersdegen M1889 backswords while functional NCOs had Seitengewehr 1898/ 05 serrated bayonets. Privates in pioneer campaigns were equipped with the Mauser Karabiner 98 with a short Seitengewehr 1898348 bayonet. A regimental machine-gun campaign was equipped with six calibre 7.92 mm Maxim MG-08349 machine guns fed from a 250-cartridge sackcloth (thick linen cloth) belt, reinforced with steel ferrules; their practical rate of fire amounted to 400–450 rounds per minute. The gun weighed 19.7 kg and 23 kg when they came with a water-filled cooler. The sledge mount, weighing 31 kg, with four legs, was made of steel, which ensured stable firing from a stationary position. The gun and the mount weighed 54 kg. The MG-08 system was also equipped with the Zielfernrohr ZF 12 for long-distance aiming including indirect fire. The MG-08 was an automatic gun with a short barrel recoil. Once the ammunition belt was fed, reloaded with the locking lug and the trigger was pulled, 346 In machine-gun companies, in 1914 the soldiers did not have the Mauser Gewehr 98 or the Mauser Karabiner 98 because, in the course of handling and transporting the MG-08 machine gun with spare ammunition, they would not have been able to carry another gun. For this reason, irrespective of rank, every soldier in the regimental machine-gun campaign was equipped with the Pistole-08. There were, however, differences, in the type of cold weapons. According to the regulation, in a machine-gun campaign the Feldwebel and the Vizefeldwebel were equipped with officer’s backswords or cavalry sabres; the remaining NCOs and privates had the Seitengewehr 1871/84 bayonet; stretch-bearers – the Seitengewehr 1871/ 84 bayonet or officer’s backswords. Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 264. 347 In 1914, infantrymen in the Poznan´ Feldwebel and Vizefeldwebel divisions were armed with the Parabellum 08 and an infantry officer’s backsword, while flag-bearers, regimental and battalion drummers and paramedics were equipped with the Parabellum 08 and the Seitengewehr 1898 bayonet or an infantry officer’s backsword. Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 264. 348 Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 264, 268. 349 Before Maxim MG-08 machine guns were introduced into the German army, a new tactic for this type of weapon was being worked out. The analyses resulted in manuals and instructions: Exerzierreglement und Schießvorschrift für die Maschinengewehr Abteilungen (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1904); H. Rohne, Das gefechtsmäßige Abteilungsschießen der Infanterie und das Schießen mit Maschinengewehren (Berlin: Mittler, 1905); Braun, Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1906). These works were continued following the introduction of the MG-08 until the end of WWI. New regulations and tactical manuals were published: D.V.E. Nr. 89, Ausrüstungsnachweisung für das Reserve-Maschinengewehr einer Maschinen gewehrkompanie 08 oder einer Reserve-Maschinengewehrkompanie 08 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1908); D.V.E. Nr. 130b, Zusatzbestimmungen für die Ausbildung der Maschinengewehr-Kompagnien und Festungs-Maschinengewehr-Formationen, (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1911); Merkatz, Unterrichtsbuch für die Maschinengewehr. More on the introduction to German troops of the Maxim MG-08 machine gun and the first combat experiences in Frederick Victor Longstaff and Hilliard A. Atteridge, The Book of the Machine Gun (London: H. Rees ltd., 1917), 143–165.

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Figure 11. The German infantry Mauser Gewehr 98 rifle and the method of mounting the bayonet. Adolf Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht für den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915 (Berlin: Mittler, 1914).

only continuous fire was possible. The MG-08 fired the same cartridges as the Mauser Gewehr 98. It was cooled with water, and the cooler’s capacity was 3.3 l. During intense firing, the temperature of the water in the cooler could exceed 100 °C, heated by the hot barrel and the locks. As a result, the water was no longer a coolant, and steam would also gather in the container. In these circumstances, the barrel could be damaged and consequently the fire was imprecise, the cartridges would fall at uneven distances or would tumble over. For this reason,

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Figure 12. A private from the 47th Infantry Regiment, 20th Infantry Brigade, 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 13. A private from the 50th Infantry Regiment, 20th Infantry Brigade, 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

regularly changing the water was imperative. According to the regulations, the water had to be changed after the firing in rapid succession of four ammunition belts, i. e. 1,000 cartridges. The performance of a well-cooled barrel was estimated at 15,000 shots. The steam was drained from the cooler by means of a rubber hose. The boiling water was drained to the so-called kettle (German Wasserkessel) – a tin, cylindrical container for transporting water with a capacity of 6.5 l. A rapid change of firing site posed a considerable challenge to handling the MG-08. The soldiers had to carry the gun with the mount, the ammunition belt stock in wooden boxes and water in kettles. To this end, two service soldiers would wear broad transport belts with steel buckles to carry the gun to another site. Two

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soldiers could also carry a gun on the mount in a lying position by grabbing the legs. Four service soldiers could carry the MG-08 this way. According to the gun regulations, when the service soldiers had to crawl, it was possible to tow the MG-08 with the sledge mount unfolded. In these circumstances, service soldiers were also required to transport the boxes with ammunition350. The structure of the MG-08 machine gun was complicated and consisted of 238 parts and tools. Maintaining the full fighting efficiency of the MG-08 required considerable diligence on the part of the service soldiers, including regular changes of water and lubricating the lock. Otherwise, according to the instructions, the lock could get stuck in one of 38 different ways. Training soldiers in firing these crew-served weapons was a long process. Special effort had to be made to protect the sackcloth ammunition belts from damp. When the belt cloth got wet, the belt would swell and become longer, and therefore the distance between the cartridges in the belt would change and get stuck. In August 1914, regimental machine-gun companies of the 10th Infantry Division had a high level of training, which was verified in the course of the initial fighting351. Theoretically, one MG-08 was capable of firing 24,000 cartridges per hour; therefore, 6 guns in a company fired 144,000 cartridges. However, in August and September 1914, there was no intense firing on the Western front in the conditions of manoeuvre warfare. It only started when the developments led to precision warfare. In order to ensure the MG-08’s attack potential, a regimental machine-gun company had to have at its disposal an adequate stock of ammunition. Every machine gun was transported on a cart with 10,500 cartridges in belts. 8,100 more cartridges were transported in an ammunition wagon. The entire stock of regimental ammunition of a machine-gun company amounted to 87,300 cartridges352. All the NCOs, functional soldiers and paramedics in the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were equipped with the Parabellum 08; this is an indication that this type of weapon was used not only by the infantry regiments of the Poznan´ division. Higher-bracket NCOs had the Parabellum 08 as well as cuirassier swords (Ger350 During inquiries in private collections in France and Germany, I found several photographs of a machine-gun section from 1914. In the pictures, the servicemen were towing the MG-08 on an unfolded mount by means of leather carrying belts. However, in all the cases the photographs were arranged and taken behind the front line. In intense firing exchanges, an MG-08 section which was under fire and tried to crawl, at the same time dragging a machine gun, weighing 54 kg together with the mount, would have poor chances of survival. This senseless solution, which stemmed from a lack of experience in using this weapon system in modern warfare, was set out in the MG-08 regulations. 351 Between 1918 and 1939, the heavy Maxim MG-08 machine gun was an element of the equipment of the Polish Army. Józef Kwaciszewski, Karabin maszynowy Maxim 08 (Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy, 1924), 5–6, 9–10, 30–31, 42–46, 52. 352 Balck, Taktik, Vol. 1, 270–284.

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Figure 14. An infantryman from the 5th Pioneer Battalion, 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 15. Deputy officer Oswald Lange from the 4th company of the I battalion, 6th Grenadier Regiment (born in Tschirne, Kreis Bunzlau – now Czerna, Lower Silesia, county Bolesławiec, commune Nowogrodziec in Poland; killed on 22 January 1915 in Bois-de-Chevaliers forest on the Meuse Hills) after completing mobilization in August 1914; the photo shows a knapsack for officers and an infantry officer’s backsword. Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935.

man Kürassier Offiziersdegen); the others had a variety of cavalry backswords for privates (Kavallerie-Degen M1889353). The privates of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were armed with cavalry backswords (Kavallerie-Degen M1889); sergeants, the Unteroffizier (non-commis-

353 Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 268.

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Figure 16. A stretch-bearer from a division’s first aid company wearing a field uniform 1914/1915. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 17. A one-year volunteer from the first aid company of the 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

sioned officers) and privates had lances (Stahlrohrlanze M1893nA)354. Officers and NCOs whose equipment did not include lances would affix backswords to the 354 The Stahlrohrlanze M1893 was a lance made of a steel pipe with a diameter of 3.6 cm. It was 3.2 m long and weighed 2.12 kg. The upper part of the lance had a steel head with a quadrangular section made of cast steel and was 12.6 cm long. Below the head of the lance, the pole had 4 hemispherical knobs with apertures through which a steel wire was threaded, to which the flag (German Lanzenflaggen) was attached. Halfway through the lance was a brass handle with a lining made of impregnated cloth. At the bottom of the pole, at 1/3 of its length, a brass ring was placed with a leather tassel above it. In the rear part of the lance was a steel conical breech so that a lance could be rammed into the ground. A cavalryman in a mounted tactical formation would put the lance’s tassel on the right arm, while the breech was inside a leather sleeve attached to the right stirrup. Before 1914 the Stahlrohrlanze

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Figure 18. “Faithful comrades in arms” – deputy officer from a field artillery regiment with his horse, August 1914; the photo shows the soldier’s main belt made of white patent leather. Photograph from the author’s collection.

left side of the saddle. Mounted marksmen were all equipped with the Mauser Karbiner 1898 with a stock of 45 cartridges in the pouches. The mounted rifle privates and NCOs equipped with lances strapped the backsword on the right side of the saddle. On the other hand, the Mauser Karabiner 98 was transported M1893 lance was produced by the Gewehrfabrik Danzig. Analysis based on an analysis of the structure of the German Stahlrohrlanze M1893 lance stored in the King’s Armouries Museum in Leeds. King’s Armouries Leeds (Wielka Brytania), Lance – Model 1890/93 Stahlrohrlanze (1800–1899). German lance, Model 1890/93 Stahlrohrlanze, 1891, modified in or after 1893, inscr. VII.1647; Wielkopolska Museum of the Military Section of the National Museum in Poznan´, Stahlrohrlanze M1893, inscr. MNP/WB/42/1-2. More about the Stahlrohrlanze M1893 lance in Andrzej Konstankiewicz, Uzbrojenie 15. Pułku Ułanów Poznan´skich in “Zeszyty Historyczne Towarzystwa b. Z˙ołnierzy i Przyjaciół 15. Pułku Ułanów Poznan´skich”, ed. Tadeusz Jeziorowski, (Poznan´: Towarzystwa b. Z˙ołnierzy i Przyjaciół 15. Pułku Ułanów Poznan´skich, 1999), 12–13.

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Figure 19. Second lieutenant from the 6th Grenadier Regiment with a Prussian infantry officer’s backsword M89, awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class, 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

vertically with the barrel down in a leather gun slide (Karabinerschuh) affixed to the rear part of the saddle, on the left side. In a mounted tactical formation, the lance’s tassel was put across the right arm. When a combat order was given, in an infantry tactical formation, the marksmen would drive their lances into the ground where the horse-holders were keeping the horses, and would put the short rifles on their backs.355. In the time in question, the regiments of the field artillery of the 10th Infantry Division were equipped with two versions of artillery sabres (Artillerie-Säbel): for privates and officers. Officers and higher-bracket NCOs had the Pistole-08. Supply wagon soldiers were equipped with the Mauser 1898 rifles, the Pistole-08

355 D.V.E. Nr. 192, Die Seitengewehre der Truppen zu Pferde und die Lanzen (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1908); William Balck, Taktik, Vol. 2: Kavallerie, Feld- und Fußartillerie im Feldkriege (Berlin: Verlag von R. Eisenschmidt, 1910), 7; Tafel 19–20 in: Rhein, Deutschlands Armee; Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 268.

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Figure 20. A watercolour – figures of two German officers: an infantry general (on the left), awarded the Pour le Mérite, the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class and his aide-de-camp in rank of captain, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

and cavalry sabres (Kavallerie-Säbel M1852/79) in versions for privates, NCOs and officers356. Each regiment of the 10th Field Artillery Brigade consisted of two divisions (each made up of three batteries and a light ammunition column). In the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, the I division included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd batteries, armed with 18 field cannons (FK 96 n.A.), 77 mm calibre357. The II division consisted of the 4th, 5th and 6th batteries equipped with 18 light field howitzers 356 Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 264–271. 357 The new FK 96 n.A. model of field cannon, 77 mm calibre, with an upgraded hydraulic recoil mechanism was delivered in 1906–1907 to arm the I division of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. Konrad Angerstein and Paul Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: Druck and Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1927), 10.

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Figure 21. Soldiers handling the German field cannon FK 96 n.A. calibre 77 mm take up firing position; uniforms and equipment from 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Figure 22. Limbering the field cannon FK 96 n.A. calibre 77 mm; field uniforms and equipment from 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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(lFH 98/09) 105 mm calibre358. The 20th Field Artillery Regiment was armed with 36 cannons (FK 96 n.A.) 77 mm calibre359. Therefore, the artillery equipment of the 10th Infantry Division included 54 cannons (FK 96 n.A.) 77 mm calibre and 18 light field howitzers (lFH 98/09) 105 mm calibre360. Each cannon battery possessed 6 cannons, 6 wagons and 16 carts. The hand stock of ammunition in a battery amounted to 780 cartridges i. e. 130 cartridges per cannon361.

Figure 23. The German light field howitzer lFH 98/09 calibre 105 mm and the service crew at a firing point in a forest in Lorraine in 1914; the 56th Field Artillery Regiment had 18 howitzers of this type, which proved very helpful during combat in difficult terrain in the 10th Infantry Division; visible, the three types of cartridges used for this howitzer. Photograph from the author’s collection.

The main means of transport in a division’s ammunition and supply services was horse-drawn carts of several types: the 96/09 forage cart, the 94 luggage cart, the 96 n/A train wagon362 and 24 carts in which machine guns were transported (6 in 358 In 1898, the Rheinmetall company started production of the 10.5 cm Feldhaubitze 98 light field howitzer. In the autumn of 1900, it became an element of the armaments of the II division of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. In 1909, the producer launched a new model of the howitzer with an enhanced hydraulic recoil mechanism which was introduced into the German Army as the 105 mm Feldhaubitze 98/09 (lFH 98/09). Angerstein and Schlemm, 9– 10, 180–181; Cron, Imperial, 10. 359 Benary, 8. 360 Angerstein and Schlemm, 112. 361 Balck, Taktik, Vol. 2, 247. 362 Hugo Wernigk, Wernigks Handbuch für die Einjährig-Freiwilligen Offizier-Aspiranten und die Offiziere des Beurlaubtenstandes der Feldartillerie (Berlin: Mittler, 1914).

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each of the 4 regimental machine-gun companies)363. Each company and squadron had its field kitchen, in German casually referred to as Gulaschkanone364 (goulash cannon).

Figure 24. The German heavy field howitzer sFH 02 calibre 150 mm in a firing point and the servicing soldiers during a firing break on the Western front in 1914; to the left of the howitzer is an ammunition wagon; this type of howitzer was used by the I battalion of the 5th Infantry Artillery from Poznan´, supporting the 10th Infantry Division on the Western front in 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

On the level of a division, of great importance in artillery combat was the distribution of machine gun ammunition. An infantryman equipped with the Mauser Gewehr 98 had a hand stock of 150 type “S” M1905 cartridges. More ammunition for a company was transported in ammunition carts (one per company, 4 in a battalion) while a single cart held 14,400 cartridges. Therefore, assuming that an infantry company in wartime in August 1914 consisted of 250 soldiers, every soldier from a single ammunition cart had at his disposal 77 cartridges. Further on, an army corps had 4 infantry ammunition columns which had 34 ammunition carts and each of them transported 23,000 cartridges. Thus, the ammunition stock from a single cart of an infantry company amounted to 144 cartridges per machine gun. In a division, an infantryman had at his disposal, in total, 227 cartridges (150 +77); on the level of a corps it was 361 cartridges (150+77+144). 363 Merkatz, 241. 364 On the front, German commanders of companies, battalions and regiments took special care of “the goulash cannon” because once it was destroyed it was impossible to deliver a new field kitchen. A company which lost a field kitchen had to do without hot meals, which was detrimental to the soldiers’ morale. Cron, Imperial, 96; D.V.E. Nr. 267, 185, 188.

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Figure 25. The German heavy field howitzer sFH 02 calibre 150 mm from a battery of a field artillery regiment at a firing point during a break, the Western front in 1914. The photo shows a battery NCO and a cartridge with a case in front of the howitzer. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Figure 26. A Packwagen 94 two-horse transport cart. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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Figure 27. A four-horse heavy ammunition cart for transporting shells from an ammunition column of an infantry artillery regiment, the Western front, the Meuse Hills (Lorraine), autumn 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

For the sake of comparison, a French soldier equipped with the Lebel Mle 1886 machine gun had a hand store of 120 cartridges. In a division, a French infantryman had at his disposal 267 cartridges, and in a corps – 431 cartridges. The larger amount of ammunition carried by the French infantry did not result in the French infantry having the advantage over German troops. The decisive factor was the armament: the French Lebel Mle 1886 rifle was clearly inferior to the German Mauser Gewehr 98 with respect to the rate of fire and reliability365.

365 Balck, Taktik, Vol. 1, 475.

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Figure 28. A two-horse supply cart Vorratswagen 96 n/A from a machine-gun company of an Infantry Regiment; on the cart is captured a French machine gun Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 calibre 8 mm; behind the cart stand soldiers handling the Maxim MG-08 machine gun; the soldier on the left is equipped with a leather transport belt; on the left is a machine gun cart; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Figure 29. A German company field kitchen with limbers and caissons and the service soldiers; the kettle’s lid is open, with mess tins next to it; the Western front, France. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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Figure 30. Two-horse sanitary carts (ambulances) used to transport the wounded (on stretchers); they were a part of the equipment of a division sanitary company in the 10th Infantry Division; visible the Red Cross marking. The photograph was published in the form of a postcard of pre-war drills in a sanitary company in 1914; the author’s collection.

Figure 31. A four-horse cart of a communication division, Belgium, August 1914; instead of the Pickelhaube, the soldiers wear shakos typical of this type of services. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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Figure 32. A horse-drawn cart of an artillery regiment crossing the river on a pontoon bridge built by the corps pontoon column; before 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Figure 33. A division’s field bakery baking bread; 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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Tactical and Operational Doctrines and Training According to the French366, the most important regulations which defined the German operational and tactical doctrine before the outbreak of the war in 1914 was the Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung from 1910367, which defines the rules of commanding tactical and operational forces, the Felddienst Ordnungs from 1908, on the army’s field service, and the Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie – the infantry regulations from 1906, supplemented in 1913368. An analysis of the content of the regulations and its importance leads to the conclusion that the French military men were right in their assessment made in the Interwar Period. According to the German doctrine included in the Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung, attack was the major mode of operation, and the goal was to destroy the enemy’s forces in an offensive battle369. According to the infantry regulations, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie from 1906, all the available units were to be present on the battlefield at the same time, because success was guaranteed by a mass assault and the pursuit of a conclusive situation. If possible, surprise was to be employed and any attack was to be launched with the strongest possible impetus. In the course of an infantry attack on the level of the division, attempts were to be made to envelop the enemy, reach the enemy force’s rear, surround and destroy it. On the level of the army corps, the remaining enemy forces were to be pursued, leading to a subsequent battle. On the level of the infantry division, beside all out attack, the regulations also provided for: 1) a brief engagement, where the forward units were to play a key role, and give the main division forces time to deploy, 2) an attack on a fortified position, during which the infantry attacked without artillery support; 3) an attack on a fortified position where the infantry took up initial positions under cover of darkness the night before, and attacked at dawn supported only by artillery. These regulations also stipulated that an extended line was the major battle formation of infantrymen on the level of the company, while an infantry attack was to be supported by artillery370.

366 In 1924, this thesis was put forward by Pascal Lucas, a French lieutenant colonel, in a book published in France and translated from the French, in Poland published in 1924. PascalMarie-Henri Lucas, Rozwój mys´li taktycznej we Francji i w Niemczech podczas wojny 1914– 1918 r., translated by Jerzy Biernacki (Warszawa: Tetragon, 2013), 27. 367 D.V.E. No. 53, Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung (Berlin: Mittler, 1910). 368 D.V.E. Nr. 130, Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai. 1906 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn), 1913. 369 D.V.E. No. 53, 7–14. 370 D.V.E. No. 130, 73–131.

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In the early 20th century, military service in the German army was meant to be a forge of character. In one of his works, General Wilhelm Balck – a prominent German military theoretician – wrote: However, the army has no community life for itself alone. Prior to the World War, the army was the school through which a very material portion of the people went. Army and people are, and must be, one. Education of the entire people for efficiency in war and willingness to sacrifice is a political and national necessity, and at the same time the main basis for the successful training for an army equal to all conditions. (…) That was possible only through the manner of our piece training, through rapid dissemination of all experiences and through never slacking in our work during the rest pauses between the battles371.

Before WWI, the system of training infantrymen was underpinned by the regulations from 1906, updated in 1913 and entitled Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie372. In the course of training a recruit, attention was paid to instil the infamous Prussian drill – obedience to the superiors in the battlefield, coupled with discipline. The field service regulations from 1908 also addressed the issue: The efficiency of a soldier depends not only upon his physical and military training, but upon his discipline and morale. To develop these qualities is the object of military education. (…) To this end the troops must learn discipline? which is the backbone of the army, and without which no victory can be achieved. It must be firmly established and strenuously maintained under all circumstances. An outer semblance of discipline, not consolidated by long training in peace time, will vanish at critical moments or under the influence of unexpected events373.

The stress created in the course of training a recruit by NCOs was expected to simulate combat stress and acquaint soldiers with it. However, it was more mindless discipline or blind obedience; it was symbolized by the Prussian corporal mistreating recruits374. During peacetime training, recruits learnt the drill which was to become second nature. As the regulations from 1908 emphasized, of equal significance was developing the ability to think on the battlefield, to take initiative and act unprompted. In combat, an infantryman was expected to demonstrate an offensive spirit, and this is why it was so important to know the drill, to shoot well and be a hardened foot soldier. The effects of the hard work were apparent 371 William Balck, Development of Tactics – World War (Fort Leavenworth: General Service Schools Press, 1922), 14. 372 D.V.E. Nr. 130. 373 D.V.E. Nr. 267, 1. 374 More on the role of Prussian drill in the training system and the German army’s fighting in 1871–1914 in Steven D. Jackman, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and “Old Prussian Drill” in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871–1914,” The Journal of Military History, no. 68 (2004): 73–104.

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following the announcement of the mobilization in August 1914. After several days spent in the German regiments, refreshing the ingrained habits, a reservist was as well trained as a conscript375. Following mobilization in August 1914, German infantrymen from the active divisions represented a very high level of firing training, which resulted from painstaking work on the part of the NCOs (firing instructors in infantry regiments) in peacetime. Beside his Pay book (German Soldbuch), every soldier also had a Firing book (German Schietzbuch) where all his shooting results were recorded, and the instructor marked the soldier’s progress. The system was extremely effective, because the superior could regularly check a soldier’s progress and introduce corrections. In the course of this training, the instructors placed considerable emphasis on the correct posture and shooting accuracy. Firing in squads and platoons was also practiced, to ensure that the soldiers were able to give sustained fire, with different degrees of intensity, according to the specific tactical situation on the battlefield. According to the infantry regulations from 1906, an infantry company started firing at a distance of 800 m from the enemy; later on, rows of soldiers would leap forward to get as close to the enemy’s positions as possible376. The German infantry’s success in combat depended on intense machine-gun fire, aimed at dominating the enemy troops and eliminating them. The infantry regulations from 1906 also placed emphasis on starting machine-gun fire at medium distance, thus increasing its effectiveness. In most cases, continuous German infantry machine-gunning from a distance of 300 to 500 m forced the enemy infantrymen to retreat or surrender. Before firing, a company commander indicated the target and organised the firing. This wasn’t possible when exchange of fire commenced due to the battle noise. Responsibility for organising the firing was handed down to the platoon commander, then to the section commander and then down to the level of the individual gunner who had to make decisions about the direction of fire. In combat, every soldier had to maintain so-called firing discipline: to observe one’s own firing, use ammunition with prudence, increase the firing rate when the enemy’s troops could be seen and to cease firing when the target took cover. However, when infantrymen of both sides clashed, bayonet fighting concluded the German infantry firing. At this stage of the fighting, the opposing infantry would frequently retreat. German soldiers were well trained in hand-to-hand fighting; they were also equipped with effective cold weapons, the solid Seitengewehr 1898/05 bayonet. Both in firing and hand-to-hand fighting, on the level of the platoon and battalion, the German

375 Balck, Development of Tactics, 19. 376 D.V.E. Nr. 130, 52–75; Balck, Development of Tactics, 32–39.

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infantryman was fairly independent, which made him a difficult opponent to the French377. Cavalry regiments were on an identical level of training in 1914; in the case of the 10th Infantry Division it was the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. German cavalry units operated with respect to the regulations of 1909378 according to which the cavalry had to fight in formation using heavy steel lances and backswords. Only in extremely favourable circumstances could cavalrymen fight on foot using the Mauser Karabiner 98. These regulations recommended that small cavalry units break through, taking advantage of surprise. The regulations were written down by cavalry officers who still believed in the power and efficiency of their weapons379. However, on the Western front in August 1914, the regulations were already anachronistic. This was verified by the first experiences on the battlefield when the French infantry, equipped with the Lebel Mle 1886 rifles, firing at short distance and mostly from hidden positions, inflicted heavy losses on the German cavalry operating in formation. This happened to the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, who, in September 1914, carried out fighting reconnaissance for the 10th Infantry Division380.

Covering Activities on the Border Once Emperor Wilhelm II announced the “war threat” in Germany on 31 July 1914, specified units of the Poznan´ garrison and the 10th Infantry Division were tasked with covering activities on the eastern border of the Province of Posen, which also served as a border with Russia. Placing a small number of troops on the border was aimed at detecting potential Russian offensive activities. If Russian divisions had invaded the Province of Posen, the covering units were to be in charge of slowing them down and retreating toward Poznan´ Fortress. In late July 1914, the 46th Infantry Regiment exercised in the Exercise Camp on the River Warta381. Despite the imminent war, the schedule of the summer ex377 Balck, Development of Tactics, 32–39; D.V.E. Nr. 130, 52–75. 378 D.V.E. Nr. 299, Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1909). 379 German cavalry officers were not the only ones who shared the sentiment about using cavalry in a modern war. Their view on the tactical use of cavalry was reflected in Great Britain and France. 380 Following the introduction of the new cavalry regulations in 1909, new tactical manuals were published in Germany: D.V.E. Nr. 299; Schießvorschrift für die Kavallerie Untertitel (Berlin: Verlag Mittler, 1909); Axel von Maltzahn, Kampfesformen und Kampfesweise der Kavallerie Untertitel: Taktisches Handbuch für den Kavallerie-Offizier des aktiven Dienststandes sowie der Reserve und Landwehr (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1913). 381 During WWI, in the Exercise Camp on the River Warta numerous ersatz battalions were stationed; units were formed and trained, including the 49th Reserve Division, the 103rd

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ercises had to be kept. The III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment received an order to return to its home barracks in Wrzes´nia as late as on 29 July. The remaining two battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment together with the staff returned to their barracks in Fort Winiary on 31 July382. When on 31 July 1914 at 15h00 the “war threat” was announced in Germany, commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment recalled all the unit’s soldiers from holiday by telegraph, and ordered them to return to barracks within 24 hours383. According to the plan, the covering units were also assigned by the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles; they were in charge of sending two officer patrols and, a few hours later, two squadrons to the eastern border. After less than an hour, two officer patrols were ready to leave. The first one, under the command of Lieutenant Andreas von Busse, prepared the 2nd squadron; the 3rd squadron was commanded by Second Lieutenant Euen. Since it was the first sub-unit of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles which set off on a military mission, it was personally inspected by the regiment’s commander, Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels, who checked the equipment, the weapons and the horses. At the end, he shook the officers’ hands and said “Do your duty!”384. Following this brief farewell ceremony, the door to the barracks at Auguste-Victoria-Strasse opened up for the officer patrols to set off for the border, which they reached as early as at 16h00. Soon, the 2nd squadron under the command of Rittmeister Blanck385 and the 3rd squadron under the command of Rittmeister von Krosigk collected their equipment from the mobilization warehouses. At the same time, their operational status was upgraded to war regulations, drawing on replenishments from the 5th squadron, which from that moment on became an ersatz squadron. Soon, both squadrons were ready to march out. A problem in completing this task could have been posed by the fact that Rittmeister Blanck, a newly appointed commander of the 2nd squadron, did not know his subordinates or the horses. However, before the two squadrons set off to complete the task, Doctor Schmalz, the Catholic chaplain of the 10th Infantry Division, arrived at the regiment’s

382 383 384 385

Infantry Division, the 403rd and the 404th Infantry Regiment. There were also specialist courses for the specific types of armament and services. Biesiadka, Gawlak, Kucharski, Wojciechowski, 252–253; Histories of Two Hundred, 486, 545, 586, 649. Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment, 68. Gerhard Loosch, Das Königl. preuβ. Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 8–10. Eduard Senftleben, Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Kriege (Berlin: Bernard&Graefe, 1937), 24. Before mobilization in August 1914, Rittmeister Blanck was a commander of the 5th squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. As part of the preparations for mobilization, Rittmeister von Nasso, the previous commander of the 2nd squadron, was assigned to the regiment staff. Consequently, Rittmeister Blanck was appointed commander of the 2nd squadron while reserve Rittmeister Freiherr von Schlotheim. Senftleben, 24–25.

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barracks to hear confession and to give the last rites. Next, Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels delivered a short farewell address, after which three cheers were shouted in honour of Emperor Wilhelm II. Next, the order was given: “March off from the right in twos!” and the two squadrons walked to the central train station, from which a train took them to the eastern border386. After 31 July, outposts of the 50th Infantry Regiment guarded facilities of strategic importance in the Rawicz garrison and around the city; after mobilization, these functions were taken over by Landsturm387. When on 31 July at 15h00, a cable message was sent to the staff of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment from Leszno with information about “the war threat”, following the respective procedures, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment was tasked with mobilising the regiment’s 3rd battery and sending it to the eastern border within the next 6 hours. Following intense preparations, the 3rd battery was ready to march off from the barracks as early as 21h15. After a short farewell ceremony and a speech delivered by Colonel Hans Lepper, the 3rd battery marched out to the train station and left for Ostrów, toward the eastern border388. On 30 July, just before 15h00, the staff of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment received orders from the staff of the V Army Corps. According to the mobilization schedule, the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment under the command of Captain Krautwald was subject to rapid mobilization. The order was immediately forwarded to the battery subunits where on the next day, intense preparations for departure were under way. All the NCOs assumed their functions; they had followed the procedure many times before in the case of mobilization. The cannoneers received war equipment and field uniforms; checks were conducted on the harnesses, wagons and cannon; in the arsenal, the bayonets and sabres were sharpened and artillery ammunition was collected. The cannoneers, NCOs and horses were supplemented from the 1st and 2nd batteries389. At 20h00, one hour ahead of time, the 3rd battery was ready for departure, as the battery commander proudly reported to Lieutenant Colonel von Schleicher, the regiment’s commander. In the evening, a roll-call was held on the barracks square for the 20th Field Artillery Regiment at Magazin Strasse in Poznan´, to bid farewell to the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. In attendance were the regiment officers and officers from the nearby staff of the V Army Corps, and the staff of the 10th Infantry Division. Among them was General Oskar Freiherr von Watter, commander of the 10th Artillery Brigade. During the ceremony, the trumpeters played Prussian marches. At 21h00, the horse-drawn carts of the 3rd 386 387 388 389

Senftleben, 25–27. Vogt, 1. Angerstein and Schlemm, 12. Benary, 24–28.

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battery left the barracks for the central train station. However, the 3rd platoon of the battery remained in the barracks under the command of NCO Wende, who received untrained horses and freshly arrived reservists. Consequently, he had to go through an entire preparation cycle, which was time-consuming. In the meantime, by 23h00, most of the 3rd battery was ready for transport from the central train station; around midnight, the battery left for Wrzes´nia and arrived there at 3h00. After moving into the quarters and a short sleep, the soldiers marched out in the morning of 31 July to Skolniki on the Russian border, 13.3 km away from Wrzes´nia390. On the border, the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment together with a battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment were incorporated into Bockelmann’s Border Protection Troops. Intense patrols ensued, and cars proved extremely helpful. In the course of border service, as a result of careless gun handling, cannoneer Schmaler from the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was the first casualty of the Great War. After several days of service on the border, the 3rd battery was relieved by a division of Landwehr and left the train station in Wrzes´nia to the west, to Lorraine391, the concentration area of the 10th Infantry Division392. On 31 July, after 5 hours on the train, at around 23h00 both squadrons of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles reached their destination, the train station in Wrzes´nia, where they were instantly unloaded. As the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment was stationed in the Wrzes´nia garrison (it was in charge of protecting the border with Russia), the squadron was subordinated to the battalion’s commander. After unloading, the 2nd squadron was ordered to march to the market square in Wrzes´nia, where it was warmly welcomed by the inhabitants who brought significant amounts of food and cigarettes for the cavalrymen. At 1h00, the first five cavalry patrols left Wrzes´nia for the Russian border; they were under the command of Second Lieutenant von Schmidt-Pauli, Second Lieutenant von Lieres, Vizewachtmeister Schulz, Sergeant Hennig and NCO Bielawski. The patrols were responsible for filling the borderline roads: Miłosław – Pyzdry and Wrzes´nia – Słupca393. Sergeant Meyer and 12 cavalrymen were appointed to a company of the 46th Infantry Regiment in Strzałkowo. Initially, 390 Topographische Übersichtskarte des Deutschen Reiches 1:200.000 – TUDR 94: Wreschen, Landesaufnahme 1901, Auflagedruck 1914, WIG Map Archive, Königlich-Preussische Landesaufnahme, accessed July 13, 2017, http://www.mapywig.org [further referred to as WIG, Topographische Übersichtskarte, Wreschen 1914]; Benary, 24–28. 391 Bezirk Lothringen (Lorraine Department) – Before 1914, the German administration area in Lorraine with its capital in Metz was inhabited by French- and German-speaking populations. As a result of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871, the region was incorporated into the German Empire until 1918. 392 Benary, 24–28. 393 WIG, Topographische Übersichtskarte, Wreschen 1914.

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there was no intelligence on the Russian troops. However, on the morning of 1 August, Rittmeister Blanck was summoned by the commander of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment to Wrzes´nia for a briefing. Aerial reconnaissance had detected a Russian cavalry division approaching the German border. For this reason, at the briefing, a plan for defending Wrzes´nia was devised and positions for the units were specified394. However, the Russian cavalry division did not cross the border. Around noon on 1 August, a German Zeppelin flew majestically over Wrzes´nia, on its course from Poznan´ to the east. It was undoubtedly a demonstration of German power, aimed at discouraging the Russians from progressing toward Poznan´ Fortress. Shortly after noon on 1 August, the Germans were already at war with Russia. The sight of the airship had a comforting effect on the locals, as well as the solitary, forward German division of 1,300 soldiers who did not have much chance of effective defence in case of an attack by the Russian cavalry and all they could have done was stall. On the evening of 1 August, 18 cavalrymen were ordered to secure the train station in Miłosław, south of Wrzes´nia395. When, on 1 August, the 3rd battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment arrived in Ostrów, it was unloaded and subordinated to Major Hans Preusker, a commander of the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment. As a result, a battalion combat group was formed. On 2 August, the soldiers from the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment marched into Russia and occupied Kalisz. According to the German commander’s account, the battalion was attacked by Russian troops. In order to support the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment, the 3rd battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment was brought to Kalisz. On 3 August, the battery’s gun squads assumed their firing positions in the vicinity of a brickyard, south-west of Kalisz, and were exposed to strong machine-gun fire and lost several horses396. The gunmen could only retreat under 394 Presumably, after crossing the German border, the Russian cavalry division would have attacked along the main road to the east and the west from Konin through Golina, Słupca, Strzałkowo (the German border village) to Wrzes´nia. The distance between Strzałkowo and Wrzes´nia amounted to 18 km. Ibidem. 395 The distance between Miłosław and Wrzes´nia was 15 km. Senftleben, 28–29; WIG, Topographische Übersichtskarte, Wreschen 1914. 396 The destruction of Kalisz by the German troops in August 1914, contributions, holding civilian hostages, executing civilians, looting, arson and forcing the inhabitants to abandon their homes were acts violating the laws of engagement. While the reasons for this behaviour by the German soldiers remain unknown, we do know that on the night of 3 August 1914 the patrols of the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment were fired on in the streets of Kalisz, which resulted in a chaotic exchange of fire. The Germans claimed that they had been attacked by Russian troops and by prisoners armed by the Russians. According to a different theory, the patrols of the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment advanced at night in an unknown area and fired on themselves. However, bearing in mind the quality of the training of German infantry, this scenario is not very likely. The 3rd battery of the 56th Field Artillery

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the escort of the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment. Due to the attack, the 3rd battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment opened fire on Kalisz; on the following days, it supported the II battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment. After the fighting, on 9 August the 3rd battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment left for the area of concentration of the 10th Infantry Division397. According to earlier plans devised in case of a war in Russia, both patrols from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles crossed the eastern border of Germany and marched into the enemy’s territory. On 2 August at 11h00, an officer patrol under the command of Second Lieutenant von Busse was ordered to set off to the east from Strzałkowo to Konin398 while Second Lieutenant Euen’s patrol to the south east from Strzałkowo to Rychwał (south of Konin)399. Before noon, Second Lieutenant von Busse’s division together with Vizewachtmeister Michler and 18 cavalrymen crossed the border after Strzałkowo and found themselves in Russia, marching to Konin via Słupca400. Following the patrol commander’s order, the cavalrymen destroyed telephone wiring en route; consequently, situation reports were sent to the staff in Wrzes´nia by means of homing pigeons. At 17h00, the patrol of Second Lieutenant von Busse marched into Konin. At that time, no initial contact with the enemy had been established. By order of the Vizewachtmeister, Michler and the cavalrymen secured all the roads from the city. Second Lieutenant von Busse summoned the city council to inform it that soon the entire V Army Corps would reach Konin and demanded absolute obedience401. The terrified city council surrendered; at the German officer’s request, all telephones were submitted and destroyed. Equally valuable was intelligence on the Russian troops’ preparations for the defence of Konin. A patrol of mounted rifles set oak planks on fire, intended to be used to build a bridge across the Warta. As a result, the mission of the patrol of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was complete and Second Lieutenant von Busse led his division back to Strzałkowo. This was evidence of the tactical prowess of the cavalrymen from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, who needed only 9 hours to cover 70 km in the August heat.

397 398 399 400 401

Regiment also came under strong gunfire. Arens, 44–50. More on the developments in Kalisz in August 1914 in Maciej Drewicz, Wypadki kaliskie 1914. Reinterpretacja obrazu zdarzen´ (Kaliskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk: Kalisz, 2014). Angerstein and Schlemm, 14. The distance from Strzałkowo to Konin amounted to 33.7 km. WIG, Topographische Übersichtskarte, Wreschen 1914. The distance from Strzałkowo via Słupca, La˛dek, Zagórów to Rychwał amounted to 44.2 km. Ibid. The distance from Słupca to Konin was 27.6 km. Ibidem. Of course the information that the entire V Arms Corps was on its way from Poznan´ to Konin was not true because the Corps was to be transported to the Western front. The message must have reached the Russian operational staff stationed in that area; one should conclude therefore that it was an example of making use of disinformation by Second Lieutenant von Busse from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles.

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Another patrol from the 2nd squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles under the command of NCO Seer, consisting of 9 cavalrymen, was sent on 2 August from Wrzes´nia to the south east, to the small town of Pyzdry, located in Russia402. The mission was successfully completed, without making ground contact with the enemy. At the same time it was ascertained that the bridge across the Warta had not been destroyed. The patrol of Second Lieutenant Seer returned to Wrzes´nia following the reconnaissance403. In the evening of 31 July, the 3rd squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles made an appearance 40 km south of Jarocin where it joined the III battalion of the 155th Infantry Regiment and was tasked with covering the border area. Soon, four patrols were sent out to secure the border along the River Prosna and the vicinity of Pleszew, up to the River Warta. On 2 August, deputy NCO Liebhardt, who was in charge of a patrol of mounted rifles in Grodzisk, was ordered to conduct reconnaissance in the town of Chocz, located across the border. The mission was completed, and the inhabitants provided information that a squadron of Cossacks had withdrawn shortly before from Chocz. Weapons and ammunition were found in the local town hall, and represented the first pillage by the mounted rifles regiment404. In the meantime, on the eastern border, where two squadrons of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles operated, on 3 August, the 2nd squadron commanded by Rittmeister Blanck was ordered to take position on the bridge on the River Warta in Pyzdry405 until the infantry arrived. When the 2nd squadron crossed the border, instead of Russian troops it encountered stacks of hay and straw that had been razed to the ground. At 14h00, the cavalrymen seized the bridge on the River Warta, much to the locals’ curiosity. Soon, a Catholic priest arrived and invited the squadron’s commander and the officers to dinner. When Rittmeister Blanck refused, because he did not want to leave the squadron without command, the priest sent a table with crockery to the vicinity of the bridge, where the officers could eat their meal. Two Russian customs officers were soon captured and sent by car to the staff in Wrzes´nia. In the afternoon, the 2nd squadron was relieved by the 2nd company of the 46th Infantry Regiment and marched to Józef Z˙ychlin´ski’s manor in Gorazdowo406, where the soldiers were welcomed. On 5 August, the 2nd squadron was reinforced by an alternate squadron under the command of reserve Second Lieutenant Unterberger from the 1st King’s 402 The distance from Wrzes´nia to Pyzdry amounted to 20.5 km. WIG, Topographische Übersichtskarte, Wreschen 1914. 403 Senftleben, 29–30. 404 Ibidem, 30–32. 405 WIG Map Archive, Karte des Deutschen Reiches 1:100.000, A33: Miloslaw – Pyzdry, 1914, accessed on July 13, 2017, http://www.mapywig.org. 406 Gorazdowo is located 6 km to the north of Pyzdry.

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Mounted Rifles. On 7 August, the 2nd squadron set off to the train station in Wrzes´nia to leave for the west, to the area of concentration of the 10th Infantry Division407. On 3 August, a patrol of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles under the command of Second Lieutenant von Friedrich was ordered to conduct reconnaissance in the south between Stawiszyn and Rychwał408 which belonged to Russia. In the evening of 3 August, the patrol reached Stawiszyn, where the telegraphic connection was destroyed, and on 4 August, around noon, the patrol reached Rychwał. While the local Polish and Jewish populations were surprised by the invasion of the German troops, their reactions were calm. When the troops left the town, homing pigeons were sent out with reports and the patrol was on its way back. Again, no initial contact with Russian troops was established. On the morning of 8 August, the 3rd squadron under the command of Rittmeister Krosigk boarded a train in Jarocin. This is how the covering activities of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles on Germany’s eastern border drew to an end, and the 3rd squadron left, via Poznan´, for the area of concentration of the 10th Infantry Division in Lorraine409.

The Course of Mobilization Following Emperor Wilhelm II’s announcement of “the threat of war” on 31 July 1914, the first reservists arrived at the barracks of the 47th Infantry Regiment in Poznan´ and in S´rem as early as at 20h00. Soldiers from the guard subunits were the first to collect the feldgrau field uniforms and war equipment from the mobilization warehouses. Next they were transported to the designated facilities within the Poznan´ garrison. According to the mobilization plan for the 47th Infantry Regiment, some officers were in charge of organizing the reserve units and Landwehr. In the barracks of the 47th Infantry Regiment, mobilization was announced on 1 August at 6h45. When on the morning of 2 August, mobilization was put in motion, in the barracks NCOs and officers had to handle large numbers of reservists, Landwehr soldiers and alternate reservists. This situation was nothing new to the reservists who were familiar with the army. However, alternate reservists who had not been trained, posed a lot of problems for the NCOs and junior officers. In order to be in control of the situation, privates on active military service were ordered to take command of the alternate reservists. The mobilised horses, not acquainted with military rigour, were also a source of 407 Senftleben, 32. 408 The distance from Stawiszyn to Rychwał was 18 km. WIG, Topographische Übersichtskarte, Wreschen 1914. 409 Senftleben, 33.

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problems. Second Lieutenant Borchers, who was in charge of mobilization in the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment in S´rem, reminisced about the developments: Appointing the reservists to the companies was relatively quick. However, the large number of alternate reservists who had not been in the army, were maddening. When the “Turn left!” command was given, about half of them turned right. When they were ordered on one side, chaos ensued on the other side. Only calm and patience could help. Now they were all to be examined by doctors, which was no mean feat with approximately 4,000 people. The staff physician and the assisting physician were on the spot. In the meantime, transports of mobilised horses arrived. The poor animals were standing there alone, left to their own devices. It seemed that one horse belonged to absolutely nobody. It stood there from morning to evening and nobody fed it, until I took pity on it. Finally, it was taken away. Food for the privates was cooked day and night. The field kitchens arrived. Everything worked, even if there were some small problems. We, the officers, were there to help… According to the regulations, from the beginning of the mobilization, horses were to be ridden on a daily basis, but nobody really had the time for it. It was handled right at the last moment, shortly before the march to the train station. None of the horses, except for the two drawing the battalion cart, would cooperate. This was probably because they had never drawn carts in horse collars before. It was already dark and they were just standing there. We pushed the cart towards their hind legs, but to no avail. Finally, after an hour’s effort and with a sweaty brow we used whips to force them to walk. There was no other way, as they were still there at midnight. We made them trot around the barracks yard in the dark to get used to the collars. We finally managed to take them on time to the station from which they were to be transported410.

Once the companies of the 47th Infantry Regiment were complete, the soldiers were trained in firing and the use of equipment, including first-aid kits. In the course of training, bonds were forged in the units, while the NCOs and the soldiers had an opportunity to get to know each other. The first to complete mobilization in the 47th Infantry Regiment was the 4th company, under the command of Captain Schmittendorf, and a platoon from the machine-gun company under the command of Lieutenant Werner Hoffmann. They were sent to the unloading station in Busendorf in German Lorraine (15 km to the west of Saarlouis)411. According to the mobilization plan, the 47th Infantry Regiment was to leave for the concentration area on 6 and 7 August. Before that, a farewell telegram was sent to the regiment’s chief, Ludwig III of Bavaria. The king’s 410 Loosch, Das Königl, 8–10. 411 Cartographic collection: Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen im Auftrage des Kaiserlichen Ober-Präsidiums zu Strassburg nach amtlichen Quellen bearb. von Heinrich Kiepert; Schriftst. v. C. Bischoff; Terrainst. v. J. Sulzer, 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg, [further referred to as Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, BNUS].

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reply was sent immediately by telegraph: “I thank my regiment for a pleasant farewell. May a candid blessing accompany my courageous 47th (regiment) Ludwig”412. On the first day of mobilization, on 2 August 1914, things were hectic in the barracks of the 6th Grenadier Regiment at Buker Strasse in Poznan´, yet everything went according to the mobilization schedule. The numerous reservists were immediately allocated to their respective companies. The mobilization stores opened, for the mobilization NCOs to hand out field uniforms, equipment and weapons. At the same time, the company commanders organised drill marches and training, to tune in the subunits and let the soldiers break in their new shoes. The mobilised saddle horses arrived at the grenadier regiment on which the aidede-camps practised horse-riding. The regiment’s staff was quite surprised when on 3 August, an order came to change the regiment’s commander. Colonel Kurt von Gallwitz, genannt Dreyling, was promoted to general major and appointed commander of the 21st Reserve Brigade in the 11th Reserve Division of the VI Reserve Corps. By the same order, he was to be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn, who did not know the regiment or his subordinates. Bearing in mind the fact that soon the 6th Grenadier Regiment was to set off on a march to the front, this decision was extremely risky413. When the mobilization was announced, in the 46th Infantry Regiment everything went according to plan. The first mobilised subunits of the 46th Infantry Regiment included a machine-gun company and a division of bicycle infantry. On the night of 2 August 1914, the mobilised subunits of the 46th Infantry Regiment were sent out by train to Wrzes´nia where after mobilization they supported the III battalion in charge of covering activities on the border with Russia. In the course of intense mobilization in the barracks reduit of Fort Winiary (Kernwerk), the regiment orchestra under the command of Fußhauer would frequently play merry melodies. Reservists and mobilised horses also arrived at the barracks. On 7 August, the machine-gun company and the unit of bicycle infantry returned from the Russian border. On 8 August, the mobilised companies of the 46th Infantry Regiment were inspected and trial marches were organised which proved that the unit was ready for departure to the concentration area of the 10th Infantry Division in Lorraine414. 412 Loosch, Das Königl, 11. 413 Colonel Kurt von Gallwitz, genannt Dreyling, was commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment from 22 April 1912. Rangliste, 168; Gottberg, 27–28. 414 In the Kerwerk barracks, the I battalion of the 46th Reserve Infantry Regiment was mobilised; the II battalion was mobilised in Szamotuły and the III battalion in Nowy Tomys´l; the machine-gun company of the regiment was mobilised by the 6th Grenadier Regiment. In the course of mobilization, the 46th Reserve Infantry Regiment was a part of the 10th Reserve Division of the V Reserve Corps. Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment, 68; About mobilization of

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On 2 August, the mobilization was in full swing in the barracks of the 50th Infantry Regiment in Rawicz and Leszno. Many war volunteers who reported in the barracks in Rawicz were from Wrocław. On 3 August, the reservists collected new field uniforms from the mobilization stores and were inoculated. As the mobilised divisions in Leszno and in Rawicz could not be held in the barracks, some of them were relocated to the nearby villages. Among the Poles conscripted to the 50th Infantry Regiment in Rawicz was Antoni Skorupka from Kosowo, a village near Gostyn´ (Province of Posen)415. On 6 August, mobilization of the garrison in Leszno was completed and in the evening a field mass was celebrated in the yard of the barracks of the 56thy Field Artillery Regiment, attended also by the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment416. According to the schedule, the mobilization in the 20th Field Artillery Regiment started on 2 August. One of the soldiers in the regiment, officer cadet Kruse, recalled the time in the Poznan´ barracks in the following way: Suddenly everything accelerated! Initially, nobody knew what to do first. The only thing that came to your mind was “There will be war!” At that time no Prussian Wachtmeister was required. The barracks corridors echoed to loud shouts [of the mobilization NCOs – B.K.]: “Vacate the rooms to collect equipment!”. Order was instantly imposed on the nervously excited group. Everyone hurried to the top floor where the battery’s mobilization store was located, to collect uniforms and war equipment. The iron door opened with a creak. In the mysterious darkness, the dull smell of combat hit us. The quartermaster opened an iron-lined manhole. In the sunlight, the surprised soldiers saw an astounding amount of equipment. Under the ceiling hung a long row of shoes for the cavalrymen and gunmen. To the left and right, there were heaps of feldgrau field uniforms, woollen shirts and underwear. The large closets held helmets, belts, revolvers, haversacks, tins with salt and coffee and lots of small and large pieces of equipment. All these objects oozed a funny sense of safety. Everything was so well taken care of. Nothing was missing. There were huge numbers of everything, including helmet covers and hobnails. Thoughts about the future were soon dispersed by Zimmermann and Sommerfeld, the clothing NCOs. In the blink of an eye, we all held uniforms. We were ordered to leave for the Tama Garbarska Train Station417 and collect the reservists, to carry the revolver ammunition, to walk to the armament workshop to have our bayonets

the 46th Reserve Infantry Regiment: Oscar Jesco von Puttkamer, Das Königlich Preußische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 46 im Weltkriege (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1938), 1–7. 415 Wawrzyniec Skorupka, Moje morgi i katorgi: 1914–1967 (Poznan´: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1970), 27. 416 Vogt, 1; Angerstein and Schlemm, 13. 417 Tama Garbarska Train Station – one of Poznan´’s train stations, located in the northern part of the city, close to the River Warta, Kerwerk and the barracks of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. Neuesterplan der Provinzial Haupt- und Residenzstadt Posen, 1:12.500, Posen 1913, APP:Pl.m.Poz.12a, Najstarsze mapy Poznania do 1938 roku, Archiwum Pan´stwowe w Poznaniu.

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and sabres sharpened and to go to ulica Główna to requisition vehicles. The mobilization order triggered off a seemingly despotic yet very detailed plan418.

However, sometimes the mobilization stores of the 10th Infantry Division did not hold enough stock. This was the case of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. In the course of the unit’s mobilization, Captain Eberhard Merckel, commander of the 1st Light Ammunition Column, discovered with horror that his soldiers lacked the regulation shoe and clothes brushes. He immediately reported this oversight to Wachtmeister Linde who replied with stoic calm: “It would only be dead weight, captain, a horse-comb will replace both”. The captain, displeased with the answer, replied: “But Linde, do you think the cutlery I am just going to buy, is also dead weight?” The Wachtmeister replied: “Of course, captain, dry bread in one hand and a piece of fatback in the other will taste the best”. In late 1914, when the 20th Field Artillery Regiment fought on the Meuse Hills, the captain remembered these words, which he commented on in the presence of his subordinate, by saying “Wachtmeister, you were right”419. As the artillery barracks at Magazin Strasse in Poznan´ were overcrowded (the 10th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment420 and some of the units of the Fortress Poznan´ artillery were mobilised there), General Robert Kosch issued an order for the specific batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment to relocate to the villages around Poznan´. In the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, just like in the infantry regiments of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division, some professional officers, NCOs and privates had to be relocated to units of reserve artillery mobilised in the garrison including the 10th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment. They were replaced by reservists who had to freshen up their artillery skills. At the same time, mobilised horses (draft and steeds) were allocated to the battery and had to be shoed, because a majority of the reserve horses were not shoed. The regimental blacksmiths showed exceptional physical endurance, as they stood for hours on end at hot furnaces and anvils, hammering the horseshoes. The 20th Field Artillery Regiment also mobilised two light ammunition columns, one for each battery. At the same time, the batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, mobilised in the villages near Poznan´, suffered from a lack of field kitchens, i. e. no hot food. The stationary kitchens located in the barracks of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment at Magazin Strasse wasn’t able to cook enough hot meals. The cooks had to first serve soldiers from the locally mobilised artillery units. This 418 Benary, 22. 419 Benary, 22. 420 In the course of mobilization in August 1914, the 10th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment was incorporated into the 10th Reserve Division from the V Reserve Corps. Martin Lezius, Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee, Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs (Berlin: Militär-Verlag, 1927), 64, 104–105; Histories of Two Hundred, 184–187.

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meant that hot meals were not delivered to the batteries of the parent regiment in the nearby villages. It was undoubtedly a serious organisational oversight in the mobilization system of the Poznan´ garrison. The artillery inspectorate should have taken care of it in the area of the V Army Corps before the war. As soon as reservists filled the batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment and the mobilised horses were enlisted, the painstaking process of allocating horse-drawn carts and cavalrymen began, accompanied by intense gunnery works421. The staff of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment in Leszno received the mobilization order on 1 August at 6h30. Shortly afterwards the officers and NCOs in charge of the process opened the safes to retrieve the mobilization agendas. On the following day, reservists started to arrive at the barracks in Leszno, horsedrawn carts were driven from the coach house, the mobilization warehouses were opened, mobilised horses came gradually while the old blue uniforms used in garrison service were replaced by field uniforms in the feldgrau colour. Each squadron of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment was accompanied by a light ammunition column with 24 carts. Next to its own batteries, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment mobilised a majority of the 10th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment; the remaining part was mobilised by the 20th Field Artillery Regiment422. On 4 August, reserve Lieutenant Wolff from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was assigned to the Commander of Anti-aircraft Warfare of Fortress Poznan´ (German Führer des Luft- und Waffenschutzes), reserve Lieutenant Mu¨ tzel. His command point was located in “Reger” Soap Factory, close to the train station in Starołe˛ka423 (German Luisenhaim)424. The fortress’s anti-aircraft defences included a platoon of searchlights, an infantry platoon at the train station in Starołe˛ka, two MG-08 machine guns on a bridge on the Warta and an air defence battery425 from the 5th Fortress Artillery Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Goettke. Soon, the mentioned command point received an order from General Hermann von Strantz, the commander of the V Army Corps, to consider aircraft flying at more than 50 m as Russian and shoot them down. In the afternoon, General Hermann von Strantz issued an order: “According to the railwaymen, an aeroplane is approaching the city, probably Russian. If it is not 421 Benary, 23. 422 Angerstein and Schlemm, 13. 423 Starołe˛ka Mała – in the early 20th century it was a village on the northern outskirts of Poznan´, close to the eastern bank of the Warta. Numerous factories were built there. The village was incorporated into the city of Poznan´ in 1925. Waldemar Karolczak, “Z dziejów Małej Starołe˛ki na pocza˛tku XX wieku,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 4 (2009): 190–210. 424 The staff of the Anti-aircraft Warfare in Fortress Poznan´ included the commander, an NCO, a telephone operator and a runner. 425 Despite a time-consuming search in the sources and literature on the subject, I did not manage to establish the type of anti-aircraft gun at the unit’s disposal. A hypothesis could be put forward that it was the Maxim Flak M14 autocannon calibre 37 mm.

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marked – fire! Exercise utmost caution!”. This instruction was forwarded to the subordinate divisions. Soon Lieutenant Goettke, the battery’s commander, reported: “An unmarked aeroplane – shall I shoot?”. Reserve Lieutenant Mu¨ tzel confirmed “Yes!”. A barrage of flak ensued and exploded around the aeroplane. These were the first shots over Poznan´ during WWI. The aeroplane was damaged, several shells punctured the wings, but the engine remained intact. Still, the pilot had to make an emergency landing at Ławica airport. The air defence battery in Starołe˛ka rejoiced, until it turned out that it was an unmarked German aeroplane. On 6 August, reserve Lieutenant Wolff was replaced by reserve Lieutenant Müller and was able to return to the 4th battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment426. On the morning of 2 August, mobilization started in the barracks of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, which was tasked with mobilising its 4 squadrons, a reserve regiment division, an alternate reserve squadron, the 4th squadron of Landsturm and gendarmerie divisions of the V Army Corps. Reservists walked in large numbers from the train station to the mounted rifles’ barracks, among them 200 reserve and Landwehr cavalrymen from the city of Bochum. Reservists from Westphalia were assigned to the alternate squadron. At the same time, mobilised horses were transported from villages around Poznan´ and soon all the available space in the barracks and around them was filled with horses. Despite the hectic activities that may have looked chaotic, the hundreds of items on the mobilization agenda were efficiently completed. The cavalrymen had to collect field uniforms and equipment including dog tags, personal dressings and field rations from the mobilization stores, and later carry all these valuable items to lockers in the soldiers’ rooms. Short rifles, pistols, bayonets and sabres were handed out; the latter needed to be sharpened. The regulation amount of rifle ammunition was also handed out, 45 pieces per rifleman. Next, saddles and harnesses had to be collected from the mobilization stores. Draught horses had to be harnessed to carts and trial rides had to be taken. The same procedure was adopted for saddle horses. All the mobilised horses had to be shoed again. All the carts had to be packed in line with the regulations. The Wachtmeisters in the specific squadrons made sure that the tasks were completed according to the schedule. Moreover, the entire staff on the level of a regiment had to switch to mobile organisation and be equipped with horses427. On 1 August at 6h30, the mobilization order reached the 5th Pioneer Battalion in Głogów, which faced the important task of forming numerous units. The 1st Field Pioneer Company was mobilised (the 9th Infantry Division) together with the 2nd and 3rd field pioneer companies (the 10th Infantry Division) which as part of the 5th Pioneer Battalion formed the I Pioneer Division. Its commander 426 Benary, 24–25; Senftleben, 27. 427 Senftleben, 27.

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was Lieutenant Colonel Haenichen. All the mentioned companies were assigned to both Infantry Divisions of the V Army Corps. What is more, as part of the II Pioneer Division, the 5th Pioneer Battalion formed the 1st and the 2nd field pioneer companies incorporated into the V Reserve Corps. The subsequent units mobilised by the 5th Pioneer Battalion included two pioneer companies of Landwehr, two Landsturm companies, a pioneer division of the 5th Cavalry Division, a Bridge Column for the Reserve Division, the 9th and 10th Division Bridge Columns, the 5th Bridge Column and the 5th Searchlight Pioneer Platoon for the V Army Corps plus own Alternate Battalion which stayed behind in Głogów428. In the atmosphere of animated mobilization works, the soldiers in the Poznan´ garrison realised that soon they would be sent to the front. A solemn ceremony was held on the afternoon of 3 August at Wilhelm Platz in Poznan´ where the last field mass was celebrated by Weiche, senior consistorial advisor, and attended by a large number of the city’s inhabitants. The other formations included the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. In the afternoon of 5 August, instructed by the regiment’s commander, the 1st company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment collected three banners of the specific regiment battalions from the building of the staff of the V Army Corps. The other regiments of the 10th Infantry Division followed suit. At 18h00, Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn, the new grenadier commander, organised in the barracks square the last roll-call before leaving for the front429. In August 1914, the German mobilization system was like a well-oiled machine, which within 12 days increased the number of soldiers from 808,280 to 3,502,700430. On 7 August 1914, on the fifth day of mobilization, the majority of the 10th Infantry Division reached endurance readiness. The lion’s share of the soldiers were reservists from Poznan´ and the Province of Posen, among them many soldiers of Polish origin. A smaller number of Poles served in the 9th Infantry Division, the other large unit of the V Army Corps whose soldiers came mostly from the north-western part of Silesia431. Once mobilization was announced in Poznan´ and in the Province of Posen, civilians and the mobilised soldiers were very scared of the approaching war and anxious about the lives of their loved ones. These sentiments grew after the announcing of the so-called “stage of siege” in Fortress Poznan´, which naturally fuelled fear among civilians not acquainted with military procedures in case of war. For this reason, the German military authorities used newspapers like the 428 429 430 431

Koch, Das Niederschlesische, 44–45. Gottberg, 28. Watson, Ring of Steel, 73. Histories of Two Hundred, 169.

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Polish “Dziennik Poznan´ski” and “Kurier Poznan´ski” to explain and calm down the civilians. Disturbing gossip circulated about Russian Cossacks, who were said to be approaching the gates of Poznan´. People “saw” a column of cars transporting gold from France to Russia in transit through the Province of Posen. Spies were chased in the streets of Poznan´ and suspects were taken immediately to the guardhouse. The “credible” information about the Russian convoy with gold reached the staff of the 47th Infantry Regiment. Subsequently, the aide-decamp of the II battalion of the regiment, Second Lieutenant Dreßler, was ordered to travel to Zaniemys´l where allegedly one of the cars from the Russian column with gold had been spotted. Not surprisingly, the report was not confirmed. A funny event occurred at the post of the 2nd company of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment which was guarding a railway embankment. One of the soldiers from the post, standing guard at night and having heard a noise, shot at the presumed attacker, presumably a Russian spy. The shot proved good, but in the morning, much to the joy of the sentry’s friends, they found a dead black cat with a gun wound432. In activities against the “Russian column with gold” was involved a patrol under the command of Second Lieutenant von Busse from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, tasked with covering activities in Strzałkowo (a borderline village). The patrol received an urgent report from the staff in Wrzes´nia that a passenger car was driving at high speed toward the border, most likely transporting gold and intending to cross the border by force. Cavalrymen blocked the road, released the safety catches of short rifles and prepared themselves to stop the car. However, when the vehicle stopped in front of the roadblock, Major von Busse from the 12th von Arnim Dragon Regiment433 from Gniezno stepped out. He was in charge of covering the border north of Strzałkowo. Apart from the military reasons, the visit created an opportunity for a family reunion between Major von Busse and his nephew, Second Lieutenant von Busse434.

Departure to the Concentration Area When mobilization was over and the regiments were packed and loaded on wagons, the specific companies were arranged into columns, left the barracks and marched to the train station. In Poznan´ and the garrison towns in the area of the V Army Corps, women in their Sunday best would see off their sons, husbands 432 Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment, 10. 433 Because before mobilization in 1914, Gniezno had already been in the area of the II Army Corps with the staff headquarters in Szczecin, the 12th von Arnim Dragoon Regiment reported to the 4th Infantry Division. Führer durch Heer und Flotte, 98. 434 Senftleben, 30.

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and brothers, whose uniforms, rifles and even carts and cannons were adorned with flowers. Soon they were to join their transport units and leave for the concentration area. The soldiers departed to the sounds of regimental orchestras. On the platforms, women from the Red Cross gave the soldiers chocolate, food supplies, coffee and cigarettes; the conversations in the wagons took place in German, as well as Polish, a language banned from the Prussian barracks before the war435. In the context of the previously anti-Polish policy of the Prussian authorities, another unusual thing was that soldiers of Polish origin were allowed to carry on correspondence in their mother tongue. In early September 1914, permission was granted to deliver Polish newspapers to the front, but only sent directly by the publishers436. The railways, one of the achievements of German development, made it possible to relocate the troops quickly, on an unprecedented scale and with truly Prussian precision. Before the outbreak of the Great War, the General Staff decided that 11,000 trains would be used to transport the mobilised troops. Between 2 and 18 August, 2,150 transport units crossed the Hohenzollern bridge on the Rheine in Cologne alone, each unit consisting of 54 wagons437. According to the German war plan perfected over many years, on the 15th day after announcing mobilization, the specific armies were to reach the concentration area438. In the meantime, the battalions of the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division, stationed in various garrisons in the area of the V Army Corps, left to the concentration area independently. That was the case of the 46th, 47th and the 50th Infantry Regiments. What is more, during mobilization the appointed units of the 10th Infantry Division received special tasks related to covering the eastern border; they could not head for Lorraine before the tasks were completed. Confident in the power of the German army, people thought that the war would last barely several weeks and that within month, the German divisions would parade through Paris. The morale was very high and the soldiers would write ironic texts in chalk on the wagons: “Dear Wilhelm, please leave my Liège in peace!”439, “Dear Albert, we will be in Brussels in three days”440, “One thrust, one

435 436 437 438 439

Kraus, Bd. 1: Infanterie-Regimenter, 1. O gazety polskie dla z˙ołnierzy, “Kurier Poznan´ski” no. 205, August 8, 1914. John Keegan, The First World War (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000), 73. Prauzin´ski and Ulrich, W marszu, 16. “Lieber Wilhelm, ich bitt Dich, lass mir mein Lüttich!” – words addressed at Wilhelm II, king of Prussia and German Emperor. 440 “Lieber Albert, wart ein bissel, in drei Tagen sind wir in Brüssel” – the author addressed Albert I of Belgium.

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Frenchman, one shot, one Russian”441, “The French and Serbs – they will all die”442, “On our way for breakfast. In Paris”443, “To Paris” or “Poincaré444, beware, we will make mincemeat of you”445. On 6 August at 19h58, transport units of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment (without the 4th company) departed for the West. On 7 August at 3h58, the III battalion was transported in the same direction; it was followed at 7h58 on the same day by the regiment’s staff, a company of machine guns (without the platoon) and staff of the 20th Infantry Brigade. On 7 August at 10h21, transport units of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment left the garrison in S´rem. They took a trip via Nowy Tomys´l, Rothenburg, Gubin, Torgau, Leipzig, Gera, Saalfeld, Bamberg, Schweinfurt, Aschaffenburg, Gr. Gerau, Meinz, Kreuznach, Neunkirchen, before reaching the destination in Gerstlingen (French Guerstling)446. After crossing the Rhine, NCO posts were established on open flat wagons transporting the regiment’s carts. The posts were in charge of looking for French aeroplanes. The first echelon of the 47th Infantry Regiment was unloaded on 9 August at 11h00, the second one at 19:00, the third one a 23h14; the last echelons that came to the unloading location on 10 August at 3h00 were companies of the II battalion447. On 7 August, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was ready for departure. When the units left for the Central Train Station in Poznan´, they were accompanied by numerous inhabitants including the soldiers’ families. Within 35 minutes, the soldiers were loaded onto transport units; the regiment’s equipment, horses and carts were loaded earlier. The wagons and cannons on flatbed wagons were adorned with garlands and the soldiers held flowers. When the train moved, an orchestra played a Prussian march; the sounds of the departing train and the whistle of the locomotive mixed with cries of the family members waving goodbyes to the soldiers. The route passed from Poznan´ to the west through Buk, Opalenica, Nowy Tomys´l, Zba˛szyn´, Gubin, Chociebuz˙ (German Cottbus), Leipzig, Gera, Saalfeld, Bamberg, Schweinfurt, Darmstadt, Mainz, Birkenfeld, Dillingen

441 “Jeder Stoss ein Franzos, jeder Schuss ein Russ” – one thrust of the bayonet – a dead French soldier, one shot – a dead Russian soldier. This unambiguous propaganda phrase was to symbolise the effectiveness of a German soldier in combat. 442 “Franzosen und Serben – alle sollen sterben”. 443 “Zum Frühstück. Auf nach Paris”. 444 The author of the threat addressed Raymond Poincaré, president of France since 1913. 445 Benary, 29; Loosch, Das Königl, 11. 446 Cartographic collection: Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, Strassburg i. E, R. Schultz & Company (1914), BNUS [further referred to as Karte des Reichlandes ElsassLothringen 1:400.000, BNUS]. 447 Loosch, Das Königl, 11.

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Figure 34. Soldiers from an Infantry Regiment dividing G.I. bread (German Kommissbrot) into smaller portions at a small train station in the Province of Posen in August 1914, just before loading transport units and departing for the Western front. To the left is a heap of bread, knapsacks and equipment; the photographer, a soldier, propped the rifle against the fence (on the left). The photograph was published in 1915 as a postcard; in the original caption, the term Polnischen Bahnhof (Polish train station); is used. Photograph from the author’s collection.

and Busendorf 448. Second Lieutenant Kruse from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment described the events in the following way: Soon it became clear to us that we were headed west. The first train stop was in Opalenica. The wheels barely stopped when a large number of young women burst in – most of them wearing [Red Cross – B.K.] uniforms and handed out coffee, sandwiches, cigars and cigarettes. It was touching how everyone tried to be good to us. The food we received would have sufficed for a trip around the globe. When the train started after a much too short stop, we sang our most beautiful songs as a thank you. In Nowy Tomys´l, warm dinner was served. Very hungry, we attacked the steaming bowls as if we had not eaten for at least 24 hours. Time passed quickly over the food and joyful conversations with women from Nowy Tomys´l. At 11h00, with an accompaniment of the loud song “Hail to Thee in the Victor’s Crown”, the train left the train station. On 9 August, at the foot of the grand Monument to the Battle of the Nations, Saxons served us lunch. While we were eating, our rolling flats were watched with much interest. The more or less sarcastic chalk inscriptions were much appreciated, e. g.: “Dear Wilhelm, please leave my Liège in peace”, “Dear Albert, wait a minute, we will be in Brussels in three days” and “In case of poor weather, the war will be fought in a room” or “One thrust one Frenchman, one shot one Russian!”. After a two-hour stopover, most unwillingly we parted with the inhabitants of Leipzig with a warm “Goodbye!”. In Gera, a hereditary princess personally 448 Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS.

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handed us postcards to send home. She offered a postcard even to the kind-hearted Adolf Wolff. Adolf first took a good look at the hereditary princess, of the postcard and said: “I will take one because of you!”. We continued the trip along the Mein, the proud castles of Lichtenfels and Vierzehnheiligen. We passed meadows in bloom, fields, villages and towns. It was as if the German mother wanted to show its sons yet again what they would fight for and what they should defend from the enemy. On 10 August, the Mein gave way to the Rhine. Facing the father Rhine, we renewed our vows with the song “Es braust ein Ruf wie Donnerhall” (The cry resounds like thunder’s peal – translator’s note) admitting that it is better to be triumphant than to suffer defeat. We had an opportunity to take care of our throats sore from the numerous farewells and “singing”, and the constantly empty stomachs, in Mainz. When I took an opportunity to ask a woman from the Rhineland if German girls were not sad that so many men were going to war and some were not meant to come back, turning some girlfriends into spinsters, she replied: “Victory is more important than men!!”449.

Figure 35. A machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in its barracks at Buker Strasse in Poznan´, 8 August 1914, shortly before departure for the front. The number of carts with machine guns is clearly too large (12 instead of 6). They may have belonged to the machine-gun company of the 46th Reserve Regiment from the 10th Reserve Division mobilised by a machinegun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment or the 47th Infantry Regiment. The service soldiers are equipped with white patent main belts, typical of the mobilization equipment in August 1914 (also in the artillery). Following the experience of the first battles, the white belts of the machinegun company and the artillery units of the 10th Infantry Division soldiers were painted black. It was also the case in the artillery units. Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935).

449 Benary, 29.

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On the evening of 7 August, a column of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles left for the Central Train Station in Poznan´. The first to leave was the regiment staff, and the 1st and 4th squadrons. As in peacetime loading equipment into transport units had been exercised, loading the people, horses and luggage went smoothly. However, it took several hours before the order to leave was given450. On 7 August, a field mass for all denominations was celebrated on the drill ground of the Rawicz barracks for the 50th Infantry Regiment451. On that day, the II division of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment left the garrison in Leszno to travel to the west to the concentration area. The I division of the regiment (without the 3rd battery) followed suit on 9 August through Halle, Leipzig, Schweinfurt, Mainz and Gerstlingen to Busendorf. The regiment was then joined by the 3rd battery which arrived by train. After unloading, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment occupied quarters in Ihn, St. Barbara, Halsdorf and Bisingen452.

Figure 36. The transport unit of the 6th Grenadier Regiment at the Central Train Station in Poznan´, waiting for departure for the concentration area on the Western front. In the wagon’s window, the first on the right is Colonel Otto Heyn, the unit’s commander. On the wagons are humorous inscriptions written by the soldiers, typical of August 1914. Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935).

In the evening of 7 August, mobilization of the 5th Pioneer Battalion was over. On 8 August at 3h00, the staff of the I Pioneer Division was the first to leave Głogów for the area of concentration of the 10th Infantry Division in Lorraine; it was 450 Senftleben, 28. 451 Vogt, 1. 452 Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS; Angerstein and Schlemm, 14.

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followed by the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd field pioneer companies. In Chociebuz˙, the staff of the I Division of the 5th Pioneer Battalion joined the staff of the V Army Corps, to which it belonged after mobilization together with the 2nd and the 3rd field pioneer company. The staff of the I Division of the 5th Pioneer Battalion was unloaded in Saarlouis and the two above mentioned companies at the next station, in Dillingen453. On 8 August, columns of the 6th Grenadier Regiment left their barracks in Jez˙yce for the main station in Poznan´. The marching grenadiers and fusiliers were accompanied by hundreds of inhabitants, German and Poles alike, bidding farewell to the regiment. The soldiers’ uniforms and rifles were adorned with flowers. The 6th Grenadier Regiment was loaded into four transport units on the Eastern Ramp of the main station. It posed a considerable challenge to the subdivision in charge of loading the regiment, especially the distribution of horses, carts and luggage. The horses, loaded 6 per wagon as per regulations, were uneasy. When the time of departure was near, at the regiment commander’s order, a staff trumpeter signalled the boarding of the wagons. Families of the conscripted reservists and professional soldiers, German and Polish, also arrived wearing their Sunday best. Among them was wife of Major Lothar von Unruh, commander of the fusilier battalion and wife of Sergeant Möller. Soon the train started and the families greeted the departing soldiers. When the subsequent transport units left the train station, the military orchestra played. Wacht am Rhein and Heil dir im Siegeskranz were accompanied by the whistle of the locomotive. On its way to the west, the train stopped at designated stations where the grenadiers were fed. On the way to the front there was a ban on alcohol yet during the stopover in Kulmbach (Bavaria), grenadiers from several wagons managed to get hold of the local Kulmbacher beer. At all the stations where the train stopped, women from the Red Cross served cold drinks and handed out sandwiches, coffee, milk, tea, cigarettes and chocolate from wicker baskets. The locals gave the grenadiers many presents, among them sophisticated snacks, cigarettes and cigars which were often thrown into the wagons in boxes. The soldiers gave the Red Cross women postcards (casually referred to by the soldiers as Feldposts) asking them to send them on454. The route of the transport units of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles led through Brandenburg, Saxony, northern Bavaria, near Mainz through the Rhine and to Lorraine. At stations, the locals and the Red Cross also delivered large amounts of food. At the Schweinfurt train station, the transport of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles caught up with the units of the 1st Uhlan Regiment from the 9th Infantry 453 Koch, Das Niederschlesische, 45; Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. 454 Gottberg, 29–33.

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Division. The latter had come into contact with Russian troops in the early days of the war. The encounter offered an opportunity to exchange war experiences. At the next station, the transport units of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were positioned next to the staff of the Silesian VI Army Corps where Captain Senftleben served, relocated during mobilization from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles and appointed Chief of Staff of the Corps. Therefore, an opportunity availed itself for the officers from the mounted rifles to meet their colleague. The transport units of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles moved on through the valley of the Nahe. As the transport was approaching the combat zone, an order was issued to limit sources of light at night. After 3 days of travelling in narrow wagons, on the morning of 10 August, the units of the regiment’s staff, the 1st and 4th squadrons of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles reached Gerstlingen455, the trip’s destination. In the afternoon, they were joined by the 2nd and 3rd squadrons. When food was unloaded from the wagon and transported to the food supplies cart of the 1st squadron, the cart’s wooden wheels broke. A local smith was summoned to repair the cart. Soon the units of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles left for their quarters; in Neunkirchen, Kerpich, Hemmersdorf and Waldwiese the quarters were occupied by the staff, and the 1st and the 4th squadron; in GroßHemmersdorf the 3rd squadron was stationed, while the 2nd squadron stayed near Neunkirchen. The next two days, before the 10th Infantry Division continued its journey, were used by the specific squadrons to ride the mobilised horses, double-check on the weapons and the soldiers’ equipment, saddles, harnesses and the condition of the wagons. Eduard Senftleben wrote in the regiment ledger: “(…) the King’s Mounted Rifles were a beautiful sight and a wonderful tool in its commander’s hands”456. On 8 and 9 August, the specific battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment were loaded in transport units to leave for the West to the division’s concentration area. The units travelled through Leipzig, Mainz to German Lorraine where, after unloading, the regiment’s staff and the I battalion were quartered in Lüdingen. In Düren and Bedersdorf the II battalion was stationed, in Bothendorf – the III battalion, in Busendorf – the machine-gun company457. Equally efficient was the mobilization of the 50th Infantry Regiment in the garrisons in Leszno and Rawicz. On 7 August, a mass was celebrated for the regiment in the Leszno barracks, followed by loading to transport units. At the train station in Leszno, women from the Red Cross treated the soldiers with

455 Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. 456 Senftleben, 33–35. 457 Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment, 31–33; Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS.

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coffee and food for the journey; this was the reason why the German military authorities dubbed the group Kaffee-Kolonne458. The transport of the 50th Infantry Regiment to the concentration area took place in four stages. On 8 August at 7h17, the staff of the 50th Infantry Regiment and the machine-gun company left Leszno and in Chociebuz˙ joined the staff of the 20th Infantry Brigade, the staff of the 47th Infantry Regiment and the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment. At 15h30, the II battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment left Rawicz, followed by the I battalion at 20h30. The III battalion of the regiment departed from Leszno at 9h58. The transport route of the 50th Infantry Regiment led through Głogów, Chociebuz˙, Torgau, Gera, Saalfeld, Schweinfurt and Aschaffenburg; in the vicinity of Mainz, the units crossed the Rhine. Next, they headed for Gerstlingen via Kreuznach, Birkenfeld and Dillingen459. On 7 August the II division of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment left for the West and on 9 August, the regiment’s staff and the I division followed suit460. Between 9 and 11 August 1914, the specific regiments of the 10th Infantry Division arrived in Gerstlingen on the Nied461 and were unloaded there. The town is located in the western part of German Lorraine, 40.9 km to the north-west of Metz462. The terrain was not conducive for unloading the transport units because the town lies in a deep and narrow valley where the soldiers and the horses suffered in the August heat. After unloading in Gerstlingen, the 47th Infantry Regiment occupied the quarters in the adjacent villages which had already received units of the 10th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps. There were not enough quarters for all the units and some of them had to set up camps. On the first day after unloading, the staff of the 47th Infantry Regiment occupied quarters in Gerstlingen, the machine-gun company in Niedwellingen, the I battalion (without the 3rd and 4th companies) in Colmen, the 3rd company in Neunkirchen, the II battalion (without the 8th company) in Grindorf, the 8th company in Flasdorf, the III battalion in Niedaltdorf. The 47th Infantry Regiment resumed its march on 10 August and on that day, the regiment staff was stationed in Flasdorf, the I battalion in Waldwiese, Gongelfangen and Flatten, the II battalion in Grindorf 458 The photograph in the form of a postcard shows 14 women from the German Red Cross accompanied by two RC employees on a platform of the train station in Leszno. The caption says: “Kaffee-Kolonne Banhof-Lissa i.-P. Kriegsjahr 1914”. Janusz Skrzypczak’s iconographic collection (Leszno). 459 Vogt, 4; Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. 460 Angerstein and Schlemm, 13. 461 Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. 462 Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS; Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, BNUS.

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and Flasdorf, the III battalion in Ober-Esch and Biringen, the machine-gun company in Zeringen. The regiment remained in this location until 12 August463. On 9 August at 11h14, the staff of the 50th Infantry Regiment and the machinegun company arrived in Gerstlingen; at 11h45 the III battalion joined them. On 10 August at 20h14 the II battalion arrived and at 23h17 the I battalion. By 12 August, the specific divisions of the regiment were quartered in the nearby villages: the regiment’s staff, the 7th and 8th companies in Br. Hennersdorf, the III battalion in Eimersdorf, the II battalion, the 5th and 6th companies in Fremersdorf/Saar and the machine-gun company in Dietzdorfer Hof and Sonnenhof 464.

Figure 37. German infantrymen during a halt at a train station en route to the front in August 1914. Nurses from the German Red Cross treat soldiers with coffee and sandwiches. It was not only an artistic vision – this was a part of the scenario of the German troops on their way to the concentration area on the Western front. Photograph from the author’s collection.

After an 80-hour-long trip, on 10 and 11 August transport units of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment arrived in Busendorf 465. On 11 August at 15h00, Gerstlingen welcomed transport units of the 6th Grenadier Regiments. After a 63-hour-long journey in narrow wagons, the destination was reached. When the horses left the wagons, they felt free and started to jump and kick about so much that for a long time, the soldiers could not restrain them. When the grenadiers, the horses, all the vehicles and luggage were 463 Loosch, Das Königl, 11–12. 464 Vogt, 3–4; Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. 465 Angerstein and Schlemm, 13.

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unloaded, a march formation was arranged. Second Lieutenant von Donop reminisced: The companies stood for quite a long time before they marched away. When they did, there was not a whiff of wind and on the very first hill, the soldiers were exhausted. The 63 hours of journey proved too tiresome. We stopped at the top of the hill for the soldiers to rest a little466.

After unloading, the 6th Grenadier Regiment occupied the quarters: the staff and the fusilier battalion in Ihn, the I battalion in Itzbach and Ober-Limburger, the II battalion and the machine-gun company in Rammelfangen, Guisingen and Kerlingen. On the next day, drill marches of the subdivisions and hand-to-hand fighting were organised467. On 11 August in Busendorf near Saarlouis, the transport units of the 20th Fierld Artillery Regiment were unloaded; due to the lack of available quarters, a camp was set up in the vicinity of the train station468. On 12 August, transports of the 46th Infantry Regiment arrived; its I battalion started unloading in Lüdingen, the II battalion in Düren and Bedersdorf, the III battalion in Bothendorf and Umgegend, the machine-gun company in Busendorf 469. Field Hospital no. 1 from the V Army Corps arrived in Dillingen on 11 August and was unloaded there. Shortly after arrival at the station, one of the six hospital physicians, Oberarzt Tadeusz Szulc (a Pole), received a “special task” from his commander. He was to contact the nearby hospital run by nuns and take over its infrastructure for the Corps. It turned out that some soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division did not survive the long journey from the Province of Posen in the narrow wagons. Tadeusz Szulc described this episode: I arrived at the specified small hospital where the nuns worked, French, if I am not mistaken. They also spoke German. I was requested to examine the body of a soldier who died suddenly and to confirm his death in writing. He lay in a coffin, fully clothed. He was dead of course. It was an emotional sight. It was an older reservist, clearly a Pole because he had a Polish surname, from near Szamotuły. He may have been the first Polish victim of the war which had just started. He died in a remote place, far from his family, that he had to abandon for a foreign cause470.

On 12 August, in the northern part of German Lorraine, unloading of the V Army Corps was over; the units were grouped in the vicinity of Busendorf and Gerst466 467 468 469

Account of second lieutenant Donop, in Gottberg, 33. Gottberg, 33–34; Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. Benary, 30. Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment, 27; Karte des Reichlandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:400.000, BNUS. 470 “Pierwsza wojna s´wiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918,” 171.

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lingen, along the River Nied. Soon, the staff of the 5th Army issued an order for the staff of the V Army Corps to march to the forming-up places which involved crossing the Moselle. The 10th Infantry Division was to cross the river between Sierck and Königsmachern, the 9th Infantry Division between Niedaltdorf and Mallingen471. At the same time the commander of the V Army Corps announced alert state due to incidents of civilian attacks on German soldiers in the borderline area. An incident like this took place in the vicinity of Lemmersdorf where three shots were aimed at bicycle infantrymen from the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment. There were also attacks on the 9th Infantry Division near St. Franz and Rodlach. For this reason, posts of the units of the 10th Infantry Division were reinforced. At the same time, waiting for a departure order, the subunits were instructed not to loot, to abide by the rules of war (bearing in mind the penalties) and taught to use the equipment. On the level of the company, field kitchens prepared hot meals. Food (including cattle) was purchased by the food officers, who negotiated prices with the local farmers. However, after a few days the crowded units ate everything there was to eat in the area, thus posing a considerable problem to the quartermasters. Lack of maps was a serious drawback in the context of the planned road marches of the staff regiments and the battalions of the 10th Infantry Division472. According to the guidelines of the staff of the 5th Army, on 13 August the units of the V Army Corps started its march to the north to reach the forming-up places. Soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division marched in the August heat; each of them carried almost 28 kg of equipment. The reservists in poor physical condition could not keep pace, and lay exhausted in the roadside ditches along the axis of the division’s march. Some of them had their feet seriously chafed from the boots, which practically excluded them from continuing the march. There were also seriously ill soldiers. As they were scattered along the entire march route, the medical services of the divisions and regiments had serious problems with granting assistance. In these circumstances, the battalion physicians tried to help the suffering soldiers, but did not want to lose touch with the marching regiment. In cases of cardiovascular problems, the exhausted soldiers were strengthened with injections, but later on they were left in the roadside ditches to rest. The soldiers, exhausted by the march, placed their luggage on the battalion wagons and, whenever possible, joined the regiment in a column supervised by paramedics. In the 47th Infantry Regiment there were no cases of deaths resulting from exhaustion473. 471 Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, BNUS. 472 Loosch, Das Königl, 13. 473 As archive documents of the German 10th Infantry Division have not survived, it is now impossible to determine the march losses in August 1914. This category was not recorded on

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Map 1. Concentration area of the German V Army Corps: the 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions in Bezirk Lothringen (German West Lorraine), the march direction, the place of crossing the Moselle, August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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On 13 August, the units of the 10th Infantry Division took their positions in the northern part of German Lorraine, near the southern border with Luxembourg. On that day, the 6th Grenadier Regiment occupied quarters in Neuenkirchen (the staff, half of the fusilier battalion and the machine-gun company), in Colmen – the other part of the fusilier battalion, in Bisingen – the I battalion, in Flasdorf – the II battalion474. On the same day, the 47th Infantry Regiment proceeded to the west and occupied the quarters: the regiment staff in Ober Sierck, the I battalion in Lemmersdorf and Bidligen, the II battalion in Goldhof, Raltweiler, Mittenhof, Marienhof and Ewendorf, the III battalion in Ober Naumen and Kirchnaumen, the machine-gun company in Ewendorf. On 14 August, the subunits of the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division organised drill marches and fighting exercises475. The units of the 10th Infantry Division which marched away on 13 August included the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles which, having marched the designated route in the division, stopped south of Sierck. The regiment’s units occupied quarters in Ewendorf (half of the 4 squadron), in Kaltweiler (the other half of the 4th squadron), in Ober Sierck (the staff of the regiment and the 1st squadron), in Lemmersdorf (the 3rd squadron), in Bidlingen (the 2nd squadron). The mounted rifles were to stay in this area until 15 August476. On 13 August, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment marched through Ihn, Niedaltdorf, Neunkirchen and reached Colmen where it stayed until 15 August477. On the night of 14 August 1914, the staff of the V Army Corps sent an operational order to the 10th Infantry Division for the V Army Corps to march to the north-west and cross the Moselle. The 10th Infantry Division was to resume march via Kerlingen. The 6th Grenadier Regiment was ordered to gather on 15 August at 6h00 on the road between Halsdorf and Kirchnaumen, with the front running to the south of the village. At 1h00, the 47th Infantry Regiment received a telephone order from the staff of the 10th Infantry Division to go into alert state. At 3h00, another order reached the staff of the 47th Infantry Regiment; at 6h00 the unit together with the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were to march to the eastern end of Kerlingen. The order was transferred from the regiment staff to the

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475 476 477

the German list of casualties. The available accounts only mention these casualties and ways in which the exhausted soldiers were rescued by the division’s medical services. Senftleben, 38; Loosch, Das Königl, 13. Karte der Sprachverteilung, Bevölkerungsdichte und Bodenschätze von Elsass-Lothringen: auf Grund von Heinrich Kieperts Spezialkarte, Échelle: 1:250.000, Date d’édition: 1919, inscription MCARTE1333, BNUS, [further referred to as Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS]; Gottberg, 34–35; Vogt, 5. Loosch, Das Königl, 12; BNUS, Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919. Senftleben, 38; Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS. Benary, 30; Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS.

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specific battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment by phone; whenever it was not possible, bicycle infantrymen were employed. The concentration area was reached at the determined time478. On 15 August, the 10th Infantry Division marched from Kerlingen to Königsmachern and further on to Niederham. The 9th Infantry Division marched to the right of the Poznan´ division. In line with the order of the V Army Corps, the specific regiments of the 10th Infantry Division were prepared to cross the Moselle on a pontoon bridge which started in Niederham (French Basse-Ham) and ended on the western bank of the Moselle in Kattenhofen (French Cattenom). The crossing was organised by the Württemberg pioneers from the XIII Army Corps479. The first division unit to march out was the 6th Grenadier Regiment which departed at 6h00 from Kirchnaumen and made a bivouac in Kattenhofen at 13h00. The crossing was secured by a platoon of the 12th company of the fusiliers battalion under the command of reserve Second Lieutenant Ticke. The 6th Grenadier Regiment stayed in Kattenhofen until 18 August480. On 15 August at 7h00, the 47th Infantry Regiment was the second unit to cross the Moselle on the pontoon bridge. The I battalion served as the vanguard, followed by the III battalion. The route passed through Kl. Hettingen, Königsmachern, Niederham, across the Moselle to Kattenhofen where the 47th Infantry Regiment stopped to rest. At that time, the I battalion was appointed to support the 10th Infantry Division and take its positions on the hills to the northwest of Kattenhofen. After resting, the 47th Infantry Regiment resumed its march through Parth and Rüttgen to Suftgen where it found accommodation. It was supported from the west by the I battalion accompanied by the 11th and 12th companies from the III battalion. On that day, the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment was joined by Lieutenant Hoffmann’s platoon; one day later, the 4th company returned to the I battalion481. On 15 August at 7h00, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles also resumed their march from Kerlingen through Königsmachern to Rüttgen. Once the pontoon bridge on the Moselle was crossed, two horse patrols were sent from the 4th squadron under 478 Gottberg, 34; Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS. 479 Vogt, 5; Carte d’Etat-Major, Echelon 1:80.000. Edition du Service géographique de l′Armée Après 1912, avant 1918. Réunion de 2 cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz). Format: 75 x 51 cm – French staff map from 1912 (updated in 1918), created by combining two sheets of German maps: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) and N° 568 (Metz) which covered German Lorraine. I acquired the map from a private antiquarian collection in France; further referred to as Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS. 480 Gottberg, 34; Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS. 481 Loosch, Das Königl, 13; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz).

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the command of Second Lieutenant Iffland and the 3rd squadron under the command of Second Lieutenant von Friedrich. These patrols were tasked with establishing communication with the support of the VI and XII Army Corps which were located in front of the V Army Corps. The mission was successfully completed. After crossing the Moselle, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles had an hour to unload; they resumed the march and at 11h00 reached Rüttgen where it stayed until 17 August. In Suftgen, a nearby village, the 47th Infantry Regiment settled down. At the same time, three horse patrols were sent out to the north to carry out reconnaissance of the section between Düdelingen and Wollmeringen482. In the afternoon, three more officer patrols were sent out. The first patrol was from the 1st squadron, under the command of Second Lieutenant Friede; the second patrol was provided by the 3rd squadron with Second Lieutenant von Borcke; the third patrol was from the 4th squadron under the command of reserve Second Lieutenant Haarhaus. The patrols were tasked with going on reconnaissance of the area in front of the infantry’s positions between Kail, Oettingen and Nonkeil483. On 15 August at 4h00, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment from the 10th Infantry Division resumed its march. Around 7h00, the regiment started to cross the Moselle on the pontoon bridge and after 8 hours of marching, the batteries reached Sentzing where they made camp. On the night of 15 August, a fierce storm accompanied by a strong wind and downpour blew down the soldiers’ tents. As a result, the horses ran around in panic. Some of the shying horses jumped over the tents in which the soldiers slept. The rain fell until the evening of 17 August484. At 11h00, the 50th Infantry Regiment crossed the Moselle on a pontoon bridge; the regiment’s units were distributed as follows: Rüttgen castle – the regiment’s staff, staff of the III battalion, the 11th and 12th companies; Dodenhofen – the 9the and 10th companies; Breisdorf – staff of the I battalion, the 1st and 4th companies; Erwingen – the 2nd company; Boler – the 3rd company; Nieder Parth – staff of the II battalion and the 8th company; Ober Parth – the 5th company; Boust – the 6th and 7th companies and the machine-gun company485. In the evening of 15 August, the specific units of the 10th Infantry Division occupied the quarters in villages on the western bank of the Moselle. The area in 482 It was a patrol from the 2nd squadron under the command of Second Lieutenant Boeckmann, from the 3rd squadron under the command of Second Lieutenant von Bake and from the 4th squadron under the command of Second Lieutenant Joachim von Busse. Senftleben, 38–39; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz). 483 Senftleben, 38–39; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz). 484 Benary, 30. 485 Vogt, 5; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz).

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front of the divisions and on the flanks were supported by patrols from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, regularly reporting to General Robert Kosch’s staff. To the right of the 10th Infantry Division was a section of the 9th Infantry Division; to the left, in the Düdelingen area ran the right flank of the VI Army Corps. In the area of Wollmeringen, units of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) took their positions. On the night of 15 August, General Kosch issued an order for half of the 3rd squadron under the command of Lieutenant Holtz, supported by two companies of the 47th Infantry Regiment, to march to Düdelingen and relieve the units of the VI Army Corps. The task was completed as ordered486. On 16 August, units of the 10th Infantry Division rested; on 17 August the staff of the 10th Infantry Division received a message about the success of German troops in Alsace. The message included the first tactical experiences of fights with French troops. Accordingly, the division’s commander ordered the officers to remove all badges from the uniforms that would glint in the bright August sunlight. Some officers asked the local shoemaker to paint black epaulettes with silver galloon487. At the same time, information about the threat of the Francstireurs’ attack on German troops was confirmed488. ***

486 Senftleben, 39; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz). 487 Gottberg, 35. 488 Francs-tireurs (German Franktireur) – a French phrase that should be translated as francs – free and tireur – shooter. During the German campaign in Belgium in August 1914, the alleged threat posed by the Francs-tireurs became an obsession of the German field commanders. It should be attributed to the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871 when guerrilla-type French volunteer troops carried out a successful harassing mission against the German army. These volunteers came from paramilitary organisations but did not wear uniforms. In August 1914, when leading their troops through Belgium, German officers were irrationally afraid of Francs-tireurs and instilled that fear in their soldiers. Therefore, Francs-tireurs would be blamed for any unexplained incident like an accidental shot. Oftentimes, it led to uncontrolled outbursts of German soldiers’ aggression against Belgian civilians. On the other hand, units of Garde Civique operated in Belgium; in August 1914 the paramilitary formation had 146 thou. soldiers, fighting weapons and civil clothing. Erich Ludendorff, Ludendorff ’s Own Story, August 1914 – November 1918 (New York: Harper, 1919), 36–37; Terence Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914 (Brimscombe Port: The History Press, 2013), Kindle: Location 6231. Operations of the German 1st Army in August and September 1914 against the Francs-tireurs were described in detail by doctor Wojciech Jacobson in his memoirs. Jacobson, Z Armja˛. A detailed analysis of the phenomenon is provided by Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I (New York: New York University Press, 2004); John Horne and Allan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 2001); Gunter Spraul, Der Franktireurkrieg 1914: Untersuchungen zum Verfall einer Wissenschaft und zum Umgang mit nationalen Mythen (Berlin: Frank und Timme Verlag, 2016).

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Mobilization of the German 10th Infantry Division in August 1914 which, just like the entire Poznan´ V Army Corps (the “Náchod Lions”), was a part of the elite of the German army, was efficient and march readiness was reported on time. Soldiers from the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division (an active unit) received state-of-art armament and equipment; they were very well trained. Numerous Polish reservists answered the mobilization call; they had 2–3 years of military service before 1914, while cases of avoiding service in German (Prussian) regiments were rare and related predominantly to privates, because officers and higher rank NCOs were of German origin. After the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, Poles were again expected to go to war arm in arm with their German comrades in arms. On top of mobilising its own units, the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division was also in charge of mobilising the units of the 10th Reserve Division (non-existent in time of peace) which was incorporated into the V Army Corps. At the same time, the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division seconded some professional soldiers to the reserve division: officers, NCOs and conscripted soldiers. At that time, the barracks of the Poznan´ units including the 20th Field Artillery Regiment were full to overflowing because the reserve, alternate and Poznan´ Fortress units were mobilised simultaneously. For this reason, for the time of mobilization, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was relocated to the villages around Poznan´. The first fighting test faced by the appointed units of the 10th Infantry Division were covering activities on the Russian border initiated after 31 July 1914, when the “war threat” was announced. Once Germany was in war with Russia, on 2 August a patrol of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles carried out in-depth reconnaissance and occupied Konin. Later on, the mounted rifles occupied a large bridge crossing on the River Warta in Pyzdry. The III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, stationed in Wrzes´nia, covered the border in the Strzałkowo area. Mobilization of the V Army Corps and departure for the concentration area in the north of German Lorraine near the border with Luxembourg indicated imminent military confrontation. To many Kaczmareks from the Poznan´ area, often farm hands and small craftsmen, it was the first trip so far away from their homeland. In the course of the trip to the west, through numerous German villages, soldiers of the Poznan´ regiments, Poles and Germans alike, were taken by surprise with the locals’ friendliness. When the units of the Poznan´ division approached the concentration area, the infantrymen had to march many kilometres a day in the August heat. Some of them were not prepared for this effort and lay exhausted in the roadside ditches. Soon the first bloody engagements with the French troops ensued.

Chapter 3. Approach March and the Battle of Éthe489

In mid-August 1914, following concentration in northern Lorraine, both Poznan´ formations: the V Army Corps and the V Reserve Corps (in total nearly 80,000 soldiers) were parts of the 5th Army under the command of Wilhelm, the German Crown Prince (German Kronprinz)490. To the west of the V Army Corps was located the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg)491, to the south-west was the XVI Army Corps492 and to the south the Silesian VI Reserve Corps. In the area of Saarbrücken, 489 The battle of Éthe of 22 August 1914, fought in the Belgian-French borderland, was an episode that ended in fiasco of the French offensive in the Ardennes, and a borderland battle (21–23 August). The French 4th Army attacked the German 4th Army while the French 3rd Army rushed towards the German 5th Army. The Germans referred to the operational efforts on the part of the German 5th Army as the battle of Longwy; the French called it the battle in the Ardennes. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Bd. 1: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925), 317–319; Karte 3: Operation der deutsche 4. und 5. Armee, Der Weltkrieg 1914, Bd 1; Alphonse Grasset, La guerre en action: Le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Éthe (Paris: Berger-Levrault 1927), 8–18. I wrote about the battle of Éthe for the first time in 2016 in “Bellona” quarterly: Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “10 Dywizja Piechoty w bitwie pod Éthe (22–23 sierpnia 1914 roku),” Kwartalnik Bellona, no. 4 (2016): 68–83. 490 The V Army Corps was then in Wallerfangen. Wilhelm Hohenzollern, The Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany (London: T. Butterworth: 1922), 164–165; Günter Wegner, Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 1: Die höheren Kommandostellen 1815– 1939 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1990), 52–55. 491 Otto von Moser, Die Württemberger im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser A.G., 1928), 15–16. 492 At the beginning of May 1914, the district of the XVI Army Corps, with its headquarters in the fortress of Metz, located in western German Lorraine, was the smallest German military district in the area. Its commander was Infantry General Bruno von Mudra. Due to its strategic location during peacetime, it hosted a robust garrison consisting of active units. The XVI Army Corps consisted of two large units. The first of them included the 33rd Infantry Division encompassing the 66th Infantry Brigade (the 98th and 130th Infantry Regiments) and the 67th Infantry Brigade (the 135th and 144th Infantry Regiment) and the 33rd Cavalry Brigade (the 9th and 13th Dragon Regiments), the 33rd Field Artillery Brigade (the 33rd and 34th Field Artillery Brigade). The other large unit of the Corps consisted of the 34th Infantry Division encompassing the 68th Infantry Brigade (the 67th and 145th Infantry Regiments) and the 86th Infantry Brigade (the 30th and 173rd Infantry Regiments); the 34th Cavalry Brigade (the 14th Uhlan Regiment and the 12th Mounted Rifles Regiment); the 45th Cavalry Brigade (the 13th Hussars Regiment and the 13th Mounted Rifles Regiment); the 34th Field Artillery Brigade (the

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to the east of the V Army Corps, the V Reserve Corps was formed. The 13th, 43rd, 45th and the 53rd Landwehr Brigades and the Bavarian 9th Landwehr Brigade were grouped in the vicinity of the Metz Diedenhofen fortresses (French Thionville). Therefore, the units of the 5th Army were placed in an area with borders running between Lebach, Diedenhofen, Metz and Saarbrücken. The 5th Army had 200,000 soldiers, including thousands of Poles from the Province of Posen, the Silesian Province as well as Germany’s industrial regions493.

Figure 1. A company of a German infantry regiment getting soldier’s pay. In the centre is a paymaster NCO, handing money to the soldiers. On the left are officers including a second lieutenant, the platoon’s commander (second on the left), the Western Front, summer 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

69th and 70th Field Artillery Regiments). The Corps also included four units of heavy artillery: the 8th, 12th and 16th Foot Artillery Regiments and the Bavarian 2nd Foot Artillery Regiment. The XVI Army Corps had as many as six machine-gun units: the 6th Machine-Gun Unit and the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Fortress Machine-Gun Units. The technical units were represented by the 16th and 20th Pioneer Battalions, the 3rd Fortress Reflector Campaign, the 16th Supply Train Battalion. Führer durch Heer und Flotte. Elfter Jahrgang 1914. Ausführliche Beschreibungen der Friedens- und der feldgrauen Ausmarschuniformen des Jahres 1914, Tabellen über die Bewaffnung der einzelnen Kontingente, Schiffslisten der Flotte, ed. B. Friedag (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Alfred Schall, 1913), 132–133. 493 Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Großen Krieges 1914–1918. Quellenwerk, nach den amtlichen Bezeichnungen zusammengestellt vom Großen Generalstab (Berlin: H. Sack, 1919), 10; Der Weltkrieg 1914, Bd. 1, 70.

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Map 1. Attack positions of the German armies on the Western front and the approach march by 20 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

In the meantime, the Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung – the OHL) fixed the starting date of the offensive on the Western front for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and the 5th Armies on 18 August 1914. Following the assumptions of the Schlieffen–Moltke Plan494, the mentioned formations were expected to launch an attack like a boxer’s punch – a right hook – through neutral Belgium, revolving around Diedenhofen (to the north of Metz) in Lorraine495. 494 More on the Schlieffen – Moltke Plan in Der Weltkrieg 1914, Bd. 1, 49–65. 495 In order to complete the task, the OHL appointed on the Western front 1,600,000 soldiers grouped in 23 active army corps, 11 reserve corps, 10 cavalry divisions and 17 and 1/2 Landwehr brigades. It was in total 950 infantry battalions, 498 cavalry squadrons, 744 field artillery batteries and 129 heavy artillery batteries. Der Weltkrieg 1914, Bd. 1, 69.

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On the western flank of the 5th Army the zone of operations of the V Army Corps was delineated, tasked with marching to the north-east near Luxembourg City, through Bettemburg to Arlon. At the same time, the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) was to proceed to the left of the V Army Corps and, further to the south, the XVI Army Corps. Behind the V Army Corps was the axis of the marching V and VI Reserve Corps. In the zone of the 5th Army’s operation was a small stronghold Longwy which was to be bypassed; a special assault group was appointed to attack the stronghold. At the same time, the air reconnaissance conducted in front of the 5th Army indicated that the French troops had positioned themselves along the Othain; large enemy forces were concentrated between Montmédy and Mézières. For this reason, the staff of the German 5th Army expected the concentrated French troops to attack the 4th Army in the north-east and the right flank of the 5th Army496. The attack order issued for both divisions of the V Army Corps provided for bypassing Longwy from the north, enveloping it from the west and attacking to the south-west through Étalle, Virton and Marville (the latter located in France). To the left of the V Army Corps was delineated an attack zone for the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg). In order to provide communication between the right flank of the 5th Army, where the V Army Corps was located, and the left flank of the 4th Army, an operation zone for the 3rd Cavalry Division was marked out497. *** On 18 August, a formation of the V Army Corps started to implement the plan for attacking France. At that time, the units of the 10th Infantry Division took positions near Kattenhofen (French Cattenom), on the western bank of the Moselle, right on the border between Germany and Luxembourg. Ahead of the 10th Infantry Division, to the north-west proceeded regiments of the 19th Infantry Brigade including the 6th Grenadier Regiment which moved through Breisdorf (French Breistroff-la-Grande) and Erwingen (French Évrange) where it crossed the border with Luxembourg and entered Frisingen (French Frisange). On that day, the grenadiers marched for 22.2 km. In Frisingen the staff, the I and

496 Ibidem, 317–319; Eduard Senftleben, Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Kriege (Berlin: Bernard&Graefe, 1937), 40. 497 Martin Lezius, Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee, Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs (Berlin: Militär-Verlag, 1927), 176; Idem, Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee, Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs, Bd. 1. Berlin: Militär-Verlag, 1932, 364.

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II battalions and the machine-gun company found quarters; in Erwingen a fusilier battalion was stationed498. To the left of the 19th Infantry Brigade, less than 6 km away, the 20th Infantry Brigade marched in parallel to the north-west axis. When on 18 August the 50the Infantry Regiment crossed the border with Luxembourg, its staff and the III battalion put up a camp in Bivingen (French Bivange) and Berchem, the I battalion in Krautem (French Crauthem), the II battalion and the machine-gun company in Röser (French Roeser). In the evening, hard rain fell499. On that day at 5h00, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division issued an order for the staff of the 1st Royal Mounted Rifles in Rüttgen to set off on a march from Bettemburg together with the 47th Infantry Regiment. The mounted riflemen reached the destination at 10h00500. Following orders, on 18 August at 6h15 the 47th Infantry Regiment started its march from Suftgen through Düdelingen (French Dudelange) to Bettemburg. As early as at 7h30, the regiment crossed the border with Luxembourg. However, it had to stop there because the march routes of the 10th Infantry Division and of the 9th Infantry Division crossed. In these circumstances, an order was issued for the Poznan´ infantry division to give priority to the march columns of the 9th Infantry Division on its way to Arlon. The 10th Infantry Division resumed its march in the afternoon. Once the goal was achieved by the 47th Infantry Regiment in Bettemburg, the II and III battalions occupied their quarters; in Fenningen (French Fennange) the regiment’s staff was stationed together with the 1st and 2nd companies plus the regiment’s machine-gun companies. Livingen (French Livange) welcomed the remaining two companies of the I battalion. At the same time, the III battalion was tasked with taking up position around 498 Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 34–35; Carte d’Etat-Major, Echelon 1:80.000. Edition du Service géographique de l′Armée Après 1912, avant 1918. Réunion de 2 cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz). Format: 75 x 51 cm – a French staff map from 1912 (updated in 1918), it was made by putting together two sheets of German maps N° 553 (Diedenhofen) and N° 568 (Metz) which encompassed German Lorraine [further referred to as Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz)]; Karte der Sprachverteilung, Bevölkerungsdichte und Bodenschätze von Elsass-Lothringen: auf Grund von Heinrich Kieperts Spezialkarte, Échelle: 1:250.000, Date d’édition: 1919, Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg [further referred to as Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS; Grand-duché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique à 1/50.000, Échelle: 1:135 000, 1911, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Département Cartes et Plans, [further referred to as Grand-duché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique, 1911, BNF], inscription. GEC-4144. 499 Otto Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914– 1920 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931), 5; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS; Grandduché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique, 1911, BNF. 500 Senftleben, 40.

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Abweiler, Fenningen and Bürsingen and safeguarding the railway bridge to the south of Bettemburg501. Simultaneously, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were ordered to set up camp and remain overnight. For this reason, the regiment’s staff, the 2nd and 3rd squadrons took up position in Bettemburg and the 1st squadron in Livingen (several km north of Bettemburg), the “Wedel” squadron was stationed in Fentingen (French Fentange), west of Bettemburg. Before the 10th Infantry Division assembled, it occupied the positions of the 9th Infantry Division and for this reason protection was limited to a minimum502.

Figure 2. Soldiers of the German forces in combat uniforms in August 1914. From left: private from battalion of jaegers of guards, private of pioneers, officer of line infantry, officer of field artillery of guards, general (on horseback), private of hussars, private of mounted riflemen (on horseback), private of foot artillery, uhlan, cuirassier, dragon. Image from the author’s collection.

On 19 August the soldiers from the 6th Grenadier Regiment started their march from Frisingen via Leudelingen (French Leudelange), bypassing the city of Luxembourg from the south and the west, proceeded through Bartringen (French Bertrange), Mamer, Kapellen (French Capellen), Hagen; in total, that day they 501 Gerhard Loosch, Das Königl. preuβ. Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 15; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS; Grand-duché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique, 1911, BNF. 502 Senftleben, 41; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS.

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covered 33.6 km. The distance between Hagen and the Luxembourg-Belgian border was barely 2 km. Due to the fierce heat, marching on that day was extremely tiring. As the soldiers proceeded, the locals treated the 6th Grenadier Regiment with cold water, milk and tea. “Luxury” goods had to be paid for: a goose cost 10 marks and a bottle of wine 2 marks. A fusiliers battalion stopped in Hagen while the rest of the regiment stayed in Körich503. The 47th Infantry Regiment, operating as part of the 20th Infantry Brigade, resumed its march on 19 August at 6h30; the route passed through Fenningen via Leudelingen, Bartringen, Mamer, Kapellen, Hagen and Kleinbettingen. At 13h50, to the west of Kleinbettingen, the troops crossed the Luxembourg-Belgium border. At 14h30, having covered 36.3 km, the soldiers entered Sterpenich and thus accomplished the march plan for that day. The III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment found quarters in Barnich and Autelbas, and the II battalion in Autelhaut. The regiment’s staff, staff of the I battalion, the 1st and the 2nd companies of the I battalion, the regiment’s machine-gun company took up quarters in Sterpenich. Clairefontaine was where the 3rd and 4th company of the I battalion was quartered. It is 3.6 km from Sterpenich to Clairefontaine, therefore the soldiers from the 3rd and 4th companies of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment covered the longest distance on that day, in total 40.2 km from Fenningen to Clairefontaine504. Due to the extreme heat, strenuous marches were very hard, especially for the infantry units. Unfit reservists, not accustomed to hard physical effort, could not keep up with the march’s pace. They lay in the roadside ditches, utterly exhausted; some soldiers suffered from heat sickness505. This is how Adam Ulrich, a private from the 6th Grenadier Regiment of Polish nationality, remembered the march: Soon, the sudden alert was followed by a hasty departure. A two-day march in the scorching August heat. The fattest guys, previously the loudest reservists, now lie in the roadside ditches. However, they get up and lag behind the company. (…) There are 250 people in the company. They are strangers brought together by an order from the ends of the earth. They are joyful and sad, talkative and withdrawn. There is a shoemaker and 503 According to the account of the officers from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the attitude of the inhabitants of Luxembourg towards the German soldiers in August 1914 was friendly. Gottberg, 34–35; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS; Grand-duché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique, 1911, BNF. 504 Loosch, Das Königl, 15; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); BNUS, Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919; Grand-duché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique, 1911, BNF. 505 Because the military ledgers and the orders of the units of the 10th Infantry Division were destroyed in April 1945, it is hard to evaluate the scale of the unit’s march casualties in August 1914. However, there must have been casualties as confirmed by regimental ledgers.

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a banker, a butcher and an office clerk, a leaseholder of an orchard and a barber, a farmer’s son from the middle of nowhere and an urban socialite. Human bedlam in monotonous grey uniforms. The leather in the new knapsacks and belts squeaks. The rifles’ barrels rock with every step506.

On 19 August the soldiers of the 50th Infantry Regiment from the 20th Infantry Brigade started off from Bettemburger forest (5 km to the north-west of Bettemburg) via Lendelingen, Bartringen, Mamer, Kapellen, Hagen and Bettingen, marching 30 km in the August heat. The companies and battalions were compelled to halt frequently because of the forced march and heat. In the late afternoon, the regiment’s staff, the I battalion, the II battalion and the machine-gun company found quarters in Bettingen; the staff of the III battalion, the 9th, 10th and 11th companies spent the night in Pfeifershof and Kahler, the 12th company in Grass507. On the evening of 19 August, the staff of the V Army Corps issued an operational order for 20 August. On the right flank of the corps, an operation strip was demarcated for the 9th Infantry Division which was supposed to stay in touch with the 11th Infantry Division from the Silesian VI Army Corps of the 4th Army. The 10th Infantry Division obtained an operational strip on the left flank of the V Army Corps; in the course of the march, it had to stay in touch with the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg). When the order reached the staff of the 10th Infantry Division, it was relayed to the subordinate units. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the road between Arlon and Virton was free from the enemy on that night508. When on 20 August at 7h30 the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was ready in Eischen to resume marching, a French reconnaissance aeroplane was spotted over a nearby forest but it turned back soon. This was the first contact with the enemy509. On 20 August at 10h45, as part of the 19th Infantry Brigade, the 6th Grenadier Regiment set off on a march from Hagen to Steinfort and soon crossed the Belgian border to reach Arlon at 14h00 and to secure quarters. On that day, the regiment covered only 12 km. Arlon was in the southern range of the Ardennes, 15 km away from the border with France. The city’s population was not antagonistic towards the German soldiers, although the locals were very detached and 506 Leon Prauzin´ski and Adam Ulrich, W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstan´ców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920 (Poznan´: Ksie˛garnia S´w. Wojciecha, 1939), 15–16. 507 Vogt, 6; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz); Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS; Grand-duché de Luxembourg, d’après la carte topographique, 1911, BNF. 508 Loosch, Das Königl, 15. 509 Albert Benary, Königlich Preußisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard & Graefe, 1932), 30.

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uncertain of their future. The soldiers seized the opportunity to do some lastminute shopping before entering France, buying lots of cigars, cigarettes, chocolate and other luxury goods that might have been in short supply in France510. At dawn on 20 August, the 50th Infantry Regiment (a part of the 20th Infantry Brigade) left Bettingen; at 7h30 it crossed the Luxembourg-Belgium border. Next it marched through Sterpenich, Autelbas, Autelhaut, Arlon and Freylange. The soldiers from the III battalion were quartered in Socken, the II battalion set up a camp in Stocken and the remaining part of the regiment in Freylange511. On 20 August at 7h45, the 47th Infantry Regiment left Stehnen, following the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. The marching formation consisted of the II and III battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment , the II battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, the I battalion and the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment. At 10h00, the soldiers from the 47th Infantry Regiment entered Arlon where an hour’s rest was ordered. At that time, the column of baggage trains of the 9th Infantry Division crossed Arlon, at right-angles to the route of the 10th Infantry Division. Following the rest, the 47th Infantry Regiment resumed its march and at 12h45 entered Heinsch. It was a small village, so only some of the soldiers could spend the night there, while the rest had to set up camp. In Heinsch, the 47th Infantry Regiment stayed till 21 August512. The staff of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment found quarters in Arlon; the I battalion of the regiment was stationed in Posterie and Schoppach, the II battalion in Vieville513. On the evening of 20 August, the V Army Corps took positions in the vicinity of Arlon, on the right flank of the German 5th Army. To the right, near Saint Marie was the 3rd Cavalry Division and, further away, the VI Army Corps from the 4th Army. To the left of the Poznan´ corps, near Châtillon, was stationed the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg). At first the staff of the 5th Army decided that its units would wait on 21 August along the Tintigny – Longwy – Diedenhofen line to meet the 4th Army marching to the west. However, the situation changed when on 21 August the staff of the 5th Army received an air reconnaissance report. Strong French units (the 3rd Army) were detected marching from the Othain river to the north-east, towards Virton and Éthe. The southern range of the Ardennes – densely forested, with steep hills and few roads – posed a considerable challenge to the marching troops. For this reason, the staff of the German 5th Army decided that the time was ripe to strike to the south-west (Virton and Éthe) where the decisive battle was to be fought and, consequently, 510 511 512 513

Gottberg, 33–35; Karte Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, 1919, BNUS. Vogt, 6; Carte d’Etat-Major, Cartes allemandes: N° 553 (Diedenhofen) et N° 568 (Metz). Loosch, Das Königl, 16. Benary, 32; Carte d’Etat-Major, S-352: Arlon, Dernière revision complete sur le terrain: 1906, 56 cm × 79 cm, Echelle Schaal 1:40.000, edit: 1908 [dalej: Carte d’Etat-Major, S-352: Arlon, 1:40.000].

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the French troops would be destroyed. While the OHL was against the plan, Prince Wilhelm – commander of the 5th Army – decided to follow the scenario514. The German V Army Corps was to strike against the French IV Army Corps from the north to the south toward Virton and Éthe. On the other hand, the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) was to strike from the east to the west on the French IV Army Corps and the French V Army Corps515. 21 August was a rest day for the 10th Infantry Division, although on the right flank of the German V Army Corps (to the south west of the 10th Infantry Division), units of the 9th Infantry Division had already advanced to contact French troops. On that day, in the Gothic cathedral in Arlon the 6th Grenadier Regiment attended the last field mass for good fortune before departure. This is how Vizefeldwebel Wilhelm von remembered the time: The church was magnificent, a Gothic cathedral with columns turned towards the sky and with beautiful colourful stained glass windows marred by cheap votive offerings. The soldiers, weapons in hand, two second lieutenants standing upright with banners on either side. To the accompaniment of a trombone, the soldiers sang “Eine feste Burg” and “Wir treten zum Beten”. Father Stelter’s sermon was short and very interesting516.

On 21 August at 18h00, the staff of the German 5th Army issued an order for the subordinate units for the following day. The XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) was tasked with marching to the south-east along Châtillon, Saint-Léger and Bleid do Ruette; its 27th Infantry Division was to capture Longwy. Next, the 26th Infantry Division was to strike on Ville-Houdlémont and Tellancourt, staying in touch with the right flank of the V Army Corps. From the north, the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) was to cover the V Army Corps. Its 9th Infantry Division was ordered to march through Étalle and Huombois to Virton while the 10th Infantry Division proceeded through Étalle and Buzenol to Éthe. On 22 August, by 16h30 the units of the V Army Corps were to capture the hills between Belmont and Virton and along the valley of Basse-Vire stream to Latour517 where they were to cover the strike by the right flank of the 5th Army on Montmédy fortress. What is more, the spearhead of the corps was ordered to 514 The plan was in line with the then German operational doctrine according to which an offensive was the major form of military operations with the goal of destroying the enemy’s troops in an offensive battle. D.V.E. Nr. 53, Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung (Berlin: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1910), 7–14. 515 Benary, 33; Carte d’Etat-Major, S-352: Arlon, 1:40.000. 516 Gottberg, 36. 517 In French military sources, the name of the village is spelled in two ways: “La Tour” and “Latour”. In order to standardise the spelling and following the French and Belgian military maps from the time in question, I have adopted the version “Latour”. Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique, Dernière révision complete sur le terrain 1906: 71 – Virton, 56 cm × 79 cm, 1:40.000, edit 1908 [further referred to as Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000].

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capture the railway line between Virton and Rulles. At that time, the Silesian VI Reserve Corps were to leave for the west and, later on, to the south of Longwy. The section between Aumetz and Crusnes was to be captured by the V Reserve Corps. The XVI Army Corps was tasked with striking on Audun-le-Roman from the area of Metz. Completion of this mission was to start on 22 August at 5h30. The commander of the 5th Army issued the following order: Tomorrow, I will lead the army against the enemy for the first time. In other locations, German troops have already demonstrated outstanding courage and death-defying dedication. I am certain that we will do what our brothers have accomplished518.

In the meantime, on late afternoon of 21 August, the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) initiated combat contacts with the French troops519. For this reason, General Hermann von Strantz, the commander of the V Army Corps, ordered the 9th Infantry Division to remain in combat readiness and take positions to the south west of Étalle. The 10th Infantry Division was to march to the Étalle – Vance area. Immediate departure was ordained for the specific units of both divisions520. On the evening of 21 August, when the staff of the 5th Army issued its orders, on its right flank to the north-west of Longwy were grouped the V Army Corps and the XIII Army Corps. On the left flank of the 5th Army, to the south-east of Longwy, were stationed the VI Reserve Corps and the XVI Army Corps. As part of the reserve of the 5th Army, to the west of the city of Luxembourg was grouped the V Reserve Corps. By the evening of 21 August, the V Army Corps took positions between Étalle and Vance; to the left was the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) between Châtillon and Habergy. On that day, the 3rd Cavalry Division, reporting to the commander of the V Army Corps, fought a battle with the French troops near Rulles. At the same time, air reconnaissance carried out on 21 August for the staff of the 5th Army provided information about numerous French units marching from Othain. On the basis of this information, Wilhelm Hohenzollern, German Crown Prince and his staff decided to start the approach march of the 5th Army on 22 August, on either side of Longwy to the southwest521. On 21 August, the staff of the 47th Infantry Regiment in Heinsch was notified about the victory of the 6th Army under the command of Rupprecht, Bavarian Crown Prince. This information was transferred to the specific companies; the 518 Alphonse Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – I” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 25 (1923): [further referred to as Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I”], 258–259. 519 Moser, 19. 520 Carte d’Etat-Major, S-352: Arlon, 1:40.000. 521 Senftleben, 45–44.

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commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment ordered the regiment’s orchestra to play in celebration of the victory. When the soldiers rejoiced at the German victory in Lorraine, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division ordered march readiness and, later on, resumed the march. Shortly before departure, the soldiers received the first military mail delivery which arrived from their homeland522. The departure order was a surprise to the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. Reserve Second Lieutenant Eberhard Wendorff, quartermaster from the 1st battalion, wrote in his memoirs: The timing of the order of greater readiness for departure was bad; we were in the course of preparing dinner and the battalion was simply concerned about the packing. Around 17h00, an order was issued to saddle the horses. Nearly every face reflected some degree of anxiety. Before we left it was completely dark. Despite the former reconnaissance, on the steep and narrow country road running from Heinsch to the south west, you had the impression that you were in a forest path. Finally, we reached the main road leading to Étalle. The battalion commander, Rittmeister Schweigger, gave me the important task of organising quarters in Sirvy for three hours of the night. However, there were approximately 6,000 infantry and artillery soldiers. Providing quarters in several barns with hay along the road was easy523.

Ultimately, the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was quartered in Vance and the 2nd and 3rd battalions in Chantemelle524. The 50th Infantry Regiment also received information about the victory of the German 6th Army, which was celebrated with marches played by the regiment’s orchestra. The soldiers used the moment of respite to send letters to their families. In the afternoon, much to the soldiers’ joy, the first letters from home arrived. Because the order to march out was expected any minute, a large group of officers and regiment soldiers helped to segregate mail in a local school. As a result of this out-of-the-box solution, each soldier received his letters before departure. At 19h45, as expected, an alert was sounded in the 50th Infantry Regiment and an order was issued to leave immediately525. The alert was also sounded in the 6th Grenadier Regiment. Sergeant Geß from the 11th company remembered it as follows: When we returned from the church to the quarters, we all did what we had to do. Around 18h00, the alert signal was sent for the fusiliers battalion. Vizefeldwebel Rokahr, a drummer in the fusiliers battalion and his trumpeter called the companies to the yard where the battalion was to gather. In a relatively short time, the battalion was ready to

522 523 524 525

Loosch, Das Königl, 16. Senftleben, 43. Carte d’Etat-Major, S-352: Arlon, 1:40.000. Vogt, 6.

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Figure 3. Soldiers from the German division communication column assembling a telephone line, August 1914, photograph from the author’s collection.

leave. The Belgians were taken by surprise. We formed the vanguard but to no avail. The storm brought much-awaited coolness. At night we left for Vance526.

At 20h30, the 47th Infantry Regiment set off on a march; the entire 20th Field Artillery Brigade527 passed at full speed by the soldiers marching in the dark. In Vance, the 50th Infantry Regiment turned to the south and at 2h00 on 22 August set up camp in Chantemelle, having marched 13 km. At that time, the 47th Infantry Regiment marched down a narrow road in the following formation: III , II and I battalions. As in the darkness the infantrymen were accompanied by batteries of the division’s artillery, frequently artillery horse-drawn carts marched next to the infantry columns on the narrow road. This posed a threat to those on foot, who could have been hit by the carts with guns at any time. What is more, the carts were quite noisy, drowning out all the orders shouted by the infantry NCOs and officers. On 22 August at 2h00 a column of the 47th Infantry Regiment reached Sivry located between Vance and Étalle (3.3 km to the west of Vance) where an order was given to secure quarters and rest. As the area was brimming with the units of the 10th Infantry Division, the soldiers slept wherever they 526 Gottberg, 36–37. 527 Benary, 34.

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could: in pigsties, barns and houses while some of them fell asleep on the road, with knapsacks under their heads as pillows528. In front of Vance, the column of the 50th Infantry Regiment turned south and at 2h00 stopped in Chantemelle. The vicinity was so crowded with units of the 10th Infantry Division that the 50th Infantry Regiment set up a camp near the village while the III battalion provided protection529. On 22 August, in line with orders from the German 5th Army, both divisions of the V Army Corps filled a strip 8.87 km wide between Étalle and Chantemelle. In the south, the vast Bois-de-Étalle forest ranged up to Éthe. On that day, the 9th Infantry Division was to continue its approach march toward Virton, while the 10th Infantry Division to the south-west, toward Éthe, where combat contact was expected with the French troops530. After capturing the villages, the march was to be continued to the south, toward Longuyon and, later on, to the southeast towards Audun-le-Roman (the road distance between Virton and Audun-leRoman was 57.4 km)531. The approach march, through a densely wooded and hilly area with numerous deep valleys in the southern range of the Ardennes, allowed the German 5th Army to stealthily approach the enemy’s troops. As early as on 15 August 1914, the French General Staff decided (although the basis for this decision is hard to conclude) that the German troops in southern Belgium (the Ardennes) would not put up too strong resistance. These fatal conclusions led to a decision about an offensive in that direction532. The task was to be handled by the 4th Army, which would strike in the general direction of Neufchâteau, between Dinant, Namur and the Ourthe533. To the right of the 4th Army would operate the 3rd Army (with staff headquarters in Verdun) tasked with covering the right flank of the 4th Army from attacks by German troops via Luxembourg. At the same time, the 5th Army was regrouped to the fork of the Sambre and the Meuse534. 528 Vogt, 6; Loosch, Das Königl, 16–17; Carte d’Etat-Major, S-352: Arlon, 1:40.000. 529 Vogt, 6. 530 Loosch, Das Königl, 19; Croquis No 1: Situation Générale dans La Région de Longwy le 21 Août 1914 au soir, Echelle 1:200.000, in Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I”; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 531 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000; Croquis No 1: Situation Générale dans La Région de Longwy le 21 Août 1914 au soir, Echelle 1:200.000, in Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I”. 532 Robert A. Doughty, “French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own,” The Journal of Military History, no. 67 (2003): 445–446. 533 Ordre particulier nr 17, Nr 1660, commandant en chef à commandants 3. Armée (Verdun) et 4. Armée (Stenay), 21. 08. 1914, 21h.30, J. Joffre, Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre [further referred to as the AFGG], t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923) [further referred to as AFGG 1/1/1], 604. 534 Ibidem.

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Notably, in this area of military operations the French troops completely neglected reconnaissance of the operational activities of both the 4th and the 3rd Army. The cavalry, making reconnaissance for the 4th Army, was misused. The staff of the 4th Army failed to send the poor intelligence to its subordinate corps and divisions or to the 3rd Army. Air reconnaissance, on the other hand, was not very intense, even if the French had the means at their disposal535. Therefore, the shortfall of intelligence resulted from sloppy reconnaissance on the part of the French air force and cavalry, coupled with underestimating the German troops in southern Belgium. On 20 August 1914, the reconnaissance divisions of the 3rd Army reported detection of only a few columns of German infantry and artillery between Étalle and Arlon536. The area around Arlon was supposed to be free of enemy forces on that day. In fact, the area had already been occupied by the entire German V Army Corps on its way to meet the French IV Army Corps from the 3rd Army. This meant that General Victor René Boëlle, the commander of the French IV Army Corps537 consisting of the 7th Infantry Division led by Edgard de Trentinian538 and the 8th Infantry Division under the command of General Raoul de Lartigue, was unaware of the imminent danger539. 535 Edgard de Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914 et la 7e Division du 4e Corps (10 Août au 22 Septembre 1914) (Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle, 1927), 122–123. 536 3e Armée, Bulletin derenseignements nr 16, P.O. Le chef d’état major Grosetti, Verdun, 21 août 1914, 15 heures, AFGG 1/1/1, 626–627. 537 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), Journaux des marches et opérations [further referred to as the JMO], 26 N 109/1, Corps d’armées, groupes de divisions et groupements, [further referred to as the CAGDG], Le Service Historique de la Défense [further referred to as the SHD]. 538 In the course of mobilization in August 1914, General Edgard de Trentinian was among the most talented French tactical and operational commanders. He was born in Brest on 25 August 1851 to a family with long traditions of military service. His grandfather was a commander in the American Revolutionary War. Edgard de Trentinian was raised in Martinique on the Caribbean Sea. He fought in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) and afterwards he graduated from the elite École spéciale militaire de Saint Cyr. In 1872 he was sent to Tonkin where he participated in the attack on the Hanoi Citadel. Between 4 March and 4 October 1881, he was acting lieutenant governor in Cochinchina. He served in Indochina until 1892. Next, he relocated to French Sudan and in 1895–1898 he was governor of Mali. In 1898 he was promoted to Brigadier-General, the youngest officer in this position in the French army. Later on he was sent to Madagascar. Before the outbreak of WWI, he was the commander of the elite 7th Infantry Division (stationed in Paris) within the IV Army Corps and led it to the front. As part of the offensive in the Ardennes, on 22 August 1914 his division fought at Éthe with the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division and units of the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg). Following severe losses sustained in the battle by the 7th Infantry Division, General de Trentinian was heavily criticised by his commanders. However, his division suffered losses due to poor command in the IV Army Corps and in the 3rd Army to which the corps was subordinated. In September 1914, during the First Battle of the Marne, General de Trentinian made a name for himself for using Paris taxis to transport infantrymen to the front. After WWI, the charges of his poor command during the battle of

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Map 2. Corps of the German 5th Army and French 3rd Army in the battle of Longwy, 22–25 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

As early as on 20 August, the inhabitants of Étalle and Arlon area approached the staff of the IV Corps in Vélosnes with disturbing messages that the local woods were full of German troops supported by artillery. However, as the information Éthe were dropped. He presented his analysis of the battle from the point of view of the staff of the 7th Infantry Division in a vast study L’État-Major en 1914 et la 7e Division du 4e Corps 10 Août au 22 Septembre 1914 published in Paris in 1927. Edgard de Trentinian died on 24 May 1942 in Paris. Justin J. Corfield, Historical Dictionary of Ho Chi Minh City (London– New York: Anthem Press, 2013), 307–308; Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914; Grasset, La guerre en action. Éthe, 6–7. 539 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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was provided by Belgian civilians, the French officers considered it incredible and as such ignored it. On the evening of 20 August and the following day, the subunits of the 3rd Dragons Regiment and the 14th Hussar Regiment were involved in intensive reconnaissance of the defensive lines of the French IV Army Corps. They detected numerous patrols and several columns of German infantry and artillery540.

Figure 4. A patrol of the French dragoon regiment, August 1914; photograph from the author’s collection.

Meanwhile, on the right flank of the French IV Army Corps, towards Saint-Léger and Vance via Éthe, was the marching path of the 7th Infantry Division541; on the 540 French intelligence from the 3rd Army failed to spot the German V Army Corps and the positions taken by the remaining operational formations of the German 5th Army. Meanwhile, on 20 August 1914, the 3rd Cavalry Division operated on the right flank of the German 5th Army, close to Rossignol and Neufchâteau, in close contact with the 4th Army. The XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) was located in the vicinity of Châtillon, Meix-la-Tige, Rachecourt; the VI Reserve Corps was in Thil, Villerupt and Cantebronne; the XVI Corps was in Ottange, Rochonvillers, Angevillers and Thionville. Arranged in a second line, in Bettembourg forest was stationed the V Reserve Corps. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I,” 250. 541 Following mobilization in August 1914, the French 7th Infantry Division included the 13th Infantry Brigade under the command of Colonel Lacotte and the 14th Infantry Brigade with General Henri-François Félineau in charge. Each of these brigades had in its organisational structure two infantry regiments. In the case of the 13th Infantry Brigade, it was the 101st Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Cally and the 102nd Infantry Regiment with commander Colonel Valentin. The 14th Infantry Brigade consisted of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Farret and the 104th Infantry Regiment with Colonel Drouot in charge. In total, the division consisted of 12 infantry

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left flank was the 8th Infantry Division. At night on 21 August the staff of the 7th Infantry Division received an order from the staff of the corps to relocate toward Latour. Consequently, the division’s commander ordered his units to march through Grand Failly, Petit Xivry, Flabeuville, Villette, Charency, Allondrelle, Ruette (the western part) to Latour542. The first to leave at 6h00 was the vanguard of the division led by the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade consisting of three squadrons of the 14th Hussar Regiment543, a company of sappers, the 104th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. A distance of 1,900 m was to be kept between the vanguard and the main column of the division. At 6h30, the 103rd Infantry Regiment departed as the first unit of the main column. It was followed at 6h50 by two other battalions of the 26th Field Artillery Regiments, at 7h30 by units of the 13th Infantry Brigade (sans two companies) and the division’s supply train544. The units of the 7th Infantry Division marched in a serried single column; regrouping was planned in the course of marching through Gomery545. On 21 August, the units of the 7th Infantry Division set off on a march, as instructed by the division’s commander. The division’s flanks were protected at that time by two companies of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, moving from Fla-

542 543 544 545

battalions and 24 heavy machine guns (6 per Infantry Regiment). Cavalry was represented in the division by the 14th Hussars Regiment under the command of Colonel Wallerand de Hauteclocque; it was further broken down to 4 squadrons; artillery was represented by the 26th Artillery Regiment under the command of Colonel Bertrand. The division’s staff was made up of 14 officers and 122 NCOs and privates who had at their disposal 92 horses. 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, Journaux des marches et operations [further referred to as the JMO], Divisions d’infanterie et d’infanterie territorial further referred to as the DIIT], SHD; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, Brigades et groupes de bataillons d’infanterie [further referred to as the BGBI], SHD; 101e régiment d’infanterie (7. 08. 1914–16. 08. 1915), 26 N 674/1, JMO, Régiments d’infanterie [further referred to as the RI], SHD; 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, Régiments d’artillerie de campagne [further referred to as RAC], SHD; 14e régiment de hussards (2. 08. 1914–1. 04. 1917), 26 N 898/21, Cavalerie-Régiments de hussards [further referred to as the CRH], SHD; Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 2: Divisions d’Infanterie, Divisions de Cavalerie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1924) [further referred to as the AFGG 10/2], 53–56; Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 227–235; Historique du 26e Régiment d’Artillerie de Campagne (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920), 4. Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. In the course of mobilization to the French 7th Infantry Division, the 5th squadron from the 14th Hussars Regiment was appointed as an organic unit of the division’s cavalry. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 228. 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD. 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD.

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beuville, through hill 334 towards Allondrelle. On the edge of La Malmaison forest, the enemy’s patrols were detected; they withdrew without fighting546. In the evening, General Edgard de Trentinian remained in Ruette with his staff, the 104th Infantry Regiment547, a squadron of the division’s cavalry, the I and III battalions of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and a company of sappers. General Henri François Félineau, commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade, was stationed in Latour with his staff and the I and III battalions of the 103rd Infantry Regiment. The II battalion of this regiment stayed in Gomery. La Malmaison provided quarters for the staff of the 13th Infantry Brigade, the I battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment and the 102nd Infantry Regiment; in Grandcourt were stationed the II and III battalions of the 101st Infantry Regiment548 and the II battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. Communication with the 8th Infantry Division on the left flank was to be provided from Pierrard farm549. On that evening, the units of the 8th Infantry Division were on the following positions: the 115th Infantry Regiment in Virton, the 117th Infantry Regiment in Saint-Mard (the 16th Infantry Brigade), the 124th Infantry Regiment in Hannoncourt and the 130th Infantry Regiment in Dampicourt (the 15th Infantry Brigade). The spearhead of the 8th Infantry Division took a position in Bellevue, on hill 295 and in Houdrigny. As a unit at the disposal of the IV Army Corps, the 44th Field Artillery Regiment filled positions in Torgny and Lamorteau550. The soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division had been marching for 48 hours without a hot meal. Still, the morale in the specific regiments was high. Major Alphons Grasset, the then commander of the 5th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, described the soldiers in the division: One third of the units was represented by young active military service soldiers; the remaining part consisted of reservists from lower social classes. They were mainly peasants from Mayenne, Ornes, Sarthe and Eure-et-Loir departments. While slightly 546 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 547 As of 8 August 1914, the 104th Infantry Regiment had 55 officers, 184 NCOs, 294 corporals and 2,820 privates. The unit’s ration allowance was for 3,353 soldiers and 168 horses. The I battalion had 1,046 soldiers, the II – 1,045, the III battalion – 1,054 soldiers. Each battalion had at its disposal 49 horses. The regiment’s staff and the machine-gun company included 13 officers and 195 soldiers of other ranks; they were transported by 39 horses. 104e régiment d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–24. 03. 1915), 26 N 675/15, JMO, RI, SHD. 548 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 549 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 550 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Figure 5. After an intense march, the soldiers of a French infantry regiment rest in a roadside ditch in the shadow of trees. On the left is a stack of Lebel Mle 1886 rifles; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

awkward, they were quiet, disciplined and tenacious. In the units were also inhabitants of Paris and the city’s suburbs: Sceaux, Vanves, Villejuif, Issy, even Rambouillet. These soldiers, on the other hand, were enthusiastic, energetic and vigorous, with an inclination toward mockery and rebellion. All these individuals were a beautiful example of all the superb and reliable features of the French nation551.

All the intelligence on the German troops approaching from the north was instantly communicated by the staff of the French IV Army Corps to the staff of the 3rd Army in Verdun. The information indicated that the corps in question would face German troops of the size of at least an infantry division. Combat contact and the resulting engagement could occur any minute. For this reason, on the evening of 21 August, General Boëlle – the commander of the French IV Army Corps – expected an order from the staff of the 3rd Army to prepare for imminent battle. At 21h00, the staff of the IV Army Corps received a secret instruction for 22 August. Both corps divisions were to resume marching to the north-west: the 8th Infantry Division was to march toward Étalle while the 7th Infantry Division toward Saint-Léger – Châtillon. After capturing this section, the IV Army Corps was supposed to repel attacks by German troops from Arlon, and thus cover the right flank of the assaulting 4th Army552. 551 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I,” 253. 552 Étàt-Major III Armée, Instruction personnelle etsecrète nr 6 pour la journée du 22 août, Q.G. de Verdun, 21 août 1914, Le Général Commandantla III Armée – Ruffey, in AFGG 1/1/1, 633– 634; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I,” 255.

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Chart 9. Organisational structure of the French 7th Infantry Division, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

However, following the instruction posed considerable risk to the two divisions of the French IV Army Corps, because it involved entering woody hills where no reconnaissance had been previously conducted. According to information obtained from the local Belgian population, numerous German troops were sta-

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tioned there. The two divisions were to depart in different directions: the 7th Infantry Division was to march down the narrow valley of the Thon which, in the case of enemy attack, left no room for manoeuvre, because the valley looked like the proverbial mousetrap. If the entrance and the exit from the valley had been cut off by artillery, the French troops would be doomed553. This is why General Boëlle decided that a mistake had been made while writing the instruction and telephoned Major Grossetti, head of staff of the 3rd Army. However, he dismissed the General’s comments and thereby confirmed the tasks for the IV Army Corps. Consequently, at 23h50 Boëlle issued a combat order for his corps for 22 August. He appointed the 14th Hussar Regiment as the vanguard; it was expected to march toward Vance and do reconnaissance of the area with the roads between Vance and Arlon, and between Étalle, Habay-la-Neuve and Heinstert. The cavalrymen were to leave Chenois at 4h00. The vanguard was supported by a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division which at 4h00 was ordered to relocate to Latour. The remaining units of the 7th Infantry Division were tasked with marching through Éthe to Saint-Léger – Châtillon where they would repel possible attacks of German troops from the west. The departure of the 7th Infantry Division from Éthe was planned at 5h00. In the course of executing the order, the unit was to maintain contact on its right flank with the French 9th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps; the contact line between the two divisions was demarcated between Gomery and Bleid. Gévimont hill was a natural bolt between the two villages; capturing the hill could have ensured protection of the flanks of the two divisions554. The order of the IV Army Corps was delivered at 2h00 to the staff of the 7th Infantry Division in Ruettes by Captain Lepetit, the corps staff courier, and collected by Major Macker, head of the division staff. At the same time, General Edgard de Trentinian did not receive any information about the result of the cavalry’s reconnaissance done at the request of the IV Army Corps, or about the route of the march of its right neighbour, the French V Army Corps. Following the guidelines of the staff of the IV Army Corps, the staff of the 7th Infantry Division reinforced the vanguard, appointing the III battalion led by Major Vicq by the 103rd Infantry Regiment to support the 14th Hussar Regiment. In the face 553 The commander of the IV Army Corps, General Victor René Boëlle, was right. Once the two divisions of his corps marched in different directions, they were 6 km away from each other, separated by a hilly and woody area with a few narrow roads. Therefore it was impossible to have communication either in march or in combat. If the enemy’s troops had been encountered, both divisions of the French IV Army Corps would have had to fight in isolation, unsupported. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 148. 554 État-Major 4e Corps d’Armée, Ordre général nr 18 pour la journée du 22 aoeˇt 1914, Q.G. Velosnes, le 21 août, à 23h50, Le général commandant le 4e C.A. Boëlle, in AFGG 1/1/1, 653– 654; Carte 200.000e. Situation des IIIe et IVe armées le 21 aouˆ t 1914, in AFGG 1/1/1; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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of non-existent reconnaissance reports on the enemy from the corps staff, the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division did not expect to come across considerable numbers of German troops555. On 22 August at 3h00, an operational order was sent from the staff of the 3rd Army to the headquarters of the IV Army Corps about departure towards Arlon. Therefore, the earlier intent of the staff of the 3rd Army, despite protests from the commander of the IV Army Corps, maintained its original form556.

Figure 7. Soldiers from the French infantry regiment during a halt in a march. The picture shows a stack of Lebel Mle 1886 rifles, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

At 3h00, General Edgard de Trentinian issued an order for his units; it was carried by the couriers of the division’s cavalry557. According to the order’s content, the 7th Infantry Division was to march through Éthe toward Saint-Léger and Vance. The division’s vanguard, commanded by General Henry-François Félineau, was grouped in the following way: the 104th Infantry Regiment, the III battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment, a company of sappers and two platoons from the squadron’s cavalry. The vanguard was intended to depart from Gomery at 4h30. Two kilometres away from the spearhead, the division’s major troops were to follow suit and leave Gomery at 5h45. The troops included the I and II battalions of the 103rd Infantry Regiment from the 14th Infantry Brigade, the I and 555 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Trentinian, L’Étatmajor En 1914, 128. 556 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 3e Armée, Ordre général d’opérations no 16 pour la journée du 21 août, Q.G. Verdun, 21. 08. 1914, 2 heures, in AFGG 1/1/1, 628–630. 557 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD.

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II battalions from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment558, the 101st and 102nd Infantry Regiments559 from the 13th Infantry Brigade, ammunition columns, the corps sappers unit and a battalion of the 317th Infantry Regiment. In line with the former order, the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment remained in Latour as a unit at the disposal of the 14th Hussar Regiment560. On 20 August, the most advanced units of the German V Army Corps were located between Étalle and Châtillon. At the same time, the reconnaissance done by the 3rd Cavalry Division before grouping the 5th Army provided valuable intelligence. In the valley of the Chiers river, north of Montmédy and south of the Othain, the French had concentrated considerable troops. At first there was no indication that the French units planned an attack on the German 5th Army. On the morning of 21 August, Longwy fortress was enveloped and preparations were made for an assault. Soon, a report came that the French divisions had started their march from the Othain to the north and the north-east, which undoubtedly indicated an intent to attack a formation of the 5th Army in order to stop it and push it back from the French border. In these circumstances Prince Wilhelm Hohenzollern decided to attack on 22 August the French troops and, following a decisive battle, to push them away toward the line of Virton, Longuyon and Audun-le-Roman561. Following the guidelines of the staff of the 5th Army, General Hermann von Strantz ordered the 9th Infantry Division to march on 22 August along the right flank of the V Army Corps through Étalle, Robelmont and Virton. The 10th Infantry Division was ordered to march along the left flank of the corps through Étalle, Buzenol and Éthe. Only one road led from Buzenol to Éthe which forked 3 km away from Éthe; the western branch led to Belmont, the eastern one to Éthe. Both branches ran along the valleys to the south, among forested hills (Bois-deÉtalle forest). The terrain made it possible for the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division to attack both villages simultaneously. Notably, the width of the assault strip between Belmont and Éthe amounted to barely 3 km, i. e. 1.5 km per brigade and 750 m per regiment. Deployment of two infantry brigades at once in this 558 The French 26th Field Artillery Regiment consisted of 3 squads (French Groupe) while each of them from 3 batteries numbered in a sequence. Each battery of the field artillery had 170 soldiers, 168 horses and 4 guns. In total, all the nine batteries had 1,530 soldiers, 1,512 horses and 36 guns. 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Historique du 26e Régiment, 8. 559 As of 6. 08. 1914, the 102nd Infantry Regiment had 68 officers, 198 NCOs and 3,140 privates, in total food and forage rations for 3,406 soldiers and 189 horses. 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD. 560 État-Major 7e Divison d’Infaterie, Ordre préparatoire pour la journée du 22 août, Ruette, 22 août 1914, 3 hèures, Le général commandant la 7e Division de Trentinian, in AFGG, 1/1/1, 803; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 561 Gottberg, 39.

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Map 3. The operations of the German 5th Army on 21–25 August 1914 during the Battle of the Frontiers. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

limited space, to the accompaniment of intense firing on the part of French artillery and machine guns, could have led to considerable losses in the 10th Infantry Division. On the other hand, it unlocked the assault and penetration potential for the attack562, in particular because the assaulting infantry regiments could count on supporting fire from the division’s two artillery regiments, armed with fifty four 77 mm FK 96 n.A. field canons and eighteen 105 mm

562 Ibidem, 33–35, 40; Terence Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914 (Brimscombe Port: The History Press, 2013), Kindle edition, Location 3526–3979; Historique du 26e Régiment, 4–8.

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lFH 1898/09 light field howitzers. The French 7th Infantry Division had at its disposal only thirty six 75 mm M1897 field canons, which had a higher rate of fire than their German equivalents but were not capable of providing plunging fire. Another disadvantage of the French equipment was poor quality ammunition; faulty fuses led to numerous duds563.

Figure 8. A panoramic view of Éthe in Belgium where on 22 August 1914, the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps fought its first battle during WWI against the French 7th Infantry Division from the IV Army Corps. A view of the top of hill 314 (to the left of the road) from the north to the south; the photo shows barbed wire fencing on the meadows, which posed a real threat to the cavalrymen from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. On the right is the tower of the church in Éthe. There is a railway embankment in front of the village; behind the village are hills and the Jeune Bois woods. Photograph from the author’s collection.

General Robert Kosch, commander of the 10th Infantry Division, issued the following order for 22 August: On 21 August, numerous French troops reached the road leading from Landres (to the north-west of Briey) to Longuyon. Opposite, the enemy [the XIII Royal Army Corps 563 The practical rate of fire of the 75 mm M1897 machine guns was up to 12 rounds per minute. Ministre de l’Armement, Renseignements Sur Les Matériels D’artillerie De Tous Calibres En Service Sur Les Champs De Bataille Des Armées Françaises (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1918), 53; US Army War College, Manual for The Battery Commander Field Artillery 75-mm. GUN (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917) – translation of the French instruction Ecole militaire de l’artillerie, L’ecole du commandant du batterie, Ire Partie, Canon 75, 2e edition (Paris: Libraeirie Militaire Chapelot, 1916/1917).

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(Württemberg) – B.K.] marched as far as the Bleid – Ville-Houdlemont line. In its march toward Carignan, the enemy has not passed through Izel. On 22 August, the 5th Army will start its attack, the right flank of the XIII Corps through Bleid toward Ruette. From the hills in the north-east and to the east of Virton, the V Corps will attack the enemy’s troops towards Montmédy. The 9th Infantry Division will launch an attack from Étalle towards the hills between Robelmont and Virton while the 10th Infantry Division will strike through Buzenol – Éthe toward the hills east of Virton, passing around Étalle564.

Before dawn on 22 August, the alarm was sounded in the 10th Infantry Division; following preparations, specific units departed for Éthe. At 2h00 on 22 August, the alarm was sounded for the 6th Grenadier Regiment which left in darkness (without the II battalion) toward Vance where it was to join the division’s column. As the night was moonless, the march was laborious, while the officers frequently stopped the column to check the route. Ultimately, the 6th Grenadier Regiment reached Vance at 4h30. The II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment stayed for some time in Arlon as the escort of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment565. In the 50th Infantry Regiment the alarm was sounded at 4h15. The 2nd company under the command of Lieutenant Goebel moved toward Buzenol (2 km to the west of Chantemelle) and at 4h45 took positions on the division’s spearhead together with the 2nd squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, resuming march to the south. The 47th Infantry Regiment was woken at 4h30. The field kitchens hastily served hot coffee and at 5h00 the troops departed. In line with the division’s order, the 47th Infantry Regiment was to follow the main force of the division. This is why it did not stop at the road between Chantemelle and Buzenol and waited until 7h15 to take up position in the marching column566. As the marching routes of the 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions crossed, there were gridlocks on some of the roads. Despite the difficulties, the situation was quickly handled. For this reason, in the Vance area the staff of the 10th Infantry Division ordered the division’s column to halt. Due to thick fog and the narrow forest paths, the march was laborious. Further to the south, toward Éthe, the terrain sloped mildly, forming the Thon river valley. Some of the local hills were densely forested; the slopes of the other hills had fields of ripe oats and clover. The soldiers of the 2nd company of the 50th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, the advance-guard point of the 10th Infantry Division, moved along the road from 564 The order of the 10th Infantry Division for 22. 08. 1914 as in Gottberg, 40. 565 The 6th Foot Artillery Regiment was a unit at the disposal of the German 5th Army. It consisted of two squads which had at their disposal the 210 mm Mörser 10 heavy mortars. Die Schlachten und Gefechte, 10; Gottberg, 40. 566 Vogt, 7; Gottberg, 40; Max Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 35; Loosch, Das Königl, 22; Senftleben, 45–46.

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Map 4. Distribution of the French IV Army Corps from the 3rd Army (on the right flank – the 7th Infantry Division, on the left flank – the 8th Infantry Division) in the operation zone of the German V Army Corps, the evening of 21 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

Étalle to Éthe and around 7h30 left the woods and marched into the open area of hill 314. They were followed by the vanguard: the 1st, 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, the 3rd company of the 5th pioneer battalion. They were followed by the division’s major forces: the III and II battalions of the 50th Infantry Regiment, a light ammunition column and, 150 m away, the 47th Infantry Regiment and the 6th Grenadier Regiment567.

567 Vogt, 7; Gottberg, 40; Zunehmer, 35; Loosch, Das Königl, 18; Senftleben, 46.

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Map 5. Location of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division near Éthe, 22 August 1914 at 6h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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Map 6. The terrain in the vicinity of the town of Virton and the villages of Éthe, Belmont, Bleid and Latour. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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Map 7. The area of the battle of Éthe, 22 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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Map 8. Map of Éthe with the distribution of the cannon fire position of the French 26th Field Artillery Regiment and the fire direction, 22 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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Figure 9. Grand Rue, the main street in Éthe where on 22 August 1914 fierce fighting took place; Photograph of the village from before 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Soon, the column of the 10th Infantry Division marched into the dense Bois-deÉtalle forest and proceeded in a narrow path along the ridge leading to the top of hill 314 while the thick fog limited visibility to 50 steps568. One kilometre to the south was the valley of the Thon river, flowing from the north-east to the southwest through Belmont and Éthe. To the north-east of Belmont were two ridges connected by the top of hill 300; to the right of it was Bois du Bon-Lieu forest. To the east was a valley along which Chou stream flowed from the north to the south. In the eastern part of Belmont the stream flowed into the Thon and, together with the railway line, marked the limit between Éthe and Belmont. However, due to the fog, the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division could not see it569. Virton was located 3 km to the south-west of hill 314. A railway line and a road led from Virton via Belmont, Éthe and Laclaireau, along the river valley. The railway line ran from Virton to the north-west. Around Belmont it turned to the west and resumed the north-west direction outside the village; it proceeded

568 Gottberg, 41. 569 An analysis of the area of the battle of Éthe carried out on the basis of a fragment of a French staff map of 1:20 000. The map was included in the military ledger of the French IV Army Corps to depict the course of the battle. Ironically, during the battle of 22 August 1914, this map was unavailable to the officers of the 7th Infantry Division. This is confirmed by reports from military ledgers of all the regiments of the division in question. 4e corps d’armée (2.08– 31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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through Éthe and just outside the village turned to the north to Laclaireau. From the north-west part of Éthe, through its northern limit towards Laclaireau, the railway line ran along an embankment which was as much 5 m high in its highest parts. The embankment could serve as an excellent defensive position for the French infantry against German troops striking from the north. On the embankment, in the eastern part of Éthe, was a road tunnel 4 m high and wide, and 20 m long570. The main road to Saint-Léger led from the west to the east, through Virton, Belmont and Éthe. From the north, from Étalle to Éthe, ran a road which was the main axis of attack of the German 10th Infantry Division. On the top of hill 314 it split into a narrow road leading to the south-east. It ran along the western edge of Bois de Laclaireau forest, crossed the Éthe – Laclaireau railway line on the eastern edge of the woods and, next to Laclaireau castle, joined the road leading north. To the west, through Bois du Bon-Lieu, a forest road led from the north to the south which sometimes changed into a path. Therefore, in the assault strip of the 10th Infantry Division, in the direction of Éthe, there was only one good road which could be used to launch an attack. What is more, the terrain and the narrow strip of the division’s strike made it impossible for the four infantry regiments and the two artillery regiments to fight concurrently571. In the southern part of Belmont was a road bridge on the Thon; there was a railway bridge to the west of Belmont, two road bridges in the southern part of Éthe and, further on, a tunnel in an embankment with the railway line above. A road led from Éthe to the south and forked right outside the village. Its western part led to Latour (3.2 km away from Éthe), the eastern one to Gomery (2.4 km away from Éthe). To the west of Latour, parallel to Basse-Vire stream, was a road leading to Chenois which turned west to Saint-Mard. Virton was located to the north of Saint-Mard. To the south of Belmont and Éthe, hills and the Jeune Bois woods ranged from the east to the west; in the west the forest changed to Bois Baconvcau and later on to Bois le Mât. To the west of Bois le Mât was Bleid village. A road ran through Jeune Bois from the north to the south, from Éthe to Gomery. The road from Éthe to Latour ran through the top of hill 293. To the west of Jeune Bois was the much smaller Bois des Loges and, further to the west, Bois de Bampont. A road to Latour ran through Bois des Loges from the north to the south. It was a perfect defence area, and for this reason the French 7th Infantry Division had an advantage over the 10th Infantry Division approaching from the north. The well-distributed posts of the French artillery, heavy machine guns and 570 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 571 A 1:20 000 map of the Éthe area, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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the positions of the infantry could stop an enemy attack for many days and inflict heavy casualties. According to operational procedure, the staff of the French 3rd Army launched an attack572.

Figure 10. The French line infantry, after a forced march, enters a Belgian village, August 1914; a woman gives the soldiers water; the photo shows the details of the uniforms, equipment and Lebel Mle1886 rifles. Photograph from the author’s collection.

When on 22 August at 4h00, the units of the French 7th Infantry Division started preparations for executing the orders, it was drizzling and a thick fog came down. The weather conditions dramatically reduced visibility and the soldiers’ sense of direction. At the same time, the staff of the 7th Infantry Division did not establish communications with its twin 8th Infantry Division on its left flank or the troops of the French V Army Corps on its right. General Edgard de Trentinian took into consideration the fact that the corps units would not have the time to reach their designated positions. This posed a risk of exposing the division’s right flank and simultaneous enemy attack from the north and the west573. 572 Chanoine Jean Schmitz and Dom Norbert Nieuwland, Documents pour servir a l’histoire de l’invasion allemande dans les provinces de Namur et de Luxembourg, Tom VII: La bataille de la semois et de Virton (Bruxelles & Paris: G. Van Oest & Cie), 1925, 263–265. 573 General Edgard de Trentinian, an officer with many years of fighting and command experience, was absolutely right in his predictions. On the evening of 21 August 1914, there was a gap of nearly 2 km between the French IV Army Corps and its right neighbour, the V Army Corps. Into the gap marched the 53rd Infantry Brigade from the 27th Infantry Division of the XIII Royal Army Corps (Württemberg) which attacked the 7th Infantry Division from the north-west. The situation was even more difficult between the French V Army Corps and the VI Army Corps located to the south where the gap exceeded 5 km. This resulted from the

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Figure 11. On a foggy morning, an officer from the French hussars regiments asks a Belgian farmer for directions, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

According to the earlier plan of cooperation between the French IV Army Corps and the V Army Corps, their advance-guard points were to be in contact between Éthe and Bleid. Therefore, in order to establish communication with the French V Army Corps, the staff of the 7th Infantry Division intended to send to its right flank an assigned unit under the command of Captain de Jouvencel, consisting of half a squadron of the 14th Hussar Regiment and the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment. The unit was ordered to march in the direction of Grandcourt (via Saint-Rémy to Bleid) and to cover the division’s main column from the east. At 5h30 major Laplace, commander of the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment, was ordered to leave for Bleid. However, because of the heavy fog and lack of tactical maps of the area, the division proceeded slowly, while some units got lost. For this reason General de Trentinian decided to change the departure time of the division’s spearhead574. At 5h30, the cavalrymen from the 4th squadron of the 14th Hussar Regiment departed. Due to the fog, visibility was reduced to 10 paces, and the cavalrymen

French 3rd Army under the command of General Emmanuel Ruffey underestimating the German 5th Army. Croquis nr 1: Situation générale dans la région de Longwy le 21 Août 1914 au soir, in Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I”. 574 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 135.

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could only travel by road as the local meadows were fenced off with barbed wire, posing a severe threat to the horses. At night on 22 August the companies of the III battalion and the 103rd Infantry Regiment posted guards and, therefore, at dawn on 22 August, they could not resume march at the specified time. The units which left the location were three squadrons of the 14th Hussar Regiment under the command of Colonel Wallerand de Hauteclocque. The hussars got lost in the fog and came under fire from the German infantry. They turned back at a fast trot and headed for Éthe. At 5h30, the units of the 7th Infantry Division had already marched towards Éthe and Bleid. At the same time, the German 2nd company of the 50th Infantry Regiment, which formed the spearhead of the German 10th Infantry Division, moved by road from the north to the south towards Éthe. In front of the western flank of the French 7th Infantry Division the spearhead of the 123rd Grenadier Regiment from the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) from the 23rd Infantry Division entered Saint-Léger forest and moved toward Bleid. Therefore General de Trentinian’s predictions were coming true, putting his division in an extremely difficult tactical situation. Undoubtedly, the staff of the French division made a mistake by failing to order the ammunition columns to distribute extra rifle ammunition. Therefore, in the course of fighting with the German 10th Infantry Division, each soldier from the French 7th Infantry Division had only 88 cartridges in on-hand stock as provided for by the regulations575. At 6h00, the vanguard of the French 7th Infantry Division was still stationed in Gomery. The infantry entered Jeune Bois and took up their posts on the northern edge of the forest but the dense fog hampered observation of the foreground. For this reason the vanguard’s march was put on hold. In the meantime, the 4th squadron of the 14th Hussar Regiment, the advance-guard point of the 7th Infantry Division, moved by road from Latour towards Éthe, trying to avoid ambush at any price. In the fog, the German troops could attack at any time, and from a small distance at that. A local man served as a guide, accompanying the unit on his bicycle. At 6h00 the hussars crossed the bridge on the Thon and entered Éthe576. Two mounted scouts sent out on reconnaissance came back quickly with the information that a large unit of enemy cavalry had been detected in Éthe. Lieutenant Ronin, commander of the spearhead of the 4th squadron, did not bide his time and ordered to attack the road to Éthe. Interestingly, the fog was still dense, so the cavalrymen did not know and did not see the route of the 575 Because the food provision columns of the 7th Infantry Division could not catch up with the division, starting on 20 August 1914 its soldiers did not get their rations. This was ameliorated by the hospitable Belgian inhabitants who fed the French soldiers well and provided them with food supplies for the next few days. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe I,” 265–266. 576 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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assault. From a tactical point of view, the decision to attack was very risky. With raised sabres, the hussars trotted between the houses in Éthe. Where the road from Latour connected at a right angle with the road from Gomery to Éthe, they spotted a patrol of the enemy’s uhlans (a squadron of the 19th Uhland Regiment from the 27th Infantry Division [Württemberg]) which withdrew at the sight of the French cavalrymen. However, the hussars did not intend to give up on fighting: they galloped into an unknown area. The road along which they charged turned abruptly and this led to a tragic accident. The horse of Wachtmeister Boisset, who was in the lead, slipped when taking the sharp turn, fell and died. Other hussars from the first line tripped over it. One of them was Wachtmeister Devaux who hit his head against the cobblestones and fractured his skull. The resulting gridlock slowed down the charge. Lieutenant Ronin made it past the dangerous spot and, alone, charged the escaping enemy. He killed one German uhlan with his sabre and wounded another one, but when he was about to strike a German lieutenant, his horse slipped and fell. The rest of the 4th squadron arrived when the German uhlans, supported by fresh reinforcements, turned round, charged and struck back. The hussars were overwhelmed by the enemy and started to retreat, firing from short rifles. However, when the entire 4th squadron of the 14th Hussar Regiment launched a counteroffensive, the German uhlans had to escape down the road to Saint-Léger, to the east577. Meanwhile, at 6h30 Colonel de Hauteclocque arrived in Éthe leading the 1st, 2nd and 3rd squadrons. He received a report on the enemy troops and the retreat of the German uhlans to the east after they occupied the train station in Éthe. Consequently, he ordered the 3rd squadron to attack in a horse formation in the direction of the train station in Éthe. A platoon from the 2nd squadron was then ordered to fill the road exits in Éthe; the three remaining platoons of the 2nd squadron were appointed as reserve. Despite the fog, the patrols sent out by Colonel de Hauteclocque to the east, the north-east and the north spotted numerous units of German infantry. It became clear that the squadrons of the 14th Hussar Regiment were not capable of withstanding the enemy’s stronger troops. So the staff of the hussars regiment sent a courier to the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Vicq, requesting that the march to Éthe be advanced. As late as at 7h00, the soldiers of the 12th company of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment marched onto the bridge in Éthe and, despite intense fire from the east, were warmly welcomed by the locals who treated them with food and hot coffee. Major Vicq met Colonel de Hauteclocque, who issued an order to clear the road for the hussars. However, the order was not very precise 577 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – II,” “Revue Militaire Francaise” 25/ 1923, 390–393 [further referred to as Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II”].

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Figure 12. A French infantryman in August 1914. The picture shows the Lebel Mle 1886 rifle and details of the uniform and equipment. Photograph from the author’s collection.

and failed to stipulate which area the III battalion was to clear. Bearing in mind the direction of the march of the 7th Infantry Division, the colonel probably meant the north-east578. Meanwhile, at 6h45 Colonel de Hauteclocque sent a report to the commander of the 7th Infantry Division which reached the staff of the division 15 minutes later; its rather exaggerated content read as follows:

578 Major Vicq – the commander of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment – entered Éthe and thought that the 104th Infantry Regiment was responsible for opening fire from the hills in Jeune Bois forest (to the south of Éthe) in the direction of the Thon river valley which was covered in fog. This was why he sent a courier to his units to the rear to cease the alleged fire. Major Vicq was wrong because the sound of fire came from the positions of the squadrons of the 14th Hussars Regiment which had come into contact with German troops to the east, north-east and north of Éthe. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 394.

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Figure 13. A German platoon from an infantry regiment waiting in positions for an order to assault, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

During a march from Latour to Vance via Éthe and Saint-Léger, I discovered that Éthe had been captured by the enemy. I repelled the enemy from the village, inflicting serious casualties. After leaving Éthe and arriving at the edge of the forest, I was stopped by the German infantry. Vicq’s battalion from the 103rd Regiment, under my command as a supporting fire unit, proceeded and is now trying to create a passage through the forest for me [to the north-east – B.K.]579.

However, the tactical situation of the French units was much harder than the commander of the 14th Hussar regiment imagined. Following the order of the 7th Infantry Division, the 14th Infantry Brigade was headed for an ambush, oblivious of the imminent confrontation. Meanwhile, the 12th company of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment was ordered to recapture the Laclaireau manor located 1.5 km to the northeast of the train station in Éthe. The task was not easy as the company’s officers, just like their colleagues from the remaining regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, were not equipped with tactical-scale maps. They could not know where the target of the attack was. The company, moving in thick fog, was soon under intense and accurate machine-gun fire from the German infantry. Despite the difficult circumstances, the soldiers of the 12th company occupied a mill in 579 Report of the commander of the 14th Hussars Regiment to the commander of the IV Army Corps, Éthe, 06h45, 22 August 1914, as in Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 396; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD.

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Hamawé and, when the fog came down a bit, they identified the enemy’s position on a woody hill south of Hamawé and west of Gévimont and on a pass leading to Bleid. It was the German 123rd Grenadier Regiment of the 53rd Infantry Brigade from the 27th Infantry Division (Württemberg). During the engagement, the French 12th company suffered heavy casualties; as a result, Major Vicq deployed the remaining companies of the III battalion and issued an order to attack to the north and south of the Thon. Implementing the order, the 9th company under the command of Captain Vincent occupied Mât forest (south of the Thon), then marched to Bleid. As early as at 7h30, the soldiers from the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th companies of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment were involved in an intense fire of the German troops to the east of Éthe. The intense exchange of fire exhausted rifle ammunition. The French infantry companies were operating in difficult terrain and had suffered severe casualties in fighting against the German battalion of the 123rd Grenadier Regiment. They included the 9th company of Captain Vincent from the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment. One of the soldiers wrote down his memories of the dramatic moments: The captain is increasing the pace of the march and moving half of the supporting fire section to the first line. When the sky clears up, the company halts on a hill. The captain is looking for Vincent’s company but to no avail. The place where the soldiers are located is being fired on from the east and the south-east and seems completely isolated from the rest of the troops. While you can see the red of the uniforms of the French soldiers in Mât forest, several hundred meters to the right, it remains unknown to which unit they belong. Therefore the captain is assuming a position, trying to determine the target of the assault as precisely as he can, and, while soldiers are being killed in large numbers around him, he orders us to open fire toward the edge of the opposite forest located approximately 1 km away. The target was chosen at random, only to calm down the soldiers580.

At 8h30, the staff of the French 14th Infantry Brigade was quartered a kilometre to the east of the train station in Éthe581. The II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment arrived at the bridge in Hamawé582 while the III battalion of the

580 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 399–400. 581 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 582 An unknown person tore out from the military ledger of the 104th Infantry Regiment a page about 22 August 1914 i. e. the battle of Éthe; traces of this act of vandalism remain between the ledger’s pages. The subsequent page bears only two sentences referring to that day. The next entry starts on 23 August. What was the goal of this action? Was it a regimental officer who intended to conceal the casualties and the command errors made by the officers? Or was it Major Grasset in the course of writing a series of articles? 104e régiment d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–24. 03. 1915), JMO, RI, SHD, 26 N 675/15.

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103rd Infantry Regiment stopped playing the role of a support unit for the 14th Hussar Regiment583. When the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, General Edgard de Trentinian arrived with his staff in Gomery, escorted by three incomplete hussars squadrons, it was clear that the French V Army Corps did not have time to take up the designated positions. Consequently, the right flank of the division was uncovered. That gap was filled by the 53rd Infantry Brigade from the 27th Infantry Division (Württemberg) of which fact General de Trentinian was oblivious584. Because of the fog, the advance of the main forces of the 7th Infantry Division was delayed. Consequently, de Trentinian ordered they begin marching again immediately. General Felineau, the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade, appealed to the soldiers to exercise caution as the units marched along a narrow road to the north through the forested hills of Jeune Bois to Éthe where the 7th Infantry Division would turn right and proceed to the west toward SaintLéger. In the course of the manoeuvre, the section north of Belmont and Éthe which was 1,500 m long together with hill 300 and hill 314 up to Lefort forest (which marked the division’s left flank) were to be held at any price. Notably, the division’s cavalry had failed to do reconnaissance of the forest north of Éthe therefore the size of the enemy troops was unknown585. The II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Jouvin was tasked with protecting the division’s left flank and filling the northern foreground of Belmont and Éthe; it marched behind the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment of Major Henry586. The soldiers of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment entered Éthe at 7h15. Command was difficult because Major Jouvin had at his disposal only a small, coloured map on a scale of 1:200 000 which did not support tactical command. The specific companies were instructed to take positions while captain Faugière’s 6th company was ordered to occupy the road at the western exit from Éthe toward Belmont and hill 314 to the north of Éthe. At the same time, a bicycle courier was to be sent to Virton in order to establish communication with the 8th Infantry Division. Soldiers from the 7th company under the command of Captain Joué were ordered to fill a slope in the north of Éthe; the 8th company commanded by captain Richard filled a ravine along which railways ran toward a pond in Laclaireau; the 5th company of captain

583 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 396–401. 584 The units of the French V Army Corps which were to be positioned on the right flank of the IV Army Corps, did not take position in the Ligneulx area; at 14h00 they were involved in a battle with the German troops near Tellancourt. 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 585 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 401–403. 586 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD.

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Grasset, supported by the 2nd machine-gun section587 under the command of Lieutenant Figeac, positioned itself in Éthe as a reserve unit. Three platoons of this company took positions along Rue Grande, the main road in Éthe. Major Jouvin made the false assumption that only the enemy’s cavalry was positioned in front of his troops. Therefore he occupied all the exits of the roads and weakened the main defence line. As a result, the gaps between the specific companies were too large. Another mistake was the failure to allocate extra rifle ammunition to the soldiers of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment. The battalion’s ammunition carts were left in Éthe and specific companies were to collect ammunition from them when needed. When the 6th company proceeded toward its positions, the inhabitants of Éthe informed them that the patrols of the enemy’s infantry had reached the western part of the village. Despite this disturbing news, the 6th company took up its position without complication, including a cemetery located on the northern edge of Éthe. The patrols of the 6th company did not confirm the presence of enemy troops. In line with their task, the 7th company, led by Captain Joué, marched to the north, from Éthe towards Étalle: (…) the captain is on the road alone, at a fast trot, with the Legion of Honour on his breast. A local is trying to stop him. “Please do not go there, Captain, the Germans are already there!” [the 2nd company of the 50th Infantry Regiment from the 10th Infantry Division –B.K.]. “Yes, I know, but this is not important now. We need to proceed”, answered the captain. Several minutes later he returned with a face like a stone: in the fog he came across a unit of the enemy’s infantry stationed on a farm588.

Meanwhile, the German 1st King’s Mounted Rifles – as part of the vanguard – was carrying out reconnaissance for the 10th Infantry Division. A patrol from the 1st 587 In August 1914, the machine-gun companies in the French 7th Infantry Division were equipped with the 8 mm Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 machine guns (6 guns per infantry regiment). According to the user’s manual, the gun’s theoretical rate of fire amounted to approx. 450 rounds per minute. However, the gun was designed with French colonial operations in mind, a dry and desert climate where water was scarce. For this reason, the gun was aircooled. It weighed 23.8 kg and its three-legged mount weighed 32.7 kg. The system of cooling with air in the Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 made intense and sustained firing impossible because the barrel would heat up. In 1914, the gun was fed from metal trays made of soft steel. In the course of loading, the tray had to be reshaped several times to fit the lock chamber. The steel of which the trays were made was so soft that it would often deform, thus rendering loading more difficult or altogether impossible. For this reason the gun’s practical rate of fire amounted to 100–300 shots per minute. The ammunition box, which weighed 13 kg, held 12 trays with 25 cartridges each i. e. in total 300 cartridges. The German equivalent – the Maxim-08 heavy machine gun, had much better tactical parameters, which was reflected in its combat effectiveness. Ministère de la Guerre, Règlement sur les sections de mitrailleuses d’infanterie dotées de mitrailleuses sur affûts trépieds ou sur affûts trépieds 1907 type C et 1915 type omnibus, Vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1916), 42, 73; Grand Quartier Général, Manuel du chef de section d’infanterie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1916), 113– 118. 588 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 407–409.

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squadron under the command of reserve Second Lieutenant Zimmer was ordered to do reconnaissance via Éthe to Latour. A patrol from the 2nd squadron under the command of Second Lieutenant Andreas von Busse was sent in the direction of La Malmaison. A patrol of Second Lieutenant von Borcke was ordered to march to the east to Mussy la Ville where it was to establish communication with the units of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg). Second Lieutenant Eberhard Wendorff was appointed the commander of the spearhead of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. He described the moment of exiting the forest just at the top of hill 314: I arrived at the spearhead of the regiment, and I was very happy to command it because no road dust had been kicked up and there were no halts in the march. The only cloud on the horizon was the fact that the coffee only filled the stomach for a short time and soon it would start to rumble. The beautiful landscape of Buzenol was enveloped in fog. We took note of the barbed wire coils lying wherever we, the cavalrymen, could not make use of them. We all had the feeling that something important was going to happen. When at 7h30 we left the forest more than 2 km to the north of Éthe, the fog was almost impenetrable. You could only see 5 paces ahead, and sporadic infantry fire was heard in the distance. I made important reports to my superiors. When the 50th Infantry Regiment continued its march to Éthe, our regiment moved right of the road. Soon, the first machine gun bullets flew over our heads. Second Lieutenant von Friedrich, riding next to me, shouted unfazed and full of youthful enthusiasm: “It’s not the done thing to be afraid! I hope we attack!”589.

At 7h30, on top of hill 314, enveloped in dense fog, in the northern defensive lines of Éthe, the French 7th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment from the 7th Infantry Division came into contact with the German 2nd company of the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, the spearhead of the 10th Infantry Division590. A respective report was immediately sent to the commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade who was in charge of the division’s vanguard591. This is an account of the developments by Captain Sommé, aide-decamp of the 50th Infantry Regiment: The first wounded! Second lieutenant Buschbeck, in charge of the front, was shot and taken to the rear area. An orderly with a bullet-pierced nose, his whole face covered in blood, energetically refused to be taken to the wound dressing station592. Soon we entered Éthe by force and were in the middle of the fiercest fighting taking place among 589 Senftleben, 46. 590 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD. 591 Loosch, Das Königl, 18. 592 Possibly it was not an orderly but Second Lieutenant Latrille from the 47th Infantry Regiment who was shot in the nose; in the battle of Éthe, this type of wound could have been more frequent. Deutsche Verlustliste, “Armee-Verordnungsblatt” [further referred to as the AVDV], 24/1914; Benary, 52.

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Figure 14. The German 77 mm FK 96 n.A. field cannon in firing position. In the background, a patrol of cavalrymen who have taken up an observation position on a haystack; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

the buildings. Soldiers and civilians shot from behind fences and from windows. The battalion’s banner, held by NCO Zeinert, was a real sight, and old Feldwebel Discar looked around furiously. In general, he was a very good person, with a bushy moustache, with his trusty notebook stuck between the buttons of his coat and with backsword in hand593.

Among the buildings of Magnette farm located on the edge of the village, on the southern slope of hill 314, the German infantry took up position to secure the northern exit from Éthe594. Second Lieutenant Gougeon, the commander of the French front platoon of the 7th company, proceeded to attack and tried to push the enemy away from this key position, but he suffered serious casualties and 593 Vogt, 16. 594 Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland; Vogt, 7–8.

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switched to defence. The remaining part of the 7th company withdrew to buildings on the edge of Éthe. After detecting the enemy’s troops, the commander of the French 7th company sent a platoon to the right and the left flanks, thus extending its defensive line. In the meantime, Lieutenant Claude’s platoon took up position at the foot of an embankment along Rue ChâteauCugnon. The thick fog hindered offensive and defensive activities. When the commander of the French II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment received a report on the situation of the 7th company, he did not know the size of the enemy’s troops or their formation, nor did he intend to make reconnaissance. He simply ordered the troops to pass around the farm being defended and to take up position on a plateau north of Éthe. He strictly followed the order from the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade. At the same time, the officer issued an order to send a cart with ammunition to the front line units. However, this was wishful thinking: the 7th company, standing opposite a regiment of German infantry supported by two artillery regiments, was doomed595. Soon, the edge of the woods north of Éthe in the vicinity of hill 314 was under strong fire from the French infantry and field artillery. So, in order to avoid losses, the squadrons of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were ordered to take cover immediately in the nearby forest596. Notably, in the tactical situation, it was impossible for the mounted rifles regiment to charge. The slope of hill 314 which descended towards Éthe was enveloped in thick fog; below was an unknown number of enemy troops and the village buildings. What is more, the terrain was not suitable for charging, because it was crossed by hollows while the meadows were enclosed with barbed wire. In these circumstances, the order for the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles to retreat was the only sensible decision597. However, the new position to which the riflemen withdrew was not absolutely safe, because shells from the French guns exploded in the tree tops. An officer of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles reported on the developments: I saw the bottom of a projectile fly slowly in a high arch, bounce off the helmet of the officer next to me and destroy the saddle bag of the soldier behind him. As a result, the NCO’s horse stepped out of line and he approached the horseman so calmly that, during 595 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 409; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 596 Senftleben, 46. 597 According to an account by the Polish soldier and physician, Lieutenant Tadeusz Szulc, mobilised to the 1st Field Hospital of the V Army Corps, soon after the battle of Éthe, a rumour spread in the Poznan´ corps that the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles had fled the battlefield, afraid of the enemy’s troops looming in the fog. For that reason, the cavalrymen from that regiment were from then on referred to as “die Nebelreiter von Arlon” (“the fog riders from Arlon”). “Pierwsza wojna s´wiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918. Ze wspomnien´ poznan´skiego lekarza wojskowego Tadeusza Szulca, introduction and edition Piotr Grzelczak,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 170.

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an inspection, the soldier would have certainly been praised. I was utterly impressed by the absolute lack of concern of most of the privates who tended to think “we are behind the officers so nothing bad can happen to us” and I must admit that I also thought that the regiment’s and the division’s commanders were standing in the front, on the hill [top of hill 314 –B.K.]598.

When at 8h00 the commander of the German 20th Infantry Brigade received a report on the initial contact with the French troops in the northern part of Éthe, he ordered two battalions of the 50th Infantry Regiment to oust the enemy from the village. At the same time, the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment was ordered to fill firing positions. The units of the 2nd and 3rd batteries were positioned on the eastern side of the road and the 1st battery on the western side, 800 m away from Éthe. The I division of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment started firing at 9h00. Soon, on top of hill 295, the 4th, 5th and 6th batteries from the regiment’s I division took up their firing positions599.

Figure 15. A unit of the French 75 mm M1897 field cannon in the course of firing; to the left is an ammunition caisson and the cannoneers. In August 1914, the cannon represented the basic artillery equipment of the French army on the level of the artillery division and the corps. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Initially, General Robert Kosch planned that the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, together with the 46th Infantry Regiment would strike from Bonlieu forest to 598 Senftleben, 46–47. 599 Konrad Angerstein and Paul Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: Druck and Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1927), 17.

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Belmont. However, General Oskar Freiherr von Watter, commander of the 10th Artillery Brigade, suggested a different solution. According to him, it would be more reasonable to send two regiments of field artillery of the 10th Infantry Division on the southern slope of hill 314 under the cover of the fog. An assumption was made that when the fog came down, the Poznan´ division would have an artillery advantage over the French troops from the beginning of the battle. This decision was very well-grounded from a tactical point of view600 and as such was also accepted by General Robert Kosch. In order to accomplish this goal, the II division of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment moved closer to Éthe along the southern slope of hill 314 on the left of the road, while the regiment’s I battalion took up firing positions to the right of the II battalion, on either side of the road. Above the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, to the left of the road, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment took up positions in order to provide crossfire. The staff of the 10th Artillery Brigade assumed quite rightly that the French artillery would take up positions opposite the German troops, in Jeune Bois (to the south of Éthe). It was also established that in the course of firing, one battery from each regiment would provide heavy fire on selected targets601. At 7h45, second lieutenant Buschbeck’s regiment from the 2nd company of the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment was ordered to pass around the French troops in the northern part of Éthe and carry out reconnaissance of the enemy’s troops in the centre of the village. This was a good decision which allowed them to determine the size of the French units there. The platoon passed round the positions of the French 7th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment and reached central Éthe. This move, spotted by the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division himself, resulted in fierce fighting with a French infantry platoon. Following an intense exchange of fire, the entire I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Keil was deployed. To the right of the road, the 2nd and 4th companies took up positions; the 1st company were located on the left, with the 3rd company in reserve. However, at 8h10 an order from the brigade staff arrived to withdraw the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment from Éthe because the village was to be fired on by the artillery. At the same time, the left flank of the division was extended by the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, deployed to the line of operation602. For the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, taking up firing positions was no mean feat as the southern slope of hill 314 was cut across by numerous hollows. In the 600 Introducing the entire artillery of the 10th Infantry Division to fighting was in line with the then German tactical doctrine aimed at gaining artillery advantage over the enemy in the battlefield by using all available means at the beginning of a battle. D.V.E. Nr. 130, ExerzierReglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai. 1906 (Berlin: Verlag Mittler&Sohn, 1913). 601 Benary, 35–36. 602 Vogt, 8–9; Loosch, Das Königl, 18.

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middle of the hill, to the left of the road, a ravine with steep slopes ran from the north-west to the south-east. Along its bottom, a road ran towards a rail embankment with a road tunnel. To the south of the ravine, opposite Éthe, the slope was mild. The batteries of the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment started to take firing positions there, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher, the commander of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, galloping on his horse. Major von Both, commander of the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment also took a command post with his staff.

Figure 16. Soldiers from a German infantry regiment in position in a forest, ready to open fire, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

When the fog started to fall, the French field artillery commenced firing, and the first projectiles hit the positions of the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher was the regiment’s first wounded soldier; a lead shrapnel shell hit him on the back of his hand so hard that he fell off his horse. After receiving medical aid, despite the pain, he refused to relinquish command. The French artillery was aiming at the edge of the forest and the top of hill 314 therefore Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher ordered all the batteries in the vicinity to move to the south of the ravine. While climbing its steep slopes, the horse-drawn cannons and caissons frequently fell over. It took a lot of effort on the part of the riders to cover this difficult section. Nearby, General Oskar Freiherr von Watter watched the units taking up their firing positions, while the cavalrymen in the passing-by batteries saluted the commander of the brigade by raising whips to their helmets. These, however, were not peacetime manoeuvres but fighting in difficult terrain under the fire from the French field artillery, inflicting casualties on the squads of the 10th

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Artillery Brigade. Horseman May from the 5th battery, in charge of a middle pair of horses drawing a cannon, was hit by a 75 mm shell which unsaddled him. Cannoneer Griese, also from the 5th battery, was less lucky; he fell off his horse, hit by an artillery missile splinter. Captain Schoenbeck, a commander of the 2nd battery, described this part of the battle: We heard the approaching batteries from afar. But where was my 2nd battery? In this impenetrable terrain nothing could be recognised. I made a quick decision and took out a red signalling flag from my boot leg and I started to wave it. Even if my fellow officers had previously mocked the flag, it proved its worth in the battlefield. Reserve Lieutenant Kauffman, a prudent officer marching in the back, immediately recognised the flag and brought his battery. A hasty march, an open firing position. In the ambush, one cannon turned over and was left like that, because several horses had been killed. Three carts were missing in the [Light Artillery –B.K.] battery. Gefreiter Rosser, who was the first in the battery to receive the Iron Cross for the bravery he showed on that day, cavalrymen Nöppert, Dombrowski and reserve Gefreiter Dierker, under the command of Wachtmeister Homuth, soon managed to bring the missing vehicles to the position. One cannon of the 1st battery was even erroneously sent to me and was placed in position on the right flank603.

This account can be supplemented by a description provided by Wachtmeister Brose, the commander of the 3rd battery: In the course of turning back, my cannoneers nearly detached the gun604. Ammunition was collected from the limbers and caissons605; then the gun was moved further back to the slope of the hill, about 10 to 15 m. Barely one shell had been launched when the French began to fire. Flying sideways, a shell ricocheted and smashed the shin of cannoneer Offergeld from Westphalia606. Medical NCO Büchner ran to administer first aid, even though he had fallen from the first ammunition cart while going up [the ravine –B.K.]. Cannoneer Perske607 was severely wounded in the head608 near the 4th gun609.

603 An account of the battle of Éthe by the commander of the 2nd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, Captain Schoenbeck. Benary, 36–38. 604 While a horse-drawn cart took a very sharp turn, a field gun could become unhooked. 605 As protection from damage, artillery shells were transported in wicker baskets. 606 Gefreiter Arnold Offergeld, born in Berlin, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment as heavily wounded. AVDV, 33/1914. 607 Reserve cannoneer Jan Perske, born in Dombrówka, county Poznan´–West, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment as lightly wounded. AVDV, 33/1914. 608 An account of the battle of Éthe by the commander of the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, Wachtmeister Brose. Benary, 38. 609 All the guns in the batteries had marking on the protective shield from the gunners’ side. This account refers to the 4th gun from the 3rd battery of the I squad of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment.

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24 out of 59 soldiers from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment who were killed, missing or wounded during this breakneck ride under the fire from the French field guns, were of Polish origin610. When a report was delivered to the staff of the German 10th Infantry Division before 9h00 on the reconnaissance of the spearhead of the division, its commander General Kosch sent two more regiments to battle (beside the 50th Infantry Regiment). The attack zone for the 47th Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Ernst Trieglaff was demarcated on the left (eastern) flank of the division, through Laclaireau forest. In the centre of the 10th Infantry Division’s formation, the 50th Infantry Regiment with Colonel Karl Diestl was to continue the attack on Éthe. This involved deployment of the entire 20th Infantry Brigade. On the right (western) flank of a battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Victor von Arent received the order from General Liebeskind, the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade, to capture hill 300 (1,300 m north of Belmont) and attack Belmont through the Chou river ravine. The 6th Grenadier Regiment under the command of Colonel Otto Heyn was expected to stay in reserve of the division’s commander. At the same time General Oskar Freiherr von Watter received an order from the division’s commander to deploy both his units: the 20th and 56th Field Artillery Regiments611. Meanwhile, a patrol from the 2nd battalion of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles under the command of Second Lieutenant Andreas von Busse, which departed in order to carry out reconnaissance of the area nearer La Malmaison, also came into initial contact with the enemy, suffering casualties. NCO Czesny described the course of the patrol: NCO Frost and I were at the spearhead, followed by the commander and two soldiers; the rest followed suit at regular intervals in the thick forest, all the time within the range of sight. We halted at a railway embankment to the north-east of Éthe. NCO Frost cut the wire. We proceeded a bit up the embankment to the right and left of the train tracks. However, because it was too “windy” at the top (several infantry rifle cartridges whistled past us) and we could not see anyone in the thick forest, we rode down the embankment to the woods. A decent road led to Éthe with a stream on the left (I think it was called Le Ton)612. We followed that road. To the right fighting was going on613. In the fog, we could 610 AVDV, 33/1914. 611 The order issued for the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles to establish communication with the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) was at that time impossible to implement but General Kosch did not know it. Laclaireau and Lefort forests, located to the east, were full of French infantrymen from the 103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments. The same held true for Laclaireau farm. Schmitz and Nieuwland, 249–253; Zunehmer, 35–36; Benary, 35. 612 The author, NCO Czesny, was mistaken. It was Laclaireau stream flowing from the north to the south, along the eastern edge of the road to Éthe. La Ton stream flowed from the west to the east through Belmont and Éthe. To the south-east of Éthe, Laclaireau stream fell into La Ton stream.

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not see much. We rode calmly, looking round. Suddenly, 150 m in front of us a house appeared614. When we came closer, we spotted infantrymen wearing uniforms in the feldgrau colour; their line of operation extended in our direction and gave us food for thought. We approached them closer, step by step. Suddenly we saw red trousers. We halted immediately. When we were watching the defensive lines, more Frenchmen arrived but they were wearing blue coats. After the battle, I found out from another German that the French had captured a patrol of our infantry marching in a spearhead and, to mislead us, they put on grey coats. Later our infantry captured about 20 of them. In this situation, we set off without delay, while the French infantry opened heavy fire on us. It was a crazy ride. NCO Frost shouted at me: “Get down, don’t be a sitting duck!”. We rode side by side. Suddenly NCO Frost’s horse dropped behind. I looked back to see the NCO hanging from the saddle. I stopped my horse to get closer to him. Just as I was going to seize the reins with my right hand to grab his horse with my left hand, he fell silently from the saddle615. His horse kept galloping. I slowed down and called Frost but he would not answer. The French were firing like madmen, joined by the artillery. I wanted to get off the horse but in this terrible firing the horse would not stop and was getting increasingly sweaty. I called my colleagues, but they had galloped too far to hear me in all that noise. Because I could not do anything alone and NCO Frost was not moving – he was dead – I followed the patrol. There were horses lying about. The King’s mounted rifleman Stopprich was first to reach the scrubs on the side of the road because his horse was killed first. There he met our infantry616, attacked Éthe with them and was among the first to be awarded the Iron Cross. Two other riflemen came back by foot. Second lieutenant von Busse gathered the other soldiers. We climbed the hill617 to join the regiment and made a report618.

The sub-unit’s commander, Second Lieutenant von Busse, described the scale of the patrol’s casualties: My orderly Krüger was killed619 and my horse, Snib-Snob, winner in the Emperor’s [Wilhelm II – B.K.] contest in 1913, ran away wounded. The next day I found my beautiful pinto dead, lying at the entrance to Éthe. I only managed to save the coat and the beckishe620. However, a postcard from my wife had disappeared from the beckishe. It 613 It was the German 50th Infantry Regiment attacking Éthe. 614 It was Laclaireau farm. 615 NCO Karl Frost, born in Friedeberg, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 2nd squad of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles as killed. AVDV, 25/1914. 616 A company of the 50th Infantry Regiment. 617 He means hill 314 to the north of Éthe. 618 NCO Czesny’s account on the patrol to La Malmaison from 22 August 1914, in Senftleben, 47–48. 619 The King’s mounted rifleman Paul Krüger, born in Guscht, Kreis Friedeberg (now Goszczanowo, Strzelce-Drezdenko county, Drezdenko commune) is recorded on the list of casualties of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles as killed, AVDV, 25/1914. 620 A beckishe was a double-breasted uniform jacket with a high collar worn in the Prussian army after the Napoleonic Wars till WWI. Jürgen Kraus, Die deutsche Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg. Uniformierung und Ausrüstung – 1914 bis 1918 (Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2004), 164–169.

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was returned to me after three days by an officer of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. He found it in a knapsack of a killed Frenchman621.

Theoretically, Éthe could only have been occupied by the French patrols, but the sound of firing and its intensity in the east, where the units of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) were to attack, was evidence that the enemy had deployed at least an infantry division facing the 10th Infantry Division. Therefore, large troops had to be deployed to ensure an advantage in firepower over the French in the line of operation. Following the order from the commander of the German 10th Infantry Division, General Freiherr von der Horst, the commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade and the division’s vanguard, ordered his troops to capture Éthe and the hills located to the south of the village. Colonel Karl Diestel, commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment, allocated subsequent detailed tasks to his unit. The main attack was to be launched by the companies of the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, tasked with capturing Éthe and later on moving to the west of the Éthe – Gomery road. To the east of the I battalion, the 9th and 10th companies of the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment were to attack. Two companies of the II battalion and a machine-gun company were appointed as the regiment’s reserve while the remaining two companies of the II battalion were allocated as reserve to the 20th Infantry Brigade. At 8h30, the soldiers from the 11th and 12th companies of the III battalion took up positions to the left of the I battalion. Further on were stationed the 9th and 10th companies of the battalion. Therefore, the left flank of the 50th Infantry Regiment was the left flank of the 10th Infantry Division622. At the same time, on the right flank of the 50th Infantry Regiment, 400 m to the north-west of Éthe, next to the road to Belmont, the regiment’s machine-gun company was deployed at 8h50 under the command of Captain Vogt. Six MG-08 machine guns were meant to protect the attacking company of the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment and combat the French machine guns623. 621 Second lieutenant von Busse’s account from a patrol to La Malmaison from 22 August 1914, in Senftleben, 49. 622 Vogt, 8–9. 623 According to Captain Vogt’s account, the commander of the machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment, the French machine guns took up positions on the tower of the church in Éthe and shot from there at the troops of the 10th Infantry Division attacking from the north. This was possible because the tower’s windows faced north. I have analysed photographs of the ruined church in Éthe (as of 1914 and 1915) and have concluded that the church’s stone tower came under fire. The wooden blinds in the windows were destroyed and the tower’s tin peak was shot off by the artillery. On the other hand, the church’s inner walls, made of bright stone, did not bear traces of fire. Possibly, the wooden structure of the roof was taken down and used after 1914 by the German troops to strengthen the front line. Vogt, 9; Photographs of the damaged church in Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland; Vogt, 7–8.

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Figure 17. Soldiers from a French infantry platoon taking positions along the road, ready to open fire. The platoon’s commander (second lieutenant) is in the background at the centre of the photograph, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

When, after 9h00, the fog started to clear over the battlefield, the positions of the French 7th Infantry Division around Éthe became increasingly visible. Soon, the morning sun shining above the slopes of the hill in Jeune Bois forest showed a number of targets so big that single units of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment started to fire. The French infantrymen’s red trousers glittered in the intense sunlight from a distance. However, due to the terrain, machine-gun batteries from both regiments of the 10th Artillery Brigade could not reach Éthe, located in a valley, unlike the 105 mm light field howitzers from the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. As a result of the firing on the southern, eastern and western exits of Éthe, the units were caught in a trap. On a road on one of the hills in Jeune Bois forest, the German 20th Field Artillery Regiment destroyed a French battery on its way to Éthe. The battery lost all its caissons and the last three 75 mm calibre guns which remained on the hill. Only a few guns managed to get to Éthe, but soon, the troops were running out of ammunition. When the guns tried to withdraw from Éthe, they were destroyed by the German 4th and 5th batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment624. Meanwhile, the majority of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles regrouped in the forest several hundred meters to the north of hill 314. Half of the 2nd battalion of that regiment, under the command of Lieutenant von Schmidt-Pauli, was allo624 After the battle of Éthe, the French 75 mm guns from the destroyed battery were deemed spoils of war of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. They were marked with a number and displayed in front of the cathedral in Metz. Benary, 41.

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cated to the artillery as its support. The 4th battalion, moving ahead of the division’s main troops, returned to the regiment. General Kosch issued an order to establish quarters for the staff of the 10th Infantry Division on the barren top of hill 314 through which the road to Éthe ran from the north to the south. Nearby, the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was stationed. The decision to establish quarters of the division’s staff on top of a bare hill, highly visible from the enemy’s side, was extremely irresponsible and typical of peacetime manoeuvres, rather than regular battle. General Oskar Freiherr von Watter drew attention to the errors on the part of the division’s commander. However, General Kosch decided to leave the staff of the 10th Infantry Division in the original location; the high risk of French artillery fire was compensated by the panoramic, truly theatrical view of the battlefield. However, the General’s subordinates were soon to pay for his mistake625. In less than an hour after the initial contact established by the spearhead of the 10th Infantry Division, an intense exchange of fire took place along the entire combat line of the German 50th Infantry Regiment. As early as 9h00, soldiers from the 9th company formed an extended line on the left flank; 15 minutes later soldiers of the 10th company followed suit. When the fog came down around Éthe, the French field artillery opened fire on the positions of the German 10th Infantry Division to the north of Éthe. For this reason the 5th, 7th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment (previously in reserve), were shifted to the combat line of the III battalion. At the same time, the 6th company of the II battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment was sent to Laclaireau forest (the left flank of the 10th Infantry Division) to support the march of the 47th Infantry Regiment626. In line with the order from the staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment deployed the III and I battalions and the machine-gun company to the east of the road; the II battalion was deployed to the west of the road. The II battalion was the first in the 47th Infantry Regiment to be deployed – at 9h15 the battalion was ordered to march to the right flank of the 50th Infantry Regiment at the point of contact with the 19th Infantry Brigade. The III and I battalions from the 47th Infantry Regiment were ordered to relocate to the left flank of the 50th Infantry Regiment and take up positions close to a basin on the edge of Laclaireau forest, to the north east of Éthe. At the same time, the companies of the two battalions were to move along the edge of the forest and be deployed at an order from the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade627.

625 Benary, 42; Senftleben, 47. 626 Vogt, 8–9. 627 Loosch, Das Königl, 20–21.

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Figure 18. A machine-gun section with the French 8 mm Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 guns, August 1914; a machine-gun company in a French infantry regiment had 6 of these machine guns. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Figure 19. A platoon from a French machine-gun company, armed with the 8 mm Saint Étienne Mle 1907 machine guns, August 1914. The photo shows details of the equipment including ammunition trays made of soft metal which posed many problems to the service soldiers and caused numerous jams. In the background is a distance meter, further away are mules with packs for transporting the guns, mounts and ammunition. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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When the companies of the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment marched into the thick Laclaireau forest and were headed south, they came under the fire from the French infantry. Then, one of the batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment exited the forest and very dynamically took up positions to the south of hill 314628. In the course of crossing a ravine, one cannon was overturned but was immediately lifted by the soldiers of the 12th company of the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment. Due to the density of Laclaireau forest, the first line was formed by the 9th, 10th and 11th companies while the 12th company moved in the second line. In the course of the attack, the companies’ and platoons’ lines were blocked by dense shrubs which impeded issuing orders and communication between subunits, resulting in confusion. To the right of the 10th company, the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment (500 m to the north of Éthe) were the positions of the 12th company of the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment. Meanwhile, the soldiers of the 12th company were ordered to dig in, which they did immediately. On the edge of Laclaireau forest was the command post of General Freiherr von der Horst, commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade. To the left of the 10th company, the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, its 9th company was taking positions. The immediate firing position was inconvenient because it was fields of clover and oats, meaning the soldiers had to shoot on their knees, which put them at risk of coming under fire from the French infantry on the railway embankment. Captain Rißmann, the commander of the 9th company, was giving orders standing up and was soon shot, but it was only a flesh wound. The 2nd platoon of the 10th company lost its way in the dense forest; it took up positions to the left of the 9th company, behind the railway embankment, and reached the south-western edge of Laclaireau forest. Captain Heinrich Kleinwächter, the commander of the 10th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment629 who marched with the 2nd platoon, was fatally wounded in the chest after crossing the railway embankment630. At 8h30, the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment serving as vanguard under cover of thick fog, took up firing positions on the southern slope of hill 314, to the left and right of the road to Éthe. Despite the poor visibility on account of the dense fog, the French troops fired from the direction of the village and bullets flew over the artillerymen’s heads. When the fog started to clear, the batteries of the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment started to fire the French positions. General Oskar Freiherr von Watter, the commander of the 10th 628 Benary, 37–38. 629 Captain Heinrich Kleinwächter is recorded on the list of casualties of the 47th Infantry Regiment as killed. AVDV, 26/1914. 630 Loosch, Das Königl, 20–21; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Artillery Brigade, analysed the situation and decided that the top of hill 314 did not provide suitable field of fire. Therefore, he ordered the II battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment and the 20th Field Artillery Regiment to gallop to the southern slope of hill 314 and take up firing positions there631.

Figure 20. A French infantry company assaulting a local hill, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

The slope was exposed to the left of the road (to the south of the ravine); while it put the German batteries to danger of the French fire, it also provided an opportunity to effectively support their own infantry632. The distribution of two artillery regiments in such a small space required good organisation, which was in the hands of battalion and battery officers. While Major Wilhelm Frisch, commander of the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, was managing his batteries taking up positions, a rifle bullet hit him in the thigh633. After medical treatment he remounted his horse and continued to command the unit. To the west of the road, the 3rd and 2nd batteries took up positions; the 1st battery was positioned to the east, 800 metres away from Éthe. Next, the II battalion of the 631 Angerstein and Schlemm, 17. 632 Two artillery regiments taking up firing positions in such a small space in a valley posed a considerable risk and, in the case of heavy fire from the French artillery, could have suffered severe losses: soldiers, limbers and caissons, caissons and horses. On the other hand, 54 field cannons (77 mm) and 18 light field howitzers (105 mm) provided a lot of firepower and thus gave invaluable support to their own infantry attacking the positions of the French 7th Infantry Division. That position was convenient for destroying the French artillery’s positions and machine guns on the other (southern) side of the valley, on the hills of Jeune Bois forest. 633 Major Wilhelm Frisch, born in Hannover, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment as lightly wounded. AVDV, 21/1914.

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56th Field Artillery Regiment (armed with 105 mm light field caissons) rode out of the forest down the road leading through the top of hill 314 to the south to Éthe. At that time, the French machine guns were already firing intensely on the slope of hill 314. This was why the 4th battery of the II battalion galloped through the damaged area of the French machine guns and took up positions to the left and right of the road, next to the I battalion. The caissons were ready to fire, while NCOs Penschke and Pawelszyn´ski used a rangefinder to measure the distance to the target and provided the data to the battery’s commander. The second gun fire from the 4th battery destroyed the enemy’s machine-gun post. The 5th and 6th batteries took their firing positions to the right of the road, near a gentle slope of hill 295 (to the south of hill 314)634. After 9h00, the batteries of the 10th Artillery Brigade opened fire on the French positions. Second Lieutenant Kruse from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment described the fighting in the following way: The battery’s front developed from a single file march. The cannons and carts with ammunition were ordered to go down the hill. There [to the south of the top of hill 314 – B.K.] one horse-drawn cart slid down to the bottom of the ravine. The artillerymen went up the slope at too much of an angle. The other gun reached its destination missing the middle rider. He had been hit on the head by a dud shell and unsaddled. At the fourth gun, the middle horses collapsed. “Turn the battery to open fire!”. As during an exercise, five guns were turned and unhooked in the process. 9h30. The first target. The staff. “4800! – Fire!”. The very first missile hit the target. “Three groups!”. It was the staff. There was only one horse alive, a dapple grey one. It grazed until the evening where its master was killed635.

By 9h30 the German field cannons and howitzers were involved in counterbattery firing and targeted the positions of the French infantry, the machine guns and the staff as well as a narrow road leading through Jeune Bois, cluttered by French artillery carts. In Belmont and Éthe, many houses and farm buildings caught fire from the exploding artillery shells. According to French sources, the village and its surroundings also came under the fire from 150 mm shells, which means that the I battalion of the 5th Foot Artillery Regiment had been deployed. When Major Wilhelm Frisch could no longer perform his duties due to losing a lot of blood, Captain Berger took over command of the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment636. Meanwhile, at 8h00, under cover of fog, the French 8th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain 634 Angerstein and Schlemm, 17; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 635 Account of Second Lieutenant Kruse from the 20th Field Artillery regiment of the battle of Éthe, in Benary, 46–47. 636 Angerstein and Schlemm, 17.

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Figure 21. A French infantry platoon in firing position, August 1914; behind the line of fire stands an officer, the platoon’s commander watching the effects of the fighting. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Richard took up positions to the north-east of Éthe, along a road to Laclaireau farm, opposite Laclaireau forest. The platoon of Lieutenant Laplace from the 5th company settled to the north of the farm. The platoon of Lieutenant Richy took up positions along the road, 200 m to the south of the north-western edge of the forest in Laclaireau. At the same time, the platoon of Lieutenant Duval established communication with the 7th company under the command of Captain Joué on Fond de Bivaux hill. Next to a railway embankment, near an intersection with the road to Saint-Léger, Second Lieutenant Miconnet’s platoon was left behind as a reserve. At that time, Lieutenant Laplace’s platoon sent patrols to Lefort forest in order to establish communication with the 104th Infantry Regiment. Lieutenant Janin’s platoon from the 5th company took up positions at Rue Clesse and Rue de la Station; Lieutenant Girard’s platoon filled the Château-Cugnon intersection. At the same time, Lieutenant’s Audran’s platoon was sent to Belmont where it was to support the 6th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Faugière. At Rue Perdue, Fabre’s platoon was left behind as a reserve together with the 2nd machine-gun platoon of lieutenant Figeac plus the battalion’s ammunition carts637. Soon the area west of Éthe in the direction of Belmont witnessed an intense exchange of fire. The soldiers of the 6th company, under the command of 637 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 409–410; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000; Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland.

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Captain Faugière from the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, got as far as 400 m to the north of Belmont, where they captured the outermost farm buildings. The French infantrymen were very up for the fight. Then the fog cleared, visibility improved and, having spotted the first German soldiers, the French soldiers started to fire hastily, without a second thought. The German formation under attack was a machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment, facing toward Éthe. The gunners of six MG-08 machine guns firing from the right flank, redirected their guns in the direction of the attackers and started intense firing. In the rays of the August sun, from a distance of 800 m, the red trousers of the French soldiers were clearly visible. The French 6th company suffered considerable casualties and the platoons were dispersed638. Single soldiers from lieutenant Audran’s platoon withdrew to the bridge on the Thon near the Belmont windmill. Soon, the German 4th company of the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment attacked along the ravine of the Chou toward Belmont; the formation captured a train bridge above the road separating Belmont and Éthe, and cut off the survivors of the French 6th company from their parent II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment639. Captain Alphons Grasset, the commander of the 5th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, was instructed to support the battalion’s position and take another one on a hill sheltered by a hedge, 200 m to the south of the Thon, along a path leading to Jeune Bois forest, between the roads to Gomery and Latour. From this position, the battalion was to fire in case of a German attack from the area of Virton and Belmont, defending the crossing of the Thon. Due to the chaos in Éthe and the intense firing of the German troops, Captain Grasset managed to collect a part of Lieutenant’s Janin’s platoon and he brought only 2 and a 1/2 platoons to the designated position. When he reached the southern bank of the Thon, his soldiers immediately initiated contact with the German troops on the plateau to the north of Éthe. Lieutenant Figeac’s 2nd machine-gun platoon was also deployed and took up positions close to Tuilerie640. When the II and III battalions of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, and the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, in charge of clearing the road for the 7th Infantry Division, initiated contact with the enemy, at 8h20, the I battalion commanded by Major Forcinal and the III battalion of Major Levin from the 638 Vogt, 9. 639 The staff of the 6th company under the command of Captain Faugière was cut off in Belmont from the platoons of Lieutenant Petitjean, Second Lieutenant Lafay and Master Sergeant Fourel. So the company’s commander withdrew with Lieutenant Meria’s platoon to the lumber yard in Belmont. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 233–234; Vogt, 9. 640 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 409–412; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000; Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland.

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Figure 22. A French infantry company attacking a local hill, August 1914; at the front of the company is an officer, the company’s commander. Photograph from the author’s collection.

104th Infantry Regiment and the III battalion of the artillery under the command of Major Savoureau from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment entered Éthe (first the 7th battery, followed by the 8th and 9th batteries)641. In charge of the troops was General Henri-François Félineau, the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade. He was accompanied by Colonel Drouot, the staff of the 14th Infantry Brigade642 and liaison officers. The fog was so dense that the soldiers could only see several meters ahead. On its way through Éthe towards Saint-Léger, the column came under the fire twice, which required a halt to the march643. At 8h30, General Félineau notified the division’s commander that the enemy had been spotted at the eastern exit from Éthe, the column had come under fire and that the 14th Hussar Regiment had been fighting at the front of the division’s column. He also informed him about the enforced temporary halt, and added that the division’s front was moving ahead in the right direction. However, the report was over-optimistic, because soon the German troops from the 10th Infantry Division, located to the north of Éthe, opened fire so intensely that the French column could not proceed. General Félineau ordered the specific companies to fill positions along the railway line, with its front to the north.

641 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (2. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 642 The staff of the 14th Infantry Brigade included General Henri-François Félineau – the brigade commander, Captain Mignon and reserve Captain Michy – staff officers. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 229. 643 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – III,” Revue Militaire Francaise 28/ 1923 [further referred to as Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III”], 5.

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Following the order from the brigade’s commander, Major Levin allocated tasks to his III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment. The soldiers of Lieutenant Tourte’s 9th company took up their positions along the train embankment, with the road tunnel exiting to the road below the tracks. The 10th company of Captain Peltier, the 11th company of Captain Bentzinger and a platoon from the 12th company of Captain Vintera644 served as reserves and took up position in a ditch running along a siding in the direction of the train station warehouses. The officers of the III battalion climbed the embankment in order to do binocular reconnaissance of the terrain (they did not have tactical-scale maps), of the enemy and the direction of fire. However, the fog was still dense, thus hindering observation645. Around 11h00, their positions came under crossfire from the machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment, firing from the north-west, and the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment which was firing from the north-east, from a position in Laclaireau forest. This caused more casualties in the units of the French infantrymen defending this section646. Major Forcinal, the commander of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment marching behind the III battalion of Major Levin, following General Félineau’s order, instructed the three subordinate companies to take up positions in the vicinity of the train station in Éthe. Captain Martin’s three platoons from the 1st company received General Edgard de Trentinian’s personal order to carry out patrols. The remaining 2 and 1/2 platoons of the 1st company were ordered to take up position on the railway embankment to the left of the 9th company of the III battalion. The soldiers of the 2nd company under the command of Captain Giansily took up positions between the 1st company and the train station. At the same time, the 4th company of Captain Laugier was allocated to cover the artillery. The soldiers of the 3rd company of Captain Roffé were ordered to march to the village limits647. At 7h45, General Edgard de Trentinian and his staff, Colonel Bertrand – the commander of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment648, Simonin – head of the medical units and Captain Massiet – the commander of a battalion of the division’s cavalry, entered Éthe. Intense firing in the village’s narrow streets could have led to a massacre. Therefore, the division’s commander ordered 2 and 1/2 of the cavalry platoon to stay in the rear next to the artillery’s positions. When 644 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 235. 645 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III,” 5–6. 646 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000; Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland. 647 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III,” 7. 648 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD.

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General de Trentinian received the report from General Henrie-François Félineau, he opened fire. The division’s commander erroneously assumed that his troops were fighting only against the patrols of the German infantry which had entered the village and were hiding in the farm buildings. Consequently, he ordered three platoons of the 1st company of Captain Martin from the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment to search the village to the east and west. When General de Trentinian entered Éthe, he was plunged into utter chaos. Closer to the bridge on the Thon, disorganised groups of soldiers were arriving from the north and east. When the commander of the division rode down Rue Grande to the intersection with Clesse, in its northern section he noticed a subdivision of the German infantry649. Near the division’s staff from Belmont marched Lieutenant Girard’s platoon from the 5th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment which, following an order, was going to withdraw to the southern bank of the Thon and join its company. General de Trentinian stopped the platoon and ordered a bayonet counter-attack on the subunit of German infantry detected in the northern part of the village. He appointed 5 hussars from his escort for support. The decision was very risky, especially in the light of the fact that the number of German soldiers was unknown. The counter-attack was a fiasco; Lieutenant Girard’s soldiers, massacred by the Germans, paid the price for their commander’s carelessness. Soon, the German infantry withdrew from Éthe, not as a result of the French counter-attack, but of the French artillery’s retreat from the damaged area. General de Trentinian joined the I battalion of Major Forcinali from the 104th Infantry Regiment and ordered two platoons from the 3rd company of Captain Roffé in the northern part of Éthe to fill all the ends of the roads650. Meanwhile, the German machine guns and artillery were firing with growing intensity, wounding and killing the French soldiers along the railway line and in the southern part of Éthe. The fog was still thick enough to require maps in order to fire on the French positions. In the narrow strip of the Thon river valley, where more than a half of the 7th Infantry Division was crammed, the shelling must have inflicted casualties. One of the first soldiers killed was Major Levin, the commander of the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment. When he (to-

649 General de Trentinian who was at the very centre of the exchange of fire, spotted the enemy’s infantry 100 m away from his position, in a house at the end of the street. Trentinian, L’Étatmajor En 1914, 137. 650 Bearing in mind the arrangement of the buildings in Éthe, the four exit roads leading to the north and Belmont having been captured by the German infantry (barricades on the road between Belmot and Éthe), the mission was impossible for the two infantry platoons to complete. Analysis carried out on the basis of Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland.

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Figure 23. Two sections of the Maxim MG-08 machine guns from the machine-gun section of a German infantry regiment firing; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

gether with other officers) was standing on a railway embankment, looking at the defensive lines through his binoculars, a rifle bullet hit him in the head651. Around 8h00, the staff of the 13th Infantry Brigade, whose regiments were located in the northern part of Gomery, was contacted by a courier from General de Trentinian with a report that the division’s commander and his staff were surrounded in Éthe. He also brought an order to immediately deploy all the available infantrymen in order to relieve the siege. Soon, the staff of the 13th Infantry Brigade received another order in which the division’s commander insisted on deploying all the infantry units in Éthe. This was evidence that the situation was serious and the French 7th Infantry Division in the village was in dire straits652. Companies from the II and I battalions of the 102nd Infantry Regiment took up positions on the hills between Gomery and Latour. The III battalion was held in reserve as support for the artillery and the commander’s available unit. Colonel Lacotte, the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade, ordered the commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment to evacuate the division’s staff from Éthe. To this end, the commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment ordered captain Signorin’s II battalion to form a double march column and to proceed from the Latour – Gomery line toward Éthe in order to break through to the staff of the 7th Infantry 651 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 235. 652 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD.

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Figure 24. The French infantry company grouped in platoons, ready to attack a nearby hill; on the left, in the background behind the platoon’s line of fire stands an officer, the platoon’s commander; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Division and to evacuate them. The companies of the I battalion were expected to follow the II battalion in a double column, marching behind its left flank. The III battalion (without the 9th company) was to march last. At the same time, the 11th company from this battalion was ordered to fill positions on the right flank where it was to cover a battalion from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment which took up firing positions on the hills west of Gomery653. Meanwhile, the IV Army Corps sent an order to the staff of the 7th Infantry Division to support the 8th Infantry Division which was defending Virton. However, the 14th Infantry Brigade, which was in a difficult tactical situation, was not able to carry out the order. It did not have communication with the 13th Infantry Brigade654. In these circumstances, General Trentinian ordered General Félineau to regroup the 14th Infantry Brigade to the north and attack the German troops which had taken up positions north of Éthe. According to the order from the brigade’s commander, the soldiers of the 1st company under the command of Captain Martin, the 2nd company of Captain Giansily and a platoon of the 3rd company of Captain Roffé from the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment cut through the metal fences in front of the tracks, jumped over the 653 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 654 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD.

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Map 9. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division during the battle of Éthe, 22 August 1914 at 10h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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embankment and took up positions 20 m to the north of the railway line along the road, in a depression in the ground which provided cover from the intense fire from the German infantry655.

Figure 25. A battery of French 75 mm field cannons from a field artillery regiment exchanging fire; August 1914. In the foreground is a caisson with shells. Photograph from the author’s collection.

After 7h30, the intensity of the fighting on the path of the 7th Infantry Division from Éthe to Saint-Léger grew with every minute. At that time, Laclaireau castle and the Hamawé windmill located to the north of the Thon were being filled by two squadrons of the 14th Hussar Regiment and the bloodied companies of the 103rd Infantry Regiment. These positions were under heavy fire from the German infantry. The situation of the French troops in this area did not improve much when the 5th company arrived under the command of Captain Bertin from the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment656. To the north-west of Laclaireau castle, in Laclaireau forest French patrols discovered the German 47th Infantry Regiment from the 10th Infantry Division and took their first POWs657. When 655 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III,” 7–9. 656 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 657 In his work, Major Alphons Grasset wrote erroneously that the POWs were from the 46th Infantry Regiment. This was a mistake, because the regiment in question was operating on the right flank of the German 10th Infantry Division i. e. to the north of Belmont. In the area we are interested in, the German 47th Infantry Regiment operated, which means that the German POWs taken by the French 103rd Infantry Regiment must have been from the 47th Regiment. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III,” 406.

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Major Henry arrived at the head of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, following consultations with Major Vicq (the commander of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment), he deployed his battalion on the southwestern edge of Lefort forest (1 km to the north-east of Éthe). Information about the number of German troops was scant and reconnaissance was still hard due to the thick fog. Major Henry sent a situation report to Colonel Drouot, the commander of the 104th Infantry Regiment658. At 8h30, the companies of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment and the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment took up positions ahead of the 7th Infantry Division, with their front to the north-east and covering the flanks from the east and the south-east. The positions of the French division in this area ranged within 2 km and included Laclaireau castle, a clearing in la Rochette and continued along the ridge of a hill towering above Hamawé to Mât forest. At the same time, all the companies of the two battalions were involved in an intense exchange of fire, suffering heavy casualties, especially among the officers. When around 8h00 the fog started to clear, the German artillery started firing to the west; the targets were both French battalions on the edge of Mât and Baconveau forests. Through binoculars, the French officers spotted with horror the numerous batteries of the German field artillery positioned to the north of Éthe659. As visibility above the battlefield near Éthe improved, the German 10th Infantry Division greatly intensified its fire. In response, the French companies of the I and III battalions of the 104th Infantry Regiment struck back from their positions in front of the railway embankment. At that time, the entire 7th battery arrived in Éthe; its horse-drawn carts sought shelter among the village’s building. It was accompanied by a part of the 8th battery from the III battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. The entire 9th battery and the ammunition caissons were still on the road leading to Éthe across a hill and the Jeune Bois forest. The carts were easy targets for the German field artillery, which had taken up firing positions directly opposite them on the northern slope of the Thon valley. By 8h30, the units of the 9th battery lost all their carts and were unable to continue fighting. The same happened to the ammunition caissons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment, which were destroyed on a road in Jeune Bois forest. As a result, 658 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 659 The II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Vicq suffered very heavy casualties including Lieutenants Desdouits, Sallet and Mousseaux. The wounded included Captain Privat, the commander of the 6th company (heavily wounded in the head and arm; on the next day he underwent a trepanning operation), Lieutenants Le Boucher, Duffour and Laparra and Sergeant Goran. 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe II,” 402–407; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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the batteries could not replenish their ammunition. The only available shells were in ammunition boxes next to the destroyed caissons, among corpses of humans and horses, on the road in Jeune Bois. However, the area was under intense fire from the German artillery, exactly opposite their positions on the northern side of the Thon valley660. Equally heavy casualties were suffered by a part of the French 8th battery of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment; two of its units took up advance firing positions to the north east, in the direction of the train station and two others to the northwest, to the church and the village of Belmont. In the course of firing, Captain Maisons, the battery’s commander, was heavily wounded; Lieutenant L’Hôte took over. Meanwhile, the artillerymen from the 7th battery occupied firing positions in the streets of Éthe. One small unit occupied the front in the north, another one in the west, two remaining ones in the east. After several minutes, due to the firing, one of these small units had to be evacuated between the buildings. Around 11h00, one small unit of the 9th battery managed to escape from the death zone and take up position in the southern part of Éthe, with its front to the north. The units of the 7th battery restricted the German infantry’s access to the main streets of Éthe and its outskirts. The 8th battery was firing in order to prevent the village being surrounded from the left and the right flanks; the 9th battery fired on the trenches of the German infantry to the north of Éthe661. When the fog came down, on the road from Éthe to Jeune Bois, behind the 9th battery was located Captain Laugier’s 4th company of the 104th Infantry Regiment and Poigny’s machine-gun section in support of the artillery. Then shelling started from the north, and Captain Laugier ordered his company to take up positions in an open area halfway up the Jeune Bois slope; the machine-gun section positioned itself on the edge of the forest662. Meanwhile, on the northern side of the embankment near the tunnel, to the right of the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, the cavalrymen from the 14th Hussar Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque took up positions as early as 7h00 and expected their infantry to open up the road to Lefort forest663. At 7h30, shelling from the north started and the 660 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III,” 13–15; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 661 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 662 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 663 In his book, which is an analysis of the battle of Éthe, General de Trentinian accused Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque of failing to do reconnaissance to the north of Éthe, i. e. hill 314. What is more, once the road from Éthe to Saint-Léger was closed off by the German troops, he did not subordinate himself to the commander of the 7th Infantry Division or the

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hussars crossed the tunnel to find shelter on the southern side of the embankment. However, after barely 15 minutes they came under fire from all directions; several horses were killed. Consequently, Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque ordered his soldiers to march between the buildings in Éthe. However, when the cavalrymen reached the buildings, their column joined the French infantry and blocked the narrow road. In the case of fighting in the streets or a densely forested area, the cavalry was in danger. The only good solution in this situation would have been to withdraw the 14th Hussar Regiments to the rear of the division, behind the Thon. However, being left idle in the course of fighting negatively affected the regiment’s morale. As a result, Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque made a decision which led to annihilation of his unit. He ordered the 14th Hussar Regiment to cross the narrow tunnel again and charge at the enemy’s infantry positioned on a slope of hill 314, to the north of Éthe. Therefore, the hussars were to charge to the north, at an unknown number of units of the entrenched enemy, in an unrecognised area (barbed wire fencing and a ravine) and up a slope of hill 314. Previously, in order to take the initial positions to charge, the entire regiment had to go through a narrow tunnel. In these circumstances, it was undoubtedly a suicide mission. The decision to charge could only have stemmed from Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque’s hot-tempered, reckless, cavalryman-like nature, because the staff ’s thorough preparations went against the insane plan664. Meanwhile, in the way of the charging 14th Hussar Regiment were the firing lines of the 9th and 12th companies of the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment (around 500 soldiers), ready and waiting665. The road tunnel, 4 m broad, through which the 14th Hussar Regiment passed, could accommodate only two riders alongside each other. Precious minutes were wasted by four squadrons of the 14th Hussar Regiment, with nearly 600 horses, crossing the narrow tunnel, posing a threat of heavy losses inflicted by German

commander of the vanguard. The culmination to this insubordination was the described attempted charge. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 156. 664 According to Major Alphons Grasset, Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque was among the most prominent graduates of Le Centre des Hautes Études Militaires (CHEM), a prestigious French military school for staff officers, opened in January 1911 which educated the elite of the French armed forces. At the same time, having appreciated his command potential, above-average intelligence as well as ability to make quick and correct decisions (a feature rare among staff officers), in 1914 the representatives of the French General Staff had ambitious plans for the Lieutenant Colonel. On the other hand, they were also aware that the Lieutenant Colonel was infamous for his bravado. This was corroborated by a sentence he loved to repeat to this soldiers: “Of all the mistakes a cavalry commander can make in warfare, idleness is the most dishonourable”. Grasset, Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III, 9– 10. 665 Vogt, 10.

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infantry fire666. However, the great risk accompanying this plan did not prevent Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque from ordering a charge. The hussars took out their sabres and stood in the stirrups. The regiment’s commander cried to his cavalrymen: “The 14th Hussar Regiment! Forward! For France!”. His horse trotted first to the tunnel with Captain Delafon, the regiment’s commander, right behind. However, once Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque entered the tunnel, his horse was shot many times, fell to the ground and blocked the exit. This meant only one thing: the enemy’s infantry took up positions opposite the tunnel exit; continuing the attack would have been a catastrophe. The regiment’s commander realised what was going on, but did not intend to give up. He mounted another horse and tried to break through the tunnel with Captain Delafon, at the head of the 3rd squadron commanded by Lieutenant de La Croix. The cavalrymen exited the tunnel at speed, straight into heavy machine-gun fire from the German infantry. The regiment’s commander managed to ride 50 m before the first bullet tore through his right forearm. In a split second, he grabbed his sabre with his left hand and kept on charging. Then another rifle bullet hit him on the shako and sent it flying off his head. The third bullet struck Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque in the thigh just above his knee, the fourth shot his horse’s leg, breaking it and felling the animal. When the commander looked behind, he saw only Captain Delafon, because the entire 3rd squadron was being slaughtered by machine guns of the German infantry positioned 150 m to the north of the tunnel. Among the casualties was Lieutenant de La Croix. A welter of dead hussars and their horses were blocking the 2nd squadron’s passage. Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque mounted yet another horse and, bleeding profusely, withdrew from the tunnel. He ordered Captain Delafon to withdraw the regiment in small groups to Éthe and gave command to Major Brémond d’Ars. The Lieutenant Colonel’s order was very hard to execute because the horses, located close to the southern entrance to the tunnel, were agitated and the hussars had problems with managing them. Therefore, only the squadrons from the rear of the formation reached the village667. The charge of the 14th Hussars regiment looked equally dramatic from the German side, as documented by the commander of a platoon of the 9th company of the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment:

666 On the morning of 22 August 1914, the fighting strength of the 14th Hussar amounted to 600 cavalrymen, including 32 officers and 620 horses. Edmond-Barthelémy Palat, La Grande guerre sur le front occidental, Vol. 3: Batailles des Ardennes & de la Sambre (Paris: Chapelot, 1918), 164; Historique sommaire du 14e régiment de hussards. Campagne de 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918 (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920). 667 Grasset, Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III, 10–12.

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(…) Meanwhile, the August sun chased away the fog and blazed down. My forehead was sweaty. I was involved in a hopeless struggle with my binoculars which kept sliding down my nose until I had to replace them with the shooting glasses kept in my knapsack. The company took off their knapsacks and used them as support for the rifles. The welltargeted fire finally shook the enemy’s troops on the railway embankment. Suddenly, we could not believe our eyes: the enemy’s cavalrymen [the 14th Hussars regimen – B.K.] were attacking along the basin in front of us. We fired from a small distance. Now, we had to make the most of the rifles. My arm started to hurt, and in the days to come it was red and blue, but all we had to do was fire, fire … The enemy’s cavalry could not handle this murderous firing. Whoever could, returned and disappeared in the forests opposite. Some horsemen kept approaching about 20 m from our position. The French summoned more reinforcements. However, each of these attacks was repelled by the quiet fire from our soldiers. As a result of repeated quick fire, we were running out of ammunition. Initially, the problem was solved by collecting ammunition from the killed and wounded. Meanwhile, Vizefeldwebel Petersen668 arrived at the left flank and drew our attention to every enemy who stuck his head above the railway embankment. The cries for ammunition attracted Captain Killmann [the commander of the 9th company of the II battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment – B.K.] to the front line. Vizefeldwebel was just raising his hand to show the enemy to his captain when suddenly the arm dropped. “Our Petersen” was dead! With tears in his eyes, the company’s commander closed the killed soldier’s eyelids. Not as a superior to a subordinate but as a brother in arms. “We will meet in life eternal!”669.

However, this was not the end of the drama of the 14th Hussars regiment. Captain Delafon managed to gather together only about 100 hussars; together they were hit by German machine-gun fire coming from the vicinity of the train station. The cavalrymen entered Éthe from Rue de la Station and, after turning right to Rue Grande, they came across a German barricade in front of the windmill in Belmont. They turned left again and, owing to the remains of the fog, broke through to Jeune Bois forest. In order to avoid the German machine guns, the remaining part of the regiment under the command of Major Brémond d’Ars crossed the Thon 200 m to the east of des Roses bridge and (as ordered) tried to reach Jeune Bois forest in small groups. However, at that time the fog had already cleared and the hussars were exposed to mass fire from the infantry and artillery, suffering more casualties670. Only a group of 50 hussars stayed with Major Brémond d’Ars in Tuilerie and proceeded to Jeune Bois forest, when the German artillery ceased fire. In an attempt to break through to Jeune Bois forest, Lieutenant Colonel de Hauteclocque died from his wounds, supported by his orderly. 668 Vizefeldwebel Albert Petersen (born in Glücksburg, Kreis Flensburg) from the 9th company of the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, AVDV, 18/1914. 669 Vogt, 18–19. 670 The casualties were caused by the fire from the German 3rd battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. Angerstein and Schlemm, 18.

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In the evening, while retreating to Latour, Major Brémond d’Ars was killed. On the following day, during a halt in Othes, Captain Delafon stated that barely 10 officers and 180 hussars remained from a regiment referred to as the “blue butchers”. The deaths of the regiment’s commander, many officers and the significant casualties among privates meant that the unit lost its fighting capability671. As early as 8h30, a majority of the French 14th Infantry Brigade from the 7th Infantry Division fought with the German 10th Infantry Division in the river Thon valley. Three companies from this French brigade and a machine-gun section from the 103rd Infantry Regiment, coupled with a machine-gun section from the 104th Infantry Regiment, represented the last reserves. The headquarters of the staff of the 7th Infantry Division, with General Edgard de Trentinian in the lead, was stationed in Éthe. When the fog cleared, fire directed at the area south of Jeune Bois forest by the German batteries of the 20th and 56th Field Artillery Regiments cut off the only way of retreat and the supplies of the French. In the situation where Belmont (to the west of Éthe) had been captured by the enemy’s infantry, the road to the east from Éthe to Saint-Léger was blocked by the Württemberg troops, Éthe was being attacked from the north by the German 10th Infantry Division, the French 7th Infantry Division was trapped. In these circumstances, General de Trentinian hoped that he would manage to unblock the road to the east (Saint-Léger). To this end, he ordered Colonel Lacotte, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade to hurry his troops from Jeune Bois forest to Belmont672. At the same time, the I battalion of Major Forcinal from the 104th Infantry Regiment was to repel the attacks of the German 10th Infantry Division from the north. However, it was impossible for the 13th Infantry Brigade to complete the mission because Jeune Bois forest and the road running through it from Gomery to Éthe came under intense fire from 77 and 105 mm shells from the German batteries of the 20th and 56th Field Artillery Regiments of the 10th Infantry Division. The 150 mm shells exploding in the area indicated that the I battalion of the 5th Foot Artillery Regiment had been deployed, a unit at the disposal of the V Army Corps673. Meanwhile Major Rondenay, the commander of the I battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, in position in Jeune Bois forest, ordered the 1st company of Captain Bruno to march to positions on the western side of the road, 671 Grasset, Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III, 12–13; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 672 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 138; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 673 Jeune Bois forest came under the fire from the 1st battery of the I division and light field howitzers from the 5th and 6th batteries of the II squad of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. Angerstein and Schlemm, 18–19.

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while the 2nd company under the command of Captain Lavalade went to the east. Both companies were then to attack in the direction of Éthe. However, due to the shelling, the soldiers from the 3rd company of Captain Daviet could not leave Jeune Bois forest and took up positions on its edge, to the left of the 1st company, together with the machine-gun section of the 103rd Infantry Regiment and the machine-gun section from the 104th Infantry Regiment. Only a part of the 9th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment reached Tuilerie in groups, and suffered serious casualties in the process674.

Figure 26. Fatigued soldiers from a field artillery regiment handling a French 75 mm gun during a break from firing, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Meanwhile, after 7h00 the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Laplace was fighting in the vicinity of Bleid. It was the northeasternmost position of the 7th Infantry Division. The soldiers from the 6th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Nicolas, marching as the spearhead, were tasked with occupying the ridge of Gévimont – Hamawé hill, where the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment of Major Vicq and the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment of Major Henry had already fought. In line with the order, the hill was captured by the 6th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment. However, at 7h30 its positions were attacked by overwhelming enemy troops from the 123rd Grenadier Regiment. The soldiers from the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment managed to reach an intersection of the roads north of Bleid, where contact was established with the enemy. These companies took up 674 Grasset, Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III, 15–17.

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defensive positions between Bleid and Mât forest. The soldiers from the 5th company of the 101st Infantry Regiment defended Bleid, taking up positions in the east. At the same time, they were attacked by the German I and III battalions from the 124th Infantry Regiment. The 8th company was positioned in the forest west of Bleid; the 9th and 6th companies were on the edge of Mât forest. Shortly after occupying positions at the bifurcation of the roads north of Bleid, the soldiers of the 7th company were attacked by the I battalion of the 123rd Grenadier Regiment and the II battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment from the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg)675. Owing to the determination of the 7th company of Captain Chameroy, the German infantry was stopped albeit at a great cost; the French lost half their soldiers in a single engagement, including all the officers and NCOs676. At 8h30, in a section of the front (3 km long), seven battalions of the French 7th Infantry Division made attempts to put up resistance to nine battalions of the German 10th Infantry Division and six battalions of the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) supported by 90 field cannons and howitzers (72 guns from the 10th Infantry Division and 18 guns from the 53rd Infantry Brigade). Despite the fact that the French 7th Infantry Division was taking up better field positions, they came under fierce fire and were outnumbered by the Germans. As a result, the situation of the French troops deteriorated by the hour. When the fog cleared, Éthe hosted the cut-off staff of the 7th Infantry Division which had no communication with the corps of the IV Army Corps and the 13th Infantry Brigade. The companies of the 14th Infantry Brigade were in an equally poor situation. Some of them did not communicate with the staff of the division or the brigade. The companies of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Jouvin were dispersed from Belmont via Éthe to Laclaireau; one platoon took up positions on the southern bank of the Thon. Meanwhile, to the south of Éthe, the companies of the I battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment commanded by Major Rondenay regrouped and two of them took up positions in the southern part of the Thon river valley. Two other companies remained on the edge of Jeune Bois forest. The companies of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Vicq also changed positions and joined the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment of Major Henry, engaged in 675 The commander of the platoon of the 7th company of the II battalion from the 124th Infantry Regiment was Lieutenant Erwin Rommel who took part in an attack near Bleid fighting the French 101st Infantry Regiment and an attack on Le Mât forest during which his battalion suffered serious casualties. In the fight for Bleid on 22 August 1914, the 124th Infantry Regiment lost 25% of its officers and 15% of other soldiers. Erwin Rommel, Infanterie greift an. Erlebnis und Erfahrung (Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter, 1942), 15–27. 676 Grasset, Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III, 17–20; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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fighting from Laclaireau to Mât forest, to the west of Bleid. A majority of the company of the I battalion of Major Forcinal and the III battalion of Major Levin from the 104th Infantry Regiment took up positions along a railway embankment, with the left flank at the train station in Éthe and the right flank above a tunnel677. In line with the order, the companies of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Forcinal attacked from the railway embankment in Éthe to the north, with the aim of ousting the German 50th Infantry Regiment from the southern slope of hill 314. The attack zone ran through a field of ripe oats, which hampered the progress of the French extended line, under intense machine-gun fire from the German infantry. In this situation, the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment tried to cross the death zone by advancing 30 m at a time, but the attackers’ casualties were heavy. The final covering fire was supported by the German artillery and machine-gun companies. In the course of this suicidal attack, Captain Giansily’s 2nd company of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment lost 75% of its initial fighting strength. The commander, wounded in the arm, continued to lead his soldiers but soon was killed by shrapnel. All the company’s platoon commanders were eliminated from the fighting. In this situation, further attacks were impossible. The survivors of the 2nd company hid in the oats in front of the German lines and, due to the fire, could not return to their initial positions. Their fate was shared by the 1st company of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment of Captain Martin which suffered serious casualties, being shelled from the right flank from Laclaireau forest by a machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment and heavy artillery firing from Gomery. In the course of the attack, the 3rd company lost 75% of its soldiers including the commander, Captain Roffé and Lieutenant Lecaudé678. In the course of repelling the attacks of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, the German 50th Infantry Regiment also suffered heavy casualties. A medical aid station with Doctor Hentschel in charge was established in a deep, narrow ravine located halfway up the slope of hill 314. The wounded were partly sheltered from direct fire from the French field cannons. However, the area around the ravine was within the reach of the French artillery and shells exploded there regularly. According to the regulations of the field troops, members of the orchestra of the 50th Infantry Regiment put down their instruments to serve as

677 Grasset, Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe III, 24–26; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 678 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – IV,” Revue Militaire Francaise no. 28 (1923) [further referred to as Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV”], 149–150; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Figure 27. Wounded German soldiers in a dressing point of a battalion of an infantry regiment, the summer of 1914; the stretcher-bearers check on the wounded. In the far back, at the centre of the photograph is the battalion’s physician. A photograph from the author’s collection.

paramedics. However, the regiment’s orchestra was out of luck that day, because a French shell hit the musical instruments and destroyed most of them679. The ravine also served as shelter for the 1st Light Ammunition Column of the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. Carts supplied ammunition for field cannons in their firing positions. Later on, the shells were secured by wicker covers and loaded on caissons. In order to minimise the losses, the ammunition carts which handed over all the ammunition, would leave immediately to the rear. The soldiers of the ammunition column, waiting in the ravine, had no chance for a warm meal. Among them was Wachtmeister Linde who made an account of these moments: Cooking in the open was out of the question. In this situation, the cannoneers opened their field rations. They had barely started to eat when an order was given against it. What now? I told myself that we had to manage somehow. After all, what are resourceful people for? One of them was a cabman from Berlin. “Abramowski680”, I said to him. 679 Destruction of musical instruments posed a significant problem to the orchestra of the 50th Infantry Regiment because it could no longer perform its function. For this reason, in the days to come the orchestra members tried to get hold of replacement instruments at any cost. Sadly, only a few signal trumpets were found, abandoned by the French troops. Vogt, 9– 10. 680 Private Emil Abramowski (born in. Koschmin) from the 1st Light Ammunition Column of the I squad of the 20th Field Artillery regiment died on 3 February 1915 due to illness (probably typhoid fever) in a field hospital. AVDV, 371/1915.

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“Find out if you can organise a farm cart, take it to a large store and bring food plus something to supplement our field rations”. He did. In the evening, he came with everything I had asked him for. He traded a saddle for a barrel full of wine. He fitted it between the cart’s rails and was sitting astride the barrel. When an officer in the road asked “Wachtmeister, what is in the cart?”, the reply came “Spare parts, Second Lieutenant!”. However, at some point the resolute Wachtmeister was taken by surprise, when he heard “I’ll contact you when I need spare parts!”. The words were soon followed by action681.

After 9h30, in the north-east of Éthe, fierce fighting took place along the railway line defended by the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment led by Captain Tourte, who took over command following Major Levin’s death. The 47th Infantry Regiment launched its attack from the western edge of Laclaireau forest on its southern edge, on the left flank of the German 10th Infantry Division. At 10h30, from the western edge of the forest, the machine-gun company of the German 50th Infantry Regiment started firing at the French companies of the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment. In order to avoid further casualties, Captain Tourte ordered the 9th and 12th companies to retreat (they occupied positions on the battalion’s left flank). When retreat was ordered, under intense shelling from the German artillery and machine guns, soldiers in the two decimated companies panicked and started to flee toward the river Thon. Captain Tourte, who was still in position, was fatally wounded by a rifle bullet. At the sight of the annihilation of the companies of the III battalion, Colonel Drouot, the commander of the 104th Infantry Regiment, made an attempt to control the chaotic retreat, when his horse was hit by over a dozen bullets and fell. Despite the dramatic developments, the regiment’s commander remained calm and tried to reconstruct the defensive line. Due to the critical situation and the heavy casualties, the staff of the 14th Infantry Brigade together with the remains of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, a company of sappers from the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment and the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, decided to retreat in the direction of the train station and, at 11h30, toward the centre of Éthe682. The survivors from the 9th company of the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment (in total 60 people) were ordered to capture the eastern buildings in Éthe. On the other hand, the survivors from the 12th company of the battalion were ordered to retreat to Tuilerie. The few surviving soldiers from the 10th and 11th companies of the battalion, under the command of Captain Peltier, also retreated to Éthe. Barely 200 soldiers from the I battalion of the 104th Infantry 681 Account of Wachtmeister Linde of the battle of Éthe, in Benary, 52–53. 682 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Regiment survived; they had fought to the left of the III battalion and also retreated to Éthe. Following an attack by the German 47th Infantry Regiment, the 8th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment commanded by Captain Richard suffered high casualties; the company took up positions to the right of the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, along the railway line as well as the southern and eastern edges of Laclaireau forest. At 11h00 Captain Richard went back to Éthe with barely 10 soldiers683. When at 8h30, in the vicinity of Gévimont hills, the fog cleared, the French units taking up positions became easy targets for the cannons and howitzers of two artillery regiments of the German 10th Infantry Division. They came under fire from the 123rd Grenadier Regiment of the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) from the west and from the east. After only a few minutes of firing, the casualties in the French companies were considerable, especially among the officers and NCOs, which was detrimental to morale. The decimated companies, bereft of command, commenced a chaotic retreat to Éthe, leaving behind the killed and the wounded. Only the 11th company from the 103rd Infantry Regiment, which took the easternmost positions, stayed put. Despite the dramatic situation, the survivors among the officers and NCOs put a stop to the retreat and re-launched the attack, thus suffering more casualties. Facing the massacre of their units, Major Vicq – the commander of the III battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment – and Major Henry – the commander of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment – decided to withdraw their companies along the Thon river valley to Éthe. Due to the human losses in both battalions, exceeding 50% of the manpower, continued resistance in the positions was futile. At 9h30, Major Vicq started to retreat with his battalion, covered by the 12th company of Captain Moleux positioned 500 m to the west of the mill in Hamawé. Major Henry withdrew the remains of his companies to Lefort forest to gather in the dense woods near Laclaireau castle. The ridge of Gévimont was defended by the 11th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Jongleux. The position along a clearing to the north of Hamawé was filled by two platoons of the 5th company from the 104th Infantry Regiment and the machine-gun section from the 104th Infantry Regiment. At 10h00 the commander of the German III battalion of the 123rd Grenadier Regiment ordered an attack on the ridge of Gévimont as he was certain that the French troops had left the position. The attack was repelled, inflicting serious losses on the German battalion. However, the 9th company of the III battalion of the 123rd Grenadier Regiment captured the edge of Mât forest and from that position launched an assault on the ridge of Gévimont, causing serious losses in the 683 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV”, 150–152; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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French 11th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment. All the platoon commanders were killed or wounded; the company commander, Captain Jongleux, was heavily wounded by shrapnel. Nevertheless, he ordered the retreat, but only 50 soldiers from the entire company reached Éthe. Captain Bertin, with a group of approximately 100 soldiers from his 5th company of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, was cut off by German troops in Lefort forest in the vicinity of Laclaireau castle, previously captured by the enemy. From the north his regiment was occupied by the German 47th Infantry Regiment marching along Laclaireau stream684. At 10h15, from the side of Laclaireau stream, to the west of the castle, on the section of the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, a report came of an attack by the French cavalry, which was in a hurry and had launched an assault. At the order from the commander of the III battalion, subsequent companies were deployed; the first was the 1st platoon of the 11th company of Second Lieutenant Erich Borchers. The forest was dense there, and French rifle fire initially ended up in the tree tops but soon was more precise. Then, Second Lieutenant Erich Borchers was shot in the head; the French bullet pierced his helmet but only wounded his scalp. The French infantry was barely 75 m away. Second Lieutenant Erich Borchers remembered the fighting: I fired from my pistol at the biggest group [of the French infantry – B.K.] shouting “Hurray!” and signalled the attack. The enemy replied with immediate and intense fire. I crawled to the rear to summon my platoon, which did not manage to catch up with me. Once I collected 2–3 groups, we set off shouting “Hurray!” through the thicket and took up our first firing position in a ploughed field. We immediately laid down heavy fire. Meanwhile, the French approached us at 50 m – they were lying in front of us in a field of oats in a ground lowering to hide away from my soldiers. I gave the order to fix bayonets, because we could expect a direct assault at any moment. But the French did not come even a pace closer. In order to take up better firing positions, I decided to move my soldiers forward a bit. I had barely got up when I was hit on the left breast685. I was lying in front of my own riflemen. Above me was extremely intense infantry shelling. With my last ounce of strength, I got up and ran toward the riflemen. I looked at my watch, it was 10h30686.

The soldiers from the 11th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, dispersed in difficult terrain, gradually gathered near a railway embankment in the southeastern part of Laclaireau forest, persistently summoned by trumpeter De684 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV”, 145–149; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 685 Second Lieutenant Erich Borchers is recorded on the list of casualties of the 11th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment as heavily wounded. AVDV, 26/1914. 686 Account of Second Lieutenant Borchers from the 11th Company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, in Loosch, Das Königl, 21.

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penbusch. Since they were in the south-easternmost position of the 10th Infantry Division, they came under the fire from the front and both flanks. Firing advantage over the French infantry was gained only due to the support of the machine-gun companies. Initially, only one MG-08 section took up a firing position on the embankment, but soon the remaining companies joined it. Captain Kurt Hoffmann, the commander of the machine-gun company, wanted to get a better picture of the tactical situation and stood up a bit, when he was fatally shot in the heart687. Heavy shelling from six MG-08 machine guns aimed at such a small section breached the French defence and triggered off a chaotic retreat in an open area and through Laclaireau stream. However, a few French infantrymen survived and broke through to Laclaireau farm buildings, where they established another resistance point. In this skirmish, which took place between 12h00 and 13h00, the six MG-08 s from the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment fired in total 6,200 pieces of ammunition688. The remaining part of the 11th and 12th companies of the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment received an assault order. Marching through Laclaireau forest, the soldiers reached a tunnel in a railway embankment located on the western edge of the embankment689. The French infantry was nearby, and handto-hand fighting was a possibility. So the company commanders ordered “Fix bayonets!”. Only one platoon managed to break through to the eastern side of the embankment. However, after marching 30 m further, the French infantry, concealed in the dense forest, opened fire fiercely. Captain Ausner, the commander of the 12th company, together with his soldiers made an attempt to march through the tunnel. The commander, holding the battalion’s banner, was followed by Sergeant Schröder. However, another round of French fire interfered with the intentions of the commander of the 12th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment. He ordered capturing the top of the railway embankment, and from that position, after 12h00, an attack was launched on the western edge of Lefort forests. Near the tunnel, reserve Second Lieutenant Robert Mittelstädt was kil687 Captain Kurt Hoffmann, born in Szamotuły, is recorded on the list of casualties of the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, AVDV, 26/1914. 688 An account of reserve Second Lieutenant Wanke from the machine-gun company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, in Loosch, Das Königl, 26; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 689 The first tunnel in the railway embankment through which the 14th Hussar Regiment tried to charge, was located several hundred meters to the east of Éthe. Another tunnel was located approx. 2 km to the north-east of Éthe, in the western part of Laclaireau forest. The German soldiers from the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment tried to march through this tunnel. An analysis of the area around Éthe, carried out on the basis of a fragment of a French staff map at a scale of 1:20 000, published in the military ledger of the French IV Army Corps. 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Figure 28. The destroyed building in Éthe where on 22 August 1914 the Poznan´ (German) 10th Infantry Division crushed the Paris (French) 7th Infantry Division. A view from the road at the foot of a hill and Jeune Bois forest from the south of Éthe to the north. In the road is a French battery destroyed by accurate fire of the German 10th Artillery Brigade and artillery waggons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment from the 7th Infantry Division. To the right is a chimney and ruins of a lumber yard; to the left is a church tower with the cupola brought down. Éthe in September 1914. A photograph from the author’s collection.

led690; on the western edge of Lefort forest, Captain Franz Ausner691 was fatally shot in the head692. As a result of intense shelling targeted at Laclaireau farm, the French soldiers raised six white kerchiefs on bayonets to signal capitulation. The decision was probably not unanimous because when Vizefeldwebel Odelga ran to the wall with a group of soldiers, they came under fire from a group of Frenchmen not ready to surrender. Only after a command in French did most of them drop their rifles. The unwilling ones were “convinced” by German bayonets. On Laclaireau farm, the 12th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment took 83 French POWs. Some of them, heavily wounded, were transported by paramedics to the regimental medical point693. 690 Reserve Second Lieutenant Robert Mittelstädt, born in Stoewen, Kreis Kolmar in Posen (Stobno, Chodziez˙ county), was killed as the commander of the 12th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment and is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties. AVDV, 24/1914. 691 Captain Franz Ausner, born in Myslowitz, Kreis Myslowitz O. S. (Mysłowice, Mysłowice county), was killed as commander of the 12th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment and is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties. AVDV, 24/1914. 692 Loosch, Das Königl, 21; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 693 An account of capturing Laclaireau farm by Vizefeldwebel Odelga from the 12th Company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, in Loosch, Das Königl, 23.

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The 9th company of the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment was followed by the I battalion in reserve. However, when they left the forest and walked into an open area on one of the slopes on hill 314, it came under intense fire from the French batteries. In order to avoid casualties, the I battalion changed its marching column into an extended line and relocated to a ravine half-way up hill 314. At 11h30, when the French infantry opened fire from Laclaireau forest, the companies of the I battalion received an order to enter the forest. There was only time to deploy the 1st and 2nd companies of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment. The 3rd and 4th companies of the regiment, while not involved in direct fighting, suffered casualties as a result of the French fire694. However, the 10th, 11th and 12th companies from the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment took part in the main fighting. They suffered severe casualties, including Captain Franz Ausner – the commander of the 12th company and Captain Eberhardt Koch695 – the commander of the 3rd company, Second Lieutenant Paul Schmiedeberg696 and Captain Heinrich Kleinwächter – the commander of the 10th company697. Due to alarming reports on the difficult situation on the section of the 47th Infantry Regiment (the left flank of the 10th Infantry Division), General Robert Kosch sent the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment as support. At the front, the 3rd and 4th companies were positioned, while the 1st and 2nd companies formed the reserve. However, in the dense forest, most of the platoons lost visual communication, and thus the companies did not keep pace. The first to reach the embankment was Captain von Schoenermarck, the commander of the 3rd company, with 40 soldiers in tail. Then, the French infantry opened fire. After capturing Laclaireau farm, the soldiers of the 3rd company used a dam to cross the stream and cleared the southern part of Lefort forest near Laclaireau castle. The grenadiers came under fire there from all directions, suffering their first losses. However, after a short exchange of fire, they took 40 French POWs; the remaining part of the French unit resorted to escape. On the other hand, the 4th company under the command of Lieutenant Nicolay, to the right of the 3rd company, launched a brave counter-attack from the railway embankment, repulsing the French infantry units behind the Thon. When the 694 Account of Captain Hermann – the commander of the 1st Company of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, in Loosch, Das Königl, 24–25. 695 Captain Eberhardt Koch, born in Königsberg in Prussia, the commander of the 3rd company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, is recorded on the list of the regiment’s casualties. AVDV, 26/ 1914. 696 Reserve Second Lieutenant Paul Schmiedeberg from the 11th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, born in Birkholz, Kreis Friedeberg (now Borów, S´wiebodzin county), is recorded on the list of the regiment’s casualties. AVDV, 26/1914. 697 Loosch, Das Königl, 25–26; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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situation on the left flank of the division improved, the commander of the 3rd company intended to attack the train station in Éthe. However, his plan was changed by the commander of the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. Then, the soldiers of the 3rd company prepared themselves to repel the French counter-attack, taking up positions on the line between the road in Éthe, Laclaireau farm and by the wall around the park near Laclaireau castle. The 4th company, to the right of the 3rd company, dug in on a hill to the east of the train station in Éthe. The soldiers of the 1st company captured the mill. At first, the French soldiers hung out white flags, but later on fired from close distance. However, the grenadiers did not give up and attacked with bayonets, defeating the attackers. When in the evening, according to the division commander’s order, the 47th Infantry Regiment withdrew to their original positions, the left flank of the division secured the 3rd company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, filling the railroad embankment698. At 8h45, the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division still did not have information about the 13th Infantry Brigade, which could have come to the rescue to the decimated 14th Infantry Brigade. So, Colonel Lacotte ordered the 13th Infantry Brigade to reach Éthe immediately. However, it was impossible to implement this order without delay. The units of the 13th Infantry Brigade was extended in a marching column towards the south (Gomery – Ruette – Malmaison) over 8 km, so they had to march strenuously to Éthe. The first units arrived at the battlefield after an hour, the entire 13th Infantry Brigade after two hours. The situation of the 14th Infantry Brigade was becoming really dramatic, although General de Trentinian was not aware of it yet. After receiving instructions from the division’s commander, Colonel Lacotte ordered the 11th and 12th companies of the III battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment (located closest to Jeune Bois forest) to start marching immediately. At the same time, the I and II squads of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment plus four batteries of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment (a unit at the disposal of the IV Army Corps) with Lieutenant Colonel Buisson in the lead, were ordered to take up firing positions on either side of the road from Latour to Éthe699. After 8h00, in line with that order, the batteries of the I battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment took up firing positions on the southern slope of hill 242 near Gomery forest, targeted at the north-east. The smallest units of the 1st 698 In the fighting for Laclaireau farm, especial bravery was demonstrated by Second Lieutenant Stolle, drummer Göckemeier, grenadier Jaskuller and Captain von Schoenermarck, who were the first in the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment to be awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class. Gottberg, 43–45; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 699 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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battery were ordered to fire at the western edge of Gomery forest, while the two remaining batteries were to cover the manoeuvres of the 13th Infantry Brigade, unblocking the road from Éthe to Gomery and bombarding the eastern edge of the forest and the hills from the side of Bleid. The batteries of the II battalion took up positions on a ridge between Gomery and hill 292. At 10h00, they opened fire at the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment which marched from Belmont and tried to cross one of the hills700. At 9h00, Colonel Farret, the commander of the 101st Infantry Regiment, was visited by Captain Jullien with an order from General de Trentinian to send all available infantry units. Colonel Farret immediately ordered the I battalion of Major Lebaud to start marching. Taking advantage of the terrain, a majority of the I battalion safely reached Jeune Bois forest. However, upon entering the open spaces in the direction of Éthe, the 2nd company came under shelling from the German artillery701. The 4th company of the I battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Cauvin shared their fate. Fleeing, the survivors from both companies reached Jeune Bois forest. Next, the 102nd Infantry Regiment was tasked with supporting the 101st Infantry Regiment. However, the order was worded so imprecisely that the commander of the 102nd Regiment misinterpreted the task. Consequently, the II battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment of Captain Signorin entered the death zone on hill 293. A large majority of the battalion (especially the 7th company) suffered serious casualties from machine gun and artillery fire and withdrew to the north-east, to Jeune Bois forest, while the rest filled the road from Latour to Éthe. After this aborted attempt at breaking through to Éthe, an order was issued for the 102nd Infantry Regiment to march along the hills to the west to Belmont and from there to Éthe. Attempts were made to carry out the former order to unblock the divisional staff of General Edgard de Trentinian. This time, the mission was to be completed by companies of the I battalion. Colonel Tarret, the commander of the 101st Infantry Regiment who was in charge of the first line in Jeune Bois forest, decided that proceeding forward was impossible and thus ordered the commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment to develop a retreat plan702. Meanwhile, the 11th and 12th companies of the III battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment from the 13th Infantry Brigade which had been instructed to reach Éthe at any price, were massacred by machine guns immediately after they left 700 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 701 Many soldiers from the 2nd company of the 101st Infantry Regiment were killed, among them Lieutenant Vallet and Cordier while their commander, Captain Segonne, was wounded. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV”, 162–164. 702 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Jeune Bois forest. The casualties included the battalion’s commander Captain Tisserand, both company commanders, Captain Bonnieux and Captain Schoenlaub as well as the remaining officers – the platoon commanders. From two companies (over 500 people) only one officer survived (Lieutenant Hémelot) with 30 soldiers703. Before 10h00, the staff of the 13th Infantry Brigade received an order to relieve General de Trentinian from Éthe704; it was followed by an order from the staff of the IV Army Corps to support the 8th Infantry Division near Virton705. However, the units of the French 13th Infantry Brigade were not able to carry out either of the orders. Around 10h00, the scouts from the 13th Infantry Brigade spotted units of the German infantry on the hills, 2 km to the north-east of Gomery. For some time, the shelling from the French artillery put a stop to their progress. For this reason, Colonel Lacotte ordered the I battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment to defend Gomery near the road from Éthe to Jeune Bois forest. The commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade rightly deduced that Gomery could be attacked any minute from the north-east, from Baconveau forest with the Württemberg troops already there. Around 11h00, the units of the 13th Infantry Brigade filled positions along the northern edge of Jeune Bois forest. The road from Éthe to Latour, running along the forest, was filled by the 6th company of the 102nd Infantry Regiment. Further to the west were the positions of the 2nd and 3rd companies from the 101st Infantry Regiment, the 7th company of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, a platoon from the 4th company of the 101st Infantry Regiment and the machine-gun section from the 102nd Infantry Regiment which was in the process of capturing the road from Éthe to Gomery. The remaining companies of both regiments were grouped deeper in the forest. All the units in Jeune Bois were led by Colonel Farret, the commander of the 101st Infantry Regiment. The defensive lines of Jeune Bois forest in the north to Éthe, covered by hundreds of killed soldiers, carcasses of horses and damaged equipment, were regularly under the fire from the German artillery and machine-gun units. Therefore, it was impossible to send reinforcements to Éthe. In this difficult situation, Colonel Farret rightly noted that there was still an opportunity to attack Belmont through Bampont forest and 703 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 704 According to the account of General de Trentinian, he intended to stay in Éthe as long as it was necessary for the situation of the 7th Infantry Division. At the same time, he and his staff allegedly moved around the village all the time, without dismounting. However, bearing in mind the intensity of the German shelling, this scenario is highly improbable. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 137–138. 705 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD.

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he shared this thought with Colonel Lacotte, the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade. The task was allocated to the I battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, positioned along the southern edge of Jeune Bois forest. The commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade was concerned about the right flank of his formation, advanced far to the west, where the companies of the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment were fighting under the command of Major Laplace, and which did not send any reports. In this situation, deploying the last reserve of the 7th Infantry Division in the form of the 13th Infantry Brigade to attack Belmont was extremely risky706. Around 12h00, the only survivors of the 6th company with Captain Nicolas, in total 150 soldiers, returned from Bleid to Jeune Bois forest, where the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment was deployed under the command of Major Laplace together with a platoon of the 9th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment707. This meant that the right flank of the French 7th Infantry Division fed by units from the 13th Infantry Brigade, ceased to exist. As a result of destroying the right flank of the French division, the German troops attacked Gomery from the west (the 53rd Infantry Brigade – Württemberg) and Latour from the north-west (the 10th Infantry Division). According to the then German tactical doctrine, the goal of the manoeuvre was to envelop, surround and ultimately destroy the French 7th Infantry Division708. When the squads of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment took up firing positions to the south of Jeune Bois forest, Captain Techow from the German 20th Field Artillery Regiment made reconnaissance of these positions. Without delay, the 5th battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was ordered to fire. Major von Both, the commander of the I battalion, ordered his batteries to fire on the area behind hill 293, between Bois des Loges forest and a quarry (Carrière). The division’s staff supposed (quite rightly) that the artillery of the French 7th Infantry Division were taking up firing positions there709. The shelling from the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment killed Lieutenant Colonel Buisson, 706 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV”, 163–166; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 707 The mobilization regulations for the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment amounted to 750 soldiers; in the case of a platoon of the 9th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment it was 50 soldiers. Therefore, near Bleid, the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) fought against 800 French soldiers. 150 soldiers reached Jeune Bois forest, 582 were killed and 60 were taken as POWs. On the other hand, the German 53rd Infantry Brigade suffered the following losses: 35 officers and 1,042 privates (including 200 dead). Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – V,” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 325 [further referred to as Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V”]. 708 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 709 A chronicler of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment wrote erroneously that the shooting killed the commander of the French 44th Field Artillery Regiment – a unit at the disposal of the French IV Army Corps. Benary, 41.

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the commander of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. At that time Colonel Sabattier, the commander of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment (a unit at the disposal of the IV Army Corps) located in the zone of operation of the 7th Infantry Division, sent two batteries to hill 293 at the request of officers from the 14th Infantry Brigade to support the 26th Field Artillery Regiment710. Cannoneer Paul Liniert from the 11th battery of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment described the dramatic moment: We took up our firing positions on the edge of a barley field under the summit of the hill. The carts drove away towards Latour to look for shelter; you could see the church tower above the trees in the valley on the right. Squatting behind the shell-proof door made by the old generations and shielded by the guns, we were waiting for the order to fire. However, the captain (kneeling in the oats in front of a battery’s position, looking through binoculars) could not spot any targets because of the thick fog covering the Éthe and Etalle forests already captured by the enemy. Grenades and shells kept exploding around us, behind us and above our heads, spraying shrapnel. Death seemed imminent. There was a small pit behind a machine gun where I took shelter, waiting for orders. A large bay saddle horse stood motionless in the middle of the field with a wound in its chest, blood spurting. In the inferno of smoke and flames, among the whooshing and hissing bullets, the thunder of the enemy’s cannons and the roar of the seventy-fives from the adjacent battery, it was impossible to distinguish specific sounds. The battery was enveloped by black, sickening smoke. Someone started to moan; I got up to see what was going on. In the yellow fog, I saw Sergeant Thierry splayed on the ground and six soldiers from our unit around him. The shell had exploded underneath the butt of his gun, destroying the hydraulic recoil mechanism thus rendering the gun useless711.

Meanwhile, after 10h30, the defence of the French 14th Infantry Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division in Éthe relied on the solid stone buildings in the village hosting at that time the division’s commander General Edgard de Trentinian with the staff, General Henri-François Félineau – the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade with the staff, Colonel Drouot and Captain de la Chavigneri – a liaison officer from the staff of the IV Army Corps. After ordering the defence, General de Trentinian instructed a liaison officer from the IV Army Corps to deliver a report to the corps’ staff. While his vehicle was travelling from Éthe to

710 According to French sources, the shelling was to be coordinated by scouting aeroplanes, most probably from the 19th Air Division, allocated to the V Army Corps. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,” 160–163. 711 Paul Lintier, My seventy-five. Reminiscences of a French gunner of a 75 mm battery in 1914 (New York: G.H. Doran, 1917), 119–120, quotation from Peter Hart, I wojna ´swiatowa 1914– 1918. Historia militarna, Polish translated by Jan Szkudlin´ski (Poznan´: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, 2014), 71–72.

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Jeune Bois forest, it came under enemy fire, but the report reached the addressee712. In Éthe, the soldiers of the 4th company of Captain Finance, the platoon of Lieutenant Sédillot from the 2nd company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment and two platoons from the 3rd company of Captain Roffé from the 104th Infantry Regiment took up their positions. By that time, Belmont and the western part of Éthe together with the church had been captured by the German I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment. Only the survivors of the French 6th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment were defending themselves in the south of Belmont. With great devotion, the soldiers from the 7th company of Captain Joué of the 103rd Infantry Regiment continued strong resistance near the northern exit of the road from Éthe but the casualties in the specific platoons were too serious. The remains of two platoons of the 5th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment and several destroyed platoons from the 3rd company of the 104th Infantry Regiment captured houses at Rue Grande. On the southern bank of the Thon, the remaining platoons of the 5th company of Captain Alphonse Grasset from the 103rd Infantry Regiment were dwindled and Captain Grasset was heavily wounded. The exit of Rue Grande was barricaded and three 75 mm field guns of the 7th battery of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment were placed nearby. One of the guns fired towards Belmont, another one to the north and the third one to the west. The fourth gun of the 7th battery took up a position at the western bridge on the Thon and fired towards Laclaireau forest. Further away to the north, along the road from Éthe to Jeune Bois forest, three units of the 8th battery took up their positions; one fired at Laclaireau forest, two in the direction of Belmont. Several hundred meters to the south-east a unit of the 8th battery took up position, firing on the road to Hamawé. Along the road to Jeune Bois forest, a unit from the 9th battery fired to the north. In total, Éthe was defended by nine 75 mm field guns713. While under very intense fire, the positions of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment on the southern slope of hill 314 did not suffer serious losses. Reserve Lieutenant Rudolf Wolf, the commander of the 4th battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment described the results of the attack: The French fire was nothing horrible. When it comes to the effects – while the fire was aimed at the positions of the 4th battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment – they were negligible, despite a considerable use of ammunition. Barely three people were hit: NCO Baumgarten714, cannoneer Weigelt715 and my humble self 716. We were not killed, only 712 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 137. 713 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 714 NCO Wilhelm Baumgarten, born in Berlin, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 4th battery of the II squad of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment as heavily wounded. AVDV, 33/ 1914.

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wounded. Between our guns, next to them and in front of them was the infantry, firing so loudly that it was impossible to shout orders. The brave trumpeter, NCO Bethge who did not have many opportunities to blow his trumpet, found an unclaimed gun and joined the riflemen with relish. Reserve NCO Krahl manifested courage when he tended to my wound under enemy fire and covered me, lying down in front of me. I admired Karl Ulrich Meyer’s sternness. The commander of a column of the 4th battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment717, sitting high on his horse, stopped near the battery to control supplies of ammunition with even more unfazed trumpeter Fiedler by his side718. Later on he discovered his Polish roots, and after the war he was a trumpeter in the staff of Polish uhlans in Poznan´719. When the turmoil subsided a bit, I had to go the rear because of a second wound inflicted by the French and, with the help of trumpeter Bethge, I took cover behind the battery after I was treated with a gulp of French cognac. (…) Behind the front, along the edge of the forest, suddenly a large number of unattended horses arrived. They ran towards the limbers and the columns. The distressed soldiers thought it was a cavalry’s attack and immediately started to fire intensely from old cylinder revolvers. Fortunately, no harm was done720.

At 10h30, halfway between Buzenol and Éthe (Bois-de-Étalle forest), the staff of the 6th Grenadier Regiment received an order from the staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade to form a division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn which included the I battalion, the regiment’s machine-gun company and the 2nd company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion. They were ordered to relocate to the top of hill 314 as the reserve of the commander of the 10th Infantry Division. On the other hand, a fusiliers battalion was to be at the disposal of the 19th Infantry Brigade and be held in readiness right behind the 46th Infantry Regiment. Colonel Heyn’s group was subsequently ordered to take up positions to the northwest of Belmont, on the slope of hill 300721. Around 11h00, on the right flank of the attack by the German 10th Infantry Division, the 46th Infantry Regiment from the 19th Infantry Brigade, led by a 715 Cannoneer Weigelt in not recorded on the list of casualties of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment in the battle of Éthe. Possibly his family name was misspelled and the account refers to a Pole, reserve cannoneer Roman Weimann, born in Bomst (Babimost) who was lightly wounded in that battle. AVDV, 33/1914. 716 Reserve Lieutenant Rudolf Wolf from the 4th battery of the II squad of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Nieder Stephansdorf (now Szczepanów, commune S´roda S´la˛ska), is recorded on the list of casualties as lightly wounded. AVDV, 33/1914. 717 The account’s author meant the 1st Light Ammunition Column of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. 718 Reservist Paweł Fiedler from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Poznan´, was lightly wounded during the initial fighting on the Meuse Hills in early September 1914. AVDV, 33/ 1914. 719 The author means the 15th Poznan´ Uhlan Regiment stationed in 1921–1939 in Poznan´, in the former barracks of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. 720 An account of reserve Lieutenant Wolf of his participation in the battle of Éthe, in Benary, 50. 721 Gottberg, 41; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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patrol of Captain Richert and Second Lieutenant Przykall, walked in single file to the south down a narrow road through the thick Bois du Bon-Lieu forest and stopped on its southern edge. A bicycle patrol sent ahead captured hill 300, from which the regiment was expected to attack. On the right flank of the attack, a section was assigned to the I battalion and on the left flank for the III battalion. In the middle section of the second line, the II battalion was grouped with the regiment’s machine-gun company. The attack of the 46th Infantry Regiment on Belmont was accompanied by light fire from the French troops and the village was captured without resistance. Second Lieutenant Reinert, the commander of a platoon of the 11th company of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, reminisced about these moments in his diary: We reached hill 300. Captain Hartung de Groote and myself were with the company. Our riflemen lay on the slope and did not fire. We did not see the enemy in Belmont. However, the forest [Jeune Bois forest – B.K.] on the hill was swarming with the French but they were too far away for our gunners [out of reach of gunfire – B.K.]. Therefore, we lay idle and only watched the work of our artillery with great satisfaction. In Éthe and Belmont, one shell exploded after another. Single houses were on fire. On the left, where the 20th Infantry Brigade was positioned, sounds of violence could be heard. On the other side, on a hill was the enemy trench, sparsely manned. Suddenly, a round of shells hit the very centre of the trench and the enemy left it quickly. Later, in a meadow behind Belmont, a mounted unit appeared, probably the staff officers. The artillery did not spot them. Terrible chaos ensued. The 9th Infantry Division located to the right of us seemed to fight fiercely [near Virton – B.K.]. We heard the loud boom of the guns. Then, we were ordered to attack, but we did not know how far we should go! Soon the effects were visible. We were lucky. Single bullets flew with a swish from afar but I did not register any wounded soldiers. When I arrived in Belmont, it was brimming with our troops. Chaos prevailed. If [the French infantry –B.K.] had counter-attacked energetically, the results could have been fatal. Captain Wilke rode a dappled grey French horse around the country road722, swinging his broadsword. Some of the soldiers broke into the houses which, unfortunately, had not been searched thoroughly. All this turned into real chaos. We were not trained enough for this type of skirmish! I tried to collect the 11th company on the village road and moved to the exit across the road. Suddenly, two Frenchmen appeared on a hill across the road; they were walking briskly and were leading a horse. At the very same moment, the entire company started to shoot at them like madmen. First one fell down, then the other. They cost us at least 300 bullets. Major von Bocklemann [the commander of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment – B.K.], furious about the waste, shouted; I shouted, too, but to no avail. Finally, the firing was over and Major von Bockelmann ordered the company to gather, present arms and set off. I proceeded further all the way behind the railway embankment. In front of the forest, two companies formed an extended line. I was at the rear then. A patrol of the

722 A dappled grey horse – grey with darker, dark-grey patches.

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king’s mounted rifles [1st King’s Mounted Rifles – B.K.] rode with admirable courage up the hill between the forests spread out in front of us. Next we resumed our march723.

In Belmont, the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade praised the regiment for effectively completing the task, and ordered it to continue the attack after 12h35 across the Thon towards hill 300 and capture the hills between Bois de Bampont and Bois des Loges. The battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment completed the mission by 14h20724. Behind the 46th Infantry Regiment, a fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment was gathered, which around 14h00 took up positions near the western exit from Belmont. At that time, the fusiliers battalion was accompanied by General Paul Liebeskind, the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade, who ordered an officers’ patrol be sent to Éthe in order to check if the French troops were still there. This task was assigned to a subdivision of a platoon of the 11th company of the fusiliers battalion. The patrol soldiers managed to reach Éthe but they had to retreat due to the casualties caused by shells fired from close distance. When the 46th Infantry Regiment crossed the Thon in Belmont and resumed their march to the south, it came under regular fire from by the French infantry from the undergrowth to the south of Belmont until the threat was eliminated by a platoon of the 10th company. The remaining French soldiers withdrew to Belmont where civilians joined them with hunting weapons in hands, supported by plainclothes Belgian Civil Guard. As the platoon came under the fire from the French artillery while carrying out the task, Major von Unruh – the commander of the fusiliers battalion – ordered an immediate return to Éthe725. The attack by the 46th Infantry Regiment was supported by the 20th Field Artillery Regiment as well as howitzers of the 5th and 6th batteries of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. In the course of the artillery’s reconnaissance to the south of Belmont, a patrol of the I battalion came under fire from the French artillery. This was when reserve Second Lieutenant Hans Schmidt was killed726 and Captain Kurt Berger727, reserve Lieutenant Georg Hochstätter728 and reserve 723 724 725 726

Zunehmer, 35–36; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. Zunehmer, 35–36. Gottberg, 50–52; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. Reserve Second Lieutenant Hans Schmidt is recorded on the list of casualties of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment as killed. AVDV, 17/1914. 727 Captain Kurt Berger, the commander of the 2nd battery of the I squad of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Zembowo, Kreis Neutomischel (Ze˛bowo, county Nowy Tomys´l), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 21/1914. 728 The author of the regiment’s ledger misspelled the name as reserve Lieutenant Hochsteller while in fact it was Landwehr Lieutenant Georg Hochstätter, born in Seifersdorf (now Rosochata, Lower Silesia, Legnica commune, Kunice county), recorded on the regiment’s list as heavily wounded. AVDV, 33/1914.

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Second Lieutenant Bruno Breitter729 were wounded. When the batteries of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment marched through Belmont, they were attacked from the houses by French soldiers who were taking cover there. It was still impossible to take up positions to the south of Belmont, when the area came under the fire from the French artillery from the direction of Virton, where the French 8th Infantry Division was still defending730. Meanwhile, the soldiers of the 6th Grenadier Regiment came under fire from Belmont, from all directions. Second Lieutenant von Frankenberg, an aide-decamp in the fusiliers battalion – was attacked in Belmont by a civilian who shot at him with pellets from a double-barrelled shotgun but missed, and thus the Second Lieutenant was able to shoot the attacker. In the light of intense fire coming from the houses in Belmont, the 11th company of Captain Herbert von Kleist was ordered to search the village thoroughly. 80 armed civilians were captured and executed immediately. In the evening, the fusiliers battalion, as instructed by the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade, retreated to its initial position (a slope on hill 300, to the north-west of Belmont). In a gully between the hilltops, the battalion’s physician, doctor Kahle, organized a dressing point where reservist Władysław Brychczyn´ski was the first soldier from the 11th company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment of Polish nationality to die of wounds731. Together with his colleagues from the company he was caught in a trap set in Belmont by armed civilians732. Meanwhile, General de Trentinian planned to deploy the 13th Infantry Brigade (which was in Jeune Bois forest) in order to attack Belmont from the west and, if successful, establish communications with the 8th Infantry Division near Virton. Bearing in mind the firepower advantage of the German artillery from the 10th Infantry Division and the fact that Belmont had already been captured by the 50th Infantry Regiment, the plan had little chance of success. At that time, Major Vicq broke through to Éthe with barely 200 soldiers who spread out to defend specific positions. The remains of the division’s company of sappers entered Éthe together with the I and III battalions of the 104th Infantry Regiment which reinforced the defence of the barricades733.

729 Reserve Second Lieutenant Bruno Breitter, officer of the staff of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Berlin, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 33/1914. 730 Angerstein and Schlemm, 20; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 731 Reservist Władysław Brychczyn´ski, born in Z˙erków in Jarocin county. The name of the place is misspelled on the list of casualties as “Jerkow, Kreis Jarotschin”; the correct German spelling is “Zerkow”. AVDV, 18/1914. 732 Gottberg, 52. 733 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,” 154–155.

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Importantly, on 22 August before 15h00, the staff of the French IV Army Corps did not have information about the situation of the 7th Infantry Division or the course of fighting near Éthe. The commander of the French corps whose command post was located on hill 280 near the road from Saint-Mard to Harnoncourt, could only hear the sounds of fighting from the direction of Belmont and Éthe. In his opinion, it was evidence of the 7th Infantry Division’s involvement in heavy fighting. However, lack of communication between the division’s staff and the division on the right flank made it impossible to coordinate actions or send reinforcements. An attempt to establish communications between a cavalry squadron from the 8th Infantry Division and the 7th Infantry Division was equally abortive. The French cavalrymen, under fire from the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment near Latour, had to turn back734. Meanwhile, General Robert Kosch, the commander of the German 10th Infantry Division, also lacked precise information about the French activity near Éthe although a reconnaissance aeroplane was operating above the division’s positions, to the V Army Corps’ advantage. However, the corps staff failed to share the reconnaissance information with the divisional staff. At the same time, there was no communication with the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) attacking from the east735. General Kosch was certain that in Éthe the spearhead of the French IV Army Corps had made initial contact with the German troops, and that the main positions of the French corps were on Jeune Bois hills. This line of reasoning stemmed from the tactical experience of the commander of the 10th Infantry Division. The position (a range of hills covered in forest) was the most suitable to defend the Thon river valley. These were the reasons why the 46th Infantry Regiment was ordered to envelop the French positions on Jeune Bois hills from the west and to capture Latour. The 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) was to attack from the east and capture Gomery. This development had been predicted by General Henri-François Félineau, the commander of the French 13th Infantry Brigade. In these circumstances, the result of the attack of the 46th Infantry Regiment was of great importance to the success of the 734 As late as at 15h00, Captain Jullien from the staff of the 7th Infantry Division and, soon after, Captain de la Chavignerie from the staff of the corps, reported on the situation of the 7th Infantry Division and the course of the battle of Éthe. The information was hardly optimistic. 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 735 In order to establish communication and synchronise the actions of the 10th Infantry Division and the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg), General Kosch sent at 13h00 the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles with a report which, however, was captured in Lefort forest by a unit from the III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Henry. Due to lack of communication with the neighbour on the right – the 10th Infantry Division – the 53rd Infantry Brigade soon left for the south thus jeopardising the plan to cooperate against the French IV Army Corps. Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 337.

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Map 10. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division in the battle of Éthe, 22 August 1914 at 12h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

subsequent operations of the German 10th Infantry Division. Next, the division’s reserve (the 6th Grenadier Regiment) in Bonlieu forest was to be deployed to the north of Belmont.

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As the area around the top of hill 314 (to the north of Éthe) was the only free area at the exit of the road from a dense forest with a panoramic view of Belmont and Éthe, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division was stationed to the left of the road together with the staff, the I battalion and the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. Nearby, in the forest to the north of the top of the hill, the carts of the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment were stationed. On the edge of the forest were located light ammunition columns of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, baggage carts of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment and field kitchens. On the edge of the forest were also positioned the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles and the 2nd company of the 5th Sappers Battalion. When the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment marched toward Laclaireau forest to support the 47th Infantry Regiment, at 14h00 Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn and Lieutenant Reinhold Kuhnke – the regiment’s aide-de-camps – arrived at the division staff quarters for briefing736. Earlier the staff of the 10th Infantry Division received reports from both staffs of the artillery regiments that the batteries of the French artillery had been mostly eliminated from the fighting. This was corroborated by less intense firing on the part of the French batteries. However, the gathering of a large number of units and vehicles in the vicinity of hill 314 must have attracted the attention of the French artillerymen. This situation could not have been avoided in such a narrow initial position in the attack zone of the 10th Infantry Division, closed off by dense forest, a road and the slope of a hill cut across with ravines. Around 14h00, the top of hill 314 was fiercely fired on from Éthe by several French 75 mm field guns which still had ammunition. The first round of fire killed Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn737, the commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, General Staff Major Franz Aubert738, the chief of staff of the 10th Infantry Division and Lieutenant Reinhold Kuhnke, an aide-de-camp739. Lieutenant Colonel Max von Kaisenberg took command of the 6th Grenadier Regiment; previously he was the commander of the I battalion, while Second Lieutenant von Frankenberg, pre736 Gottberg, 53–54; Senftleben, 50. 737 Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn, born in Nieder Gläsersdorf, Kreis Lüben (Szklary Dolne, Lubin county) is recorded on the list of casualties of the 6th Grenadier Regiment as killed. AVDV, 17/1914. 738 General Staff Major Franz Aubert, staff commander of the 10th Infantry Division, born in Berlin, is recorded on the division’s list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 28/1914. The ledger of the 47th Infantry Regiment presents a slightly different version of the officer’s death. His body was found in the division’s staff car on the road to the north of the top of hill 314. This would suggest that he was killed in an ambush set up by a unit of the French infantry which broke through to the rear of the 10th Infantry Division. Loosch, Das Königl, 28. 739 Lieutenant Reinhold Kuhnke, an aide-de-camp of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Szczecin, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 17/1914.

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viously an aide-de-camp of a fusiliers battalion, became the regiment’s aide-decamp. Another casualty was reserve Second Lieutenant Lehmann, a liaison officer from the 9th Infantry Division, seconded to the staff of the 10th Infantry Division740. The French 75 mm field guns fired intensely for about 15 minutes. Their shells hit the units of the German 10th Infantry Division, grouped to the north of the top of hill 314, initially creating chaos. Following an explosion, the field kitchens and numerous carts were overturned. Next to the road was a car turned upside down, with bent axles. Many horses had been killed or wounded, others were running around panicked, among the dead and wounded soldiers. The paramedics who were trying to carry the wounded to the medical point were trampled by the galloping horses741. The officers who were there during the firing tried to control the panic and restore order. Among them was Captain von Puttkamer, the commander of the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment: (…) As soon as the artillery fire subsided we marched quickly to the edge of the forest. I did not have to go far. Next to the road, where the enemy’s shells had hit them, lay the regiment’s commander Lieutenant Colonel Heyn with the regiment’s aide-de-camp Lieutenant Kuhnke, the division’s staff officer, an aide-de-camp of the 50th Infantry Regiment who previously brought a report, the division’s orderly and many others. Also NCO Weber742 from my company lay motionless, lethally wounded and, next to him, a picture of his wife and a songbook. It was a sad and unforgettable sight! The heavily wounded who were carried to the medical point, the lightly wounded who hobbled with difficulty in the same direction, horses rolling in their own blood shaken by convulsions, vehicles overturned and destroyed by the firing – supplemented this terrifying picture. Meanwhile, we could hear pistol shots putting an end to the agony of the heavily wounded horses. We were shaken by the artillery fire and its direct impact on everyone. It was uplifting to see how naturally and quickly order was restored and the units concentrated. To replace the killed horses, new ones were captured, torn harnesses were exchanged, overturned carts were put on wheels; everyone helped as much as they could. One brave Gefreiter from the machine-gun company, shot in the head and arm, dragged a box with cartridges with difficulty until he fell. We all wanted to restore fighting readiness in order to be re-deployed to the battle. After a relatively short time, every-

740 After this incident, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division received information about the casualties: musketeer Adolf Fiedler, born in Grünberg (now Zielona Góra) – initially declared missing who soon returned to the unit; supply train Private Kazimierz Hartinger, born in Poznan´ – heavily wounded, died from his wounds; Gefreiter Józef Klemm, born in Trombinek, Kreis Schrimm (now Tra˛binek, Wielkopolska Province, S´rem county, Dolsk commune) – lightly wounded; reserve Second Lieutenant Kuno Lehmann, born in AltGoerzig, Kreis Birnbaum (now Gorzycko Stare, Wielkopolska Province, Mie˛dzychód county and commune) – killed. AVDV, 28/1914; AVDV, 21/1914; AVDV, 62/1914; Gottberg, 46, 54. 741 Senftleben, 50. 742 NCO Jakob Weber from the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Hanonien, Galizien, is recorded on the list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 18/1914.

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thing was in order and I could report to His Excellency [General Robert Kosch, the commander of the 10th Infantry Division – B.K.] that the machine-gun company was ready in the forest, in the front and on the left while the carts were on the road 300 m further away in the rear743.

The French artillery fire also inflicted losses on the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, affecting the cavalrymen and the horses alike. On the edge of the forest, shrapnel splinters shot through the ears of Rittmeister von Noso’s horse, causing heavy bleeding. Unlike the rifleman, the horse showed no signs of distress. One-year volunteer Schulze744 from the 4th squadron was hit in the eye by a ricochet, but received immediate medical aid. When Second Lieutenant Fritz Hoffmann von Hoffmannswaldau, the aide-de-camp of the mounted rifles regiment, was leaving the forest after delivering an order from the division’s staff, he came under the fire from the French field artillery. His horse was killed and, falling, pinned down the horseman who had a large splinter of a French shell in his chest. Nevertheless, most probably acting in a shock, the officer crawled from underneath his horse with the intention of carrying out the order. However, when he tried to capture a loose horse, he fainted and collapsed. He was immediately carried to the dressing point established on de Bar farm to the north of the top of hill 314. Second Lieutenant Krause was appointed the regiment’s new aide-de-camp745. The horses of the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were distributed behind a steep slope running from the top of hill 314 which did not protect them from harm. Rittmeister von Scheven who was there during the fire, also tried to control the panic: Despite what seemed like a good shelter, there were casualties. The horse-holders, who bravely tried to hold several horses by one hand, soon lost control of the animals. Many of them escaped and ran off, among them my grey horse. It took a few days before a light artillery column handed me my horse back after catching it, not without problems. There was nothing else to do but wait until the firing subsided and join the regiment in the forest to look for my other horse. I arrived at the right time because the entire road leading to the rear was occupied by fleeing vehicles and columns closely followed by our [the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles’ – B.K.] baggage carts. I stopped them immediately, turned them to face the enemy and then galloped after the fleeing column. I caught up with it and, with a revolver in my hand, forced it to stop and turn around. Captain Merckel from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment whom I met en route actively helped me, and thus the two of us managed to prevent a tragedy which could have been worse if, in the chaos, the columns had not decided to take the road through de Bar – Halte farm but 743 Gottberg, 47–48. 744 NCO Reinhold Schulze from the 4th squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as lightly wounded. AVDV, 25/1914. 745 Heavily wounded, Second Lieutenant von Hoffmannswaldau was transported to a field hospital in Arlon and later on to a field hospital in Trier where he convalesced in his wife’s care. In mid-October 1914 he returned to the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. Senftleben, 51.

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rather had turned left at the crossroads to the south of the farm and had galloped to the rear of the 9th Infantry Division746.

The intense French fire from 75 mm field guns was also targeted at the positions of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. It resulted in casualties among cannoneers and horses from the 4th battery; a piece of shrapnel crushed the jaw of Major Otto von Scherer747, the commander of the II battalion. The positions of the 3rd battery were showered with several hundred shells. In spite of the difficulties, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Lepper, the commander of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment smoked his pipe stoically and managed the firing from his batteries. According to the regulations of the German artillery, the limbers and caissons, together with the horses, were located 300 m away from the firing positions while the light ammunition columns were 500 m behind them, on the edge of the forest behind the top of hill 314748. At 12h00 General Hermann von Strantz, the commander of the V Army Corps, notified the staff of the 5th Army about the capture of Belmont and Laclaireau. Once Laclaireau farm was captured, at 13h00 it was possible to send to the southeast a patrol from the 4th squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles under the command of Second Lieutenant Teßler to establish communication with the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) 749. It was of special importance for coordinating subsequent operations, because communications could not be established between the V and XIII Army Corps. The course of Second Lieutenant Teßler’s patrol showed the advantages of cavalry in reconnaissance: Around 13:00 I received a task. At the same time I was informed that the forest [Bois Lefort –B.K.] had been captured by the enemy and that von Busse’s patrol was under enemy fire and had failed to get through the forest. I first went to de Bar farm in the forest 4 km north of Éthe and from there through a ravine to a road leading to SaintLéger750. In the forest, tall deciduous trees grew, so visibility amounted to approx. 100 m. After 2 km, we crossed Laclaireau stream. Here, the road was so narrow that we could only ride in single file. In front of me was Sergeant Michler with two soldiers. The road meandered up the hill, the deciduous trees gave way to about 3-m tall scrub so you could not see anything to the side; visibility in the front and back was as far as the nearest turn

746 Senftleben, 50–51. 747 Major Otto von Scherer, the commander of the II squad of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, born in St. Blasien in Baden, was recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 33/1914. 748 Angerstein and Schlemm, 18. 749 The movement of the units of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) on the left flank of the Poznan´ division was spotted at 12h30 from the quarters of the staff of the 10th Infantry Division near the top of hill 314. Angerstein and Schlemm, 18. 750 It was the same ravine through which the entire regiment was transferred in the evening.

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i. e. a maximum of 50 to 60 paces. Halfway up the hill, a shabrack751 from Busse’s patrol lay on the road. I think the patrol had been fired on by the enemy in that place. I called to Michler: “Careful, we are close to the enemy!”. We had barely ridden 200 m when Michler called back: “The enemy’s here!”. In a moment, I was riding next to Michler. The enemy turned round and was only 30 paces away from us. We drew our pistols and started to shoot. Two horses and a French soldier sped across the road. A French officer, initially riding toward us, could not continue his charge, as he was attacked with a lance and unsaddled by one of our soldiers who had stopped next to me. Because we could not ride in horse formation, I ordered: “Off the horses, fight on foot!” and, having reached my short rifle, I started to shoot at the still visible enemy. I left Sergeant Michler and two soldiers with the horses and ordered him to look around and make sure that he was not surrounded. We did not get far when we were fired on from all directions by the French infantry. At the same time, I received a report from Michler that the enemy was trying to encircle us on the left flank. It was futile to proceed because the risk of envelopment was too high. At the same time, there was no prospect of continued horse-riding. I ordered the soldiers to mount their horses and ride to their initial positions. We took the horse of the killed French officer; the enemy left on the battlefield one officer, one officer cadet and two privates752.

After an aborted attempt to establish communications with the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg), the commander of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles intended to make subsequent attempts of carrying out the order from the commander of the 10th Infantry Division. To this end, he was going to send a patrol of two NCOs from the 4th squadron tasked with breaking through to the staff of the Württemberg corps. Many soldiers volunteered to complete this dangerous mission; the regiment’s commander chose the deputy of reserve Wachtmeister Kurt von Jouanne and NCO Max Fischer. Despite great determination, this attempt also failed. In Bois Lefort forest, Fischer753 was killed and Vicefeldwebel von Jouanne754 was heavily wounded; after the paramedics found him, he died of the wounds received in action755. 751 A shabrack – in 1914 in the German cavalry referred to as saddle blanket (German Woilach), a saddlecloth made of soft fabric to protect the horse’s spine from skin sores. At the same time, the blanket protected a leather saddle from the harmful effects of the horse’s sweat. 752 During that fight, Second Lieutenant Teßler was shot in the thigh (after hospitalisation he returned to the regiment on 23 September 1914); a reservist and a horse were wounded. An account of Second Lieutenant Teßler from the 4th squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles from 22 August 1914 on fighting in Lefort forest, in Senftleben, 49–50; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 753 NCO Max Fischer from the 4th squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, born in Kunzendorf, Kreis Sorau (now Kunice, Lower Silesia, Legnica county, Kunice commune), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 25/1914. 754 Vicefeldwebel Kurt von Jouanne from the 4th squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, born in Malinie, Kreis Pleschen (now Maliny, Wielkopolska, S´rem county, Dolsk commune), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 25/1914. 755 Senftleben, 50.

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When the French field artillery opened fire on the quarters of the staff of the 10th Infantry Division and its units near the top of hill 314, the wounded and POWs were transported to the rear in the direction of Étalle where the V Army Corps with General Hermann von Strantz had its quarters. The area between the right flank of the 5th Army and the left flank of the 4th Army was to be supported by the 3rd Cavalry Division. However, for some inexplicable reason, the unit did not complete the task well. Consequently, on 21 August a battalion of the French colonial infantry and a sappers company broke through. On 22 August, the French troops made an attempt to break through to their division and attacked to the south – on Étalle. This unexpected attack caused sheer panic in the staff of the V Army Corps – the corps staff officer sent an official report to the 5th Army: “We have just been attacked by the French”. In these circumstances, when Lieutenant Colonel Haenichen, the commander of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, heard shots, he was certain that a soldier had carelessly handled his rifle and the shot was accidental. Haenichen ordered the ammunition column of the 10th Infantry Division to proceed to the south of Étalle and then, the horses of the staff of the V Army Corps shied at rifle shots and galloped to the middle of the village. In the northern part of the village, Haenichen and 8 soldiers came across a unit of the French infantry. When he shot an NCO and another soldier with his pistol, the other Frenchmen ran away. Through his binoculars he spotted an extended line of French infantry attacking from north to south. In the northern part of Étalle Lieutenant Hauschulz756, an aide-de-camp of the 5th Pioneer Battalion was wounded in the knee while he was leading soldiers from the 154th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division to attack a French unit. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Haenichen left a few soldiers in position, while he ran for support to the quarters of the corps staff where he met Major Krebs and gave him an account of the situation. Haenichen sent a corps staff support unit to the north of the village and took the remaining soldiers to its western part. In the last house they took up a firing position from which both privates and officers shot. The French unit suffered serious casualties and decided to retreat. On the next day, the survivors were captured by a patrol in a field to the north of Étalle. Following an exchange of fire, the horses of the staff of the V Army Corps galloped to Arlon from where they were led to the corps quarters as late as on 23 August757. On the southern slope of hill 314 where the 20th Field Artillery Regiment had its firing position, ammunition was supplied by the 2nd Light Ammunition 756 The wounds received in the skirmish by Lieutenant Willy Hauschulz, an aide-de-camp of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, were listed along with the other casualties of the staff of the V Army Corps. AVDV, 21/1914. 757 Paul Koch, Das Niederschlesische Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsverbände im Weltkrieg 1914/18 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1928), 47–48; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Column of the formation. An officer from the ammunition column recalled about that time: Around 11h00 before noon, we brought the first supply of ammunition. We were fired on with shrapnel shells. Wachtmeister Nowak758, shot in the helmet with a piece of shrapnel, fell off his horse. Lone ammunition carts approached the gun-firing posts; in other places, gunners from the ammunition column, with Captain Merckel in the lead, were dragging wicker baskets up a steep hill to the firing position. Next, the column turned back to replenish its ammunition. However, the only exit from the forest was blocked by various vehicles; our column took up position in a depression in the ground in front of the forest. The corps’ artillery ammunition column arrived. We had the dressing point in front of us and the division’s staff right behind us. Captain Merckel was about to deliver a speech to the NCOs when French shrapnel shells hit the vehicles and wounded some soldiers. With the consent of the regiment’s commander, the captain withdrew the column’s soldiers to the forest. Meanwhile, chaos ensued at the exit from the forest where the soldiers, horses and vehicles were gathered. Fortunately, the majority of the shrapnel shells exploded in the tall tree tops and did not harm us. When the firing stopped after half an hour, the officers ordered the column onto the forest path with difficulty. However, we came under enemy fire again. The French infantry broke into the forest and opened fire on the King’s mounted rifles to the right of us. The French artillery resumed firing, too. It led to more chaos. Everyone tried to withdraw from the firing. Only after a while, far in the rear, Captain Merckel managed to stop the escaping soldiers and restore order. Reserves replaced the lost light ammunition columns of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. In the meantime, it got dark and we moved to Arlon to replenish our ammunition759.

In the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, the wounds of the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher760, proved serious enough to evacuate him around 12h00 to a dressing point and later on to a field hospital. Earlier, Major von Krogh took over command. Despite the losses in both the regiment’s light ammunition columns (men, carts and horses), artillery ammunition was supplied regularly throughout the battle; the ammunition carts frequently reached even the front line. At the same time, the ammunition columns of the V Army Corps under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hasse (who arrived at the staff of the 10th Infantry Division) replenished the artillery ammunition for the light ammunition columns of the 20thy Field Artillery Regiment. Ammunition replenishment from 758 Wachtmeister Wilhelm Nowak (his family name was misspelled on the list of casualties as “Noak”) from the 2nd Light Ammunition Column of the II division of the 5th. Field Artillery Regiment, born in Ritschenwalde, Kreis Obornik (now Ryczywół, Wielkopolska, Oborniki county, Ryczywół commune), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as lightly wounded. AVDV, 33/1914. 759 An account of an anonymous officer from the 2nd Light Ammunition Column of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, in Benary, 54. 760 Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher, born in Bielefeld, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment as lightly wounded. AVDV, 20/1914.

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the corps’ supplies was managed with considerable devotion by reserve Second Lieutenant Konrad Freiherr von Gregory761 who was earlier wounded in the arm762. Meanwhile at 12h15, the companies of the German 46th Infantry Regiment moved toward Belmont, where the companies of the right flank of the 50th Infantry Regiment were stationed. At the same time, the commander of the 10th Infantry Division ordered deployment of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Sick which was to reinforce the decimated companies of the right flank of the 50th Infantry Regiment. The battalion’s soldiers took up positions to the right of the 4th and 3rd companies of the 50th Infantry Regiment. At 12h30, the spearhead of the 46th Infantry Regiment crossed a bridge on the Thon near a mill unobstructed, and then crossed the Virton – Éthe railway line. The spearhead was followed by the II and III battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment accompanied by a fusiliers battalion from the 6th Grenadier Regiment763. At the same time, the machine-gun company of the 46th Infantry Regiment took up positions in the vicinity of the railway bridge in Belmont, involved in intense fire. The 46th Infantry Regiment’s attack was supported the 4th battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment firing straight ahead and destroying the French artillery battery. Only one horse-drawn French gun escaped the firing764. Meanwhile, the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment extended the right flank of the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment whose positions ended several hundred meters to the east of the road to Éthe. To the right of the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, the 7th, 5th, 6th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment stood subsequently in an extended line. In the centre of the 7th company moved a platoon under the command of reserve Second Lieutenant Morawski. In the course of taking the designated position, Captain Franz Hoppe765, the commander of the 7th company, was shot in the abdomen. The omnipresent terror of death was accompanied by funny episodes like the one described by Second Lieutenant Georgi, a platoon commander:

761 Reserve Second Lieutenant Konrad Freiherr von Gregory, born in Gr. Zauche, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 10th Artillery Brigade as lightly wounded. AVDV, 28/1914. 762 Benary, 42. 763 Vogt, 11; Gottberg, 42; Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers, Kindle: Location 4230. 764 Angerstein and Schlemm, 18–19; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 765 Captain Franz Hoppe, the commander of the 7th company of the 47th Infantry Regiment, born in Friedeberg Neumark, Regierungsbezirk Frankfurt (now Strzelce Krajen´skie, Lubuskie Province, Strzelce-Drezdenko county, Strzelce Krajen´skie county), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 26/1914.

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The right pivot-man, slim and tall musketeer Jechalek, suddenly blanched, dropped his rifle and grabbed the buckle of his belt. A stray bullet had hit him on a [brass – B.K.] buckle, ricocheted and ended up in his boot leg. “Man, thank God you are so tall. Otherwise that thing would have hit you in the head”, said a Berliner and the musketeer and his colleagues burst out laughing766.

When the soldiers from the 5th and 7th companies of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment took up their positions, their extended lines were intensely fired on by the French infantry in the direction of Éthe. The French soldiers had good firing positions from which few of them could be seen. For this reason, only some soldiers from the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment opened fire at the detected posts of the French infantry. This was evidence of considerable discipline exercised during basic training. In these circumstances, the commander of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment ordered to stop the attack, because on the right flank the extended lines of the 46th Infantry Regiment were moving to catch up with the assault line of the 20th Infantry Brigade. When at 14h15 the soldiers of the 46th Infantry Regiment crossed Belmont and were headed for Bois des Loges forest, Major Sick, the commander of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, ordered to attack the western part of Éthe. The first to move were the extended lines of the 5th and 7th companies, followed by the 6th and 8th companies. At the same time, the French artillery opened fire, but aimed too high; however, a correction was only a matter of time. In these circumstances, the only solution was a combination of “escape forward” and a dynamic transfer to the attack target767. When the companies of the 47th Infantry Regiment marched between the buildings in Éthe they were viciously attacked from various directions by the French infantry. According to the reports of German soldiers, the French riflemen were firing from a building marked with a Red Cross flag (it was probably a dressing point). On the other hand, a French machine gun fired from the church tower. The armed Belgian Civil Guard took part in the fighting; it was an irregular formation, without a command structure and fighting in civil clothes768. Soon, 766 An account of Second Lieutenant Georgi from the 47th Infantry Regiment, in Loosch, Das Königl, 27. 767 Loosch, Das Königl, 27; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 768 During a search of the buildings in the western part of Éthe, in one of the houses Second Lieutenant Georgi captured a young man in civilian clothes with a French army revolver in a bag. A woman fired from a pistol at reserve Second Lieutenant Erdmann who opened the door to a house. The house, marked with the Red Cross flag, held French soldiers with faux dressings. The Belgian Civil Guard took part in the defence of Éthe which did not have uniforms but was equipped with modern military-type weapons. In 1913, the organisation attracted 46,000 Belgians and in the early August 1914 the Belgian government armed 100,000 more civilians. In total, 146,000 civilians were armed with modern military weapons. This development breached the rules of engagement ratified before the war by France,

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Map 11. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division in the battle of Éthe, 22 August 1914 at 15h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

Belgium and Germany. Loosch, Das Königl, 27; Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers, , Kindle: Location 6231.

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Major Sick received a report that the village would come under the fire of the artillery; as a result, he deployed soldiers from the 5th and 6th companies, who were to evacuate civilians and farm animals. At 17h30, Major Sick from the staff of the 20th Infantry Brigade was ordered to retreat from Éthe with his battalion. The order was incomprehensible to the soldiers of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Brigade because they had successfully ousted the French infantry. However, they supposed that something must have gone wrong in another section of the brigade’s or the division’s assault769. When the spearhead of the 10th Infantry Division made contact with the French troops near Éthe, the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment under the command of Major Apelt was in Arlon as a unit covering the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment (a unit at the disposal of the 5th Army, allocated to the V Army Corps). According to the corps commander’s order, the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment left for Châtillon before 4:00. Between the horse-drawn carts marched soldiers grouped in semi-platoons from the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment as an escort. The commander of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment ordered a halt to the north-east of Châtillon and sent out patrols. The grenadiers from the II battalion captured Châtillon; then, they took up defensive positions on the local hills. Meanwhile, from the direction of Éthe, many wounded soldiers from the 19th Uhlan Regiment arrived and were given medical assistance. Around 13h30, when the sounds of the battle subsided a bit, the column of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment, escorted by grenadiers, resumed marching and reached Saint-Léger. However, due to the unclear tactical situation the commander of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment ordered a return to Châtillon to spend the night there. At the same time, the grenadiers from the 6th company commanded by Captain von Schuckmann from the II battalion searched the vicinity of SaintLéger to clear the area of French survivors770. The march by a strong unit of the German 10th Infantry Division to the southern bank of the Thon posed a real threat of enveloping the left flank of the French 7th Infantry Division. On the western edge of Jeune Bois forest, at 13h00, the position was defended by only 100 soldiers771. Therefore, an attack by the 10th Infantry Division on Jeune Bois forest and capturing the position would have meant enveloping the decimated units of the French 14th Infantry Brigade772 in Éthe. Meanwhile, by 12h00 General Edgard de Trentinian did not have any information about the situation of the 13th Infantry Brigade which, in accordance 769 770 771 772

Loosch, Das Königl, 27–28. Gottberg, 52–53; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. Zunehmer, 37–46, 489; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,” 154–155. Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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with an earlier order, was expected around noon in the vicinity of Jeune Bois forest. The division’s commander and his staff remained for 4 hours under intense enemy fire, and he was not able to command his division. According to Major Alphons Grasset, the honour of a French officer did not allow General de Trentinian to leave his soldiers, who were in a critical situation. What is more, an immediate retreat from the first line of fighting by the commander and chiefs of staff could have been detrimental to the soldiers’ morale. So it was not until noon when the general decided to return to the main troops of his division, giving command of the defence of Éthe to General Henri-François Félineau, the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade. However, before that, under the fire from the German artillery, the soldiers had to use fascines to strengthen the road which had been washed away by the river, and which delayed evacuation of the division’s chiefs of staff. At 13h30 General de Trentinian and his staff left Éthe for Latour on horseback toward Jeune Bois forest, followed by intense German artillery and machine-gun fire773. During this escapade, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division was very lucky, because he reached the treeline with only a grazed uniform, hit by a few German rifle bullets. The horse of Major Macker (chief of staff in the division) was killed, but the major managed to run to the woods unassisted. The division’s medical chief, Doctor Simonin and the interpreter Deschars were wounded. During that short, breakneck ride, the squadron of the division’s cavalry which was escorting the chiefs of staff was massacred, losing 50% of its forces. However, the risky mission was completed and General de Trentinian successfully reached Jeune Bois forest. He expected to meet the battalions of the 13th Infantry Brigade there, ready to fight, so that he could send them off to rescue the 14th Infantry Brigade in Éthe774. By 12h00, Colonel Lacotte, the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade, had no information about the fate of the division’s commander, or the 14th Infantry Brigade in Éthe. The right flank of the 7th Infantry Division had been destroyed and the left flank was being fiercely attacked by enemy troops. Following an analysis of the tactical situation of the 7th Infantry Division, Colonel Lacotte concluded that the 14th Infantry Brigade in Éthe was already lost; due to the possible envelopment of Jeune Bois forest, his brigade was also at risk. Therefore, at 12h30 he ordered a retreat for the 13th Infantry Brigade, which was to transfer to the forest to the north of La Malmaison; the 102nd Infantry Regiment was instructed to proceed east to the road between Ruette and La Malmaison, while 773 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 774 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,” 159–160; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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the 101st Infantry regiment was to proceed west of that position. The retreat was meant to provide cover for the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment and the II battalion (the 4th, 5th and 6th batteries) under the command of Major Appert from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment which took up positions on the hills between Latour and Gomery. The retreat started without too many problems, because the German heavy artillery from the V Army Corps was firing only sporadically775. Following an order from the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division instructed the I battalion to march toward Cahaut forest. On the other hand, the II battalion was ordered to remain in position to cover the manoeuvre. Once the mission was completed, the soldiers were to take up positions near Ruette776. When General de Trentinian ordered Colonel Farret to desist from retreating and to start offensive operations, the withdrawal of the 13th Infantry Brigade to the south was very advanced777. Therefore, the troops stationed in Gomery: the remains of the 6th company of the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment of Captain Nicolas, the 2nd platoon of Lieutenant Delvert from the 3rd company of the I battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment and two sapper companies from the IV Army Corps, were designated as the local crew. Simultaneously, the I battalion of Major Wilbien and the III battalion of Major Le Merdy from the 102nd Infantry Regiment turned back, and General de Trentinian informed Colonel Lacotte and Colonel Valentin, the commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment about the manoeuvre. However, it was no longer possible to halt and turn back the artillery units. So the planned attack by the 13th Infantry Brigade could not be supported by artillery778. The batteries of the I battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment started their retreat along a hedge running parallel to the railroad track. However, the march could not be continued because of the growing number of German infantry troops. Therefore, the battalion’s commander decided to change the direction of the march to hill 260. When the batteries marched from the forest into open space, the companies of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment 775 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,” 166–167; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 776 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 777 According to the fighting ledger of the French IV Army Corps which included the 7th Infantry Division, after 12h30, General de Trentinian only partly revoked his order for the 13th Infantry Brigade to retreat. 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 778 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 325–327.

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opened up intense fire on the French. The units of the 2nd battery of the I battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment tried to take up firing positions to cover the retreat of the remaining batteries. However, the troops managed to mount only one gun on the boggy road to open fire. The remaining soldiers from the battery, armed with short rifles, formed an extended line and started shooting at the attacking German infantry. The 1st and 3rd batteries could be thus withdrawn from fire, while the 2nd battery was sacrificed and its 4 guns and carts abandoned. Notably, many of the horses drawing carts for the 2nd battery were either killed or severely wounded. The batteries of the I battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment marched through La Malmaison, Allondrelle and Charency to Villers-le-Rond. At 17h00, the batteries of the II battalion of the regiment withdrew from Ruette and resumed marching to La Malmaison when German heavy howitzers from the I battalion of the 5th Foot Artillery regiment opened fire on the 6th battery. Still, the batteries of the II battalion managed to reach Charency by midnight779. Soon, the I battalion commanded by Major Wilbien from the 102nd Infantry Regiment (covering his parent regiment’s retreat) which took up positions to the south of Jeune Bois, came under fire from the north and west. The III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, supported by a machine-gun company, attacked from Latour. The II battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Signorin was also ordered to cease the retreat and continue fighting. The 5th company of Captain Friecker and the 8th company of Captain Charlot marched toward Latour. The III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment appointed the 10th company commanded by Captain Rungs to take up positions on a hill facing the eastern limit of Latour. The 11th company of Captain Renaudin was grouped opposite Latour and the machine-gun section filled a position along the road from Latour to Signeulx780. Due to considerable losses, the 6th company commanded by Captain Gérard, and the 7th company of Captain Fromont from the II battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment took up positions to the north of Ruette as the reserve. They were joined by the 12th company of Captain Goïp from the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment. The I battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment of Major Lebaud was also instructed to return from Gomery and march to the south-west edge of Jeune Bois forest where it took up positions to the left of the I battalion of Major Wilbien from the 102nd Infantry Regiment. The 3rd company of Captain Nicolas from the I battalion of

779 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 780 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD.

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the 101st Infantry Regiment filled a position along the railroad track to the south of Latour781. On the southern bank of the Thon, in the section attacked by the German 46th Infantry Regiment, a reconnaissance by a patrol of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles confirmed the presence of only one battery of enemy artillery near Latour, accompanied by small units of infantry which had started to retreat. This information sounded extremely optimistic. Colonel Victor von Arent ordered immediate machine-gun fire on the retreating troops and artillery. The French field artillery retaliated with shrapnel shells and grenade fire lasting 20 minutes and aimed at the front and the right flank of the 46th Infantry Regiment. It was effective enough to cause casualties in the specific companies. Therefore, the commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment ordered the III battalion (which was the most advanced unit) to march to the nearest valley. Meanwhile, the I battalion and the 10th company of the 46th Infantry Regiment took up positions in Bois de Bampont forest; the companies of the II battalion, marching in a second line, took shelter in a forested basin to the north-east of Bois de Bampont (without the platoon of the 6th company). As soon as the companies of the 46th Infantry Regiment appeared on the hills the French field artillery opened accurate fire. The situation repeated four times782. At 14h30, the units of the 13th Infantry Brigade consisting of eighteen companies (nine companies opposite Latour) engaged the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment which took up positions near hill 293 and attacked in the vicinity of Latour. Three further companies of the 13th Infantry Brigade occupied positions opposite the southern edge of Jeune Bois. The remains of the 6th company of Captain Nicolas from the II battalion of the 103rd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd platoon of Lieutenant Delvert from the 3rd company of the I battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment and two sapper companies from the IV Army Corps remained in Gomery. Four companies were located to the south of the railroad track. At the same time, the II battalion of Major Appert from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment which was covering the retreat on hill 293 was itself forced to withdraw in the direction of Ruette by the fierce fire from the German infantry. Consequently, the units of the French 13th Infantry Brigade did not have artillery support. Colonel Lacotte was a realist and was aware that he would not be able to hold these positions with such sparse troops, especially as he did not have any reserves and the right flank of his brigade (and also the division) was completely open to attack from the direction of Bleid. At the same time, the

781 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 326–328. 782 Zunehmer, 39; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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wounded came to Éthe in large numbers – an indication that the 14th Infantry Brigade was close to annihilation783. Major Friedrich von Bockelmann analysed the tactical situation of his III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, which was occupying positions on the hills near Latour, and concluded that a frontal attack by company would crush the resistance of the few remaining French infantry units. When, at 13h30, the companies of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment rushed down a gentle slope to assault Latour, the French infantry in the village opened up with rifle and machine-gun fire. Soldiers from the 9th and 12th companies, supported by a platoon of the 10th company, crossed the road between Chenois and Latour. From this position they opened fire on the French units located in the Basse-Virre lowland and on the opposite hill. One victim of the firing was the 2nd battery of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment; while withdrawing to the west along the railroad track toward Bois Lahaut forest it lost all horse-drawn carts and guns. The attacking III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment also came under fire from the French artillery attacking from the south-west of Saint-Mard and machine guns firing from the direction of the railroad track. At 14h40, the soldiers of the 11th and 12th companies of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment broke through to Latour, where fierce fighting took place in the streets with French soldiers, as well as armed Belgian civilians. One of the barricades on the road leading from Latour to Gomery was captured using bayonet combat. However, the tactical situation of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment in Latour was becoming increasingly alarming because the enemy was firing from numerous houses as well as from the direction of Gomery, from where three French infantry companies were approaching. In order to save the battalion, Major von Bockelmann and Second Lieutenant Richert collected all the available soldiers and took up fighting positions in a ravine in the north-eastern part of the village. The soldiers of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment fired from 700 m away. At the same time, enemy troops came under fire in Latour. In the course of an intense exchange of fire, Major Bockelmann stood up many times from his command post to better observe and orient himself regarding the developments. His aide-de-camp Second Lieutenant Richert and Second Lieutenant Donath warned him many times to stop putting himself in danger. However, the major would not listen and was shot 5 times during one of his observations, killing him784. Second Lieutenant Eberhard Reinert was wounded in the neck785; later on he described the fighting in his diary: 783 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 326–328. 784 The shots were aimed from the buildings by French soldiers taking cover there; the major called on them to surrender. Major Friedrich von Bockelmann was born in Hamburg on 4. 02. 1868. He was killed near Latour on 22. 08. 1914. AVDV, 21/1914; Zunehmer, 37–46, 489; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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I reached the southern edge of Latour and there, near the wall, I opened fire on an enemy column. A French rifle [a captured French infantry rifle – B.K.] proved very useful. Suddenly, from the right flank, exactly parallel to the road, the first shrapnel shells dropped, leaving the road deserted. We were next to the left exit from the village. Here the road, located about 500 m from the village, ran partly across a hill. The hill’s ridge seemed somewhat dangerous. I was just about to send a patrol when, sitting in a trench and looking at a map, I spotted two French cavalrymen riding down the hill at high speed. We were shooting at them when a salute of enemy infantry shells whizzed over our heads; the next thing we knew, they were firing from all directions. 20 paces in front of me, machine-gun shells hit the road. I still don’t know how I survived. Staying there without any cover or field of fire was suicide. The enemy’s numerous troops filled positions on the ridge of the hill, whereas I had only 20 soldiers. Therefore, we returned to the village. There, in the ravine, we climbed over a wall under heavy fire and lay down in the high oats. 600 m above us, the enemy was in position with three times as many troops and with machine guns as well. I would never have thought that such infernal fire was even possible. To add insult to injury, a machine gun was firing from a house on the right. I sent up a short prayer to heaven. Next I kneeled, loaded the gun and fired until the barrel was hot. An enemy shot tore the sights off my rifle. I fired 10 more times. Then I took the rifle off a dead soldier lying next to me. The enemy fire intensified considerably, and I heard that characteristic clapping sound [the sound of a machine-gun shell hitting a body – B.K.] more and more frequently, followed by a moan or cry. A wounded Pole was saying the rosary out loud until a second shot rendered him silent forever. I took in the situation. “Riflemen, count from the right!” In total, 6 soldiers. Hopeless bloodshed! We took cover. I felt as if someone had hit me with a stick on the throat. It was a horrible feeling. Later on I found out what had happened. Hopefully, the aorta is intact! “Withdraw from the positions!”. When I crawled back, I saw my own blood on the ground and my first impression was that of a shot buck! In the laundry room, a soldier dressed my wounds. Next, with two wounded soldiers, we went back. For a moment, I felt faint. Round a corner, 100 m in front of me I saw the Vizefeldwebel who immediately raised his pistol and shot at me, even though I waved my helmet at him. I feel sad about my beautiful watch which he shot! During the march, I came across Major Keller786, who had been shot in the foot and was being carried out by two NCOs. At the edge of the road, a soldier sat with his head completely covered in blood. Next, I met the 3rd and the 7th companies on their way to Virton. In a hurry, I squeezed Schulz’s hand. For the last time! Nobody knew where the dressing point was. Very close to Belmont we came under the shrapnel fire yet again787.

785 Second Lieutenant Eberhard Reinert, born in Groß Strehlitz (now Strzelce Opolskie in Upper Silesia, Opole Province), is recorded on the list of casualties of the 46th Infantry Regiment as heavily wounded. AVDV, 21/1914. 786 Major Alfred Keller, the commander of the I battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, born in Oberröblingen, Mansfelder Seekreis, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as lightly wounded. AVDV, 24/1914. 787 Zunehmer, 43.

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In this dramatic situation, command of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment was taken by aide-de-camp Second Lieutenant Richert. For the next two hours, the number of attacking French soldiers kept growing, and their attack reached the line between Basse-Virre and Gomery. Colonel Victor von Arent, the commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment heard the intense exchange of fire from Latour, and at 15h30 ordered the machine-gun companies and the 6th company to take up positions on a hill to the south of Bois des Loges forest. When the outlines of soldiers appeared in the distance, the machine-gun company opened fire without hesitation. Later, it turned out that it was a company of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment fighting in the vicinity of Latour. At 17h30, the Vizefeldwebel came back from a battlefield near Latour with the wounded, and described the dramatic situation of the III battalion. He said that the battalion’s colours had even been lost, which was not true788. In the fighting near Latour, the 46th Infantry Regiment suffered heavy casualties; among them were numerous soldiers of Polish origin, especially in the III battalion789. Meanwhile, the I battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, whose all four companies took positions on the hills near Bois de Bampont forest, came under heavy fire from the French artillery. The 1st and 4th companies located on the left flank of the I battalion willingly joined the III battalion’s attack on Latour. The soldiers from the 1st company managed to reach the road to the east of Chenois while the 4th company was involved in an attack on the left flank of the III battalion. Initially, the soldiers of the 3rd company opened fire at the columns of the French infantry from a distance of 800 m, inflicting heavy losses. However, soon they came under heavy fire from the French artillery, sending shrapnel shells from the top of the hill. Ordered by the regiment’s commander, they took cover in Bois de Bampot forest. When the firing stopped, the 3rd company launched an attack toward Chenois. NCO Gräff described these moments in the following way: (…) The enemy’s artillery is firing on the forest where we have found shelter. This is a critical situation for the 3rd company: shrapnel shells are exploding right above our heads which is a torture to the nerves, the rain of shells is falling noisily on the roof of leaves above us, driving into the tree trunks and the ground. It was all a trial of strength to us. Sergeant Krüger, positioned next to me, kept calming down the company all the time. His steadfast calm and fearlessness largely contributed to maintaining discipline. The first soldiers were shot. The first to be killed from my team were musketeers Laverenz790 and Milinski791. Brothers in arms! (…) 792.

788 Ibidem, 37–46, 489; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 789 AVDV, 21/1914; AVDV, 24/1914. 790 In his account, NCO Gräff erroneously spelled the soldier’s name as “Laverenz”. In fact it was musketeer Peter Lawrenz born in Riga, Latvia, the Russian Empire, recorded in the regiment’s list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 24/1914.

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The commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment realised how important it was for the 10th Infantry Division to hold Latour. In line with the order from the division’s commander, companies from the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment took up positions in Bois de Bampont forest (to the south-west of Belmont) and Bois des Loges forest (to the south of Belmont) thus supporting the division’s right flank. Further to the west was the attack zone of the twin 9th Infantry Division, yet its units were still engaged in fighting to the north of Virton, while the right flank of the 10th Infantry Division had no cover. In this situation, the commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment could not send the II battalion to support the III battalion in Latour. The poor situation of the regiments of the 9th Infantry Division to the north of Virton necessitated intervention on the part of the 10th Infantry Division. Therefore, at 17h00 the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade ordered the 46th Infantry Regiment to move the II battalion to the north-west of Bois de Bampont. It posed a threat to the rear of the French 8th Infantry Division to the south of Virton. However, the mission was difficult to complete without artillery support; the only battery located in the regiment’s attack zone was soon relocated to a different position. The only reserve at the disposal of the commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment was a pioneer company and a machine-gun company as support, involved in indirect fire793. On the French side, the decision to counterattack Latour was made by Colonel Lacotte after long deliberation; the first attack was led by Major Le Merdy, a commander of the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment. The fighting also involved soldiers from the 10th company of Captain Rungs and the 11th company of Captain Renaudin, from the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, the 1st company of Captain Lancelot and the I battalion of Major Wilbien of the 102nd Infantry Regiment and a machine-gun section commanded by Lieutenant Dandrieux. However, in the course of the assault, the troops suffered heavy casualties from German machine guns and remained in front of the positions of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, 500 m to the south of Latour. Then three companies of the I battalion of Major Lebaud from the 101st Infantry Regiment and Joubé’s 9th company from the III battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment served as support. However, after crossing hill 293, the fire from the

791 Musketeer Hermann Milin´ski, born in Stieglitz, Kreis Czarnikau (Siedlisko, Czarnków county), AVDV, 24/1914. 792 Zunehmer, 44–45; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 793 Zunehmer, 45–46.

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German infantry in front of Latour was so intense that the attack by the French infantry failed, while the decimated companies withdrew to the start position794. At 18h00, an aide-de-camp from the 19th Infantry Brigade arrived at the staff of the 46th Infantry Regiment to gain information about the developments on the right flanks of the brigade and division. The regiment’s commander sent a report to the brigade’s and division’s commanders that the regiment’s situation was good795. Following the failed counterattack on Latour launched by the combined forces of the 101st Infantry Regiment and the 102nd Infantry Regiment, General Edgard de Trentinian decided that a continued attack by the 13th Infantry Brigade would only lead to more casualties. There was also a real threat of the 13th Infantry Brigade being enveloped. Therefore, he decided to withdraw the units of the 7th Infantry Division to the south, to La Malmaison plateau, where he intended to regroup the troops796. In order to tactically support the 7th Infantry Division, at 16h00 the commander of the IV Army Corps sent the 5th battalion of the 317th Infantry Regiment to La Malmaison797. At 17h30, the 102nd Infantry Regiment received an order to retreat from the vicinity of Latour in the direction of Ruette. The retreat was covered by the 11th company of the III battalion and the regiment’s machine-gun section798. The units of the German 10th Infantry Division did not attack as expected. Consequently, Colonel Valentin, the commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, ordered the III battalion to retreat. Meanwhile, at 18h00 the commander of the 7th Infantry Division was approached by Major Leboiteux from the staff of the IV Army Corps who reported on the fighting of the 8th Infantry Division near Virton and carried an order for the 7th Infantry Division to take up a new position on the hills near La Malmaison799. While the division’s units were marching, an order arrived for them to head for Villers-le-Rond800. Meanwhile, preparations for the defence of Éthe were managed by Captain Durand, the commander of the division’s sapper company had to change horses twenty times, as they were hit one by one by splinters from German artillery shells. The specific battalions of the 14th Infantry Brigade suffered such high 794 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 326–331; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 795 Zunehmer, 47–49. 796 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 797 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 798 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD. 799 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 326–331. 800 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD.

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casualties that only ad hoc organised companies and platoons were able to defend themselves. Soon, three platoons of the 2nd company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Lavalade were ordered to march from Jeune Bois forest to Éthe and attack in the direction of the train station. This was an intrusive operation aimed at diverting the German troops’ attention from Jeune Bois, where 150 soldiers were to walk from Tuilerie to the edge of the forest; they were survivors from the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment equipped with three guns. Before the platoons of the 2nd company headed by Captain Lavalade reached the railroad embankment near the train station, they were decimated by fire from the German 47th Infantry Regiment and the artillery. Nevertheless, Captain Lavalade ordered the attack and, leading his troops, was soon shot in the heart. In the next two minutes, the 2nd company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment was annihilated. Only five soldiers withdrew to the rear, under the command of an NCO and the intrusive operation was a fiasco. In the meantime, the 8th company of the 103rd Infantry Regiment arrived at Éthe under the command of Captain Richard and was ordered to reinforce the defensive line to the south-west of Éthe in the vicinity of de la Scierie bridge. Soon, Captain Richard was heavily wounded, and only 10 soldiers survived from his company, who withdrew to Jeune Bois forest801. Meanwhile, the pressure exerted by the German 10th Infantry Division on Éthe was reduced by nine 75 mm field cannons from the 7th, 8th and 9th batteries of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. Initially, the artillery was commanded by Captain Maisons, the commander of the 8th battery. When he was wounded, Second Lieutenant Lhôte took over. The major goal of the French artillery was to approach Éthe from the north and to the western edge of Laclaireau forest, where the entrenched German 50th and 46th infantry regiments from the 10th Infantry Division were preparing to attack. A small unit fired along Rue Grande in the direction of Belmont, another one along Rue de la Station to the train station, to the north. The French units were plagued by a lack of ammunition, which was in the destroyed wagons along the road in Jeune Bois forest, because that area was under intense fire from German artillery. The situation was saved by volunteers who, under fire, brought shells to the artillery positions802. However, not all of 801 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,” 156–158; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 802 Among the volunteers was Duchamp de la Geneste, deputy physician from the 103rd Infantry Regiment, who ran 20 times to deliver shells taken from the destroyed wagons in Jeune Bois forest. In the light of the international rules of engagement at the time, which had been ratified by Germany, France and Belgium, medical personnel, protected by the Red Cross sign, could not take part in fighting but only help the wounded. Therefore, de la Geneste’s conduct was an act of blatant violation of those rules, which the French and the Belgian governments accused the Germans of during the war.

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them survived the dangerous mission – some of them were killed en route. The dedication of the shell-bearers saved the remains of the 14th Infantry Brigade from destruction803. Around 13h00, the commander of the defence section in Éthe managed to reorganize the resistance points so that the French groups were ready to repel attacks from the German infantry. However, due to the casualties among the officers and NCOs, combined with the annihilation of some of the subunits, the French lost their organisational structure. In these circumstances, the defence was extremely difficult to manage. What is more, some of the companies and platoons were separated by the river. On the northern edge of Jeune Bois was Colonel Cally with a part of his 103rd Infantry Regiment, Major Rondenay, the commander of the I battalion and Major Jouvin, the commander of the regiment’s II battalion. The edge of Jeune Bois forest was also filled by the 1st and 2nd companies from the I battalion and a machine-gun section under the command of Lieutenant Jonquères. The 2nd and 4th companies of the I battalion were positioned in Éthe. Two platoons from the 5th company of the II battalion were in Éthe while two more platoons had their positions on the southern bank of the Thon. The survivors from the 6th company defended Éthe. Having suffered casualties in Belmont, Lieutenant Petitjean’s platoon from that company was forced by the German 47th Infantry Regiment to retreat to Latour. A majority of the 8th company of the II battalion took up positions on the slopes of Baconveau and Jeune Bois forests and several platoons in Éthe. The III battalion of Major Vicq was in a dramatic condition as its companies suffered sustained heavy losses and were scattered by the divisions of the 10th Infantry Division. In disorderly groups, the soldiers filled positions in Éthe, in Mât forest and on the hills of Jeune Bois. General Henri-François Félineau, the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade and Colonel Drouot, the commander of the 104th Infantry Regiment, were in Éthe. Tuilerie was defended by 100 soldiers under the command of Captain Martin from the 1st company of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment. Several platoons from the 3rd and 4th companies took up positions in Éthe to man barricades and the fortified buildings. By order of the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, a unit of approximately 100 soldiers led by Major Forcinal, the commander of the I battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment, took up positions in the vicinity of the Belmont lumber yard. For the German troops trying to envelop the division’s positions, this would have been the first defensive line. At 14h00, Captain Peltier’s division, together with the remains of the

803 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe IV,“ 156–158.

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III battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment followed Major Macker’s order and attempted to retreat to the road to Latour and were destroyed in the process804. After 13h00, on the left flank of the German 10th Infantry Division the companies of the 47th Infantry Regiment systematically killed the survivors from the French infantry in Lefort forest805; in the vicinity of Laclaireau castle, units of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Henry were cut off. They were joined by the 7th company of the battalion with Captain Wibratte in command, conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Saint-Léger806. Around 14h30, Captain Bertin and approximately 100 soldiers from the 5th company of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment broke through stealthily to the west, from Lefort forest to Laclaireau forest807. Captain Bertin was therefore 1,800 m to the north of Éthe and approached the rear of the German 10th Infantry Division. On the eastern slope of hill 314, 200 m away from the western edge of Laclaireau forest, two batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment (including the horses of the regiment’s staff) and the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, which was fired in a southerly direction were located. Captain Bertin divided his troops into two parts. The first was to open fire on small units, the other one, under his command, was instructed to carry out bayonet attacks on German artillerymen. Unexpected and intense machine-gun fire was followed by a French infantry bayonet attack808. Captain von Puttkamer, the commander of the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, described the developments in his memoirs: Captain Peltner, the commander of the 12th company and I were to ride on horseback to the division’s commander when suddenly, [machine-gun –B.K.] shooting started less 804 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 331–332; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000; Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland. 805 Vogt, 11. 806 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 807 The attack by the French 5th company of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment took the units of the German 10th Infantry Division by surprise. The German officers were certain that they were being attacked by 1,000–2,000 French soldiers. This was undoubtedly the effect of surprise, and the fact that the attack was launched from Laclaireau forest, where it was difficult to see the enemy. Senftleben, 51–52. 808 The data provided by Major Alphons Grasset on the results of the attack by the 5th company commanded by Captain Bertin on two batteries of a field artillery regiment of the 10th Infantry Division are quite exaggerated. According to Captain Bertin’s account, a subunit was also assigned to shoot the horses drawing artillery carts in the head. According to Grasset, 90 German artillerymen and 300 horses were killed, while German sources claim that the casualties of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment during the entire battle of Éthe amounted to 74 soldiers and 140 horses, of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment – 55 soldiers and 91 horses. AVDV, 20/1914; AVDV, 21/1914; AVDV, 33/1914; AVDV, 59/1914; Angerstein and Schlemm, 195–203; Benary, 42.

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than 20 paces away from the edge of the forest [the eastern edge of Laclaireau forest – B.K.]. One bullet hit my friend Peltner809 on the head. He fell from his horse silently, drenched in blood. The limbers and horses [carts of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment – B.K.] galloped past us without riders. We had to act fast, get to the nearest battery as soon as possible: “The enemy’s infantry is behind us!” and further on to the artillery’s escort, which I ordered to head for the forest and to the right810.

In this volatile situation, General Robert Kosch, the commander of the 10th Infantry Division, kept his composure. The nearby pioneer company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles811 which were nearby were deployed to counterattack. Captain Sommé, an aide-de-camp of the 50th Infantry Regiment, described the developments: (…) the commander of our division remained calm. I can still hear his voice: “Gentlemen, on your horses!”. The artillery placed around the guns [the 56th Field Artillery Regiment – B.K.], the pioneers attacked the enemy [the other half of the pioneer company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion – B.K.] which was soon neutralised812.

The situation was saved by the guns of the 1st battery and several howitzers of the II battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment which changed direction of fire and struck the attacking French infantry. However, soon the shooting had to stop to ensure that their own infantry was not hurt. The fighting took place at very close distance; in the process, reserve Second Lieutenant Emil Rißmann813 from the 1st battery was killed, shot many times by the French infantry, together with 6 soldiers from the 1st Light Ammunition Column of the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. The artillerymen from the ammunition column who did not have rifles, shot from old-fashioned revolvers, the Reichsrevolver M1879. Cannoneer Gertig from that column shot 5 of the enemy and took several POWs with his revolver814. The surprise attack launched by the remains of the 5th company of the 104th Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain Bertin on the left flank of the German 10th Infantry Division did not bring the expected success. However, it led to the annihilation of the French 5th company, which lost 80 809 Captain Friedrich Peltner, the commander of the 12th company of the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Altwasser, Kreis Waldenburg (now Stary Zdrój, a residential district of Wałbrzych), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as killed in action. AVDV, 18/1914. 810 Gottberg, 49; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 811 Senftleben, 52. 812 Vogt, 17. 813 Reserve Second Lieutenant Emil Rißmann from the 1st battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Tauer, Kreis Glogau (now Turów, Dolnos´la˛skie, Głogów county and commune), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as killed in action. AVDV, 21/ 1914. 814 Angerstein and Schlemm, 19–20.

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soldiers. In the skirmish, Captain Bertin was wounded and barely 30 French soldiers were left fit for fighting. When they exhausted their own ammunition, they took the German short rifles with their ammunition and retreated to the west, to Bonlieu forest. There they made a last attempt to break through to their own lines, during which the unit was destroyed and held in captivity, while Captain Bertin was lethally shot in the head815. In this French attack on the positions of the artillery of the 10th Infantry Division, the heaviest horse losses were inflicted on the 20the Field Artillery Regiment. All the horses from the unit’s chiefs of staff, pack and saddle alike, ran around in the vicinity posing a considerable problem to the officers. Some of them were “adopted” by other units and others were found after a week. This was the case of the horse of Lieutenant Colonel Hasse, the commander of the ammunition column of the V Army Corps, named “Goldjunge”. The horse was being “taken care of” by an infantry captain, who was instructed firmly by the lieutenant colonel to return it816. At 14h00, all the buildings in Éthe were ablaze, and the companies of the German 46th and 50th Infantry Regiments from the 10th Infantry Division gradually broke through to the village. Despite being outnumbered by the enemy, the French infantrymen continued to resist and shoot their machine guns. French field guns fired along the streets, to the north. Buildings next to the bridge in Belmont hosted a field hospital, where Major Chon (2nd class physician) and Major Lévêque (physician’s assistant) from the 14th Hussars Regiment assisted the wounded soldiers, French and German alike. However, at 16h00 the hospital’s buildings were set on fire817. The defence of the French 7th Infantry Division in the northern part of Éthe, relying on numerous barricades, was efficient enough to stop enemy companies 815 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 333–334; According to the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division, Captain Bertin – the commander of the 5th company of the II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment – was wounded and taken prisoner of war. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 235. 816 Benary, 43. 817 According to Major Alphonse Grasset, when the field hospital of the 7th Infantry Division near the bridge in Belmont was captured, the wounded German soldiers were evacuated from the hospital in horse-drawn ambulances, while the French wounded, together with the physicians and paramedics were marched out of Belmont and shot. Bearing in mind the earlier inaccuracies and confabulations of Grasset about German soldiers in the battle, one should treat the account of wounded POWs being shot by the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division with extreme caution. The French major published his account in an article in 1923. On the other hand, in his book, published in Paris in 1927, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, General Edgard de Trentinian described Major Chon (2nd class physician) and Major Lévêque (1st class physician’s assistant) from the 14th Hussar Regiment as missing. 14e régiment de hussards (2. 08. 1914–1. 04. 1917), 26 N 898/21, CRH, SHD; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 334; Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 227.

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from the 50th and 47th Infantry Regiments even if the defenders’ ammunition, both for guns and the artillery, was almost exhausted. Around 16h00, a company of the 47th Infantry Regiment managed to capture the ruins of the train station building. At 17h00, Belmont and the western part of Éthe were completely occupied by the 47th Infantry Regiment. In the northern, eastern and southern parts of Éthe, subunits of the French 7th Infantry Division were still putting up strong resistance. However, in the northern and eastern sections of the defence, German companies from the 47th and 50th Infantry Regiments broke through the French positions in several places. In the rear of the left flank of the 47th Infantry Regiment, in Lefort forest and Laclaireau castle, a unit of the French II battalion of the 104th Infantry Regiment remained. Between Belmont, Bois des Loges forest and Latour, three battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment were placed; the unit’s patrols started to enter Jeune Bois forest where at that time, only two decimated French infantry companies were stationed. However, Colonel Victor von Arent, the commander of the German 46th Infantry Regiment, decided against attacking Jeune Bois forest, which was of key importance to the plight of the French troops in Éthe. This was because capturing Jeune Bois, with the two roads running from Éthe to the south, involved enveloping the remains of the 14th Infantry Brigade and the inevitable destruction thereof 818. After 17h30, on the right flank of the V Army Corps, where the 9th Infantry Division was fighting near Virton, the situation remained undetermined, because the French 8th Infantry Division put up strong resistance. When the 46th Infantry Regiment reached its positions near Latour, the right flank of the 10th Infantry Division was exposed and, theoretically, the French troops could have attacked its rear from Virton. So, General Robert Kosch decided to put a stop to the 46th Infantry Regiment’s attack in the direction of the south. Consequently, pursuit of the defeated French 7th Infantry Division was ceased and an opportunity to cut off Éthe wasted. At any time, the 10th Infantry Division could have been ordered by the staff of the V Army Corps to attack Virton to reinforce the 9th Infantry Division. In these circumstances, General Robert Kosch’s decision to stop the 10th Infantry Division’s assault and send it to Virton would have been tactically viable. However, in these circumstances the commander’s order to withdraw the 10th Infantry Division to the north of Éthe, i. e. to the attack positions, was irrational, because it offered the French freedom of action near Virton and the possible withdrawal of the decimated units of the 7th Infantry Division from Éthe. At 19h00, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division was approached by General Hermann von Strantz, the commander of the V Army Corps

818 Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 334–337; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000; Plan du village d’Éthe, in Schmitz and Nieuwland.

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who approved of General Robert Kosch’s decision to withdraw the 10th Infantry Division to the attack position819. Providing medical aid to such a large number of wounded soldiers and their evacuation to the rear posed a considerable threat to the medical services of the 10th Infantry Division and the physicians of the V Army Corps. The division’s main dressing point was located in a deep ravine to the south of the summit of hill 314, which was meant to provide shelter from the French artillery fire. Among the physicians who helped the wounded was Oberarzt820 Hans Brumby821 from the I battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, hit by a splinter of a French shell in the eye. When his serious wound was dressed he continued assisting soldiers in need, gaining the respect of the medical personnel and the wounded822. Among the wounded soldiers in the dressing point was reserve Lieutenant Rudolf Wolf 823 from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment who wrote about it in his memoirs: It was getting dark and, in the company of several infantrymen, I had to go to the main dressing point – unfortunately, I needed to walk there because the physician had taken my horses. The area was littered with dead soldiers and horses, and damaged equipment. However, soon this sad view was obliterated by the dark of the night. The dressing point, located in a yard in front of a factory, was crowded. A young physician was in charge, and the paramedics did whatever they could. However, there were too many

819 The retreat of the German 10th Infantry Division in the evening of 22 August 1914 was evidence for the French that their 7th Infantry Division had won the battle of Éthe. This opinion was propagated in the Interwar period by Major Alphonse Grasset, a French participant of the battle, in the venerable magazine “Revue Militaire Francaise”. However, the truth was very different, as may be confirmed by the casualties, amounting to 1/3 of the military resources of the French 7th Infantry Division, the division’s positions having been broken through, German troops crossing the Thon, the French losing Belmont and the majority of Éthe, and the resulting night retreat of the survivors of the French 14th Infantry Brigade from Éthe. Notably, General Robert Kosch did not order his division to retreat, not due to the stubborn defence on the part of the French 7th Infantry Division but because of the 9th Infantry Division making no progress near Virton. What is more, the German commander perhaps exercised too much caution. On the other hand, he did not disregard his soldiers’ lives, unlike the French, who in August 1914 fought according to the effective tactical doctrine – attack at any price and maintain the highest rate of attack. Loosch, Das Königl, 27–28; Pascal-Marie-Henri Lucas, Rozwój mys´li taktycznej we Francji i w Niemczech podczas wojny 1914–1918 r., translated by Jerzy Biernacki, (Warszawa: Tetragon, 2013), 22– 24. 820 In the German army in 1914, the military rank of an Oberarzt was an equivalent of a lieutenant. 821 Oberarzt Hans Brumby, doctor of the I squad of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Liebenwerda, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 21/ 1914. 822 Angerstein and Schlemm, 18. 823 Reserve Lieutenant Rudolf Wolf from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Nieder Stephansdorf (now Szczepanów, Dolnos´la˛skie, S´roda S´la˛ska county and commune), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as lightly wounded. AVDV, 33/1914.

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wounded men. Consequently, the belief was that the enemy would be victorious and that possibly the dressing point would be captured and we would be taken prisoners of war. Therefore, we were asked to hand over our guns, which I stoutly refused to do. I got a shot of morphine and fell asleep so deeply that I failed to notice that an infantry officer lying next to me died during the night from his wounds. In the morning, on a sunny Sunday [23 August – B.K.] it turned out that the physicians were all wrong, and that our troops had been very successful. Again, I saw reserve Lieutenant Teichmann824 who was brought next to me on stretchers. Though he was still alive, he was totally distracted and I could not communicate with him. At my request, a physician immediately took care of him. To no avail. Shortly afterwards my good colleague died. In the afternoon, I was dressed very neatly. As I had lost lots of blood, I was meant to stay put. However, the moans and suffering of the numerous wounded and dying soldiers made staying there unbearable. Transport of the wounded was to be organized. A Belgian two-wheeled cart was brought and filled with the wounded, including Second Lieutenant Oelsner825, aidede-camp of a battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment. At the same time, Second Lieutenant Latrille (wounded in the nose) arrived on Oelsner’s horse, while 15–20 lightly wounded soldiers went on foot. However, Oelsner had another horse, which he gave to me. Following a serious conversation, the head physician relented and allowed me to ride the horse at my own risk. Our intention was to travel to Vance and Alron. (…) Shortly before midnight, we reached Vance, where we stayed for the night (…). The following morning we continued to Arlon where I parted with my companions. The field hospital in Arlon was already full. However, in the train station there was a train full of the wounded, which was about to leave for Trier. I quickly hopped on it. We reached Trier in the evening but there were no free beds there, either. A steamship took me down the Moselle to Koblenz. I will never forget the cruise in the beautiful weather. Whenever the steamship bearing a red cross passed a village or town, the bells would toll and countless boats brought us large amounts of wine and other gifts. The enthusiasm was enormous. Everyone wanted to help the wounded. In Koblenz, I was accommodated in St. Martin’s shelter. I think of the doctors, paramedics and young nurses with gratitude as they did their best to make the stay in the field hospital more pleasant. Soon, I overcame the weakness, the wounds looked good, I could travel and, with the support of the head physician, I was allowed to go home and be in the care of a field hospital in Neumarkt in Silesia. Although I could not move either hand, the trip was nicer than I could have expected. It was moving how all the other passengers, young and old, men and women, tried to make the trip pleasant for me. Back then, I felt that our German nation was a nation of brothers, a society sharing the same fate826.

Among the wounded soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division were many Poles. Oberarzt Tadeusz Szulc, a physician of Polish origin, was seconded to de Bar farm (next to the road from Éthe to Buzenol, to the north of hill 314) together with the

824 Reserve Lieutenant Walter Teichmann from the staff of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, born in Berlin, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 59/1914. 825 Second Lieutenant Oelsner. 826 Reserve Lieutenant Wolff ’s account of the battle of Éthe, in Benary, 51–52.

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remaining doctors from the Field Hospital no. 1 of the V Army Corps to a temporary dressing point. He described the developments in his memoirs: When, after a few hours’ slow walk, we reached the destination (…) and marched onto the farm, we saw a huge square yard surrounded on all sides by farm buildings, with a countless number of bandaged wounded soldiers; more soldiers were inside the buildings (…). Among them were also Poles. I remember a young Polish soldier with a German family name, heavily wounded, who died after a few days. He lived in Poznan´ in Nowy Rynek. He was happy to hear me whispering in Polish to him. But it did not last long because, having sent back the lightly wounded with a French doctor, and the heavily wounded slightly later, we soon closed down our “business” as instructed (…)827.

Meanwhile the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles took up their positions on the eastern flank of the 10th Infantry Division, in the forest to the north of hill 314 but were not deployed. Therefore, General Robert Kosch ordered the mounted rifles to establish communication with the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) whose operation zone ran to the left of the 10th Infantry Division828. Simultaneously, reconnaissance was to be carried out to the south-east of Éthe to find out if large numbers of French troops were still to the north of Gomery. In order to complete a task ordered by the division’s commander, Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels instructed his regiment to march to the north-east, through de Bar farm, and continue through Bois de Saint-Léger forest to Saint-Léger. Immediately, an order was given for the mounted rifles to ride through the dense forest in the designated direction. When they left de Bar farm, the regiment’s column turned to the east, crossed the railroad track, entered Bois de Saint-Léger and later on the road to Saint-Léger which ran to the east, up a steep ravine. In the case of an unexpected French attack, the regiment of mounted rifles would have been trapped, as there was no room for manoeuvre. Soon, the column reached the location where Second Lieutenant Teßler’s patrol was fighting enemy troops. A dead French dragoon officer lay in the road, impaled on the steel head of a 827 “Pierwsza wojna s´wiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918,” 172. 828 In his order to the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, General Robert Kosch stated at 18h00 “(…) The Regiment is to remain on the left flank of the division, maintaining contact with the XIII Corps”. The phrase “maintaining contact” raises considerable doubt, because on 22 August by 18h00, despite numerous attempts, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles did not manage to establish communications with the Württemberg corps. It remains unclear if the commander of the 10th Infantry Division did not know (as late as at 18h00) that there was no communication with the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg). Or perhaps it stemmed from lack of precision on the part of the officer of the staff of the 10th Infantry Division who worded the order? One way or another, the commander of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was tactically aware of no communications with the Württemberg corps. So, in line with the division’s order, he intended to establish communications. Order from General Robert Kosch, the commander of the 10th Infantry Division, for the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles of 22 August 1914, at 18h00, in Senftleben, 52.

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Prussian lance, accompanied by three of his soldiers. Riding in a single file down a path, the mounted rifles painstakingly climbed the steep slope and finally reached du Taillis farm. By order of the regiment’s commander, the designated unit of reserve Second Lieutenant Eberhard Wendorff secured the farm and reported that the enemy’s troops were not present. The farmer’s 7-year-old son served as a guide and showed the way. When they reached Saint-Léger it turned out that many wounded French soldiers were accommodated there, together with a patrol of several cavalrymen from the 14th Uhlan Regiment of the 34th Infantry Division829. They had lost their way during the day and decided to stop for the night. The King’s mounted rifles, exhausted after a forced march and two days without sleep, were ordered to seek accommodation. During a breakneck night march in difficult terrain, 120 cavalrymen lost their way and became detached from the regiment. Among them was the standard bearer with the standard. In the lost group of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was Second Lieutenant Walther Iffland who provided an account of the events: Due to the darkness, right in front of me, the column marched into a wire abatis. To all the riders behind it meant a stoppage and separating from the part of the regiment in front of us. There were many junctions on the road and, riding behind, we lost our way. Our group consisted of 120 horsemen, among them Holtz, Brendel, Friedrich and I. Having no idea of the regiment’s intentions, we were left to our own devices. We also reached St. Léger but the regiment was not there. The village was very big and, as it turned out later, the regiment had set up camp at the other end of it. Exhausted beyond belief, not surprisingly we got off the horses – we had not slept for 48 hours. We had three hours before hitting the road again to join the regiment. Unfortunately, sleep was out of the question as shots were heard at regular intervals. Another reason why we could not sleep was hunger. Our stomachs rumbled noisily. Sadly, we had nothing to offer them830.

Meanwhile, at 17h30, the 2nd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was instructed to change firing position and to march to the western side of the road running towards Éthe. It was the previous firing position of the II battalion of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment which, having joined the 46th Infantry Regiment, was supporting an attack near Bois des Loges forest and, further on, to the southwest831.

829 The 34th Infantry Division was at that time a part of the XVI Army Corps headquartered in Metz. 830 During a march of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles in the difficult and forested terrain the subunits were mixed. On the following day, there were considerable shortages in the squads. Alarming gossip spread that the regiment had been scattered, especially as the standardbearer was missing. Second Lieutenant Walther Iffland’s account of the operations of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles from 22–23 August 1914, in Senftleben, 54. 831 Benary, 43.

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At 18h40, the staff of the 46th Infantry Regiment received an order to retreat to hill 300 to the north of Belmont. Second Lieutenant Ulrich delivered the retreat order to the III battalion of the regiment in Latour. Soon the French infantry, in the positions opposite, started to leave them and marched to the south. When the intense firing of the French infantry stopped, the officers and NCOs from the III battalion could rearrange the troops and the paramedics could evacuate the wounded to dressing points. The companies of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, the southernmost units of the 10th Infantry Division, did not withdraw to hill 300 before 21h00 where they joined the regiment. In the eyes of the soldiers who did not know the broader context of the battle, it was a retreat, despite their full devotion and fighting effectiveness. However, the soldiers from these companies considered themselves victorious832. In the evening, the 5th and 6th batteries of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment also received an order to retreat; when the entire regiment took its positions on the edge of the forest, 1 km to the north of Belmont, at 19h30 its positions were fired on by shrapnel shells from the west by the French artillery833. The companies of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment withdrew in columns to a hill north of Éthe. There, the soldiers dug in, because a French counter-strike was expected834. The 50th Infantry Regiment withdrew through Belmont; the I and III battalions from the 47th Infantry Regiment withdrew from a section of Laclaireau stream. The soldiers from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the division’s reserve, took up positions behind the 46th Infantry Regiment. In order to cover the infantry’s retreat, the German artillery opened mass fire on Éthe which continued for 15 minutes. The most affected were the 1st, 9th and 10th companies of the 50th Infantry Regiment. The soldiers were exhausted from the intense fighting; they did not receive warm food because the field kitchens arrived after a considerable delay. When the soldiers of the 47th Infantry Regiment saw the state of their comrades from the 50th Infantry Regiment, allegedly they said: “50th Regiment, what did they [the French – B.K.] do to you?”835. Oneyear volunteer, Bodsch from the 50th Infantry Regiment, recalled: The evening progressed and darkness descended as if intending to cover all this suffering. The paramedics were busy. The cries for help in the dark instilled fear; not all the wounded had been attended to. Some of us gave up on the night rest and used tent material to bring their wounded comrades to the dressing point. Water was brought from the nearby Thon stream in cooking vessels. Then, I was struck by the extraordinary silence at the entrance to the village. On another day, stories were told that the soldiers

832 833 834 835

Zunehmer, 49–50. Angerstein and Schlemm, 20. Loosch, Das Königl, 28. Vogt, 12, 17.

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who went to fetch water without rifles were killed by the village inhabitants. Meanwhile, wounded enemies and friends lay next to each other836.

Ultimately, the units of the German 10th Infantry Division dug in first on the hills in the northern part of the Thon valley, to the north of Belmont and Éthe. General Robert Kosch received an order from the commander of the V Army Corps to hold his position at any cost. The division’s line of defence was formed from left to right by the I battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, the III battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, the I and III battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment and the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment (the western edge of Laclaireau forest). At the request of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, one small unit of the 4th battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment marched through the forest to Laclaireau farm and took up a firing position there837. At night, on the battlefield, the wounded moaned loudly and cried for paramedics. Opposite, the buildings in Éthe were set on fire by artillery. Although it was summertime, it was very cold. All night long, the soldiers from the division’s medical company collected the wounded and transported them to the dressing points. Among the wounded, reserve Second Lieutenant Schäffter found several French soldiers who were pretending to be dead and took them prisoner. At the same time, the remains of the French 5th company of the 104th Infantry Regiment broke through to the rear of the German 10th Infantry Division and nearly created panic. What is more, two horses in a cart transporting the wounded from the III battalion were killed. At the dressing point of the medical company of the 10th Infantry Division, located in de Bar farm 4 km to the north of Éthe, the atmosphere in the late afternoon was also nervous because of lack of news about the course of the fighting838. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Waldmann from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment received an order from General Robert Kosch to leave at 22h00 and lead a patrol to the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment and bring that unit to the division’s firing position. The patrol lost its way several times, and did not find the chiefs of staff of the foot artillery regiment until 4h00, and ultimately carried out the order from the division’s staff. The regiment’s commander returned with Lieutenant Waldmann and on 23 August at 6h00 he reported to General Oskar Freiherr von Watter that the mission had been completed. Lieutenant Waldmann was praised by the commander of the 10th Artillery Brigade and the division’s commander for conducting the mission efficiently. The commander of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment allocated Lieutenant Waldmann to the regiment’s staff to replace re-

836 Vogt, 19. 837 Benary, 42. 838 Loosch, Das Königl, 28.

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serve Second Lieutenant Walter Teichmann who died from his wounds. Lieutenant Waldmann’s wounded orderly was replaced by a new one: A horse ride in the night had a funny ending when the former orderly of reserve Second Lieutenant Teichmann suddenly approached me to replace my wounded orderly and said in broken German “Gefreiter Nowicki reporting to Lieutenant Waldmann, seconded as an orderly!”. When I asked what he did before, he answered quickly: “I was a Second Lieutenant’s orderly but he is dead now”. This brave Pole stayed with me until 1917 when he was appointed forager839 in my battery of the 600th Field Artillery Regiment840.

The retreat of the German 10th Infantry Division was a stroke of luck, and the only chance of salvation for the remains of the French 14th Infantry Brigade in Éthe. It was more than certain that on the next day, the Germans would resume the offensive. Consequently, General Henri-François Félineau issued an order at 20h00 to retreat immediately. A local man served as a guide in this risky march from Éthe through the woods to Tuilerie, the forest in Baconveau to the south to Gomery, Ruette, Malmaison, Allondrelle, Charency up to Vezin. At the general’s command, special precautionary measures were taken to conceal the retreat. The soldiers spread horse dung along the road from Éthe to Tuilerie, they covered the carts’ wheels with straw and the horses’ hooves with cloth, while the metal elements of the equipment were strapped down841. The retreat started at 20h30, soon after nightfall. In the spearhead was a platoon under the command of Lieutenant Ricar from the 11th company of the 104th Infantry Regiment followed by eight cannons from the 7th and 8th batteries with wagons, the supply and ammunition carts of the 103rd and 104th Infantry Regiment, cavalrymen without horses and the infantry’s horses. The wounded who could not walk were transported on carts and horses. Next, followed the lightly wounded, General Félineau with his staff, Colonel Drouot, communication officers and the core brigade’s infantry represented by barely 500 people842. A dedicated infantry unit represented the rearguard accompanied by cavalrymen leading the horses on foot – the remains of four squadrons of the 14th Hussars Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Hubin. Due to a lack of horsedrawn carts, it was not possible to evacuate four units of the destroyed 9th battery. On the other hand, the units of the 7th and 8th batteries were complete. Soldiers from the last barricade posts left Éthe at 21h30 without contact with the enemy. The column reached Gomery at 22h00 and joined soldiers from two companies decimated in Jeune Bois forest. At dawn on 23 August, the remains of 839 840 841 842

Forager: a soldier in charge of providing forage for the horses. Benary, 49. 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD. Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 132.

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Map 12. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division during the battle of Éthe, 22 August 1914 at 22h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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the 14th Infantry Brigade joined the main troops of the 7th Infantry Division in Vezin843. *** In the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914, the French 7th Infantry Division suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the serious losses inflicted by the German 10th Infantry Division, the unit lost its fighting potential and was forced to retreat. At the same time, it was the first clash of the French and German tactical and operational doctrines. Undoubtedly, the training and equipment made the soldiers from the 10th Infantry Division much better prepared than the French troops. However, several bad decisions were made both on the level of the staff of the German V Army Corps and the staff of the 10th Infantry Division. To a large extent, the mistakes stemmed from lack of experience in the staff work in a modern war and from nonchalance as if it were peacetime manoeuvres. A case in point was General Robert Kosch appointing hill 314 as the quarters of the staff of the 10th Infantry Division; the hill was exposed to the French artillery’s fire. During the battle, a considerable problem was posed by lack of communication between the V Army Corps and the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) operating on the left. This stemmed mostly from the difficult terrain of the fighting. The 1st King’s Mounted Rifles made many attempts to establish communication. In this case, lack of communication contributed to fratricidal fire when the Poznan´ 20th Field Artillery Regiment from the 10th Infantry Division shot at the 123rd Infantry Regiment (Württemberg), inflicting casualties844. During the fighting in Éthe and Belmont, the French artillery fired not only the first line units but also the rear of the attacking troops. Due to a limited area of the initial positions of the Poznan´ division, its specific units were crammed around the top of hill 314. This concentration of troops and movement of couriers to and from the division’s staff with reports drew attention of the French artillery observers and, consequently, triggered off fire from the French field cannons. The casualties of the 10th Infantry Division in the battles of Éthe and Belmont on 22 August 1914 were very serious, the biggest were inflicted on the 50th In843 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD; Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V,” 337–341. 844 In the fighting on 22 August 1914, lost 7 officers from the 123rd Infantry Regiment (Württemberg) were killed and 18 wounded, 73 NCOs and privates were killed and 510 wounded, 37 NCOs and privates were missing. It is hard to say how many casualties were inflicted by the fire of the German 20th Field Artillery Regiment. Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers, Kindle: Location 4530.

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fantry Regiment. After the battle, the casualties were estimated at 806 soldiers including 137 of Polish origin. By the end of the war, out of 806 soldiers, the fate of nearly 100 was identified, previously believed to be missing or killed. Meanwhile some of them returned to their respective regiments or were taken over by other units845. 13 officers from the officer corps of the 50th Infantry Regiment were killed and 19 were wounded in the battle i. e. in total the casualties among the officers amounted to 32 people. Assuming that in the 50th Infantry Regiment, the officers’ fighting condition following mobilisation amounted to 73 people, the unit lost 44% of its officer corps. Due to these considerable losses, the unit lost temporarily its fighting capacity. The data must have shocked the commanders in the 10th Infantry Division as well as the staff of the V Army Corps. In the 50th Infantry Regiment, the casualties were equally high among the NCOs and privates; they amounted to 261 killed and 425 wounded soldiers (including 1/4 of lightly wounded). In the 50th Infantry Regiment, out of 274 killed soldiers, 43 died from the wounds. Assuming that the regiment’s fighting condition after mobilisation amounted to 2,993 soldiers, the regiment’s losses in the battle equalled 24% of the fighting condition. As a result of the French field artillery’s fire, the 50th Infantry Regiment lost also 2 ammunition carts, 3 field kitchens and 10 horses846. Among the missing soldiers of Polish nationality from the 50th Infantry Regiment missing after the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914 was musketeer Antoni Skorupka847 from the 1st company of the I battalion, born in Kosowo near

845 In August 1914, during the attack of German troops on Belgium and France, it was common practice to take over missing (lost) soldiers from other units. Most frequently, these “adopted” soldiers would not go back to their original units while their fate could often be traced several years after the war. This unwelcome phenomenon stemmed from chronic lack of replenishment in the German army following the first battles in August 1914. In the case of the 50th Infantry Regiment and the battle of Éthe, this scenario is confirmed by the AVDV. It was also confirmed by the then physician Wojciech Jacobson from the 49th Infantry Regiment. Wojciech Jacobson, Z Armja˛ Klucka na Paryz˙. Wspomnienia lekarza Polaka. Edition: Bartosz Kruszyn´ski (Os´wie˛cim: Napoleon V, 2015), 36–37. 846 The staff of the 50th Infantry Regiment was the only regiment of the 10th Infantry Division which sent to Berlin a separate list of casualties after the battle of Éthe. The fate of the subsequent soldiers from the 50th Infantry Regiment, published on the original list of casualties of the battle of Éthe, were explained in the AVDV until 1919. As a result of a painstaking analysis of the AVDV, I recreated a list of casualties of the 50th Infantry Regiment in the first battle. AVDV, 18/1914; AVDV, 26/1914; AVDV, 45/1914; AVDV, 62/1914; AVDV, 115/1914; AVDV, 134/1914; AVDV, 142/1914; AVDV, 179/1914; AVDV, 194/1914; AVDV, 179/1914; AVDV, 273/1914; AVDV, 361/1915; AVDV, 468/1915; AVDV, 488/1914; AVDV, 496/1915; AVDV, 515/1915; AVDV, 627/1916; AVDV, 656/1916; AVDV, 676/1915; AVDV, 871/1916; AVDV, 1237/1916; AVDV, 1297/1916; AVDV, 1404/1917; AVDV, 1446/ 1917; AVDV, 1555/1917; AVDV, 2473/1919. 847 AVDV, 18/1914.

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Gostyn´ (Province of Posen). His brother Wawrzyniec reminisced about his late brother: This is how my brother’s Antoni’s sad courtship ended: instead of going to bed with Antosia, he went – hacked with bullets – to sleep to the ground, a foreign ground, for a foreign cause. The body was never found besides, who would care? In Stary Gostyn´, the parents had his name carved on the family gravestone and on the table of the fallen soldiers on a monument in Kosowo. In the old family house, in a room upstairs there is still a photograph of a young man with daring eyes, a disdainfully curled lower lip, wearing a Prussian uniform who died for Emperor Wilhelm II in 1914848.

On 22 August, the casualties of the officer corps of the 46th Infantry Regiment included 2 killed and 5 wounded soldiers plus 24 killed and 133 wounded NCOs and privates. Interestingly, in that regiment the number of the missing in action was very high – 69 soldiers. Therefore, the total losses of the 46th Infantry Regiment in the battle of Éthe amounted to 235 soldiers including 128 of Polis nationality849. On that day, 6 officers from the 47th Infantry Regiment were killed: Captain Eberhardt Koch – a commander of the 3rd company, Captain Heinrich Kleinwachter – a commander of the 10th company, Lieutenant Franz Ausner – a commander of the 12th company, Captain Kurt Hoffmann – a commander of the Machine-Gun Company, reserve Second Lieutenant Robert Mittelstädt and reserve Second Lieutenant Paul Schmiedeberg – a commander of a platoon in the 11th company850. In addition, 50 NCOs and privates were killed, 5 officers and 161 NCOs and privates were wounded while 16 soldiers were missing. The regiment’s casualties totalled to 238 soldiers including 79 of Polish nationality851. In the battle of Éthe, the casualties of the 6th Grenadier Regiment were also serious including the unit’s commander Lieutenant Colonel Otto Heyn (he was with the regiment barely 20 days), Captain Friedrich Peltner – a commander of the 12th company and Lieutenant Reinhold Kuhnke – the regiment’s aide-decamp. Nine NCOs and privates of the regiment were killed and 52 wounded. Therefore, the total casualties of the 6th Grenadier Regiment at Éthe amounted to 63 soldiers including 20 Poles852. The casualties in the 56th Field Artillery Regiment amounted to 3 killed officers (including reserve Second Lieutenant Emil Kitzmann) as well as 15 NCOs 848 Wawrzyniec Skorupka, Moje morgi i katorgi: 1914–1967 (Poznan´: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1970), 34. 849 AVDV, 20/1914; AVDV, 21b/1914; AVDV, 24/1914. The authors of the regiment’s ledger suggest that the number of 69 missing soldiers includes mostly deserters. Zunehmer, 49. 850 AVDV, 24/1914; AVDV, 26/1914. 851 AVDV, 26/1914; Loosch, Das Königl, 31. 852 AVDV, 21/1914; List of casualties of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in 1914–1918, in Gottberg, 609–681.

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and privates, 6 wounded officers (including Major Wilhelm Fritsch – a commander of the I Squad, Oberartz Hans Brumby – a physician of the I Squad Captain Kurt Berger – a commander of the 2nd battery) and 43 other soldiers plus 7 soldiers missing. Therefore, the total losses of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment suffered in the battle of Éthe amounted to 74 soldiers including 20 Poles. Moreover, 66 horses were killed, 40 were wounded and 34 missing so in total the regiment lost 140 horses853. Unit of the 10th Infantry Division Division’s staff 6th Grenadier Regiment

Unit’s casualties 5 63

Including Poles 3 20

47th Infantry Regiment 50th Infantry Regiment

238 718

79 137

46th Infantry Regiment 20th Field Artillery Regiment

233 52

128 25

56th Field Artillery Regiment 1st King’s Mounted Rifles

74 20

20 –

71

12

8

4

2nd and 3rd Field Pioneer Companies 5th Pioneer Battalion 2nd Sanitary Company

1482 428 Table. Casualties of the 10 Infantry Division in the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914. AVDV, 20/1914; AVDV, 21/1914; AVDV, 24/1914; AVDV, 26/1914; AVDV, 33/1914; AVDV, 37/ 1914; AVDV, 59/1914; Zunehmer, 49; Koch, Das Niederschlesische, 45–48; Loosch, Das Königl, 31; Angerstein and Schlemm, 195–203; Gottberg, 609–681.

The 20th Field Artillery Regiment’s casualties included reserve Lieutenant Walter Teichmann854 and head of the regiment’s orchestra, Musikmeister Ernst Rehfled855 and his 2 subordinates. Two officers were wounded: Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Schleicher856 and reserve Lieutenant Rudolf Wolf 857. As for the NCOs and privates, 32 were wounded and 14 were missing. The total casualties of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment in the battle of Éthe amounted to 52 soldiers including 25 Poles. Furthermore, 91 horses went missing, among them all the horses of the regiment’s staff 858.

853 AVDV, 21/1914; List of casualties of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment in 1914–1918, in Angerstein and Schlemm, 195–203. 854 AVDV, 59/1914. 855 AVDV, 20/1914. 856 AVDV, 20/1914. 857 AVDV, 33/1914. 858 Benary, 45; AVDV, 33/1914.

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The 1st King’s Mounted Rifles lost 4 soldiers: deputy reserve Wachtmeister Kurt von Jouanne, NCO Fischer from the 4th squadron, NCO Frost and the King’s riflemen Krüger from the 2nd squadron; 3 officers and 4 privates were wounded while 9 soldiers were declared missing. The total losses of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles in the battle of Éthe amounted to 20 soldiers; neither of them was a Pole. The regiment lost 27 horses which were either killed or missing859. In the 2nd company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion, 6 soldiers were killed and the wounded included an officer, 11 NCOs and privates while 13 soldiers were missing. The 3rd company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion lost 6 soldiers, 2 were wounded (including the heavily wounded Oberarzt der Reserve, Dr George Wiedemann), 29 wounded NCOs and privates plus 6 missing soldiers. Consequently, the total losses of the 5th Pioneer Battalion in the battle of Éthe amounted to 71 soldiers including 12 Poles860. The high casualties came as a shock to the staff officers from the 10th Infantry Division, especially those taking part in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). A question arose: if that was the first contact with the French troops, what would subsequent fighting be like?861. The most affected units of the French 7th Infantry Division included the 14th Infantry Brigade which defended Éthe with enormous devotion. In the 103rd Infantry Regiment, the casualties included 29 officers and 1,760 NCOs and privates; the 104th Infantry Regiment lost 25 officers and 1,689 other soldiers. The situation was equally dramatic in the 13th Infantry Brigade where the 101st Infantry Regiment was decimated. The 102nd Infantry Regiment lost more than 50% of its soldiers. The French 26th Field Artillery Regiment lost 4 officers who were either wounded or taken prisoner and 10 NCOs and 40 other soldiers: killed, wounded and missing, in total 54 soldiers. The 2nd battery of the regiment lost 4 units which were abandoned862. When the 14th Hussars Regiment withdrew from Éthe, there were only 194 cavalrymen (including 14 officers) and 180 horses. The regiment’s casualties on 22 August 1914 amounted to 458 soldiers (including 18 officers) and 440 horses863. At Latour, the units of the 13th Infantry Brigade supported the 44th Field Artillery Regiment as a unit at the disposal of the IV Army Corps. On 22 and 23

859 Many of the 9 missing soldiers returned after a few days to the regiment. Senftleben, 55. 860 Koch, Das Niederschlesische, 45–48; AVDV, 37/1914. 861 Steven D. Jackman, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Close Control and “Old Prussian Drill” in German Offensive Infantry Tactics, 1871–1914,” The Journal of Military History, no. 68 (2004): 73–104. 862 Historique du 26e Régiment, 8. 863 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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August 1914, the 44th Field Artillery Regiment was left with 2 dead soldiers, 20 wounded, 3 missing and 13 killed horses864. The casualties in the French 7th Infantry Division which made an attempt to stop the German 10th Infantry Division, lost in the battle of Éthe 124 officers and 5,200 NCOs and privates. This number included 2,056 killed and 400 POWs865. Therefore, the total losses of the French 7th Infantry Division exceeded 50% of the mobilisation condition which dramatically reduced its fighting potential and was detrimental to the soldiers’ morale. It demonstrated itself in the subsequent battle with the German 10th Infantry Division at Marville. Notably, during the battle of Éthe, both the German and the French troops lost many horses, the loyal companions of the war misery. To a soldier, a horse was not only a tool in the fighting but also a friend which, in extreme circumstances, he would entrust with his life. One-year volunteer Fechner from the 3rd battery of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment of the 10th Infantry Division described this relation in an engaging way: On 22 August, when running uphill, my horse was hit with a shrapnel between the ribs next to the saddle. I bandaged the horse and carefully massaged a lead bullet from the animal’ hot body. In the days to come, during long marches, I led the horse by the bridle, I squeezed puss from its wound three times a day and tried to keep it strong, feeding green plants to it. The loyal animal lagged behind until, after three days of fever, a breakthrough came. It started to enjoy the oats in blood in the field and its health would improve quickly. I was proud of having saved my horse without a vet’s help866.

864 SHD, RAC, JMO, 44e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (6. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), inscription 26 N 984/1. 865 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Vogt, 15; Among the POWs taken by the 10. Dywizje˛ Piechoty byli z˙ołnierze francuscy z 14. Pułku Huzarów oraz 101., 102., 103. i 104. Infantry Regiment. Gottberg, 54; AFGG 10/2, s. 53–56, s. 53–56. 866 Relacja podporucznika rezerwy Fechnera z 3. baterii 20. Pułku Artillery Polowej, in Benary, 62.

Chapter 4. Pursuits, and the Battles of Charency and Marville

On 22 August 1914, the German 5th Army managed to stop the attack by the French 3rd Army in a section between Maix-Devant-Virton and Landres (40 km wide) and inflicted serious casualties among the enemy. It was a fiasco of the French counter-offensive in the Ardennes, where the very poorly commanded French army corps could not complete its mission. In these circumstances, the German 5th Army gained freedom of manoeuvre; in this favourable operational situation, on 23 August at 7h45, Wilhelm, German Crown Prince and the commander of the 5th Army, ordered his units to pursuit the enemy fleeing to the west. The Poznan´ V Army Corps, operating on the edge of the right flank of the 5th Army, received an order of limited pursuit. To the right of the corps ran the left flank of the 4th Army; its Silesian VI Army Corps was involved in intense fighting near Rossignol and Tintingy867. Meanwhile, on the French side, in the late evening of 22 August, the staff of the 3rd Army sent orders to the staff of the IV Army Corps for 23 August. The divisions of the IV Army Corps were expected to retreat to the south-east through Allondrelle (8.5 km to the south-west of Latour) and Villers-le-Rond in order to organise defence of the Charency area868. However, due to the dramatic situation 867 Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Bd. 1: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925), 303–316; Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Großen Krieges 1914–1918. Quellenwerk, nach den amtlichen Bezeichnungen zusammengestellt vom Großen Generalstab (Berlin: H. Sack, 1919), 10; Otto Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914–1920 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931), 20; More on the participation of the Silesian units in the battle of Rossignol and Tintingy in Ryszard Kaczmarek, Polacy w Armii Kajzera. Na frontach pierwszej wojny ´swiatowej (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2014), 126–139; Karte 3: Operationen der deutschen 4. und 5. Armee, in Der Weltkrieg 1914, Bd 1. 868 According to General Edgard de Trentinian, the order from the staff of the IV Army Corps related to the 7th Infantry Division taking positions in Allondrelle, Charency and Villers-leRond, was based on the fact that the area was located exactly where the right flank of the 7th Infantry Division met the left flank of the French 9th Infantry Division of the V Army Corps. Therefore, the staff of the IV Army Corps tried to maintain a serried front. Edgard de Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914 et la 7e Division du 4e Corps (10 Août au 22 Septembre

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of the French V Army Corps (located to the right of the IV Corps), the task was changed869. *** On the night of 22 August, the commander of the German 10th Infantry Division issued an order for 23 August for his subordinate units to capture the hills to the west and east of Latour (to the south of Belmont). Along the right (western) flank of the division ran the attack zone of the 19th Infantry Brigade. There, a fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment was tasked with capturing Bois de Bampont and Bois des Loges forests. The left (eastern) flank of the division marked the attack zone of the 20th Infantry Brigade with the I and II battalions of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. The units of the 20th Brigade were tasked with capturing Éthe and the hills to the south of the village870. Before dawn on 23rd August, the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division started to complete their respective missions. Before the troops left for the south, they were served a hot meal in the field kitchens in the zone occupied by the 47th Infantry Regiment from the 20th Brigade. The 2nd company of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment was ordered to bury their dead and clear up the battlefield. Due to the scale of the work involved, the 2nd company did not join its battalion until late afternoon. Soon, an alarm was sounded and the units of the 20th Infantry Brigade started an attack. It was initiated on the right flank, namely by the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, the II battalion of the 1914) (Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle, 1927), 141; Carte 200.000e. – Situation des IIIe et IVe armées et armée de Lorraine le 23 août 1914, in Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1: Les préliminaires – La bataille des frontières (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1922) [further referred to as AFGG 1/1]. 869 To the right of the French 7th Infantry Division was the IV Army Corps and the 9th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps. The line of contact between the two divisions ran 2 km to the south-east of Marville, along the south-west axis through Petit Failly. 3e Armée, Ordre général pour la journée du 23 aoûts 1914, in: AFGG 1/1, 749–750; Carte 200.000e. – Situation des IIIe et IVe armées et armée de Lorraine le 23 aouˆ t 1914, in Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (operations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923) [further referred to as AFGG 1/1/ 1]. 870 Franz Döring von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 54–55; Vogt, 49–50; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique, Dernière révision complete sur le terrain 1906: 71 – Virton, 56 cm × 79 cm, 1:40.000, edit 1908 [further referred to as Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000]; Map 1:20.000 rejonu Éthe, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, Journaux des marches et opérations [further referred to as the JMO], Corps d’armées, groupes de divisions et groupements [further referred to as the CAGDG], Le Service Historique de la Défense [further referred to as the SHD].

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6th Grenadier Regiment and the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment (on the left flank which reached the road from Éthe to Gomery). The second line on the road from Éthe to Latour was formed by the 50th Infantry Regiment marching from the right flank and the III and I battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment, accompanied by a machine-gun company on the left flank (behind the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment)871. On the night of 22nd August in Saint-Léger, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were housed in two groups. At 3h00, the first to march was the “missing” part of the regiment, together with Second Lieutenant Walther Iffland, who reported on the march: We left around 3h00 and joined a battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. Near Bleid872 we had a skirmish with scattered French soldiers, during which we took a few prisoners of war. A bullet scratched Friedrich’s calf. The horse of a trumpeter fighting next to me was killed. At dawn, to the west of Bleid we met the staff of our division. In the field, everywhere you could see the red trousers of the killed and wounded opponents. Numerous wounded Frenchmen gathered around hay stacks. Although they could not even crawl, some of them – silly fanatics – came up with the idea of shooting at us. In the morning, I received an order to carry out a patrol, which was an easy task. What I saw during that ride will stay with me forever. When I had covered several kilometres, on a hill I saw a long line of French riflemen, lying on the ground. They did not see me at all. Cautiously, I rode even closer, all the time expecting to be shot at. However, not a single shot was fired. All the time, I was in plain sight and waited for the shots to come, but in vain. After brief consideration, I galloped towards the French and, to my horror, I realised that the line of riflemen had been literally slaughtered. They lay on the ground, some of them dead and some heavily wounded. Thank God I did not send a report saying “A line of French riflemen on the flank” which could have played havoc! As I found out later, the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment put a stop to the battalion’s attack from the flank. The heavily wounded soldiers begged me for water. I met their wishes as far as I could. Afterwards, I was an eye witness of the execution of 20 out of 30 partisans. They calmly formed a line and waited for death. In the afternoon, close to Éthe, we met the regiment again873.

Meanwhile, the remaining part of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles and the staff were in Saint-Léger. They had managed to establish communication with the units of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg). So on 23 August at 5h00, the mounted rifles’ staff sent a report to the staff of the 10th Infantry Division on the location of 871 Gerhard Loosch, Das Königl. preuβ. Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 32. 872 Bleid is located to the south-west of Saint-Léger. 873 Second Lieutenant Walther Iffland’s account of the operations of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles of 22–23 August 1914, as in Eduard Senftleben, Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Kriege (Berlin: Bernard&Graefe, 1937), 54; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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the Württemberg corps and the planned attack on Ruette874. At the same time, some cavalrymen had problems with their horses wounded on the previous day at Éthe. One of the cavalrymen was NCO Czesny whose attempt at overcoming the obstacle had a humorous end: When on the morning of 23 August we were ready, I noticed that my captured horse could not run because of problems with its front legs. It had several splinters in its kneecaps and the knees were very swollen. I had a horse again but it was not for long! I spotted a small chestnut tied to a limber of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. After several minutes I caught it without drawing the artillerymen’s attention. I transferred the saddle, mounted the horse and followed my platoon. The chestnut would not trot. First and foremost, it was small and too weak for me. When I sat on its back I could bounce my legs against the ground. After a while I noticed that the horse was blind. All this was a real blunder. I could not forward reports all day long because my horse would tread with difficulty and only when prodded with a stick875.

Initially, Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels, the commander of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, intended to return to the formations of the 10th Infantry Division via Saint-Léger to Bleid. However, at the request of the commander of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment,876 which had been attacked by an unrecognised French unit, Major Wildenfels agreed for his regiment to protect the heavy artillery in its march from Saint-Léger to Vance. General Hermann von Strantz, the commander of the V Army Corps, ordered the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment to support the 9th Infantry Division in its attack on Virton and shoot on the village. Previously, the artillerymen were protected by a battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, which was relieved and sent to the right flank of the 10th Infantry Division. Consequently, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles escorted the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment to Vance and, having completed the mission, returned via Chantemelle and Buzenol to Éthe to the section occupied by the 10th Infantry Division. Since the horses were tired and hungry, at noon the regiment’s commander ordered a halt in Chantemelle, where the loyal comrades were watered and fed877. Soon, an operational order was sent to the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles – the unit was supposed to march to the left flank of the 10th Infantry Division and support an attack on the hills located to the south of Belmont. However, in the meantime the hills had been captured by an infantry regiment. Second Lieutenant Wendorff described the march through a destroyed Éthe and the distressing sight:

874 Ruette was located to the south of Éthe. 875 NCO Czesny’s account of the operations of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, as in: Senftleben, 56. 876 Die Schlachten und Gefechte, 10. 877 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Just at the entrance to the village, near the train station, I saw Lieutenant von Busse’s dappled horse lying dead on the ground. The soldier was already buried. Gradually, the ground was littered with more and more carcasses of dead horses. My typically skittish horse passed them by as if they were mounds of earth. You could also see single locals vanishing round corners. At the end of the village was a group of executed civilians who had opened fire on the German troops878. The view across the bridge, where the road went uphill and behind the forest, was terrifying879. An entire French battery, slaughtered during a march, blocked the road880. We found lots of oats in deep ancient chests. Initially, we scoffed at it, because it was pitch black, but the horses gorged on it and we realised that these were regular, healthy, black oats. The Wachtmeisters were delighted!881

At 7h30, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment marched out in columns to Éthe, with the II battalion in the lead. When the horse-drawn artillery carts entered the village, the 4th battery was fired by wounded French soldiers and locals. Therefore, the artillerymen under the command of Lieutenant Petzel had to break through with revolvers in their hands. The armed locals were immediately executed. At 10h00, the specific batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment reached hill 295 (to the north of Latour) and took up shooting positions. Due to the planned attack by the 20th Infantry Brigade on Ruette, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment was ordered to support the assault882 yet the staff of the 10th Artillery Brigade failed to order them to open fire. The regimental officers took advantage of the break to identify the effects of their shelling from the previous day. One of them recalled the sight in the following way: The entire slope [in Jeune Bois forest – B.K.] was littered with hundreds of dead Frenchmen with hands as pale as wax, tightly driven into the ground, swollen carcasses of horses with their legs turned up to the sky, destroyed vehicles, scattered around rifles, knapsacks, ammunition pockets, shell cases, parts of garment and vessels. A ravine to the south of Éthe was particularly terrifying – it hosted some of the cannons and a column of the French vanguard destroyed by the shelling [opened by the 20th Field Artillery Regiment – B.K.] (…) Major von Krogh who replaced the commander ordered us to remove the cannon locks as regimental loot. Plans were made to display the cannons on the square in front of the Poznan´ barracks as victorious trophies. Alas, that 878 He meant an attack on the soldiers from the German 20th Infantry Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division entering Éthe. They came under fire from both locals and lone French soldiers, some of whom were paramedics and were marked with the Red Cross. 879 Reference to the road which ran from Éthe to Ruette through a forested slope of Jeune Bois hill. 880 It was the 9th battery and all the wagons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, Régiments d’artillerie de campagne [further referred to as RAC], SHD. 881 Second Lieutenant Wendorff ’s account of the operations of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, as in Senftleben, 57. 882 Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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was never to happen! When we looked toward Éthe it became clear why our batteries were so unaffected by the French artillery fire despite standing in the open. Looking from the hills to the south of Éthe [Jeune Bois hills – B.K.], the firing position on the hill slope north of the village [the southern slope of hill 314 – B.K.] merged into the edge of the forest located several hundred meters behind it [Bois de Laclaireau forest – B.K.]. The French had been firing on the edge of the wood, with the batteries as their aim. After one intense day of fighting, the gunners understood that reinforcing the firing positions was imperative. There, heedless of the fatigue, after taking up firing position, they immediately started to dig in the cannons883.

On the night of 22 August, the artillerymen of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment had to eat their field rations because the field kitchens failed to arrive; lack of hot food was detrimental to the soldiers’ morale. The casualties in the specific batteries were replenished by gunners from the ammunition columns who, in turn, were replaced by soldiers from the corps’ ammunition columns. Personnel changes also took place among the officers: Captain Bürde was appointed the commander of the I battalion, Captain Uhse of the II battalion, Second Lieutenant Geisler took command of the 1st battery, Lieutenant Ernst Fengler of the 2nd battery, Second Lieutenant Schenk of the 6th battery884. At 8h00, the companies of the II battalion (which marched from Châtillon through Saint-Léger) and the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment met to the north of Éthe. At 8h30 both battalions marched along the western edge of Éthe and continued to the south, to Latour885. When the 47th Infantry Regiment entered Éthe, Belgian civilians and French soldiers opened fire from the buildings in the village. This response was probably triggered off by Captain Rißmann who, in the vicinity of the church, shot his wounded horse to put it out of its misery. This led to a violent and chaotic exchange of fire; the soldiers of the 47th Infantry Regiment fired at all the buildings. Riflemen also fired from the dressing point marked with a Red Cross flag. When the 47th Infantry Regiment transferred to the southern part of Éthe, the civilians were driven away from their homes and some of the buildings were set on fire. In the course of searching the houses, armed civilians and French soldiers were found. In line with the rules of engagement, armed civilians and French soldiers dressed up as civilians were immediately executed. Later on, the 47th Infantry Regiment attacked to the south along the road from Éthe to Gomery, running through Jeune Bois forest. There were so many bodies of dead French soldiers on either side of the road that a German soldier referred to it as a 883 Albert Benary, Königlich Preußisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20 (Berlin: Verlag Bernhard & Graefe, 1932), 56. 884 Konrad Angerstein and Paul Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: Druck and Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1927), 22. 885 Gottberg, 56.

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“corpse alley”. Among them was a French officer with a backsword held tight in his hand. At 11h00, the soldiers from the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment took up positions on hill 293. To the left of the regiment were the positions of the II and I battalions of the 6th Grenadier Regiment whose left flank stretched to the west of Gomery. Further to the left was a section of the 50th Infantry Regiment on the south-western edge of Jeune Bois forest. The eastern part of Jeune Bois forest hosted the position of the I and III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, representing the left flank of the 10th Infantry Division. The regiments stayed in their positions until the evening; the soldiers had to cope with thirst, because water had not been delivered886. By order from the 10th Infantry Division, the “von Arent” Group was established (a brigade fighting group) including two companies of the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Division, the machine-gun company of the 46th Infantry Division, the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment and half of the pioneer company from the 5th Pioneer Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Victor von Arent, the commander of the 46th Infantry Division, was appointed commander of the group; his position in the regiment was temporarily assumed by Major Mathieu887. At 11h00, without encountering enemy troops, the “von Arent” Group captured the hills north of Marville. However, at 11h45 there was a short exchange of fire with the French infantry. Since there was no crossing through the Othain river in the Group’s attack zone, the machine-gun company of the 46th Infantry Division had to leave its carts behind; the soldiers had to carry the MG-08 machine guns, together with the mounts and the ammunition for the next 10 km888. The companies of the I and II battalions of the 6th Grenadier Regiment moved along two roads, from Éthe to Latour and from Éthe to Gomery. The hills to the east and west of Latour were captured at 11h00. At the same time, patrols did not identify enemy troops. Further on, the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, operating as part of the 20th Infantry Brigade, received an order to capture the hills between Latour and Gomery. Captain von Schoenermarck, commander of the 3rd company of the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, was afraid that the situation in Éthe would repeat itself. So he issued an order to search the buildings in Gomery thoroughly. In the course of this operation, two machine guns were discovered, ready to fire on the road, and French soldiers were captured, dressed in civilian clothing. In revenge, the western part of the village was set alight, yet the French dressing point was spared. Despite the preventive 886 Loosch, Das Königl, 33; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 887 Max Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 50. 888 Zunehmer, 51.

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measures, when dusk fell, the marching German columns were fired on from the remaining houses in Gomery. In the meantime, at 9h00 the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment marched through Belmont and took up positions on the southern and south-western edge of Bois de Bampont forest. On the evening of 23 August, the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment received an order to stop for the night, north of Chenois. The regiment’s II battalion was transferred from one place to another, much to the soldiers’ chagrin. Ultimately, they were ordered to stop for the night in the western part of Bois de Bampont forest, to the left of the fusiliers battalion889.

Figure 1. A section of the German Maxim MG-08 machine gun from the regimental machine-gun company collecting ammunition and taking the gun from a cart, August 1914. The photo shows the cart’s equipment, including water container. Photograph from the author’s collection.

On 23 August at 8h00, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division ordered the 50th Infantry Regiment to capture the hills south of Éthe. Due to the serious casualties, especially among the officers (32 killed), the 50th Infantry Regiment was to follow the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment in the second line. The patrols concluded that the French troops had retreated from Éthe. Consequently, the march through the village seemed trouble-free. However, when the soldiers of the 12th company of the 50th Infantry Regiment were leaving Éthe, their column was shot at from a house and a short exchange of fire ensued. Next, the buildings along the road were searched and many armed civilians captured. Following an order from the commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade, the captured aggressors 889 Gottberg, 56–57; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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Map 1. The passage of the German 10th Infantry Division after the battle of Éthe in the direction of Charency, 23–24 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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were executed. At 11h30, the units of the 20th Infantry Brigade occupied a position on hill 293 – Jeune Bois forest890. When, in the afternoon, the staff of the V Army Corps received a report that the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) operating on the left flank had launched a successful attack, the 10th Infantry Division was ordered to form a front to the north-west. At the same time the 50th Infantry Regiment entered Latour, where 100 French soldiers and 6 machine guns were captured in the course of searching the buildings891. At dawn on 23 August, the 46th Infantry Regiment took up positions on the right flank of the 10th Infantry Division, near Bois de Bampont forest, and formed a front to the west. Simultaneously, the regiment’s commander received an order from the staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade to prepare for an attack on Virton from the south-east in support of the 9th Infantry Division. With this in mind, at 18h20 the staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade ordered the 46th Infantry Regiment to attack Vieux and Saint-Mard, in the direction of Virton. However, before the companies took up their attack positions, the order was rescinded. The section of the 46th Infantry Regiment was then supported by the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment892. At 8h30, the staff of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment received an order from the staff of the 10th Field Artillery Brigade to join the 19th Infantry Brigade and march to the south to Belmont. When the I battalion crossed the village, it was fired on from the buildings. To the south-west of Belmont, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment took up firing positions on either side of Bois-de-Bampont forest, facing Virton – Saint-Mard. In this way, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division started preparations for attack in support of the twin 9th Infantry Division, still 890 The events that took place during the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914 and the subsequent day, raised lots of controversy in the context of abiding by the rules of engagement. Both the French and Belgians accused the Germans of war crimes – executing medical personnel, the wounded and “innocent” civilians. On the basis of the Belgian accusations, the German military authorities conducted an investigation as early as in 1915. The mayor of Éthe was interrogated; on 8 March 1915 he stated that the accusations were false. He added that on the morning of 23 and 24 August 1914, the field kitchens of the 10th Infantry Division handed out food to a large number of civilians from the destroyed Belmont and Éthe. In the course of searching the buildings, German soldiers paid for the confiscated goods, unlike French soldiers who would not even issue receipts. During the fighting in Belmont, Éthe and Latour, many German soldiers mentioned in their diaries armed civilians shooting at them whenever German troops approached. According to accounts of the soldiers of the 50th Infantry Regiment, Belgian civilians in Éthe killed unarmed paramedics when they went to the river Thon for water for the wounded. These accounts could hardly be deemed mass German confabulation. After the war, in 1921 the Belgian accusation was examined by the Supreme Court in Leipzig. Sadly, I have not been able to find the result of the investigation. Zunehmer, 49; Vogt, 21. 891 Vogt, 21. 892 Zunehmer, 50; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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engaged in fighting near Virton, but the attack was never launched. At the same time, the regiment took up positions near Jeune Bois forest which had been under fire the day before. Prince Oskar Hohenzollern (the fifth son of Emperor Wilhelm II), the commander of the 7th Grenadier Regiment in the 9th Infantry Division, who on 24 August marched with his regiment along a road through the hills and Jeune Bois, described the scene: The area was not cleared yet. The sight made my blood curdle. Soldiers from the French batteries who had been killed by the gunfire lay in rows893. The carts were in a state of chaos, the harnessed horses lay on their backs. This view continued for hundreds of meters and, suddenly, moans could be heard from a pile of soldiers. Some of them were wounded. The entire road was covered by parts of the equipment, knapsacks, haversacks, destroyed rifles, axes, mess tins and canteens894.

At around 19h00, to the south-west of Virton, the batteries of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment started an exchange of fire which continued until the dusk895. At 17h30, following an order from the staff of the 10th Infantry Division, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles took up positions on the southern edge of Jeune Bois forest, to the north of Gomery. Meanwhile, the 10th Infantry Division concentrated its right flank to the north of the road between Chenois and Latour in order to launch an assault on Virton from the south-east in support of the 9th Infantry Division. When dusk started to gather, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles received an order to protect a food transport from Éthe to Latour. At the same time, Second Lieutenant Friede’s platoon was sent to the 19th Infantry Brigade and Second Lieutenant Iffland’s platoon to the 20th Infantry Brigade in order to carry out reconnaissance of the defensive lines of the 10th Infantry Division. The subunits returned to the regiment at night. Once the task of escorting the food transport to Latour was completed, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were ordered to march to the north of Éthe where a camp had been set up in a battlefield which had not yet been cleared. The mounted rifles had to sleep among the moaning, heavily wounded, or dead soldiers from both sides killed in Jeune Bois forest. Second Lieutenant Wendorff described this horrifying evening of 23 August in his memoirs: It got cold; I climbed the nearest hill to see a horrifyingly beautiful night landscape after the battle. Right in front of us, Ethe was ablaze; further away flames swept through Virton, Gomery, Bleid and Moussy la Ville. It was the calm after a storm. I took a few paces and crawled through a wire fence. This made a noise which woke up several dying

893 Three field 75 mm cannons from the destroyed French battery were deemed trophies of the 4th battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment. They were later transported to Arlon. 894 Angerstein and Schlemm, 22–23; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 895 Angerstein and Schlemm, 23.

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soldiers for the last time, before falling asleep forever. I will never forget the words “de l’eau” [water –B.K.] uttered with moans. On my way back, I tripped over someone’s dead body. In spite of it all, when I found a small pile of straw I fell asleep instantly896.

At 19h00, the units of the 20th Infantry Brigade continued their march to the west via Latour to Chenois (2.2 km to the south-east of Virton) tasked with capturing Saint-Mard897. The first to march to the north of the road was an extended line of the II battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, followed by the 50th Infantry Regiment. To the left, along the road between Latour and Saint-Mard, the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment proceeded, followed by the I and III battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment, as the reserve of the 20th Infantry Brigade. As there were no French troops in Latour, the march to Chenois could be continued. At 20h30, to the north-east of Chenois, the commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade ordered the soldiers to make a camp. In Chenois, an abandoned French battery was found with horses, which were captured to replenish the losses in the division’s artillery. Numerous abandoned French bicycles were precious loot, distributed among the infantry units898. Meanwhile, as early as at 4h45, the staff of the French 7th Infantry Division received new orders from the IV Army Corps to prepare for action. Due to the casualties, the infantry regiments and batteries of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment were reorganised. According to the order, two battalions took up positions near Norbulle farm and in Ronne forest. Another battalion was positioned on hill 334 to the east of Charency, where it was tasked with covering an artillery battalion from the 44th Field Artillery Regiment and defending Bouillon farm. An infantry battalion filled La Malmaison; La Prêle farm serves as reserve for an infantry battalion899. On 23 August at 5h00, in La Malmaison the German heavy artillery fired on the positions of the 317th Infantry Regiment. The shelling was destructive, causing serious casualties and damaging the soldiers’ morale. The survivors from the 317th Infantry Regiment withdrew to the south-west from La Malmaison to Charency upon the Chiers. A battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment, which was defending the area around hill 334 (5 km to the north-east of Charency) and 896 Second Lieutenant Wendorff ’s account of the operations of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, as in Senftleben, 58; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 897 Saint-Mard is near Ton stream, 1.9 km to the south of Virton where a bridge crossing was located. Therefore capturing Chenois and Saint-Mard by the 10th Infantry Division was in fact an act of enveloping the French 8th Infantry Division defending Virton, since the German 9th Infantry Division was attacking Virton from the north. 898 Zunehmer, 49–50; Loosch, Das Königl, 33–34; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 899 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, Divisions d’infanterie et d’infanterie territorial [further referred to as DIIT], SHD.

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Map 2. Attack of the V Army Corps including the 10th Infantry Division, toward the Othain river on the right flank of the German 5th Army, 25 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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Figure 2. Fatigued French infantrymen during a rest. Stacked Lebel Mle 1886 rifles, knapsacks and equipment, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

maintained communication with the French V Army Corps, was attacked from the right flank. It came under crossfire, suffered casualties and was forced to retreat in the direction of Charency, later on to Villers-le-Rond900. On the eastern edge of Ronne forest, the 102nd Infantry Regiment took up positions: a company was placed along the road from Allondrelle to Charency; two battalions were stationed in the vicinity of Norbulle farm. In order to avoid envelopment by the German troops, the regiment retreated toward Villers-le-Rond and reached the village at midnight on 22 August. Despite serious human casualties and poor morale, the march was uninterrupted. Notably, the staff of the 7th Infantry Division did not have information about the situation of the 14th Infantry Brigade901. Due to the casualties in the 13th Infantry Brigade in Villiers-le-Rond, reorganization was ordered as part of which the II battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment was taken over by the commander of the 101st Infantry Regiment. The staff of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, the I and III battalions marched to Allondrelle. The major defence section was delineated on a hill to the north-east of Épiez-sur-Chiers. On the right flank, on hill 334, a battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment took up positions; on the left flank, in La Roue forest, was located a 900 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 171. 901 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; 13e brigade d’infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, Brigades et groupes de bataillons d’infanterie [further referred to as BGBI], SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000.

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battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment. Before 16h00, the 12th company of the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment fought with German troops on the road between Charency and Allondrelle. At 16h00, an order came to retreat to Marville which the 13th Infantry Brigade reached at midnight on 23 August902. Meanwhile, on 23 August at 15h00, the staff of the French 7th Infantry Division received an order from the staff of the IV Army Corps to attack in support of the French V Army Corps and save the units from envelopment. However, it was an impossible mission for the much strained units of the 7th Infantry Division. At 19h45, another order arrived from the staff of the IV Army Corps according to which three infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron from the 7th Infantry Division were to take over the task. The attack was to be launched up to Petit Xivry. What is more, the assault was to be coordinated with the V Army Corps and a battalion of the 8th Infantry Division. However, due to the soldiers’ exhaustion and numerous delays in deploying the troops, only a battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment and one artillery battery were to carry out the task. They stayed for the night near Ham lès Saint Jean and did not manage to take part in the attack. For these reasons, the operation was aborted on the night of 23 August along a line between Charency, Flabeuville and Petit Xivry. The commander of the IV Army Corps assigned two battalions from the 44th Field Artillery Regiment with supporting the subsequent operations of the 7th Infantry Division. They were instructed to take up positions to the south-west of Petit Failly on the section of the 13th Infantry Brigade903. At 16h00, the units of the 14th Infantry Brigade from the French 7th Infantry Division were ordered to take up positions between hill 303 and Villers-le-Rond; they did so an hour later904. Meanwhile at 17h00, a situation report was sent from the staff of the French IV Army Corps to the staff of the 3rd Army seated in Verdun. The units of the 7th Infantry Division were grouped along the line between Allondrelle, Villette and Lagrange forest, including the road between Marville and Longuyon. A large part of the division was stationed near Villers-leRond. The commander of the French IV Army Corps was right to expect that the main assault of the German V Army Corps would be targeted at the positions of the 7th Infantry Division905. 902 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, Régiments d’infanterie [further referred to as RI], SHD. 903 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Carte topographique et militaire de la Belgique: Virton, 1:40.000. 904 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 905 4e Corps, de Velosnes, à état-major de l’armée, Poste de Damvillers Rec´u de Marville par téléphone le 23 août à 17h, in AFGG 1/1, 1922, 909; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 2: La

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Around 18h00, the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade received a report that the German infantry had entered Charency906. In the evening the German heavy artillery started shelling Lagrange forest and Petit Xivry village. The staff of the French V Army Corps informed the staff of the 7th Infantry Division about retreat in the direction of Grand Failly907.

Figure 3. A French battery of a field artillery regiment marching, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Meanwhile, on 23 August at 18h15, the staff of the French IV Army Corps issued new orders for the subordinate units. Consequently, the 7th Infantry Division was to fill the southern section of the corps’ defence. The division’s headquarters were established in Marville and the following defensive posts were marked for its units: 1) hill 303–3 km to the south-east of Velosnes, 2) Villers-le-Rond – Charency908. At the same time, the division’s vanguard took up positions on the right bank of the Othain. To the north of the 7th Infantry Division, units of the 8th Infantry Division took up positions, with defensive posts in Montquintin, Céline-Torgny forest and Velosnes. Following an analysis of the terrain of the future battle, General Edgard de Trentinian decided that for the 7th Infantry

manoeuvre en retraite et les préliminaires de la bataille de la Marne (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1925) [further referred to as AFGG 1/2]. 906 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 907 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD. 908 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Le général commandant le 4e C.A., Ordre général no 20, 23 août, 18h15,in AFGG 1/1, 1922, 910–911.

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Division, the hills to the north-west of Marville would form a better defensive post909. The staff of the IV Army Corps agreed that the Othain river flowing through Marville would be a more convenient defence line. The order of regrouping the 7th Infantry Division to the new positions arrived at 23h00 and the respective units started to carry it out910. The above described deployment of the French 7th Infantry Division was extremely chaotic and laborious. Undoubtedly, this resulted from the soldiers’ battle fatigue, the intense retreat and serious casualties incurred, especially in the officer corps. The division caused a huge gridlock when crossing the monumental, ancient bridge over the Othain, spanning from the eastern bank in Saint Jean to the western bank in Marville. In Saint Jean, the artillery and the infantry units became mixed, and it took time to sort them out and cross the river. The disastrous organisation of crossing the Othain delayed execution of the order from the staff of the IV Army Corps. Therefore, the units of the 7th Infantry Division arrived in Marville as late as at 1h00 and took up positions by 2h00. The 7th Infantry Division was protected by the 315th Infantry Regiment on the hills to the north and the north-east of Charency and a battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment on a hill in Ham lès Saint Jean911. At the same time, Marville and hill 274 to the south of the village were captured by the 13th Infantry Brigade and two artillery battalions; the hill to the north-west of Marville was occupied by the 14th Infantry Brigade and a battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. In the early morning, the artillery controlled by the 7th Infantry Division opened fire in the La Chiers valley, supporting the French V Army Corps which was defending the hills in Petit Xivry. In this way, General de Trentinian wanted to stop the German offensive in the area. However, the firepower of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and the corps of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment, decimated at Éthe, was too low to complete the mission912. Meanwhile, on the evening of 23 August the II battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment arrived in Marville and took up positions at the western end of the village, next to the road to Montmédy. The III battalion’s positions were already nearby after retreating from Charency, accompanied by the I battalion. For safety reasons, at 20h30 the specific

909 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 170–174. 910 État-Major 4e C.A., Instruction aux généraux commandant les 7e et 8e divisions, au général commandant l’artillerie, au génie de corps et au commandant du T. C., 23 août, 23 heures, [w:] AFGG 1/1, 1922, 911–912. 911 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Boumier, Notice Historique. Le 315e Régiment d’Infanterie (dans la Grand Guerre) (Mamers: 1920), 2. 912 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG 1/2.

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batteries were ordered to march outside the village. By 23h00, the batteries stood in marching formation along the road to Montmédy913. On the night of 23 August 1914, the rest of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was interrupted yet again, because the commander of the 10th Infantry Division ordered them to cover a column of transport carts headed for Latour via Éthe. When the mounted rifles entered Éthe which was ablaze, they were fired on by unknown perpetrators from the buildings’ windows. The Mounted Rifles searched the local houses and found the attackers: civilians, inhabitants of Éthe who were immediately executed. After this incident, the column reached Latour by 3h00. When the carts were unloaded, the Mounted Rifles were ordered to escort the column to Gomery where they arrived at 6h00. The village was heavily affected during the recent fighting as reflected in Second Lieutenant Wendorff ’s account: A terrible sight! At the entrance to the village we could see a well-to-do farm which survived partly intact. Inside were dead bodies, smouldering ruins and nothing more. A group of approximately 100 people squatted around. There were women breastfeeding babies, old people, priests, and with them pigs and goats. They were all mixed together. We moved about 100 m to the southern end of the village. There we fed and watered the horses. I had an opportunity to wash – for the first time since Heinsch – in ice-cold water from the stream and with a bit of hard soap from a dilapidated country shop. It was an extraordinary experience. We dragged a frantic German soldier from the cellar. He seemed to be out of his mind. The impressive castle was filled with French wounded. When I tried to look around, a French lady asked me to leave, nicely but firmly. They probably had wine, but they needed it for the wounded. I managed to catch a cow in the road and milk it. I also found two fresh eggs. Ultimately, I did not need much more and was happy to continue the march914.

On the evening of 23 August, the staff of the German 5th Army received reports from the subordinate corps. All the evidence suggested that the French 4th Army intended to retreat to the south-west to the Othain river (flowing through Marville) and put up resistance there. For this reason on 24 August, Prince Wilhelm issued an order to instantly chase the defeated enemy along the entire front of the 5th Army. However, the 9th Infantry Division on the right flank of the German V Army Corps had not yet captured Virton where they met resistance from the French 8th Infantry Division of the IV Army Corps. After capturing Virton, the V Army Corps was instructed to march through Villette and take up positions to the south of Montmédy stronghold, between Ruette and Charency, along the

913 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 914 Second Lieutenant Wendorff ’s account of the operations of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles, as in Senftleben, 59.

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Chiers river. The stronghold was to be attacked by the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg)915.

Figure 4. A panorama of the area between Charency and Vezin, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Meanwhile, the valley had only one narrow road in the operation zone of the German V Army Corps, running through Latour, Ruette and Grandcourt to La Malmaison. In Grandcourt the road turned to the west and ran down the slopes through the Belgian-French border. La Malmaison was located in France. Two parallel roads led from Allondrelle to the south and the south-west. One of them ran along the border to the south-west and reached Urbulle mansion (700 m to the north of Charency). There it forked into a road leading to Épiez-sur-Chier and to Charency. The other road ran from Allondrelle to the south and further on to the west to Charency, along Dorlon stream. Directly after Charency, on the southern bank of the Chiers, was Vezin village. Épiez-sur-Chiers was located less than 1 km to the north-west of Charency. Both villages were located on the Chiers which was approximately 20 m wide. About 1.7 km to the north of Charency was located Urballe mansion916.

915 Der Weltkrieg, Bd. 1, 303–316; Carte 200.000e. – Situation des IIIe et IVe armées et armée de Lorraine le 23 août 1914,in AFGG 1/1; Karte 3: Operationen der deutschen 4. und 5. Armee, in Der Weltkrieg, Bd. 1. 916 A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area, 1:80 000,in 4e corps d’armée (2.08– 31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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On the morning of 24 August, as ordered by Prince Wilhelm, on the entire front of the German 5th Army, the specific corps started attack on the Othain. On the left flank of the 5th Army, near Etain to the east of Verdun, the “Oven” corps, consisting of units from the Metz stronghold, withheld the assault of the French troops. Meanwhile, on the morning of 24 August, the French 8th Infantry Division retreated from Virton to the west917. In line with this order, at 10h00 the German V Army Corps set off on a march. The 10th Infantry Division was the first to leave from the area of Latour to the south through Ruette, Grandcourt, La Malmaison to Allondrelle with the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles as the vanguard. They were followed by the 9th Infantry Division918. Oberarzt Tadeusz Szulc, a physician of Polish nationality from the Field Hospital no.1 from the V Army Corps, wrote in his memoirs: We stopped once in a village; sitting on my horse, like the others, I watched the marching German infantry and saw an old friend from a Poznan´ school, Maks Rakowski, called “froggy” because of his bulging eyes. With a rifle in his hand, red from exertion (the day was hot), he lagged behind as a “Gefreiter” among his comrades. He saw me from afar and I am sure he was more envious of me than the other way round. Some other time, when I watched the marching field artillery, I saw someone bowing from a distance and waving from the cannon carriage on which he sat. It was Parzybok, who had recently played the organ part in “Quo Vadis”. Another time, I saw Jan Marweg greeting me from the cannon of a passing artillery unit; he was a younger brother of Zygmunt, whom I mentioned before, a Polish activist from Poznan´. These meetings always evoked memories of Poznan´ and made me realise the sudden change which had encroached on our lives so brutally. These were the only threads that tied me to my hometown of Poznan´, because letters or newspapers from home had not come for some time. Slowly, when the troops in the front took their positions in the formation, news from the country was allowed and newspapers and letters were delivered (…). I had subscribed to “Kurier Poznan´ski” which was sent to me during my entire stay on the front. Consequently, I was in regular and quite close contact with Poznan´, and I had a relatively good idea of what was going on in the country and in the city (…)919.

On 24 August before 9h00, the units of the German 10th Infantry Division set off on a march with the 19th Infantry Brigade in the lead. At the front of the division moved the 6th Grenadier Regiment; on the spearhead of the division was its II battalion. A column of the 19th Infantry Brigade was covered by the 56th Field 917 More on the battle of the German 9th Infantry Division at Virton in Alphonse Grasset, La guerre en action: le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Virton, vol. 2 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925). 918 Vogt, 21; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir,in AFGG 1/2. 919 “Pierwsza wojna s´wiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918. Ze wspomnien´ poznan´skiego lekarza wojskowego Tadeusza Szulca, introduction and edition Piotr Grzelczak,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 173–174.

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Artillery Regiment920. The rocky roads hampered the march, especially in the case of supply carts and machine-gun carts. Along the road were scattered numerous elements of equipment, uniforms, chests with ammunition, bayonets and infantry rifles abandoned by the French troops – evidence of a chaotic retreat. Near the French border, at 12h00, a halt was announced. By order from General Robert Kosch, the division’s commander, reconnaissance of the march’s route was carried out, because the road from Allondrelle to Charency ran along a dense forest and the area was ideal for setting up ambushes. However, a report received before 16h00 on the reconnaissance excluded the threat – Bois la Roue forest (between Allondrelle and Charency) was free of the enemy. However, French troops were identified in Charency. Having received the report, General Robert Kosch ordered the 10th Infantry Division to resume marching921. In the area of the 19th Infantry Brigade, the 6th Grenadier Regiment was followed by the 46th Infantry Regiment which at 9h00 joined the march column of the 10th Infantry Division west of Latour. At 12h00 the troops crossed the border between Belgium and France (2 km behind Ruette). In Allondrelle, the III battalion was separated from the 46th Infantry Regiment and tasked with covering the brigade’s left flank. At the same time, an artillery unit was allocated to the 7th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment. On the other hand, the 5th and 6th companies of the II battalion together with the machine-gun company reached Urbulle farm located 1.7 km to the north of Charency922. Near the farm, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment also set up a camp near the farm923. On 24 August, the 20th Field Artillery Regiment also resumed its march in a column of the 10th Infantry Division through Latour, Ruette and La Malmaison in the direction of Charency. The batteries of the II battalion took up positions to the south-east of Urbulle farm (to the north of Épiez-sur-Chiers) where they were tasked with granting artillery support to a battalion which, together with the 46th Infantry Regiment, had crossed the Chiers river and at around midnight placed its batteries on firing positions to the south of Charency and to the west and east of the road between Vezin and Villers-le-Rond924. After capturing Épiez-sur-Chiers, General Robert Kosch designated the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment to occupy it, supported by the 2nd company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion. The group was tasked with crossing 920 921 922 923

Angerstein and Schlemm, 23. Gottberg, 58. Zunehmer, 50. Angerstein and Schlemm, 23; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000,in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 924 Benary, 57; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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the Chiers and capturing hill 303 to the south-west of Épiez-sur-Chiers. Capturing Charency was assigned to the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment while the fusiliers battalion served as reserve of the 19th Infantry Brigade and was ordered to stop on Urbulle farm. The soldiers of the I battalion of Captain Pikardi from the 6th Grenadier Regiment captured – uninterrupted – the southern edge of Bois du Charel forest to the north of Épiez-sur-Chiers. Reconnaissance revealed that the road leading to the village was free of the enemy. To the left of the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the regiment’s II battalion under the command of Captain von Schuckmann moved through Bois la Roue forest to Charency925. When the 5th company of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment marched from the forest to open space, it was shot at by French troops from Charency and from the hills to the south and south-west of Vezin. The soldiers from the 5th company formed an extended line and set off on a march to Charency. Soon, the 6th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment joined the fighting. As support, a battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment was unlimbered and fired on the hills near Vezin, thus forcing the French infantry to retreat. At 19h30, the companies of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment launched a direct attack on Charency926. The battalion’s commander, Captain von Schuckmann, accompanied the 6th company, with Sergeant Meth bearing the unfurled standard of the II battalion. The French infantry was removed from Charency, but some of the civilians were shooting at the German soldiers from hunting rifles. Consequently, an NCO was killed and three privates from the 6th company had shot (pellet) wounds. In retaliation, several houses were set ablaze. Second Lieutenant von Donop described his company’s attack on Charency: Today we had real war. The exchange of fire lasted until 20h00. Later on a battery from the 20th Field Artillery regiment arrived and took up positions. Captain von Schuckmann decided to attack. Our company fixed bayonets and formed an extended line. They all rushed forward, down a rocky slope. We were quite agitated. I admired six to eight bayonets beautifully reflecting against the dark-green shrubs in the light of the setting sun. We proceeded down with our standard unfurled, heading for the village. I jumped over a fence, and then over a wall in front of a cemetery. Suddenly, shots were fired from the roof (if I am not mistaken). The attackers fired back. Soon, we were in the village, where 1,000 fearful soldiers were stationed. In the entrance lay a lethally wounded member of the 6th company. What happened next was evidence of how quickly structures could be loosened and how destructive the French mode of deceitful fighting was. The soldiers cried at the petrified locals and entered their houses. I tried to 925 Gottberg, 58. 926 A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, w 4e corps d’armée (2.08– 31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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calm them down and gather them on the road, but chaos reigned. Several houses were ablaze. I do not know how they could have become engulfed in flames so quickly927.

Next, the soldiers from the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment captured the bridge on the Chiers, and when night fell they proceeded uninterrupted through Vezin and captured hill 261 to the south-west of the village. The II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment was followed by the fusiliers battalion. At the same time the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment captured Épiez-surChiers, crossed the Chiers river and captured hill 303. The grenadier’s crossing was possible due to the 2nd Field Pioneer Company from the 5th Pioneer Battalion, which had built a footbridge across the Chiers. Next, the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment dug in on the hills; in the case of the French counterattack these were convenient locking positions. However, it was a hard night for the grenadiers – cold and rainy, despite the summertime928. At 21h00, a new order was issued by the chiefs of staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade for the subordinate units of the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the 46th Infantry regiment (the brigade’s reserve) to dig in on the hills to the southwest of Charency and Vezin upon the Chiers. By order of the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade, the “von Arent” Group took up positions on hill 303 to the west of Charency929. Nearby, the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery regiment set up camp with the units of the 9th Infantry Division to the right. Near La Malmaison, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles made camp930. Following the commander’s order, the 10th Infantry Division, the units of the 20th Infantry Brigade (the 47 and 50th Infantry Regiments) resumed marching on 24 August at 10h15 and walked from Chenois to the crossroads to the south of Gomery. From there, they marched to the south through Ruette, Grandcourt, La Malmaison and Allondrelle931. The 50th Infantry Regiment moved from Latour via Basse-Vire, Ruette, La Pte and Grandcourt932. A soldier from the 47th Infantry Regiment described the march as follows: The road ran through the battlefield of the Württemberg troops [the troops of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) – B.K.]. Knapsacks, shoes, clothes, destroyed rifles, 927 Account by Second Lieutenant von Donop from the 6th company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment of the assault on Cherancy, in Gottberg, 59. 928 Paul Koch, Das Niederschlesische Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsverbände im Weltkrieg 1914/18 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1928), 48; Gottberg, 58–59; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000,in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 929 Zunehmer, 50. 930 Senftleben, 60; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 931 Zunehmer, 50; Vogt, 22. 932 Vogt, 22; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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dead French soldiers and horses were everywhere; it was a terrifying picture of the war and the air was awful because the sun blazed down mercilessly933.

In Ruette, the physicians from the 10th Infantry Division warned the soldiers about the threat of typhoid fever. Behind Grandcourt was the border between Belgium and France which the 50th Infantry Regiment crossed at 17h00. Further on, the marching direction turned to the west, and La Malmaison was the first French village934 in which the units of the 20th Infantry Brigade could rest. Because food supplies failed to reach the 20th Infantry Brigade yet again, the soldiers from the 47th Infantry Regiment slaughtered hens and rabbits from the local farm in La Malmaison. However, even this portion of fresh meat did not suffice. The regiment’s field kitchens limited hot meals, serving them only once a day, around noon. The food supply services also failed to deliver the bread baked by the division’s field bakery. Due to the poor food supply situation, every soldier from the 47th Infantry Regiment received only his daily ration of fatback and a mug of coffee. On the other hand, turnip and wine from the local cellars were in abundance, a rather quirky combination935. When the 20th Infantry Brigade resumed its march, the 47th Infantry Regiment was ordered to give way in Allondrelle to the marching 6th Field Artillery Regiment, a unit at the disposal of the V Army Corps. The 21 cm Mörser 10 heavy howitzers936 parading through the village improved the infantrymen’s morale. It was reassuring to know that the soldiers could rely on the support of these powerful weapons. Once the howitzers disappeared, the march was resumed, but soon the evening came and at 22h30 an area to the west of Bois la Roue forest was chosen for the camp site of the 47th Infantry Regiment with the destination – Charency – located in the south. The 1st company of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment received an order near Urbulle farm to protect the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, while the 3rd company of the I battalion was tasked with protecting the 6th Field Artillery Regiment on the northern edge of Bois la Roue forest. Due to the proximity of the French troops and the experience gained in the battle of Éthe, the decision to guard the infantry was very well justified. The 50th Infantry Regiment made camp at 22h30 to the south of Urbulle farm. An order was also issued for the soldiers of the 20th Infantry Brigade to eat the last part of their field rations because the field kitchens had not cooked warm food

933 Loosch, Das Königl, 34. 934 A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08– 31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 935 Loosch, Das Königl, 34. 936 The German heavy howitzer, the 21 cm Mörser 10 produced by Krupp, could fire further than 11 km; its rate of fire amounted to 2 shots per minute; a shell weighed over 100 kg.

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for two days937. The local cellars were well supplied with wine so every soldier drank several litres of it. Some of the soldiers carried out small barrels from the cellars, hoping for a wine feast. Much to their disappointment, the barrels held purée used in the famous Lorraine Mirabelle plum liquor938. On the morning of 24 August, the 7th Infantry Division was already near Marville where, in line with the instructions from the staff of the IV Army Corps, it intended to put up major resistance. In this section, the I battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment occupied hill 277 (to the south-east of Marville), the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment captured the section between Saint Jean and Marville (including the village) up to hill 274 while, due to the new fighting regulations, the II battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment was placed on the western slope of hill 277 in Crédon forest. The 101st Infantry Regiment was positioned on hill 274, up to and including the road leading to a ford. The French infantry dug two rows of trenches. One of them was dug on the eastern slopes, the other one along a plateau to the rear. The vulnerable spots in the defence included the ford and the river crossing, which were to be defended by two sections of machine guns. The companies of the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment took up positions next to the 14th Infantry Brigade to the north of Marville (hill 280). New orders from the divisional staff arrived at 18h00. One platoon from the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment was instructed to take up positions on the bridge in Marville; the other units were to take up firing positions on the road between Marville and Longuyon (to the east of Marville). Only a company of sappers remained in Marville939. The area around Marville upon the Othain was good for defence because the buildings in the village rose gradually from the bank of the river to the summit of the hill, which was ideal for field artillery positions. However, the defence section of the French 7th Infantry Division was too stretched. To the left of it were the positions of the 8th Infantry Division, to the right was the French V Army Corps940. 937 The shortage of food in the field kitchens of the 10th Infantry Division resulted from lack of supplies from the stores of the V Army Corps. This, in turn, stemmed from an inefficient food provision system which, due to a lack of railway lines running along the attack direction, had to rely on heavy horse-drawn supply carts. Providing food and forage for 41,000 soldiers and 14,000 horses in the difficult terrain on the French-Belgian border posed a significant challenge to the food supply columns of the V Army Corps. 938 Loosch, Das Königl, 34; Vogt, 22; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, as in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 939 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000,in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 940 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 172.

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Figure 5. A French machine-gun platoon from the machine-gun company of an infantry regiment; the photograph shows the Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 machine guns and the platoon’s equipment, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

On that day, the artillery supporting the French 7th Infantry Division was divided into two fighting groups: 1) the I and III battalions of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment under the command of Colonel Bertrand (with the 10th battery of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment), two battalions of the 45th Field Artillery Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Hug and a battalion of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment; 2) the II battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and a battery of 120 mm cannons from the 2nd Heavy Artillery Regiment under the command of Major Appert941. At 4h30, the 10th battery of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment arrived at an area occupied by the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. At the same time, an order was issued for all the batteries to go on alert and take up position to defend Marville. To this end, two firing zones were established: 1) to the north of the road from Marville to Montmédy for the II battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and a battery of 120 mm cannons from the 2th Heavy Artillery Regiment; 2) to the south of the road from Marville to Montmédy for the 14th Infantry Brigade supported by the I and III battalions of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. The batteries of the II battalion stopped on hill 280 (to the north-west of Marville) facing north-east. The batteries of the I battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment took up positions on hill 277, also facing the north-east. The batteries 941 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD.

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Map 3. The area around Marville upon the Othain where on 25 August 1914, the German 10th Infantry Division fought against the French 7th Infantry Division. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

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Figure 6. A panorama of Saint Jean, a suburb of Marville; a view to the south-east to the stone bridge on the Othain, the summer of 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

of the I battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment took up positions on the same hill, whereas the batteries of the III battalion of the regiment were on hill 285. By 6h40 the artillery, supporting the 7th Infantry Division in the area of Marville, had taken up its positions942. On the night of 24 August, by order of the staff of the IV Army Corps, the 7th Infantry Division formed a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Blin, who was tasked with covering the division to the south-east of Villers-leRond943. The unit consisted of the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 315th Infantry Regiment, a battery of Jourdan from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and 1/2 of the division’s cavalry battalion944. On 25 August at 5h00, a unit appointed by Lieutenant Colonel Blin was ordered to march to Marville. In the course of executing the order, the unit was attacked by German artillery supported by the right flank infantry in Hamdevant-Marville. The soldiers from the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regi-

942 Ibidem. 943 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 172. 944 Boumier, 2; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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ment defended their artillery with great devotion, exchanging fire from less than a hundred meters945. At dawn on 25 August, the units of the 14th Brigade from the 7th Infantry Division occupied positions on the hills to the north of Marville and Varny, along the Othain river, in this way connected with the 8th Infantry Division. Following the casualties suffered in Éthe, the brigade was reinforced with a battalion from the 101st Infantry Regiment which took a position in Flassigny. The units of the 13th Infantry Brigade: three battalions of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment, a battery of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment and a company from the 120th Infantry Regiment captured Marville, hill 277 and hill 202 (to the west of Petit Failly). From the early morning, these positions were shelled by the artillery of the German 10th Infantry Division946.

Figure 7. French infantrymen resting after a march; the picture shows the Lebel Mle1886 rifles and details of the soldiers’ uniforms and equipment, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

A heavy fog covered the positions of the 7th Infantry Division. At 4h30, intense artillery fire started in the western part of Marville. The positions of the 7th Infantry Division on hill 303, in Charency and Lagrange forest were flooded by 945 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; Boumier, 2. 946 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD.

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shells. Hill 285 was fired on by German heavy artillery; hill 277 came under fire from field artillery. After 30 minutes, the barrage was over947. At 5h00, Lieutenant Colonel Blin’s unit which, according to the previous order, was to set off on a march to Petit Hivry, came into contact with large numbers of German infantry units on a plain to the north-west of Ham Lès Saint Jean. The commander of the 7th Infantry Division did not intend to risk more casualties in fighting a stronger opponent. At 7h00, he ordered retreat to the right bank of the Othain. The 102nd Infantry Regiment was designated to occupy Marville948. At 6h00, two battalions of the 45th Field Artillery Regiment were placed at the disposal of the French V Army Corps, and marched towards Delut949. Meanwhile, the patrols sent to the defensive lines in Marville reported at 5h30 that the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment had not returned to its original positions and the village was being defended only by a company of sappers. Consequently, the only reserve of the 102nd Infantry Regiment, in the form of the 1st company, was ordered to occupy Marville until the III battalion returned. The companies of the III battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment returned to Marville at 6h15 which stabilised defence in this area. Meanwhile Captain Gérard, the commander of the 3rd company of the I battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment reported as early as at 7h10 that his soldiers had opened fire on the German infantry attacking in an extended line 4.5 km away from the river. At 7h15, hill 277 was again hit by German shells of various calibres and fire was exchanged along the entire line of defence of the French 7th Infantry Division950. The area between Charency and Marville was hilly. The Othain meandered from the north-west to the south-east, flowing through Marville. In the central part of the town, the river took a sharp turn to the south-east, forming a u-shape with its arms facing east. A road ran from the north-east from Charency in the south-west, through Villers-le-Rond (4 km from Marville) and Saint Jean. The distance between Charency and Marville amounted to 6.1 km. The road entered Marville from the east, and turned sharply to the north where a bridge crossed it. The road ran to the other bank of the Othain and further on to the north-west, to Iré-le-Sec (a distance of 6.7 km) and to the north to Flassigny (a distance of 3.7 km). A road to Delut ran from Marville to the south-west (a distance of 6.4 km), to the south-east to Rupt-sur-Othain (a distance of 4.9 km); another one 947 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 948 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD. 949 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 950 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD.

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ran along the Othain to Petit Failly (a distance of 4.2 km) and Grand Failly (a distance of 7.2 km). There were numerous hills along the Othain valley, on its western and eastern edge. There was a ford to the north-east of Marville, in the direction of Villers-le-Rond. The area between Charency and Marville was not forested which was conducive to observation. This terrain was undoubtedly to the defenders’ advantage951. Meanwhile, the battalions of the 13th Infantry Brigade from the 7th Infantry Division filled the first line of defence: hill 277, the ford in Marville and the area located 800 m down the river, toward Petit Failly (to the south-east of Marville). The 14th Infantry Brigade took up positions on hill 283, in Marville and ChapelleSaint-Hilaire. In order to shorten the line of defence, the division’s commander decided to transfer the defence positions to Saint Jean, opposite Marville on the eastern bank of the Othain952. On 25 August, following Prince Wilhelm’s order, the attack on the Othain was to be continued along the entire front of the 5th Army. At the same time, the V Army Corps was tasked with enveloping the northern flank of the French IV Army Corps. This was why, operating within the V Army Corps, the 10th Infantry Division was ordered to march to the south-west in order to attack Marvilleupon-Othain953. General Robert Kosch appointed the 6th Grenadier Regiment to complete the mission because, following the battle of Éthe, the regiment had the greatest firepower in the division. The 47th Infantry Regiment was appointed as the reserve to the 10th Infantry Division; on 25 August at 3h00, the regiment marched through Charency, took up a position 600 m to the south-west of Vezin and then proceeded to hill 261. At 3h15, the 50th Infantry Regiment, another unit of the 20th Infantry Brigade, set off on a march through Charency and Vezin and took up positions on a hill to the west of Vezin. There, the 50th Infantry Regiment, together with the III battalion and the 7th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, were placed under the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade. These troops formed the central column of the brigade954. At dawn, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment was ordered by the staff of the 10th Field Artillery Brigade to take up fire positions on hill 303 (to the west of Charency) with the aim of supporting the infantry attack on Marville. In order to complete the mission, the regiment left at 4h00 but got stuck among forage 951 A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000, in 4e corps d’armée (2.08– 31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD. 952 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 170–172. 953 Der Weltkrieg, Band 1, 556. 954 Vogt, 22; Loosch, Das Königl, 34; A fragment of a French staff map of the Marville area 1:80 000,in 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG 1/2.

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wagons and the division’s bridge column. Consequently, the regiment took up positions on hill 303 as late as at 7h30955. At 3h00, the alarm was sounded in the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. The unit was ordered to cover the right flank of the 10th Infantry Brigade from the side of Montmédy citadel. When at 5h30, the V Army Corps launched an attack, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles secured the right flank of the 10th Infantry Brigade to the north-west of Charency, operating on the eastern bank of the Chiers, and crossed the river toward the western bank956. Meanwhile, a column of supply carts of the 10th Infantry Brigade which was marching in front of the 47th Infantry Regiment, skidded on a steep road to Charency and caused a logjam which was then shelled by the French field artillery. While the 47 t Infantry Regiment did not fight on 25 August, its 8th company of the II battalion suffered casualties: 11 soldiers killed and 19 wounded as a result of the French artillery fire. This episode was described in a letter by reserve Second Lieutenant Schäffter from the 10th company of the III battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment: It was complete chaos. To the front, our carts got stuck on the bridge, blocking the entire march; a long row of guns stopped next to us. To add insult to injury, the enemy started to fire. I only managed to shout “10th Company, to me!!!”and I ran to the right, across from the artillery fire, following the old rule that you need to run in the direction of the source of artillery fire. Thank God I did. 20–30 paces in front of the company a volley of shrapnel fell, another one 200 m behind us. If I and my company had withdrawn, the casualties would have been bigger. My company stuck together and, for the sake of myself and my soldiers, I asked them to present themselves twice. It must have been funny, to admire a company exercising rifle handling in an open space over which the shells flew with a whizz957.

At 6h00, the soldiers from the 6th Grenadier Regiment left Villers-le-Rond and marched toward Marville. At the front was the II battalion of Captain von Schuckmann, followed by the I battalion of Captain Pikardi, and a fusilier battalion under the command of Major von Unruh. At the front of the regiment marched a half platoon from the 7th company commanded by Lieutenant le Viseur. In the thick fog, the vanguard came across the French infantry, which opened fire with rifles aggressively. By order of the commander, the soldiers of the 7th company scattered into an extended line and were ordered to hold position at any cost. At the same time, the French field artillery opened fire and shrapnel bombs started to explode over the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier

955 Angerstein and Schlemm, 23. 956 Senftleben, 61; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG 1/2. 957 Loosch, Das Königl, 35.

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Figure 8. A platoon of the French infantry firing from a prone position; the rifle supports were made from dirt; they were sheltered from the front with knapsacks; the photo shows the Lebel Mle1886 rifles and details of equipment and uniforms, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Regiment. The skirmish was described by reserve Second Lieutenant Lucian Blümel in his diary: Le Viseur [Lieutenant le Viseur, the commander of the 7th company – B.K.], full of ambition and impertinence, went too far with his vanguard. We failed to notice that we had suddenly been surrounded by French troops. They were equally unaware that a whole company was standing in front of them in the oat field. What was that gleaming 40 m in front of us in the fog? Red trousers? I ordered Donop to open fire, but we were not certain what it was. It was only once we were on our horses that we clearly saw the red trousers, but it was too late! The bullets were already on their way with a whizz. The explosions and splinters in the tree tops were an indication that the French were aiming too high. We got used to it quickly. It was a baptism of fire for the 7th company. Captain von Schuckmann was standing behind us, stoically propped against a tree, with a cigar, his regular companion, in his mouth. Because of the fog, the situation was rather eery. We could not see a thing, when we heard commands in French: “Feu! – Cessez le feu!” [“Fire! – Cease fire!” – B.K.]. We spread out into an extended line. The command was “Hold the position at any price!”958.

The attack by the 6th Grenadier Regiment was supported by accurate cannon fire from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment. Specific batteries changed their firing positions as the infantry proceeded up to hill 281 (to the north-west of Villers-de958 Diary of reserve Second Lieutenant Lucian Blümel from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, in Gottberg, 60–61.

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Rond). The French artillery was shelling from the area of Flassigny and Montmédy citadel, but it was ineffective959.

Figure 9. View of Charency and Vezin, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

The direct assault by the 6th Grenadier Regiment was supported by the 4th battery under the command of Captain Bieler, closely following the infantry’s extended lines. However, the units of the 4th battery lost 4 horses. General Oskar Freiherr von Watter, the commander of the 10th Artillery Brigade, was nearby; he ordered the 4th battery to take up firing positions on a hill near the road, and started to shell Marville. When the cannons were unlimbered, the gunners did not have ammunition because the caissons were lagging behind. In this situation, they immediately brought wicker baskets with shells from the limbers. The shelling started and eliminated a French battery of field cannons which was firing from the edge of the village. Soon, the 6th Grenadier Regiment asked for permission to destroy the enemy machine gun in Chopey farm, as it posed a threat to the assault. To this end, the battery’s commander, Captain Bieler, ordered a cannon to be moved 400 m to the front, in order to have the entire valley within its range and take up a more convenient firing position. The remaining 3 battery cannons were to start firing on the French infantry positions on the local hills. The shelling was very effective, and only a few French infantry units managed to retreat. At the same time, several shells eliminated the last French 75 mm cannon firing from Marville. The 3rd battery also took part in the fighting. One of its 959 Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG 1/2.

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officers, reserve Lieutenant Krugmann, was tasked with eliminating a French machine gun located in the tower of the church in Marville: The 3rd battery was located on the regiment’s left flank [the 20th Field Artillery Regiment – B.K.]. At 10h00, a breathless courier from the 6th Grenadier Regiment approached my last gun and, by order of his commander, asked me to fire on the church tower in Marville. Apparently, there was a machine gun there, aiming at the road on which the grenadier regiment wanted to launch an attack. Major von Krogh let me fire. I adjusted the fuzes and fired an accurate shot; the enemy retaliated with a few shots and the machine gun went silent. The shot must have been very accurate. As we acknowledged later on, two window blinds in the upper window of the tower had been hit. Shortly afterwards, we heard a trumpet of the 6th Grenadier Regiment: “Slowly forward! Slowly forward!”. The shooting was exactly like on a firing range. The infantrymen and the artillerymen stood around me, checking if I would take a good aim960.

Meanwhile, the 7th and 8th companies of the II and III battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment were placed under the commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment. At 6h00, they crossed the Chiers on the bridges near Vezin and reached Villers-le-Rond. The 7th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment were appointed to capture hill 230. They were to be followed by the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment and, later on, the 50th Infantry Regiment. The starting positions to attack Marville were located to the north-west of Villers-le-Rond. The mission was harder to complete because of the dense fog. Therefore, the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment (the 11th and 12th companies, followed by the 9th and 10th companies) changed formation from a marching column to an extended line 150 m behind the 7th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment. Between 7h15 and 10h00, these units marched in an extended line toward the hills to the northeast of Marville under the fire of the French field artillery. At the same time, the companies of the 46th Infantry Regiment were mixed with the companies of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. However, soon the NCOs and officers sorted out their companies and battalions961. At 8h15, the batteries of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment were ordered to change their firing positions to hill 281 (to the north of Villers-le-Rond). Under cover provided by the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, three columns of the 19th Infantry Brigade attacked the French positions which ran between la Higny farm and Villers-le-Rond. The accurate shelling on the part of the battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment played a significant role in the developments, because it forced the French troops to stay in position. At the same time, the 960 Benary, 58. 961 Zunehmer, 52; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG 1/2.

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Figure 10. View of Marville from Saint Jean (suburbs of Marville) – a stone bridge on the Othain. A French photograph published in the form of a postcard before 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

regiment’s II battalion neutralised the French artillery which fired from its flanks in the vicinity of Flassigny962. When the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment left Villers-le-Rond, its commander, Captain von Schuckmann, ordered the remaining companies to form an extended line and march to the road running from Marville and Longuyon (to the north of Marville). When the fog cleared, the red trousers of the French infantrymen were spotted, as they were retreating to Saint Jean (the suburbs of Marville). Better visibility made the shelling from the French field cannons more accurate and the subsequent shells started to fall on the positions of the most advanced 7th company of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. By order of the commander of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the 6th and 8th companies formed a line on both flanks of the 7th company, thus extending the front and enabling a continued attack on Marville along the road. Behind them, the extended line of the 5th company marched. The French field artillery was firing violently from a small distance and the infantrymen shot from their rifles, yet the fog made it impossible to locate their positions. Reserve Second Lieutenant Lucian Blümel described this part of the fighting in his memoirs:

962 Angerstein and Schlemm, 23.

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We were extending our line of rifles and moving forward exactly like on a firing range: jump, get up, march, march. Another jump. There’s a haystack in front of me. It attracts attention like a magnet. I ran to the haystack and was about to fling myself on it when a Gefreiter called: “Lieutenant, don’t go there!”. He was right, I almost forgot: nearly always, the enemy focuses its fire on this type of cover. Something rustled in the haystack for a long time: ssss, pffff, ding! The artillery fire is gaining in force. We need to continue our march to run away from them. The grenades are getting near. I am extending my platoon ever wider. Suddenly, everyone is squatting in the grass. I can see four, eight and later on a larger number of shrapnel shells above us, saying their blessings with a thundering noise. The ground around me was quaking. I lay still for long minutes, certain that I would die, with my hands in a stubble field, pressed against the ground. Suddenly, two strong blows hit my knapsack. Ouch! No, nothing happened, the bullets are probably stuck in it. But suddenly it feels as if a metal rod hit me on all the bones in my leg. I am wounded963.

Meanwhile, a fusilier battalion and the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment took up positions on the hills to the south-west of Villers-leRond, which enabled effective support of the attacking companies of the II battalion964. Captain von Puttkamer, the commander of the machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, gave the following account: Suddenly, heavy fire on the front company [the 7th company of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment – B.K.]. Pressing ahead in the thick fog, the company approached the enemy positions and there was a threat of it bleeding to death, before the remaining companies were deployed. However, it took no time at all to extend one company on the right and on the left of the front company [the 6th and 7th companies of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment – B.K.], just like on a firing range. Consequently, the front company soon gained support. At the same time, the fusilier battalion and the machine-gun company captured the area to the south-west of Villersle-Rond, still being shelled by the enemy’s artillery. The French artillery was particularly oppressive – judging by the noise, it must have been very close, just in front of us to the left. “Please try to neutralise it with one machine-gun platoon!” was the order I received. The fog could have come in handy. However, just as Lieutenant Maager’s platoon, appointed by me to complete this mission, got to the road from Longuyon and Marville, to approach the battery more from a flank, it came under heavy fire. Therefore, the immediate enemy, i. e. the infantry had to be defeated. We looked for them through good binoculars to no avail, even when the visibility improved. The French had perfectly camouflaged their positions, and only the noise and the direction of the flying shells gave any indication. Finally, a trench was discovered in the southern part of the village 963 Memoirs of reserve Second Lieutenant Lucian Blümel from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, in Gottberg, 60–61. Reserve Second Lieutenant Lucian Blümel from the 7th company of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Schroda, Kreis Schroda (now S´roda Wielkopolska), is recorded in the regiment’s list of casualties as lightly wounded. AVDV, 45/ 1914. 964 Gottberg, 60–61; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG 1/2.

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and then effectively shelled. The French did not last the German machine-gun fire for a long time. As the POWs agreed later on, they were very much afraid of it. Some movement in the French troops was spotted, but this time it was them retreating. While fear fuelled flight, many French soldiers were found [dead – B.K.], lying outside the trench with their backs to the enemy965.

Soon after the French infantry trench was identified south of Marville, the artillery fire forced the French troops to retreat. When the commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment ordered all his units to attack Marville, the fusilier battalion grouped its companies in extended lines to the south-west of Villers-leRond. Initially, the 9th and 12th companies of the fusilier battalion joined the first line of the II battalion. The second line was formed by the 10th and 11th companies. When the French field artillery shrapnel bombs started to explode above the fusilier battalion, its companies moved aggressively forward, suffering casualties. The attack was described by the Sergeant Manthey’s deputy from the 9th company of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment: We leapt forward – the 1st platoon followed by the 2nd and the 3rd platoons. At the very first leap, deputy reserve officer Bohm, the commander of the 3rd platoon, was wounded966 in this situation, I took over command. During the next leap forward, deputy reserve sergeant967, a secondary school teacher, was shot in the head968.

The soldiers from the 10th and 11th companies of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment crossed the Othain on footbridges, where they joined the 46th Infantry Regiment and launched an attack969. The assaulting troops were supported by the division’s artillery and the regiment’s machine-gun company. The attack was described by grenadier Adam Ulrich from the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment: (…) “Company, form extended lines to the right of the road!” – comes the captain’s order, half an hour later. The company extend into a long line. It now consists of 200 people. Intervals of four paces – the company’s front is approximately 800 m long. “Forward! The grey extended line moves obediently forward through a field of oats. It is early morning. The oats are quite ripe, but it is not time to reap. What’s that? There are 965 Notes by Captain von Puttkamer, commander of a machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, in Gottberg, 62. 966 Deputy reserve officer Georg Bohm from the 9th company of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Schwedt a.O., recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV; 17/1914. 967 It was Vizefeldwebel Georg Mathey from the 9th company of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Klein-Bartelsee, Kreis Bromberg (now Bartodzieje Małe, in the city of Bydgoszcz, on the southern bank of the Brda), recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 17/1914. 968 Account of Sergeant Manthey from the 9th company of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, in Gottberg, 63. 969 Gottberg, 61–64.

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sudden bangs from ahead. Swarms of angry bees are buzzing in the air. Down! In the tall oats you cannot see a thing except for the swarm of flies or bees humming above our heads. “Diagonally to the right! March, on the double!” says the platoon’s commander. The grey extended line rises and runs. In front of it is a field of rye. The a swarm of buzzing bullets, the French machine guns are chattering bitterly. The rifle bullets are cracking. Who will get up, who will walk forward when the grey uniforms are falling like haystacks? Someone is shouting, someone is cursing, someone is moaning and calling. The command is “Diagonally to the right!”. Among the stacks of golden rye are grey and immobile patches of uniforms. The company walks through the field to a meadow through which a wide stream flows; there is also a pond on the right. Someone finds a footbridge. The company bunches up. Suddenly, we hear the chatter of a machine gun. Someone is falling. A low rumble starts in the back. The air is split by a terrible swishing and a barrage of white puffs of smoke with a dry crack. The artillery is clearing the way for the infantry. Yet the artillery is firing too short970 because the twelfth company [from the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment – B.K.] is in the front. There, the small town of Marville stretches out in a valley. The company is crossing the stream on a footbridge and marching through dense forest. Every soldier is proceeding on his own. The platoons and sections are all hotchpotch. Yet everyone keeps walking forwards, always forwards! There is something that nobody realises, something calling in us without a command. The spirit of the infantry! We have left the hellish woods (where a berserk, crazy swarm of bullets is grazing the leaves, toppling trees and people, severing any communication) only to see our own artillery sending a hail of pressed lead and steel shells – out of the frying-pan into the fire. The real dance is only starting. The first to fall is a young reserve sergeant. Another one falls, hit between the eyes. Groups of grey uniforms keep falling. Someone is shouting: “To the right of the yellow patch, in the shrubs by the road – gun sight 600 – single fire!…” Heavy firing ensues. The words of the command are inaudible. A company of the second battalion [of the 6th Grenadier Regiment – B.K.] is firing from the right flank through an open field, triggering off violent counter-fire. The grey uniforms are falling, falling, but others are running. Finally, the extended line merges into field of beetroot and opens fire. The white clouds of shrapnel bombs crack indefatigably and always too briefly971.

The soldiers from the 6th company of the II battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment carried out an attack on the right side of the road to the south of Marville. A battery of the French artillery was firing from that direction and posed a considerable threat to the grenadiers. When the fog cleared, the battery’s position was revealed, next to the church in Marville, and half of the 6th company opened fire. The intensity of the French artillery fire decreased considerably and 970 When the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment was shelled by its own artillery during an attack on Marville, the regiment’s aide-de-camp Second Lieutenant Frankenberg hopped on a bike and rode under strong artillery and machine-gun fire to the battery’s position to correct the shelling. For his act of courage he received the Iron Cross 2nd class. Gottberg, 61–64. 971 Leon Prauzin´ski and Adam Ulrich, W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstan´ców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920 (Poznan´: Ksie˛garnia S´w. Wojciecha, 1939), 20.

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soon ceased. When the grenadiers reached the position of the French battery, they wrote in white chalk “6./6.” on the gun shields to mark the 6th company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment’s capturing the French guns. After crossing the Othain, the soldiers of the 10th and 11th companies of the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment marched in the woods toward Marville, pushing out the French infantry from its position. At the same time, an order was issued for the machine-gun section to take up firing position and to open fire on the French troops from the flank. Captain von Puttkamer recollected the skirmish in the following way: Nearly all the units of the II battalion were deployed to fight, and the fusiliers battalion was ordered to extend its line to the right of the II battalion. Both machine-gun platoons were expected to join the front line. The I battalion was still positioned on the right and to the rear. Now, the first thing to do was to march under the artillery fire through an open area. The soldiers proceeded quickly, in compact lines of riflemen like during exercises, taking only short breaks to catch their breath. The area, almost 1,200 m wide, was crossed almost without casualties. It was not easy for the machine gunners to carry 50 kg and keep pace, but they managed it, and soon we could hear “tack, tack, tack” when they started to fire. I ran more to the left, and fell into a trench probably abandoned by the enemy at the beginning of the skirmish. I could not see out of the trench, but I could hear my 1st platoon. I could no longer command the entire unit because the machine-gun company took up positions in a section 400 to 500 m long; each section commander had to operate single-handedly. After the infantry platoons fired on a trench to the north of Marville, we tried to march forward. However, we had barely stood up, when the enemy aimed its machine-gun fire at us and a grenade exploded right in front of us. Two soldiers next to me fell, covered in blood. I was dragged to the back by force and, when I came to my senses, I was very surprised that nothing had happened to me972.

On 25 August, the “von Arent” group was ordered to resume marching through La Higny farm to Villers-le-Rond, where it was to join the marching column of the 19th Infantry Brigade. However, when intense fire was exchanged near Marville, the soldiers of the 5th and 6th companies of the II battalion and the machine-gun company of the 46th Infantry Regiment joined the fighting on their own initiative. They were followed by the I battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment973 which at 6h00 set off on a march from hill 303 (near Épiez-sur-Chiers) to hill 281 where it took over support of the artillery. When the II battalion and the fusilier battalion of the 6th Grenadier regiment were deployed to the fighting, the commander of the “von Arent” Group ordered the I battalion to proceed to the right flank of both battalions and launch an attack. According to the order, the

972 Gottberg, 65–66. 973 Zunehmer, 51–52.

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I battalion resumed marching through Moulin-de-Grandvaux, forded the Othain and took up positions in a forest to the north of Marville974. At 11h00, the troops of the “von Arent” Group marched to the hills to the north of Marville. There, at 11h45, a short exchange of fire ensued with the French infantry. The carts of the machine-gun company could not cross the Epiez river and therefore the soldiers had to carry 6 MG-08 machine guns over 10 km; each gun with its mount weighed 54 kg. What’s more, the gun handling soldiers were carrying two water containers (6.5 l each) and ammunition boxes (each carrying 250 cartridges in a belt)975. At 12h30, the machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment was deployed to the east of Saint Jean, on the 6th Grenadier Regiment’s section, where it opened up with heavy fire on the French infantry across the river. Meanwhile, at 14h00, on the main road to the west of Marville, the 50th Infantry Regiment was ordered to cease fire. At the same time, the 9th Infantry Division, attacking to the left of the10th Infantry Division, was ordered to give pursuit to the retreating French troops976. At 13h00, the 5th and 6th batteries of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment took up firing positions to the west of Marville but did not manage to take part in the fighting. Because of the late hour, both batteries set up camp there977. Meanwhile, the artillery of the 10th Infantry Division eliminated the batteries of the French artillery to the north and south of Marville and opened fire on the enemy’s infantry positions. The attack by the battalions of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, the machine-gun and artillery fire caused serious casualties in the French troops. Soon, the French infantry, driven away from its positions by the grenadiers, started to retreat to the south-west to Jametz. The retreating troops were pursued by machine-gun and artillery fire. At 16h00, the staff of the 10th Infantry Division ordered the units under its command to stop pursuing the enemy. In the course of the assault launched by the fusiliers battalion, the battalion’s standard bearer, Sergeant Alfred Dambor978 from the 11th company, was wounded. Then the standard was taken over by fusilier Hoer from the 11th company, who later received the Iron Cross 2nd class for this deed979. When the French troops withdrew from Marville, the jumbled companies of the 6th Grenadier Regiment were sorted out in Saint Jean. The regiment entered 974 Gottberg, 65–66; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 975 Zunehmer, 52. 976 Vogt, 22. 977 Benary, 59. 978 Sergeant Alfred Dambor, born in Wrocław, is recorded on the list of casualties of the 6th Grenadier Regiment as heavily wounded. AVDV, 18/1914. 979 Gottberg, 66–68; Loosch, Das Königl, 35.

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Marville at 1h00. Some houses in Marville caught fire from the artillery attack. Only the I battalion passed the village from the north-east, rather than enter it. In order to cover the front of the 10th Infantry Division, the 6th Grenadier Regiment took up positions on the hills to the south-west of Marville. Soon, another regiment took up these positions and the 6th Grenadier Regiment set off on a march to Vezin980. At 6h00, in dense fog, the soldiers of the 7th and 8th companies of the II and the III battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment reached the bridge across the Chiers in Vezin, proceeded to Villers-le-Rond and captured hill 230. The units were placed under the command of the 50th Infantry Regiment and took up positions to the north-west of Villers-le-Rond. In the first line were formed the 7th and 8th companies of the II battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment; the second line consisted of the regiment’s III battalion. While this group was not deployed in a direct attack on Marville, between 7h15 and 10h00 it came under intense fire from French field cannons981. The companies of the 46th Infantry Regiment were directly followed by the 50th Infantry Regiment which, after crossing Villers-le-Rond, marched into an open area at 8h30. The III battalion formed an extended front line; the I and II battalions followed in a second line. However, soon their positions were shelled by the French field artillery. The companies of the II battalion marched to Villersle-Rond to take cover from the artillery fire among the village’s buildings. However, the French artillery reached them there, and the II battalion had to march into an open space again, to a field of potatoes. The same happened with the I battalion and the machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment. Shrapnel shells exploded above the infantry’s positions and made any move impossible. Despite the difficult situation, the 50th Infantry Regiment did not suffer serious casualties: only one soldier was killed by the French artillery, and 12 were wounded982. Despite the thick fog, at about 6h00, both battalions of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment started to fire on what they thought were the positions of the German artillery near Lagrange forest, behind hill 288, firing in short bursts983. Meanwhile, as part of the preparations for an attack, the assault forces of the 19th Infantry Brigade were grouped into three columns in a zone 2 km wide between the village of Villers-le-Rond and La Higny farm. Despite the fact that the 47th Infantry Regiment was in the rear of the 10th Infantry Division, the 980 Gottberg, 66–68; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 981 Zunehmer, 52; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 982 Vogt, 22. 983 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD.

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soldiers from the regiment’s II and III battalions did not avoid casualties caused by explosions of French artillery shrapnel shells: 11 soldiers from the 8th company of the II battalion were killed and 19 were wounded. One of the shells ended up in the school in Charency, which contained a dressing point managed by Doctor Berg from the III battalion. The explosion killed all the wounded gathered in two rooms and a corridor. In the third room, a wounded Vicefeldwebel witnessed the developments and was in such shock that he took his own life by shooting himself in the head984.

Figure 11. The German 21 cm Mörser 10 heavy howitzer in a fire position; these howitzers were at the disposal of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment which supported the operations of the 10th Infantry Division near Marville on 25 August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

When at 11h00 the fog cleared, the situation was saved by the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, which opened fire on the French positions. Meanwhile, the French 75 mm cannon batteries from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment made an attempt to exchange fire, but the German artillery’s positions were beyond their effective range985. As early as at 7h00, the division’s light 105 mm howitzers and 150 mm heavy howitzers incapacitated the French artillery by means of accurate shelling. At the same time, Marville was fired on by 210 heavy howitzers from the 984 Loosch, Das Königl, 35. On that day, the companies of the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment suffered other casualties: Vicefeldwebel Gustav Kretschmer, born in Gurtschin, Kreis Posen (now Górczyn, a district of Poznan´) and reserve Vicefeldwebel Artur Schulze, born in Gdansk. AVDV, 26/1914. 985 Angerstein and Schlemm, 22; Die Schlachten und Gefechte, 10; Vogt, 22.

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6th Mortar Regiment; their accuracy was coordinated by a reconnaissance aeroplane, which marked the targets with flares986. Paul Liniert, a French cannoneer from the 11th battery of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment, described it as follows: Another aeroplane – the same dark bird against the pale sky which was becoming lighter every minute. The cannoneers knelt and shook their fists. What tyranny! It marked us! [with flares – BK] Soon, our hill and the adjacent forest were fired on by the enemy’s heavy artillery. It was time to change positions, because the most dangerous moment was when the horse-drawn carts approached the cannons: a battery is then very sensitive to fire. Before the enemy corrected their trajectory, our major issued an order and we marched to a new position987.

The French artillery tried to open counter-battery fire on the identified positions of the German artillery from hill 277 and the road to Flassigny, although its capacity was rather limited (75 mm field cannons). However, the result was less than satisfactory988. At that time, the heavy fire of the German artillery killed and wounded many of the horses drawing the French field cannons and wagons. The French artillerymen made an attempt to withdraw the cannons from the firing area and head down the road from Marville, but the attacking grenadier companies torpedoed the plan989. When the French infantry withdrew from Marville, the companies of the II and III battalions of the 46th Infantry Regiment were ordered to capture the hill to the west of the village. Once this mission was completed, a new order came from the regiment’s commander – to march to the western part of Marville. For the best part of the battle, the I battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment was located in Villers-le-Rond as the reserve of the 19th Infantry Brigade. However, before 12h00, the commander of the I battalion (without the 4th company) was ordered to launch an attack on Marville. Meanwhile, the French troops withdrew from Marville. At 13h30, the commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment was ordered by the staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade to set off on a march to Vezin. The companies of the 46th Infantry Regiment left at 19h00 and reached Vezin at 22h30 to spend the night there990.

986 Trentinian, L’État-major En 1914, 174. 987 Paul Lintier, My seventy-five. Reminiscences of a French gunner of a 75 mm battery in 1914 (New York: G.H. Doran, 1917), 119–120, quotation from Peter Hart, I wojna ´swiatowa 1914– 1918. Historia militarna, Polish translated by Jan Szkudlin´ski (Poznan´: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, 2014), 79. 988 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; Vogt, 25. 989 Historique du 26e Régiment d’Artillerie de Campagne (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920), 8–9; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 990 Zunehmer, 52.

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At 8h00, Lieutenant Major Blin assumed command of the defence of Marville. However, the attack was so savage that there was a good chance that the decimated 7th Infantry Division would not be able to withstand the assault of the German 10th Infantry Division. Therefore, the commander of the IV Army Corps instructed the 7th Infantry Division to march 3 km to the south-west from Jametz to a line between Chabot and the forest on hill 291 in case of a forced retreat. In the new location, the troops were to continue to put up resistance. At 8h30, the soldiers from the 6th Grenadier Regiment forded the Othain (to the north of the bridge) near Grandvaux and launched an attack on Marville from the north, thus forcing the battalions from the 14th Infantry Brigade to retreat991. At 8h45, the division artillery staff of the French 7th Infantry Division received a report that the villages of Ham and Saint Jean had been abandoned by the French troops. Consequently, the III battalion of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment opened fire on the villages, hill 288 and the valley running from the hill992. Cannoneer Paul Liniert from the 11th battery of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment described his unit’s operations very vividly: Fire! The cannon recoiled like a shying horse. I was shaken from head to toe, my skull hurt, the ringing in my ears was like a huge bell tolling. A long tongue of fire came out from the barrel while the shot’s blast formed a cloud of dust around us. The earth moaned. It has an unpleasant taste in the mouth, first musty and then turning tart. It was gunpowder. I did not know if I could feel it through my sense of taste or smell. We kept firing, quickly, continuously; the cannoneers’ movements were well-coordinated, precise and quick. Nobody spoke, gestures were enough to manage the cannons. All you could hear were the coordinates provided by the captain and repeated by the first line: “Two thousand five hundred!” – “Fire!”. “Two thousand five hundred twenty five!” – “Fire!”. Following the first shot, the cannon sank in and the gunners and aimers sat down behind the shield. During a shot, the steel 75 mm barrel withdrew on the recoil buffer and then, silently and gently, went back to its original position, waiting for another cartridge. Soon, there was a heap of smouldered, smoking shell cases behind the cannon993.

As fierce fighting took place in Marville and on hill 277, the staff of the 7th Infantry Division received a report about enemy infantry reaching Delut. The German field artillery from the 10th Infantry Division took up positions on the hills to the south-west of Petit Failly and to the north-west of Marville and opened fire on the rear of the French troops. Soon the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division was informed that the German troops had pushed out the units of the French V Army Corps from Grand Failly. What is more, the ford 991 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD. 992 26e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 950/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 993 Lintier, My seventy-five, 119–120, quote from Hart, 78.

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which the 14th Infantry Brigade was supposed to defend was not occupied and the German troops penetrated the area on their way to Marville994. Consequently, at 9h30 the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division ordered the retreat and evacuation of the defenders of Marville and the troops from hill 277. The units of the 14th Infantry Brigade were to take up positions to the south of Chabot forest and to cover the retreat of the 13th Infantry Brigade to the south-west toward Jametz. The divisional staff took up positions at the junctions of the roads from Marville to Montmédy and Juvigny. Two battalions from the 103rd Infantry Regiment, supported by the battalions of the 315th and 317th Infantry Regiments, positioned themselves around the firing positions of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment995. As a result of the sudden collapse of the defence built up by the French V Army Corps to the south-east of Marville, the unit was enveloped by the German troops from the right flank of the French IV Army Corps. At the same time, the French 7th Infantry Division from the defence centre in Marville occupying the section could not withstand the thrust of the German 10th Infantry Division. In these circumstances, the retreat of the 7th Infantry Division was essential. At 9h15, Lieutenant Colonel Blin, commander of the defence of Marville, reported that – following the division commander’s order – he had started to evacuate his troops. The I battalion of the 102nd Infantry Regiment was instructed to march to the second line of the trenches. The 8th company was to march to hill 277 located opposite Marville. When the commander of the 102nd Infantry Regiment was wounded, Lieutenant Colonel Blin took over command. Meanwhile, the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade ordered retreat to the south-west to Jametz996. At 10h00, the ravine along which the road from Marville ran towards Delut, and where the supply carts of the 7th Infantry Division had taken cover together with the wagons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment, became the target of German heavy artillery fire. The exploding shells and the splinters caused serious casualties among the horses and carts. The French units put up strong resistance until 11h30, when an order was given to retreat to the west through Remoiville and Louppy sur Loison, toward the Meuse Hills. The 7th Infantry Division’s retreat from Marville was accompanied by intense fire from the German artillery which soon ceased. The units of the 13th Infantry Brigade marched 2 km to the

994 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 995 Boumier, 2. 996 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2.

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south-west of Jametz, while the 14th Infantry Brigade marched to the west, to the crossing of the roads from Marville to Iré-le-Sec997. The French 7th Infantry Division set off on a march to Dun – Doulcon. The retreat was covered by two companies of the 315th Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and the 104th Infantry Regiment which took up positions 2 km to the south-west of Remoiville, in the vicinity of hill 279. The retreat was extremely chaotic. At 9h30, the staff of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment received a report about the carts of the I and III battalions having been fired by the German heavy howitzers. At 9h50, both battalions were instructed to retreat from Marville. The artillerymen pushed the cannons to where the wagons had halted, but the shelling either destroyed or damaged them, while many soldiers from the Field Artillery Regiment decided to abandon those cannons whose barrels had been damaged or become blocked by shell splinters. Soldiers from both battalions retreated to Jametz where the II battalion had gone before998. When the units of the 7th Infantry Division arrived in Jametz, their commanders tried to sort out their troops. Next, the 13th Infantry Division was ordered to regroup to hill 197 along the road from Remoiville to Brandeville. The battalion from the 26th Field Artillery Regiment took up positions on the northeast edge of the forest in Remoiville. As ordered by the IV Army Corps, at 17h00 the units of the 7th Infantry Division marched to the region between Bréhéville and Brandeville999. In the course of the fighting near Marville, the casualties of the French 26th Field Artillery Regiment included one officer killed, 2 wounded officers, 3 regular soldiers killed and 28 wounded. However, most detrimental to its firepower was losing 16 cannons1000 and approximately 30 artillery wagons. Coupled with the 997 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD. 998 102e régiment d’infanterie (6. 08. 1914–23. 04. 1915), 26 N 674/5, JMO, RI, SHD; Boumier, 2; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 999 However, the situation was much worse in the section defended by the French 8th Infantry Division; instead of putting up strong resistance, the troops started to retreat in panic. 4e corps d’armée (2.08–31. 08. 1914), 26 N 109/1, JMO, CAGDG, SHD; 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; 14e brigade d’infanterie (8. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 500/3, JMO, BGBI, SHD; 13e Brigade d’Infanterie (7. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 500/1, JMO, BGBI, SHD; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 1000 The chronicle of the German 50th Infantry Regiment from the 10th Infantry Division says that the French artillery lost 20 cannons in Marville. If the 26th Field Artillery Regiment lost 16 cannons, the remaining 4 could have belonged to the 44th Field Artillery Regiment. Vogt, 22.

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losses near Éthe, the regiment had only 16 cannons (out of the original 36)1001. Equally serious were the losses of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment, especially in terms of wagons; 9 cannoneers were wounded and 60 horses were killed near Marville1002. The casualties of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in the battle of Marville on 25 August 1914 amounted to 228 soldiers; 71 of them were of Polish nationality. The number included 19 officers and grenadiers from the II battalion; reserve Lieutenant Colonel Lucian Blümel from the 7th company and 68 NCOs and privates were wounded. In the fighting, the I battalion lost in total 88 soldiers. From the fusiliers battalion, reserve Second Lieutenant Fritz Ticke1003 from the 12th company was killed together with 33 NCOs and fusiliers, 3 officers were wounded: Second Lieutenant Franz Schlüter1004 from the 12th company, Second Lieutenant Franz Borchardt1005 from the 12th company and reserve Second Lieutenant Kurt Eggert1006 from the 11th company plus 103 NCOs and fusiliers1007. Therefore, the total number of casualties in the fusiliers battalion amounted to 140 soldiers. Grenadier Adam Ulrich from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, a soldier of Polish origin, described the fate of his brothers in arms in the battle of Marville: NCO Stein, in charge of the first battalion, was wounded at Marville. He was replaced by Corporal Krebs: red-haired, thickset, with small beady eyes, a career NCO. The technical sergeant was no longer here: a bullet hit him in the right heel. A silly situation, lying on a slope with your head down. You can be hit anywhere, like on the buttock, as was the case of Gefreiter Kleinwächter; a bullet first entered his knapsack, hit the canteen and lodged in his left buttock. Winter’s suffering was the longest. He received a “Querschläger” [ricochet –B.K.]. When a bullet hits a tree trunk or a branch, it changes its trajectory and, fiercely whirring in the air, hits a human, and shreds his abdomen and intestines. He screamed, to put it mildly: he howled, moaned, begged and asked for help. What could his comrades do? Roloff had 8 holes in him and he was blue all over. His mouth was full 1001 Historique du 26e Régiment, 8–9. 1002 44e régiment d’artillerie de campagne (6. 08. 1914–31. 12. 1916), 26 N 984/1, JMO, RAC, SHD. 1003 Reserve Second Lieutenant Fritz Ticke from the 12th company of the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Berlin, is recorded on the list of casualties as killed. AVDV, 18/1914; Gottberg, 69, 613. 1004 Second Lieutenant Franz Schlüter from the 12th company of the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Gdansk, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 18/1914. 1005 Second Lieutenant Franz Borchardt from the 12th company of the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Karthaus (Kartuzy), is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 18/1914. 1006 Reserve Second Lieutenant Kurt Eggert from the 11th company of the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, born in Stralsund, is recorded on the regiment’s list of casualties as heavily wounded. AVDV, 18/1914. 1007 AVDV, 44/1914; AVDV, 47/1914; Erhard von Mutius, Die Schlacht Bei Longwy (Oldenburg: Verlag Stalling, 1919), 28; Gottberg, 69.

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of dirt and grass. He was biting the grass and clawing at the earth around him. Krüger’s lower jaw had been shot off and he could not scream. He only wheezed. Józ´wiak stayed where he was hit on the head with a round piece of shrapnel fired by our own artillery, with his head in a stream, still holding the gun in his hand. They were buried in a shallow grave as the French limestone was hard, on a slope in the vicinity of a forest near Marville1008.

Second Lieutenant Kairies from the 8th company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment briefly described the funeral of his comrades: In the evening my soldiers and I buried our dead comrades. It was a modest grave. Attention! Shoulder arms! Present arms! Our father in heaven! Later on the officers threw earth on the brave soldiers. Shoulder arms! Order arms! The grave was filled and a simple cross was placed on top. Life went on1009.

The casualties of the 46th Infantry Regiment which secured the right flank of the 10th Infantry Division during the attack on Marville amounted to 7 soldiers killed, 3 officers, 80 NCOs and privates wounded, as well as 40 missing soldiers. Therefore, the total casualties of the 46th Infantry Regiment amounted to 90 soldiers, including 26 of Polish nationality1010. After 16h00, the soldiers of the 47th Infantry Regiment in Marville finally received warm meals from the field kitchens. When the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment found quarters in Marville, a large French food store was discovered with large quantities of canned meat, white bread, cheeses, fatback, eggs and red wine. Notably, French food was of much higher quality than German food. Finally, the exhausted soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division could have their fill and supplement field rations. What is more, two reservists from the 2nd company of the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment found a beehive and tried to obtain honey. However, they had absolutely no idea about beekeeping and were so severely stung that the doctor qualified both of them as heavily wounded. Meanwhile, in the late afternoon a majority of the troops of the 47th Infantry Regiment found quarters in Villers-le-Rond while the I battalion and the machine-gun company was stationed in a mill in Grandvaux1011. At 17h00, the commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment was ordered to march to Villers-leRond and remain there for the night. It was a time when the regiment received its first field delivery of mail from home1012. The 1st King’s Mounted Rifles set up a camp near Vezin and the “Krosigk” squadron was stationed near Villers-le Rond. 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012

Prauzin´ski and Ulrich, 21–22. A fragment of a letter of Second Lieutenant Kairies, in Gottberg, 69. Zunehmer, 53; AVDV, 20/1914. Loosch, Das Königl, 36. Vogt, 23.

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On the evening of 25 August the cavalrymen rejoiced because the long-sinceforgotten luggage wagons arrived1013. On 25 August, changes occurred in the 20th Field Artillery Regiment’s command. The new commander was Lieutenant Colonel Hasse, previously the commander of the Ammunition Column of the V Army Corps; he was replaced by Major von Krogh, the former commander of the I battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment who, in turn, was replaced by Captain von Froreich. The new commander of the 1st battery was Captain Merckel. Subsequently, reserve Lieutenant Krugmann took over command of the 2nd light ammunition column of the II battalion of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment1014. On the evening of 25 August, the 6th Grenadier Regiment found quarters in Vezin and its surrounds. Despite the losses, morale in the regiment was high. At the same time, luggage arrived from Arlon accompanied by the first military mail from home1015. The 56th Field Artillery Regiment also set up a camp in the vicinity of Vezin where at 20h00, for the first time since 21 August, supply columns arrived including mail from the mother country1016. Following the defeat at Éthe and Marville where the 7th Infantry Division suffered heavy casualties, on 26 August the divisional staff issued an order to retreat 30 km away to the left bank of the Meuse. The troops’ morale was very low and the soldiers were disheartened. At 21h00, the units of the 7th Infantry Division set off on a night march down the road through Haraumont and Vilosnes to Brieulles were they arrived at 6h00. The French soldiers, exhausted by several days of intense fighting, were a sorry sight. Due to the ever-present threat posed by the German 5th Army Corps, the 7th Infantry Division was then tasked with defending the crossing on the Meuse near Brieulles and occupied the hills to the north and south of the village1017. On 24 August, the French troops launched a major counterattack on the left flank of the German V Army between Etain and Conflans; initially it was considered a meaningless incident. However, the situation became so serious that in 1013 Senftleben, 61; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 1014 Benary, 62. 1015 Gottberg, 69–72. 1016 Angerstein and Schlemm, 23. 1017 On 27 August 1914, the troops of the 7th Infantry Division were released by the units of the 8th Infantry Division and the V Army Corps and marched to the rear, toward Romagnesous-Montfaucon (the divisional staff), Gesnes and Exermont in order to replenish the losses and regenerate, 7e division d’infanterie (1.08–31. 12. 1914), 26 N 282/1, JMO, DIIT, SHD; Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 2: Divisions d’Infanterie, Divisions de Cavalerie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1924), 53–56; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2.

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order to stabilize the left flank of the 5th Army, an order was issued to retreat to a line between Spincourt and Landres. On 25 August, the right flank and the centre of the German 5th Army were engaged in fierce fighting for the zone of the Othain river between Marville and Spincourt.1018. Following a success on the right flank of the 5th Army, its commander Prince Wilhelm decided to continue the offensive in the area. Consequently the V Army Corps was ordered to march to Vittarville, to the south-west of Marville. In order to complete the mission, the first to leave was the 9th Infantry Division, while the 10th Infantry Division covered the area from the direction of the Montmédy stronghold near the road from Charency to Marville. When after 8h00, the troops of the 9th Infantry Division reached Vittarville, General Hermann von Strantz ordered pursuit of the French IV Army Corps through Haraumont toward the Meuse Hills1019. At 8h45, General Robert Kosch issued an order for the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles to move toward Flassigny and then carry out reconnaissance between Chiers and Loison. Half of the 3rd squadron of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles was tasked with supporting the units besieging the Montmédy stronghold. The remaining part of the 3rd squadron under the command of Lieutenant Holtz was to protect the staff of the 10th Infantry Division. Carrying out the order from the divisional commander, at 9h00 the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles sent out four patrols commanded by Second Lieutenants Boeckmann, Joachim von Buuse, Zimmer and Unterberger. Soon the patrols were followed by the entire regiment, which by around noon was located north of Marville. The reconnaissance revealed that the area up to the Montmédy stronghold was free of the enemy. A patrol under the command of reserve Second Lieutenant Zimmer reached Stenay upon the Meuse. When the 10th Infantry Division was ordered to follow the 9th Infantry Division to Vittarville, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were ordered to cover the division’s march from the Montmédy stronghold and Jametz. In the course of the march of the 10th Infantry Division, the mounted rifles were ordered to conduct reconnaissance in the area near the Montmédy stronghold and the roads leading to the Meuse Hills and further on to Rémoiville and Jametz1020. On 26 August, the I battalion was separated from the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Infantry Division; the battalion had a new commander, Tillmann, and was meant to take part in enveloping the Montmédy stronghold. Soon, the re1018 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Deutschlands Heldenkampf 1914–1918 (München: J. F. Lehmann Verlag, 1922), 37–40; Loosch, Das Königl, 18–31. 1019 Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 1020 Senftleben, 62–63; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2.

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maining companies of the regiment were instructed to be on the alert; a machinegun company was instructed to march to Villers-le-Rond. At 14h00, the soldiers of the 47th Infantry Regiment set off on a march through Saint Jean and Marville to Delut where a halt was ordered. Meanwhile, the separated I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment marched to the north-west toward the Montmédy stronghold and at 12h30 took up positions to the west of Flassigny where it started to dig trenches in the difficult rocky bed. At the same time, on the night of 26 August a patrol of the 2nd company exchanged fire with an unknown opponent. Only in the morning did they realise that it had been a patrol from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. The German troops captured the Montmédy stronghold on 28 August1021 and the I battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment went back to its regiment1022. On 26 August, the 46th Infantry Regiment mostly rested but at the end of the day, it was ordered to march to Marville where on 27 August it cleaned the battlefield. The soldiers from the 3rd and 4th companies of the I battalion were tasked with burying their dead comrades from the 46th Infantry Regiment. The fusiliers from the 6th Grenadier Regiment were ordered to bury the fallen soldiers from their battalion1023. On that day after 10h00, the battalions of the 50th Infantry Regiment were ready to leave. However, initially only the II battalion was deployed and ordered to take up positions to the west of Marville on the road between Jré-le-Sec, Jametz and Credon farm where it changed the vanguard of the 9th Infantry Division. Then heavy rain came down. At 15h30, the staff of the 50th Infantry Regiment were ordered to set off on a march through Saint Jean, Marville and Delut. At 20h00, the soldiers from the 50th Infantry Regiment reached Delut and found quarters for the night. At 22h00 an order arrived for 27 August which was announced a day free of fighting1024. On the late afternoon of 26 August, a promising attack by the V Army Corps was stopped by an order from the staff of the 5th Army. In the corps’ structure, the 9th Infantry Division came first, followed by the 10th Infantry Division whose front lines were located in the vicinity of Delut. The 1st King’s Mounted Rifles set up camp to the south of Marville1025. Most of 26 August, the 6th Grenadier Regiment remained in Vezin but at 15h00 the alarm was sounded and a roll call carried out for the companies. The commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade spoke, and praised the grenadiers for 1021 1022 1023 1024

Die Schlachten und Gefechte, 10. Loosch, Das Königl, 36. Zunehmer, 53. Vogt, 23; Carte 80.000e. – Situation de la IIIe Armée et de l’Armée de Lorraine le 25 août 1914 au soir, in AFGG, 1/2. 1025 Senftleben, 66.

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their efforts in the battle of Marville. The roll call finished with three “Hoorays” in honour of Emperor Wilhelm II. The grenadiers marched to Saint Jean, where they found quarters. In the afternoon, Emperor Wilhelm arrived in Marville together with his son Wilhelm, the German Crown Prince, the commander of the 5th Army1026. The Emperor’s visit was described by Rittmeister Blanck from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles: My squadron and I were stationed in a camp in Marville; I spent the night in a house demolished by shelling. To have some light at night, I was buying an altar candle from a French candle vendor when I spotted an automobile with the crown prince. I ran to the road and informed my squadron about the prince’s visit. He shook my hand firmly and said that he was pleased with the reports delivered by the King’s Rifles. He told us to continue to carry out our duties. Meanwhile, our regiment’s commander arrived. The crown prince talked to him for a long time1027.

Emperor Wilhelm II and Wilhelm, the German Crown Prince, met the soldiers from the 10th Infantry Division stationed in Marville and inspected the battlefield. At the sight of the effects of the fighting, they praised the involvement of the 6th Grenadier Regiment; they awarded many Iron Crosses 2nd class. The soldiers, especially the Poles, would mock Prince Wilhelm in private conversations because of his eccentric behaviour, not befitting an heir to the throne, or a commander of the 5th Army1028. In line with the order from the staff of the 5th Army, following intense fighting, 27 August was to be a rest day for specific army corps. In that time, the divisions were expected to sort out their units, replenish their ammunition, food rations and fodder for the horses. The battlefields also needed to be cleared and the wounded evacuated. On the afternoon of 26 August, the Longwy stronghold capitulated. On that day, the commander of the 10th Infantry Division sent patrols out under the command of Second Lieutenants von Lieres and Haarhaus from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles toward the Meuse Hills to Dun and Vilosnes. The patrols informed that the French troops had withdrawn to the western bank of the Meuse1029. Meanwhile, the staff of the 5th Army issued an order for the V Army Corps to pursue the French troops to the south-west, to the Meuse along the Vittarville – Haraumont line. However, due to the Russian offensive in East Prussia and the threat of Russians capturing the region, the Supreme Army Command (OHL) decided to withdraw the units of the V Army Corps from the Western front and 1026 Gottberg, 69–72. 1027 Senftleben, 66. 1028 An account from Captain von Puttkamer, in Gottberg, 69–72; Angerstein and Schlemm, 24; Alain Denizot, Des Poilus aux Doughboys: Saint-Mihiel 1914–1918 (Nouvelles Editions Latines: Paris, 1998), 37. 1029 Senftleben, 66.

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transport them by train to East Prussia. The Poznan´ corps was to be accompanied by the Guards Reserve Corps and the XI Army Corps1030. Consequently, on 27 August the 10th Infantry Division, as part of the V Army Corps, was designated the reserve of the OHL. The division was ordered to march to the north of Metz to the vicinity of the Diedenhofen railway junction where it was to board a train and travel to the east1031. On the afternoon of 27 August, the staff of the 19th Infantry Brigade issued an order for the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the 46th Infantry Regiment to set off on a march through Noërs, Longuyon, Beuveille and Doncourt (a march distance of 11.6 km); they immediately obeyed the order. The 46th Infantry Regiment found quarters in Beuveille1032. At 14h00, as part of the 20th Infantry Brigade, the 47th Infantry Regiment set off on a march from Delut to the north-west. Late in the evening, the regiment reached Longuyon and found quarters for the night. The companies were very tired after the intense march, because the state of the roads was bad after rain. What is more, the soldiers did not receive any bread, as the downpour damaged the stocks and the divisional bakery could not operate in the rain1033. At 15h30, the 50th Infantry Regiment marched out on boggy roads and proceeded through Marville to Longuyon where it was quartered. The 1st King’s Mounted Rifles were the last unit of the 10th Infantry Division to set off as late as at 20h00, once all the patrols had returned1034. The 20th Field Artillery Regiment arrived in Longuyon late in the evening. Since it was not possible to set up camp, the artillerymen remained in their marching columns on the road. The regimental staff found quarters in the local hotel, while the gunners spent the night in the nearby houses1035. On 28 August, the V Army Corps resumed its march toward Diedenhofen down a road running through demolished villages and battlefields. The 6th Grenadier Regiment resumed march from Doncourt through Boismont, 1030 Vogt, 24. 1031 The marching distance from Marville to Diedenhofen was 60 km and could have been covered by the units of the 10th Infantry Division in 2–3 days; the division needed 2 more days to board the trains, assuming that enough wagons were available. Cartographic collection: Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen im Auftrage des Kaiserlichen Ober-Präsidiums zu Strassburg nach amtlichen Quellen bearb. von Heinrich Kiepert; Schriftst. v. C. Bischoff; Terrainst. v. J. Sulzer, 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, MCARTE10392, Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg, [further referred to as: Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, BNUS]. 1032 Gottberg, 70–72; Zunehmer, 53. 1033 Loosch, Das Königl, 36–37. 1034 Senftleben, 66–67; Vogt, 24; Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, MCARTE10392, BNUS. 1035 The author of the ledger of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment recorded the wrong date; according to him, the unit marched into Longuyon on 26 August 1914, which actually took place one day later. Benary, 60.

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Fillières and Aumetz (march distance of 23.5 km) while the 46th Infantry Regiment marched through Lüdelingen to Tressingen1036. As part of the 19th Infantry Brigade, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment moved from Marville to the north-west, through Longuyon, Beuveille, Aumetz, Tressingen to Diedenhofen1037. The 47th Infantry Regiment left at 6h30 in a march column of the 20th Infantry Brigade; its route of 26 km went through Pierrepont, Bazailles, Ville-au-Montois, Fillières, Serrouvulle and Errouville. It brightened up, so the march was not as tiring as on the previous days1038. At 7h00, the 50th Infantry Regiment set off on a march through Pierrepont, Boismont, Bazailles and Ville-au-Montois to Fillières. To the west of Bazailles, the marching columns of the 10th Infantry Division were passed by the staff automobile of Wilhelm, the German Crown Prince. As he passed them, the commander of the 5th Army waved to the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division. Meanwhile, the III battalion and the machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment found quarters in Fillières while the regiment’s staff, the I and II battalions were stationed in Serrouville1039. The 20th Field Artillery Regiment resumed its march via Boismont, Serouville and Errouville1040. Marching on that day in the rearguard of the 10th Infantry Division, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles reached Fillières late in the afternoon1041. On 29 August, the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division rested and used the free time to clean their guns, equipment and uniforms. On 30 August, following the victory of the German 8th Army under the command of General Paul Hindenburg over Russian troops in East Prussia, the OHL revoked the order sending the V Army Corps to the east. Next, the V Army Corps, including the 10th Infantry Division, was re-appointed to the 5th Army. Immediately, the staff of the 5th Army ordered the V Army Corps to march to the west through Longuyon and Marville to Stenay. Following that order, the V Army Corps started its march around 17h00. In front of the marching columns of the 10th Infantry Division were the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles and in the evening they reached Doncourt (8 km before Longuyon)1042. On 30 August at 17h00, the 50th Infantry Regiment moved as the vanguard of the 10th Infantry Division in the west, and reached Beuveille at 23h001043. In the afternoon, the 6th Grenadier Regiment and the 46th Infantry Regiment set off on 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041

Gottberg, 70–72; Zunehmer, 53. Angerstein and Schlemm, 24. Zunehmer, 54. Vogt, 24. Benary, 60. Senftleben, 68; Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, MCARTE10392, BNUS. 1042 Senftleben, 68. 1043 Vogt, 25.

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a march, and in the late evening reached Bazeilles and Ville-au-Montois1044. On 30 August at 17h30, the 47th Infantry Regiment started its march to Pierrepont. The tired soldiers were amused at discovering a factory of soap and eau de cologne. The soldiers from the 47th Infantry Regiment stocked up on the goods and started using them profusely to refresh themselves1045. On the evening of 30 August, the units of the 10th Infantry Division took up positions near Beuveille, Pierrepont and Boismont. In Beuveille, the staff of the 5th Army was stationed1046. On the morning of 31 August, before the 10th Infantry Division assembled, the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles resumed their march; two patrols were sent toward Montmédy under the command of Second Lieutenants Zimmer and von Friedrich, Second Lieutenant von Schmidt-Pauli’s patrol was instructed to march to Stenay, where it was to establish communications with the 3rd Cavalry Division under the command of Division General Freiherr von Hollen. Soon, the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles and then the staff of the 10th Infantry Division received a report from a patrol of Second Lieutenant von Friedrich that the Montmédy stronghold had been captured by German troops1047. On 31 August at 6h30, as the division’s vanguard, the 50th Infantry Regiment set off on a march through Longuyon, Marville and Saint Jean1048. The 6th Grenadier Regiment reached Grand Failly (near Marville)1049. The 47th Infantry Regiment, marching through Noërs to Villers-le-Rond, reached the destination around 15h00 and later on continued to Petit Xivry and Petit Failly (to the west of Longuyon) where it was stationed until 1 September1050. On that day, the 56th Field Artillery Regiment also reached Marville; in the evening, the batteries found quarters in Grand-Failly and Petit-Failly1051. On the evening of 31 August, the units of the 10th Infantry Division captured the area between

1044 Gottberg, 70–72; Zunehmer, 53. 1045 Loosch, Das Königl, 37. 1046 Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, MCARTE10392, BNUS. 1047 On the night of 28 August, the French troops in the Montmédy stronghold (2,000 soldiers) made an attempt to retreat and break through the woods to Verdun. The plan failed because the crew came across the XIII Army Corps. After fierce fighting, the stronghold’s commander was taken prisoner of war and his unit was destroyed. The Montmédy stronghold was captured without a fight. Julius Rebold, Die Festungskämpfe im Weltkriege (Zu¨ rich: Ges. f. militär. Bautechnik, 1938), 69. 1048 Vogt, 25. 1049 Zunehmer, 54. 1050 Loosch, Das Königl, 38. 1051 Angerstein and Schlemm, 24.

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Flassigny, Marville, Saint Jean, Villers-le-Rond, Ham lès Saint Jean, Petit Xivry, Petit Failly and Rupt-sur-Othain1052. On the evening of 31 August, the patrol of Second Lieutenant von SchmidtPauli sent a report to the staff of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles in Flessigny (to the north-west of Marville) that the 3rd Cavalry Division had assembled in the vicinity of Stenay, while the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) crossed the Meuse between Stenay and Dun. Meanwhile, the VI Army Corps had been stopped near Sommauthe (to the west of Stenay) by a powerful counter-attack by French troops. In this situation, the staff of the 5th Army planned for the V Army Corps to march through Marville and Stenay, to cross the Meuse and form up between the VI Army Corps and the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg). The staff of the V Army Corps were afraid, however, that the French troops would attack the positions of the 5th Army between Verdun and Metz from the direction of Verdun. For this reason, the staff of the 5th Army decided to send the V Army Corps to support the section. Consequently, the V Army Corps was ordered to march to Marville and Longuyon where it was to serve as reserve of the 5th Army1053. Notably, the V Army Corps’ retreat from the frontline was so efficient that the French troops missed it completely. Afterwards, on 9 September 1914, the commander of the Verdun stronghold informed the staff of the 3rd Army of the fact. He found out by capturing correspondence from a wagon in Fresnes-enWoëvre which belonged to the 10th Infantry Division1054. After being re-incorporated into the structure of the 5th Army, the V Army Corps was initially its reserve. The following day, 1 September, was a rest day; the soldiers purchased a large number of hens and prepared them in many different ways1055.

1052 Vogt, 25; Karte 3: Der Kampf der Deutschen 5. Armee um den Maasu¨bergang vom 29. August bis 1. September 1914, in Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Bd. 3: Der Marne Feldzug. Von der Sambre zur Marne (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1926); Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, MCARTE10392, BNUS. 1053 Senftleben, 69; Specialkarte des Deutschen Reichslandes Elsass-Lothringen 1:250.000, Berlin 1879, MCARTE10392, BNUS. 1054 Télégramm Gouverneur Verdun à général cdt Pierrefitte et Ligny-en-Barrois, 09. 09. 1914, in Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (operations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 3: La bataille de la Marne, Annexes: vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1927), 713. 1055 Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918). Compiled from Records of Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces at General Headquarters (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 181–183; Hans Möller, Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens “Pour le Mérite” im Weltkrieg, Bd. 1 (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 607–609; Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Bd. 3, 53.

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On 1 September, from 6h00, the units of the 10th Infantry Division were ready for march, yet the plans were changed. This was because at 17h00 the staff of the 10th Infantry Division received information that Emperor Wilhelm II Hohenzollern would visit the troops. In anticipation of the emperor, large numbers of soldiers lined the road and the bridge across the Chiers. Captain Schoenbeck from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment provided the following account of the moment: We ran out of the camp to reach the nearby road along which many vehicles were travelling toward Marville. We could hear the cheers from afar. We stood by the road, and when His Imperial Majesty spotted us, he ordered the driver to stop. We hurried to his automobile, he shook many hands and asked about the regiment. Then, I gave a brief report that was enthusiastically supplemented by others. Much to our astonishment and great joy, we heard about the wonderful success in the east, about the battle of Tannenberg! Emperor Wilhelm said briefly: “Well, boys, I can share good news with you, we clinched a glorious victory in the east, a large Russian army was destroyed, many corps had to prove their worth in the battlefield. Keep fulfilling your responsibilities!”. There was no end to the roar. My people threw flowers into the automobile, the shouts full of delight ended, he shook hands again and the vehicle could proceed slowly1056.

When Emperor Wilhelm II arrived at the quarters of the V Army Corps in Marville, General Hermann von Strantz reported that the emperor wanted to spend the night next to the 10th Infantry Division. Wilhelm II’s quarters was in the castle in Marville; the guards were selected from 21 NCOs and 18 soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Beyer from the machine-gun company of the 50th Infantry Regiment1057. On that day, the companies of the 47th Infantry Regiment rested in Villers-le-Rond1058. *** The pursuit of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division of the French 7th Infantry Division, defeated at Éthe, followed by the battles of Cherancy and Marville, demonstrated the 10th Infantry Division’s excellent training in wartime conditions. On the level of the division, of key importance was cooperation of different formations supporting the infantry in accomplishing the major goal. On the hills around Marville, where sappers from the French 7th Infantry Division had dug a lot of trenches, the artillery (especially heavy artillery) allocated to the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division played an important role. In the difficult, hilly terrain around the Othain river, the attack of the units was efficiently com1056 Account by Captain Schoenbeck from the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, in Benary, 60–61. 1057 Vogt, 25. 1058 Loosch, Das Königl, 38.

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manded by the divisional staff with General Robert Kosch in command. On the level of regiments, battalions and companies, the officers and NCOs of the 10th Infantry Division also led their soldiers in an exemplary way. Several days after the battle of Marville, the commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment, Lieutenant Major Max von Kaisenberg1059 wrote in a letter to his wife: Our soldiers are fighting with all their hearts, shooting like in a drill during a hailstorm. Also the enemy shells, typically launched too far, and so dangerous to the staffs in the rear, drove the soldiers forward. My recently acquired position, 300 m behind the machine-gun company and located on an unsheltered plain, was not very welcoming. Frankenberg, my aide-de-camp, called: “We have found the best spot!”. I could not believe how flat you could lie on the ground1060.

Lieutenant Colonel von Kaisenberg and the regiment’s staff were right behind the first line, which was very risky of the regiment’s commander. On the other hand, it provided the freshest insight into the course of the attack of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. The commander was accompanied by aide-de-camp Second Lieutenant von Frankenberg who described the course of the battle of Marville in the following way: All the time, the second lieutenant and I took up position right behind the line of fire [a company of the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment – B.K.]; around us, the shells whizzed with all types of tones, which we soon started to recognise and appreciate. Miraculously, we were not hit!1061 Unit of the 10th Infantry Division 6th Grenadier Regiment 46th Infantry Regiment

Unit’s casualties 228

Including Poles 71

90 318

26 97

Table. Casualties of the 10 Infantry Division in the battles of Charency and Marville, 24–25 August 1914. AVDV, 20/1914; AVDV, 21/1914; AVDV, 24/1914; AVDV, 26/1914; AVDV, 33/ 1914; AVDV, 37/1914; AVDV, 59/1914; Zunehmer, 49; Gottberg, 609–681.

On 22 August, the 7th Infantry Division was decimated at Éthe, which resulted in very low morale. Consequently, on 25 August the troops did not put up strong resistance at Marville, suffered serious casualties and were forced to retreat. The success of the 10th Infantry Division in the battle of Marville was appreciated by

1059 Lieutenant Colonel Max von Kaisenberg was killed on 15 December 1916 in the battle of Verdun while commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. AVDV, 1917/1331; AVDV, 1917/ 1390. More on the participation of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in the battle of Verdun in Bartosz Kruszyn´ski, “Poznan´ski 47. Pułk Piechoty i 6. Pułk Grenadierów w walkach pod Verdun w grudniu 1916 roku,” Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 4 (2016): 228–240. 1060 Lieutenant Colonel Max von Keisenberg’s letter to his wife, in Gottberg, 65. 1061 Account by Second Lieutenant von Frankenberg, in Gottberg, 65.

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the Supreme Commander – Emperor Wilhelm II and Wilhelm, German Crown Prince, the commander of the 5th Army who visited the battlefield. Since East Prussia was under the threat of a Russian attack, the OHL was thrown into a mild panic and issued an unjustified order to weaken the 5th Army. The V Army Corps, including the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division, was to be transported to the east. Withdrawing the V Army Corps from the front made it impossible to continue the pursuit of the defeated enemy toward the Meuse and therefore to take advantage of the success in the battles of Éthe and Marville. When the OHL revoked the order and the V Army Corps returned to the front, the First Battle of the Marne was already raging, which the success of the German offensive on the Western front hung on.

Figure 12. Grave of two soldiers: a German – musketeer, Paul Kruger from the 12th company of the 154th Infantry Regiment from the 9th Infantry Division and Pole – grenadier Adalbert Baranowski (born in Uzarzewo near Poznan´) from the 1st company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment who was killed at Charency on 24 August 1914 in F.D. Gottberg, Das Grenadier- Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege, Berlin 1935.

While the soldiers from the 10th Infantry Division who had gone through hell at Éthe and Marville had also collected invaluable experience, the battles must have traumatised the soldiers. They were not prepared for modern warfare, for the

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irrational fear at the sight of the enemy and the clear threat of death. In the course of fighting, the stress was omnipresent; it often sparked off extreme reactions and in some cases was hard to manage. Grenadier Adam Ulrich, a soldier of Polish nationality from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, wrote: A strange and new rumour spread in the companies. At Marville soldiers were seen who had not been in the line of fire at all. While it is true that the companies were all mixed up, there were people who had seen, for example, how the red-haired, loud-mouthed NCO Lehmann had spent the whole time with his comrades in a deep ravine. There were soldiers who said with an ironic twinkle in their eyes that they had not seen the captain on the line. At Virton [the author of the memoirs meant Éthe – B.K.] a reservist cleaned his rifle but forgot to unload the sixth cartridge. The rifle’s bullet hit the company’s commander in the head. Was it an accident or a vendetta? There were also soldiers who knew that at Virton, several canny types had taken advantage of the commotion and the fog and fled without saying their goodbyes to the French1062. Unit of the 10th Infantry Division Division’s staff 6th Grenadier Regiment

Unit’s casualties 5 291

Including Poles 3 91

47th Infantry Regiment 50th Infantry Regiment

238 718

79 137

46th Infantry Regiment 20th Field Artillery Regiment

323 52

154 25

56th Field Artillery Regiment 1st King’s Mounted Rifles

74 20

20 –

71

12

8

4

2nd and 3rd Field Pioneer Companies 5th Pioneer Battalion 2nd Sanitary Company

1800 525 Table. The casualties of the 10th Infantry Division between 22 August and 1 September 1914. AVDV, 20/1914; AVDV, 21/1914; AVDV, 24/1914; AVDV, 26/1914; AVDV, 33/1914; AVDV, 37/1914; AVDV, 59/1914; Zunehmer, 49; Koch, Das Niederschlesische, 45–48; Loosch, Das Königl, 31; Angerstein and Schlemm, s. 195–203; Gottberg, 609–681.

In the battle of Marville, fought on 25 August 1914, as was the case before at Éthe, many Polish soldiers were killed or wounded, along with their German comrades. Their names were published on the lists of casualties of the 10th Infantry Division in September and October 1914. In the 6th Grenadier Regiment, which launched the major attack on Marville, the casualties in the battle amounted to 228 soldiers, among them 71 soldiers of Polish nationality. The 46th Infantry Regiment lost 90 soldiers including 26 Poles. Among the casualties was one-year volunteer Bronisław Wadzyn´ski, (born in Tursko, Pleszew county) from the 12th company of 1062 Prauzin´ski and Ulrich, 25.

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the fusiliers battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment1063. His family published brief information about the deceased in the Dziennik Poznan´ski:

Figure 13. Obituary of one-year volunteer Bronisław Wadzyn´ski from the 6th Grenadier Regiment who was killed at Marville on 25 August 1914, dated 7 September 1914, “Dziennik Poznan´ski” no. 205, 8 September 1914.

(…) he was killed, aged 24, in a battle in the Western theatre of the war. Following his graduation from grammar school and becoming a professional merchant, the deceased managed in a short time to earn his colleagues’ and superiors’ love, trust and respect. Having joined the 6th Grenadier Regiment as a one-year volunteer, he went to war with them and found his grave in a foreign land. The death of Bronisław has affected his grieving family as well as his colleagues and friends1064.

Despite the success of the 10th Infantry Division in the initial weeks of the war in 1914, in the subsequent months it faced the cruel reality of the Western front. The German troops included Poles, anonymous, submerged in the grey and green mass of uniforms of the German regiments, fighting under German command for the German Emperor Wilhelm II, hoping for a better tomorrow.

1063 AVDV, 21/1914. 1064 “Obituary of Bronisław Wadzyn´ski,” Dziennik Poznan´ski, no. 207, August 10, 1914.

Conclusion

The fighting value of the “Lions of Náchod” – the German 10th Infantry Division – in August 1914 was verified during the first battle of Éthe in the southern range of the Ardennes, on the border between Belgium and France. Despite the difficult terrain and a worthy opponent, namely the French 7th Infantry Division under the command of General Edgard de Trentinian, an experienced staff officer and a talented tactician, defeating the French IV Army Corps was a fact. The soldiers and officers from the 10th Infantry Division gained their first experiences in the industrial and mass conflict of WWI. Privates and NCOs from the division in question had to abandon their civilian lives to follow their superiors’ intents and will. On all the levels of command, based on the regulations in force, the officers executed the orders of General Robert Kosch, the divisional commander. On the level of the specific regiments, battalions and companies, the officers were responsible for carrying out orders, and for their soldiers. Interestingly, before the first shots were fired in the area of operation of the 10th Infantry Division, soldiers and officers alike were not aware of what fighting in a modern war was like. They were not familiar with the intensity of battle, or the effects of an exchange of fire, artillery fire, or the dynamics of attack under enemy fire. They did not understand the brutal aspect of the fighting, taking enemy lives at very close distance, or their colleagues being wounded or killed under French fire. German troops had practised manoeuvres at regimental, brigade and divisional level on training areas before the war broke out. On the operational level, military exercises took place during imperial manoeuvres, organised every few years in different parts of Germany. In the barracks, German NCOs (the infamous Prussian corporals) taught the soldiers the legendary Prussian drill with great devotion. While the subordinates hated it, in a broader context it prepared the soldiers for the stressful wartime environment like nothing else. In comparison with the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, the technical progress was considerable, as reflected in the new models of weapons in 1914. A case in point is the German Mauser Gewehr 98 infantry rifle, whose tactical and technical parameters easily surpassed its French equivalent, the Lebel Mle 1886

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with its tube magazine and a long, fragile bayonet. The same held true for the machine guns: the German, water-cooled Maxim MG-08 was superior to the French, air-cooled Saint-Étienne Mle 1907, which tended to jam. In 1914, the French troops could only boast about the ultramodern 75 mm M1897 field gun, yet the poor quality of the fuzes and the frequent misfires largely diminished its benefits. In the initial months of the war in 1914, this gun was the only artillery weapon available at the level of the French Infantry division or corps. The advantage of the artillery of the German 10th Infantry Division over the French 7th Infantry Division was considerable; at the German troops’ disposal were fifty four 7.7 cm FK 96 n.A. field guns and eighteen 10.5 cm lFH 98/09 howitzers, while the 7th Infantry Division had only thirty six 75 mm M1897 field guns, incapable of plunging fire. From a tactical point of view, this was of special importance for fighting in difficult, hilly and woody terrain, just like at Éthe and Marville. On the other hand, in these conditions the artillery of the 10th Infantry Division could deploy the 10.5 cm lFH 98/09 light field howitzers. The situation regarding French uniforms and equipment was dire, and stemmed from the conservative opinions of French politicians who hindered the army’s development. Consequently, in August 1914 the French infantrymen were wearing bright red trousers, uncomfortable long navy blue coats, and caps with bright red tops instead of helmets. In the fierce August sun, the colourful uniforms were very visible from a long distance, which made them an easy target for the German infantry and artillery. The knapsack of a French infantryman with its archaic equipment, coupled with the dysfunctional uniform and weaponry, did not differ much from the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. Another weak link was the French infantry’s laced-up shoes, made of poor quality leather. As for the uniforms and the equipment, in August 1914 the German infantry was definitely superior to the French infantry. The uniforms – comfortably cut and made of fabric in Feldgrau (field grey) providing camouflage – were introduced in the early 20th century. Every German infantryman had two pairs of shoes (one they wore, the other in their knapsacks). The first pair was the Marschstiefel M1866 – marching shoes with a high boot leg, made of thick leather, extremely resistant to the hardships of marching. The other pair was the Schnürschuhe M1901 – laced-up ankle boots made of soft leather, worn in garrisons and in the mud. Equally well-thought was the structure and the content of the Tornister 07/13 knapsack, as well as the main belt with pouches. Every soldier had a handy ammunition stock of 150 cartridges for the unfailing Mauser Gewehr 98. Interestingly, the organizational faults of the operations of the German troops in August 1914 included an ineffective supply system; this resulted from the mistakes made by the OHL in planning the attack on Belgium and France. In the plans, the staff did not organize the transport of supplies from train stations in

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Lorraine, further to the west, to France. There were no railway lines there that would allow the supplies to be transported in accordance with the direction of the offensive. Meanwhile, during the forced march and fighting, each German Infantry Division required dozens of tons of supplies per day. After entering France, the supply system had to rely on horse-drawn carts. In the early months of WWI, there was a serious deficit of draft horses; this situation prevailed in the entire German army until the end of WWI. The more technically advanced, and therefore more effective weapons, with a higher rate of fire and accuracy, caused much more serious casualties. On the first day of fighting alone, 22 August 1914, in the battle of Éthe, the casualties of the 10th Infantry Division amounted to 1,482 soldiers, including 428 soldiers of Polish nationality. At Éthe, the biggest losses were suffered by the 50th Infantry Regiment: 718 soldiers, including 137 of Polish nationality. In the regiment, the casualties in the officer corps alone represented 44% of the soldiers and led to a temporary loss of the unit’s combat readiness. The casualties in the 50th Infantry Regiment at that time amounted to 24%. In the 46th Infantry Regiment, the casualties included 235 soldiers (128 of Polish nationality); in the 47th Infantry Regiment it was 238 soldiers, including 79 of Polish nationality; in the 6th Grenadier Regiment, 63 soldiers were shot, including 20 Poles; in the 56th Field Artillery Regiment it was 74 soldiers, including 20 Poles; in the 20th Field Artillery Regiment – 52 soldiers were killed, including 25 Poles and in the 5th Pioneer Battalion – 71 soldiers, including 12 Poles. Undoubtedly, this data must have been shocking to both the commanders of the 10th Infantry Division and the staff of the V Army Corps. Questions were posed about the casualties in the battles to come, if they were so high in the first one. It was certain, however, that the German reserve system was not ready to replace the soldiers. In peacetime, not enough reservists had been trained in Germany, and this scenario soon affected the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division. In the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914, the French 7th Infantry Division suffered the following losses: 124 officers and 5,200 NCOs and privates; this number contained 2,056 soldiers killed, and 400 taken prisoner. On one day of fighting alone, the German 10th Infantry Division, supported by a brigade of the XIII Army Corps (Württemberg), decreased the mobilization status of the 7th Infantry Division by over 50%. This was detrimental to the French unit’s morale, greatly decreased its combat potential and forced the French IV Army Corps to retreat to the south-west toward Marville, to the Othain river. Notably, despite the decimated regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, General Edgard de Trentinian made an orderly retreat, even if it was very hard to command the disorganised units, when new fighting missions were to be completed (the defence of the Othain).

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Following the battle of Éthe, the pursuit of the French IV Army Corps was delayed. Possibly, General Hermann von Strantz, the commander of the V Army Corps, was afraid that his two divisions would walk into an ambush. After the 10th Infantry Division’s pursuit of the French 7th Infantry Division, another engagement took place 27 km to the south-west of Éthe, near Marville (in France). Operations near Marville, in the hilly area around the Othain valley, were very strenuous for the privates from the 10th Infantry Division. At the same time, it was yet another test for the officers and the unit’s commander, General Robert Kosch, which they passed with flying colours. Some regiment commanders, defying the regulations, wanted to be as close to their soldiers as possible, next to the first line. Of course, the death of a regiment commander, or a large number of staff officers would have been a blow to the command system. This risk was taken in the battle of Marville by Lieutenant Colonel Max von Kaisenberg, the commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment. On the other hand, he had an opportunity to respond instantly to the changing tactical situation and to correct the battle plan. On 25 August 1914, at Marville the French 7th Infantry Division did not put up great resistance because it had suffered considerable casualties at Éthe and its morale was low. Moreover, the commander of the German 10th Infantry Division, General Robert Kosch, effectively supported the attack of his infantry units with field artillery fire and 21 cm howitzers from the 6th Field Artillery Regiment. To correct the artillery’s fire, aerial observation was used, during which the pilots marked targets with flares. It was an instance of deploying a new type of weapon – aircraft – and it heralded subsequent innovations to this means of fighting introduced in WWI. As a result of the model attack of the regiments of the German 10th Infantry Division at Marville, the French 7th Infantry Division was beaten, bloodied and forced to retreat. However, the German division paid a high price for this victory. The attack on Marville was launched by the 6th Grenadier Regiments as part of the 10th Infantry Division; its casualties included 228 soldiers, including 71 of Polish nationality. The 46th Infantry Regiment lost 90 soldiers, including 26 of Polish nationality. By the end of August 1914, the total losses of the 10th Infantry Division amounted to 1,800 soldiers, including 525 of Polish nationality. The battlefield at Marville was visited by Emperor Wilhelm II – the Supreme Commander – and his son, Wilhelm, the German Crown Prince – commander of the 5th Army. They both appreciated the tactical effort and the combat tenacity of the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division, awarding the first medals of merit. The battles of Éthe and Marville in August 1914 were also evidence of the superiority of the German army corps over the French ones, in particular of the German army’s better training, equipment and armament. Of equal importance was the fact that the German officers were tactically superior. This also resulted

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from the poor French tactical doctrine from 1913 with respect to commanding large units; the doctrine was completely ill-suited to modern war, recommending as follows: Only offensives lead to positive results; by taking the initiative, action is taken rather than accepted. Passive defence leads to certain defeat; it should be absolutely rejected1065.

The authors of the French doctrine based their idea of an offensive war on the country’s historical experiences, without taking into consideration the changeable nature of warfare and technical progress in armaments. The doctrinal errors of the French heads of staff cost French soldiers their lives in the battlefields in 1914, as was the case at Éthe. Additionally, the soldiers of the German 10th Infantry Division represented a very high level of physical condition and morale, which, to a large extent, stemmed from the unique regional idiosyncrasies of the Province of Posen1066. This was admitted, after the war, by Colonel Alphonse Grasset, who fought against the German 10th Infantry Division at Éthe with the French 103rd Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division: They [the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division – B.K.] are excellent soldiers, very well trained and acquainted with military exercises. However, the Sudetes highlanders who represent a bigger part of the mobilization state of the 9th Infantry Division, are not very skilful. The Poles, who represent nearly the entire 10th Infantry Division, display features typical of the nation: energy, bravado, tenacity; they are curt and disciplined. The German V Corps is a borderline corps; two thirds of it are active soldiers, young and willing to listen to orders from privates1067.

1065 Pascal-Marie-Henri Lucas, Rozwój mys´li taktycznej we Francji i w Niemczech podczas wojny 1914–1918 r., translated by Jerzy Biernacki, (Warszawa: Tetragon, 2013), 14. 1066 More on the regional specificity of the Province of Posen and the Wielkopolska ethos in Etos Wielkopolan: antologia tekstów o społeczen´stwie Wielkopolski z drugiej połowy XIX I XX wieku, selected and edited by Witold Molik in cooperation with Agnieszka Baszko (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skiego Towarzystwa Przyjacio´ł Nauk, 2005); Rudolf Jaworski, “Swój do swego”: studium o kształtowaniu sie˛ zmysłu gospodarnos´ci Wielkopolan 1871–1914 (Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie: Poznan´, 1998); Witold Molik, Z˙ycie codzienne ziemian´stwa w Wielkopolsce w XIX i na pocza˛tku XX wieku: kultura materialna (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 1999); Samomodernizacja społeczen´stw w XIX wieku: Irlandczycy, Czesi, Polacy, ed. Lech Trzeciakowski, Krzysztof Makowski (Poznan´: Instytut Historii UAM, 1999); W. Jakóbczyk, Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski, vol. 3: 1890–1914, Poznan´ 1967; Witold Jakóbczyk, Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski, vol. 3: 1890–1914 (Poznan´: Pan´stwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1967). 1067 Alphonse Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – I” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 25 (1923): 258.

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Fusilier Adam Ulrich from the 6th Grenadier Regiment, a soldier of Polish nationality, described the value of the 10th Infantry Division following his wartime experience: The Kaczmarek-Regiments, in greater and smaller numbers, were diminished in the mud, fire and blood. The Poznan´ divisions1068, relocated from one zone to another, did not lose, either in marching or during battles, their combat ready, disciplined, hard and extremely tenacious soldiers. Managed with iron discipline, raised in Prussian schools, trained by Prussian officers and NCOs, the Poznan´ “village peasants” represented the physically and morally healthiest soldiers. Physically – because in comparison with the population of big cities and industrial areas, they always represented the biggest number of healthy and strong recruits; morally – because in a predominantly rural area, devoid of the proletariat, social-democrat parties did not have the room or conditions to come to power1069.

The units of the V Army Corps did not have an opportunity to make use of the tactical success which resulted in the retreat of the French IV Army Corps (a section of the French 3rd Army). In that time, a crisis arose in East Prussia. The German 8th Army tried to put up resistance to the prevailing Russian troops. For this reason, the OHL issued an order to transfer several corps from the Western front, including the Poznan´ V Army Corps. In accordance with this plan, the V Army Corps, including the 10th Infantry Division, was withdrawn from the front and, at the same time, transferred from the 5th Army to the reserve of the OHL. However, before the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division managed to board the train in Diedenhofen (French Thionville), reports arrived that the Russian troops had been defeated in East Prussia in the battle of Tannenberg (26 August – 30 August 1914). Therefore, the withdrawal of the V Army Corps from the frontline at the expense of the 5th Army meant that an opportunity to launch a final attack on this section of the front was missed. After the first battles of 1914, on the tactical level – in the subunits and companies of the German 10th Infantry Division – a sense of brotherhood among the soldiers emerged which did not stem from ideological or nationality-related reasons, but rather was a sense of shared fate amid the dangers of the war. The soldiers of a single platoon or company identified with their unit, had to trust each other in battle and rely on each other to complete their missions and survive the hell of war. While the companies of the Poznan´ infantry regiments consisted of approximately 50% of Poles, Polish-German brotherhood in arms in the 10th Infantry Division in 1914 was not an official phenomenon. It is not men-

1068 Here, except the 10th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps, the author meant also the 10th Reserve Division from the V Army Corps. 1069 Leon Prauzin´ski and Adam Ulrich, W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstan´ców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920 (Poznan´: Ksie˛garnia S´w. Wojciecha, 1939), 20–21.

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tioned in the regiments’ ledgers written in Germany in the Interwar period by German officers. The ledgers show the war from the German perspective. In the Interwar period, this phenomenon was a disturbing fact, for Germans and Poles alike, and as such was not mentioned. The situation did not change during WWII, much less after its end. The role of Nazi Germany in the crimes against the Polish nation obliterated to a large extent the memory of WWI and Polish soldiers fighting in the German army during the conflict. Therefore, the Polish-German brotherhood in arms in the 10th Infantry Division in 1914 and the subsequent years of WWI has been forgotten, rejected and thus ignored. On the basis of numerous sources, including archived materials, I have recreated the organisational structure of the German 10th Infantry Division in 1914. However, in the course of my enquiries I did not come across sources on the unit’s training. Therefore, in the analysis of the issues, I made use of the regulations effective in the German army, coupled with the tactical and operational doctrines. In this respect, the high level of tactical training of the 10th Infantry Division was proved in combat. By using information from the regulations, source publications and iconography, I have presented the equipment and weapons of the specific units. As a result of an analysis of numerous sources, I have drawn new conclusions about the mobilization of the Poznan´ (German) garrison in August 1914 and the parallel covering activities on the border with the Russian Empire. They include the previously unknown episodes of a patrol of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles capturing the city of Konin, and the participation of a battery of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment in fighting near Kalisz. I have also managed to identify the details of the departures of the specific units of the 10th Infantry Division to the concentration area, as well as the transport’s itinerary and organization. On the basis of numerous accounts, memoirs and letters, I have presented how the soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division, Poles and Germans alike, perceived the war and the phenomena occurring in the battlefield, including wartime cruelty. By presenting individual cases, I have shown the process of administering medical help to the wounded, evacuation to field hospitals and the work of the doctors (including Poles). The regiments of the 10th Infantry Division in 1914 were full of soldiers of Polish nationality – inhabitants of the Province of Posen. Hence the importance of an analysis of the German list of casualties (Verlustliste) published in 1914– 1919 in the “Armee-Verordnungsblatt”. It was an extremely painstaking job, involving an analysis of several thousand large-format pages written in Schwabacher. I needed to find the specific units of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division, reading the lists page by page. The task was even more difficult, due to the fact that the casualty lists were frequently ordered by battalion. What is more, corrections were made in the subsequent issues. The process of explaining the fate of

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the specific soldiers often lasted until 1919. The resulting data have been analysed and arranged in tables. While the analyses were very time-consuming, as a result I managed to gather data on the beginnings of the regiments of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division in August 1914 for the first time. The above findings require more details from archived sources: books of births and deaths kept by German authorities in the Province of Posen and church archives. However, this will require the work of a large team working for many years. Additionally, large scale and urgent surveys should be carried out in family collections because some of the existing materials related to Poles – veterans of the German troops – have already lost their historical context due to the nonexistent written accounts. As the process is accelerating, family archives require digitalisation, source analysis and preservation for future generations. Many soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division did not come home; the casualties of the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division between 22 August and 1 September 1914, i. e. in 11 days, amounted to 1,800 soldiers, including 525 of Polish origin.

Annex

General Edgar de Trentinian Commander of the French 7th Infantry Division Part two Operations of the 7th Infantry Division of the IV Army Corps between 10 and 22 September 1914 I was the commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the IV Army Corps until 22 September 19141. With respect to the division’s fighting between 10 and 22 August 1914 and a brief description of the unit’s operations until 22 September 1914, I will be able to show the exceptional skills displayed from the early days of the war by our officers and privates, the circumstances in which the GQG2 deployed its army in battle [the 3rd Army – BK] and, last but not least, the threat posed by the organisational and decision-related inefficiency of the staffs of large

1 BK: Division General Edgar de Trentinian was in command of the French 7th Infantry Division from 26 September 1913. Before that, from 10 October 1908, he was commander of the 3rd Infantry Division and, from 21 September 1911, of the 4th Infantry Division. Therefore we may assume that he was an experienced officer at this level. Feuillet du Personnel de M. de Trantinian, Edgar Louis de Trentinian, Officiers généraux. Généraux de division (coloniale) (1880– 1932), GR 11 YD 40, Guerre et Armée de Terre. Le Service Historique de la Défense (further referred to as the SHD). 2 BK: Grand Quartier Général – (further referred to as the GQG), literally the Great General Quarters, the French general command, first seated in Vitry-le-François in Marne department, headed by Division General Joseph Joffre. Initially, the GQG structure consisted of four offices: the 1st Office – in charge of organisation, personnel and equipment; the 2nd Office in charge of intelligence, counter-intelligence and censorship; the 3rd Office in charge of operational planning, the 4th Office in charge of transport, communication and supplies. Benoît LaGarde, Grand Quartier Général 1914–1918, GR 16 NN. Répertoire Numérique Detailleé (Paris: Service Historique de la Défense, 2013): 31–41.

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units (divisions and corps), unprepared for the responsibilities they faced, i. e. the support of the command of their parent units. By presenting several important facts, I will let the readers evaluate the “deceit” and “bias” of which the army staff and the GQG were accused. These facts will suffice to draw the public’s attention to the problem of the reliability of officers’ reports and documents submitted to the archives of the Ministry of War3.

Chapter I 3. The army in a border battle Plan XVII4 entrusted the chief commander with numerous troops distributed in the following way: two armies along the border between Alsace-Lorraine (the 1st and 2nd Armies); a grouping of three armies in the centre (the 3rd and 5th Armies in the front line, the 4th Army in the rear) ready to launch an immediate offensive in the Belgian Ardennes. To the left were small Belgian and British armies, which sufficed in this operational area because the assumption was that the Germans would send few troops to the left bank of the Meuse5. This strategy proved completely unsuccessful. “Schlieffen’s plan” (“Denkschrift” since 19056 and “Studie” since 1912), while abridged by Helmuth von Moltke ( junior), was aimed at a wide manoeuvre on the right flank and lowering the assault to the south. Once the western bank of the Meuse was captured, the right flank of the German troops (the 1st and 2nd Armies) marching across 3 BK: In this statement General Edgar de Trentinian – the commander of the 7th Infantry Division – suggested that the officers from the staff of the French IV Army Corps and the 3rd Army were sloppy in keeping the reports in order to cover up their mistakes in command during the border battle of August 1914. 4 BK: Plan XVII – a French plan amassing five armies on the border of Belgium, Luxemburg and France and attacking the German armies stationed there. It was devised in case of war with Germany and approved on 7 February 1914. Therefore, it was not a plan of war with Germany, but rather a plan for an offensive on a selected part of the front. Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2005), 37–43; Robert A. Doughty, “French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own,” The Journal of Military History, no. 67 (2003), 427–454; A detailed analysis of Plan XVII in Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1: Les préliminaires – La bataille des frontières (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1922) [further referred to as AFGG 1/1], 18–67. 5 This assumption proved erroneous; Belgium was invaded by the German 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies. More on implementation of Schlieffen’s plan by German troops in August 1914 in Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Bd. 1: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen, Berlin 1925. 6 BK: A. G. von Schlieffen, Denkschrift “Krieg gegen Frankreich” [Schlieffen-Plan], December 1905 in 100(0) Schlüsseldokumente zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, access February 18, 2020, www.1000dokumente.de

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Belgium were meant to capture the northern part of France; the 5th Army formed an axis of rotation around Thionville; the 6th and 7th Armies – involved in the defensive in the initial stage of the fighting, were to launch an attack at the right moment toward Saar-Nied and capture “Cannae”. In the Vosges, on the edge of the German left flank, the enemy planned to amass its covering troops7. On 8 August, the French 3rd Army gathered along the Meuse Hills, ready to launch an offensive to the north or a counter-attack toward Metz. On the same day, to the left of the 3rd Army, the 4th Army was about to finish massing in the vicinity of Suippe and Sainte-Menehould. The first contact with the enemy [on the section of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] took place on 9 August: a battalion of chasseurs which was moving back toward the Longuyon–Spincourt area was forced to retreat under pressure from the enemy cavalry supported by infantry. On 10 August, the vanguard of the French IV Army Corps were also attacked by large numbers of German cavalry troops. On 9 August, the French II Army Corps (General Gérard)8 took up positions along the Othain while the 9th Cavalry Division (General Abonneau) moved to the right toward Damvillers. The commander of the 3rd Army ordered the VI Army Corps (General Sarrail9) to guard the uncovered section between Etain and Spincourt and send a cover battalion to protect Etain. At the same time, he instructed the IV Army Corps (General Boëlle10) to join the division from Etain in the vicinity of Gincrey and to guard the northern and the eastern exits from Dombras, Mangiennes and Spincourt forests11. On 10 August, according to the above mentioned orders, the 7 BK: More details on the concept of the German plan of war with France in Terence Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). 8 BK: Division General Augustin Gregoire Arthur Gérard was in charge of the French II Army Corps between January 1914 and July 1915. Augustin Gregoire Arthur Gérard, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, LH/1117/51, http ://www2.culture.gouv.fr, (access 16 Feb. 2020). 9 BK: Maurice Sarrail (1856–1929) – a French general, in August 1914 commander of the VI Army Corps of the 3rd Army, under his command during the battle of the Ardennes. On 30 August 1914, he was appointed the commander of the 3rd Army replacing the dismissed General Victor René Ruffey. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (Publisher: Presidio Press, New York 2004), 284; Holger H. Herwig, The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World (New York, Random House: 2009), 148–149, 195. 10 BK: Victor René Boëlle (1850–1942) – a French general with great experience in commanding line units. After 3 December 1911, he was the commander of the IV Army Corps. In August 1914, as part of the 3rd Army, he was in charge of a counter-attack in the Ardennes, implementing Plan XVII. Victor René Boëlle, LH/266/20, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 2, 2020, http://www2.cul ture.gouv.fr; Herwig, The Marne, 1914, 148–149. 11 BK: The order issued by the commander of the 3rd Army was aimed at combining the flanks of the VI Army Corps and the IV Army Corps near Etain.

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7th Infantry Division under my command and the 8th Infantry Division of General de Lartigue12, massed near Gremilly, Aznaannes and Romagnes-lesCôtes, were expected to take up forward positions in Gincrey (one battalion of the 7th Infantry Division), in Billy-sous-Mangiennes (two battalions of the 7th Infantry Divisions) and in Mangiennes (two battalions of the 8th Infantry Division).

I. Fighting at the front: Mangiennes and Billy-sous-Mangiennes (10 August 1914) Around 8h00, I was headed in the same direction as the guard of the 7th Infantry Division. Having acknowledged the situation, I established the positions of both divisions and I identified Moreigne farm as the touch point for their guard13. At the same time, a liaison officer was sent to the staff of the 8th Infantry Division to inform about the location of the guard of the left flank of the 7th Infantry Division. Around 10h00, approximately one kilometre away from Billy-sous-Mangiennes, on the right bank of the Loison, we spotted several enemy cavalrymen. They observed us without even trying to take cover. At 10h30, a battalion of the 8th Infantry Division which temporarily captured Billy-sous-Mangiennes, was relieved by a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division. As the squadron of the division’s cavalry was not there14, a cavalry platoon protecting the battalion was appointed [as a spearhead – BK] to form the guard of the 7th Infantry Division. For over an hour, the subunit carried out reconnaissance of the area near the Loison river without sending reports until 10h45. Meanwhile, the division’s zone was quite wide and the enemy’s presence quite likely. Before I returned to the quarters I decided to reinforce the units of the guard with an infantry battalion and an artillery battalion. To this end, I ordered the commander of the division’s artillery to conduct immediate reconnaissance of the area with the battalion’s commander and prepare the battalion for firing.

12 BK: Raoul Julien François de Lartigue (1857–1937) – a French divisional general with great experience in commanding line units. In August 1914 he was the commander of the 8th Infantry Division (after 21 December 1913). As part of the IV Army Corps he was in charge of the division in the course of implementing Plan XVII and a counter-attack of the French 3rd Army in the Ardennes. At that time, his 8th Infantry Division fought near Virton, to the left of the 7th Infantry Division. Raoul Julien François de Lartigue, LH/1488/73, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr. 13 ET: In the order to halt, these two key indications were disregarded. 14 ET: A squadron of the division’s cavalry did not join the division yet.

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In case of attack, the amassed guard should have put up resistance long enough for the division [the 7th Infantry Division – BK] to have the time and space to deploy its units and start fighting. Around 12h15, a battalion of the 8th Infantry Division relieved in Billy-sousMangiennes joined the vanguard of the 8th Infantry Division in the face of nonexistent cavalry patrols, on its way along the left bank of the Loison. Then the battalion was caught in an ambush and came under machine-gun fire from the southern edge of the woods in Brunehaut. In this situation, an order was issued to “Fix bayonets” while the battalion launched an attack. However, it suffered serious casualties, was dispersed and withdrew behind Moreigne farm. Shortly afterwards, the enemy’s units left the forest and set off on a march toward Billy-sous-Mangiennes and did not encounter any cavalry patrol. The enemy must have hoped to take my [the 7th Infantry Divisions’ – BK] guard by surprise. However, the German advance was stopped by a battalion of field artillery, whose batteries took up firing positions in the meantime. Chaos ensued in the enemy’s attacking troops which started to retreat immediately. ******

At the time when the guard of the 7th Infantry Division was attacked, with the support of several batteries of 7.7 cm field cannons, the enemy launched a brutal attack in Mangiennes. The incapacity of the division’s cavalry, cleaved from the guard of the 8th Infantry Division, made it possible for the enemy to storm the woods in Brunehaut, take by surprise the main posts, which raised the alarm that reached the staff of the French IV Army Corps. Without the immediate intervention of three infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion from the II Army Corps, the village would have been seized by Germans. The shelling of the French artillery was so intense that one of the enemy’s batteries was pinned down. Around 18h00, the retreat of the Germans looked like they were simply taking flight. On the morning of 10 August, according to the orders of the commander of the French IV Army Corps, a regiment of the corps’ cavalry set off to the area of Pillon to support the terrain reconnaissance carried out near Longuyon. After halting the columns of all types of weapons [a regiment of the corps’ cavalry – BK] on the road from Pillon, the regiment turned sharply behind the guard, passed Mangiennes from the north and took up positions on the road to Gremilly where subunits retreating from Mangiennes massed together with a battalion decimated by the enemy’s machine guns. At 20h00, the commander of the IV Army Corps called me and informed that Mangiennes had been captured by the enemy. He decided that on the following

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day [11 August – BK] we would set off to retake Mangiennes, without notifying the commander of the 3rd Army. On 11 August at 2h45, the GQG issued an order to establish immediately a corps (the IV or the II) to attack Mangiennes. However, in the morning, after the commander of the 3rd Army had already issued the orders, he found out that the area had already been captured by units of the II Army Corps. (History of the Great War)15

We calculated the enemy troops which took part in the fighting: a cavalry division, a company of bicycle infantry, three artillery batteries and one section of machine guns. In the first volume of the History of the Great War, in the reference to the battle of Mangiennes, the following two telegrams are mentioned, sent by the chief of staff of the 3rd Army to the GQG16. Annex no. 17117 Telegram: Commander of the 3rd Army to the commander of the Army Group – Vitry-le François In the afternoon, the guard [the French 130th Infantry Regiment – BK]18 was attacked in Mangiennes by numerous [German – BK] troops, a battalion of six or seven batteries. Two [German – BK] brigades, successfully supported by an artillery battalion, which enjoyed an advantage in firepower, retreated at night and were not pursued; the 130th [the French 130th Infantry Regiment – BK] likely suffered serious casualties. In some desperation, I have ordered the IV Corps to take up positions between Damvillers and Ornes, these were appointed during the day. I am in a position to retake Mangiennes and push the enemy back to Spincourt but this would involve exposing the flanks and leaving them to their own devices; I will not order this unless you authorise me to. You will find a detailed report below. 15 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian referred to a book titled Histoire de la Grande Guerre, yet he failed to provide the date, or year of publishing, or page numbers. Analysis has shown that it was a monumental series published in the Interwar period by the French historical services of the General Staff of the Ministry of War entitled Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre. 16 BK: In the context of the battle of Mangiennes, the two telegrams were quoted in an analysis included in AFGG 1/1, 132. 17 BK: Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923), [further referred to as AFGG 1/1/1], 182. 18 BK: In August 1914, the French 130th Infantry Regiment was a part of the 15th Infantry Brigade from the 8th Infantry Division, the IV Army Corps, Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 2: Divisions d’Infanterie, Divisions de Cavalerie (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1924), [further referred to as AFGG 10/ 2], 62.

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Grosetti19 – acting Chief of Staff (The History of the Great War)

Annex no. 24720 Verdun, 13/8/1914. My Dear Friend, The liaison officer is delivering to the G.E.M.G.21 an order effective on the 14th [August 1914 – BK] that was requested from us (…) despite heavy casualties, the 130th [the French 130th Infantry Regiment – BK] is showing remarkable fortitude. According to the information that we have received, we are talking about 700 soldiers incapable of fighting, and I mean only two battalions. When I talk to the survivors and see their joy it is hard for me to believe that they had such a horrific day (…) Grosetti

Observation Of course, the commander of the army corps [i. e. the IV Army Corps – BK] did not expect an attack on his guard. After all, the surprise at Mangiennes was a result of improper use of a cavalry regiment by the army corps commander. The 14th Hussar Regiment should have been tasked with covering the guard of the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions, on top of looking for the enemy beyond Pillon, where a single squadron should have operated. The enemy attacked around 13h00. Successful intervention on the part of the II Army Corps sufficed to handle the situation. However, the communications between the staff of the IV Army Corps and the staff of the 8th Infantry Division were so bad that at 20h00 the commander of the IV Army Corps called the commander of the 7th Infantry Division with information that Mangiennes had been lost. On the following day, the commander of the 3rd Army, General Ruf19 BK: Paul François Grossetti (1861–1918) – a French general with considerable experience in commanding line units. After 2 August 1914, the chief of staff of the 3rd Army; he held this position in late August 1914 when Plan XVII was being implemented and during the army’s offensive in the Ardennes. On 30 August 1914, he was appointed commander of the 42nd Infantry Division and led it in the battle of the Marne. Paul François Grossetti, LH/1210/13, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 10: Ordres de Bataille des Grandes Unité, vol. 1: Avant-propos, index géographique, abréviations, grands quartiers généraux, groupes d’armée, armées, corps d’armée (Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923), [further referred to as AFGG 10/1], 159; AFGG 10/2, 339. 20 AFGG 1/1/1, 258. 21 I have not managed to decipher the acronym G.E.M.G. Nor was it explained in the AFGG series. However, it was used in August 1914 in reference to the staff of the GQG. AFGG 1/1/1, 88, 89, 90, 258.

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fey22, already knew the course of events and the casualties, and turned to the commander of the IV Army Corps. General Tanant stated disrespectfully that General [Victor René – BK] Boëlle “had it coming…”23. The commander of the IV Army Corps and his staff ignored the excellent recommendations for field troops and the effective instruction of operating large units24: The cavalry of the army corps will be mostly appointed to the covering troops in order to carry out reconnaissance and glean information [about the enemy – BK] (…) – (S. des A.R. en C.) During daytime, the cavalry appointed to the guard represents its most important part (…) – (S. des A.R. en C.) The commander of the army corps appoints the cavalry in charge of protecting the troops from surprise attack and distributes the cavalry among the specific infantry divisions (…) – (S. des A.R. en C.) The corps’ cavalry will be typically allocated to the cover troops in order to carry out reconnaissance for them and collect information [about the enemy – BK]; to a large extent, it will participate in covering the troops during halts, marches and fighting (…) – (S. des A.R. en C.)

A reminder of the German doctrine: In exceptional situations, the divisional cavalry (a regiment consisting of four squadrons) sends out squadrons on reconnaissance. Stripping a division of its organic cavalry is always risky.

The immediate effect enjoyed by the field artillery of the guard of the 7th Infantry Division is evidence that the appointment of several batteries to cover units is of great significance. Chapter VII of the regulations of operating large units says: “In a fighting, the troops always launch an assault with the intention of attacking the enemy with cold weapons and defeating the enemy”.

22 BK: Pierre Ruffey (1851–1928) – a French officer, a divisional general, commander of the French 3rd Army. After the outbreak of the war, in August 1914 he followed Plan XVII and launched a successful counter-attack in the Ardennes. Discharged by General Joseph Joffre shortly before the battle of the Marne. Doughty, Pyrrhic victory, 85; AFGG 10/1, 273. 23 ET: Memoirs of the chief of staff, according to General A. Tanant, La IIIe Armée dans la Bataile. 24 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian quoted from regulations published in 1914 by the French Ministry of War. At the end of each chapter he referred to the rules of using cavalry in the field; he used an acronym – (S. des A.R. en C.) Ministère de la Guerre, Décret du 2 décembre 1913, Portant règlement sur le service des armées en campagne: Service en campagne – Droit International (Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle L. Fournier, 1914).

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How can we therefore be surprised with the heroic folly with which the battalion, taken by surprise on Moreigne farm, attacked the enemy?

II. Rendezvous fighting at Éthe-Virton 1. Operations of the 3rd Army between 14 and 21 August 1914 Despite the pressure exerted by General Lanrezac25, the obstinate GQG realised too late how serious the situation was. On 15 August, the GQG deployed the [French –BK] 5th Army between the Sambre and the Meuse. At the same time, the 4th Army was moved to the front line. Then the 4th Army faced the double responsibility of maintaining the eastern bank of the Meuse where the right flank of the 5th Army was and destroying the centre of the enemy’s troops by cooperating with the 3rd Army. The documents below, published in the History of the Great War, provide the details of the mission to be completed by the 3rd Army and refer to the reports of the 2nd Bureau (of intelligence) from between 17 and 21 August [1914 – BK]. Annex no. 22626 3rd Army The Staff, the 3rd Bureau The staff quarters in Verdun 13 August 1914, 22h00

25 BK: Charles Lanrezac (1852–1925) – a French divisional general (since 1911). He had valuable experience in commanding line units of the infantry. He was a charismatic academic teacher, professor and deputy commander in the elitist French École Supérieure de Guerre (1982– 1898) where he taught “History of military science”. He disagreed with the idea of the French doctrine of 1913 of “offensive actions at any price”. When in May 1914 he learnt about the assumptions of Plan XVII, he pinpointed the drawbacks. He was certain that after an outbreak of war, German troops would launch the main attack against France via neutral Belgium. However, his opinions were not taken into consideration by the French GQG. In early August 1914, he was appointed commander of the French 5th Army. On 14 August 1914, during a meeting with the Chief Commander, General Joseph Joffre unsuccessfully appealed to the French 3rd and 4th Armies not to attack German troops in the Ardennes as Plan XVII instructed. In his opinion, by following the plan, these armies would march into an ambush and suffer serious casualties. His predictions turned out to be true. The course of his military service on the basis of Charles Louis Marie Lanrezac, L1473046, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http:// www2.culture.gouv.fr; Tuchman, The Guns, 214–215, 246–250; Anthony Clayton, Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914–18 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Clayton, 2015), Kindle: Location 355–369. 26 BK: The quoted annex number is wrong. The correct version is Annex no. 246. AFGG 1/1/1, 257.

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Secret instruction for 14 August The general situation: The major formation of the German armies, placed in the vicinity of Metz, Thionville, Luxembourg and further to the north in Belgium, may approach to launch an attack to the west, or turn back to the south, forming a rotation axis in Metz. The mission: 1) To launch a counter-attack by means of two corps from the right flank onto all the units leaving Metz. 2) Or to take part in an attack to the north by means of two corps from the left flank. In the latter case, the army [the 3rd Army – BK] deployed to the west of the forested area of Gremilly and Billy-sous-Mangiennes, will cooperate with the II [Army – BK] Corps of the 4th Army, launching an attack from the Hills of the Meuse toward Eucrey and Brandeville-sur-Quincey. Transfer of the army corps [the 3rd Army – BK] and the 7th Cavalry Division, on 14 August [1914 – BK] to take up positions in the area indicated by General Operational Order no. 8. The IV [Army – BK] Corps, facing north, is to be ready to leave Damvillers-sur-Witarville and Dombras. There, it will defend the exit from Mangiennes and le Haut-Fourneau to the south-west of Billy-sous-Mangiennes and will relieve the guard of the II [Army – BK] Corps if the latter clears the battlefield [of the enemy – BK]. The V [Army – BK] Corps will take up positions to be ready to launch an attack of two columns to the north via Mangiennes and Billy-sous-Mangiennes or to the east via Ornes and Etain. The 7th Cavalry Division will be ready to set off on a march to the north, the north-east and the east, and will cover Spinocurt, Longuyon, Norroy-le-Sec, Londres, Bouvilliers, Briey and Conflans (…)

Annex no. 32727 ARMÉES DE L’EST GQG, 16 August, 14h30 The Staff, the 3rd Bureau (…) The 3rd Army, after the units commanded by General Durand have been placed opposite the Metz [stronghold – BK]28, is to take up positions on the Gametz – Etain front, ready to launch an attack toward Longwy, with its IV and III [Army – BK] Corps and two divisions of the VI [Army – BK] Corps. Joffre

27 BK: The quoted annex number is wrong. The correct version is Annex no. 347. The hour is also incorrect – it should be 14h25. The title of the order was: Instruction particulière n° 12 au général commandant la IIIe armée, Verdun. AFGG 1/1/1, 339–340. 28 BK: Paul Durand – a French infantry general, in early August 1914 he was appointed commander of the 3rd Group of Reserve Divisions. Between 17 and 21 August 1914, as part of the 3rd Army, he was in command of the Army of Lorraine (French Armée de Lorraine) consisting of the units of the 3rd Group of Reserve Divisions. AFGG 10/1, 1531.

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The results of reconnaissance and carried out by air and by a cavalry division Air reconnaissance from 17 August [1914 – BK]29 [Enemy – BK] infantry regiment marching from Kayl to Esch, to the south of the Alzette. [Enemy – BK] infantry battalion marching from Foetz to Monderange30. A long (3 km) convoy marching from Bettebourd-sur-Noertzange, a convoy (1,000 m) marching to Finon31 (…) The enemy guard, between Othain and Kienne32, is getting stronger. Officer on duty Captain R.

Annex no. 48433 Armée de Varennes The Staff, the 2nd Bureau

A report on air reconnaissance of 18 August Reconnaissance no. 1 The results: 1) One infantry column in the form of a regiment is marching at 8h00 from Arlon toward Attorf; 2) Two infantry columns in the form of a brigade, each leaving Mersch toward Arlon (…) 3) At 7h40, to the east of Étalle, approximately 80 supply carts and 300–400 horses were spotted during a halt (…) Reconnaissance no. 2 Flight over Arlon: (…) 2) A column placed near the train station. Marching toward Attorf, probably an infantry column, 4 km long. Supposedly [enemy – BK] troops detected in the vicinity of Arlon, headed for the north-west (confirmed information) (…)

Annex no. 48234 Received from Verdun, 20/8 [20 August 1914 – BK] at 17h55 Verdun Army to Grand Quartier Général

29 BK: This fragment comes from a document – Armée Verdun à G.Q.G. Compte rendu renseignu n° 29, Reçu de Verdun, le 18/8, à 17h55. Annex no. 482. AFGG 1/1/1, 447–448. 30 BK: It should be Mondercange. 31 BK: Should be Fixem. 32 BK: Should be Pienne. 33 BK: AFGG 1/1/1, 449–450. 34 BK: AFGG 1/1/1, 447–448.

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Report no. 29 Nothing happened until 15h00; the area to the north and east of Spincourt is still occupied by enemy cavalry and supporting infantry which did not instigate any actions; works on the camp site. Closer to Briey, in preparation for a serious attack, the Germans organized the front [along – BK] Lantefontaine, Genarville, Valleroy (where heavy artillery was placed), Trichemont and Labry (…) Mars-la-Tour shelled (…) Air reconnaissance from 18/8 [18 August 1914 – BK]: four air reconnaissance trips between 7h00 and 10h00 along Virton, Luxembourg, Firck35 and Bouzonville (…) No troop transfer in the area of Arlon, Habay-la-Neuve, Virton or Aubagne. Big artillery camps (from one to two regiments, 3 km to the south-east of Étalle). (…) At 19h00, General Abonneau36 informed that in the corridor in Étalle, the German 3rd Cavalry Division probably withdrew chaotically to the east to Arlon via Vance and that both the edge of Neufchâteau and the railway line between Neufchâteau and Libremont were occupied by light cavalry and infantry troops. Nothing new spotted near Bertrix, Maissin or Paliseul.

Annex no. 62937 Received from Verdun, 20/8 [20 August 1914 – BK], 11h10

Colonel Lebouc38 to General Berthelot39 Our air reconnaissance troops have just returned. No trace of the enemy in the area of Virton, Arlon or Longwy. On the other hand, in the south-eastern part of Luxembourg several columns have been spotted; they form a division marching from the south-east to the north-west (…)

35 BK: It should be Sierck. 36 BK: Pierre Charles Adalbert Abonneau was a French officer, a divisional general and, after the outbreak of WWI in August 1914, was appointed commander of the French 4th Cavalry Division. Between 18 and 25 August 1914, he was commander of the Improvised Cavalry Corps which included the 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions. AFGG 10/1, 940. 37 BK: AFGG 1/1/1, 551–552. 38 BK: Colonel Lebouc was the deputy head of the staff of the 3rd Army. AFGG 10/1, 158. 39 BK: Henri Mathias Berthelot (1861–1931) was a French general with considerable experience in large unit staff and in commanding line units. After 1907 he was an officer of the French General Staff, where he participated in developing Plan XVII. Right after the outbreak of the war, on 2 August 1914, he was appointed first deputy GQG staff commander until 21 November 1914 when he was appointed the commander of the 3rd Group of Reserve Divisions. AFGG 10/1, 5, 603; More on the general in Jean Noël Grandhomme, Berthelot: du culte de l’offensive à la stratégie globale (Ivry sur Seine: ECPAD, 2011).

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[Annex no. 629 – BK] Armée de Stenay40 Stenay, 20 August 1914 The Staff, 2nd Bureau

Reconnaissance bulletin no. 6 Under pressure from our cavalry, the German cavalry division which was deployed near Arlon and Florenville, was stretched on 19/8 [19 August 1914 – BK] between Tintigny and Arlon. Arlon was probably preparing for defence. According to the air reconnaissance (…) this morning numerous columns crossed the road between Neufchâteau, Bastogne and Alize marching to the west and the north-west (…)

Annex no. 74041 3rd Army The Staff, 2nd Bureau Verdun, 21 August [1914 – BK], 15h00

Reconnaissance bulletin no. 1042 (…) The specific situation before the front of the 3rd Army – on 20 August [1914 – BK], in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg German columns have crossed the northern part of the country, to the north of the Sure to march toward Neufchâteau. The southern zone, particularly to the south-east of Luxembourg, is occupied [by the enemy – BK] although the military manoeuvres spotted were of little importance. Between Étalle and Arlon there are only a few quarters or camps of the infantry and artillery. On 20 August, Longwy was attacked from the south-east, from Differdange where [ the enemy – BK] heavy artillery was detected. Acting Chief of Staff Grossetti

Annex no. 63043 Received on 20 August [1914 –BK] at 18h45

40 41 42 43

BK: The document is listed as Annex no. 629 in AFGG 1/1/1, 554–555. BK: Annex no. 740. AFGG 1/1/1, 626–627. BK: The bulletin’s number is wrong, it should be 16. AFGG 1/1/1, 552–553.

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From the Verdun Army44 to the GQG – Message no. 32 Three rounds of air reconnaissance of the area around Longuyon, Virton, Arlon, Luxembourg, Grevenmacker45, Sarrebourg (to the south-east of Grevenmacker) and Siezk46. The vicinity of Virton, Arlon and Longwy seems still unoccupied just like the left bank of the Moselle, between Siezk and Grevenmacker. The airplanes spotted an infantry brigade in the area of Stoetz47 (3 km to the north of Esch-sur-Alzette), an infantry brigade with the artillery marching from Bettembourg toward Reckange; a small camp to the south-east of Luxembourg, near Dalheim, Hassel Ha (…), Rentgen, close to the [field – BK] airport in Dudelange (3 airplanes). It looks like the enemy’s columns detected yesterday are continuing their march to the north-west. The cavalry division spotted several days ago near Marville was shelled today by our airplanes and likely suffered casualties.

Annex no. 74148 Verdun, 21 August, 15h00

Reconnaissance bulletin no. 16 (…) Between Étalle and Arlon, only several quarters or camps of the infantry and artillery were spotted; on 20 August [1914 – BK] Longwy was attacked from the south-east. Acting Chief of Staff Grossetti

As for the GQG instructions, the situation on 21 August [1914 BK] was described as follows: To the north of the Meuse, the German army, consisting of the II (one division), IX, X, VII and IV Corps and the Guard Corps, together with three cavalry divisions in the front, relocated its right flank toward Brussels. To the south of the Meuse, the German troops dug themselves in on the right flank near Lesse, between Rochefort and Dinant while the left flank (the XVIII and XIX Army Corps) was halted by our cavalry in the area of Neufchâteau. Between Metz and the Vosges, a march by French troops put a stop to the counter-attack by the Bavarians and a part of the XV Army Corps. In Upper Alsace, our troops seized Mulhouse after a short engagement during which 24 enemy cannons were captured.

44 45 46 47 48

BK: It relates to the 3rd Army. BK: It should be Grevenmacher. BK: It should be Sierck. BK: It should be Foetz. BK: The same Reconnaissance Bulletin no. 16 was quoted above. The annex number is wrong – it should be Annex no. 740. AFGG 1/1/1, 626–627.

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A special situation of the 3rd Army: on 20 August [1914 – BK], in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg the German columns crossed the northern part of the country, to the north of the Sure, in order to continue their march toward Neufchâteau. The southern part of Luxembourg or, to be more precise, the southeastern part, was occupied, although only small military manoeuvres were observed. Between Étalle and Arlon, only a few quarters, or infantry and cavalry camps were spotted. On 20 August [1914 – BK] Longwy was attacked from the south-east (Differdange) where the enemy had placed heavy artillery (RB no. 16, no. 2/113 of the 3rd Army, Verdun, 21 August [1914 – BK], 15h00). However, the reality was strikingly different. While the enemy’s moves to the north of the Meuse were evaluated quite accurately, the moves in the forested part of Luxembourg49 was missed by our airplanes and cavalry. The thing was that the Crown Prince’s army [the German 5th Army – BK] had already been so well grouped that all you could see was a few camps. From the right flank, it was covered by the 3rd Cavalry Division, which proceeded toward Rossignol and Neufchâteau and provided communications with the 4th Army. The Crown Prince’s army [the German 5th Army – BK] had its V [Army – BK] Corps camping in the woods of Étalle50; the XIII [Army – BK] Corps (Württemberg) remained in the area of Châtillon, Meix-la-Tige and Rachecourt; the VI [Army – BK] Corps was in Ottange, Rochonvillers and Angevillers, on the edge of Thionville; the second line was formed by the entire V Reserve Corps in the woods of Bettembourg. We had heard for several days that German troops were marching to the northeast, and because the front in Lorraine did not move, the French chief command had the impression that in the Ardennes and in Luxembourg, the enemy troops would put up the least resistance. Therefore, an order was issued for the 4th Army to push the enemy’s troops between Dinant, Namur and Ourthe toward the Meuse. To this end, an attack in the direction of Neufchâteau was ordered: “The enemy troops will be attacked irrespective of the place we meet them” (Detailed Order no. 16 for the 4th Army, 21 August [1914 – BK]). General L. de Langle de Cary51 (chief of staff, General Maistre52) did not have information about the enemy as confirmed by the instructions of 20 August and 49 BK: the author meant the densely forested hills of the Ardennes. 50 BK: Into which the 10th Infantry Division marched. 51 BK: Fernand de Langle de Cary (1849–1927) was a French division general; in August 1914, he was commander of the French 4th Army appointed to implement Plan XVII – the French counterattack in the Ardennes. The general carried out a critical analysis of the operation in a book published in the Interwar Period: Langle de Cary, Souvenirs de commandement 1914– 1916 (Paris: Payot, 1935). F. de Langle de Cary, Souvenirs de commandement 1914–1916, Paris, 1935; The general’s file on awarding the Legion of Honour and the course of military service

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order no. 17 from the same day; reconnaissance information was not provided by the wrongly deployed artillery, either (the 4th and 9th Cavalry Division); because the number of airplanes was too small, air reconnaissance was insufficient; there were no intelligence gathering troops [intelligence operators engaged in the areas occupied by the enemy – BK]. In order to start the offensive, on 22 August [1914 – BK], the commander of the [French – BK] 4th Army arranged his troops in a bizarre way: 12 divisions placed parallel and stretched along a front approximately 60 km wide: – a part of the IX [Army – BK] Corps from Mezières-Sedan, target: Gédine. – XI [Army – BK] Corps from Sedan, target: Porcheresse-Maissin. – XVII [Army – BK] Corps from Mouzon, target: Anlay-Orchamps. – XII [Army – BK] Corps, target: Recogne-Libramont. – Colonial Corps, target: Neufchâteau. – II [Army – BK] Corps from Montmédy-sur-Eglise (east of Neufchâteau). The commander of the 4th Army assumed that he would launch a surprise attack on the flank of the German columns, which were careless enough to march from the east to the west in front of his troops It is true that the French 3rd Army retreated from Ourthe (Durbuy-Le Roche) toward the Meuse; it crossed the river between Namur and Givet. Hausen53 was covered by the 4th Army stationed in the south. The Prince of Württemberg (the VIII Army Corps; the XVIII Army Corps; the XVIII Reserve Corps) stopped the [French – BK] 4th Army’s offensive from the front; in the meantime, the 5th Army left the area of Arlon–Thionville to attack the enemy’s right flank and march toward the 3rd Army. Marching to the north, the 5th Colonial Brigade reached Neufchâteau; the 1st [Infantry – BK] Brigade was halted in Rossignol; near Saint-Vincent, the 3rd and 7th [Infantry – BK] Regiments were forced to fight in the east. The II [Army – BK] Corps, halted in Bellefontaine, changed the axis of [assault – BK] and was deployed in Meix, Robelmont, Houdrigny and Virton, where the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division of the IV [Army –BK] Corps of the 3rd Army launched an attack, on the same day and at the same time! before 1914 in Fernand Louis Armand Marie Langle De Cary De, LH/1469/62, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr. 52 BK: Paul Maistre (1858–1922) was a French officer, a divisional general; in August 1914, he was chief of staff in the French 4th Army. The general’s file on being awarded the Legion of Honour and the course of his military service before 1914 is in Paul André Marie Maistre, LH/ 1699/52, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr. 53 BK: It is hard to say which village General Edgar de Trentinian meant.

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The 7th Infantry Division in combat Annex no. 70654 21 August [1914 – BK], 21h30 Detailed Order no. 17 Supreme Commander to Commander of the 3rd Army (Verdun) and the 4th Army (Stenay) (…) II. – The 3rd Army still has the mission of covering the flanks of the 4th Army from attacks by [enemy – BK] troops which may still be located in the vicinity of Luxembourg. [The 3rd Army – BK] will march right behind the 4th Army, ready to launch a quick and effective attack to the east, by deploying all or some of its troops against any units [of the enemy – BK] sighted. As far as it is possible, the outer flank will also be thoroughly covered (…)55. J. Joffre

Annex no. 59256 GQG, Vitry, 20 August [1914 – BK], 20h30 Delivered on 21 August [1914 – BK] at 00h15 Supreme Commander to Commander of the 3rd Army in Verdun Starting tomorrow, i. e. on 21 August [1914 –BK], the 3rd Army will launch an offensive toward Arlon. Two corps of the left flank will attack along the axis between Virton and Tellancourt; the corps of the right flank will attack Beuveille. The 3rd Army will be tasked with neutralising the enemy offensive on the right flank of the 4th Army. In the course of the offensive, if need be, [the 3rd Army – BK] will be ready to be deployed in the east. The road between Gametz, Bazeilles, Ecouviez and Virton marks the western limit of the area of operation of the 3rd Army. Supreme Commander J. Joffre

21 August After receiving instructions from the supreme commander, in the night [20 August 1914 – BK] General Ruffey started to implement the order for 21 August which stipulated the actions for the IV, V and VI [Army – BK] Corps, previously planned in the Secret Instruction of 17 August. The 3rd Army was tasked with attacking in the direction of Arlon – its right flank was to be ready to repel any attack from the direction of the Metz [stronghold – BK] while the left flank was to 54 BK: Annex no. 706. AFGG 1/1/1, 604. 55 BK: After reading the last sentence of this order it is hard to understand what general Joffre meant. What was the “outer flank” in this case”? 56 BK: Annex no. 592. AFGG 1/1/1, 531.

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coordinate its moves with the II [Army – BK] Corps (4th Army) tasked with attacking from Montmédy to Tintigny. The 7th Cavalry Division, attacking in the direction of Audun-le-Roman and Amuetz, was to be supported by two [infantry – BK] battalions from the VI [Army – BK] Corps. At the same time, in its march the division was to cover the 3rd Army and to continue reconnaissance in the direction of Arlon, Luxembourg and Bettembourg. Annex no. 74257 [3rd Army, The Staff, 3rd Bureau The commanders’ quarters in Verdun 21 August 1914, 2h00 – BK]

General Operational Order no. 16 for 21 August [1914 – BK] (…) The IV [Army – BK] Corps, whose zone of operation is delineated between Marville, Bazeilles, Velosnes, Torgny, Lamorteau and Virton and between Grand Failly, Petit Aivry (…) Allondrelle, la Malmaison and La Tour, will launch its vanguard toward Basse-Vire, Virton and La Tour, with the rear of its major troops on the Chiers river. The head guard of the IV and V [Army – BK] Corps will cross the Othain at 6h00 (…) Signed: Ruffey (History of the Great War)

On 21 August at 9h00, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division crossed the Chiers in Colmey. From Charency onwards, the enemy troops forced the division to halt for long periods. At 20h00, the division reached its destination. The 8th [Infantry – BK] Division left Vittarville at 5h00. The troops halted in Torigny in order to give time to the guard which engaged with an enemy battalion in Virton, but the Germans did not put up any resistance [and retreated – BK]. The division reached the destination at 16h00. IV Army Corps58 The Staff, 3rd Bureau [Velosnes, 21 August 1914, 15h00 – BK]

57 BK: The number of the annex is wrong, it should be annex no. 743. AFGG 1/1/1, 628. 58 BK: A copy of this order has survived in the files of the 1st Bureau of the staff of the IV Army Corps. Etat-Major, 3eBureau, 4e Corps d’Armée, Ordre Général N° 16, Velosnes, 21 Aoute 1914, 15h, 4e Corps d’Armée, 1er Bureau, 22 N 146, Corps d’Armee, Des Archives De La Guerre 1914–1918, SHD.

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General Order no. 16 (situation as of 21 August) The IV Corps will take up positions to the north of the Chiers along the course of its march. The staff quarters: Vélosnes. The 7th Infantry Division. Vanguard in Latour. Distribution: Buette, La Malmaison, Allondrelle (inclusive). The staff quarters: Latour. The 8th Infantry Division. The vanguard in Virton. Distribution: Vieux-Virton, SaintMard, Harnoncourt, Bouvroy, Dampicourt. The staff quarters: Saint-Mard. The 14th Hussar Regiment: Chenois to be entered by the regiment at 17h00. The corps artillery: 2 battalions in Lamorteau, 2 battalions in Torgny and the staff. The corps sappers: Lamorteau. The 317th Infantry Regiment: 1 battalion in Torgny together with the regimental staff, the 1st battalion in Bazeilles and Othe. The 315th Infantry Regiment: 1 battalion and the regimental staff in Épiez and Charency. Supply trains: Bazeilles, Othe. The 1st supply battalion: Epiez, Charity, Vezin. The 2nd supply battalion: Consenvoye (section no. 2). Damvillers – section no. 1 and supply horses store. The vanguard: Demarcation between the divisions. The resistance line of the 7th Infantry Division: Gomery (communication with the V Army Corps via Bleid), Éthe, hill 210 (2 km to the north of Chenois) – communication with the 8th Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry Division: the road from Éthe to Virton inclusive from Bellevue and hill 295 in Houdrigny (communication with the II Army Corps). The limit between the two divisions: Babay stream, road 210 to Chenois (the 7th Infantry Division). (History of the Great War)

On the evening of 21 August, the corps of the 3rd Army were placed in the following way: – the IV [Army – BK] Corps between Virton, Latour and Les Ruette, in contact on the left flank with the II [Army – BK] Corps of the 4th Army; – the V [Army – BK] Corps between Ville and Houdlemont, Gorcy; – the VI [Army – BK] Corps with the 12th [Infantry – BK] Division in Pierrepont, the 42nd [Infantry – BK] Division in Mercy-le-Bas, Xivry-Circourt; the 40th [Infantry Division – BK] in Pienne-Norroy-le-Sec. The latter division is covering the right flank of the 3rd Army which, advancing to the north, was increasingly uncovered and vulnerable to German attacks from the Metz– Thionville area. In this operation, the 7th Cavalry Division was also deployed, attacking in the direction of Ozérailles and the Group of Reserve Divisions, gathered in the vicinity of Etain.

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On the evening of 21 August, the commanders of the 3rd Army in Verdun had the following information about the enemy: The area between Virton, Arlon and Longwy seems still unoccupied. To the north-east of Thionville, enemy troops were spotted marching to the north-west. Opposite the 3rd Army, Briey was evacuated while the occupying troops left for Fontoy. In the vicinity of Longuyon, our cavalry patrols did not detect the enemy. They entered Longwy which seems “less and less tormented by the enemy” (B.R. no. 15, no. 2/104 of the 3rd Army, Verdun, 20 August).

Information collected by the staff [of the French – BK] IV [Army – BK] Corps and forwarded to the 3rd Army On 20 August, Lieutenant d’Otard d’Artis from the 3rd Dragoon Regiment had to meander amid the numerous patrols of enemy cavalry, engaged along the line between Athus, Musson, Ville-Houdlemont, Saint-Pancré and Tellancourt. At 7h30, the locals informed him about the numerous [German – BK] troops in Clemency. At 10h30, he reached Éthe, later on Saint-Léger captured by the [German – BK] cavalry. In the evening, between 18h00 and 19h00, he heard a furious cannonade from the direction of Longwy. The enemy was also spotted by the 14th Hussar regiment which on 21 August covered the march of the army corps [the IV Army Corps – BK]. The report they sent should have encouraged serious reflection. At 11h30, the guard of the [infantry – BK] regiment which was marching from Malmaison to Ruette came under machine fire from Ruette forest. The area was captured by [enemy – BK] infantrymen who took up positions in an ambush; the locals estimated their number at 1,500. Grandcourt in the vicinity of Rouette was also captured [by the German troops – BK]. In the evening, the vanguard of [the French – BK] 8th Infantry Division pushed a [German – BK] battalion out of Virton, which left behind only one killed and one wounded soldier. It was the III battalion (Württemberg) from the 123rd Infantry Regiment. A reconnaissance sub-unit from the 14th Hussar Regiment commanded by Lieutenant De La Ferté who had been ordered to advance to Roblemont, could not cross the Vire or the Thon because all the crossings had been seized by [enemy – BK] infantry. The lieutenant’s horse was wounded. Another reconnaissance sub-unit led by Lieutenant De La Croix came across the same obstacle – [enemy – BK] infantry positions along the bank of the Vire, from Latour to Signeulx. Lieutenant De La Croix had to make reconnaissance near Étalle. Under fire, he intended to remove two obstacles: at the lower course of the Vire and on the railway track. However, he was spotted and, while he was happy that he was galloping to Tellancour, he suffered casualties: two soldiers were wounded, one horse was killed and six were shot. However, he took a [German – BK] POW from the 1st Uhlan Regiment who spoke excellent French59. All this information was passed on to the commanders of the 3rd Army in Verdun. (Grasset, Revue Militaire Francaise, p. 252) 59 BK: At that time, the German 1st Uhlan regiment was a part of the 9th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps, a sister unit of the 10th Infantry Division.

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The 7th Infantry Division reached the day’s destination too late to deploy the vanguard to Éthe. Around 22h00, the division’s troops reached the edge of Bampont and Loges forests and the western edge of Jeunes Bois60 and Gomery. The army corps’61 order for 22 August [1914 – BK] was delivered to the quarters of the staff of the 7th Infantry Division at 2h00. The division’s commander did not receive the cavalry’s reports on the reconnaissance; he was not even notified about the route taken by the column of the left flank of the [French – BK] V Corps62. [Annex no. 747 – BK]63 3rd Army The Staff, 3rd Bureau Command in Verdun, 21 August 1914

Secret and personal instruction for 22 August [1914 – BK] The army’s mission is as follows: 1) Cover the flank of the 4th Army while marching to the north. 2) Repel all [enemy – BK] attacks launched from the north and east. Tomorrow, on 22 August, the first part of the mission will be conducted by the IV Army Corps. [The Corps – BK] will send one division to the vicinity of Étalle and another one to Saint-Lêger-Châtillon to be in a position to launch a counter-attack from Étalle and Vance against any troops of the enemy that leave Arlon to pose a threat to the right flank of the [French – BK] 4th Army. The V [Army – BK] Corps, deployed in an area between the roads between Virton, Châtillon and Arlon (exclusive) and Musson, Halanzy and Messancy, will reach the area of Meix-laTige and Rachecourt to repel enemy attacks from Arlon and to support the VI [Army –BK] Corps in its attack in the direction of Aubagne and Athus. The second part of the mission will be conducted by the VI Army Corps etc. (…) Commander of the 3rd Army Signed: Ruffey Acting Chief of Staff: Grossetti

60 BK: It should be Jeune Bois. 61 BK: A reference to the French IV Army Corps. 62 BK: A reference to the French V Army Corps which operated on the right flank of the IV Army Corps. 63 BK: Annex no. 747, AFGG 1/1/1, 633–634.

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Annex no. 77264 IV Army Corps Staff, 3rd Bureau Staff Quarters, Velosnes, 21 August [1914 – BK], 23h50

General Order no. 18 as of 22 August [1914 – BK] Part one I. – The southern part of Luxembourg or, more precisely, the south-eastern part, was captured [by the enemy – BK] although troop manoeuvres were minimal; between Étalle and Arlon, only a few quarters and camps of the infantry and artillery were spotted. On 20 August [1914 – BK] Longwy was attacked from Differdange where heavy artillery was placed65. II. – The IV Army Corps reached the zone specified in General Order no. 16. Its mission is to cover the right flank of the 4th Army (II Corps)66 which is marching to the north. III. – The 14th Hussar Regiment will leave for Vance in order to carry out reconnaissance between the road from Vance and Arlon (inclusively) and the road from Étalle, Habay-laNeuve and Heinstert (inclusively). Departure for Chenais at 4h00. At 4h00 in Latour the regiment will have at its disposal the support of a battalion from the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. Reports will be forwarded to division commanders and the commander of the Army Corps67. IV. – The movement of the Army Corps a) The 7th [Infantry – BK] Division will march through Éthe toward Saint-Léger Châtillon in order to launch an attack from Vance to enemy troops on their way west, posing a threat to the II Army Corps. Departure from Éthe at 5h00. b) The 8th [Infantry – BK] Division is to march through Huombois to Étalle and continue to the west of the road (inclusive) to Étalle and Habay-la-Neuve. The division will launch a

64 BK: Annex no. 747, AFGG 1/1/1, 652–654. 65 BK: A reference to the distribution of German heavy artillery. 66 BK: During the attack of the French 4th Army to the north, the II Army Corps was its rightwing corps. Therefore, in the course of the operation, the left flank of the French IV Army Corps from the 3rd Army was meant to maintain contact with the right flank of the II Army Corps from the 4th Army and to cover the flank from the expected German attack from the east. 67 BK: Therefore, reconnaissance was to be made by the 14th Hussar regiment for the benefit of the main forces of the IV Army Corps. To a large extent, the effectiveness and the result of this reconnaissance affected the subsequent orders issued by the commanders of the two huge units of the French IV Army Corps: the 8th and 7th Infantry Divisions. The reconnaissance was supposed to protect both units from a difficult tactical situation. It was also of importance for the reconnaissance reports to arrive regularly and be forwarded to the staffs of the divisions.

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counter-attack against any troops of the enemy that pose a threat to the [right – BK] flank of the II Army Corps. Departure from Virton at 4h30. The division’s commanders are to ensure the assistance of guides who know the [local –BK] woods well. The 7th [Infantry – BK] Division will maintain contact with [the French –BK] V Army Corps in the direction of Meix-la-Tige68. The 8th [Infantry – BK] Division will maintain contact with [the French –BK] II Army Corps and with the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division, from one side along the line of Bellefontaine, Bois d’Ardennes and Éthe69, on the other side along the line of Tintigny, Étalle, Châtillon. At 7h00 the field artillery and the sappers will set off on a march from Latour [taking up positions – BK] at the rear of a column of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division together with a battalion of the 317th [Infantry Regiment – BK], divided between field artillery and sappers as the rearguard. The units at the corps’ disposal will depart at 5h00 from Bazeilles toward Virton (the western part) together with another battalion of the 317th [Infantry Regiment – BK]. A battalion of the 315th [Infantry Regiment – BK] that will return to Marville at 8h00, will be at the disposal of the army commander for protection of his quarters. The commander of the IV Army Corps will march together with the main column of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. By 10h00, duty hours in the quarters of the corps staff in Velosnes. From 6h00, new location of the quarters of the corps staff in Virton70. VI. – L/2 returned to Marville at 7h00 and will be at the disposal of the Commander of the 3rd Army. VII. – Regimental supply troops allocated to the divisions: the 7th Division, the 14th Hussar Regiment and a group of supply troops, Vezin. – The 8th Division of A.G. Gén. G. Verdun. VIII. – Communication: Posts A. Verdun and Marville open: Velonses at 6h00. Posts of the Army Corps in Virton, 8h00. IX. – Liaison officers: an officer from the IV Army Corps is to arrive in Marville at 8h00. An officer forwarded to the division in Latour at 6h30. A platoon from the division’s cavalry squadron from the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division returned at 5h45 to Virton to be at the disposal of the commander of the IV Army Corps. NB: Despite the difficult terrain, the mission to be completed by the divisions is of purely offensive nature. The division’s squadrons should watch the columns’ flanks very actively71.

68 BK: On the right flank of the French IV Army Corps, the 7th Infantry Division was placed, which was expected to stay in touch during the march with the V Army Corps. 69 ET: The verses written in italics are not included in the publications devoted to the fighting of Éthe. This is most certainly because the staff of the IV Army Corps deleted them from the message communicated to Major Grasset. 70 ET: The commander of the army corps [the commander of the IV Army Corps – BK] and the commander of the corps’ artillery marched together with the units of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division. 71 ET: As at the bottom of the previous page. [Look at the comment in footnote 1].

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Approved by Chief of Staff Degoutte Commander of the IV Army Corps Boelle (History of the Great War).

[Annex no. 996 – BK] 72 [7th Infantry Division Command, Ruette, 22 August 1914, 3h00 – BK]

Ordered issued for 22 August 1914 The division will march through Éthe toward Saint-Léger and Vance. The vanguard will be led by the commander of the 14th [Infantry –BK] Brigade consisting of: – three battalions of the 104th [Infantry Regiment – BK] – a battalion of field artillery – a company of sappers – two platoons from the division’s cavalry squadron The front of the vanguard will march through Gomery at 4h30. A majority of the column [of the division – BK] will follow 2,000 metres [behind the front of the vanguard – BK]. – a battalion of the 103rd [Infantry Regiment – BK] – two battalions of field artillery – the 13th Infantry Brigade – ammunition supply vehicles – the corps’ artillery – sappers with a battalion of the 317th [Infantry Regiment – BK] At 5h45, the front of the column will enter Gomery. At 4h00, a battalion of the 103rd [Infantry Regiment – BK] will remain in Latour at the disposal of the colonel in charge of the 14th Hussar Regiment. The corps’ supply vehicles will be limited to cars with ammunition and tools. The remaining supply vehicles will be gathered in Gomery and their commander will take over command of the division’s supplies. Commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division [Division – BK] General [Edgar – BK] de Trentinian Acting Chief of Staff Macker 72 BK: Annex no. 996, AFGG 1/1/1, 803.

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The troops stationed on 22 August 1914 on the front in Robelmont, Virton, Éthe, Bleid, Signeulx: – the 9th Division (II Corps) [9th Infantry Division – II Army Corps – BK] – IV Army Corps – General Boëlle, the corps’ chief of staff: Colonel Dégoutté. – the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division – General de Lartigue: a squadron of the division’s cavalry, twelve infantry battalions, the 31st Field Artillery Regiment. – the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division – commander: General de Trentinian, a squadron of the division’s cavalry, twelve infantry battalions (13th [Infantry – BK] Division, the 101st, 102nd [Infantry Regiments – BK], Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte73; the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade, the 103rd, 104th [Infantry Regiment – BK], [Brigade – BK] General [Henri François – BK] Felineau74), the 26th Field Artillery Regiment. – 24 machine guns (6 per regiment) 75. – the corps’ artillery, the 44th [Field Artillery–BK] Regiment. – four squadrons of the Army Corps’ cavalry regiment (the 14th Hussar Regiment), Colonel [Wallerand – BK] de Hauteclocque76. – the 3rd Division (II Corps) [the 3rd Infantry Division, II Army Corps – BK]. The German V [Army – BK] Corps: the 9th [Infantry – BK] Brigade and the 10th [Infantry – BK] Division – the 1st Uhlan Regiment and the 1st King’s Chasseur Regiment77; – the 5th Foot Artillery Regiment (150 howitzers); – the 6th Mortar Regiment; – the 5th Pioneer Battalion, the 6th Machine-Gun Division; – the 19th Air Division 73 BK: Colonel Georges Lacotte – 20 June 1914 was (temporarily) nominated commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade in the 7th Infantry Division. He held that position until 31 October 1914. Georges Lacotte, LH/1426/62, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr. 74 BK: Brigade General Henri François Felineau assumed the position of the commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade in the 7th Infantry Division on 21 September 1911. Henri François Felineau, LH/952/68, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr. 75 BK: This is a reference to 6 machine guns per infantry regiment and 24 in the 7th Infantry Division. 76 Colonel Wallerand Marie Alfredde Hauteclocque (1866–1914) – the commander of the 14th Hussar Regiment was killed in the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914. Walleranda de Hauteclocque, LH/1272/46, La base de données Léonore (Légion d’honneur), Archives Nationales. Site de Paris, accessed: February 16, 2020, http://www2.culture.gouv.fr; Wallerand Marie Alfred de Hauteclocque, Mémoire des hommes. Base des Morts pour la France de la Première Guerre mondiale, Le Ministère de la défense, accessed February 20, 2020, www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr. 77 BK: General Trentinian confused the name – it should be the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles.

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– twenty four infantry battalions; – two field artillery brigades ( 77 and 105) The German XIII [Army – BK] Corps: – the 53rd [Infantry – BK] Brigade: seven infantry battalions; – the 54th [Infantry – BK] Brigade: an infantry battalion; – two machine-gun companies; – the 19th Uhlan Regiment; – a company of the 13th Pioneer Battalion; – a battalion of the 49th [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment. On the evening of 21 August, the V and [enemy – BK] XIII [Army – BK] Corps were amassed in the woods near Villancourt, Saint-Léger and Éthe. The corps were covered by reinforced vanguards while the main troops took cover in the woods. [The French –BK] 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was expected in Éthe at 5h00. Consequently, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was ordered to leave its quarters at 4h00. The mission to be completed by the division was “pure offense”; “only unimportant moves of [enemy – BK] troops” were spotted. The 14th Hussar Regiment had a mission of “(…) carrying out reconnaissance along the road between Vance and Arlon (inclusive) and the road along Étalle, Habay-la-Neuve and Heinstert (inclusive)”. The flanks of the 7th and 8th [Infantry – BK] Divisions were not expected to come into contact before taking up the positions [appointed for that day – BK]. I did not anticipate any serious resistance in the course of the march, especially as I had no idea about the information collected on 20 and 21 August [1914 – BK] by the cavalry regiments and the vanguard of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division. The 7th [Infantry – BK] Division had at its disposal only a single cavalry squadron: two platoons joined the vanguard while the remaining two were later sent to the column’s wings. The cavalry regiment and its support battalion were not under my command but marched along the same route as the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. The wooded area slowed down the march. In the first few hours of the march, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division had an opportunity to notice that the 14th Hussar Regiment and its support battalion was providing both immediate and remote cover. The squadron of the vanguard of the 14th Hussar Regiment which left Chenois at 4h00 entered Éthe at 5h00; it drove away [enemy – BK] uhlans who had already seized the village and pursued them up to the windmill in Hamawé down the road to Saint-Léger.

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The platoon commander of the spearhead and the vanguard did not notice anything in the woods or on the hills towering above our left flank. At 5h30, the commander of the 14th Hussar Regiment marched to Éthe with three cavalry squadrons. Before resuming the march, he thought it would be prudent to send off a few patrols to the south and the south-east. They encountered the German infantry, which fired on them and halted them from Lacheneau to Bleid. In order to crush the enemy’s resistance, in the presence of all his patrols, the colonel ordered a support battalion to clear the road and sent the following report to me and the vanguard’s commander: Éthe, 6h45 On my way from Latour to Vance via Éthe and Saint-Léger, I realised that Éthe had been captured by the enemy. I dislodged the Germans from the village, inflicting heavy casualties. When I reached the edge of the woods on my way out of Éthe, I was stopped by enemy infantry. The battalion commanded by Vicq from the 103rd [Infantry Regiment – BK] who was allocated to support me stepped in and tried to open the way for me through the woods. De Hauteclocque

Around 5h00, near Gomery, General [Henri – BK] Felineau, the commander of the vanguard, noticed the first shots fired by the platoon of the vanguard of the 14th Hussar Regiment. He decided to halt the march on account of the fog and to wait for information from the cavalry, which should already have made contact with the enemy. I joined him and ordered to resume marching immediately with his vanguard. Needless to say, in the course of the march [General Henri Felineau – BK] imposed appropriate safety measures on his units. Order no. 18 failed to specify a liaison unit for the 7th and 8th [Infantry – BK] Division. The divisions were not to communicate before they took up positions along the line between Tintigny, Étalle and Châtillon. The order also failed to indicate the area captured by the [German – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps at 21h00. It did not mention the [marching – BK] route on 22 [August 1914 – BK]. The commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division only knew that [the French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps would reach Meix-la-Tige and that the day before, the vanguard of [the French – BK] 7 [Infantry – BK] Division of the V [Army –BK] Corps should have made contact between Éthe and Bleid. However, late on 21 [August 1914 –BK], the guard failed to reach either Éthe or Bleid. Order no. 18 only recommended increased activity of my squadron of division cavalry on the flanks of my column [of the march division – BK] which was 7 to 8 km long. I deemed the instructions insufficient and, since the enemy was in

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Éthe, I thought it appropriate to support my soldiers better and cover the main flank of the column by means of two units78. Consequently, around 5h30 I ordered the commander of the 13th [Infantry – BK] Brigade to immediately send a battalion of the 101st [Infantry Regiment – BK] to Bleid. The guard unit was to be covered by a cavalry platoon; I appointed cavalry Captain de Jouvencel, my staff officer, as its commander. Starting in Bleid, the platoon was to continue to act as a guard unit, marching in parallel to the road from Saint-Léger. At the same time, in agreement with General [Henri – BK] Felineau, the commander of the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade, I decided that the battalion included in the vanguard would march to the north of Éthe. It was to serve as a guard unit of the left flank [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK]. Following these instructions, I joined the vanguard’s artillery which (because of the terrain) I had placed in the rear of the guard troops. The artillery was escorted by a company from the 104th [Infantry Regiment – BK]. At 7h30, the commander of the vanguard sent me this information: Éthe, the eastern exit, 22 August [1914 – BK], 7h3079 Commander of the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade To the commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Brigade At the eastern exit from Éthe, a few shots were fired toward the main troops of the vanguard, probably by isolated patrols [of the enemy – BK]. The 14th Hussar Regiment and its support battalion joined the march column. The march was halted for a while but was soon resumed (…)

At 7h00 the support battalion, stopped by enemy fire, took up positions between Hamawé and Lacheneau. General [Henri – BK] Felineau had barely sent a report when he had to hastily place two battalions of the vanguard to face a brutal enemy attack launched from the left flank, from Lefort forest and from Bivaux. The [enemy – BK] troops were so numerous that our soldiers had to retreat [to Éthe – BK] and cling to a railway embankment. In this situation, Colonel [Wallerand – BK] Hauteclocque, probably assessing the situation as critical, decided to intervene and courageously deployed 3 squadrons against the enemy80. 78 ET: Obviously, it would have been absurd if I had weakened my division, deploying to my right or even left flank troops tasked with establishing communication with [the French – BK] V Corps (whose itinerary I did not know) and with the 8th Division (putting them at an increased distance from the 7th Division). As a result, as confirmed by the events of 22 [August], we would have needed two units to establish communication in a useful way and put up enough resistance. 79 This report was not found in the documents of the staff of the 7th Infantry Division stored in the SHD. 80 BK: The charge of the 14th Hussar Regiment took place in slightly different circumstances – see Chapter 3 of this book.

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After several desperate attempts at charging behind the railway line81, he decided that his sacrifice was futile and retreated to the major part of the division, crossing Jeunes Bois82 where, unfortunately, his squadrons were decimated by shelling and subjected to a cruel ordeal; shot earlier, he was killed in action83. Around 7h45, when I entered Éthe with the last vanguard company, the fog which had covered the entire region dispersed as if by magic. Numerous [enemy – BK] artillery shells were launched on the batteries [of the French field artillery – BK] marching in the rear of the main part of the vanguard. However, I continued the march in order to find out about the conditions in which the vanguard operated. I did not even get past the first houses in the village [Éthe – BK] before I was in the midst of heavy fire84. In front of me, less than 100 m away, enemy soldiers captured a house at the end of the road from which they tried to attack. When the eastern end of the village on my right was attacked by numerous soldiers, the German infantry appeared on my left, in a long street leading to Belmont. It was our duty to defend Éthe at any price. I decided that I would stay there as long as I was needed85. The [75 mm field – BK] cannons were immediately placed in position along the roads which the enemy chose to approach us on, while the other troops were marching to the left bank [of the river – BK], successfully withstanding the enemy pressure and preventing the village from being surrounded. The liaison officer of the IV [Army – BK] Corps entered Éthe with me; once he had taken in the situation, he left in a car for the command post of the IV [Army – BK] Corps. The German artillery opened fire on his car, yet he managed to escape

81 BK: The commander of the 14th Hussar Regiment did not attack the railway line but the charge started at the railway line or, more precisely, in a tunnel which ran above the railway line. 82 It should be: Jeune Bois. 83 BK: As a result of this ill-fated charge through a tunnel, the 14th Hussar Regiment lost its fighting efficiency. 84 BK: Following contact with the enemy units, it was very careless of the division commander to remain with his staff with the vanguard as it posed a threat to the divisional staff and made it impossible to command the entire French 7th Infantry Division. Therefore, General Edgar de Trentinian could not respond to the dynamic tactical developments in his own division. In this situation, he and his staff should have immediately retreated to the rear of his units, established a divisional command post there and ordered his units to change from marching formation to fighting formation. Meanwhile, the division’s commander was in the middle of the battle and lost communication with his units, thus disrupting the command process. At the same time, approximately 50% of the French 7th Infantry Division was engaged in the fighting and there was no communication with the remaining half. 85 ET: Contrary to the accounts according to which I was shooting together with the riflemen, I remained at the centre of the village to command the defence. My escort did not set foot on the ground.

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the shelling and disappeared into Jeunes Bois forest86. So he was able to explain to the corps’ commander the location of the vanguard [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK]. Several minutes later, I sent Captain Jullien, an officer from my staff, to Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte, the commander of the main troops of the column with an order to march forward and attack Belmont. Once these two officers left, the intensity of the enemy artillery and machinegun fire seriously disrupted communications between the vanguard and the main part of the column. However, several attempts were made in the morning to ensure that the order given to Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte was completed and a report delivered to the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps. The colonel in charge of the divisional artillery could leave Éthe and join the battery on hill 298. The situation remained critical until noon, i. e. until the commander of the 14th [Infantry – BK] Division retreated to Éthe with a majority of the vanguard. After that, the village was defended by enough units to maintain this excellent point of defence and let the main part of the division manoeuvre and locate the remaining units. My presence in Éthe was no longer required. I entrusted the commander of the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade with the defence. I decided to join the major units of my division immediately, as their intervention seemed delayed. Fortunately, I managed to cross a barrier made out of enemy cannons and machine guns; several minutes later I was among the soldiers from the 101st [Infantry – BK] Regiment87. After the initial cannon fire at approximately 8h00, the colonel in charge of the division’s main troops stopped his soldiers; the front of the 101st [Infantry – BK] Regiment had just passed Gomery, behind the line from Belmont to Bleid, marching through Éthe. The units consisted of 6 battalions and 10 cannons. Therefore, the colonel had a lot of room to manoeuvre for his battalion and two artillery battalions. Initially, Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte followed the order to march to Belmont; he ordered the 101st [Infantry Regiment – BK] to capture Jeunes Bois88 while the 26th [Field –BK] Artillery Regiment took up positions on hill 293 to the west of Gomery. The 101st [Infantry Regiment – BK] accomplished its mission and the 102nd [Infantry Regiment – BK] had already taken up positions to the north-west of 86 It should be Jeune Bois. 87 ET: While the enemy’s barrier was solid, I did not have a moment of doubt that I would be able to join the main troops of my division, as I was certain that the defenders of Éthe were putting up resistance to the enemy; indeed, through the entire day it was possible for a proficient horseman to cover the short distance between Éthe and Jeunes Bois. 88 It should be Jeune Bois.

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Gomery. Around noon, after the entire division had already been engaged in fighting between des Loges forest and Bleid, Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte suddenly abandoned following the order of attacking Belmont as instructed by one of my staff officers. The battalion covering the right flank of the XIII [Army – BK] Corps clashed with the Württemberg brigade on its way to the south. Showing outstanding courage, the [covering battalion – BK] had to gradually leave the area and reach Gomery under cover of [fire – BK] from a battery of the 26th [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment positioned on hill 293. Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte, who had been requested to send reinforcements for the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division was concerned by the fact that the enemy infantry was approaching Latour and had reached the area south of Belmont. He was afraid that all the troops in front of Gomery would be surrounded and, instead of trying to re-group them, he decided to withdraw both the artillery and the infantry battalions in order to take up new positions on Malmaison plateau. When I reached the southern end of Jeunes Bois89, the artillery and two battalions of the 102nd [Infantry Regiment – BK] had already finished their march. However, the 101st [Infantry Regiment – BK] was only leaving the area. I immediately ordered the regiment’s commander to re-launch the attack and to inform all the units they encountered about it. While my chief of staff supervised the carrying out of the orders, I left toward the position of a battery of the 44th [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment through Gomery; from that post, you could see the entire battlefield. Then, the enemy marched through Belmont and approached Jeunes Bois forest90; the enemy was stopped on the Thon and repelled by our 75 s [75 mm field cannons – BK]91. Next the enemy disappeared in the trees bordering the river. With a completely exposed right flank, endangered from the left flank, without communication with the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division and the commander of [the IV – BK] Army Corps, around 4:30 I decided that we should take advantage of the enemy retreat and the lengthy standstill to withdraw from the battlefield which my troops had dominated all day long92.

89 It should be Jeune Bois. 90 It should be Jeune Bois. 91 ET: Initially, the artillery refrained from firing because the distance did not allow them to differentiate the German from the French infantry, but the enemy movements were quickly recognised by our artillery. 92 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian disregarded many important stages of the battle of Éthe. Therefore, it is hard to agree with his opinion.

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Around 5h30, the defenders of Jeunes Bois forest93 started to retreat slowly toward Gomery and Malmaison. While approaching Malmaison, I found Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte together with the 102nd [Infantry Regiment – BK] and two battalions of the 26th [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment. The 101st [Infantry Regiment – BK] withdrew, not pursued by the enemy. There would have been nothing easier than to capture and hold Malmaison plateau. However, around 20h00 I was ordered to station my division in Allondrelle, Charency and Villers-le-Rond94. At dawn on 23 [August 1914 – BK], the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade joined the division’s main troops in Charency. All the enemy’s efforts came to nothing in the face of the heroic resistance of the defenders of Éthe. At dusk, the artillery and lightly wounded soldiers of General [Henri – BK] Felineau evacuated the village. En route, they were joined by the troops which remained in Jeunes Bois forest95. Annex no. 115496 23 August [1914 – BK], 12h20

Captain Pellegrin to the Army Commander, Damvillers. (…) The 7th division, which has got a grip on itself, has at its disposal 6 battalions. In Éthe, it lost only two cannons. There, a part of the French infantry held its position until the night and could safely retreat to Malmaison (…)97. (History of the Great War)

Major Grasset from the History Section of the Ministry of War finished his exceptional analysis of the battle of Éthe98, published in Revue Militaire Française99: 93 It should be Jeune Bois. 94 ET: As a result of this distribution, the 7th Division was precisely connected with the 8th Division and the V Army Corps. After dusk, around 20h00, the regiments of the 7th Division started marching. Needless to say, I did not know the location of the 8th Division or the V Corps. Therefore I could not deploy our regiments to Allondrclle, Charency or Villers-leRond only because these locations had been appointed by a staff officer [Etat-Major] of the IV Corps. 95 ET: The vanguard evacuated Éthe around 21h00. 96 BK: Annex no. 1154, AFGG 1/1/1, 908. 97 ET: These are not infantry sub-units but an entire brigade which stayed in position in Éthe or on the outskirts of the village until the night. 98 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian mentioned analyses carried out by Major Alphons Grasset, published in the form of 5 articles in Revue Militaire Française, namely Alphonse Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – I” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 25 (1923):

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All in all, it was a terrifying day in Éthe, a baptism of fire for the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division; it was a victory for the division, clinched in a border battle, because after 17h00 it saw the fleeing German 10th [Infantry – BK] Division, and we did not hold Éthe only because the circumstances (over which the division did not give control) did not allow it. This hollow victory came at a price. The division lost 124 officers and 5,000 privates (killed, wounded or missing) i. e. approximately half its fighting efficiency100. For this reason the 101st, 103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments, three artillery battalions and the 4th company of the 1st Sapper Regiment, which halted and withstood the attack of German troops, three times greater, definitely deserve to have Éthe on their flags and standards among their most glorious victories. This glorious name, referred to in stories told to young soldiers, will be a symbol of the outstanding devotion and heroic deeds which could have been outperformed in the four years of the war, yet never was. (Major A. GRASSET: Une bataille de rencontre — ÉTHE — 22 August 1914 — Revue Militaire Française, No. 30)101

248–266; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – II” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 25 (1923): 390–412; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – III” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 5–26; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – IV” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 145–167; Idem, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe (22 août 1914) – V” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 28 (1923): 322–341; He also published two books about the operations in question: Alphonse Grasset, La guerre en action: Le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Éthe (Paris: Berger-Levrault 1927); Alphonse Grasset, La guerre en action: le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Virton, vol. 2 (Paris: BergerLevrault, 1925). 99 ET: Major Grasset from the History Section of the Ministry of War published in 1923 a very well-documented analysis of the fighting near Éthe. In all the most significant aspects, it is compliant with the notes of the commander of the 7th Infantry Division. Several paragraphs from General Order no. 18 published in History of the Great War were removed. The role of the troops covering the right flank was borrowed from a story created post-factum by the staff of the IV Army Corps. 100 BK: it is difficult to agree with this opinion. In the course of the battle of Éthe which took place on 22 August 1914, the French 7th Infantry Division was knocked out and it was only the excessive caution of the commander of the German 10th Infantry Division and the decision against attacking made by the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) from the 27th Infantry Division that saved the French troops from annihilation. This undesirable situation resulted from mistakes made by the French commanders on the brigade, division, corps and army levels. The outcome of the fighting would have been even worse for the 7th Infantry Division but for the courage and devotion of the French privates and NCOs. However, they had to pay with their own blood for their superiors’ errors. On the evening of 22 August 1914, the commander of the 10th Infantry Division ordered his units to return to their initial positions. He intended to avoid casualties in chaotic night-time fighting. On the other hand, he did not make sufficient contact on the right and left wings with the adjacent German divisions or intelligence about the enemy. It is equally untrue what Major A. Grasset wrote, namely that the German 10th Infantry Division suffered on that day casualties amounting to “124 officers and 5,000 privates”. According to my source analyses, it was 1,482 soldiers. 101 BK: Grasset, “Une bataille de rencontre. Éthe V”, 341.

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The 9th Division (of V Corps) and the 8th Division (of the IV Corps) on 22 August 1914 In order to present the situation of the 7th Infantry Division on 22 August 1914, I need to sum up the activity of the 9th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps on that day (according to the History of the Great War) and the 8th Infantry Division (as accounted by Major Grasset in the Revue Militaire Française). [Annex no. 773 – BK]102 [3rd Army, 5th Army Corps, Command in Longuyon, 21 August 1914 The staff, 3rd Bureau – BK]

[General order no. 17 for 22 August – BK] (…) Tomorrow, on 22 August [1914 – BK], the [V Army – BK] Corps will attack enemy troops that are in the corps’ way to the west of Longwy, from Signeulx to Bel Arbre redoubt. On the right flank (…) On the left flank, the V [Army – BK] Corps will march toward Saint-Léger and Châtillon and attack along the Gorcy – Signeulx front (without the 9th Infantry Division), along the attack axis between Tellancourt, Saint-Pancré, Bassancy and C (…); at 5h00, the attack will cross the line of Signeulx, Gorcy and Cosnes. The cavalry (…) The 8th Division will ensure communication with the VI Army Corps. (History of the Great War)

[The French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps was tasked with capturing Meix-la-Tige and Rochecourt. At night, the German XIII [Army – BK] Corps started marching heedless of the fog. The German troops clashed with the [French –BK] V [Army – BK] Corps near Signeulx. After 7h30, on the left flank of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps, the 9th [Infantry – BK] Division started to retreat along the road to Saint-Pancré. At 11h00 the commander of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps ordered the retreat of his troops; the 9th [Infantry – BK] Division resumed its march to Tellancourt. At 14h00, the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps received the following telegram from the staff of the 3rd Army:

102 BK: Annex no. 773, AFGG 1/1/1, 654–655.

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“At 11h00, the II [Army – BK] Corps had three regiments from its division in Tintigny and Bellefontaine. The fourth [regiment] and a brigade of the second division fought on the front in Meix before Virton-Houdrigny, without indicating the time at which the event would take place. At 10h55, the commander of the V Army Corps announced that his left flank could not leave Signeulx and that he was obliged to support it. Further to the right, in front of the [French – BK] VI [Army – BK] Corps, the enemy troops which had arrived from Cutry, Chenières and Lain, suddenly attacked the VI Corps, which repelled the attack and gained a firing advantage. The [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps has no communication with the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division of the IV [Army – BK] Corps. Now the goal is to drive away the enemy, whose troops left Étalle marching toward the edge of the woods, to the north of Virton, without deploying significant troops. If possible, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division from the IV [Army – BK] Corps should be directed to the right flank of enemy troops which will attack Signeulx from the left side of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps”103. (History of the Great War)

Despite the thick fog, the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division started marching because it had to cover the right flank of the 4th Army immediately; “besides, nobody believes that he will fight (…)”. At 4h30, a squadron of the division’s cavalry made contact with the enemy. After 5h00 the squadron informed the vanguard that the enemy had already been on the spot, taking cover. At 5h00, the vanguard left Virton under the keen eye of the division’s commander. Soon, the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps joined in. The 31st [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment was 3 km further ahead. At 5h30, the vanguard which clashed with the enemy at Bellevue, was suddenly in the middle of machine-gun fire. While the commander of the 15th [Infantry – BK] Brigade found out that enemy troops were not very large and decided to press on Étalle, he was forced to successively deploy all his battalions. At 7h20, the decimated [battalions of the French 15th Infantry Brigade – BK] were pushed away from Virton, where the regiments of the 16th Brigade were just taking up their positions. Around 8h00, the situation of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division was critical. Nine enemy battalions from [the German 9th Infantry Division – BK] which intended to envelop Virton “only had to attack to push into the fog the destroyed 103 BK: Annex no. 847: On 22 August [1914 – BK] at 13h45, a courier on a motorcycle was sent from Velosnes with a [report – BK] dispatched from Marville by Lieutenant Durand, the army’s liaison officer, AFGG 1/1/1, 713–714.

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units of the 115th and 130th Infantry Regiment”. Then a new danger appeared on the right flank of the Prussian V [Army – BK] Corps in the form of the [French – BK] II [Army – BK] Corps marching to Bellefontaine. The corps separated several battalions from the side guards and put a threat to the right flank of the German 9th Infantry Division [from the V Army Corps – BK], even forcing the division to switch to defence. Between 10h00 and noon, the entire 3rd [Infantry – BK] Division and the II [Army –BK] Corps, the 117th and 124th Infantry Regiments (from the IV Army Corps), distributed along its right flank, were deployed and supported by a battalion of the vanguard artillery of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division amassed on the south-west, between Dampicourt and Bois de la Cote. The remaining two units made an attempt to take up positions on the left bank of the Thon in the direction of hill 280. At 9h30, after some time spent in the town hall in Virton, where a colonel lieutenant from the corps cavalry was wounded, the commander of the IV Army Corps chose his command post on hill 280, to the south of Saint-Mard, from which he could follow the manoeuvres of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division. He was joined by the commander of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division. At 10h00, the cannons of the 31st Field Artillery Regiment and the corps artillery took up positions between hill 280 and Gomery where the commander of the 44th [Field Artillery –BK] Regiment placed one of its battalions. At noon, the artillery completely silenced the enemy’s batteries firing in the direction of Saint-Mard. However, the situation in the defensive lines of Virton was so difficult that General [Victor René – BK] Boëlle with the remains of the 115th, 124th and 130th Infantry Regiments decided to take up position [on hill – BK] 280 – Mont-Quintin; meanwhile, the 117th Infantry Regiment, cooperating with the II Army Corps, was expected to continue the attack on Robelmont. At 14h00, on the northern outskirts of Virton, where some riflemen remained until 15h00, the 130th Infantry Regiment had only 300 soldiers. “The position on hill 280 – Mont-Quintin – was taken up by the artillery; several of its units were decimated, yet the rest were intact, with fourteen batteries [of field cannons – BK] supporting it. They were very well equipped [with ammunition – BK] and completed their mission very well. The position was therefore fully prepared to withstand the enemy attempting to leave Virton and proceed to the rear of the II Corps (…)”

By 13h00, though exhausted, the 117th Infantry Regiment held its position on the right flank of the II [Army – BK] Corps. At 19h00, it continued fighting at the head of the II Corps; later on, the regiment retreated toward Harnoncourt. At 14h00, a cavalry officer came across the enemy in Latour; at 15h00, while returning he met a battalion of the 26th [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment which was stuck on the road to Lehaut forest.

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A captain from the staff [of the IV Army Corps –BK] was summoned to Malmaison with an order for General de Trentinian to stop in that village. Once he rode past the troops from the 13th Infantry Brigade, to the north of Malmaison, he met a staff officer from the [French – BK] 9th Infantry Division of the V Army Corps. “In a barely audible whisper, the officer said to him: on your right, the 9th Division has been destroyed; one can suppose that three regiments have been annihilated; the division is retreating to Tellancourt”. In Malmaison, the captain from the staff [of the IV Army Corps – BK] was accompanied by General de Trentinian who was placing his troops on the plateau104. OBSERVATIONS Grand Quartier Général – Under the pretext of not deploying us prematurely and avoiding an ambush, the Supreme Commander did not allow the commander of the 3rd Army to carry out reconnaissance of enemy troops. Such reconnaissance [on this section of the front – BK] would have allowed the 3rd Army, and the Supreme Commander himself to avoid the inaccurate assessment of the situation. This manner of command was not inspired by either Napoleon or Moltke; it was an act of negating the doctrines advocated in the Ecole de Guerre by Bonnal, Lanrezac, Foch, Bourderiat etc.105 The Germans responded quite differently. Even if they paid a high price for the fighting near Mangiennes, at least after 18 August [1914 – BK] the Crown Prince’s army [the German 5th Army – BK] could clearly focus on the operations of the French II and IV Army Corps. On 21 [August 1914 – BK], owing to the remote covering troops placed in Ruette, Latour and Virton, they knew that the vanguards of the [the French – BK] IV Army Corps had been stationed behind Vire. This was the reason why the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division which expected only insignificant units, clashed in a marching column with the German 10th [Infantry

104 ET: Following an oral account of an officer from the staff of the IV Army Corps, I allegedly said: “General Felineau has been killed”. As if I had regarded the vanguard’s situation as desperate, while it was quite the opposite: upon leaving Éthe, I left the vanguard in excellent defensive condition. 105 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian referred to the school of command established by Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) and Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (1800–1891), a Prussian field marshal. He also referred to the military doctrines taught in the École Supérieure de Guerre, an elitist French military school, by its professors: General Henri Bonnal (1844– 1917), General Charles Lanrezac (1852–1925), Marshal (1851–1929) Ferdinand Foch and Frédéric Bourdériat (1857–1921).

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– BK] Division, whose three regiments were marching under the cover of the powerful division artillery106. Therefore, the Supreme Command should be held responsible for this engagement107. The 3rd Army – Meanwhile, on 18 August, scouts provided information that suggested that “3 infantry columns, one brigade each, leaving Mersch toward Arlon, may still remain near Arlon on 20 and 21 [August 1914 – BK]”. Indeed, on 20 [August 1914 – BK] in the area of Virton, Arlon and Longwy, the [reconnaissance – BK] airplanes did not detect anything else; there was nothing easier for [enemy – BK] troops than to take cover in this forested area. On 21 [August 1914 – BK], reconnaissance carried out by the 14th Hussar Regiment revealed that the enemy was behind the Thon and that “the vanguard was involved in minor skirmishes everywhere” (General Tanant – La IIIe Armée dans la Bataille). Therefore, the [reconnaissance – BK] information at the disposal of the [staff – BK] of the 3rd Army could hardly be deemed “non-existent” as General Tanant insisted. This way or another, the statement that only insignificant manoeuvres of [enemy – BK] troops were spotted, misled the commanders of the [IV – BK] Army Corps. It would have been better to say that no other information [on the enemy – BK] “was gleaned” and to keep the commanders of army corps alert. In fact, albeit late, the staff of the 3rd Army received reconnaissance data collected by the IV [Army – BK] Corps on 20 and 21 [August 1914 – BK]. There was still time to write and send additional instructions at night on 21 [August 1914 – BK] to the IV [Army – BK] Corps. Obviously, the 3rd Army was not facing insignificant [enemy – BK] infantry troops. However, the staff [of the 3rd Army – BK] did not take any measures that the situation suggested, based on the reconnaissance of the IV Army Corps. Therefore, these instructions were not changed. The 3rd Army [its commander and the staff – BK] were so certain that the IV [Army – BK] Corps would not come across the enemy on 21 [August 1914 – BK] that they made the unforgivable mistake of appointing different marching routes to the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions. As a result, the two units kept putting 106 BK: The data provided by General Trentinian is not very precise. The French 7th Infantry Division collided with four regiments from the German 10th Infantry Division supported by a cavalry regiment and two regulations field artillery regiments. Both divisions were comparable with respect to size. However, the German division had much more effective equipment, much better trained soldiers, more imaginative tactics and better qualified officers. 107 BK: I agree with General Edgar de Trentinian; implementation of Plan XVII – an attack by the French armies on unidentified enemy units – was an act of utter carelessness and lack of respect for the soldiers’ lives.

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distance between themselves. After several hours [the two divisions – BK] were 6 km apart with a dense forest between them and no road running through it. Without an infantry unit, or even cavalry on the flanks of the IV and V [Army – BK] Corps, it would have been necessary (as Colonel de Grandmaison himself recommended at the 2nd conference) to shift the corps of the 3rd Army to good positions. Then, communication would have been possible in the course of the march, coupled with cooperation in case of meeting the enemy. Due to the divergence of the routes of the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions and the risk involved, as a safety precaution, the 3rd Army was ordered to draw the attention of the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps that there was a need of [deploying – BK] a liaison unit between the two divisions108. The IV Army Corps – It was the commander and the staff of the 3rd Army that put the IV [Army – BK] Corps, especially the 7th Infantry Division, in this dangerous situation. Unfortunately, the commander of the IV Corps, who understood the mistake made by the 3rd Army, did nothing to eliminate the imminent danger. In order no. 18, he failed to consider the results of the reconnaissance carried out by the 14th Hussar Regiment on 20 and 21 [August 1914 – BK] or the results delivered on the evening of 21 [August 1914 – BK] by the vanguard of the 8th Infantry Division. Order no. 18 for 22 [August] says: “The southern part of Luxembourg is occupied although only insignificant manoeuvres of [enemy – BK] troops have been spotted; between Étalle and Arlon only several quarters and camps of the artillery and cavalry were observed”. In his order, the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps did not mention a word about the reconnaissance conducted by the cavalry from 21 [August 1914 – BK] and did not take any actions that would justify the enemy’s presence near Virton; in this situation a more cautious march should have been ordered, or at least reconnaissance made. It looks, said Major Grasset, that the Army’s order [no. 3 – BK] utterly confused the Commander of the IV Army Corps. On the following day [the commander of the IV Army Corps – BK] were instructed as follows: 1°. Together with your army corps, formed into a marching column, penetrate the unidentified forest where the enemy has taken cover; 2° In the same forest, send two of your divisions in the opposite directions, the 8th Infantry Division toward Étalle and the 7th toward Saint-Léger i. e. the same area where the [French

108 During the battle, communication between the Supreme Command [Grand Quartier] of the 3rd Army and the commanders of the IV and V Corps was so bad that at 14h00, the commander of the IV Corps was requested to send the 7th Division to the right flank of the enemy troops.

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– BK] V Army Corps operated which was ordered by the army [the 3rd Army – BK] to march from Virton to Châtillon109.

However, the editors of Instruction no. 16 took notice of the doubts. While instructing Lieutenant Colonel Lebouc, a liaison officer of the IV [Army – BK] Corps, Captain Lenoir said: “I would not want to be held responsible for executing the order issued by your army corps commander.” The commander of the [French – BK] IV Army Corps at least thought that it was an easily rectified mistake, as a result of which the 7th Infantry Division was tasked with marching through a deep valley in which it would be at the mercy of a few enemy machine guns. There was an [alternative – BK] road running along the ridge – why not follow it? He grabbed a phone and called General Grosseti, but the chief of staff of the 3rd Army listened to his opinions perfunctorily. There was nothing he could change. The 7th Infantry Division had to march through the valley because the suggested road along the ridge would have led the division to the zone of operation of the [French – BK] V Army Corps. Alea iacta est. The order of the IV [Army – BK] Corps had already been written110. Consequently, the staff officer and, later on, the commander of the IV Army Corps and his staff commander realised the danger that the IV Corps was facing, most of all, the 7th Infantry Division. However, the orders for the division or for the cavalry regiment [the 14th Hussar Regiment – BK] did not reflect the officers’ concern! They even failed to inform the commander of the 7th Infantry Division about a report on reconnaissance carried out by the 14th Hussar Regiment; not a word was said about the vanguard of the 8th Infantry Division [located to the left of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] clashing with enemy troops in the evening [on 21 August 1914 – BK]. The commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps should have at least rectified the mistake made by the 3rd Army which neglected the establishment of liaison units between the IV [Army – BK] Corps and the two adjacent ones (the II and V corps). Contact [on the flanks – BK] between the II [Army – BK] Corps, the 7th and 8th Infantry Division and between the 7th Infantry Division and the V [Army – BK] Corps was not planned before reaching the line running through Bellefontaine, Bois d’Ardennes and Éthe, and the line from Étalle to Châtillon and Meix-la-Tige. The only communication [between the divisions and the corps – BK] was established by couriers. If several units of enemy infantry or cavalry were able to throw the [French – BK] IV [Army – BK] into disarray, what could a hundred cavalrymen do, stretched along the sides on an 8 km-long column in sheltered, uneven terrain? 109 ET: A secret and personal army instruction for 22 August. 110 ET: GRASSET, Revue Militaire Française, no. 96, 255–256.

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Starting in Éthe, the entire 7th Infantry Division, without communication with the V [Army – BK] Corps, was exposed to a sudden attack by enemy troops from the left and right flanks. Quos vult perdere Jupiter dementat prius (…) (Whom the gods would destroy) According to History of the Great War, in the order [for the 3rd Army – BK] for 21 [August 1914 – BK] the following destinations were marked: the IV Corps – Virton and Latour, the V Corps – Signeulx. The order clearly marked the locations of the [French – BK] IV and V [Army – BK] Corps separated by an obstacle, namely the lower course of the Basse-Vire. According to the relocation order from 21 [August 1914 – BK], the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps deployed the vanguard of the 8th Infantry Division to Virton when the vanguard of the 7th Infantry Division had to reach Éthe, 5 km away from the lower course of the Basse-Vire. After nightfall, the vanguard [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] did not march further than to Jeunes Bois forest111; it was a long way away from the line of Virton, Latour and Signeulx marked by the commander of the 3rd Army. Assuming that the 8th Infantry Division reached Virton by 4h30 and the 7th Infantry Division arrived in Éthe by 5h00, the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps yet again heightened the danger faced by the two divisions. The staffs of the [3rd – BK] Army and the [IV – BK] Army Corps failed to establish good communications between the columns; in an order for 22 August [1914 – BK] they should have informed the divisional commanders about the targets of the II and V [Army – BK] Corps, the time of departure, as well as the itinerary of the 3rd Infantry Division (the II Corps) and the 8th Infantry Division112 (the V Corps). This information was crucial. It is hard to understand how the staff [of the 3rd Army – BK] was able to write an order with such yawning gaps113. The staff of the [3rd Army – BK] and the staff of the IV [Army – BK] Corps were guilty of doing everything they could to cover up their mistake. They suggested that the commander of [the 7th Infantry Division – BK] had received orders related to communications with the V [Army – BK] Corps but they were not able to present any order or instruction to corroborate their claims. The commander of the Army Corps did not supply any instructions on communications between the 7th Infantry Division and the [French – BK] V 111 It should be Jeune Bois. 112 BK: The author made a mistake: it should be the 9th Infantry Division which was a part of the French V Army Corps. 113 ET: As General Farret, the commander of the 101st Infantry Regiment, stated without sparing a moment to explain to him the goal of his mission.

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[Army – BK] Corps. When I decided to send the cover units to Bleid, I verbally instructed Captain de Jouvencel from my staff and offered a platoon from the division’s cavalry squadron. Following my instructions, he asked the commander of the 101st Infantry Regiment to transfer the battalion placed in Grandcourt to Bleid, informing the commander about his mission of defending the [left – BK] flank [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK]114. I did not even think of entrusting this battalion with a liaison mission; the danger would have been double because I did not know the itinerary of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps. As I mentioned before, establishing communication was the responsibility of the army [the staff of the 3rd Army – BK] or at least the commander of the army corps [the IV Army Corps]. “General Palat wrote that this inexplicable skirmish at Longwy had very serious consequences because communications with the IV Corps were severed”. The presence of the 53th Infantry Brigade [Württemberg – BK] on the flank of the [French – BK] 7th Infantry Division in Bleid is evidence of the danger of marching in an echelon formation if the army’s commander failed to make the required preparations115. Apparently, the commander of the [French –BK] IV [Army – BK] Corps foresaw difficulties in commanding two divisions expected to move in opposite directions. Fortunately, this march in opposite directions from Éthe did not take place because the vanguard had to stop in a village while the front of the division’s main troops was at that time on the line of Gomery. Therefore, he had at his disposal two divisions. However, he abandoned the 7th Infantry Division, leaving it to its own devices. In these circumstances, the commander of the [IV – BK] Army Corps was merely a useless and at times dangerous agent operating between the army’s commander and the divisions’ commanders. Regulations for the conduct of large formations stipulated the responsibilities of an army corps’ commander: if an army corps’ commander wanted to enjoy a degree of flexibility and to undertake an operation according to plan, it was up to him to establish the composition of the columns of the army corps, the security units (the vanguards, the flank guards), “(…) the main corps troops are safe

114 ET: Captain de Jouvencel was killed when he was heading a platoon in the course of making contact with the enemy in Bleid. 115 ET: Because of this serious mistake, the 7th Infantry Division of IV Corps was in a difficult situation. It would have been even worse if the commander, General de Trentinian, had not taken precautionary measures and had not secured himself with a covering unit on his right flank (Rapport officiel de la Commission d’enquête sur la question de Briey).

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owing to the very existence of these units (…)”116 (Art. 99, Chapter VII, The Regulations for the Conduct of Large Formations)117. In the light of the threat of the enemy’s presence, without hindering the march of the IV [Army – BK] Corps, General [Victor René – BK] Boëlle should have chosen the appropriate marching formation i. e. [division – BK] columns. Consequently, the 7th Infantry Division could have reached the Thon along three roads: Latour–Belmont, Ruette–Éthe and Grandcourt–Bleid. Once the vanguards [of both divisions of the IV Army Corps – BK] made contact with the enemy, he [General Victor René Boëlle – BK] should have reviewed the situation, found a solution, agreed on an action plan, set goals, grouped the regiments and deployed his two divisions. In short, he should have commanded his army corps (Chapter VII, The Regulations for the Conduct of Large Formations)118. What happened was quite the opposite: the commander of the IV Corps and his chief of staff remained the entire day [22 August 1914 – BK] at their command post, failing to provide the 7th Infantry Division with any guidelines. By the very selection of the location of the command post to the south of Saint-Mard, the commander of the army corps not only lost sight of the battlefield of the 7th Infantry Division but his staff officers had real difficulties with ensuring communications with the division119. The commander of the IV Army Corps did actually nothing to find out what was happening on the other side. Around 1h00 the commander of the IV Army Corps received the following report from Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte: Colonel Lacotte, Commander of the 13th Brigade to the commander of the IV Army Corps At 7h30, the troops under my command gathered between Gomery and Éthe, including 2 battalions of the 101st [Infantry – BK] Regiment, the entire 102nd regiment [the 102nd Infantry Regiment – BK] and 3 [field – BK] artillery battalions. The units set off on a march toward Éthe, following an order of General de Trentinian to liberate him from Éthe. However, the infantry could not possibly leave the forest [Jeune Bois – BK] because the edge 116 Bulletin Officiel Du Ministère De La Guerre, Service des armées en campagne. Conduite des grandes unites (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1913), 36. 117 BK: The instruction referred to by General Edgar de Trentinian was Bulletin Officiel Du Ministère De La Guerre, Service des armées en campagne. Conduite des grandes unités, Paris 1913, 32. 118 BK: Bulletin Officiel Du Ministère De La Guerre, Service des armées en campagne. Conduite des grandes unités, Paris 1913, 36–41. 119 ET: According to Histoire Officielle de la Guerre, General Boëlle made an attempt to combine the 8th and 7th Divisions, deploying the remaining hussars to Latour. At 8h00, he should have placed a battalion of the 8th or 7th Infantry Division in Latour, thus ensuring communications between the two divisions and blocking the road which the enemy intended to use, put their central troops in danger.

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of it was being shelled by enemy artillery, while our artillery was not able to identify the enemy’s location. Five battalions had to retreat to the forest to the south of Ruette. Acting Staff Officer120

In the report there is no mention of [the officer – BK] being ordered to attack Belmont; this is evidence of how Colonel Lacotte needed effective communication with the commander of the army corps [the IV Army Corps – BK]. The 14th Hussar Regiment – a cavalry regiment, followed the route of the 7th Infantry Division. Due to the early departure time [the regiment set off on the march at 4h00, in poor visibility – BK] and the forested area in the vicinity of Vance, the troops had to rely on the vanguard of the 7th Infantry Division. Up to Vance, the division was in touch with the vanguard of the 7th Infantry Division. In line with the order, if they detected the enemy, the 7th Infantry Division was to counterattack to the west via Vance. How was it, then, that the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps did not grasp the need of subordinating the 14th Hussar Regiment to the commander of the 7th Infantry Division? Following contact with the enemy, the infantry, the cavalry, virtually everyone had to fight separately. And that is what actually happened. [General – BK] Order no. 16121 did not indicate the key roads to follow during the march; as it happened, the road to Étalle was of special importance to both divisions. The order failed to indicate the destinations of both cavalry regiments. The commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps tasked the 14th Hussar Regiment with reconnaissance typical of a cavalry division and ignored the recommendations from an instruction of 10 December 1912, assigning only one cavalry regiment to the army corps. In order to predict the enemy’s manoeuvres [the direction thereof – BK] we had to carry out reconnaissance by means of a single battalion near Vance on 22 [August 1914 – BK] at 13h00 or even at the end of 21 [August]122. Two battalions

120 BK: I could not find this report in the documents of the staff of the IV Army Corps from August 1914, stored in the SHD. 121 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian referred to the General Order no. 16 from 21 August 1914 issued by the staff of the IV Army Corps for the 7th Infantry Division and the remaining units given in Velosnes at 15h00. A copy of the order is stored in the documents of the 3rd (operations) Bureau of the staff of the 7th Infantry Division. 7e Division d’Infanterie, 3e Bureau – Opérations, 24 N 117, Divisions et Brigades, Des Archives De La Guerre 1914–1918, SHD. 122 ET: Just like the Germans in 1870, in the course of the manoeuvres, General Tremeau ordered the army’s commander in charge of the reconnaissance to instruct the cavalry officers of what information he was expecting. Be it the army or the army corps, commanders should always be inspired by Napoleon’s methods. “Employ all the forms of intelligence – Colonel Colin advised – sometimes obtain information by means of reconnaissance, in other cases by means of cavalry squadrons or entire divisions. However,

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were to join each division and another battalion would cover a robust unit (2 battalions and 1 artillery battery) responsible for maintaining contact [on the flanks – BK] with the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions, following the road through Latour, Belmont and Étalle. Again, we had to follow the regulations for the conduct of large formations which the staff [of the IV Army Corps – BK] had ignored. The staff certainly did not appreciate the importance of these regulations: “The corps cavalry will typically join the covering troops in order to protect and lead; to a large extent, the cavalry will co-participate in supporting the troops in the course of camping, marching and fighting. In no case can the army corps cavalry play the same role as the army cavalry deployed to detect the enemy”123.

After arriving in Éthe, Colonel [Wallerand – BK] Hauteclocque [the commander of the 14th Hussar Regiment – BK] demonstrated prudence and sent out patrols in the direction of Saint-Léger and Bleid; he neglected the area to the north of Éthe which could have served as a dangerous shelter for enemy troops. That was the direction from which an attack was launched, posing a threat to the entire vanguard. The negligence which led to taking the vanguard by surprise was an inexplicable mistake made by the cavalry officer who was regarded the best in this type of troops (he was a graduate of the Centre des Hautes Etudes124). Besides, the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps and his staff presented to Colonel [Wallerand – BK] Hauteclocque an entirely false picture of the situation. The order which concerned him said that once the Vance region was reached, he was expected to report to two divisional commanders. Not a word was said about where the reconnaissance was to be carried out before the arrival [of the main troops of both divisions – BK].

each time you need to explain to the cavalrymen what information a commander requires [in a specific situation – BK]”. 123 ET: All the specific cases studied during cavalry tactics classes at the École de Guerre conducted by Colonel Bourderiat, Colonel Desvallières or their predecessors are inspired by these tactical rules. Obviously, a chief of staff, overwhelmed by bureaucracy, has only a vague idea of the tactics of the three types of formations [infantry, artillery and cavalry – BK]. 124 BK: The Centre of Higher Military Studies (Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires – further referred to as the CHEM) was established in Paris in 1911 on the initiative of Ferdinand Foch, the then brigade general. Education at the centre took 6 months and was intended for lieutenant colonels and colonels operating in corps staffs and divisional staffs. There were 25 graduates in its first year. During a course, the officers participated in autumn manoeuvres, worked on maps and in the field. The goal of the practical classes was to present the work of army staff and army groups. Soon, the centre was referred to as “a school of marshals”. As one of the French elitist military schools, the CHEM has been based in Paris. Caroline Tison and Philippe Vial, 1911–2011: 100 ans de formation des futurs chefs de la Défense au Centre des hautes études militaires (Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires), accessed: February 16, 2020, https://www.dems.defense.gouv.fr/chem/historique/100-ans-dhistoire.

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After 8h00, the position allocated to the 14th Hussar Regiment was behind the vanguard. As [the commander of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] did not report to the divisional commander, he should have temporarily followed the orders of the commander of the vanguard125. When, at around 8h30, Colonel [Wallerand – BK] Hauteclocque recognised the danger to the forward battalions, he decided to sacrifice his troops. Eager to intervene as quickly as possible, he attacked the German infantry [the 50th Infantry Regiment from the 10th Infantry Division – BK] choosing the only available route: a road tunnel through a railway embankment126. After two heroic attempts [at crossing the tunnel – BK] he was forced to leave the battlefield and he moved behind the Thon when it was too late. His battalions were decimated by a deluge of shrapnel bombs. After halting for a while, having left Gomery, the general in charge of the vanguard resumed marching in line with my order. Upon reaching Éthe, the cavalry made contact with the enemy on the road to Saint-Léger. The support battalion could not repel the German infantry, therefore the vanguard which stopped at the exit from Éthe was in charge of making the reconnaissance of enemy troops and their position, and of supporting the battalion. “When the reconnaissance of the enemy is not complete, the vanguard forces the enemy to reveal its forces” (The Regulations for the Conduct of Large Formations, page 105). “The main role of the vanguard is the reconnaissance of enemy troops by repelling their advance elements and attacking until the enemy reveals larger forces” (Revue Militaire, page 345, No. 30, 1923)127.

A battalion located on the left flank of the vanguard reached the northern end of the village; with non-existent cavalry and a lack of reports from the 14th Hussar Regiment, the vanguard’s commander General [Henri – BK] Felineau disregarded the possibility of placing his troops in Éthe first and later on continuing the march. If the cavalry regiment had discovered the German infantry to the 125 ET: On the following day after the battle of Éthe, the officers of the 7th Division could not believe that the cavalry regiment and its support had not been subordinated to the commander of the 7th Division. This serious mistake of the commander of the army corps resulted from the organisation and doctrines propagating particularism. In the same spirit, Colonel [Wallerand – BK] Hauteclocque hesitated putting himself under the command of the vanguard’s commander when he encountered considerable resistance on the road to Saint-Léger. 126 BK: The evaluation of the situation of the 14th Hussar Regiment and the decision to charge were made in different circumstances and for reasons different than those presented by General Edgar de Trentinian. The situation is analysed in Chapter 3 of this book. 127 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian quotes a book by Brossé, “Notre théorie de 1914 sur la Conduite des Opérations et les Leçons de la Guerre (Fin),” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 30 (1923), 345.

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north of the village, the cavalry and the support battalion would obviously have halted the march and the vanguard’s commander would certainly have started defence of Éthe. As a result, the 7thInfantry Division would even have been able to manoeuvre in better conditions in Belmont. General [Henri –BK] Felineau, surprised by the enemy, who appeared unexpectedly on his left flank, could only have stopped for a moment, withdraw and cling to Éthe. The vanguard’s commander provided space for the 7th Infantry Division and thus allowed the main troops to complete their manoeuvres without the risk of being stopped by the enemy offensive or artillery fire. General [Henri – BK] Felineau remained in Éthe into the night, despite regular attacks launched by German battalions and a barrage of artillery shells aimed at Éthe for an entire day. The general displayed the most notable military features. He made it possible for the 7th Infantry Division to continue fighting while the enemy threatened the divisional flanks. As the first cannon shots were heard, the commander of the divisional main troops [the 7th Infantry Division – BK] halted his column, whose front was approaching Gomery. Therefore, he had at his disposal excellent room to manoeuvre: shielded by Jeunes Bois forest128 [a densely forested hill and forest bearing the same name – BK], the infantry could take advantage of the cover. At the same time, the artillery was taking up positions in the west, toward hill 105. While the position was too exposed, it allowed them to survey all the directions from which the enemy could have arrived129. Following the order to attack and capture Belmont, Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte immediately instructed the 101st regiment [the 101st Infantry regiment – BK] to capture Jeunes Bois130 while a battalion of the 102nd regiment [the 102nd Infantry Regiment – BK] was to extend the regiment’s left flank. It does not seem that, in the course of the march, the companies made a reconnaissance of the terrain131. It would have been better if the battalion of the 102nd regiment [the 128 It should be Jeune Bois. 129 ET: This is absolutely not true; contrary General Tanant’s opinion, immediately after leaving quarters, the column could have been completely exposed to enemy fire. If that had been the case, of course the responsible party would have been the commander of the 3rd Army and the IV Army Corps. However, how would have the artillery managed to take up positions to the west of Gomery? How could have the main troops manoeuvred, fought, faced all these attacks if enemy guns had shelled the troops on their way to Gomery after leaving the quarters? Division General Farrel, in command of the 101st Infantry Regiment during the fighting of Éthe, declared that his companies easily manoeuvred in an area not visible to the enemy. 130 It should be Jeune Bois. 131 BK: Not knowing well the terrain where the attack was to be launched, the companies of the 101st and 102nd Infantry Regiments were not able to take advantage of the terrain. When

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102nd Infantry Regiment – BK] had captured Bois des Loges forest, or even if it had marched through Bois de Bampont, as the commander of the 101st Regiment [the 101st Infantry Regiment – BK] suggested. In the course of the manoeuvres [of the major troops of the 7th Infantry Division – BK], in an attempt to halt the enemy marching to the south of the Thon, the [French – BK] units suffered heavy casualties. The enemy even appeared on the edge of Bois des Loges forest; Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte was notified that the battalion of the troops covering the right flank all day long had repelled in Bleid attacks of much more numerous [enemy –BK] troops. After he lost a large part of his soldiers he ordered retreat toward Gomery. [Colonel Georges Lacotte – BK], asked to deploy support for the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division, from which he had been separated by enemy forces heading for Latour, was concerned about the situation of his left flank, which was under attack in Gomery and unable to communicate the commander of the [IV – BK] Army Corps, informed that commander at around 12h30 of his situation. The colonel evaluated his situation so poorly that he decided to defy the order to attack Belmont, as instructed by the divisional commander (the order was reissued around noon). Colonel [Lacotte – BK] even decided to withdraw up to Malmaison. With the assistance of [infantry – BK] battalions and two units of the 26th [Field Artillery –BK] Regiment supported by a battery of the corps artillery132, he could face the attacks which endangered his two flanks. Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte, who did not know what had happened in Éthe and Virton, deserted by the commander of the IV Corps, decided to remain on the defensive and establish several robust defensive posts in the rear, between Gomery and Latour. Lamentably, despite the detailed orders received from the commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division, he thought that he had to leave Gomery to retreat hastily over 10 km from his own troops still fighting in Éthe and Jeunes Bois forest133. In this hasty retreat, he deployed his artillery via Latour instead of Ruettes, thus exposing the troops to grave danger. The commander of the 101st Regiment [the 101st Infantry Regiment – BK], Colonel Farret, took up position in Jeunes Bois forest and remained there for the rest of the day, thus helping to save the vanguard. The enemy gave up on the final attack because at the end of the day [after dusk – BK], Jeunes Bois forest was still in our hands.

they left the forest and marched into the open area on the hill, they were easy targets for the artillery from the German 10th Infantry Division. 132 ET: A battalion and a battery. 133 It should be Jeune Bois.

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The Laplace battalion134 (the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment – BK): by halting the Württemberg brigade before Bleid and heroically fighting for several hours, the battalion made it possible for the [French – BK] 9th [Infantry – BK] Division of the V [Army – BK] Corps to retreat, but also pinned down the enemy, which would otherwise have attacked the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division and threatened its right flank or would have enforced the retreat135. The commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division: if the commander of the army corps [the IV Army Corps – BK] did not think that he had to order each of his divisions to march in several columns (which would have facilitated quick deployment of the corps’ units in the case of contact with the enemy), I should hardly be criticised for having failed to do that, the more so that Éthe was appointed to me as the beginning of the march of the 7th [Infantry –BK] Division. If, on account of the remote and soon after divergent march by the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division, the commander of the IV Army Corps proceeding with the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division decided that he was not able to ensure safety (which was a natural responsibility of an army corps commander), order no. 16136 should have had the following wording: “The commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division, as soon as he leaves the quarters, is to prepare to march and will adopt safety measures as he sees fit in the course of the march to Saint-Léger”137. Was I supposed to halt the vanguard and the major part of the divisional troops after the report of several [enemy – BK] uhlans in Éthe?138 Common sense and the regulations required the vanguard to continue its march before the enemy put up more resistance. Interestingly, avoiding any painful surprises in the course of the march was imperative, because the mission of the two divisions was “clearly offensive”. It was therefore important to reach the area of Vance at a specified time, as the enemy was certainly there. Order no. 18139 also specified that the division should march through Éthe at 5h00. 134 BK: In charge of this battalion was Major Louis Leplace (born 04–09–1864) who was killed heading his soldiers near Bleid during the battle of Éthe on 22–08–1914. Base des Morts pour la France de la Première Guerre mondiale, accessed: February 11, 2020, https://www.memoi redeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr. 135 BK: The XIII Army Corps (Württemberg) from the German 5th Army broke through into a gap between the right flank of the French IV Army Corps and the left flank of the French Army Corps. 136 BK: This is in reference to the previously quoted General Order no. 16 issued on 21 August 1914 by the staff of the IV Army Corps for its units for 22 August. 137 ET: Notably, order no. 18 said that the general in charge of the Army Corps should march with the 7th Division. 138 BK: This is a reference to a patrol from the German 1st Uhlan Regiment detected by the French 14th Hussar Regiment. 139 BK: This is a reference to the previously quoted General Order no. 18 issued on the evening of 21 August 1914 by the staff of the IV Army Corps for its units.

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As long as the commander of the army corps [the IV Army Corps – BK] did not issue an order for his two divisions to halt their march, neither of them could stop without exposing the other’s flank140. On the other hand, it was imperative to maintain the [defensive – BK] line on the Thon. These were the reasons why I ordered the vanguard’s commander (who had stopped his column after leaving Gomery) to resume marching. Despite the fog, the enemy also resumed marching; the subsequent developments confirmed that the vanguard of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division arrived just in time to capture Éthe, an important defensive post that the division could hold on to. It should have allowed the major divisional troops to manoeuvre and capture the right positions. If the enemy had been ahead of the vanguard on the Thon, it could only have turned to the poor cover offered by the Jeunes Bois141 and Bois des Loges forests. At 8h00, I still did not know that the vanguard’s commander was fighting with the enemy. Only after entering Éthe did I realise that the entire vanguard had been involved in brutal fighting. Should I have joined immediately the major troops of my division and appointed my command post near Gomery to command my regiments from there, or should I have remained for some time in Éthe before I was certain that this defensive post, on which the fate of the vanguard and the entire division depended, would withhold the violent attacks of the enemy troops which were already at all the exits from the village? According to the regulations, the position of a divisional commander was with the vanguard; according to the regulations, the commander of the 13th [Infantry – BK] Brigade was the commander of the main troops [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK]; this rule can certainly be rescinded. In my opinion, it would have been better to place a divisional commander at the head of the main troops142. Anyway, quite unexpectedly I was placed amid the fighting soldiers; I evaluated the situation as being too critical to leave Éthe with my staff and escorts without disheartening the young soldiers who were fighting bravely but were attacked by much greater numbers. Therefore, I remained with them and, having studied a map with my chief of staff, I asked Captain Jullien to instruct at 10h30 the commander of the main troops [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] to capture Belmont. This order was reissued to Colonel [Georges – BK] Lacotte around noon by means of another officer from my staff. At 9h00, the commander of the division artillery left me to 140 ET: Despite the fog, the II Army Corps saved the 8th Infantry Division from the danger. 141 It should be Jeune Bois. 142 ET: In the course of marching with the vanguard of the 8th Division for several hours, the general in charge of this division and the commander of the Army Corps found themselves among the soldiers fighting in Virton.

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join his batteries and give more orders to the commander of the main troops. A liaison officer of the IV Army Corps entered Éthe together with the divisional commander; around 9h00 [the liaison officer – BK] left in a car to deliver a report to the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps on the situation of the vanguard [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK]. Failing to ponder the plan of fighting adopted by the corps commander, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division issued an order for the prevailing troops to attack Belmont with the aim of combining them with the 8th Infantry Division. The order clearly guarded the centre of the two divisions. In Revue Militaire Française of 1 November 1924, Colonel Alléhaut presented the tactical recommendations for meeting engagement143; he erroneously used the example of the battle of Éthe to criticise the guidelines of General de Trentinian, the commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. [Colonel Alléhaut – BK] indicated the German 10th [Infantry – BK] Division from the V [Army – BK] Corps had 3 regiments at their disposal, while the 7th Division had only 7 battalions on the first line, while the remaining part of the division was in a marching column. He disregarded the fact that since 21 [August 1914 – BK] the enemy knew that they would certainly meet the [French –BK] IV [Army – BK] Corps on the morning of 22 [August]. The [French – BK] 7th and the 8th [Infantry – BK] Divisions, misled by the information and orders received from the commander of the IV Corps, were marching in the conviction that during that day they would not have to fight large [enemy – BK] numbers. Unlike the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division, the German V [Army – BK] Corps was very well informed by its cavalry. In these conditions, we cannot compare “the methods of a proximity march and deployment of troops on either side”. Assuming that I agree with Colonel Alléhaut’s tactical ideas, together with the commander of the 3rd Army, inspired by linear tactics, as I was not warned of the enemy’s presence, I could not waste time or force my units to march with 3 regiments deployed in a fighting line. However, even if I had expected the enemy on the banks of the Thon, I would have been cautious about the immediate deployment of more than 7 battalions out of 12 in a line. I had to keep 5 battalions from the 13th [Infantry – BK] Brigade to complete the mission given by the commander of the Army Corps [the commander of the IV Army Corps – BK] in accordance with his plan of operation. On the other hand, I had to face [enemy – BK] attacks from a flank which I knew I would suffer. As the cavalry could not provide cover [to the front of the marching column of the 7th Infantry Division – BK], the vanguard was taken by surprise. Otherwise, it was strong enough to effectively capture not only Éthe but also Belmont. With that cover, together with 143 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian referred to an article by Alléhaut, “Nouvelles Réflexions a Propos de la Bataille de Rencontre,” Revue Militaire Francaise, no. 41 (1924): 199–232.

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my 5 battalions, I could support the 8th [Infantry –BK] Division and face the Württemberg brigade which halted in Bleid rather instead of marching in the direction of Gomery. I need to add the following: 1) contrary to what Colonel Alléhaut claimed, the artillery of the main troops [the 7th Infantry Division – BK] took up firing positions to the west of Gomery144 without a problem; 2) I was not stuck in Éthe, quite the contrary – I left the village as soon as I was no longer needed there145; 3) the commander of the main troops received my order as confirmed by his report for the commander of the army corps. In summary, placed [by the commander of the 3rd Army – BK] in a forested area, in a divergent direction to the march of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division, finding myself at the head of that division and of the [French – BK] 9th Division (V Corps), I was forced to fight in extremely poor conditions, irrespective of what had been decided. Indeed, because of the retreat of the [French – BK] 9th [Infantry – BK] Division with the V [Army – BK] Corps on the morning of 22 August, starting at 7h30 and with the entire 8th [Infantry –BK] Division engaged in Virton, my flanks [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] were completely exposed. The commander of the army corps [the IV Army Corps – BK] who was marching with the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division and entered Virton, did nothing to establish communication with the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. He did not even deploy companies to Latour. From that moment on (12h00), the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division which tried to keep marching (to no avail) and was left to its devices, was attacked on its front, flanks and rear by large enemy forces. It is not difficult to image how critical the situation of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division would have been if the German troops had left two hours later. My left flank covering troops and a cavalry sub-division would have been repelled; the entire division, attacked from the flank, would have been destroyed and pushed away toward Gomery and Malmaison. Then the responsibility would have been assumed by the commanders of the 3rd Army and the IV [Army – BK] Corps. The 7th [Infantry – BK] Division avoided disaster only thanks to the 14th Brigade, which put up strong resistance in Éthe until nightfall; it was also thanks to the heroic efforts of the right flank covering troops [i. e. the II battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment – BK] which halted the entire Württemberg brigade in Bleid. The 101st regiment [the 101st Infantry Regiment – BK] and several units of the 102nd [the 102nd Infantry Regiment – BK] stopped the enemy in front of

144 ET: On this position, the artillery suffered light casualties. 145 ET: At the beginning [of the battle – BK], the German artillery put up interdiction fire which was easy for single riders to get through. Only later, when I had just joined the main troops of my division, [machine – BK] did machine gun fire start, which made the barrier much more dangerous.

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Jeunes Bois146 and resisted the attacks from Belmont. Last but not least, the batteries of the artillery battalion defended the limits of Éthe with extremely cold blood, the battalions of the 26th regiment [the 26th Field Artillery Regiment – BK] fought on positions near Gomery, on the river Thon the batteries of the 44th regiment [the 44th Field Artillery Regiment – BK] repelled the German battalions which posed a significant threat to the left flank of the 7th [Infantry –BK] Division147. If the commander of the main troops [the 7th Infantry Division – BK] had followed orders, if he had retreated more slowly and had halted in Vire, the bravery of our soldiers, the talents of our officers would have sufficed to rectify the errors made by the commanders and the staffs of the 3rd and IV [Army – BK] Corps, and the day would have ended in glorious victory148. In fact, an analysis of the fighting of the [French –BK] IV and V [Army – BK] Corps taking place in this part of the battlefield leads to a conclusion that in the various stages of the battle, nothing affected the decisions of the commander of the 3rd Army or the commander of the IV Corps. If that was the case, they should be accused of neglecting communications with the units under their command and of applying linear tactics which left no reserves to turn to. The liaison officer of the 3rd Army: if we want to find out how the commander of the 3rd Army was informed on 22 August [1914 – BK] about the operations of the 7th [Infantry –BK] Division, all you need to do is to read Virton by Major Grasset149 and IIIe Armée dans la bataille, which General Tanant naively published together with comments which he took the liberty of including150. On 22 August Captain Tanant, the staff commander of the 3rd Army, deployed by his commander to the battlefield of the IV [Army – BK] Corps, first went by

146 It should be Jeune Bois. 147 BK: It is hard to agree with this opinion. The batteries of the 44th Field Artillery Regiment failed to stop the units of the German 10th Infantry Division on the Thon. Its right flank, formed by the III battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment, crossed the Thon without a problem, reaching Latour and the foot of hill 295. In this way, the French 7th Infantry Division was enveloped and separated from the 8th Infantry Division. The 53rd Infantry Brigade (Württemberg) from the 23rd Infantry Division attacked the right flank of the French 7th Infantry Division toward Gomery. 148 BK: It is hard to agree with Genera Edgar de Trentinian’s opinion. When the commander of the main troops of the 7th Infantry Division decided to retreat, it was too late to save the division’s position. It would have been possible at the very beginning of the battle of Éthe. However, in these circumstances the divisional commander had to be located with his staff in a place from which he could command all his troops. 149 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian mentioned a book by Grasset, La guerre en action: le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Virton, 144 150 BK: General Edgar de Trentinian mentioned a book by Albert Tenant, La 3e armée dans la bataille (Paris: La Renaissancedu Livre, 1922).

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car to the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division and, later on, issued several orders to different units placed along the line of de la Côte forest. “I am notifying Colonel Sabatier (the commander of the 44th Artillery Regiment) about the danger he is exposing himself to and I am appealing to him to find a safe position in the rear. Meanwhile, an [enemy – BK] aeroplane was flying above the gunners. However, Colonel Sabatier is refusing to leave his excellent position without an order and is reporting to General Parreau on what his commander has just requested”151. (Virton, Major Grasset, page 145).

Meanwhile, Major Tanant met captain of the staff of the IV [Army – BK] Corps who informed him about the morning surprise at the entrance to Virton. “The entire 8th Division is exhausted”, said the captain . “We cannot keep marching but we are holding up”. According to Major Tanant, continuing the march was senseless, as he was 10 km away from Virton. He returned to the car with the captain and drove toward Malmaison to check what was happening in the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. “He hadn’t even driven 1,500 m when he saw two dishevelled officers and asked them questions. Next, 200 m further, he saw an artillery captain from the divisional staff approaching; a new halt, new questions. — Do not go any further , there is nothing between you and the enemy, and the infantry has turned to dust. The Germans will be here soon. — But what is the situation like? — General de Trentinian and his vanguard were taken by surprise at Éthe. In order to escape, he deployed two regiments, which launched a bayonet attack and were destroyed by enemy machine guns. The general was shot. I must be the only survivor of the staff etc.” (La IIIe Armée dans la bataille, General Tanant, page 58).

This is Major Tanant’s perception of the situation of the IV [Army – BK] Corps, especially the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. Travelling by car, in 10 minutes Major Tanant could have reached Gomery and taken in the entire battlefield from hill 293, where the battery had its firing position. He would have seen what he could not possibly have seen located more than 11 km behind the front line. Meanwhile, he considered it unnecessary to drive further. He decided he knew enough about the situation of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division; he returned to the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division, issued several orders while travelling at speed. En route, he met a staff captain, a liaison officer from the 3rd Army affiliated with the IV [Army – BK] Corps who “gave him a report”. In fact, the liaison officer did not know more about the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division than Major Tanant himself. It was getting late, so the major told an 151 ET: Virton, Major Grasset, page 145.

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officer to deliver a report to General [Victor René – BK] Boëlle and immediately returned to Marville. General Grossetti, who saw the [German – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps, returned to the GQG and reported on the developments: “Briefly speaking, there is surprise, chaos and a complete lack of command”. (La IIIe Armée-dans la Bataille, page 61)

Major Tanant reported on his mission in the following way: “The 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was taken by surprise, General de Trentinian was shot, the [division’s – BK] units were dispersed. The artillery was defeated (…)”152. On the same day, the report was forwarded to the GQG and to the Ministry of War on the following day. Major Tanant wrote (in IIIe Armée dans la bataille, page 119): “The German XVI Corps was so depleted after the fighting on 22 August [1914 – BK] that the Kronprinz [the Crown Prince Wilhelm Hohenzollern – the commander of the 5th Army – BK] had to withdraw. The corps returned to the battlefield two weeks later, during the battle of the Marne”153. This decisive fact, and the accounts of the battles of Éthe and Virton, published after 1914, did not affect General Tanant’s opinion, published in 1923, on the commanders and their deeds in August 1914: “Firstly, wrong tactics. Secondly, the commanders (whose courage was unquestionable) were famous soldiers, but not generals. Instead of staying in place [where the staff was – BK] they were on the firing line with the gunmen. They followed the corporals’ orders rather than give their own. We can only do well the things that we know. If their tactical idea had equalled their courage and energy, the developments would have been different154. Obviously, on 22 August [1914 –BK], out of seven divisions located in the sector of the 3rd Army, a few were completely taken by surprise in the fog after they left their quarters. When 152 ET: According to the documents published in the first volume of Histoire de la Grande Guerre, the 7th Division lost only two field cannons. 153 ET: Following the presentation of the various stages of the battle of Éthe-Virton, Hanotaux indicated that “The German V Corps, located in front of our IV Corps, was forced to leave the front and replenish troops in the Arlon area. It completely disappeared. We came across it again much later, in front of Fort Troyon in the course of the battle of the Marne. Meanwhile its adversary, the IV Corps, although exhausted, did not cease to fight or serve courageously”. (Hanotaux: La Guerre de 1914. — La Bataille des Frontières, page 144). This is more evidence that before the enemy reached the banks of the Marne, it suffered serious casualties. – BK: General Edgar de Trantinian quoted an illustrated publication: Gabriel Hanotaux, Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, T. 5 (Paris: Gounouilhou, 1917). The information referred to is false. The German V Army Corps had been withdrawn from the western front to the rear because it was to be sent to Eastern Prussia in support of the 8th Army and take part in the fighting against Russian troops. More on the subject in Chapter 4 of this book. 154 BK: General A. Tanant did not name names in his analysis, yet the content indicates clearly that he meant Division General Edgar de Trentinian. The general himself knew that, too.

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the sun rose, the others came under the fire of the German heavy artillery. Naturally, the commanders are turning to the Army, accusing it of failing to warn them about the enemy’s proximity. The time has come to put an end to this legend”155. (La IIIe Armée dans la bataille, page 86).

This is how the GQG documented the words of historians of the Great War [the I World War – BK] on the battle of Éthe-Virton: [Annex no. 854 – BK] Report by Major Bel, liaison officer of the GQG of the 3rd Army [22 August, 20h00 – BK] (…) This morning the entire army [the 3rd Army – BK] is occupying the frontline running from Virton to Geppecourt156. The result, in fact of no significance, stems from the fact that from the beginning of the fighting the two divisions in the centre of the group (the 7th Division of the IV Corps and the 9th Division of the V Corps) were taken by surprise [by the enemy – BK] and suffered serious casualties. The situation was almost totally brought under control thanks to our [field – BK] artillery, which had a considerable advantage over the German artillery, and owing to the calmness and vigilance of General Ruffey [the commander of the 3rd Army –BK]. At the end of the day, the IV Corps more or less captured the Virton-Allondrelle front. The [French – BK] V Corps captured the rear part of the hill, 3 km to the north of the Chiers valley (…)157 (Histoire de la Grande Guerre) Therefore, the two divisions of the IV [Army – BK] Corps fought the entire day in isolation. General [Victor René – BK] Boëlle who took notice of the commitment of the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division in the north and then to the south of Virton, took care to establish communications between his two divisions to the east of Saint-Mard. The cavalry deployed in the south was halted in Latour while in Lahaut forest, a reserve battalion could only capture Malmaison 3 km to the south. On the left (…) and on the right the unit sent to the flank of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps fought for an entire day with the enemy occupying Bleid around 3 km to the east of Éthe and could not complete the mission. At night the IV [Army – BK] Corps started its retreat to the line between Dampicourt, Bois Céline (the 8th Division) and on the left bank 155 ET: I wanted to find out if General Ruffey, the commander of the 3rd Army, in August 1914 analysed my conduct in the course of the battle of Éthe-Virton; this is the crux of his reply: The XI Region, the Commander, Nantes, 13 February 1916. I do not have on me my notes on the campaign, but I have a vivid memory of the exemplary conduct of the general in charge of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division in Éthe where he demonstrated extraordinary military skills (…) Signed: Ruffey. BK: This letter is stored in the personal documents of the commander of the French 7th Infantry Division. Feuillet du Personnel de M. de Trantinian, Edgar Louis de Trentinian, GR 11 YD 40, SHD. 156 BK: It should be Joppécourt. 157 BK: AFGG 1/1/1, 717–718.

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of the Chiers (the 7th Division). The V Corps was near Vilette, to the north-west of Longuyon. The V Corps could not reach its destination and after 7h30, it started to retreat toward Saint-Pancré; at 11h00, the 9th Division was ultimately pushed away to Tellancourt plain158. (Histoire de la Grande Guerre). The battalion deployed as protection in the direction of Bleid intended to establish communications with the [French – BK] V Corps but failed. Hence the surprise on the flank, an utter surprise (…); in Bleid, instead of finding the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps, the II battalion of the 101st [Infantry – BK] Regiment collided with the enemy and suffered serious casualties. Hanotaux, Histoire de la guerre de 1914 – La Bataille des Frontières, pages 138 and 143

Despite what was written in Histoire de la Grande Guerre and a document presented by the staff to the author, the covering troops of the right flank [of the 7th Infantry Division – BK] were not tasked with establishing communications with [the French – BK] V [Army –BK] Corps. Contrary to what General Tanant claimed, the former deputy of the chief of staff of the 3rd Army, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was not under fire from German heavy artillery from the moment it left its quarters, or in the course of marching or being positioned. Contrary to what General Tanant and Major Bel from the staff of the GQG say, the 7th [Infantry –BK] Division was not taken by surprise, but forced the enemy to leave the battlefield159.

III. The skirmishes at Villers-le-Rond and Marville on 23 and 24 August 1914 On 23 August, following the orders of the commander of the IV [Army – BK] Corps, the marching column of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division stretched from Allondrelle via Charency up to Villers-le-Rond. One battalion occupied hill 234, five kilometres to the north-east of Charency; its right flank was in contact with the vanguard of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps. In the morning, the battalion’s right flank was spotted by the V [Army – BK] Corps and attacked; it withdrew to Charency. This posed a threat to the units occupying the line between Charency and Allondrelle. Consequently, the units were ordered to retreat in the direction of Villers-le-Rond.

158 BK: AFGG 1/1/1, 374–375. 159 BK: I share the opinion that on the morning of 22 August 1914, the French 7th Infantry Division was taken by surprise near Éthe by the German 10th Infantry Division. A detailed analysis is provided in chapter 3 in this book.

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Around 15h00, following the orders of the commander of the IV Army Corps, two artillery battalions and one battalion left Villers-le-Rond toward the road to Longwy in order to find the enemy and launch a counter-attack. The 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was ready to set off as support or at least to overcome the enemy’s resistance. However, they did not manage to do that before nightfall because the operation was launched too late and, without cavalry, it took too long. Villers-le-Rond was obscured by wooded hills ranging for several kilometres to the north of the village. In the scenario with retreat to Marville as previously instructed by the divisional staff, our troops would have been forced to cross the bridge in Marville under enemy artillery fire. At dusk, the commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division decided to cross the Othain without delay in order to take up a good position in Marville. The positions around Marville, a town towering above the entire right bank of the Othain, were prepared by sappers. [Defending the town – BK] seemed easy because the houses were arranged in rows, one above another, from the river banks up to the top of the hill. As a result, the artillery could take up good positions on either side. It would have been an excellent position if the front of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division had not been so stretched and if the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division and the V [Army – BK] Corps had been well established on the right bank of the Othain. Late on 23 August, the commander of the army corps [i. e. the IV Army Corps – BK] insisted on re-deploying the unit in charge of “counterattacking” the enemy. Two battalions withdrawn from Marville, supported by two artillery batteries and a division squadron, marched through the suburbs of Saint-Jean toward the road to Longwy. The unit marched for 3–4 km before it was forced to halt for the night. On 24 August, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was amassed along a section more than 4 km wide in order to establish contact with the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division and the V [Army – BK] Corps. The 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade, supported by a field artillery battalion, took up positions on hill 283, between Marville and Chapelle-Saint-Hilaire. The 13th [Infantry – BK] Brigade and a field artillery battalion were positioned on hill 277, between Marville and a ford, 800 m behind Petit-Failly. At dawn the unit which had left the day before was attacked on the left flank. It withdrew to Saint-Jean and then efficiently took up its former positions on the hills around Marville. Two reserve battalions and the corps’ artillery battalion took up positions approximately 2 km to the south of Marville. Around 8h00, enemy columns supported by the heavy artillery’s brutal fire emerged from various posts on the right bank and captured the suburbs of Saint-Jean. Our artillery kept firing in the direction of these columns, but to no avail. At the same time, they responded to the fire of enemy artillery, whose firing positions were located at a distance. Shelling from a cannon placed in a square in front of the church halted the

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attackers on the bridge in Marville and forced them to retreat from the nearby trenches where they tried to take cover. Nevertheless, the enemy managed to march down the ford and break through between Marville and the right flank of the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade positioned on hill 277. One day earlier, enemy cavalry appeared on the left flank of the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade, in loose contact with the 8th [Infantry – BK] Brigade which [due to the casualties –BK] was not able to position its units in the area. As the 14th Brigade was in danger [of being enveloped and surrounded – BK] from the west and east, around noon its commander ordered the retreat. At the same time, the colonel in charge of defending Marville also ordered the retreat, as he knew that the enemy had captured the western edge of the town and that the 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade was withdrawing. The commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was still unaware of the fact that his left flank was withdrawing while he thought he could deploy it to another position where the divisional reserve was located. Then an officer from the staff of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps informed him that the corps had started to retreat and was headed for Grand-Failly. On 25 August the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps was guarded on the right bank of the Othain, in front of the positions of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. Most of the troops were located on the left bank of the Othain. While in loose contact with the 7th Division from which it was separated by a hill worth capturing, it covered the 7th Division’s right flank sufficiently for the 13th [Infantry – BK] Brigade to put up strong resistance in a well-defendable area. The unexpected retreat of the [French – BK] V [Army – BK] Corps toward Grand-Failly completely exposed the right flank of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division. What other reason for the retreat was there but the approaching enemy troops and the V [Army – BK] Corps’ inability to withhold them on the bank of the Othain? From that moment on, the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division could not rely on the support of the V [Army – BK] Corps but only on the 8th [Infantry – BK] Division. Due to the lack of integrated cavalry, the commander of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division was unable to repel, if need be, the enemy’s attacking troops. Nothing changed that; there were strong indications that if he tried to stay in position, he would be left isolated, with both flanks exposed and thus at the gravest risk [of being enveloped and surrounded – BK]. Not that the army [the 3rd Army – BK] would have benefited from it in any way. I ordered the 13th and 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigades to retreat immediately behind the Loison river to take up new positions.

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Prior to the retreat order, the 13th [Infantry – BK] Brigade came under vicious fire from German howitzers160 and lost nearly all its artillery batteries161. The brigade had to leave a few cannons behind; it withdrew and marched across the bridge on the Loison in Jametz. The 14th [Infantry – BK] Brigade, threatened [by the enemy – BK] from both flanks, was sent across the bridge in Remoiville. Near Loison, I was accompanied by the commander of the army corps [General Victor René Boëlle – the commander of the IV Army Corps – BK] followed by the corps artillery and a cavalry regiment (the 8th Division left its positions early in the morning). Around 17h00, the entire 7th [Infantry – BK] Division had already been on the left bank of the Loison and crossed it shielded by a battery of the 26th [Field – BK] Artillery Regiment, whose batteries took up firing positions on the edge of Remoiville forest. The bridges in Jametz and Remoiville were guarded by two infantry companies. Before the cavalry regiment at my disposal reached the Loison, it was placed on the right bank of the river to cover the last elements of our retreating columns. Our artillery fire sufficed to push several [enemy – BK] squadrons to the forest; we had spotted them approximately 3 km to the north of the river. Observations In order to fight during a retreat to subsequent positions, these positions need to be specified, while small and large units need to manoeuvre in perfect combination, i. e. in accordance with some instructions and orders. Notably, the retreat march of the 7th [Infantry – BK] Division from Villers-le-Rond to Remoiville forest took place without the supervision of the army’s commander or the army corps. At the same time, there was no communications between the divisions on the flanks and, as a result, the commanders could not coordinate the march.

160 BK: Besides the two field artillery regiments of the 10th Infantry Division, ten 21 cm Mörser heavy howitzers from the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment also opened fire. The regiment was a unit at the disposal of the German 5th Army and was assigned to the above mentioned division. To a large extent, the howitzers’ firing contributed to breaching the defence of the French 7th Infantry Division near Marville. 161 ET: Enemy firing was preceded by air reconnaissance.

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2.4.

Source Publications

Cron, Hermann. Die Organisation des deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege. Dargestellt auf Grund der Kriegsakten. Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1923. Cron, Hermann. Imperial German Army 1914–1918. Solihull: Helion, 2012. Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Großen Krieges 1914–1918. Quellenwerk, nach den amtlichen Bezeichnungen zusammengestellt vom Großen Generalstab. Berlin: H. Sack, 1919. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Bd. 1: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen. Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Bd. 3: Der Marne Feldzug. Von der Sambre zur Marne. Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1926. Führer durch Heer und Flotte. Elfter Jahrgang 1914. Ausführliche Beschreibungen der Friedens- und der feldgrauen Ausmarschuniformen des Jahres 1914, Tabellen über die Bewaffnung der einzelnen Kontingente, Schiffslisten der Flotte, ed. B. Friedag, Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung Alfred Schall, 1913. Handbuch über den Königlich Preußischen Hof und Staat. Berlin: Decker, 1907. Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918). Compiled from Records of Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces at General Headquarters. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920. Kleines Kriegslexikon. Stuttgart: Wegner, 1914. Langle de Cary F. de. Souvenirs de commandement 1914–1916. Paris: Payot, 1935. Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1: Les préliminaires – La bataille des frontières. Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1922. Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 1, Annexes: vol. 1. Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1923. Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 2: La manoeuvre en retraite et les préliminaires de la bataille de la Marne. Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1925. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, t. 1: La guerre de mouvement (opérations antérieures au 14 novembre 1914), vol. 3: La bataille de la Marne, Annexes: vol. 2. Paris: Imprimeria Nationale, 1927.

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Memoirs and Memories

Fiedler, Arkady. Mój ojciec i de˛by. Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Miejskie, 2006. Hohenzollern, Wilhelm. The Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany. London: T. Butterworth: 1922. Jacobson, Wojciech. Z Armja˛ Klucka na Paryz˙. Wspomnienia lekarza Polaka. Edition: Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Os´wie˛cim: Napoleon V, 2015. Lintier, Paul, My seventy-five. Reminiscences of a French gunner of a 75 mm battery in 1914. New York: G.H. Doran, 1917. Ludendorff, Erich. Ludendorff ’s Own Story, August 1914 – November 1918. New York: Harper, 1919. Ludendorff, Erich. Moje wspomnienia, cz. 1: 1914–1916. Warszawa: Tetragon, 2014. ‘Pierwsza wojna ´swiatowa i przewrót 1914–1918. Ze wspomnien´ poznan´skiego lekarza wojskowego Tadeusza Szulca, introduction and edition Piotr Grzelczak’ Kronika Miasta Poznania, no. 3 (2014): 166–192. Prauzin´ski, Leon and Ulrich, Adam. W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstan´ców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920. Poznan´: Drukarnia i Ksie˛garnia s´w. Wojciecha sp. z o.o., 1939. Rommel, Erwin. Infanterie greift an. Erlebnis und Erfahrung. Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter, 1942. Skorupka, Wawrzyniec. Moje morgi i katorgi: 1914–1967. Poznan´: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1970.

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2.6.

Battalion, Regiment and Division Ledgers

Angerstein, Konrad and Schlemm, Paul. Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918. Berlin: Druck and Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1927. Altmann, Hans von. Das Füsilier-Regiment v. Steinmetz (Westpreußisches) Nr. 37: im Weltkrieg 1914–1918. Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931. Arens, Walter. Das Königlich Preußische 7. Westpreuß. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 155. Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1931. Benary, Albert. Königlich Preußisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20. Berlin: Verlag Bernhard&Graefe, 1932. Boumier, Notice historique. Le 315e Régiment d’Infanterie (dans la Grande Guerre). Mamers: 1920. Das Niederschlesische Fussartillerie-Regiment Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsformationen im Weltkrieg 1914/18. Berlin, 1924. Duncker, Hans, Eisermann Heinrich. Das Infanterie-Regiment v. Kluck (6. Pomm.) Nr. 49 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918. Berlin: Verlag von G. Stalling, 1927. Gottberg, Franz Döring von. Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege. Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935. Grasset, Alphonse. La guerre en action: Le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Éthe. Paris: Berger-Levrault 1927. Grasset, Alphonse. La guerre en action: le 22 août 1914 au 4e corps d’armée. Virton, vol. 2. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925. Historique sommaire du 14e régiment de hussards. Campagne de 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918. Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920. Historique du 26e Régiment d’Artillerie de Campagne. Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1920. Historique du 42e Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale Pendant la Guerre 1914–1918. Paris– Nancy–Paris– Strasbourg: Imprimeria Nationale, [unknown publication date]. Koch, Paul. Das Niederschlesische Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 5 und seine Kriegsverbände im Weltkrieg 1914/18. Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1928. Kundt, Jaspar and Raschke, Walter. Das Infanterie-Regiment von Courbiere (2. Posensches) Nr. 19 im Weltkriege 1914–1919. Go¨ rlitz: Boka¨ mper, 1935. Loosch, Gerhard. Das Königl. preuβ. Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919. Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932. Niebelschütz, Günther von. Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 230: zusammengestellt nach den amtlichen Kriegstagebüchern und privaten Aufzeichnungen. Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1926. Meyer, Werner. Das Infanterie-Regiment von Grolman (1. Posensches) Nr. 18 im Weltkriege. Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929.

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Senftleben, Eduard. Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Kriege. Berlin: Bernard&Graefe, 1937. Schubert, Max. Infanterie-Regiment von Courbiére (2. Posensches) Nr. 19. Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1922. Schulenburg, Wolfsburg, Carl H. von der. Geschichte des Garde Füsilier Regiment. Erinnerungsblätter deutscher Regimenter. Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1926. Schmidt, Walter. Das Königlich Preußische 3. Posensche Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 58 im Weltkriege. Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1934. Puttkamer, Oscar, Jesco von. Das Königlich Preußische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 46 im Weltkriege. Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1938. Reichert, Wilhelm. Das Infanterie-Regiment Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen (4. Posensches) Nr. 59 im Weltkriege 1914/18. Potsdam: Stein, 1930. Trentinian, Edgard de. L’État-major En 1914 et la 7e Division du 4e Corps (10 Août au 22 Septembre 1914). Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle, 1927. Watter, Oskar Freiherr von. Dem Gedenken eines großen Soldaten von den alten Kameraden der 54. Infanterie-Division des Weltkrieges. Hamburg: Verlag Broschek & Co., 1940. Watter, Oskar Freiherr von. Die Tankschlacht von Cambrai am 20. Nov. 1917: Ein Ehrentag d. 54. Inf.-Division u. der zu ihrer Verstärkung eingesetzten Truppen. Hamburg: Hermann’s Erben, 1937. Vogt, Otto. 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914– 1920. Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1931. Zunehmer, Max. Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918. Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935.

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Magazines

“Kurier Poznan´ski” 1914 “Dziennik Poznan´ski” 1914

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Literature

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Lipkes, Jeff. Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2007. Longstaff, Frederick, Victor and Atteridge, A. Hilliard. The Book of the Machine Gun. London: H. Rees ltd., 1917. Marcinek, Krzysztof. Izera i Ypres. Kampania we Flandrii 1914. Zabrze – Tarnowskie Góry: Infortedions 2013. Meyers grosses konversationslexikon, Bd. 14. Berlin: Bibliographisches Institute, 1906. Meerheimb, Ferdinand, Freiherr von. ‘Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich’, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, ed. Rochus Freiherr von Liliencron, Bd. 16 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1882), 124–127. Milde, Kurt. Neorenaissance in der deutschen Architektur des 19. Jahrhunderts: Grundlagen, Wesen und Gültigkeit. Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1981. Mirouze, Laurent. World War I Infantry in Colour Photographs. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press Ltd, 1999. Molik, Witold. Z˙ycie codzienne ziemian´stwa w Wielkopolsce w XIX i na pocza˛tku XX wieku: kultura materialna. Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Poznan´skie, 1999. Molik, Witold. ‘Poznan´skie pomniki w XIX i pocza˛tkach XX wieku’. Kronika Miasta Poznania, no.2 (2001): 7–40. Molik, Witold. ‘Wielkopolska w okresie I wojny s´wiatowej. Stan i propozycje badan´’, in Społeczen´stwo polskie na ziemiach pod panowaniem pruskim w okresie I wojny ´swiatowej (1914–1918): zbiór studiów, ed. Mieczysław Wojciechowski (Torun´: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1996), 25–37. Möller, Hans. Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens “Pour le Mérite” im Weltkrieg, Bd. 1–2. Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1935. Mutius, Erhard von. Die Schlacht Bei Longwy. Oldenburg: Verlag Stalling, 1919. Nicot, Jean. Inventaire des journaux des marches et opérations des grandes unités. Paris: Imprimerie La Renaissance, 1967. Nicot, Jean. Journaux des marches et opérations des corps de troupe 1914–1918. Paris, 1968. Nimmergut, Jörg and Nimmergut, Anke. Deutsche Orden und Ehrenzeichen 1800–1945. Regenstauf: Battenberg, 2019. Pajewski, Janusz. Pierwsza wojna ´swiatowa 1914–1918. Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991. Passingham, Ian. All the Kaiser’s Men. The Life and Death of the German Army on the Western Front 1914–1918. Thrupp: Sutton Publishing, 2006. Palat, Barthelémy. Edmond. La Grande guerre sur le front occidental, vol. 3: Batailles des Ardennes & de la Sambre. Paris: Chapelot, 1918. Poten, B. ‘Steinmetz, Karl Friedrich von’, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, ed. Rochus Freiherr von Liliencron, Bd. 36 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1893), 10–19. Rebold, Julius. Die Festungskämpfe im Weltkriege. Zu¨ rich: Ges. f. militär. Bautechnik, 1938. Rezmer, Waldemar. ‘Polacy w korpusie oficerskim armii niemieckiej w I wojnie s´wiatowej (1914–1918)’, in Społeczen´stwo polskie na ziemiach pod panowaniem pruskim w okresie I wojny ´swiatowej (1914–1918): zbiór studiów, ed. Mieczysław Wojciechowski (Torun´: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1996), 137–148. Richter Günter, ‘Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich Graf,’ in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Bd. 12 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot), 27–28.

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zirkskommandos und Ausbildungsleiter von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis 1939. Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1992. Wegner, Günter. Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815–1939, Bd. 3: Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Regimenter, Bataillone und Abteilungen von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis zum 26. August 1939 Kavallerie, Artillerie, Pioniere, Train, Kraftfahr und Fahr Abteilungen, Panzertruppe, Verkehrstruppen und Nachrichten Abteilungen. Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1993. Tenant, Albert. La 3e armée dans la bataille. Paris: La Renaissancedu Livre, 1922. Zuber, Terence. The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914. Brimscombe Port: The History Press, 2013. Zuber, Terence. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. Zuckerman, Larry. The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I, New York: New York University Press, 2004.

5.

Internet Publications

Tison, Caroline and Vial, Philippe. 1911–2011: 100 ans de formation des futurs chefs de la Défense au Centre des hautes études militaires. Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires: https://www.dems.defense.gouv.fr/chem/historique/100-ans-dhistoire, (accessed: 16 February 2020).

List of Organizational Charts

Chart 1. Organisational structure of the German V Army Corps, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 2. Organisational structure of the German 10th Infantry Division, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 3. Organisational structure of the German 6th Grenadier Regiment Kleist von Nollendorf, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 4. Organisational structure of the German 46th Infantry Regiment Graf Kirchbach, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 5. Organisational structure of the German 47th Infantry Regiment King Ludwig III of Bavaria, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 6. Organisational structure of the German 50th Infantry Regiment, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 7. Organisational structure of the German 20th Field Artillery Regiment, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 8. Organisational structure of the German 56th Field Artillery Regiment, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Chart 9. Organisational structure of the French 7th Infantry Division, after mobilization in August 1914. Design concept and development by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski.

Lists of Figures

Chapter 1 Figure 1. Portrait of General Hermann von Strantz taken after 1916 with a caption; visible the Pour le Mérite, the highest German order of merit awarded to the General in 1915, and the Iron Cross 2nd class. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 2. General Robert Kosch, in 1912–1914 commander of the Poznan´ 10. Infantry Division, the Library of Congress. Figure 3. General Oskar Freiherr von Watter, commander of the 10th Artillery Brigade from the 10th Infantry Division in 1914–1915. Landesarchiv Baden-Wu¨ rttemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, inscription M 707 Nr. 1658 Bild 2. Figure 4. General Hugo Ewald von Kirchbach, commander of the Poznan´ (German) 10th Infantry Division in 1865–1870, then commander of the V Army Corps in 1870–1880; since 16 June 1871 until the end of WWI commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment. Landesarchiv Baden-Wu¨ rttemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv, inscription M703 R958N8.

Chapter 2 Figure 1. Colonel Otto Heyn (in his gala uniform), appointed commander of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in the course of mobilization in August 1914. He was killed on 22 August 1914 in E´the during the first battle of the 10th Infantry Division, on the FrenchBelgian border in the southern Ardennes. F.D. Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreusiches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege, Berlin 1935. Figure 2. Colonel Victor von Arent, commander of the 46th Infantry Regiment from the 19th Brigade Infantry of the 10th Infantry Division, August 1914. M. Zunehmer, Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 im Weltkrieg 1914/1918, Berlin 1935.

442

Lists of Figures

Figure 3. Colonel Ernst Trieglaff, commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment from the 20th Brigade Infantry of the 10th Infantry Division. G. Loosch, Das Königl. preuss. InfanterieRegiment Konig Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919, Zeulenroda 1932. Figure 4. Colonel Karl Diestel, commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment from the 20th Infantry Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, August 1914. O. Vogt, 3. Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914–1920, Berlin 1931. Figure 5. The Maxim MG-08 machine-gun section, August 1914. In the foreground the servicing soldiers with the gun (visible telescopic sight mounted on the gun, but no water container or steam hose), to the left of the machine gun are four boxes with spare ammunition. The four servicing soldiers are equipped with leather belts with buckles to carry the gun. A protective shield is next to the soldier first on the right. In the background, a guntransporting cart with two water containers at the front. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 6. Lieutenant colonel Hans Lepper, commander of the 56th Field Artillery Regiment from the 10th Artillery Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, August 1914. K. Angerstein, P. Schlemm, Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918, Berlin 1927. Figure 7. Lieutenant colonel Otto von Schleicher, commander of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment from the 10th Artillery Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, the Meuse Hills, autumn 1914. A. Benary, Königlich Preussisches 1. Posensches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 20, Berlin 1932. Figure 8. Major Otto Graf zu Solms Wildenfels, commander of the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles (wearing civilian clothes, photo taken after 1918). E. Senstleben, Das Regiment Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 im Frieden und im Krieg, Berlin 1937. Figure 9. A properly packed knapsack of an infantry private, August 1914. Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht fu¨ r den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915, Berlin 1914. Figure 10. An infantryman in a walking uniform and equipment, August 1914. Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht fu¨ r den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915, Berlin 1914. Figure 11. The German infantry Mauser Gewehr 98 rifle and the method of mounting the bayonet. Transfeldts, Dienstunterricht fu¨ r den Infanteristen des Deutschen Heeres. Ausbildungsjahr 1914/1915, Berlin 1914. Figure 12. A private from the 47th Infantry Regiment, 20th Infantry Brigade, 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

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Figure 13. A private from the 50th Infantry Regiment, 20th Infantry Brigade, 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 14. An infantryman from the 5th Pioneer Battalion, 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 15. Deputy officer Oswald Lange from the 4th company of the I battalion, 6th Grenadier Regiment (born in Tschirne, Kreis Bunzlau – now Czerna, Lower Silesia, county Bolesławiec, commune Nowogrodziec in Poland; killed on 22 January 1915 in Bois-deChevaliers forest on the Meuse Hills) after completing mobilization in August 1914; the photo shows a knapsack for officers and an infantry officer’s backsword. F.D. Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreusiches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege, Berlin 1935. Figure 16. A stretch-bearer from a division’s first aid company wearing a field uniform after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 17. A one-year volunteer from the first aid company of the 10th Infantry Division after mobilization in August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 18. “Faithful comrades in arms” – deputy officer from a field artillery regiment with his horse, August 1914; the photo shows the soldier’s main belt made of white patent leather. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 19. Second lieutenant from the 6th Grenadier Regiment with a Prussian infantry officer’s backsword M89, awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class, 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 20. A watercolour – figures of two German officers: an infantry general (on the left), awarded the Pour le Mérite, the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class and his aide-de-camp in rank of Rittmeister, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 21. Soldiers handling the German field cannon FK 96 n.A. calibre 77 mm take up firing position; uniforms and equipment from 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 22. Limbering the field cannon FK 96 n.A. calibre 77 mm; field uniforms and equipment from 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 23. The German light field howitzer lFH 98/09 calibre 105 mm and the service crew at a firing point in a forest in Lorraine in 1914; the 56th Field Artillery Regiment had 18 howitzers of this type, which proved very helpful during combat in difficult terrain in the 10th Infantry Division; visible, the three types of cartridges used for this howitzer. Photograph from the author’s collection.

444

Lists of Figures

Figure 24. The German heavy field howitzer sFH 02 calibre 150 mm in a firing point and the servicing soldiers during a firing break on the Western front in 1914; to the left of the howitzer is an ammunition wagon; this type of howitzer was used by the I battalion of the 5th Infantry Artillery from Poznan´, supporting the 10th Infantry Division on the Western front in 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 25. The German heavy field howitzer sFH 02 calibre 150 mm from a battery of a field artillery regiment at a firing point during a break, the Western front in 1914. The photo shows a battery NCO and a cartridge with a case in front of the howitzer. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 26. A Packwagen 94 two-horse transport cart. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 27. A four-horse heavy ammunition cart for transporting shells from an ammunition column of an infantry artillery regiment, the Western front, the Meuse Hills (Lorraine), autumn 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 28. A two-horse supply cart Vorratswagen 96 n/A from a machine-gun company of an Infantry Regiment; on the cart is captured a French machine gun Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 calibre 8 mm; behind the cart stand soldiers handling the Maxim MG-08 machine gun; the soldier on the left is equipped with a leather transport belt; on the left is a machine gun cart; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 29. A German company field kitchen with limbers and caissons and the service soldiers; the kettle’s lid is open, with mess tins next to it; the Western front, France 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 30. Two-horse sanitary carts (ambulances) used to transport the wounded (on stretchers); they were a part of the equipment of a division sanitary company in the 10th Infantry Division; visible the Red Cross marking. The photograph was published in the form of a postcard of pre-war drills in a sanitary company in 1914; the author’s collection. Figure 31. A four-horse cart of a communication division, Belgium, August 1914; instead of the Pickelhaube, the soldiers wear shakos typical of this type of services. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 32. A horse-drawn cart of an artillery regiment crossing the river on a pontoon bridge built by the corps pontoon column; before 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 33. A division’s field bakery baking bread; 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 34. Soldiers from an Infantry Regiment dividing G.I. bread (German Kommissbrot) into smaller portions at a small train station in the Province of Posen in August 1914, just

Lists of Figures

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before loading transport units and departing for the Western front. To the left is a heap of bread, knapsacks and equipment; the photographer, a soldier, propped the rifle against the fence (on the left). The photograph was published in 1915 as a postcard; in the original caption, the term Polnischen Bahnhof (Polish train station); is used. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 35. A machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment in its barracks at Buker Strasse in Poznan´, 8 August 1914, shortly before departure for the front. The number of carts with machine guns is clearly too large (12 instead of 6). They may have belonged to the machine-gun company of the 46th Reserve Regiment from the 10th Reserve Division mobilised by a machine-gun company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment or the 47th Infantry Regiment. The service soldiers are equipped with white patent main belts, typical of the mobilization equipment in August 1914 (also in the artillery). Following the experience of the first battles, the white belts of the machine-gun company and the artillery units of the 10th Infantry Division soldiers were painted black. It was also the case in the artillery units. F.D. Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege, Berlin 1935. Figure 36. The transport unit of the 6th Grenadier Regiment at the Central Train Station in Poznan´, waiting for departure for the concentration area on the Western front. In the wagon’s window, the first on the right is Colonel Otto Heyn, the unit’s commander. On the wagons are humorous inscriptions written by the soldiers, typical of August 1914. F.D. Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege, Berlin 1935. Figure 37. German infantrymen during a halt at a train station en route to the front in August 1914. Nurses from the German Red Cross treat soldiers with coffee and sandwiches. It was not only an artistic vision – this was a part of the scenario of the German troops on their way to the concentration area on the Western front. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Chapter 3 Figure 1. A company of a German infantry regiment getting soldier’s pay. In the centre is a paymaster NCO, handing money to the soldiers. On the left are officers including a second lieutenant, the platoon’s commander (second on the left), the Western Front, summer 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 2. Soldiers of the German forces in combat uniforms in August 1914. From left: private from battalion of jaegers of guards, private of pioneers, officer of line infantry, officer of field artillery of guards, general (on horseback), private of hussars, private of mounted riflemen (on horseback), private of foot artillery, uhlan, cuirassier, dragon. Image from the author’s collection.

446

Lists of Figures

Figure 3. Soldiers from the German division communication column assembling a telephone line, August 1914, photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 4. A patrol of the French dragoon regiment, August 1914; photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 5. After an intense march, the soldiers of a French infantry regiment rest in a roadside ditch in the shadow of trees. On the left is a stack of Lebel Mle 1886 rifles; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 6. A squad of the French field artillery regiment during a halt. The photo shows 75 mm field cannons together with limbers and carts. On the left, in the background, are caissons transporting the ammunition, August 1914, photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 7. Soldiers from the French infantry regiment during a halt in a march. The picture shows a stack of Lebel Mle 1886 rifles, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 8. A panoramic view of E´the in Belgium where on 22 August 1914, the Poznan´ 10th Infantry Division from the V Army Corps fought its first battle during WWI against the French 7th Infantry Division from the IV Army Corps. A view of the top of hill 314 (to the left of the road) from the north to the south; the photo shows barbed wire fencing on the meadows, which posed a real threat to the cavalrymen from the 1st King’s Mounted Rifles. On the right is the tower of the church in E´the. There is a railway embankment in front of the village; behind the village are hills and the Jeune Bois woods. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 9. Grand Rue, the main street in E´the where on 22 August 1914 fierce fighting took place; Photograph of the village from before 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 10. The French line infantry, after a forced march, enters a Belgian village, August 1914; a woman gives the soldiers water; the photo shows the details of the uniforms, equipment and Lebel Mle1886 rifles. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 11. On a foggy morning, an officer from the French hussars regiments asks a Belgian farmer for directions, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 12. A French infantryman in August 1914. The picture shows the Lebel Mle 1886 rifle and details of the uniform and equipment. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 13. A German platoon from an infantry regiment waiting in positions for an order to assault, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 14. The German 77 mm FK 96 n.A. field cannon in firing position. In the background, a patrol of cavalrymen who have taken up an observation position on a haystack; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Lists of Figures

447

Figure 15. A unit of the French 75 mm M1897 field cannon in the course of firing; to the left is an ammunition caisson and the cannoneers. In August 1914, the cannon represented the basic artillery equipment of the French army on the level of the artillery division and the corps. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 16. Soldiers from a German infantry regiment in position in a forest, ready to open fire, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 17. Soldiers from a French infantry platoon taking positions along the road, ready to open fire. The platoon’s commander (second lieutenant) is in the background at the centre of the photograph, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 18. A machine-gun section with the French 8 mm Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 guns, August 1914; a machine-gun company in a French infantry regiment had 6 of these machine guns. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 19. A platoon from a French machine-gun company, armed with the 8 mm Saint Étienne Mle 1907 machine guns, August 1914. The photo shows details of the equipment including ammunition trays made of soft metal which posed many problems to the service soldiers and caused numerous jams. In the background is a distance meter, further away are mules with packs for transporting the guns, mounts and ammunition. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 20. A French infantry company assaulting a local hill, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 21. A French infantry platoon in firing position, August 1914; behind the line of fire stands an officer, the platoon’s commander watching the effects of the fighting. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 22. A French infantry company attacking a local hill, August 1914; at the front of the company is an officer, the company’s commander. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 23. Two sections of the Maxim MG-08 machine guns from the machine-gun section of a German infantry regiment firing; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 24. The French infantry company grouped in platoons, ready to attack a nearby hill; on the left, in the background behind the platoon’s line of fire stands an officer, the platoon’s commander; August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 25. A battery of French 75 mm field cannons from a field artillery regiment exchanging fire; August 1914. In the foreground is a caisson with shells. Photograph from the author’s collection.

448

Lists of Figures

Figure 26. Fatigued soldiers from a field artillery regiment handling a French 75 mm gun during a break from firing, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 27. Wounded German soldiers in a dressing point of a battalion of an infantry regiment, the summer of 1914; the stretcher-bearers check on the wounded. In the far back, at the centre of the photograph is the battalion’s physician. A photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 28. The destroyed building in E´the where on 22 August 1914 the Poznan´ (German) 10th Infantry Division crushed the Paris (French) 7th Infantry Division. A view from the road at the foot of a hill and Jeune Bois forest from the south of E´the to the north. In the road is a French battery destroyed by accurate fire of the German 10th Artillery Brigade and artillery waggons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment from the 7th Infantry Division. To the right is a chimney and ruins of a lumber yard; to the left is a church tower with the cupola brought down. E´the in September 1914. A photograph from the author’s collection.

Chapter 4 Figure 1. A section of the German Maxim MG-08 machine gun from the regimental machine-gun company collecting ammunition and taking the gun from a cart, August 1914. The photo shows the cart’s equipment, including water container. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 2. Fatigued French infantrymen during a rest. Stacked Lebel Mle 1886 rifles, knapsacks and equipment, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 3. A French battery of a field artillery regiment marching, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 4. A panorama of the area between Charency and Vezin, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 5. A French machine-gun platoon from the machine-gun company of an infantry regiment; the photograph shows the Saint-Étienne Mle 1907 machine guns and the platoon’s equipment, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 6. A panorama of Saint Jean, a suburb of Marville; a view to the south-east to the stone bridge on the Othain, the summer of 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 7. French infantrymen resting after a march; the picture shows the Lebel Mle1886 rifles and details of the soldiers’ uniforms and equipment, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection.

Lists of Figures

449

Figure 8. A platoon of the French infantry firing from a prone position; the rifle supports were made from dirt; they were sheltered from the front with knapsacks; the photo shows the Lebel Mle1886 rifles and details of equipment and uniforms, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 9. View of Charency and Vezin, August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 10. View of Marville from Saint Jean (suburbs of Marville) – a stone bridge on the Othain. A French photograph published in the form of a postcard before 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 11. The German 21 cm Mörser 10 heavy howitzer in a fire position; these howitzers were at the disposal of the 6th Foot Artillery Regiment which supported the operations of the 10th Infantry Division near Marville on 25 August 1914. Photograph from the author’s collection. Figure 12. Grave of two soldiers: a German – musketeer, Paul Kruger from the 12th company of the 154th Infantry Regiment from the 9th Infantry Division and Pole – grenadier Adalbert Baranowski (born in Uzarzewo near Poznan´) from the 1st company of the 6th Grenadier Regiment who was killed at Charency on 24 August 1914; the grave is a symbol of the Kaczmarek-Regiments, [as in:] F.D. Gottberg, Das Grenadier- Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6 im Weltkriege, Berlin 1935. Figure 13. Obituary of one-year volunteer Bronisław Wadzyn´ski from the 6th Grenadier Regiment who was killed at Marville on 25 August 1914, dated 7 September 1914, “Dziennik Poznan´ski” no. 205, 8 September 1914.

Lists of Maps Maps design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski Maps developed by Radosław Przebitkowski

Chapter 2 Map 1. Concentration area of the German V Army Corps: the 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions in Bezirk Lothringen (German West Lorraine), the march direction, the place of crossing the Moselle, August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

Chapter 3 Map 1. Attack positions of the German armies on the Western front and the approach march by 20 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 2. Corps of the German 5th Army and French 3rd Army in the battle of Longwy, 22–25 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 3. The operations of the German 5th Army on 21–25 August 1914 during the Battle of the Frontiers. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 4. Distribution of the French IV Army Corps from the 3rd Army (on the right flank – the 7th Infantry Division, on the left flank – the 8th Infantry Division) in the operation zone of the German V Army Corps, the evening of 21 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 5. The terrain in the vicinity of the town of Virton and the villages of E´the, Belmont, Bleid and Latour. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

452

Lists of Maps

Map 6. The area of the battle of E´the, 22 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 7. Map of E´the with the distribution of the cannon fire position of the French 26th Field Artillery Regiment and the fire direction, 22 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 8. Location of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division near Éthe, 22 August 1914 at 6h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 9. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division during the battle of E´the, 22 August 1914 at 10h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 10. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division in the battle of E´the, 22 August 1914 at 12h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 11. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division in the battle of E´the, 22 August 1914 at 15h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 12. The tactical situation of the French 7th Infantry Division and the German 10th Infantry Division during the battle of E´the, 22 August 1914 at 22h00. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

Chapter 4 Map 1. The passage of the German 10th Infantry Division after the battle of E´the in the direction of Charency, 23–24 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 2. Attack of the V Army Corps including the 10th Infantry Division, toward the Othain river on the right flank of the German 5th Army, 25 August 1914. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski. Map 3. The area around Marville upon the Othain where on 25 August 1914, the German 10th Infantry Division fought against the French 7th Infantry Division. Design concept by Bartosz Kruszyn´ski. Developed by Radosław Przebitkowski.

List of Tables

Table 1. Prescribed content of a German infantryman’s knapsack (Knapsack 07/13) during mobilization in August 1914. Table 2. Casualties of the 10 Infantry Division in the battle of Éthe on 22 August 1914. Table 3. Casualties of the 10 Infantry Division in the battles of Charency and Marville, 24–25 August 1914. Table 4. The casualties of the 10th Infantry Division between 22 August and 1 September 1914.

Index of Names

Abonneau Pierre Charles Adalbert (General) 365, 374 Abramowski Emil (Private) 234 Albert I of Belgium 140 Alexander III of Russia 52, 53, 72, 89 Alléhaut (Colonel) 413, 414 Altmann Hans von 35, 53, 73 Angerstein Konrad 35, 87, 112, 114, 126, 129, 134, 136, 144, 147, 148, 203, 214, 215, 229, 230, 250, 256, 260, 275, 276, 279, 283, 290, 298, 303, 313, 324, 328, 335, 342, 345, 347, 348, 353 Apelt (Major) 263 Appert (Major) 265, 267, 318 Arens Walter 35, 53, 73, 129 Arent Victor von (Colonel) 52, 74, 81, 207, 267, 270, 278, 299, 315, 332, 333 Arnim Hans von 49, 139 Atteridge Hilliard A. 39, 104 Aubert Franz (Major) 73, 253 Audran (Lieutenant) 216, 217 Ausner Franz (Captain) 238, 239, 240, 289 Balck Hermann 44 Balck William (General) 29, 43, 44, 72, 84, 90, 96, 100, 111, 122, 123, 124, 114, 117, 352 Baranowski Adalbert (Grenadier) 352, 449 Baszko Agnieszka 359 Bauer Gerhard 37, 51, 87 Baumgarten Wilhelm (NCO) 246 Bel (Major) 418, 419 Benary Albert 35, 88, 114, 126, 127, 135, 136, 137, 141, 143, 149, 152, 154, 164, 165,

166, 169, 200, 204, 206, 207, 210, 211, 213, 215, 235, 244, 247, 259, 260, 275, 277, 280, 282, 284, 285, 290, 292, 298, 313, 327, 333, 342, 346, 347, 350, 442 Bentzinger (Captain) 219 Berg (Doctor) 335 Berger Kurt (Captain) 215, 249, 290 Bernhardi Friedrich von 43, 44, 68, 343, 433 Berthelot Henri Mathias (General) 374 Bertin (Captain) 224, 237, 275, 276, 277 Bertrand (Colonel) 174, 219, 318 Bethge (NCO) 247 Beyer (Lieutenant) 350 Bielawski (NCO) 127 Bieler (Captain) 326 Bielfeld (Major) 74 Biernacki Jerzy 29, 121, 279, 359 Biesiadka Jacek 40, 46, 48, 52, 55, 84 Bischoff C. 27, 132, 346 Biskup 20 Biskupek Gustaw (Volunteer) 68 Blanck (Rittmeister) 125, 128, 130, 345 Blin (Lieutenant Colonel) 320, 337, 338 Blu¨ mel Lucian (Second Lieutenant) 325, 328, 329, 340 Bockelmann Friedrich von (Major) 127, 248, 268 Boeckmann (Second Lieutenant) 154, 343 Boëlle Victor René (General) 25, 171, 176, 178, 365, 370, 386, 387, 398, 405, 417, 418, 422 Bohm Georg (Deputy Reserve Officer) 330 Bon´cza-Tomaszewski Wiesław 39, 62

456 Bonnieux (Captain) 243 Borchardt Franz (Second Lieutenant) 340 Borchers Erich (Second Lieutenant) 132, 237 Borcke von (Second Lieutenant) 154, 200 Borowski Stanisław 40 Both von (Major) 205, 244 Boucher Le (Lieutenant) 225 Boumier 36, 309, 320, 321, 338, 339 Bourdériat Frédéric 399 Boysen Jens 37, 67 Braun (Captain) 30, 104 Breitter Bruno (Second Lieutenant) 250 Brémond d’Ars (Major) 228, 229, 230 Brendel (Mounted Rifles) 282 Brose (Wachtmeister) 206 Brossé 408 Brumby Hans (Oberarzt) 279, 290 Bruno (Captain) 230 Brychczyn´ski Władysław (Reservist) 250 Buat Edward 38, 92 Büchner (Medical NCO) 206 Buisson (Lieutenant Colonel) 241, 244 Bürde (Captain) 298 Buschbeck (Second lieutenant) 200, 204 Busse Andreas von (Second Lieutenant) 125, 129, 139, 154, 200, 207, 208, 209, 256, 257, 297 Busse von (Major) 139, 209 Buuse Joachim von (Second Lieutenant) 343 Cally (Colonel) 173, 274 Cary de Fernand Louis Armand Marie Langle (General) 25, 377, 378 Cauvin (Captain) 242 Chameroy (Captain) 232 Charlot (Captain) 266 Chavigneri de la (Captain) 245 Chon (Major) 277 Clark Christopher M. 60 Claude (Lieutenant) 202 Clemente Steven E. 38, 314 Corfield Justin J. 172 Croix de La (Lieutenant) 228, 382

Index of Names

Cron Hermann 32, 45, 57, 72, 74, 80, 82, 88, 91, 114, 115 Czesny (NCO) 207, 208, 296 Czubin´ski Antoni 40 d’Otard d’Artis (Lieutenant) 382 Dambor Alfred (Sergeant) 333 Dandrieux (Lieutenant) 271 Daviet (Captain) 231 Dégoutté (Colonel) 386, 387 Deist Wilhelm 18 Delafon (Captain) 228, 229, 230 Delvert (Lieutenant) 265, 267 Dewitz Emmo von (General) 52 Dierker (Gefreiter) 206 Diestl Karl (Colonel) 53, 207 Discar (Feldwebel) 201 Dobosz Józef 41 Dombrowski (Cavalrymen) 206 Donath (Second Lieutenant) 268 Donop von (Second Lieutenant) 149, 314, 315, 325 Doughty A.R. 36, 170, 364, 370 Dreßler (Second Lieutenant) 139 Drewicz Maciej 129 Drouot (Colonel) 173, 218, 225, 235, 245, 274, 285 Duffour (Lieutenant) 225 Durand (Captain) 272, 372, 397 Durand (Lieutenant) 397 Durand Paul (General) 372, 397 Duval (Lieutenant) 216 Eggert Kurt (Reserve Second Lieutenant) 340 Eisenschmidt R. 29, 30, 44, 72, 101, 104, 111 Erdmann (Second Lieutenant) 261 Euen (Second Lieutenant) 125 Farret Léon Gaston Jean Baptiste (Colonel) 25, 173, 242, 243, 265, 410 Faugière (Captain) 216, 217 Felineau Henri François (General) 25, 173, 175, 179, 198, 218, 220, 222, 245, 251, 264, 274, 285, 387, 389, 390, 394, 399, 408, 409

Index of Names

Felsztyn Tadeusz 30, 103 Fengler Ernst (Lieutenant) 298 Ferté De La (Lieutenant) 382 Fiderek Wojciech 41 Fiedler Adolf (Musketeer) 254 Fiedler Arkady 15, 18, 19, 33, 94, 254 Fiedler Paweł (Trumpeter) 247 Figeac (Lieutenant) 199, 216 Finance (Captain) 246 Fischer Max (NCO) 257 Fleischer Wolfgang 39 Foch Ferdinand 399, 407 Forcinal (Major) 217, 219, 230, 233, 274 Fourel (Master Sergeant) 217 Frankenberg von (Second Lieutenant) 250, 253, 331, 351 Frederick II of Prussia 44 Frederick William III of Prussia 57 Friecker (Captain) 266 Friedag B. 32, 52, 79, 158 Friede (Second Lieutenant) 154 Friedrich (Mounted Rifles) 282 Friedrich von (Second Lieutenant) 131, 154, 200, 348 Frisch Wilhelm (Major) 214, 215 Fromont (Captain) 266 Froreich von (Captain) 342 Frost Karl (NCO) 207, 208 Gallwitz Kurt von (Colonel) 52, 133 Gawlak Andrzej 40, 46, 48, 52, 55, 84, 125 Geisler (Second Lieutenant) 298 Georgi (Second Lieutenant) 260, 261 Gérard Augustin Gregoire Arthur (General) 25, 266, 322, 365 Gertig (Cannoneer) 276 Geß (Sergeant) 168 Giansily (Captain) 219, 222 Girard (Lieutenant) 216, 220 Goebel (Lieutenant) 183 Goettke (Lieutenant) 136, 137 Goïp (Captain) 266 Goran (Sergeant) 225 Gottberg Franz Döring von 29, 34, 48, 49, 73, 74, 79, 82, 108, 133, 138, 143, 144, 145, 149, 152, 153, 155, 161, 163, 165, 166, 169,

457 180, 183, 184, 189, 241, 247, 249, 250, 253, 254, 255, 260, 263, 276, 289, 290, 292, 294, 298, 300, 313, 314, 315, 325, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 340, 341, 342, 345, 346, 347, 348, 351, 352, 353, 441, 443, 445, 449 Gougeon (Second Lieutenant) 201 Gräff (NCO) 270 Grasset Alphons (Major) 26, 35, 157, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 216, 217, 218, 219, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 242, 244, 245, 246, 250, 251, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 272, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 287, 312, 359, 382, 385, 394, 395, 396, 401, 402, 415, 416, 430 Gregory Konrad Freiherr von (Second Lieutenant) 260 Griese (Cannoneer) 206 Grochoteska Paweł (War Volunteer) 68 Grolman Karl von (General) 15, 47 Groote Hartung de (Captain) 248 Grossetti Paul François (Major) 25, 178, 369, 375, 376, 383, 417 Grzelczak Piotr 19, 67, 202, 312 Gudmundsson Bruce 39 Gündell Erich von 72 Gutowski Paweł 68 Haarhaus (Second Lieutenant) 154, 345 Haenichen (Lieutenant Colonel) 138, 258 Haevernick Oskar (Colonel) 53 Hanotaux Gabriel 417, 419 Hart Peter 36, 245, 336, 337 Hartinger Kazimierz (Private) 245 Hasse (Lieutenant Colonel) 259, 277, 342 Hauschulz Willy (Lieutenant) 258 Hauteclocque Walleranda de (General) 25, 174, 193, 194, 195, 226, 227, 228, 229, 387, 389, 390, 407, 408 Heinrich Agnes 57 Heise-Rotenburg Arnold von 53 Helebrant Martin 103 Hémelot (Lieutenant) 243 Hennig (Sergeant) 127 Henri Bonnal (General) 399 Henry (Major) 225, 231, 232, 236, 251, 275

458 Hentschel (Doctor) 233 Hermann (Captain) 240 Heydekampf Stieler von 36, 47, 60, 61, 64 Heyn Otto (Colonel) 79, 133, 138, 144, 207, 247, 253, 254, 289, 441, 445 Hildebrand Karl Friedrich 38, 39, 44, 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 72 Hilliard Atteridge A. 39, 104 Hindenburg Paul (General) 347 Hirschfeld Gerhard 14, 39, 45, 93 Hochstätter Georg (Reserve Lieutenant) 249 Hoffmann Kurt (Captain) 238, 255, 289 Hoffmann Werner (Lieutenant) 132 Hoffmannswaldau Fritz Hoffmann von (Second Lieutenant) 255 Hohenzollern Oskar (Prince) 303 Hohenzollern Wilhelm (Crown Prince) 157, 167, 180, 417 Hohenzollern Wilhelm II (German Emperor) 18, 49, 67, 96, 100, 124, 126, 131, 140, 208, 289, 303, 345, 350, 352, 354, 358 Hollen Freiherr von (General) 348 Holtz (Lieutenant) 155, 282, 243 Homuth (Wachtmeister) 206 Hoppe Franz (Captain) 260 Horne John 37, 155 Horst Arnold Freiherr von der (General) 52, 209, 213 Hubatsch Walther 44 Hubin (Lieutenant) 285 Hütte Werner Otto 39 Iffland Walther (Second Lieutenant) 154, 282, 295 Jackman Steven D. 38, 122, 291 Jacobson Wojciech (Doctor) 18, 19, 33, 34, 68, 69, 92, 101, 155, 288 Jäger Herbert 39 Jakóbczyk Witold 40, 45, 359 Janin (Lieutenant) 216, 217 Jaspar Kundt 15 Jaworski Rudolf 359 Jeziorowski Tadeusz 110 Joffre (General) 170, 363, 370, 371, 372, 379

Index of Names

John Keegan 140 Jongleux (Captain) 236, 237 Jonquères (Lieutenant) 274 Jouanne Kurt von (Wachtmeister) 291, 257 Joubé (Major) 271 Joué (Captain) 198, 199, 216, 246 Jouvencel de (Captain) 192, 390, 404 Jouvin (Major) 198, 199, 232, 274 Jullien (Captain) 242, 251, 392, 412 Kaczmarek Ryszard 15, 37, 293 Kahle (Doctor) 250 Kaisenberg Max von (Lieutenant Colonel) 253, 351, 358 Kaliciak Grzegorz 41 Kalinowski 20 Karolczak Waldemar 65, 136 Karwat Janusz 40, 71 Kauffman (Reserve Lieutenant) 206 Keil (Major) 204 Keller Alfred (Major) 269 Kiepert Heinrich 27, 152, 161 Killmann (Captain) 229 Kirchbach Franz Karl Helmut von 56, 61 Kirchbach Hugo Ewald von (General) 23, 29, 43, 49, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 73, 74, 76, 81, 183, 299, 441 Kitzmann Emil (Reserve Second Lieutenant) 289 Kleinwächter (Gefreiter) 340 Kleinwächter Heinrich (Captain) 213, 240, 289 Kleist Georg von 49 Kleist Herbert von (Captain) 250 Klemm Józef (Gefreiter) 254 Koch Eberhardt (Captain) 240, 289 Konstankiewicz Andrzej 110 Koß Ewald von (Colonel) 53 Kosch Hermann 57 Kosch Robert (General) 43, 57, 58, 73, 135, 155, 182, 203, 204, 207, 211, 240, 251, 255, 276, 278, 279, 281, 284, 287, 313, 323, 343, 351, 355, 358, 441 Krahl (NCO) 247 Kramer Allan 37, 155

459

Index of Names

Kraus Jürgen 37, 39, 51, 52, 53, 74, 80, 87, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 140, 208 Krause (Second Lieutenant) 255 Krautwald (Captain) 126 Krebs (Corporal) 340 Krebs (Major) 258 Kretschmer Gustav (Vizefeldwebel) 335 Krogh von (Major) 342, 259, 297, 327 Kroll Andrzej (Musketeer) 5 Kroll Jan (Cannoneer) 5 Krosigk von (Rittmeister) 125, 131, 341 Kru¨ ger (Privet) 341 Krüger (Sergeant) 270 Krüger Paul (Mounted Rifleman) 208, 291 Krüger Paul (Musketer) 352, 449 Krugmann (Reserve Lieutenant) 327, 342 Krumeich Gerd 14, 39, 45, 93 Kruse (Cadet) 134 Kruse (Second Lieutenant) 142, 215 Kruszyn´ski Bartosz 13, 19, 40, 44, 45, 52, 53, 55, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 85, 86, 151, 157, 159, 172, 177, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 223, 252, 262, 286, 288, 301, 305, 319, 351, 439, 451, 452 Kucharski Szymon 40, 46, 48, 52, 55, 84, 125 Kuhnke Reinhold (Lieutenant) 253, 254, 289 Kutrzeba Tadeusz (General) 44 Kwaciszewski Józef 30, 107 Kwiatkowski Waldemar 41 L’Hôte (Lieutenant) 226 Lacotte Georges (Colonel) 25, 173, 221, 230, 241, 243, 244, 264, 265, 267, 271, 387, 392, 393, 394, 405, 406, 409, 410, 412 Lafay (Second Lieutenant) 217 Lancelot (Captain) 271 Lange Oswald (Deputy officer) 108, 443 Lanrezac Charles Louis Marie (General) 25, 371, 399 Laparra (Lieutenant) 225 Laplace (Lieutenant) 192, 216, 231, 244, 411 Lartigue Raoul Julien François de (General) 25, 171, 366, 387

Latrille (Second Lieutenant) 200, 280 Laugier (Captain) 219, 226 Lavalade (Captain) 231, 273 Lawrenz Peter (Musketeers) 270 Lebaud (Major) 242, 266, 271 Leboiteux (Major) 272 Lebouc (Colonel) 374, 402 Lecaudé (Lieutenant) 233 Lehmann (NCO) 353 Lehmann Felix 62 Lehmann J. F. 343 Lehmann Kuno (Second Lieutenant) 254 Lenoir (Captain) 402 Lepetit (Captain) 178 Lepper Hans (Colonel) 54, 87, 88, 126, 256, 442 Lévêque (Major) 277 Levin (Major) 217, 219, 220, 233, 235 Lezius Martin 32, 135, 160 Lhôte (Second Lieutenant) 273 Liebeskind Paul Heinrich (General) 52, 207, 249 Liebhardt (NCO) 130 Lieres von (Second Lieutenant) 127, 345 Liliencron Rochus Freiherr von 49, 60 Linde (Wachtmeister) 135, 234, 235 Liniert Paul (Cannoneer) 245, 336, 337 Lipkes Jeff 37 Longstaff Frederick Victor 39, 104 Loosch Gerhard 29, 34, 82, 125, 132, 133, 141, 148, 150, 152, 153, 162, 163, 164, 165, 168, 170, 183, 184, 200, 204, 211, 213, 237, 238, 239, 240, 253, 261, 262, 263, 279, 283, 284, 289, 290, 295, 299, 304, 316, 317, 323, 324, 333, 335, 341, 343, 344, 346, 348, 350, 353, 442 Lucas Pascal Marie Henry (Lieutenant Colonel) 29, 121, 279, 359 Ludendorff Erich (General) 66, 155 Ludwig III of Bavaria 50, 52, 74, 77, 132, 439 Luger Georg 103 Luitpold (Prince Regent of Bavaria) 50 Maager (Lieutenant) 329 Maciejowski Tadeusz von (Gefreiter)

68

460 Macker (Major) 178, 264, 386 Maisons (Captain) 226, 273 Maistre Paul André Marie (General) 25, 378 Makowski Krzysztof 359 Manthey (Sergeant) 330 Marshal 399 Martin (Captain) 220, 222, 233, 274 Marweg Jan 312 Massiet (Captain) 219 Mathey Georg (Vizefeldwebel) 330 Mathieu (Major) 299 Matusik Przemysław 41 Meerheimb Ferdinand Freiherr von 49 Menzels Max (Major) 30, 101 Merckel Eberhard (Captain) 135, 255, 259, 342 Merdy Le (Major) 265, 271 Meria (Lieutenant) 217 Merkatz Friedrich von 30, 80, 81, 82, 104, 115 Meth (Sergeant) 314 Meyer (Sergeant) 127 Meyer Karl Ulrich 247 Meyer Werner 15, 47 Michler (Sergeant) 129, 256, 257 Michy (Captain) 218 Miconnet (Second Lieutenant) 216 Mignon (Captain) 218 Milde Kurt 55 Milin´ski Hermann (Musketeers) 270 Mirouze Laurent 39, 100, 101 Mittelstädt Robert (Second Lieutenant) 238, 239, 289 Mittler Ernst Siegfried 26, 30, 31, 32, 36, 45, 47, 55, 72, 74, 80, 87, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 114, 121, 124, 157, 166, 204, 293, 349 Moleux (Captain) 236 Molik Witold 40, 65, 359 Möller (Sergeant) 145 Möller Hans 38, 44, 57, 59, 60, 349 Moltke Helmuth Karl Bernhard von (Field marshal) 399 Moltke Helmuth von (General) 159, 364, Mombauer Annika 18

Index of Names

Morawski (Reserve Second Lieutenant) 260 Moser Otto von (General) 26, 36, 157, 167 Müllenheim-Rechberg Walter von 69 Müller (Reserve Lieutenant) 137 Münnich Alexandra Friederike 56 Mutius Erhard von 36, 45, 72, 340 Nicolas (Captain) 231, 244, 265, 266, 267 Nicolay (Lieutenant) 240 Nicot Jean 24 Niechciałkowski Stanisław (War Volunteer) 68 Nieuwland Dom Norbert 191, 201, 207, 209, 216, 217, 219, 220, 275, 278 Nimmergut Anke 39, 62 Nimmergut Jörg 39, 62 Nollendorf Friedrich Kleist von 29, 48, 49, 52, 54, 73, 74, 75, 79, 108, 144, 161, 294, 352, 439, 441, 443, 445, 449 Nöppert (Cavalrymen) 206 Noso von (Rittmeister) 255 Nowak Wilhelm (Wachtmeister) 259 Nowicki (Gefreiter) 285 Odelga (Vizefeldwebel) 239 Oelsner (Second Lieutenant) 280 Offergeld Arnold (Gefreiter) 206 Olszewski 20 Paczkowski 20 Palat Barthelémy Edmond (General) 36, 228, 404 Parzybok 312 Pawelszyn´ski 215 Pellegrin (Captain) 394 Peltier (Captain) 219, 235, 274 Peltner Friedrich (Captain) 275, 276, 289 Penschke (NCO) 215 Perske Jan (Reserve Cannoneer) 206 Petersen Albert (Vizefeldwebel) 229 Petitjean (Lieutenant) 217 Petzel (Lieutenant) 297 Pikardi (Captain) 314, 324 Poniedziałek 21 Poten B. 60, 64

461

Index of Names

Prauzin´ski Leon 13, 15, 33, 71, 80, 140, 164, 331, 341, 353, 360 Preusker Hans (Major) 128 Priesdorff Kurt von 89 Privat (Captain) 225 Przebitkowski Radosław 151, 159, 172, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 223, 252, 262, 286, 301, 305, 319, 454, 452 Przykall (Second Lieutenant) 248 Reinert Eberhard (Second Lieutenant) 248, 268, 269 Puttkamer von (Captain) 134, 254, 275, 329, 330, 332, 345 Rakowski Maks 312 Raschke Walter 15 Rebold Julius 36, 348 Reichert Wilhelm 15, 50 Renaudin (Captain) 266, 271 Renz Irina 14, 45, 93 Rezmer Waldemar 37 Ricar (Lieutenant) 285 Richard (Captain) 198, 216, 236, 273 Richert (Second Lieutenant) 248, 268, 270 Richy (Lieutenant) 216 Rißmann (Captain) 213, 276, 298 Rißmann Emil (Second Lieutenant) 213, 276, 298 Rodziewicz Dariusz 41 Roffé (Captain) 219, 220, 222, 233, 246 Rohne H. 104 Rokahr (Vizefeldwebel) 168 Roloff (Privet) 340 Rommel Erwin 34, 232 Rondenay (Major) 230, 232, 274 Ronin (Lieutenant) 193, 194 Rosser (Gefreiter) 206 Róz˙ycki Łukasz 41 Ruffey Pierre (General) 176, 192, 365, 370, 379, 380, 383, 418 Ruhl Moritz 52, 73 Rungs (Captain) 266, 271 Rupprecht Bavarian Crown Prince 167 Sabatier (Colonel) 416 Sarrail Maurice (General)

365

Satter Alfred 37, 98 Schäffter (Second Lieutenant) 284, 324 Schenk (Second Lieutenant) 298 Scherer Otto von (Major) 256 Scheven von (Rittmeister) 255 Schleicher Otto von (Lieutenant Colonel) 54, 88, 126, 205, 259, 442 Schlemm Paul 29, 35, 87, 112, 114, 126, 129, 134, 136, 144, 147, 148, 203, 214, 215, 229, 230, 250, 256, 260, 275, 276, 279, 283, 290, 298, 303, 313, 324, 328, 335, 342, 345, 347, 348, 353, 442 Schlieffen Alfred von (General) 159, 364, 365 Schlotheim Freiherr von (Reserve Rittmeister) 125 Schlu¨ ter Franz (Second Lieutenant) 340 Schmaler (Cannoneer) 127 Schmalz (Doctor) 125 Schmidt Hans (Reserve Second Lieutenant) 249 Schmidt Walter 15, 49 Schmidt-Pauli von (Second Lieutenant) 127, 210, 348, 349 Schmiedeberg Paul (Second Lieutenant) 240, 289 Schmittendorf (Captain) 132 Schmitz Chanoine Jean 191, 201, 207, 209, 216, 217, 219, 220, 275, 278 Schneider Louis 39, 62 Schoenbeck (Captain) 206, 350 Schoenermarck von (Captain) 240, 241, 299 Schoenlaub (Captain) 243 Schröder (Sergeant) 238 Schubert Max 15, 47 Schuckmann von (Captain) 263, 314, 324, 325, 328 Schulz (Vizewachtmeister) 127 Schulze Artur (Vicefeldwebel) 335 Schulze Reinhold (NCO, One-year volunteer) 255 Schwartz Anna 62 Schweigger Rittmeister 168 Sédillot (Lieutenant) 246 Seer (NCO) 130

462 Sick (Major) 260, 261, 263 Signorin (Captain) 221, 242, 266 Simonin (Doctor) 219, 264 Siwinna Carl 30, 31 Skorupka Antoni (Musketeer) 134 Skorupka Wawrzyniec (Musketeer) 134, 289 Skrzypczak Janusz 147 Sommé (Captain) 200, 276 Sommer Hugo 39, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 62, 63, 64 Sommerfeld 134 Sporn Bernhard 15, 29, 49, 82, 89, 125, 134, 162, 258, 295, 315 Spraul Gunter 37, 155 Stalling Gerhard 15, 29, 36, 45, 47, 72, 87, 112, 203, 298, 340 Stein Hans Rudolf von 39 Steinmetz Karl Friedrich von 35, 53, 60, 64, 73 Stelter (Father) 166 Stopprich (Mounted rifleman) 208 Strantz Hans Friedrich von (Major) 56 Strantz Hermann von (General) 43, 56, 57, 67, 136, 167, 180, 256, 258, 278, 296, 343, 350, 358, 441 Sulzer J. 27, 132, 346 Szkudlin´ski Jan 36, 60, 245, 336 Szlanta Piotr 18 Szulc Tadeusz 19, 33, 67, 149, 202, 280, 312 Szymanski 20 Tanant Albert (General) 370, 400, 409, 415, 416, 417, 419 Tarret (Colonel) 242 Techow (Captain) 244 Teichmann Walter (Reserve Lieutenant) 280, 285, 290 Teßler (Second Lieutenant) 256, 257, 281 Thierry (Sergeant) 245 Thoss Bruno 93 Ticke Fritz (Reserve Second Lieutenant) 340 Tillmann (Major) 343 Tisserand (Captain) 243 Tourte (Captain) 219, 235

Index of Names

Transfeldts Adolf 30, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 442 Trentinian Louis Edgar de (General) 22, 25, 35, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180, 191, 192, 198, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 226, 227, 230, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 250, 263, 264, 265, 272, 277, 285, 293, 306, 308, 309, 317, 320, 323, 336, 355, 357, 363, 364, 368, 370, 378, 386, 387, 391, 393, 394, 399, 400, 404, 405, 406, 408, 413, 415, 416, 417, 418 Trieglaff Ernst (Colonel) 82, 207, 442 Trzeciakowski Lech 40, 68, 359 Uhse (Captain) 298 Ulrich (Second Lieutenant) 283 Unruh Lothar von (Major) 145, 249, 324 Unterberger (Second Lieutenant) 130, 343 Urbaniak Miron 40, 55 Valentin (Colonel) 173, 265, 272 Vicq (Major) 178, 194, 195, 196, 197, 225, 231, 232, 236, 250, 274, 389 Vincent (Captain) 21, 197 Viseur le (Lieutenant) 324, 325 Voggenreiter Ludwig 34, 232 Vogt Otto 29, 34, 53, 73, 83, 126, 134, 144, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 161, 164, 165, 168, 170, 183, 184, 201, 204, 209, 211, 217, 227, 229, 234, 260, 275, 276, 283, 284, 292, 293, 294, 302, 312, 315, 317, 323, 333, 334, 335, 336, 339, 341, 344, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 442 Volkmann Erich Otto 36 Wachowiak Stanisław 40 Wadzyn´ski Bronisław (One-Year Volunteer) 68, 354, 449 Waldmann (Lieutenant) 284, 285 Walkowiak 20 Walther (Second Lieutenant) 282, 295 Wanke (Second Lieutenant) 238 Watson Alexander 37, 38, 40, 41, 68, 138 Watter Oskar Freiherr von (General) 53, 60, 87, 204, 205, 211, 284 Weber Jakob (NCO) 254

463

Index of Names

Wegner Günter 15, 38, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 64, 73, 74, 89, 157 Weigelt (Cannoneer) 246, 247 Weiland Babette 61 Wendorff Eberhard (Second Lieutenant) 168, 200, 282, 297, 303, 304, 310 Wernigk Hugo 30, 114 Wibratte (Captain) 275 Wiedemann George (Oberarzt der Reserve) 291 Wilbien (Major) 265, 266, 271 Wildenfels Solms Otto Graf zu (Major) 89, 90, 125, 281, 296, 442 Wilke (Captain) 248 William I Hohenzollern (German Emperor) 65 Wojciechowski Mariusz 40, 46, 48, 52, 55, 84, 125 Wolf Rudolf (Reserve Lieutenant) 246, 247, 279

Wolff Adolf 143 Wron´ski G.A. 16, 18, 34 Wurmb Eckart von 30, 101 Zeinert (NCO) 201 Zimmer (Second Lieutenant) 343, 348 Zimmermann 343, 348 Zuber Terence 36, 155, 181, 260, 262, 287, 365 Zuckerman Larry 37, 155 Zunehmer Max 29, 34, 49, 52, 63, 64, 73, 81, 82, 125, 133, 139, 146, 149, 183, 184, 207, 249, 263, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 283, 289, 290, 299, 302, 304, 313, 315, 327, 332, 333, 334, 336, 341, 344, 346, 347, 348, 351, 353, 441 Zweng Christian 39, 44, 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 72 Z˙ychlin´ski Józef 130

Geographical Index

Abweiler 162 Alize 375 Allondrelle 174, 175, 266, 285, 293, 306, 307, 311, 312, 313, 315, 316, 380, 381, 418, 419 Alsace 26, 155, 364, 357, 364, 376 Alt-Goerzig (now Gorzycko Stare) 254 Altwasser (now Stary Zdrój) 276 Alzette 373 Amuetz 380 Angevillers 173, 377 Anlay 378 Ardennes 79, 157, 164, 165, 170, 171, 293, 355, 364, 365, 366, 369, 370, 371, 377, 454 Arlon 160, 161, 164, 165, 171, 176, 178, 179, 183, 202, 255, 258, 259, 263, 280, 303, 342, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 388, 400, 401, 417 Aschaffenburg 141, 147 Athus 382, 383 Attorf 373 Aubagne 374, 383 Audun-le-Roman 167, 170, 180, 380 Aumetz 167, 347 Australia 27 Austria 62, 63 Autelbas 163, 165 Autelhaut 163, 165 Aznaannes 366 Babay 381 Baconveau (Forest) 225, 274, 285 Baden-Württemberg 23 Bamberg 141

Barnich 163 Bartodzieje Małe (German Klein-Bartelsee) 330 Bartringen (French Bertrange) 162, 163, 164 Bassancy 396 Basse-Vire 166, 190, 270, 315, 380, 382, 399, 403, 415 Bastogne 375 Battemburg 160, 161, 162, 164 Bavaria 145 Bazeilles 347, 348, 379, 380, 381, 385 Bedersdorf 146, 149 Bel Arbre 396 Belgium 17, 28, 37, 119, 140, 155, 159, 163, 165, 170, 171, 182, 262, 273, 288, 313, 316, 355, 356, 364, 371, 372 Bellefontaine 378, 385, 397, 398, 402 Bellevue 175, 381, 397 Belmont 166, 180, 186, 189, 190, 198, 204, 207, 209, 215, 216, 217, 220, 224, 226, 229, 230, 232, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 256, 260, 261, 269, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 279, 283, 284, 287, 294, 296, 300, 320, 391, 392, 393, 405, 406, 407, 409, 410, 412, 413, 415, 451 Berchem 161 Berlin 49, 56, 57, 58, 62, 206, 246, 250, 280, 340 Bertrix 374 Bettebourd-sur-Noertzange 373 Bettembourg 376, 380 Bettembourg Forest 173, 377 Bettingen 164, 165

466 Beuveille 346, 347, 348, 379 Bidlingen 152 Biedrusko 84, 87 Bielefeld 259 Billy-sous-Mangiennes 366, 367, 372 Biringen 148 Birkenfeld 141, 147 Birkholz (now Borów) 240 Birnbaum (now Mie˛dzychód) 254 Bisingen 144, 152 Bivaux 390 Bivingen (French Bivange) 161 Bleid 166, 178, 183, 186, 190, 192, 193, 197, 231, 233, 242, 244, 267, 295, 296, 303, 381, 387, 389, 390, 392, 393, 404, 405, 407, 410, 411, 414, 418, 419, 451 Bochum 137 Bois Baconvcau (Forest) 190 Bois Céline (Forest) 418 Bois d’Ardennes (Forest) 385, 402 Bois de Bampont (Forest) 190, 243, 249, 267, 270, 271, 294, 300, 302, 383, 302, 410 Bois de la Cote (Forest) 398 Bois des Loges (Forest) 190, 244, 249, 261, 270, 271, 278, 282, 294, 298, 383, 393, 410, 412 Bois du Bon-Lieu (Forest) 189, 190 Bois du Charel (Forest) 314 Bois la Roue (Forest) 306, 314, 316 Bois le Mât (Forest) 190 Bois-de-Chevaliers (Forest) 108 Bois-de-Étalle (Forest) 170, 180, 189, 247 Boismont 346, 347, 348 Boler 154 Bolesławiec 108 Bomst (now Babimost) 247 Bonlieu 203 Bothendorf 146, 149 Bouillon Farm 304 Boust 154 Bouvilliers 372 Bouvroy 381 Bouzonville 374 Br. Hennersdorf 148 Brandenburg 145 Brandeville 372, 339

Geographical Index

Bréhéville 339 Breisdorf (French Breistroff-la-Grande) 154, 160 Brieulles 342 Briey 372, 374 Brunehaut 367 Brussels 140, 142, 376 Bruville 68 Buette 381 Buk 141 Bürsingen 162 Busendorf 132, 142, 144, 146, 148, 149 Buzenol 166, 180, 183, 200, 247, 280, 296 Bydgoszcz (German Bromberg) 45, 52, 330 Cahaut 265 Cantebronne 173 Caribbean Sea 171 Carignan 183 Carrière 244 Céline-Torgny forest 308 Chabot 337, 338 Chantemelle 169, 170, 183, 296 Chapelle 323, 420 Charency 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 174, 266, 285, 293, 301, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 335, 343, 351, 352, 380, 381, 394, 419, 448, 449, 452, 453 Charity 381 Château de Vincennes 23 Château-Cugnon 216 Châtillon 165, 167, 173, 176, 178, 180, 263, 298, 377, 383, 384, 385, 389, 396, 402 Chenais 384 Chenières 397 Chenois 178, 190, 270, 300, 303, 304, 315, 381 Cherancy 315, 350 Chiers 180, 304, 309, 311, 313, 314, 315, 324, 327, 334, 343, 350, 380, 381, 418, 419 Chociebuz˙ (German Cottbus) 141, 145, 147 Chocz 130 Chodziez˙ 239 Chopey 326

467

Geographical Index

Chou 189, 217 Clairefontaine 163 Clemency 382 Clesse 220 Cochinchina 171 Colmen 147, 152 Colmey 380 Cologne 58 Conflans 372, 342 Cosnes 396 Credon 317, 344 Crusnes 167 Culm (now Chełmno) 56, 62 Cutry 397 Czech Republic 60 Czernikau (now Czarnków) 271 Dalheim 376 Dampicourt 175, 381, 398, 418 Damvillers 307, 365, 368, 372, 381, 394 Danzig 110 Darmstadt 57, 141 Delut 322, 337, 338, 344, 346 Denmark 63 Diedenhofen (French Thionville) 26, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 173, 346, 347, 360, 365, 372, 377, 378, 381, 382 Dietzdorfer Hof 148 Differdange 375, 377, 384 Dillingen 141, 145, 147 Dinant 170, 376, 377 Dodenhofen 154 Dolsk 254 Dombras 365, 372 Dombrówka 206 Doncourt 346, 347 Dorlon 311, 313, 314 Douaumont 28 Doulcon 339 Drezdenko 208 Düdelingen (French Dudelange) 154, 155, 161, 376 Dun 339, 345, 349 Durbuy 378 Düren 146, 149

Duxford

28

East Prussia 345, 346, 347, 352, 360 Ecouviez 379 Eimersdorf 148 Eischen 164 Elsass-Lothringen 26, 27, 132, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 346, 347, 348, 349 Épiez-sur-Chiers 306, 311, 313, 314, 315, 332, 381 Erfurt 49, 62 Errouville 347 Erwingen (French Évrange) 154, 160, 161 Esch-sur-Alzette 373, 376 Etain 312, 313, 314, 316, 342, 365, 372, 381, Étalle 160, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 178, 180, 183, 184, 190, 199, 245, 258, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 382, 383, 384, 385, 388, 389, 397, 401, 402, 406, 407 Éthe 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 35, 40, 68, 157, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 309, 310, 316, 321, 323, 340, 342, 350, 351, 352 353, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 371, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 399, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419 Eucrey 372 Eure-et-Loir 175 Ewendorf 152 Exermont 342

468 Fenningen (French Fennange) 161, 162, 163 Fillières 347 Flabeuville 174, 307 Flasdorf 147, 148, 152 Flassigny 321, 322, 326, 336, 343, 344, 349 Flatten 147 Flessigny 349 Florenville 375 Foetz 373, 376 Fond de Bivaux 216 Fontoy 382 Fort Leavenworth 44 Fort Troyon 417 Fort Winiary 46, 52, 54, 125, 133 France 5, 9, 17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 43, 49, 52, 62, 64, 92, 107, 118, 121, 124, 139, 141, 153, 160, 164, 165, 228, 261, 273, 288, 311, 313, 316, 355, 357, 358, 364, 365, 365, 371, 387 Frankfurt (Oder) 49 Fremersdorf/Saar 148 Fresnes-en-Woëvre 349 Freylange 165 Friedeberg (now S´wiebodzin) 240 Friedeberg Kreis 208 Friedeberg Neumark (now Strzelce Krajen´skie) 260 Frisingen (French Frisange) 160, 162 Galizien 254 Gametz 372, 379 Gédine 378 Genarville 374 Geppecourt 418 Gera 141, 142, 147 Gerstlingen (French Guerstling) 141, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 Gesnes 342 Gévimont 178, 197, 231, 236, 237 Gincrey 365, 366 Givet 378 Glatz 58 Glogau (now Głogów) 14, 89, 137, 138, 144, 147, 276 Gniezno 18, 33, 45, 69, 139

Geographical Index

Goldhof 152 Goldsmiths 40 Golina 128 Gomery 174, 175, 178, 179, 190, 193, 194, 198, 209, 217, 221, 222, 230, 233, 241, 242, 243, 244, 251, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 281, 285, 295, 298, 299, 300, 303, 310, 315, 381, 383, 386, 389, 392, 393, 394, 398, 404, 405, 408, 409, 410, 412, 414, 415, 416 Gongelfangen 147 Gorazdowo 130 Gorcy 381, 396 Górczyn (German Gurtschin) 335 Gostyn´ 134, 289 Goszczanowo 208 Gr. Gerau 141 Gr. Zauche 260 Grand Failly 174, 323, 337, 348, 380, 421 Grandcourt 175, 192, 311, 212, 315, 316, 382, 404, 405 Grandvaux 341, 337 Grass 164 Great Britain 43, 364 Gremilly 366, 367, 372 Grevenmacher 376 Grindorf 147 Grodzisk 13 Groß Strehlitz (now Strzelce Opolskie) 269 Groß-Hemmersdorf 146 Grünberg (now Zielona Góra) 254 Gubin 141 Guisingen 149 Guscht 208 Habay-la-Neuve 178, 384, 388, 374 Habergy 167 Hagen 162, 163, 164 Halanzy 383 Halle 63, 144 Halsdorf 144, 152 Ham lès Saint Jean 307, 309, 320, 322, 337, 349 Hamawé 197, 224, 225, 231, 236, 246, 388, 390 Hamburg 100, 268

Geographical Index

Hannoncourt 175 Hanoi 171 Hanonien 254 Hanotaux 390, 417, 419 Haraumont 342, 343, 345 Harnoncourt 251, 381, 398 Hassel Ha 376 Hausen 378 Haut-Fourneau 372 Heinsch 165, 167, 168 Heinstert 178, 384, 388 Hemmersdorf 146 Higny 327, 332, 334 Houdlemont 381 Houdrigny 175, 374, 378, 381, 397 Huombois 166, 384 Ihn 144, 149, 152 Indochina 171 Iré-le-Sec 322, 339 Issy 176 Italy 62 Itzbach 149 Jametz 333, 337, 338, 339, 434, 344, 422 Jankowice 5 Jarocin 73, 130, 250 Jeune Bois 182, 190, 193, 195, 215, 217, 226, 229, 230, 231, 232, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 248, 250, 251, 263, 264, 266, 267, 273, 274, 278, 285, 297, 298, 299, 302, 303, 383, 391, 392, 393, 394, 403, 405, 409, 410, 412, 446, 448 Jez˙yce 145 Jonville 68 Jré-le-Sec 344 Juvigny 338 Kahler 164 Kail 154 Kalisz 128, 129, 361 Kaltweiler 152 Kapellen (French Capellen) 162, 163, 164 Kartuzy (German Karthaus) 340 Kattenhofen (French Cattenom) 153, 160 Kayl 373

469 Kerlingen 149, 152, 153 Kerpich 146 Kienne 373 Kirchnaumen 152, 153 Kleinbettingen 163 Kłodzko (German Glatz) 57 Koblenz 48 Kolmar 239 Königsmachern 150, 153 Konin 128, 129, 156, 361 Körich 163 Kosowo Wielkopolskie 134, 288 Kraków 19 Krautem (French Crauthem) 161 Kreuznach 141, 147 Królewiec (German Königsberg) 46 Krotoszyn (German Krotoschin) 53, 73, 87 Kruszewnia 66 Kulm 49 Kulmbach 145 Kunice 249 La Prêle farm 304 La Pte 315 La Ton (Stream) 207, 304 La Tour 380 Labry 374 Lacheneau 389, 390 Laclaireau 189, 190, 196, 207, 211, 213, 216, 224, 225, 232, 233, 235, 241, 246, 253, 256, 273, 275, 276, 278, 283, 284 La˛dek 129 Lagrange forest 307, 308, 321, 334 Lain 397 Lamorteau 175, 380, 381 Landres 182, 293, 343 Lantefontaine 374 Laon 49 Latour 166, 174, 175, 178, 180, 186, 190, 193, 194, 196, 200, 217, 221, 230, 241, 242, 243, 245, 251, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 278, 283, 291, 293, 294, 295, 297, 298, 299, 302, 303, 304, 310, 312, 313, 315, 381, 382, 384, 385, 386, 389, 393, 398, 399, 403, 405, 407, 410, 414, 415, 418, 451

470 Latvia 270 Le Roche 378 Lebach 158 Leeds 28, 110 Lefort (Forest) 198, 207, 216, 225, 226, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 251, 256, 257, 275, 390 Legnica (German Liegnitz) 45, 249 Lehaut (Forest) 398 Leipzig 49, 141, 142, 144, 146 Lemmersdorf 150, 152 Lendelingen 164 Leszno (German Lissa) 53, 54, 55, 74, 88, 126, 134, 136, 146, 147 Leudelingen (French Leudelange) 162, 163 Libramont 374, 378 Lichtenfels 143 Liège 140, 142 Livingen (French Livange) 161, 162 Loison 338, 343, 366, 367, 421, 422 London 27, 28, 40 Londres 372 Longuyon 170, 180, 182, 307, 308, 317, 328, 329, 346, 347, 348, 349, 365, 367, 372, 376, 382, 396, 419 Longwy 36, 45, 72, 157, 160, 165, 166, 167, 170, 172, 180, 192, 340, 345, 372, 374, 375, 375, 377, 382, 384, 396, 400, 404, 420, 451 Lorraine (German Lothringen) 26, 27, 114, 117, 127, 131, 132, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 161, 168, 317, 357, 364, 372, 377, 294, 307, 309, 311, 312, 317, 323, 324, 326, 327, 329, 333, 334, 336, 338, 339, 342, 343, 344, 357, 364, 372, 377, 443, 444, 451 Louppy sur Loison 338 Lower Rhineland 49 Lower Silesia 19, 45, 49 Lüben (now Lubin) 253 Lu¨ delingen 347 Lüdingen 146, 149 Ludwigsburg 59 Lusówko 5 Luxembourg 152, 156, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 170, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 379, 380, 384, 401

Geographical Index

Madagascar 171 Magdeburg 62 Magnette 201 Mainz 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147 Maissin 374, 378 Maix-devant-Virton 293 Mali 171 Mallingen 150 Malmaison 175, 200, 207, 208, 209, 241, 264, 266, 272, 285, 304, 311, 312, 313, 315, 316, 380, 381, 382, 393, 394, 399, 410, 414, 416, 418 Mamer 162, 163, 164 Mangiennes 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 372, 399 Marienhof 152 Marne (River) 26, 32, 171, 308, 349, 352, 363, 365, 369, 370, 417 Mars-la-Tour 68, 374 Martinique 171 Marville 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 35, 68, 160, 292, 293, 294, 294, 299, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 356, 357, 358, 376, 397, 417, 419, 420, 421, 422, 448, 449, 452, 453 Mât 197, 225, 232, 233, 237, 274 Mayenne 175 Mecklenburg-Schwerin 64 Mein (River) 143 Meix-la-Tige 173, 377, 378, 383, 385, 389, 396, 397, 402 Mercy-le-Bas 381 Mersch 373, 400 Messancy 383 Metz 26, 127, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 210, 282, 312, 346, 349, 365, 372, 376, 379, 381 Meuse (River) 342, 343, 345, 349, 352, 364, 371, 376, 377, 378 Meuse Hills 88, 135, 338, 343, 345, 365, 442 Mezières 160, 377, 378 Milicz (German Militsch) 53

471

Geographical Index

Miłosław 27, 127, 128 Mittenhof 152 Monderange 373 Mont Valérien 60 Mont-Quintin 398 Montigny 68 Montmédy 160, 166, 180, 183, 309, 310, 324, 326, 338, 343, 344, 348, 378, 380 Montquintin 308 Moreigne 366, 367, 367, 371 Moselle 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160, 280, 376 Moulin-de-Grandvaux 333 Moussy la Ville 303 Mouzon 378 Mulhouse 376 Münnich 56 Musson 382, 383 Mussy la Ville 200 Myslowitz (now Mysłowice) 239 Náchod (German Nachod) 43, 60, 63, 156, 355 Nakel an der Netze (now Nakło nad Notecia˛) 56 Namur 170, 377, 378 Nantes 418 Neuenkirchen 152 Neufchâteau 170, 173, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378 Neumarkt 61 Neunkirchen 146, 152 Nied 147, 150 Niedaltdorf 147, 150, 152 Nieder Gläsersdorf (now Szklary Dolne) 253 Nieder Parth 154 Nieder Stephansdorf (now Szczepanów) 247, 279 Niederham (French Basse-Ham) 153 Niedwellingen 147 Niesky (now Niska) 64 Noërs 346, 348 Nollendorf (now Naklérˇov in Czech Republic) 49 Nonkeil 154

Norbulle farm 304, 306 Norroy-le-Sec 372 Nowogrodziec 108 Nowy Tomys´l 133, 141, 142, 249 Ober Naumen 152 Ober Parth 154 Ober Sierck 152 Ober-Esch 148 Ober-Limburger 149 Oberröblingen 269 Oettingen 154 Opalenica 141, 142 Opole 269 Orchamps 378 Orleáns 60 Ornes 175, 368 Ornet 372 Ostrów (German Ostrowo) 53, 73, 87, 126 Othain (River) 160, 165, 167, 180, 305, 308, 309, 310, 312, 317, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 328, 330, 332, 337, 343, 350, 357, 358, 365, 373, 380, 420, 421, 448, 449, 452 Othe 381 Ottange 173, 377 Ourthe 170, 377, 378 Ozérailles 381 Paliseul 374 Paris 23, 25, 49, 60, 140, 141, 171, 176, 239 Parth 153 Petit Aivry 380 Petit Failly 294, 307, 321, 323, 337, 348, 349, 420 Petit Hivry 322 Petit Xivry 174, 307, 308, 309, 348, 349 Pfeifershof 164 Pienne-Norroy-le-Sec 381 Pierrard 175 Pierrepont 347, 348, 381 Pillon 367, 369 Pleszew (German Pleschen) 68, 53, 73, 130, 353 Poland 27 Polanowo 68 Porcheresse 378

472 Potsdam 57 Powidz 68 Poznan´ (German Posen) 5, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 36, 40, 41, 43, 44, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 84, 85, 87, 88, 94, 104, 107, 110, 115, 124, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 153, 156, 157, 161, 165, 171, 202, 204, 206, 239, 247, 254, 256, 281, 287, 293, 297, 312, 335, 346, 350, 351, 352, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 441, 444, 445, 446, 448, 449 Prosna 130 Province of Posen (German Provinz Posen) 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 36, 43, 45, 46, 47, 56, 65, 67, 68, 71, 94, 124, 134, 138, 139, 142, 149, 158, 289, 359, 361, 362 Pyzdry 27, 127, 130, 156 Rachecourt 173, 377, 383 Raltweiler 152 Rambouillet 176 Rammelfangen 149 Rawicz (German Rawitsch) 53, 55, 74, 84, 134, 146, 147 Reckange 376 Recogne 378 Remoiville 338, 339, 343, 422 Rentgen 376 Rhine 143, 145, 147 Rhineland 48, 143 Riga 270 Robelmont 180, 183, 378, 382, 387, 398 Rochecourt 396 Rochefort 376 Rochette 225 Rochonvillers 173, 377 Rodlach 150 Romagne-sous-Montfaucon 342 Romagnes-les-Côtes 366 Ronne forest 304, 306 Röser (French Roeser) 161 Rossignol 173, 293, 377, 378 Rothenburg 141 Rue Grande 199

Geographical Index

Ruette 166, 174, 175, 183, 241, 264, 265, 266, 267, 272, 285, 297, 310, 311, 313, 316, 381, 382, 386, 399, 405, 406, 410 Rulles 167 Rupt-sur-Othain 322, 349 Russia 27, 49, 52, 53, 63, 72, 89, 124, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 139, 156 Rüttgen 153, 154, 161 Rychwał 129, 131 Saalfeld 141, 147 Saarbrücken 157, 158 Saargemünd 68 Saarlouis 132, 145, 149 Sadová (German Königgrätz) 63 Saint Jean 307, 309, 317, 320, 322, 323, 328, 333, 337, 344, 345, 349, 420, 448, 449 Saint Marie 165 Saint-Hilaire 323, 420 Saint-Léger 166, 176, 178, 179, 190, 193, 194, 196, 216, 218, 224, 226, 230, 256, 263, 275, 281, 282, 295, 296, 298, 382, 383, 384, 386, 388, 389, 390, 396, 401, 407, 408, 411 Saint-Mard 175, 190, 251, 268, 302, 304, 381, 398, 405, 418, Saint-Pancre 382, 396, 419 Saint-Rémy 192 Saint-Vincent 378 Sainte-Menehould 365 Sambre 170 Sankt Petersburg 64 Sarrebourg 376 Sarthe 175 Saxony 48, 64, 145 Sceaux 176 Schaumburg-Lippe 64 Schrimm (now S´rem) 254 Schweinfurt 141, 144, 147 Schweinschädel 63 Sedan 60, 378 Seifersdorf (now Rosochata) 249 Serrouvulle 347 Sieraków 28 Sierck 150, 374, 376 Signeulx 266, 396, 382, 387, 397, 403 Silesia 293

473

Geographical Index

Silesia Province (German Provinz Schlesien) 14, 19, 138 Sivry 169 Skalica (German Skalitz) 63 Skolniki 127 Słupca 68, 127, 128, 129 Socken 165 Sołacz 55 Sommauthe 349 Sonnenhof 148 Spincourt 343, 365, 368, 372, 374 S´rem (German Schrimm) 52, 55, 74, 131, 132, 141 S´roda S´la˛ska 247, 279 S´roda Wielkopolska (German Schroda) 329 St. Barbara 144 St. Franz 150 Starołe˛ka 136 Stawiszyn 131 Stehnen 165 Stenay 170, 343, 347, 348, 349, 375, 379 Sterpenich 163, 165 Stieglitz (now Siedlisko) 271 Stobno 239 Stoewen 239 Stralsund 340 Strasbourg 26, 64 Strzałkowo 127, 128, 129, 139, 156 Stuttgart 23 Sudan 171 Suftgen 153, 161 Suippe 365 Sure 377 Szamotuły 133, 238 Szczecin (German Stettin) 45, 253 Tama Garbarska 134 Tannenberg 360 Tauer (now Turów) 276 Tellancourt 166, 198, 379, 382, 396, 399, 419 Thil 173 Thon 178, 183, 189, 190, 193, 195, 197, 217, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 232, 235, 236, 240, 246, 249, 251, 260, 263, 267, 274,

279, 283, 284, 302, 371, 382, 393, 398, 400, 405, 408, 410, 412, 413, 415 Tintigny 165, 293, 375, 380, 385, 389, 397 Tonkin 171 Torgau 141, 147, 175, 308, 380, 381 Torigny 380 Tressingen 347 Trichemont 374 Trier 255 Trombinek (now Tra˛binek) 254 Tschirne (now Czerna, Lower Silesia) 108 Tuilerie 217, 235, 285 Tursko 68, 353 Umgegend 149 United Kingdom (UK) 27 United States (US) 27, 43 Upper Lusatia 64 Urbulle 311, 313, 314, 316 Uzarzewo 352, 449 Valleroy 374 Vance 167, 168, 169, 173, 178, 179, 183, 296, 374, 383, 384, 388, 389, 406, 407, 411 Vanves 176 Varennes 373 Varny 321 Velosnes 172, 178, 307, 308, 380, 381, 384, 385, 397, 406 Verdun 28, 170, 171, 176, 179, 307, 312, 349, 351, 369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 379, 380, 382, 383, 385 Versailles 60 Vesoul 60 Vezin 285, 287, 311, 313, 314, 315, 323, 327, 334, 336, 341, 342, 344, 381, 385, 448, 449 Vierzehnheiligen 143 Vieux 302, 381 Vilette 419 Villancourt 388 Ville-au-Montois 347, 348 Ville-Houdlémont 166, 183, 382 Villejuif 176 Villers-le-Rond 266, 272, 293, 306, 307, 308, 313, 320, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327,

474

Geographical Index

328, 329, 330, 332, 334, 336, 341, 344, 348, 349, 350, 394, 419, 420, 422 Villerupt 173 Villette 174, 307, 310 Vilosnes 342, 345 Vimy 5 Vitron 35, 36, 68, 160, 164, 165, 167, 170, 172, 174, 175, 178, 180, 183, 186, 189, 190, 191, 198, 202, 213, 215, 216, 217, 219, 222, 224, 225, 226, 230, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 310, 312, 353, 366, 371, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 385, 387, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 403, 410, 412, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 451 Vitry-le François 363, 368 Vittarville 343, 345, 380 Vosges 365, 376 Wa˛growiec 45 Waldenburg (now Wałbrzych) Waldwiese 146, 147 Wallerfangen 157

276

Warsaw 28 Warta 84, 87, 124, 130, 134, 136, 156 Weiland 61 Weissenburg 64 Wielkopolska Province 46, 68, 254 Winiary 46 Witkowo 68 Wollmeringen 154, 155 Wrocław 134, 333 Wrzes´nia (German Wreschen) 52, 55 64, 74, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 156 Württemberg 34, 59, 64, 296, 302, 311, 315, 349, 357, 377, 378, 382, 393, 395, 404, 411, 414, 415 Xivry-Circourt

381

Zagórów 129 Zaniemys´l 139 Zba˛szyn´ 141 Zembowo (now Ze˛bowo) Zeringen 148 Z˙erków 250 Zgorzelec 19

249