The Geopolitics of Space Colonization: Future Power Relations in the Inner Solar System 1032454806, 9781032454801

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The Geopolitics of Space Colonization

This book presents a geopolitical analysis of the upcoming human exploration of celestial bodies in the inner solar system by the major space powers. It utilizes a systemic approach to the analysis of political events in space to develop a comprehensive overview of the factors influencing planned or proposed missions to the selected objects – the Moon, Mars, and asteroids. As a result of this analysis, the book establishes forward-looking scenarios of possible developments to highlight the main fault lines of the upcoming operations beyond the currently most heavily utilized terrestrial orbits. This framework is rooted in a holistic overview of factors relevant to the mid-term settlement and mining efforts and allows us to highlight the main focal points that will determine the future power distribution inside the inner solar system. The methodology is based on the analysis of an interplay of numerous factors deemed crucial for the decision-making of the major space powers and their capacities to promote their interests in a given region. Major space powers are, for the purpose of this book, understood as those actors with a realistic ability to participate in or lead the inner solar system colonization and mining missions in the mid-term future for which scenario-making is the most suitable. Given the realities of space travel, however, smaller actors are also taken into consideration as a part of cooperative efforts which are, nonetheless, dominated by the major players or, alternatively, as possible spoilers of the efforts in several regional settings. The book thus provides an in-depth analysis of the possible futures regarding the nearing competition over the celestial bodies This book will be of much interest to students of space power and policy, geopolitics, airpower, and International Relations. Bohumil Doboš is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. He has authored among others, the book The Geopolitics of Outer Space: A European Perspective (2018).

Space Power and Politics

The Space Power and Politics series will provide a forum where space policy and historical issues can be explored and examined in-depth. The series will produce works that examine civil, commercial, and military uses of space and their implications for international politics, strategy, and political economy. This will include works on government and private space programs, technological developments, conflict and cooperation, security issues, and history. Series Editors: Thomas Hoerber, ESSCA, France and Mariel Borowitz, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA A European Space Policy Past Consolidation, Present Challenges and Future Perspectives Edited by Thomas Hoerber and Sarah Lieberman Security and Stability in the New Space Age Alternatives to Arming Brad Townsend European Integration and Space Policy A Growing Security Discourse Edited by Thomas Hoerber and Antonella Forganni The Commercialisation of Space Politics, Economics and Ethics Edited by Sarah Lieberman, Harald Köpping Athanasopoulos and Thomas Hoerber The Geopolitics of Space Colonization Future Power Relations in the Inner Solar System Bohumil Doboš For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ strategicstudies/series/SPP

The Geopolitics of Space Colonization Future Power Relations in the Inner Solar System

Bohumil Doboš

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Bohumil Doboš The right of Bohumil Doboš to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-45480-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-45498-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-37725-2 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252 Typeset in Sabon by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

1 Introduction1 2 Astropolitics5 3 Actors33 4 Environmental Factors61 5 Normative Considerations 

84

6 Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements106 7 Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies128 8 Conclusion 

147

Index152

1

Introduction

When the Soviet Sputnik 1, on the night from 4th to 5th October 1957, reached the first of its 1,440 orbits around the Earth, outer space became the latest natural domain penetrated by purposeful human activity. Despite being, by the time of writing, the target of terrestrial endeavours for more than six decades, the 21st century is witnessing unparalleled proliferation in the number of actors and technology utilized to widen the number of services provided in and from space. The same is the case for piloted and robotic missions to celestial bodies. While the first person landed on the surface of the Moon on July 24, 1969, no human being has returned to any celestial body since December 1972. Despite that, we can expect a return of piloted mission to the Moon in the 2020s or, at the latest, in the 2030s. Moreover, the sustainability of humanity’s return to the lunar surface is very likely to be much higher, allowing for permanent inhabitation. The incoming era of lunar and Martian colonization, accompanied by the asteroid mining missions, calls for an in-depth understanding of the political interplays behind such a process. An analysis of the power dynamics of the upcoming inner solar system political and economic activities might be introduced utilizing many perspectives focusing on economic, military, legal or normative factors that will play a role in the near and mid-term space settlement efforts. This book, however, strives to provide a holistic geopolitical analysis of the short-to-medium term activities of selected celestial bodies in order to develop the playing field on which the choices of the participating actors are to be made. It connects the spatial dimension and cartographic data with the political background and context of missions that are likely to target the celestial bodies, which are, in the foreseeable future, most likely to become sites of humanity’s non-scientific efforts. It studies how the physical, political and legal environment affects the future of human activity on the three selected most likely candidates for the sustained activity of terrestrial actors – the Moon, Mars and inner solar system asteroids and other smaller objects. It thus follows a large amount of literature dedicated to (geo)political, strategic and military thought on activities on terrestrial orbits and brings it to further reaches of our celestial neighbourhood. DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-1

2 Introduction Throughout this book, an in-depth geopolitical analysis, critical for grounding the academic understanding of the upcoming lunar and deep space missions into the hard realities of geography and politics, is developed and used as a background against which the scenarios of plausible developments that are crucial for the setting up of a strategic approach to inner solar system colonization are identified. Geopolitics as a discipline provides an analysis of the crucial restrictions and possibilities that are necessarily influencing any activity in any domain and region. Realizing that the same determinants are applicable for the deep space missions as they do on Earth should help us protect ourselves from surprises that stem from the “revenge of geography” (Kaplan 2012) that caused numerous issues for the policymakers and academics that disregarded the role of geographic and other “hard” features in the politics following the end of the Cold War. The main argument of the following text is that the choices about the proposed and potential missions to settle or mine celestial bodies in the inner solar system hold clear geographic logic and political consequences that can be best understood through the lenses of geopolitics. Given the lack of technological sophistication, the geographic factors establish very strict limitations on the possible ways forward, limiting the number of plausible scenarios of human activities in the region. Understanding the critical uncertainties and the predetermined factors of the proposed and plausible missions will allow us to draft these scenarios of future developments that should prove useful for mission planning and also an academic inquiry into the decision-making regarding the specific missions. The selection of these three (types of) objects is based on their physical characteristics. First, they are close enough to allow for mid-term considerations about at least the beginning of sustained activities in the form of long-term permanent human settlement or the development of mining operations. The scenarios will be developed for the period of the late 2020s and 2030s, depending on the type of celestial object and followed by longer term projections working with timeframes approximately until the mid-21st century. Second, the natural features of studied objects allow for the sustainable presence of piloted and non-scientific robotic missions. Unlike bodies like Venus or Mercury, these bodies allow for protracted activities using a comparatively lower level of technological progress. Third, there is some predictable reason why space-faring nations might be interested in such missions, including economic benefits, prestige, military advantage or development of self-sustainable settlements. Looking at the inner solar system – the region bounded by the Sun on one side and the asteroid belt on the other – we can identify two important bodies that are left out of the study – planets Venus and Mercury. While both are theoretically reachable and a target of past, present and future scientific missions, they are not suitable targets for any near or mid-term mission with significant political or economic impact. In the case of Venus, this is, despite its size similar to Earth, caused by the violent atmosphere

Introduction 3 that disallows for any practical activities on its surface. Venus is shrouded by a dense atmosphere that creates an extremely hostile environment on its surface due to high temperatures and pressure and enormous concentrations of compounds threatening technology and life. While there is a possibility of establishing flowing habitats in the clouds higher from the surface where the conditions are less inhospitable, such a mission is not projected to occur in the foreseeable future. Mercury is a relatively small object located on orbit close to the Sun, making any activity on its surface and travel to the planet rather difficult. As such, it allows for some limited sustainable activities besides scientific research around its poles but once again, it is not being projected that it will become a target of any politically or economically significant mission any time soon.1 The aim of this work is to capture the upcoming development of habitats, installations and other infrastructure on the Moon, Mars and asteroids from the perspective of geopolitics and to develop forward-looking scenarios of the power contest in the inner solar system. Such a methodological approach will allow us to root the proposed and ongoing missions into hard-power realities and use a methodologically sound, forward-looking perspective to highlight the key points of decisions when it comes to the grand politics of the inner solar system. With the increasing number of operations and planned settlement efforts, we will necessarily witness competition over scarce resources, no matter whether these include access to water, energy resources, some lucrative natural resources or strategically important locations. As all of the prominent space-faring actors plan the missions to these objects, we can expect the heightening of the competition and the realization of the scarcity of many strategic resources on the celestial bodies that are of interest to humanity. The following text provides the readers with the most likely scenarios of the development of sustainable non-scientific projects on the celestial bodies that are to become the targets of piloted and robotic missions in the next two decades. The main body of the text presents, besides the theoreticalmethodological justification for the selection of the geopolitical approach for research of the cases, an in-depth analysis of the main critical uncertainties and predetermined factors that are crucial for the development of the scenarios of the humanities’ activities on the selected bodies. These will include physical, geographical and geological features of the selected objects, as well as the legal and normative framework of outer space activities. The final chapter presenting the scenarios then highlights what will likely be the most crucial points of decision and contention in the process of the colonization of the inner solar system and what choices are to affect our future in the cislunar and deep space the most. The ultimate goal is thus to point to the fact that the settlement and economic activities on the celestial bodies are not a realm of science fiction anymore and that there are clear political choices to be made in the years to come. These decisions are to be necessarily affected by the international

4 Introduction situation and great power competition but are to be done in a determined environmental framework that must be understood in order to prevent irrational behaviour. Additionally, the selected approach highlights how the geographic realities of the inner solar system affect the geopolitical logic behind the settlement efforts, prioritizing some approaches and locations over others, even if popularly preferred targets. Also, said this, the book is not dealing with terrestrial orbital space, where the majority of the contemporary traffic is taking place, and that is, in the studied time period, still remains the most important region of outer space regarding the great power competition. The book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis. As geopolitics constitutes a very shattered academic approach, it is vital to present the specific approach used to develop the consequent analysis and scenarios. Chapter 3 analyses actors relevant to the current era of the space age. Astropolitics is understood as an outgrowth of terrestrial politics and is thus, to a large degree, determined by relations on the Earth. Therefore, the chapter will look at the topic from the perspective of current terrestrial rivalries and cooperative efforts and highlight how these impact the nature of space international relations. In Chapter 4, the text develops the physical context, including the essential features in outer space and the main determinants of the selected celestial objects. Chapter 5 introduces the normative and legal framework of outer space activities as another contextual factor affecting the operations of space-faring nations. The following chapter looks at the roles, specifications and political and other factors affecting the development of outer space colonies. Finally, the upcoming space race analysis is presented, placing all the researched factors together in a coherent analysis and developing scenarios of humanity’s efforts in the inner solar system. Note 1 For the overview of possible settlement activities on these two planets (see Crotts 2014, 401).

References Crotts, A. 2014. The New Moon: Water, Exploration and Future Habitation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaplan, R. D. 2012. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate. New York, NY: Random House.

2

Astropolitics

Geopolitics is a sub-discipline of the social sciences that analyses the spatial distribution of power through interdisciplinary lenses (Glassner 1996, 11–12). However, even this definition would be contested by many in academia and beyond, as the term is still not, and is unlikely ever to be, fully settled. Be it by placing focus on the sub-division of geopolitics under political geography understanding it as a similar form of analysis on a different scale (Hnízdo 1995, 10), by focusing on the study of geostrategically important features, patterns and events (Cohen 2015, 7–9), or making sense of perceptions and makings of the space (Ó Tuathail 1996), it is crucial to dedicate sufficient space to the development of the theoretical and methodological background for the consequent analysis. This chapter thus develops an understanding of the term geopolitics used in this particular book and presents its application and applicability for analysing outer space, including celestial bodies. The term geopolitics originated in 19th-century Europe and was in many circles explicitly abandoned following the Second World War and its misuse by the Nazi regime. However, geopolitical thinking was never completely disqualified, and it managed to be resurrected as an academic discipline as well, with large importance being played by the French journal Hérodote in the process. Consequently, it incorporated the major debates taking place inside the mainstream study of international relations, thus further increasing the width of theoretical assumptions on what geopolitics actually means. Besides its realist and geographically determinist origins, we can also identify a turn towards language in a critical school or a mere softening of the original standpoints in neorealist approaches. In the following chapter, we will first browse through the major strands of geopolitical thinking and consequently apply them to the outer space environment. This will help us develop not only the theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis but also a better understanding of outer space as an operational and strategic domain that will frame the study of the celestial bodies.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-2

6 Astropolitics 2.1  Classical geopolitics The origins of geopolitics as an academic discipline can be traced back to the 19th century and the attempt to derivate the understanding of social processes from existing knowledge of natural sciences, such as biology or geography, even mimicking a similar methodology. For the 19th-century thinkers, only natural sciences were deemed as a science, and human activity was to be understood through the same universalistic prism and methodology as other principles observed in nature. There needed to be some laws that could be applied to the working of society similarly as there are laws that help us understand the working of nature. This led, on the one hand, to a significant simplification in the understanding of the causalities behind social processes, including international politics. Every attempt to develop universal laws tying human activity and geographic conditions was later found to be too simplistic. However, it also set a starting point that led to the development of today’s more nuanced understanding of political communities’ spatial dimension of behaviour. Classical geopolitics thus must stand at the beginning of the development of the theoretical framework for this book. 2.1.1  Organic theory of state

Any insight into the development of geopolitical thought cannot begin anywhere else than with the organic theory of statehood developed by the so-called “German” geopolitical school. It is this school of thought that first brought the term geopolitics into existence and that first explicitly dealt with the spatial characteristics of a state as a political body. It is also an approach that importantly dealt with the state through its power characteristics rather than the legal domain of its existence, analysing the unit, not as a judicial but rather as a political entity. This feature is also vital for many consequent authors and understanding of geopolitics as an analysis of the spatial distribution of power. Despite being primarily tied to Germany, the origin of geopolitics as a term actually lies in Sweden. It was brought to the academic lexicon and later the German academia by Rudolf Kjellen. This origin is tightly connected to the application of the approaches stemming from natural sciences in the social domain that led to the development of the organic analogy for statehood. Kjellen, himself a conservative and a supporter of a strong social state, proposed an extremely exaggerated organic analogy to statehood and tied it to the above-mentioned departure from the juridical thinking about the state to an understanding of a state through the prism of power dynamics. He tied the state to the idea of, unlike some later incarnations not racially based, a nation and propagation of the nationalist agenda and the well-being of a state’s population. Geopolitics then became one of the five domains through which to analyse a state – the other being constitutional order, ethnopolitics, sociopolitics and political economy. Geopolitics in this concept meant analysis of a state’s behaviour in space and was a part of the general study of a state.

Astropolitics 7 As such, it needed to be co-researched with ethnopolitics as a study of the nation-organism that fills the state. This predominance of a state in Kjellen’s thinking about world politics was tied to its strong connection to land, which was not present among other political actors, such as the Church or trade unions. The alternative units were, thus, in his thought, comparatively weaker (Gunneflo 2015). State, for Kjellen, is behaving like an organism filled with a nation that is established through the centuries of common development of the population living on the given territory. The racial basis of the nation is, nonetheless, missing. The principle of territorial expansion is, additionally, also a necessity for some states only, and not all states must seek new territories abroad. Those with enough available unpopulated land for internal colonization should turn inward and not expand as they did not fill the territory they have at their disposal. This category in the 19th century included countries like Russia, the United States or Kjellen’s Sweden. On the other hand, for countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, or Japan, external expansion is necessary. His non-racial understanding of the nation led him to develop an idea of the construction of state blocs or leagues of states that would respect the members’ independence while multiplying their capacities. For Kjellen, the formation of these units would, in the 20th century, become a political and economic necessity (Tunander 2005). Similarly to Kjellen, also Friedrich Ratzel, a second key author tied to the organic theory of the state, rooted his analysis in natural sciences. As such, he highlighted the importance of geographical data for an analysis of a state. Political geography thus became an analysis of a state as a geographical organism acting in a space filled with a population whose characteristics were based on culture and not race. Despite the misuse of Ratzel’s thought for Nazi expansionism, he was, similarly to Kjellen, not operating with race as a relevant factor. Following the organic analogy, the state is, in Ratzel’s thought, composed of its land and people. This connection then creates synergies that turn a state into a superior type of institution. This institution has its body – its land dimension – and soul – its political system. Different levels of development of states present qualitatively divergent types of organisms that we can encounter on the political map (Stogiannos 2017). As human beings are, for Ratzel, driven by the law of expansion and as the state lives of the land, it is sovereign over, it is natural for a state to expand. The spread of the state then follows the spread of its population and is thus limited by some climatic effects. It is also determined by the culture of the people which affects their ability to organize the land. Territorial expansion is then tied to the economic survivability and ability to support its inhabitants. Thus, Ratzel introduced the term Lebensraum as a space needed for the state’s survival. This space is not unlimited, so conflict over territory must occur. The struggle for space is natural, and it is the primary condition of life. As the borders among the European powers seemed stable, Ratzel envisioned this struggle to continue elsewhere, including the Balkans or Africa.

8 Astropolitics Both Kjellen and Ratzel thus explicitly tied population to state and these two to land. They developed an organic analogy that explained the necessity for growth, understood as a territorial expansion, of a state and the necessity of territorial conflict in international relations based on these principles (Stogiannos 2017). According to these two authors, a connection of knowledge from biology and geography should thus allow us to understand the behaviour of and power differences between different states and help us predict which state will prosper and which will die. The connection of the ideas of organic geopolitics to the Nazi regime, as well as the consequent discrediting of the approach on a historical rather than academic basis, is mainly tied to the name of Karl Haushofer, a German general disheartened by the defeat of his country in the First World War. Haushofer found a new purpose in an academic career using his newfound love for Japanese militarism in combination with geopolitical thinking to influence the political elites and strengthen the German state. He utilized the previously developed ideas of autarky, organic analogy, or Lebensraum to educate the Nazi leadership through Rudolf Hess in geopolitical thinking. Through this education, he aimed to put geopolitical thought into practice and return Germany to a position of power. German internal and foreign policies should, according to Haushofer, be based on the geopolitical knowledge that would bring Germany to the front position in international affairs. He mainly focused on the idea of panregions that was, similar to other lessons developed by the organic school, nonetheless, ignored in the practical steps taken as a part of the expansion of Nazi Germany. The terms like Lebensraum were utilized mainly to justify the expansionist policies and not to guide them. Geopolitik was thus used as an academic cover for racist and genocidal policies that were not rooted in even the oversimplified organic theory (Herwig 2016, Tunander 2005, Wolkersdorfer 1999). Despite being tarnished by its misuse by Nazi Germany, the organic theory is the first systematic attempt to develop a knowledge base about the spatial characteristics of a state or political power in general. It attempted to root the understanding of the state’s behaviour in newly acquired knowledge from biology and geography and to adapt the biological principles tied to the prosperity of organisms to the state’s behaviour. However, the principles developed by authors like Kjellen and Ratzel were later utilized as a justification for the genocidal expansionism of Nazi Germany, rather than as a blueprint for systematic expansion and strengthening of the German state as envisioned by Haushofer. Following the end of the Second World War, the organic theory never entered mainstream academic thinking and is generally not considered to be a useful tool to analyse the behaviour of the political actors in space or the relation between the political processes and geography. 2.1.2  Anglo-Saxon tradition

The Anglo-Saxon tradition of classical geopolitics is tightly rooted in the work of Halford Mackinder. Unlike the German continental tradition, the

Astropolitics 9 Anglo-Saxon tradition is more focused on the role of the sea domain in global power distribution and especially on the interplay between land and sea as the two primary geopolitical domains setting up diverse constraints and opportunities. Similar to other classical approaches, the Anglo-Saxon tradition focuses on the key importance of natural conditions and geography on human activity and political processes. Mackinder himself became the author of the very impactful “Pivot” or “Heartland” theory that later affected other authors and, at least implicitly, the Anglo-Saxon policy-making decisions visà-vis the Eurasian landmass for decades to come. Originally called a geographical pivot of history, Heartland was located in the part of Eurasia inaccessible from the sea due to its rivers flowing either into large lakes like the Caspian Sea or frozen waters of the Arctic Ocean. While its exact geographical delimitation changed in different Mackinder’s works, it was always protected against possible invasion from the sea by its geographical position and, given its natural climate, also easily defendable against land invasion as its whole territory regularly freezes. This pivot is geographically determined by its natural connection to the flatlands of Europe, large geographic area and low population density. It was these characteristics that allowed raiding of the European continent by the Mongolian Hordes, and that gave the Asian warriors and massive horse-back armies superior mobility over the settled communities. European communities were, consequently, developed in opposition to this threat coming from Heartland. Nonetheless, the situation changed with technological progress, the introduction of new means of transportation tied to sea travel and new geographic findings – especially the discovery of the Cape Town route to Asia. Suddenly, not only did sea travel become faster and more convenient, but it also allowed the sea powers to connect themselves to the regions inaccessible through the land, including Japan, the Americas and Australia. This gave the advantage to the sea powers, and the power centre shifted towards the ocean realm. However, the power balance between the two main domains shifted again with further technological progress that allowed the land powers to transport supplies, armies, or resources via railroads that were to become superior to sea transport. The technological advancement in the military sphere also, for Mackinder, further enhanced the recovered favourable position of land powers. The inaccessible Heartland, or pivot, thus allows for superior power projection compared to the sea powers that cannot access the core region (Mackinder 1904, 1942). There is, according to Mackinder, a geographical balance between Heartlandic land power – in his times dominated by Russia/Soviet Union – and sea powers. These are, furthermore, divided by the inner crescent, a geographical region that is partially land-based and partially sea-based and is located along the shore of Eurasia. While the source of the power of Heartland power(s) stems from the tight control of landmass in Eurasia – thus making, for example, Russia’s decision to sell Alaska very logical – the sea powers have their advantage in increased mobility over the world ocean. If the superior position of Heartland power were to unite with the sea realm, for example,

10 Astropolitics through the alliance of Russia and Germany, the German conquest of Heartland, or Chinese domination of the same region, the power potential of such a unit would allow the unit to dominate the course of the global events. By the nature of its geography and resources, Heartland is dominant and must be contained (Mackinder 1904, 1942). This was the reason why Mackinder prescribed a policy of geographical division between Western Europe and Russia. He called for active British support to the solution of the historical dispute between the Germans and the Slavic nations. The answer was to promote the right of the Slavic nations to external self-determination, thus setting up independent states between Russia and Germany that would provide a geographical barrier between the two entities (Mackinder 1942). As East Europe was the region where these nations were to appear and as it is essentially a part of Heartland, Mackinder sets up his famous quote, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World” (Mackinder 1942, 106). Not only must the alliance between Germany and Russia be prevented, but Germany must also be prevented from conquering Heartland. While we can clearly identify a historical context in this prescription, what this line of thought tells us is that Mackinder was very conscious of the division between sea and land sources of power and was aware of the challenges the combination of these two would bring to the superiority of the sea powers, primarily his native Britain. Mackinder’s ideas were further revisited by the Dutch-American scholar Nicholas Spykman, who amended the theory in two ways. First, he looked at the issue primarily from the United States´ and not the British perspective. Second, he in his concept decreased the importance of Heartland for the development of global politics by measuring the power potential of different regions. While still placing the foremost priority on the role of geography as the most stable feature of international politics, Spykman is less deterministic about its role. He looks at geography as a factor that presents political communities with different choices and limits rather than only factor deciding the faith of nations. Taking this all into account, he stressed the role of Rimland – the region located around Heartland at the shore of Eurasia – as a critical geographic location deciding global dominance. For him, this was true not only throughout the Second World War but also universally. He advocated for a policy that would prevent an adversary, mainly the Soviet Union, from uniting Rimland – practically meaning East Asia and Europe – as this would allow it to dominate Eurasia as a whole and, consequently, the globe. The United States were advised to focus on post-war support of Japan, setting up military bases in Rimland countries, establishing alliances with Rimland powers and preventing the unification of Rimland by any hostile power(s) (Wilkinson 1985). This led him to rephrase the famous Mackinder’s quote to “Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world” (Spykman 1944, 43, cited in Wilkinson 1985, 108).

Astropolitics 11 The classical Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics thus refocuses on the interaction between different domains – in this case, land and a sea. It draws attention to the different characteristics of these two and, importantly, to the impact of technology on the role of geography in international politics and power distribution. Its impact on the development of the theoretical basis for this work is limited by its focus on Eurasia and specific historical context. Still, as we will see later on, the insight into the role of geography was extrapolated by different authors writing on other particular issues, including astropolitics. While being affected by the specific historical context of the first half of the 20th century, the basic features of the Heartland theory are essential for the development of the geopolitical theory even beyond Cold War and the confines of the Blue Planet. 2.1.3  Beyond land

Finally, there is a set of classical texts dedicated to geopolitical thought beyond the realm of land domain. Inside the classical stream, this would include works on the role of sea and air domains on the power projection capabilities of states or possibly other geopolitical actors. While the analysis of the sea domain is in this respect mainly tied to the 19th century and the work of Alfred Mahan, the thinking on air domain was, for logical reasons, developed only in the first half of the 20th century as a reflection of the technological progress in aviation and utilization of aeroplanes in the conduct of warfare. Alfred Mahan was a US naval officer and military theoretician. His work on the history of naval battles led him to the identification of several flashpoints that reappear in the struggles on and over the ocean. Based on a vast historical introduction, Mahan developed the influential idea of chokepoints that form determinants of the movement over the seas and conflict over maritime supremacy. Control over seas is itself crucial for Mahan because he identifies the sea as a superior domain for transportation both due to the speed and safety of the maritime routes and thus consequently for power projection as well. Sea thus establishes a form of vast highway that can be controlled through several vital chokepoints. This highway ties the military and commercial uses of the oceanic transport. Military and commercial vessels are thus interconnected to each other. Every prospective sea power needs to develop safe seaports that will allow it to operate on high seas even at times of war. If a state is capable of maintaining uninterrupted access to the world ocean, it establishes superior power projection capabilities to the land powers. For a sea power to operate effectively, it needs to prevent the adversary from challenging its role militarily – meaning be able to destroy the enemy’s military navy – while keeping the maritime trade running. In this case, it will keep obtaining profit from the exchange of goods without unnecessary disruptions. Status of sea power can be obtained by a state that holds a specific combination of geographic and political features: access to a sea with geographic protection against land invasion; effective utilization of

12 Astropolitics such access; sufficiently long coastline with enough population centres settling it; sufficient amount of population readily available for sea operations; a maritime spirit of the nation; and suitable governance structure – the freer the society, the more sustainable are the naval operations. According to Mahan and his criteria, the United States was thus in the 19th century in a position to succeed the United Kingdom as the maritime and, therefore, a global hegemon (Mahan 1890). While the organic and Heartland theories favoured the dominant role of land and Mahan the key role of seas, the beginning of the 20th century brought an introduction of a new domain into strategic thinking – air. This domain was eventually by some authors identified as the key to global dominance. One of these authors was Giulio Douhet, whose thinking on the role of air warfare came during his life through a significant shift. He began with applying Mahan’s thought on the air realm, thus advocating for the necessity of controlling the air domain. Such control would bring an actor an ultimate power projection capability. Air power thus needs to have access to technology that would allow it to control the air as the domain itself will enable it to dominate the others. He, at first, advocated the utilization of air for the attacks on the lines of communications that would disallow the adversary to maintain any movement on the land or seas. However, he later shifted his works towards the advocacy of the massive bombing of the population centres. Douhet identified war as the pursuit of the whole society, of every aspect of a state. As he maintained the precondition that bombers and aeroplanes, in general, cannot be stopped from the ground, it was to be more efficient to target the centres that support the war effort rather than the battlefronts themselves. The utilization of incendiary bombs and gas deployed from air was to hold the potential to destroy the whole population centres, thus disallowing the adversary to win the war (Hippler 2013). This line of thought was not abandoned after Douhet. In the US tradition it was most famously followed by Aleksander De Seversky, who also realized the potential of the airpower for the future of power contest. He warned against fortress thinking in the United States and highlighted the appearance of the “air ocean” that allowed for an uninterrupted movement. With the new technological developments, the United States would no longer be protected by the two oceans, thus losing much of its geographic advantage. Due to the ability of air bombers to annihilate large population centres and the impossibility to hold a defensive posture in the air, the United States must get involved in offensive air operations in order to keep the enemy air forces away from its territory. De Seversky, additionally, presented a new reading of the map, including measurement of the distance in the time needed to traverse it rather than in units of length. He also highlighted the 360° perspective of the world map, including previously inaccessible polar regions that became relevant in the age of aeroplanes as the polar regions ceased to be impenetrable. The dominance over the air domain newly presents, according to De Seversky, a key factor for power projection – the sea has lost its role

Astropolitics 13 as the navy can no longer compete with air technology (De Seversky 1942). From the perspective of the Cold War, this line of thought led to reimagining of the reading of the map of the world, including the polar perspective that became the shortest route between the USSR and the United States, thus placing the Arctic into the spotlight of the strategic thinking. While the authors generally overstretched the role of their respective domains for power projection purposes, they still present very important insights. The identification of chokepoints is crucial for strategic thinking on the seas, but also outer space, up until today. The new perspective gained with the inclusion of air travel further disturbed the static vision of the world and gave the thinkers and practitioners a new, truly global perspective that must be kept in the account. Additionally, all of the thinkers highlighted the importance of technological development for our understanding of the spatial dimension of political processes and the impact of geography on the power projection capabilities. The role of geography is thus no longer seen as static but dependent upon technological progress, which is especial for the analysis of air power. While it is not empirically justifiable to claim that conflicts would be winnable from air only, the new technological developments clearly changed the importance and role of distance and geography and allowed for new regions and readings of the map to affect geopolitical thought. 2.2  Post-classical geopolitics Despite the near-total obliteration of the explicit geopolitical thinking from academia following the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, the geopolitical thought and understanding of the role of geography for political processes remained highly relevant throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War environment. It happened first through its influence on a development of the foreign policy and later even in its return to academic discourse. It was rooted in the geographically informed, yet no longer geographically deterministic, analysis of the power distribution in the world. It also took into account various other factors like history, culture or demography. This stream of thought that was developed throughout many works relevant for the postclassical geopolitical thinking includes vast number of authors. This section will present just a sample of those, focusing on explicit geopolitical analysis in the post–Cold War setting of international politics and some works stressing other environmental and societal factors relevant to the study of contemporary relations of politics and space. 2.2.1  Explicit geopolitical thought

In the first part, we will cover three works that explicitly work with geopolitics as an academic discipline and analytical tool. The three are selected to present different approaches to geopolitical analysis that appeared from the post–Cold War environment. While Brzezinski’s work directly follows

14 Astropolitics Mackinder’s and Spykman’s approach, Kaplan strains further away from the tradition, and Cohen develops a new methodology to analyse spatial relations globally. The first author mentioned here directly applies Mackinder’s and Spykman’s thoughts on the post–Cold War environment. In his The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski, reworked these theoretical assumptions for the political context of the 1990s. For Brzezinski, Eurasia establishes a chessboard on which the power competition among the great powers is being played. Europe is turning from an actor into a playing field due to the two world wars. As the development of nuclear weapons made a direct confrontation among great powers impossible, three fronts appeared in Eurasia, where the indirect competition takes place instead – Europe, East Asia, and Central Asia that emerged as a new region of competition through the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan. The United States as a dominant global power is present in the game thanks to its alliance with (western) Europe. The power in the game is then measured by military, economic, technological and cultural factors that were all, by the mid-1990s, according to Brzezinski, dominated by the United States. The United States established a global network of which they are the central node. The geopolitical competition is global as well, but it is being played on the Eurasian landmass – the grand chessboard of world politics. The competition is being played among geostrategic players that project power outside their borders with a crucial role of geopolitical pivots – countries vulnerable due to their location and limited capabilities. Central Asia establishes a position of Eurasian Balkans being located among great powers while remaining internally weak. It is the critical battleground because Europe is a natural ally of the United States, and East Asia is being dominated by China that by the 1990s was still not yet on an entirely determined course of future political development. This also leaves Russia locked between these pivots (Brzezinski 1997). The book thus presents a redrawing of the classical geopolitical imperatives on the role of Eurasian landmass in the global power distribution with a focus on the role of great powers’ conflict in the regions with limited power potential. It additionally ties the traditional measurements of power to geography in the post–Cold War context of the crumbled bipolarity that shows the utility of the traditional geopolitical thinking in changing context. The second work mentioned here that directly follows classical geopolitical thought developed inside the Anglo-Saxon school is Robert Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography. Kaplan points to the loss of geographic knowledge and understanding of the role of the environment in the political processes as primary contributors to the failed US policies, mainly in the Middle East. He revisits classical geopolitics in its focus on the role of geography. Still, he softens the deterministic approach by placing it into a position in which it, together with history, sets a context inside which the political processes take place. Kaplan highlights that the broad public, including decision-makers, throughout the Cold War overfocused on the importance of non-geographic,

Astropolitics 15 mainly ideological, divisions, like the Berlin Wall, forgetting about the geographical, cultural, and historical factors. These are taking their revenge in the events of the 1990s and 2000s. For the actors to be successful, control of territory, especially in its peripheries, is crucial. Geography is stable and vital for the unravelling of political processes. On the other hand, our perceptions of it might be misleading due to the distortions in the maps. For the proper understanding of the political processes in different regions and for setting up policies towards these, geographical, historical and cultural contexts must be understood appropriately (Kaplan 2012). Kaplan thus provides a blueprint for contextually oriented analysis of political processes. We should also pay attention to the seminal work on geopolitical analysis developed by Saul Cohen. He presented a geopolitical structure of the world as being dynamic and hierarchical. He divided the map of the world into three levels of analysis, comprising of geopolitical realms, geopolitical regions, and states and other autonomous entities. Besides this structure, there are other groupings that do not fit any region/realm. Most relevant of such extra-systemic groupings are the shatterbelts that are unstable and compressed between pressures from external actors that steer these regions in different ways. Furthermore, Cohen identifies two main geopolitical settings, marital and land, and these two have their specific geopolitical features that define them. The states are hierarchically ordered according to their power in the system in five categories that are, nonetheless, dynamic. The five categories are major powers possessing global influence, second-order states as regional powers, third-order states that affect regional affairs by some special treat, fourth-order states are having minimal impact on regional affairs, and fifth-order states that are incapable of sustaining themselves. One specific type of states and regions are the so-called gateways state/regions that allow for connection between different parts of the world are thus crucial for mobility (Cohen 2015). Therefore, Cohen also works with the role of geography and power to understand the political processes and presents a method for analysing global power distribution. As evident from this brief overview, the postclassical approach is firmly rooted in the geographic reading of political processes. Geographical limits are, nonetheless, to a degree softened by the introduction of other factors like demography or culture. The analysis is rooted in a state-centric vision of the world, however, informed by the unevenness of the power distribution or, in some cases, the capacity of the states to control their territory. These works are thus important for analysing the geographic factors and their influence on the power projection capabilities and political processes in general. They also show us that the traditional factors of analysis need to be kept in mind even in a transformed political and technological environment and might be applicable to different domains. The approach thus highlights the necessity to analyse power distribution in space and changes in the power dynamics and geographic manifestation no matter the domain and historical period.

16 Astropolitics 2.2.2  History, environment and political processes

Besides the explicit geopolitical thought, we can also identify numerous works that analysed the impact of factors relevant for the authors mentioned above and their importance of the political processes. These need to be briefly examined as they present a set of non-geographic data necessary to fully grasp the role of contextual factors for the political processes in the current global politics and are crucial for developing the theoretical and methodological background for the consequent analysis. The first factor that is crucial for the current outlook of global geopolitical setting is historical development. There are numerous authors dealing with the historical development of the current international political system. These different authors highlighted factors like the development of the military forces and warfighting (Tilly 1975, 1990) or economic systems (Wallerstein 2004) as the key factors affecting the political processes, but they generally agree that we cannot understand the current political system as static and given. The process of evolution of the political systems was not ended by the development of the modern state system or by the end of Cold War bipolar competition. It is also uneven, creating different types of political communities with unequal interdependencies. While the world-system analysis school of thought looks at the development of this unevenness through the prism of capitalist exchange and the existence of centre-periphery relations (Wallerstein 2004), the security-centred approach deals with the process of state-building in reaction to external threats and warfare (Tilly 1975, 1990). Due to the impact of the violent interaction among political units, some parts of the world system developed into effective states, institutionally tying their territories, population and resources with the state, while others, historically not sustainably challenged and after the Second World War, internationally protected, states were not forced to take such a step (Herbst 1989, Jackson and Rosberg 1982). What is crucial is that the historical development is not at its end. We can see further development and differentiation, currently highly dependent on the ability of units to participate in networking among the political communities (Friedrichs 2001). Also, decreased competence of many states to control their territory is in many parts of the world becoming a norm. This leads to the point when the outlook of the political map is uneven with the appearance of qualitatively different types of geopolitical environments (Doboš 2020) that will be further affected by historical and contextual factors. The historical development thus, according to this approach, plays a critical role in our understanding of different regions, and various future settings are to be expected to appear. Changes in the natural environment constitute another factor that increasingly came to the attention of the authors dealing with the future development of the spatial political organization of societies and power distribution inside the global system. However, the possible political impact of issues like water scarcity, overpopulation, or the spread of diseases are far from being

Astropolitics 17 discovered in the past couple of years. We may return to the 1990s when already cited Robert Kaplan presented his Coming Anarchy thesis as a vision of the incoming collapse of the world order rooted in environmental degradation. His outlook was informed by his travels across Western Africa. He envisioned the challenges faced by this region to spread worldwide, leaving the majority of the population searching for the essential means of sustenance and a minority living in relative luxury (Kaplan 1994). Upon correction on his original argument 25 years upon making it, Kaplan further highlights how the environmental factors, together with the rise of the population and shrinking of the world due to the technological progress, developed into a formidable challenge for the stability of the international system (Kaplan 2018). It is quite obvious that the environmental factors also play a crucial role in the spatial dimension of political processes and that the effects of climate change and related processes will heavily impact not only the worst affected regions but also the stability of the global geopolitical system and its actors. It is also clear that a power distribution inside this system will be affected by such shifts. They might even lead to the point of disappearance of certain unfortunate states altogether (Ker-Lindsay 2016). As such, environmental factors must also be taken into account. We must also look at the role of culture for geopolitical considerations and analysis. One of the authors that dealt with the issue was Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations develops an analytical scope that divides the world into nine civilizations – Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, African, Latin American, Sinic, and Japanese – that guide the relations among different communities and create the fundamental division of the world into basic components of geopolitical analysis. The relations among these civilizations are not equal, meaning that some dyads establish more cooperative or conflicting relations. Also, these civilizations cannot be defined by the same traits. Every one of them holds some specific set of features that are crucial for their self-identification. The internal functioning of the civilizations also differs regarding centralization, organization and coherence. While the Orthodox civilization is quite clearly dominated by Russia, the Islamic one has no single power centre, and the African civilization is not yet clearly developed. However, Huntington claimed that his model allows us to spot the fault lines that establish the conflict zones for the post–Cold War world (Huntington 1996). While the specifics of Huntington’s theory were often criticized, it points at the importance of yet another factor that must be taken into account in order to understand the global politics and relations among and behaviour of the geopolitical actors – systems of belief and self-identification. Cultural factors thus also must be regarded as a factor affecting the current geopolitical system. The non-geographic factors play an important role in further understanding the geopolitical system. They differentiate among different regions and help us nuance our understanding of the political processes that would not be fully grasped just by the connection of geography and politics on a global

18 Astropolitics scale. To this end, the works that are not explicitly dealing with geopolitics but study these non-geographic factors establish a crucial set of knowledge that is extremely useful to develop a methodology to analyse geopolitical settings in any domain or region. Even if some of the predictions and claims are proven incorrect or too strong, they still hold crucial insights. 2.2.3  Impact of networking

Finally, it is necessary to cover some basic perspectives that focus on the role of networks and globalized, interconnected economic systems in the post– Cold War world as these are often perceived as challenging the relevance of geopolitical analysis in particular and the role of geography for the political processes in general. It is undoubtedly the case that the technological progress tied to the process of globalization is enhancing the power of networks and the effectiveness of non-military means of power projection. Nonetheless, it is far from certain whether these processes have the potential to nullify the validity of the geopolitical analysis as well as the role of traditional means of evaluating power and its global distribution. We will look at two issues tied to this debate. The first is the development of a concept of geoeconomics as a stream of thought aiming to replace geopolitics in the era of globalization. The second is the debate between Connectography and Teichopolitics as two explanations for the changes in international politics in the 21st century. Edward Luttwak, a prominent propagator of geoeconomics, pointed at the fact that in the post–Cold War environment, the role of the military might weaken. However, this does not mean that the world would be turning away from conflict to a setting determined by free exchange and cooperation only. It also does not mean that non-state actors would necessarily overcome the role of states in the international system. According to Luttwak, what is changing are the means and tools with which the conflict is held. Instead of traditional military means, the core of the competition will be held via economic means. Additionally, the causes of conflict are also increasingly rooted in the economy instead of politics. Consequently, private entities are increasingly utilized to support state goals as possessors of economic tools that might be used to propel national goals (Luttwak 1990). Geoeconomics is thus a system of thought analysing strategic use of economic tools, including regulatory measures, the rise of state capitalism and multipolar development of economic governance (Vihma 2018). Geoeconomics is not a new phenomenon. While it is more efficient compared to territorial military advances, it does not replace geopolitics but operates beside it. As such, it develops tools to analyse international politics as well as methods to be used by decision-makers. Geoeconomics is dependent on the centrality of the state. It is not conditioned by restrictions that are placed on the use of military power, including the democratic peace – even democracies might compete utilizing geoeconomic tools (Csurgai 2018). While geoeconomics assumes a shift in the use of tools in the competition among states in

Astropolitics 19 the international arena, it does not challenge the basic logic of geopolitical analysis – states competing for power inside the global system. It just identifies more efficient means of conducting such a competition reflective of the technological progress and spread and deepening of globalization. A different picture is drawn by Parag Khanna in his Connectography. For Khanna, connections overcame geography as a destiny of human societies, and if we want to understand the dynamics of the political processes, we must focus on connections instead of geography. The global economy increasingly demands the construction of new connections and infrastructure, and competition over these is determining the conflict lines among states. Such a conflict is, nonetheless, less heated than a conquest over territorial borders. Territorial borders are, additionally, more porous as they are being penetrated by the connections. Connections are also changing the meaning of geography – they try to use the geographical features to their advantage and make the distance less relevant. As such, we gain a more accurate picture of global affairs through an analysis of the globe through functional rather than political geography. International politics is increasingly shaped around supply chains that also affect population distribution through enhancing the process of urbanization. The impact of supply chains leads to the outcome that favours not the actor who controls the land but the one who can use it. The role of sovereignty is decreasing. This process will in the future only strengthen and lead to further devolution in order to organize space to maximize the effectiveness of the system along the lines of connections. It will lead to the creation of optimal units of production that will be organized in larger structures efficient for other purposes. In effect, the global competition will be led over means of connectivity and not traditional power factors (Khanna 2016). Such a view can, however, be complementary to the conventional reading of international affairs. Nonetheless, what is crucial is to take the connections into account as they play an increasingly important role and to develop the foreign policy strategy based on this reading of international affairs (Slaughter 2017). As it plants itself contrary to this outlook, we must also briefly skim through the theory of Teichopolitics. Rosier and Jones, in their work, presented a different picture of the world – a world divided between sovereign states, separated by an increased number of border barriers and further subdivided by similar means inside their societies along the socio-economic hierarchies in forms of gated communicates and other forms of protected zones. They point to the fact that states are increasingly attempting to control the flows across their borders and thus focus on the border-hardening process. This is the reason for the naming of the approach as teichos – a city wall in ancient Greek. The states are restricting the flows according to the product transported. According to the authors, the movement of raw materials is less regulated compared to human migration or trade with finished products. They thus identify the key role of economic disparities in the emergence of border barriers (Rosiere and Jones 2012). The explanation through economic

20 Astropolitics logic only, nonetheless, is not accurate on its own. It must be understood along with the security considerations – attempts to protect the country’s sovereignty – and identity development. Border hardening thus serves as a method to divide a society from the exterior (Mičko and Riegl 2020). Additionally, the border hardening process might be understood as a reaction of states that are losing their role in an increasingly unified world. It might be interpreted as a final attempt to protect the vital signs of sovereignty from being shifted at the international level while not affecting the pooling of the non-essential features (Pusterla and Piccin 2012). The impact of networking and globalization on international politics cannot be overlooked. What is disputed is its specific impact on power distribution. Debates over the role of geography, supply chains, cyberspace and border walls will continue, and it is impossible to cast a final verdict at this point. What is important for the analysis in this book is to note the importance of economic tools of power struggle and the impact of networking on the strategies of different actors while not overstating their transformative effect. 2.3  Critical geopolitics Geopolitical thought did not avoid the so-called turn to language that impacted the political and social sciences in general. While the classical and post-classical approaches dealt with the impact of the physical environment on power distribution, the critical approaches looked at how the environment is being produced and understood by various actors. The critical approach thus brought a new perspective and identified new factors that affect the political processes. We will thus look at the critical and anti-geopolitical streams that will help us to understand many terms and factors related to geopolitical processes that are overlooked by other schools of thought. This section will also look at the attempt to unite classical and critical approaches in systemic geopolitics. 2.3.1  Critical and anti-geopolitics

Exhausting the whole width of critical geopolitical thought would take up hundreds of pages. This section, however, limits its aims at the identification of its main foundations in order to add to the many ideas brought by the works mentioned above. Our probe into the critical geopolitical thought must start with the analysis of geography as a tool of power. Ó Tuathail provided a different reading of the geographical knowledge from that utilized by the classical approaches. Instead of using geographical knowledge as a neutral approach to analysing space, he works with the word geo-graphing – earthwriting. The central governments or the actors in the position of power are producing idealized maps that project their vision of division of space that often contests with lived geographies of the local population, establishing

Astropolitics 21 competing cartographies of certain places. Map-making is essential for the strengthening of centralized power over a state, and modern cartography was important to divide space among European powers and later globally. It was not a method to capture realities on the ground but rather a tool of a division of space and centralization of states. Classical geopolitics is criticized for being based on a Eurocentric colonial perspective that does not recognize the importance of maps and cartography as such tools while treating the knowledge as neutral (Ó Tuathail 1996). Critical geopolitics works with the perspective that maps send a clear, concrete vision of the world, and popular maps further enhance the specific views of the globe (Agnew 2003). (Neo)classical geopolitical traditions are, according to critical geopolitics, setting up a specific vision of the world stemming from the Western perspective and historical experience. Critical geopolitics is in this respect an examination of the geographical assumptions, designations and understandings that enter into the making of world politics. The modern visualizations of the globe are developed and were established throughout history. This vision is even more troubled due to the long-standing perception of the borderlands of the maps as chaotic and dangerous that places many regions into predetermined disadvantaged positions (Agnew 2003). This perception consequently justifies interventionist policies and other attempts of the Western political actors to get involved around the world (Slater 2004). Critical geopolitics deals with how the projections, perceptions and discourses about places are being developed (Ó Tuathail 1996), how the geopolitical reasoning, on different levels, establishes the (strategic) significance of different places and features (Dodds 2003). An important role of critical geopolitics lies in its deconstruction of terminology utilized to describe international politics and dig deeper into its meanings. One of the examples of such research is Agnew’s work on sovereignty and globalization. He dislodges the term sovereignty from a territory, pointing at the fact that the two terms are not necessarily connected, and many practices are sovereign and non-territorial, like the US anti-terrorist practices. In the same work, Agnew also points at five myths on globalization. These include the claim that the world is flat, when in fact many places are disconnected; that globalization is new, while it can be traced at least to the 16th century; that it is tied to neoliberalism, when in fact it is an outcome of the US foreign policy and successful actors are clearly utilizing state economic policies; that it is opposed to the welfare state, even though there are no data supporting the claim; and that there is no alternative course of action. Agnew finally brings into light the limits of the vision of global politics through the prism of national territorial states divided by clearly demarcated borders into sovereign entities having distinct domestic and foreign policies, dubbing such thinking as a territorial trap (Agnew 2009). A crucial role is additionally given to the perceptions of geopolitical actors. These perceptions contain not only the role of geography but also the relationship to other actors and one’s role in the geopolitical system. The

22 Astropolitics geopolitical imaginations are rooted in historical encounters (Agnew 2003) and might be distorting the understanding of other actors and societies. These perceptions are, nonetheless, not necessarily rooted in historical experience but are also actively developed either through a long-term process of education or through manipulation of public perceptions of specific actors or events by the government interventions (see Foxall 2019) or other means that does not necessarily have to be tied to a state’s administration. Historical imaginations can then lead to contemporary simplifications such as orientalism (Said 1977) or occidentalism (Buruma and Margalit 2004) that generate tensions rooted in projections of stereotypes that might develop thought systems establishing seemingly irreconcilable conflicts. The analysis of the discourses behind power politics led some authors to cross from the critical to the anti-geopolitical realm. Anti-geopolitics presents the justification for resistance against the power centres and is also involved in its practice. As such, it has a long history, including, for example, parts of the anti-communist movements in eastern Europe throughout the Cold War. Currently, it is more closely tied to the opposition to neoliberal policies and the globalization process among groups like the Mexican Zapatistas. Still, it can also be identified in counter-hegemonic struggles in places like Tibet or Hong Kong. Anti-geopolitics, in this sense, works against power incursions not only by states but also multinational corporations and other actors. It establishes a culture of opposition. This culture ties local and global dimensions, setting up global movements covering local topics and localizing global struggles (Routledge 2003). Anti-geopolitics is thus a critique of classical geopolitical thinking turned into action. Critical approaches allow us to identify non-physical factors that must be taken into consideration when analysing power distribution. First, it is the role of perceptions regarding physical features. While geographical features remain stable, their role might change in the eyes of the (geo)political actors. Similarly, naming of places and mapping the world is not neutral but presents a particular specific reading of the features that itself might be conflicting with perceptions of other actors. Finally, it is crucial to understand perceptions of the other actors and oneself to grasp the decision-making and its spatial projections fully. All in all, critical geopolitics makes us care more about the language tied to the study of geopolitics. 2.3.2  Systemic geopolitics

Nonetheless, even the critical approach to studying the spatial dimension of political processes have undergone its own critique. For example, according to Haverluk, Beauchemin, and Mueller, contemporary critical geopolitics became too politicized and strayed away from academic vigour. They identify three main flaws in critical geopolitics that must be addressed. First, critical geopolitics is anti-geopolitical, meaning that it is anti-influential. As such, the thoughts cannot have a major impact outside of a small circle of

Astropolitics 23 academicians and cannot be used for foreign policy purposes. Second, critical geopolitics is anti-cartographic. Maps are presented as a resource to be criticized without providing any meaningful alternative on how to address the spatial issues. Finally, critical geopolitics is anti-environmental in the sense that it refuses to utilize environmental factors to explain social phenomena. The environment is, in this sense, only an anthropogenic issue. While bringing important ideas, critical geopolitics must also be overcome (Haverluk, Beauchemin and Mueller 2014). As both classical and critical approaches hold their strengths and shortcomings, it is helpful to look at a way to unite the perspectives (Kelly 2006). Such a way forward might be identified in a systemic approach to geopolitics. A systemic approach to political science was first developed by David Easton (1957) and was later grasped by authors dealing with other than just the domestic dimension of politics. The attempts to understand the inner working of the system led to attempts to divide it into several parts that interact with each other. Such an approach to systemic geopolitics was undertaken, for example, by Gerard Dussuoy. His reading of geopolitics is non-teleological, thus giving no meaning to the course of history while simultaneously being stochastic, thus understanding history as being dependent on large-impact events. It is furthermore based on several fundamental axioms – rejection of historical developmentalism; understanding of a system as a constellation of participants with intentions and capabilities; centres of power being movable and different according to criteria, such as military, economy, or culture; and a dichotomy between objective geopolitical infrastructure and a system of representations by actors. The logic of a system based around specific spatial forms such as territory or networks sets limits to actors’ decisions. He then divides the cartographic projection of space into five different maps that should be analysed separately and consequently put together to discover interactions and interdependencies among them. These five include the physical map projecting the most stable picture including geographical features or presence of resources, demo-political space covering the distribution and characteristics of the population, diplomatic-military field overviewing the “high politics”, socio-economic field mainly identifying important production sites and other economic centres, and symbolic field analysing projections, symbols or other cultural traits. The relative importance of these fields changes in time and might change in relation to a single significant event, as was the case for the end of the Cold War that decreased the importance of the diplomatic-military field and increased the impact of the socio-economic field. The method developed by Dussuoy can be replicated on any scale and in any domain (Dussuoy 2010). An alternative approach to analysing the geopolitical system covered here is introduced in the writings of Jacques Lévy. He presented the world system as being composed of four different types of systems that have been developing historically but are currently to be found existing simultaneously in time, yet not in space. The first system is the grouping of the world that is

24 Astropolitics characterized by a presence of atomized societies with no contact with each other. Currently, this type of system is extremely limited and can be found among the indigenous people living in remote regions like the Amazon jungle or some islands in the Indian or Pacific Ocean. The second type of system is called the field of forces in which the space is divided among territorially demarcated states that oppose each other and are in conflict over the domination of the space. Third, Levy identifies a system named hierarchical network that is based on a transaction that leads to unevenness in the system rooted in capitalist exchange. The fourth type of system that appears in the international system is the world as a society that uses technology to remove distances at the global level and is based on communication among actors. It sets up a cultural community, political identity and economic integration of the system in which different parts are equal. Analysis of different regions through this prism allows us to grasp better the processes taking place (Lévy 2000). Systemic geopolitics thus develops methods that seeks to unify classical and critical approaches and identify the crucial criteria that would allow us to study any geopolitical system. They try to present the approach as a methodology to guide the authors to dig into factors that are crucial for understanding geopolitical processes without attempting to actively change them or give them some deeper teleological meaning. Systemic geopolitics thus might be perceived as the next synthetic step in the development of geopolitical thought. 2.4 Astropolitics Outer space was for a long time free of the power struggles as the population of Earth was too technologically backward to conduct operations above the atmosphere. Entered for the first time only in 1942 by a V2 rocket that crossed the 100-kilometre Kármán line and with the first orbital flight taking place in 1957, the domain was for a long time understood as a unique environment free of terrestrial conflicts and power contest. With the fastening of the space race by the end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, this mirage turned largely false as the competition in military affairs and over prestige entered the domain. It is, nonetheless, still reflected in the normative background of international treaties. With the increasing capabilities of a larger number of actors to operate in outer space, the theoretical assumptions behind the space activities needed to be deepened and updated. In the following section, we will look at several texts that applied different approaches to geopolitical analysis on the outer space domain. Any debate on the geopolitical thought on outer space must begin with Dolman’s works on Astropolitik (Dolman 1999, 2002). His theoretical model is based on classical geopolitics and its application to the physical realities of outer space. As such, it is rooted in the realist understanding of global politics and belief in the inevitability of conflict. Dolman identifies essential physical

Astropolitics 25 features that determine the future strategic environment. These features include the principles and specifics of orbital movement, the relative stability of Lagrange libration points, the impact of gravity wells on movement or the restrictions caused by the presence of Van Allen radiation belts. He brought to attention the fact that outer space is not an empty domain but actually holds its specific topography based on gravitational interactions. The key strategic features are the tops of gravity wells that allow for the domination of places “below”, and it is a military necessity for any nation to prevent the domination of these locations by others. Dolman brings his focus on the importance of the so-called “ultimate high ground”, and this leads him to the prescription of the establishment of liberal Pax Americana on orbits. Any actor dominating orbits will dominate places below, and the only responsible actor to be vested with such power are the United States. Dolman divides outer space into four regions – Terra, Earth space, lunar space, and solar space, with the Earth always in the centre of any thoughts on future political and economic utilization of the domain. This terracentric approach is, nonetheless, common among the authors writing on astropolitics. His basic logic is summed up in the rephrasing of the Mackinder’s quote on the importance of Eastern Europe – “Who controls low-Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind” (Dolman 2002, 6–7). The primary importance of Dolman’s work on astropolitics arguably lies in the detabooisation of the application of realist (neo)classical power analysis on the domain of outer space. He presented the basic strategic dilemmas that are tied to the activity in the domain and detailed the astrophysical characteristics that develop the “geography” of outer space that is crucial for any geopolitical analysis. In the context of the previous chapters, we can identify his work fitting the category of classical approaches in two ways. First, it explicitly works with concepts and terminology developed by classical geopolitical theorists. Second, it defines outer space as an ultimate domain through which an actor can dominate terrestrial politics. This is, in essence, very similar to the discussed works on the role of air from the first half of the 20th century. Outer space was also analysed from the post-classical perspective. One author fitting this stream is Sheng-Chih Wang, who, in the analysis of transatlantic space relations, discusses different theoretical frameworks capable of explaining the dynamics of international space politics. In the research, neorealism is identified as the most potent explanatory tool helping identify the key variables as opposed to more liberal or normative approaches. Wang, in his study, identifies that space realism, unlike the predictions by normative schools of thought, correctly captures the periods of convergence and competition between Europe and the United States in the space arena. Wang thus claims that the interactions among states in outer space affairs are closely reflective of their terrestrial relations. However, given the low level of technological development, the relations tend to be less conflicting. We can

26 Astropolitics observe a higher level of cooperation due to the high price of space operations (Wang 2013). Similarly, Bleddyn Bowen identifies the need to present a spacepower theory that would reflect the need for a comprehensive understanding of outer space from the realist perspective. He operates with the seapower analogy to develop his thought, but unlike some other authors, he does not use an analogy with the blue navy operations but rather with the coastline waters. This is, according to Bowen, a much more accurate approximation that allows for the development of theoretical tools to analyse the space strategy. Amending the analogy, he also takes into account the constraints on spacepower of space actors and refuses claims on the possibility of dominating the Earth from orbits as similar claims were not true regarding seapower or airpower. Thus, Bowen again presents a theoretical framework that falls into a postclassical approach, however with a focus on military operations, and helps with the grasping of the political processes in (outer) space (Bowen 2020). Outer space is, nonetheless, also discussed by the authors utilizing the critical perspective on the analysis of geopolitics. Havercroft and Duvall, in their writing, directly criticize the assumptions of E. Dolman about the establishment of the US hegemony on orbits. Unlike Bowen’s critique of actual possibility of such domination, their position is based on the normative grounds dealing with the agency of the global population and a fact that even if originally benign, the hegemony is allowing one actor to dominate others without any possible check on its power. Thus, on a theoretical level, they challenge the notion of the viability of any form of space empire and question the usefulness of the establishment of Pax Americana as prescribed by Dolman (Havercroft and Duvall 2012). We can also observe critical reflections of space expansionism in general. For example, Deudney (2020) develops an in-depth reflection of space expansionist thought. Similarly, radical approaches are identifiable, as evident from the anti-geopolitical stream that strictly calls for the sustainment of outer space as completely free of power struggle (MacDonald 2007). Additionally, we can also identify a stream of systemic geopolitics appearing in the study of outer space. Al-Rodhan developed a methodology of metageopolitics to analyse outer space. The book presents an overview of different activities that are relevant for the spatial dimension of the analysis of space politics and looks at their interplay. This way, the book presents a comprehensive overview of the geopolitics comparable to the approaches developed earlier by systemic geopolitics (Al-Rodhan 2012). We can additionally identify attempts to explicitly utilize the universal methodology developed by the above-mentioned streams of systemic geopolitics, thus pointing at the usefulness of such a method even in the celestial domain. An example of such an approach is (Doboš 2018). As evident, outer space does not establish any radically new domain as far as the political theory goes. Despite the challenging environmental factors, the basic processes can be analysed using the same theoretical approaches

Astropolitics 27 and methodological and conceptual tools developed for the terrestrial context. Based on one’s ontological and epistemological approach, the whole pallet of theoretical assumptions on the study of political processes, even inside a specific field of geopolitics, is available. The word astropolitics is thus similarly ambiguous as its terrestrial version – geopolitics. Any analysis utilizing geopolitical lenses thus must contain an explanation on what specific approach to the analysis of the power distribution in space it will select. The next section is dedicated to such a specification. 2.5  Research model The theoretical framework of this book is rooted in the systemic approach to geopolitics, analysing the political processes not only in geographic but also in historical context. According to this approach, we can develop a sound analysis of any region in any of the domains (land, sea, air, outer space and, possibly, cyberspace) by combining several factors that were developed by the different streams of thought described in the previous text and adding this in the historical context. Such a division of any system is then used as a basis for the scenario-making analysis that needs to work with the specific factors in order to pinpoint the key points of decision. This approach is mirrored in the further structure of this book. The policies towards outer space are, additionally, understood as a part of the overall power contest taking place on Earth using different tools and affecting the policies and capabilities of space powers. The book additionally avoids using analogies to other domains. While analogies to other domains can be helpful in the development of concrete strategies (Bowen 2020), this work in accordance with Mendenhall (2018) – who claims that analogies risk making an analysis blind to outer space’s specific ecosystem and completely different physical conditions, distinct technologies operating in the domain, particular type of movement utilized, its sheer vastness, or risks to human life tied to its exploration – avoids using analogies as much as possible. This book thus treats outer space as a specific domain applying methodology derived from the examination of the terrestrial geopolitics but lacking direct use of analogies. This is also crucial for the development of scenarios as they need to be rooted in as precise development of the factors of analysis. Utilization of analogies would unnecessarily lead to a development of imprecise data in part, where as precise an understanding of the factors of analysis as possible is needed. Along with the methodological foundations of systemic geopolitics, the following text will divide the analysis of the celestial bodies into several parts. The text begins with the analysis of actors that are currently relevant in the space arena with a focus on the frontier missions that are likely to result in meaningful missions to selected celestial bodies. It is necessary to analyse the history, aims and capabilities of different space powers, including their perceptions of the activities on celestial bodies as to set the foundation of

28 Astropolitics the human activity in outer space and the relevance of the case selection that is closely tied to the mid-term considerations of the spacepowers. Following Wang’s (2013) approach, the book understands space relations as tightly connected to the terrestrial realities. The text needs to analyse the historical context as such an analysis will allow us to frame the behaviour of different actors. It will also cover strategic documents, where available, to point at the goals of the actors, but these will be tied to the historical and broader strategic context. The capabilities and modus operandi of the different space programmes are also a relevant determinant of the possibilities that the various actors hold to achieve their goals, affect the future of colonization of celestial bodies, and achieve their wider strategic aims connected to outer space. Second, the book will identify the key physical features affecting the geopolitical considerations, including the basic astrophysical principles, strategically important locations and geography of the selected bodies. Understanding the physical characteristics and constraints will develop a “geographic” framework that will place the plans of spacepowers into the astrophysical realities. The chapter will identify the basic cartography of the inner solar system defined by gravitational interactions of celestial bodies and the orbital mechanics that affect movement inside the geography of outer space. This analysis allows us to grasp better the physical realities of transportation across the vastness of the inner solar system. The geography and other physical features of celestial bodies will additionally allow us to identify fundamental determinants of the construction of settlements. As the discussed bodies possess unique possibilities and restrictions, the part is crucial to properly understand the differences among the plans to lunar and Martian colonization or utilization of the smaller bodies like asteroids. These include the presence of atmosphere, orbital and rotational period, distance from the Earth and Sun or presence of water and natural resources. The third factor that will be added includes the normative considerations and the legal framework that will play its role in constructing settlements, resource extraction, or motivations behind and organization of the settlement projects. Next to the hard physical realities, this part of the overall analysis allows us to include the soft normative framework necessary for an understanding of the issue as well. While the international space law is often vague and unclear, it still develops a basic (normative) framework that is necessary to understand and can be a cause for additional conflicts given divergent interpretations. The same goes for other normative questions related to the construction of settlements or extraction of natural resources. While by no means perfectly developed, without understanding a legal and normative framework of outer space exploration, the analysis would not be complete. The last piece of the puzzle is the debate over the outlook of the colonies themselves. We need to introduce questions on their raison d´être, necessary infrastructure, internal organization and relations between settlements constructed by different actors. There are many issues that must be taken into account, including the size of their population, possible types of internal

Astropolitics 29 organization, or international cooperation over their development and deployment. The purposes with which the settlements were constructed are also significant as research modules present different impacts on the power competition on the celestial bodies. The different organizational and territorial settings might lead to a completely different interplay among the space powers. While this type of debate is to a degree speculative, the book discusses possible settings and their impacts on the future of outer space settlement. The different plausible settings can then be used for the modelling of the scenarios. As all the pieces of the puzzle are in place, we will be able to draw a comprehensive geopolitical analysis of the selected celestial bodies and draw predictions about possible outcomes of the human activity at these. The selected areas developed in the specific chapters will present all the necessary factors of analysis that will consequently allow us to develop scenarios of the future of space colonization and the geopolitical competition beyond the closest vicinity of the “blue planet”. The structure of the book allows to cover all the necessary factors of a holistic geopolitical analysis as presented, for example, by Csurgai (2009) and proceed further with scenario-making that allows us to model the most likely futures based on the identification of the critical uncertainties for each of the bodies and highlight the key points of decision. The analysis of the probable futures will thus be rooted in the factors identified as crucial for the geopolitical analysis of any environment or region. It will clarify the future of (piloted) frontier missions to the Moon, Mars and the smaller celestial bodies in the inner solar system. This comprehensive analysis serves as an input into the debate over the future of space exploration and piloted missions that include in-depth analysis from the point of view of geopolitics as a specific sub-discipline of social sciences. Such an approach to scenario-making based on several key factors that differ for each body will arguably help us better deal with the inherent uncertainty that is well-identified in the social sciences in general (Jamieson 1996). A similar approach was applied, for example, in a recent analysis of the cislunar ecosystem (Chavy-Macdonald et al. 2021) or asteroid mining prospects (Goswami and Garretson 2020, 299–320) and is deemed to bring important outlook necessary for the academia and decision-makers as it decreases the uncertainty by identifying the crucial factors and possible futures. The book thus does not claim to and cannot give a definitive answer on the question of the future of the space colonization as this would be impossible. It, however, develops a specific point of view that should help the readers to add a different perspective into their own thinking on the future of space endeavours and allow them to more systematic approach the uncertainties ahead of us. References Agnew, J. 2003. Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics. London: Routledge. ———. 2009. Globalization and Sovereignty. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

30 Astropolitics Al-Rodhan, N. 2012. Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bowen, B. E. 2020. War in Space: Strategy, Spacepower, Geopolitics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Brzezinski, Z. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York, NY: Basic Books. Buruma, I., and A. Margalit. 2004. Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies. New York, NY: The Penguin Press. Chavy-Macdonald, M.-A., K. Oizumi, J.-P. Kneib, and K. Aoyama. 2021. “The CisLunar Ecosystem—A Systems Model and Scenarios of the Resource Industry and Its Impact.” Space Policy, 188:545–558. Cohen, S. B. 2015. Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Csurgai, G. 2009. “Constant and Variable Factors of Geopolitical Analysis.” In Geopolitics: Schools of Thought, Method of Analysis and Case Studies, edited by G. Csurgai, 48–86. Geneva: Edition de Penthes. ———. 2018. “The Increasing Importance of Geoeconomics in Power Rivalries in the Twenty-First Century.” Geopolitics, 23:38–46. De Seversky, A. 1942. Victory Through Air Power. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. Deudney, D. 2020. Dark Skies: Space Expansionism, Planetary Geopolitics, and the Ends of Humanity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Doboš, B. 2018. Geopolitics of the Outer Space: A European Perspective. Cham: Springer. ———. 2020. New Middle Ages: Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World. Cham: Springer. Dodds, K. 2003. “Cold War Geopolitics.” In A Companion to Political Geography, edited by J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal, 204–218. Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Dolman, E. 1999. “Geostrategy in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 22:83–106. ———. 2002. Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age. London: Frank Cass. Dussuoy, G. 2010. “Systemic Geopolitics: A Global Interpretation Method of the World.” Geopolitics, 15:133–150. Easton, D. 1957. “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems.” World Politics, 383–400. Foxall, A. 2019. “From Evropa to Gayropa: A Critical Geopolitics of the European Union as Seen from Russa.” Geopolitics, 24:174–193. Friedrichs, J. 2001. “The Meaning of New Medievalism.” European Journal of International Relations, 7:475–502. Glassner, M. I. 1996. Political Geography. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. Goswami, N., and P. A. Garretson. 2020. Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Gunneflo, M. 2015. “Rudolf Kjellén: Nordic Biopolitics before the Welfare State.” Retfærd: Nordic Journal of Law and Justice, 24–39. Havercroft, J., and R. Duvall. 2012. “Critical Astropolitics: The Geopolitics of Space Control and the Transformation of State Sovereignty.” In Securing Outer Space, edited by N. Bormann and M. Sheehan, 42–58. Abingdon: Routledge.

Astropolitics 31 Haverluk, T. W., K. M. Beauchemin, and B. A. Mueller. 2014. “The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics.” Geopolitics, 19–39. Herbst, J. 1989. “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa.” International Organization, 673–692. Herwig, H. H. 2016. The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer “Educated” Hitler and Hess. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Hippler, T. 2013. Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundation of the Air Power Strategy, 1884–1938. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hnízdo, B. 1995. Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionů. Praha: Institut pro středoevropskou kulturu a politiku. Huntington, S. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. Jackson, R. H., and C. G. Rosberg. 1982. “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridicial in Statehood.” World Politics, 1–24. Jamieson, D. 1996. “Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 35–43. Kaplan, R. D. 1994. The Coming Anarchy. February. Accessed November 28, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/ 304670/ ———. 2018. The Anarchy That Came. 21 October. Accessed November 28, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/anarchy-came-33872 ———. 2012. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate. New York, NY: Random House. Kelly, P. 2006. “A Critique of Critical Geopolitics.” Geopolitics, 24–53. Ker-Lindsay, J. 2016. “Climate Change and State Death.” Survival, 73–94. Khanna, P. 2016. Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization. New York, NY: Random House. Lévy, J. 2000. “A user’s Guide to World-Spaces.” Geopolitics, 67–84. Luttwak, E. 1990. “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce.” The National Interest, 17–23. MacDonald, F. 2007. “Anti-Astropolitik – Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography.” Progress in Human Geography, 592–615. Mackinder, H. J. 1904. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal, 421–437. ———. 1942. Democratic Ideals and Reality. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press. Mahan, A. T. 1890. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. Mendenhall, E. 2018. “Treating Outer Space Like a Place: A Case for Rejecting Other Domain Analogies.” Astropolitics. Mičko, B., and M. Riegl. 2022. “Towards a Schmittian Theory of Border Hardening: Nomos, Sovereignty, Political Unity and Barriers in the Middle East.” Geopolitics, 27(1): 206–237. Ó Tuathail, G. 1996. Critical Geopolitics. London: Routledge. Pusterla, E., and F. Piccin. 2012. “The Loss of Sovereignty Control and the Illusion of Building Walls.” Journal of Borderlands Studies, 121–138. Rosiere, S., and R. Jones. 2012. “Teichopolitics: Re-Considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences.” Geopolitics, 217–234.

32 Astropolitics Routledge, P. 2003. “Anti-Geopolitics.” In A Companion to Political Geography, edited by J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal, 236–248. Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. Said, E. 1977. Orientalism. London: Penguin. Slater, D. 2004. Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations. Carlton: Blackwell Publishing. Slaughter, A.-M. 2017. The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Stogiannos, A. 2017. The Genesis of Geopolitics and Friedrich Ratzel: Dismissing the Myth of the Ratzelian Geodeterminism. Cham: Springer. Tilly, C. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc. Tilly, C. 1975. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.” In V The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by C. Tilly, 3–83. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tunander, O. 2005. “Swedish Geopolitics: From Rudolf Kjellén to a Swedish ‘Dual State’.” Geopolitics, 546–566. Vihma, A. 2018. “Geoeconomic Analysis and the Limits of Critical Geopolitics: A New Engagement with Edward Luttwak.” Geopolitics, 1–21. Wallerstein, I. 2004. World-System Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: Duke University Press. Wang, S.-C. 2013. Transatlantic Space Politics: Competition and Cooperation Above the Clouds. Abingdon: Routledge. Wilkinson, D. 1985. “Spykman and Geopolitics.” In On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, edited by C.E. Zoppo and C. Zorgbibe, 77–129. Dordrecht: Springer. Wolkersdorfer, G. 1999. “Karl Haushofer and Geopolitics—The History of a German Mythos.” Geopolitics, 145–160.

3

Actors

Since the 1990s, the number of space actors able to conduct more or less independent activities on orbits and beyond has been increasing. This also involves the growing capacity of a significant number of states and non-state actors to reach celestial bodies. With the proliferation of space technologies and the ability of less developed actors to participate in complex collaborative missions, global and regional space relations establish a basic canvas that guides the aims of space actors that are likely to get involved in the near and mid-term operations on the celestial bodies. As per the theoretical background, this work accepts the premise that the relations among space powers mimic those on the Earth while being framed into technological and environmental limitations connected with space travel. Thus, it is essential to take this interconnection into account. The first mission into the proximity of our nearest celestial body, the Moon, took place already in 1959. In that year, the first two Soviet Luna probes successfully operated around the Moon, including an impact mission and taking the first pictures of the far side of our sole natural satellite (Bille and Lishock 2004, 166). These became the first in a series of missions that constitute probably the most famous period of the Space Race between the United States and the Soviet Union – the race to the Moon. While the possible military utility of the Moon as a high ground was understood at least since the 1950s (Wingo 2009, 151), it was the struggle over prestige and the position of the technological leader in the world that led to the first series of lunar landings taking place between 1969 and 1972. President Kennedy was an unlikely candidate to announce the goal of sending an American to the Moon before the end of the decade as he was not originally much interested in the development of space technology. Yet, it was he who did this in front of the US Congress on May 25, 1961 and again in his famous speech at the Rice Stadium in Houston on September 12, 1962. While not a space enthusiast per se, Kennedy needed a challenge that the United States could use to overcome the Soviets in the shadow of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the Soviet victories in the Space Race. Having a propagator of space travel, Lyndon Johnson, for his vice-president, Kennedy DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-3

34 Actors agreed that the landing on the Moon constitutes a formidable challenge that could overcome not only the recent failures of the US foreign policy but also its secondary status as a space power behind the USSR that was at the time reaching all the milestones of the space race ahead of the United States (Hays 2011, 19–20, Moltz 2014, 38, Schmitt 2006, 16). Before the Apollo 11 landing, several milestones were reached, including taking the first sharp images of the lunar surface by the US probes Rangers from 7 to 9 in 1964 and conducting the first soft landing on the lunar surface, or any other celestial body in that respect, by the Soviet Luna 9 in 1966 (Lewis 1997, 38). Following the assassination of President Kennedy and the beginning of the Johnson administration, the assurance of the Apollo mission was further strengthened by Johnson’s public support for space efforts (Harding 2013, 61). The Soviet Union, however, never officially entered the race to send a human to the lunar surface, despite some attempts to beat the United States (Lewis 1997, 38). This is true even though President Kennedy offered the USSR to join the United States in the joint effort to send an astronaut to its surface in 1963 (Harding 2013, 60). Despite the catastrophe of Apollo 1, leading to the death of three astronauts Gus Grissom, Edward H. White II and Roger B. Chaffee, the programme turned out to be a success culminating in the landing of Apollo 11 accompanied by Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin first step at the lunar surface on the July 20, 1969 – meeting the late President Kennedy’s deadline. Apollo’s Lunar module, Eagle, additionally became the first actual spacecraft that was not designed to operate in an atmosphere that thus disregarded aerodynamics in its design. Apollo 11 success was followed by other five crewed landings bringing another ten astronauts to the lunar surface until the programme ended following the last successful moonwalk of Jack Schmitt and Eugene Cernan on the December 14, 1972, as a part of Apollo 17 mission (Crotts 2014, 23–50). Following the end of the Apollo programme, then US President Nixon re-focused the space efforts towards sustainability of the space operations and development of the space shuttle instead of progressing with the piloted missions further from the Earth (Hays 2011, 29). It so happened that the August 1976 landing of the Luna 24 probe was the last landing on the lunar surface for the next 14 years when new space actors – in this case, Japan with its Hiten spacecraft – returned human machinery to Luna (Crotts 2014, 128). As the lunar race ended with a clear US victory with no economically viable way for the Soviets to respond, the tensions tied to the lunar missions decreased and other activities were pursued (Harding 2013, 63). These included, among others, the first successful soft landing on Venus on October 22, 1975 by the Soviet Venera 9 or the Martian surface conducted by the US Viking 1 on July 20, 1976. After the end of the Cold War, the number of actors interested in exploring the celestial bodies dramatically increased, including the objects relevant for this study. The lunar missions included the US Lunar Prospector in 1998 that, among others, monitored water ice deposits, the Chinese

Actors 35 Chang’e programme involving the first landing of a probe on the far side of the Moon, Indian Chandrayaan programme, Japanese SELENE mission, or European Space Agency’s (ESA) SMART-1 probe. The Martian surface was reached by five US rovers – Sojourner (landed in 1997), Spirit (2004), Opportunity (2004), Curiosity (2012) and Perseverance (2021). Nonetheless, the planet was a target of numerous missions by other actors, including ESA’s Mars Express, Indian Mars Orbiter Mission, the United Arab Emirates’ Al Amal and Chinese Tianwen-1 probes. Regarding asteroids and other smaller objects, we can, for example, identify the Japanese Hayabusa missions, US Deep Impact or Dawn missions or ESA’s Rosetta satellite including the Philae comet lander. As evident, the celestial bodies have been in the past 20 years probed as never before. This section will first cover the most progressed state space programmes, followed by an overview of regional dynamics around the globe and finalizing by introducing non-state space actors, all with special attention being paid to the missions to the celestial objects. 3.1  Global dimension As of the beginning of the 2020s, we can identify five leading space powers with the potential to set up sophisticated space operations, including establishing a potential settlement or another type of installation on celestial bodies. They possess full-scale capabilities regarding manufacturing, launch capabilities and the ability to operate probes on Earth’s orbits and beyond. These include the United States, Russia, China, Europe (through a combination of ESA, EUSPA and other institutions and national programmes) and India.1 While, as will be evident from the rest of the section, others also want to or will join the missions to celestial bodies, these five actors are able to run full-fledged space programmes and lead independent efforts if they decide to do so. Nonetheless, they are maintaining a diverse set of capabilities, motivations and doctrines that affect their role in contemporary space politics. The first actor that must be mentioned and the only state that in the recorded history sent a piloted mission to another celestial body is the United States. A party to the first space race of the 1960s, the United States is since the collapse of the Soviet Union not only a dominant power on Earth but also in outer space. This remains true even despite the temporary loss of the ability to launch piloted missions to outer space for the larger part of the 2010s that followed the decommissioning of the space shuttle (Space Transportation System) programme in 2011 after 30 years of activity. Despite the different approaches to space stretching from the Obama administration’s more cooperative (Moltz 2013, 26), to Bush’s and Trump’s more nationalistic one, the United States remained at the forefront of the space efforts in all of its aspects. This role was further strengthened by the United States resolve to retain the security of its space assets and operations in space despite the fact that such an approach sometimes clashes with the ambitions of other space actors, including the United States´ allies (Johnson-Freese 2007, 21–22).

36 Actors The US policies in the space security domain are mainly tied to a heating competition with China that is in the space domain evident at least since the end of the 1990s. While the US export restrictions under International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) disqualifying China from cooperation on the vast majority of space operations at first drew Europe and Asian space actors closer together (Johnson-Freese 2007, 161–163), the United States is currently strengthening its cooperation with Europe and India in the attempt to maintain its global position against the Chinese rise. This is further evident from the contents of the documents like the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act or Trump administration’s Space Directives. These strengthened two important dynamics determining contemporary US space programme – the above-mentioned push to ensure (its) freedom of operation in outer space (including the introduction of Space Force as an independent branch of the US Army), and privatization and commercialization of numerous space activities. This development follows the US terrestrial strategy combining unmatched military strength and a liberal approach to the global economic system. A key document presented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) regarding the US plans related to the celestial bodies is the Artemis Accords2 (NASA 2020). The document aims to develop fundamental principles for the operations of the national civilian agencies on celestial bodies and other key strategic points in space, such as Lagrange Libration points. Explicitly adhering to the wording of the international space law, the accords are pushing through interpretations of some controversial norms according to the US general strategy and long-term policy approach, including allowing the space mining (disconnecting the process of mining from national appropriation clause) or establishing of safety zones for the purposes of the activities on the celestial bodies (thus disconnecting the need for territorial control of lunar activities from the ban on sovereignty and territorial claims that is included in the widely accepted part of the international law). Such an approach follows the wording of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act that supports “the commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources by United States citizens (US Congress 2015, par. 51302, art. 1)” and the private ownership of the extracted resources. The legislative provisions of the accords, while relatively brief, constitute the basic principles for the US-led efforts to settle and/or mine the celestial bodies. By the time of its adoption, the accords were signed, besides the United States, by Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United Kingdom. By the time of writing, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Poland, South Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,Ukraine and Isle of Man joined as well. This includes all four states that, by the time of writing, allowed for space mining in their national laws – the United States, Luxembourg, the UAE and Japan. The current plans of the US civilian space agency related to the celestial bodies include most profoundly the 2024 deadline for the piloted landing

Actors 37 on the Moon as set by the former US President Donald Trump that was later pushed back by another year. The expected timeline is connected to the success of the development of the Orion Crew Vehicle and the Gateway space station that are to become collaborative projects managed together with Artemis Accords’ partners, including Canada, Japan or the ESA (NASA 2021). While the Biden administration did not steer away from the programme, the decrease in funding is likely to push the deadlines further into the future, however (Davenport 2021). Other current or planned missions to the studied celestial bodies include the research of two, by the time of writing, operational rovers – Curiosity and Perseverance – on the Martian surface, Double Asteroid Redirection Test that succeeded in colliding with Dimorphos, a moon of Didymos asteroid on late September 2022, or Near Earth Asteroid Scout. These are scientific missions with secondary application potential. The United States is thus active regarding activities on all three case studies – the Moon, Mars, asteroids and comets. The second country involved in the 1960s Cold War space race, the Soviet Union, is no longer in existence. Nonetheless, its space programme was inherited by Russia as a successor state that keeps the legal continuity of the union. Similarly to the United States, the Russian space programme is closely tied to the Russian grand strategy and general foreign policy objectives. These mainly aim to maintain the global, or at least regional, appearance of the great power status that is in symbolic plane tightly connected to the capacity to hold a developed space programme. Despite the fact that the Russian space programme survived the turbulent 1990s only due to the international cooperative agreements pumping funds into its space programme (Arbatov 2009, 439–440), the Russian space efforts remain relevant mainly due to the capacity to provide both piloted and non-piloted space launches for competitive prices, thus partially funding its own budget (Oberg 2009, 422). In the period of 2011 to 2020, Russia was the only International Space Station (ISS) member capable of piloted launches, thus making the full operationality of the space station dependent on its capacities. Russia also operates GLONASS navigational constellation – another sign of developed space capacities. That being said, it is also important to point out that the Russian space programme is in a long-term decline. The first issue that must be overcome by Russian space ambitions is a lack of finances. The state budget was for a long time unable to sustain the ambitious planned missions (Arbatov 2009, 440). The financial issue is also evident from the budgetary cuts that affected the programme throughout the 2010s (Zak 2016). It also has issues with shortage of qualified personnel, corruption or competition presented to the Russian launchers by launch systems newly developed by other space actors (Oberg 2009, 419–420). Despite operating several launch stations, including in Baikonur in Kazakhstan, Plesetsk in high north near Arkhangelsk or Vostochny in the far east, the launch segment is becoming less reliable for the customers due to the increasing number of accidents. Russia, furthermore, since the end of the Cold War did not show any significant progress and

38 Actors success in the development of new space technologies (Oberg 2009, 434) that continues up until today. The Russian approach is, unlike that of the Western space agencies, but also, to a much lesser degree India, extremely state-centric. In 2015, the reorganization of the Russian space activities led to the establishment of the Roscosmos State Corporation as a centralized node of the Russian space efforts. The Russian position as a space power is extremely threatened. Russian efforts seem to be mainly tied to the attempt to maintain its international status rather than to innovate to deal with future challenges (Vidal 2021). The Russian approach to outer space and development and management of space infrastructure is since the 1990s tightly connected to the Chinese space project, providing it with technologies that are, for the text of this study, mainly relevant due to the planned cooperation of the two on the lunar settlement project. Russia was an important partner to Europe regarding launch technology as ESA is using modified Soyuz for its own needs besides light Vega and heavy Ariane launchers. ESA also met some of its specific launch needs, including deploying parts of the Galileo navigational system by utilizing Russian spaceports. However, the relations are deteriorating following the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the consequent Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the internationalized conflict in eastern Ukraine. The 2022 full-fledged invasion into Ukraine is likely to severe any ties to the Western space agencies for time to come. The impacts of international sanctions are also likely to further deteriorate the ability of the Russian space programme to develop and construct further space technologies. Roscosmos is currently not being very active regarding independent active or proposed missions to the celestial bodies of our interest and is probably not planning to develop a major independent mission outside of the cooperative schemes. Its main focus lies on the ISS, with a presented plan to develop its independent space station (Howell 2022), as its rare mission to Mars, Fobos-Grunt, failed upon launch in 2012. The progress of Luna-Glob missions to the Moon is uncertain, with Luna 25 lunar rover, however, being under development. While the Russian space programme has been in steady decline since the beginning of the 1990s, the Chinese efforts are following an opposite trajectory. Tied to the economic boom of the country, China was able to obtain Russian assistance and technology to boost the progress of its indigenous space programme (Perfilyev 2010). Tied to the general Chinese strategy, the aim of the space programme is primarily to lower the gap between the Chinese and the United States´ space capabilities (Johnson-Freese 2016, 70) and obtain strategic independence in outer space and, by default, aid its strategic position on Earth (Handberg 2013, 256). Despite being cut-off from the US technologies since the inclusion of space technologies under ITAR-based restrictions in 1999 (Moltz 2014, 53–54), the Chinese space programme is after the beginning of the 2000s a regular full-scale space programme (Handberg 2013, 250–258) including the ability to launch piloted missions (since 2003) and a possession of proven kinetic anti-satellite capacity (since 2007). It also

Actors 39 successfully sent robotic missions to both the Moon (Chang’e series) and Mars (Tianwen-1 that reached the planet in 2021). Relations of China with other major space powers are heavily influenced by its overall geopolitical strategy, political and economic system (ESPI 2017), and the reaction of other actors of international politics to the rise of China. Besides the rising competition between China and Russia on one side and the United States, Europe and possibly India on the other, the Chinese space programme is also mired by secrecy that affects the predictability of many Chinese projects and missions, combining military and civilian purposes (Johnson-Freese 2016, 71–72) in the context of the dual-use nature of the vast majority of space applications (Pražák 2021). This leads to a complete lack of cooperation between China and the United States in outer space, which is very unique for the domain otherwise characterized by comparatively higher levels of cooperation (Moltz 2014, 60). The overall reading of the Chinese space efforts is challenged by interpretations that are driven by security concerns and perceptions of Chinese ability to threaten US space assurance by military means on the one hand (Tellis 2007) and a focus on the civilian developmental part of the Chinese space programme on the other (Zhang 2013). Unclear structure and intentions of the Chinese space programme are leading to insecurity and a lower level of trust between the United States and its partners on the one side and China on the other. Similarly to the Russian space programme, China holds a state-centred structure that places heavy limits on the ability of private companies to independently develop new space technologies and markets (Doboš 2022). China holds full-scale space capabilities, including the Long March launcher series, launch sites in Wenchang or Xichang and manufacturing capabilities. It also operates the BeiDou navigation system. Regarding missions to the celestial bodies, China is relatively active. Its missions include the Chang’e series, which managed the landing of the first rover on the far side of the Moon or the Tianwen-1 mission to Mars. In the period of 2022 to 2026, China plans to send additional robotic missions to the lunar polar regions, send sample-return missions to asteroids and develop technology for sample return mission to Mars (CNSA 2022). Before the end of the 2020s, China plans to send a piloted mission to the lunar surface, followed by the construction of the lunar settlement. This will likely be a cooperative effort enhancing Chinese standing in international affairs, similarly to the US collaborative efforts along the Artemis Accords framework. The main partner of China in this effort is likely to be Russia, as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two countries in March 2021. The document aims to coordinate and cooperate with other actors on the development of the lunar projects, including the lunar base – International Lunar Research Station (CNSA 2021). The construction of the base should be followed by the development of the cislunar transport system and a space economic zone by 2045 (Pollpeter et al. 2020, 47–48). Similarly to other foreign policy initiatives, China and Russia are presenting an alternative to the US-led initiatives.

40 Actors Unlike the previous actors, the European space programme is more decentralized, composed of the European Union (EU) programme under the EU Agency for Space Programme (EUSPA) with the involvement of European Defence Agency, ESA and national space programmes. It is important to point out that despite the fact that ESA is managing a large number of EUtasked projects, the membership between the two is not the same, and ESA is not an EU agency. EU members not involved in ESA are by the time of writing Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. Otherwise, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK) are ESA members not included in the EU. Nonetheless, ESA also holds cooperative agreements involving some lower levels of cooperation with Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. While being already drafted in the Lisbon Treaty, the development of the common EU space programme began in earnest only following the establishment of the new European Commission after the 2019 elections to the European Parliament. On the contrary, ESA is being active since 1980. Being long developed by ESA, the European space policy is primarily focusing on the civilian applications with the security and strategically oriented thinking explicitly tied only to the recent development of the EU programme or the national space efforts of some of the European nations like France or the UK. ESA itself is focused on maximizing utilization of orbital technologies, promoting human activity and academic and industrial potential of space activities in relation to economic growth, and maximizing gains from space missions. As such, ESA did develop robust robotic and non-piloted launch infrastructure, remaining dependent in the department of crewed launches on other actors. ESA is also focused on further activities to the Moon and Mars, potentially including piloted missions. It is also critical to point out that ESA is focused on its cooperative nature involving actors outside of Europe to participate in its projects (Hufenbach, Reiter and Sourgens 2014). It even originally included China in the development of Galileo, with around 12 manufacturing contracts being given to the Chinese companies. Nonetheless, due to the combination of the unwanted technological transfer, competition with BeiDou, US pressure and security concerns connected to the Chinese 2007 anti-satellite test (Aliberti 2015, 267–269), China was eventually stripped of its participation in the project. However, this does not mean that Europe would be unaware of strategic considerations as evident from the pursuit of projects enhancing its strategic independence like the development of Ariane launchers in the 1980s, or establishment of navigational system Galileo, reconnaissance Copernicus and GovSatCom secure communication system. The predominantly cooperative nature is also evident from the ESA’s 2016 proposal on the development of a lunar settlement through the Moon Village scheme. However, ESA was to become the leading pillar of the project that would be open to any other participant that would like to develop and aid a part of the village. The concept would combine scientific and industrial

Actors 41 approaches to lunar settlement in a joint cooperative framework (ESA 2016). Given the developments in international politics, however, the participation of Europe in the US-led Artemis project seems like a more realistic scenario compared to uniting competing space powers behind an ESA-led project. ESA is, additionally, cooperating with other agencies on the missions to the celestial bodies, including the Lunar Resurs sample return project and ExoMars in cooperation with Roscosmos or participation on the Orion module and Gateway station developed by NASA. The cooperation with Roscosmos is following the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 likely to be severed completely. ESA also held independent missions like the Rosetta probe, including Philae lander that reached the surface of the comet 67P/ Churyumov-Gerasimenko in 2014, Mars Express [its first successful mission to another planet (Weintraub 2018, 227)], or In-Situ Resource Utilization demonstration mission to the lunar surface that is planned to test technologies on the production of oxygen and/or water on the lunar surface. It also presented the project Moonlight that should develop a lunar navigational and communication satellite system (ESA 2020). Europe is thus primarily still attempting to establish a cooperative approach to the utilization of celestial bodies that plays to its soft power strengths in the international arena while increasingly becoming part of the US-led approach to the lunar colonization. The Indian space programme is also swiftly obtaining increasing ability to operate in the domain and was in the past 10–20 years able to develop and utilize full-fledged space capacities. Unlike the primarily security-oriented origins of the United States´, Russian and Chinese space programmes or commercial and strategic roots of the European space efforts, the Indian space programme is rooted in the country’s developmental process. Outer space technology was developed not as a sign of a great power prestige but as a way to independently, as India was a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, improve the living conditions of its population (Aliberti 2018). Nonetheless, the shifting geopolitical position of India led it to invest in deep space missions as well. India also plans to launch its first independent piloted mission by 2023. Given the enhanced competition in the region, which is discussed in more considerable detail later, and the increasing role India is playing and aims to play on the international scene, the larger focus on deep space missions can be described as a part of the Indian grand strategy, even though it diverges from the primary developmental focus of the programme. From this perspective, the ability to successfully conduct a Martian Mangalyaan-1 mission in 2013 prior to the Chinese approach to the planet played an important role (Johnson-Freese 2016, 38). The Indian space activities are thus tightly connected to its increasing assertiveness in the international domain but also to the attempt to remain independent in its decision-making. The most wellknown Indian missions to the bodies of our interest are Chandrayaan lunar missions. As evident, the global dimension of international space relations is following the development of terrestrial international politics. The efforts at

42 Actors lunar colonization are led by the US Artemis Accords on the one side and the Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station on the other. Russia is, similarly to other major global initiatives, increasingly a junior partner to China. While aligned to the US efforts, Europe attempts to strengthen international cooperation in the domain as well as its own strategic independence. India then comes with the rapid progress of its own, cooperating with the international partners while attempting to be independent in its strategic capacities and decision-making process. The United States and Europe, furthermore, focus on the increased liberalization and privatization of space affairs, especially in relation to space mining and other economic activities under a contested international legal regime. On the other hand, China and Russia highlight the state-centric legal framework and approach to deep space missions. 3.2  Pacific realm Arguably, the core terrestrial geopolitical realm crucial for the contest over celestial bodies is the transpacific region, with the United States on one side and China on the other. While this particular relationship is the most impactful one, we cannot disregard other actors – most prominently Japan – from the analysis of the space relations among the Pacific actors as well. Nonetheless, despite the heating competition, the repetition of the 1960s-like space race is unlikely as the general experience from the era, high costs and limited outcomes, is first not very positive (Aliberti 2015, 74), and none of the sides to the contemporary competition is likely willing to spend portions of the budget comparable to the era on their respective space programmes. As mentioned previously, the Chinese space programme is partially an enigma with no external differentiation between its civilian and military segments. While the self-promotion of the Chinese space programme focuses on its independence, peaceful nature, innovation and openness that supports the developmental strategy of the Chinese state through the principles of technological and operational self-reliance, peaceful utilization of outer space, the establishment of a genuinely innovative system, and open and constructive international cooperation (Aliberti 2015, 23–33), its actual goals remain more opaque. In the transpacific region, this led to the inclusion of space technology under ITAR regulation in 1999, forbidding the US agencies and companies to cooperate with China in respect to space technology. It also leads to the decreased ability of the companies to cooperate with any agency or other actor cooperating with China in the development of the given space technology, thus, however, involuntarily also enhancing the non-US cooperation in the space domain (Blount 2008). Additional US regulation regarding the Chinese space programme includes the Wolf Clause that further limits the collaboration with China. While still having some loopholes regarding the commercial cooperation in areas not involving technology transfer, this provision further restricted possible cooperation between the two parties despite

Actors 43 some attempts towards enhancing cooperation with China since 2012/13 (Reddy 2017, 242–243). However, the continuing opaqueness of the Chinese space programme in the context of the heated relations among the two actors further enhances the conflict potential, also involving space affairs. China is for some time attempting to become a regional leader in the development of space activities. It is since 2012 providing the BeiDou navigational system not only in the form of encrypted service to the People’s Liberation Army but also to its international partners (Aliberti 2015, 37). China also tried to be active in regional diplomacy through its role in Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). Nonetheless, while being an interesting format for the spread of Chinese influence in the region, it is not deemed suitable for coordination of missions to celestial bodies (Aliberti 2015, 248). China thus uses APSCO to portray itself as a leader of the developing countries in the space affairs in the region and strengthen its relations with resource-rich partners (Suzuki 2013, 104). China is, as noted above, also very assertive regarding activities on celestial bodies, especially the Moon. Lunar missions, including piloted landings and the establishment of a lunar colony, are relevant for China for numerous reasons ranging from domestic to international to technological and military (Aliberti 2015, 77). Prominently, China seeks to utilize space resources for strengthening its industrial potential including possible utilization of spacebased solar power (Goswami and Garretson 2020, 201–203). Lunar project is also tied to a symbolic connection with Chinese history – Chang’e is the goddess of the Moon (Aliberti 2015, 54). However, despite the fact that China is for a long time interested in the deployment of further lunar missions, as evident from the ability to provide a high-resolution 3D map of the Moon already in 2009, the centralization of the space programme and opposition from other international actors might hamper these ambitions (Aliberti 2015, 102, 181). The most relevant competitor in the Asian part of the transpacific region is Japan (Yoshimatsu 2021, 14). The Japanese space programme is due to the restrictions written into the post–Second World War constitution almost exclusively focused on the civilian, scientific and technological aspects of the space programme. Even though it was initially dependant on the US technological transfer, Japan managed to develop indigenous capacities that allowed it in 1970 to launch the first domestic Asian satellite and become the third nation to launch a satellite to the geosynchronous orbit. Japan is also active in relation to the studied celestial bodies. In 1990, it became the first nation to return a probe to the lunar surface following the 1976 landing of Luna 24. It also launched two Hayabusa sample return missions to Itokawa (launched in 2003) and Ryugu asteroids (2014) (Lele 2013, 96–106). Recently, Japan became involved in more security-oriented space services as well. These initiatives are tied mainly to the threat posed by the North Korean missile and nuclear programme. As a member of a defence pact with the United States, it aims to counterbalance Chinese influence in the region

44 Actors that appeared as a reaction to the Chinese antisatellite test in 2007. Japan is in this respect part of the Artemis Accords framework and, given its role in East Asia, might become the leading power in the process of establishment of an indigenous counterpoint to the Chinese influence in space affairs in the region (Moltz 2014, 55–57, Suzuki 2013, 101, Yoshimatsu 2021). However, cooperation with the US remains extremely important, and it establishes one of the most profound international cooperative efforts regarding space programmes (Pace 2015). The cooperation was further confirmed by the seventh Japan-US Comprehensive Dialogue on Space meeting in 2020 that reaffirmed Japanese participation in Artemis (US Embassy in Japan 2020). Next, we must also take note of the competition on the Korean peninsula. While the two Koreas’ capacities regarding outer space activities are limited, they are still relevant, especially given the connection of the North Korean ballistic missile programme to its space endeavours. Additionally, besides security measures, South Korea is developing its own limited space programme in cooperation with the United States (Lele 2013, 73–74). Nonetheless, North Korea launched its first satellite in 2012, upon which its southern neighbour reacted a year later with the same action (Moltz 2014, 55–57). South Korean space programme is additionally motivated by industrial development possibilities and socio-economic development tied to the utilization of space-based services (ESPI 2021, 113). Due to its underdevelopment in the space sector, South Korea is not likely to play a significant independent role in the competition over celestial bodies. North Korea is to remain interested in utilizing space technology for security purposes directly tied to the development of ballistic missiles. They, however, might present a pressing security issue that might extend the deadlines for the more ambitious space missions as they are high on the radar of both the United States and China. The transpacific region is thus dominated by the balancing between China and the United States, and the regional geopolitics is likely to play one of the critical roles in the short and mid-term settlement of and activities on the celestial bodies. These processes will be affected by the mutual relations between the two great powers and also the level of regional stability as any armed conflict (either over Taiwan or at the Korean peninsula) would very likely involve the space domain as well with a likely impact on the viability of deep space missions. Both main actors are attempting to establish regional alliances. China promotes its role in developing the states’ economic and social status while the US centres on its traditional leading role among liberal democratic states and alliances with countries like Japan. Very important in this sense will be a future expansion of the settlement schemes defined by the Sino-Russian lunar station project on the one hand and the Artemis Accords on the other. As pointed out by Moltz (2014, 55–57), despite the fact that a lunar settlement would be much more efficiently constructed as a global collaborative endeavour, the Sino-American competition makes such an outcome highly unlikely.

Actors 45 3.3  Atlantic realm (Western) European and US space efforts have been tied since the beginning of the European attempts to develop domestic capacities to conduct space operations. While France developed its own limited space capabilities that led to the successful launch of the Diamant A rocket with Astérix satellite on board in 1965, no nation was able to develop an independent heavy launcher, and so the Western European states agreed on the development of the joint European project. While the United States presented its support to the European efforts by providing space launches for the continent, it was hardly a reliable enough partner. Europeans attempted to develop a Europa launcher based on the UK Blue Streak rocket with the second and third stages developed by France and Germany, respectively, and Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands being responsible for additional ground facilities and services. Nonetheless, the efforts institutionally placed under the European Space Research Organization and European Launcher Development Organization ultimately failed. Despite that, from the ashes of the project new institutional design arose – European Space Agency (Al-Ekabi and Mastorakis 2015, Doboš 2018, 90–94, Krige and Russo 2000a, 2000b). ESA Convention was ratified in 1980 by obtaining a final signature from France that joined Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK as the founding member of the organization and became the leader of the technological development of heavy Ariane launcher. The rapid and very successful development of commercial competitive heavy launcher allowed Europe to obtain strategic autonomy regarding space launches but also led to an increased pressure on the US regarding the commercial space launch market as the Ariane launcher became less costly and more reliable compared to the US space shuttles (Al-Ekabi and Mastorakis 2015, Doboš 2018, 94–98, Krige and Russo 2000a, 2000b). Thus, in the 1980s, the United States lost its dominance over space launches in the West, and the former dependence of Europe on the United States turned into an economic competition between the two (Wang 2013, 443). Another system that triggered the transatlantic dispute was Galileo navigational system. The system was proposed by the European Commission in 1998 as a reaction to the possible risk of dependence on military-grade systems like the US GPS or Russian GLONASS. In 2011, the EU further pointed out that the development of the system is necessary from the strategic point of view as well, as it allows for the uninterrupted provision of the vital signal even at the time of crisis. Even though the civilian role of Galileo is strongly stressed, given the potentially military capacity of the system and superior capabilities, Galileo established a security dilemma for the United States, who tried to dissuade Europe from developing its own system (Němečková 2020). This points to the dynamic nature of the transatlantic relations. The Europe and the United States cannot be understood as two parts of the same basic unit. Europe is developing its independent strategic capabilities – besides

46 Actors launch capability (Ariane) and navigation (Galileo), we must point out reconnaissance (Copernicus) and communication (GovSatcom) – but also participates in many joint projects, including the ISS or deep space missions. The Europe and the United States share many common foreign policy interests and envision similar frameworks regarding space activities, but if their interests differ, they can diverge in their actions, including low-level confrontation (Wang 2009, 2013). Such a difference is evident also in the legal approach to space mining where the US law requires a majority of stakeholders of the company importing space resources to be located in the United States while Luxembourg, the only European country with such a legal provision, holds no restriction on the geography of the licenced companies (James and Roper 2018). Another point of contention is tied to the project increasing European strategic autonomy in space and seemingly challenging the US position, including Ariane launchers or Galileo (Němečková 2020). On the other hand, the US influence can lead to a change in the European approach to some strategically important decisions. As noted above, the US position was one of the reasons for the disqualification of China from the Galileo partnership. Additionally, given its more rapid progress, some European states are involved in Artemis Accords despite the original idea of developing their own Moon Village project that currently seems to be on a second track. Even though the European approach to space is not unified (ESPI 2020), it now appears that the United States are in a stronger position to lead the common lunar settlement efforts. While being very close in their behaviour in the international politics regarding the space and other international affairs, Europe is generally the more open and cooperative party of the relationship, including some forms of cooperation with China and, more importantly prior to the 2022 aggression against Ukraine, Russia, while the United States are more actionable. Nonetheless, in the process of developing the missions to the celestial bodies, we can expect a complementary, while not unified, approach to the grander missions and in major strategic decisions. We can also expect cooperation in many other international efforts rooted in the liberal approach to the utilization of space resources and commercialization of outer space activities with the aim to develop a favourable international framework for space affairs in general. 3.4  Continental Asia Continental Asian space international relations are mainly characterized by the interplay between three major space powers – China, Russia and India. As noted earlier, Russia and China have been cooperating in the space sector since the 1990s. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the primary partner of China in the development of space technologies was, following the establishment of the US-Chinese relations in the 1970s, however, Washington. On the other hand, India was long attempting to balance between the Soviet and Western influence (Aliberti 2018, 16–27). It is currently competing over

Actors 47 the general geopolitical position in Asia and Indian Ocean region with China, thus getting closer to the West regarding the space as well as terrestrial foreign policy and strategic approach. While China became, already in 1970, the fifth state to launch a domestically developed launcher, it based its impressive progress in the development of space technologies on the proven Russian infrastructure and technologies. It redeveloped purchased technology to fit its own needs and continued in cooperation both in training and in the diplomatic efforts on international fora. China thus did not only train its astronauts in Russia but also got assistance from its Russian partners in the conduct of its first spacewalk in 2008 or in the process of construction of space station. While Russia still managed to retain the most sensitive space technologies to itself, the relationship is mutually advantageous. An influx of Chinese money helped keep the Russian space programme alive, while China sped up its process of developing a fullfledged space programme with a complete set of space capabilities (Perfilyev 2010). On the other hand, the Indian space programme was historically a recipient of Soviet and Russian aid while being in a long-lasting strategic competition with neighbouring China, including dispute in the Kashmir region and border war that took place in 1962. The border issue is still not settled, presenting one particular point of contention in the increasingly competitive strategic relations tied to the rise of China and the consequent rise of India. The Indian space programme, as noted earlier, has its roots already in the 1960s and the attempt to use space technologies for internal developmental purposes. Despite this primary focus on domestic development, the Indian space programme increased its funding in 2002 that allowed it to engage in more security-related and other non-developmental projects (Paracha 2013). In reaction to the inability to use space infrastructure in the 1999 Kargil War and to the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test, India began developing its own military projects aiming to the development of this capacity (Aliberti 2018, 40, Moltz 2014, 55–57). It has since developed a proven anti-satellite capacity following its own first test in 2019. In order to maintain and improve its position in the space competition with China, India may make use of its massive system of remote sensing satellites, space launch capacity, large investment into space research and development and enhancement of regional cooperation with Australia, South Korea and Japan aiming to contain China (Paracha 2013) similar to the terrestrial initiatives like Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, involving India, Japan, Australia and the United States. Indian GPS augmentation system GAGAN is part of the area that allows for uninterrupted enhanced GPS navigational capacities stretching from Europe (operated by EGNOS) to Japan (MSAS), which is very important for aviation (Aliberti 2018, 81). Besides, we can identify smaller actors, like Pakistan supported by its Chinese ally (Lele 2013, 45–46) or Southeast Asian nations, with limited space capabilities or operating purchased foreign-built satellites. However,

48 Actors the main actors in Asia remain China, India, Japan, and, if geographically included Russia. While the US-Japanese cooperation is very close, Russia is not unambiguously tied only to China and is maintaining some of the historical ties to India, including, for example, the participation of India in the Russian GLONASS system (Lele 2013, 153–154). Nonetheless, the competing IndoChinese dimension of the relationship is clearly demonstrating in the celestial domain, especially in the development of the lunar missions, as the interest in Mars seems to be secondary (Lele 2013, 171). Chinese Chang’e mission began with the launch of a lunar probe in 2007, while Chandrayaan-1 became a year later the first Indian satellite mission to the Moon (Lele 2013, Paracha 2013, 160–163). This was, however, only an opening salvo of the deep space competition among the two Asian powers. China progressed with the second orbital mission in 2010. Chang’e 3 and 4 included soft landings with rovers deployed in 2013 to Mare Imbrium on the near side of the Moon and in 2019 to the South Pole Aitken basin, particularly to the part of the crater located on the far side of the Moon, becoming the first lander on the averted part of Earth’s only natural satellite. The year 2020 followed with Chang’e 5 sample return mission. Indian Chandrayaan-2 mission ended with an unsuccessful soft-landing attempt to the south polar region. The attempted landing is likely to repeat in 2023 with Chandrayaan-3. As mentioned earlier, India was the first of the two to reach the Martian orbit in 2013 but was followed by Chinese Tianwen-1 in 2021 that additionally managed a soft landing of a rover on the Martian surface. Both of the actors see a wide array of advantages in the lunar and Martian missions, including prestige, research and development progress, natural resources extraction, obtaining diplomatic leverage, or controlling strategic locations. Their competition might add another level of complexity to the geopolitical considerations regarding the celestial bodies. 3.5  Middle Eastern awakening Despite being the centre of attention in the research of topics related to international politics and security and resource economy, the Middle East was, for a long time, except Israel, more or less passive regarding the utilization of space applications. Despite the fact, we can observe very interesting developments regarding the space domain, including participation on the missions to the studied celestial bodies. Middle Eastern outer space awakening, additionally, also highlights the tight connection between the terrestrial and space policy. The first Middle Eastern state to possess indigenous space capabilities was Israel. This came as a result of the impact of the strategic environment that appeared following the signature of the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 on Israeli decision-making. As such, it was tightly connected to the military needs of the country (Paikowsky, Levi and Ben Israel 2013, 331). As Israel lacks geographic strategic depth due to its small territory, it needed

Actors 49 to develop some verification mechanism to enhance its intelligence gathering capability and provide early warning in case of a surprise attack. The country thus decided to develop space reconnaissance capacities to meet this demand via means that are generally perceived as legitimate on the international scene (Ben Israel and Paikowsky 2017). After it met its security demands, Israel additionally focused on industrial and social development through space applications. These are based on the military origins but due to the dual-use nature of the satellites allowed for such a broadening of the provided applications (Paikowsky et al. 2013, 331). Israel thus reversed the development of, for example, the Indian space programme that began as civilian and later added the military segment. The Israeli space programme is thus developing from a military application basis and serves as a peaceful deterrent as well as an additional proof of Israel’s technological development (Lele 2013, 36, 163). Despite the regional diplomatic issues that prevent Israel from utilizing the advantageous eastward launch due to the risk of interception from hostile states lying in the potential flight path, Israel manages important cooperation regarding space travel. As the launch of larger satellites against the Earth’s rotational force would be extremely costly, Israel makes. For example, use of cooperation with India to launch these from its territory (Lele 2013, 36–38). The country also holds additional agreements regarding strategic space cooperation with the United States and European states and agencies (Ben Israel and Paikowsky 2017, 162). In the field of celestial bodies’ missions, Israel most famously conducted failed soft landing of the Beresheet probe in 2019 that was, interestingly, constructed by the Israeli private company SpaceIL. The UAE became the rising star of the early 21st-century space development, including missions to celestial bodies and the development of a legal framework regarding further activities on these objects. While there were initiatives inside the Arab world aiming to develop space services supportive of the regional development, including Arabsat, or, in full, Arab Satellite Communications Organization, founded in 1976 that since 1985 operates a geosynchronous orbit-based telecommunication system (Lele 2013, 39), it was the UAE’s policy decisions regarding deep space activities that drew more attention to the region. First, the UAE in 2019 passed a law facilitating space mining, becoming the third nation after the United States and Luxembourg to go this direction and joining the economically liberal camp of countries supportive of the private utilization of space resources (spacewatch.global 2020). This decision followed a path that was already drawn in the UAE 2016 National Space Policy (UAE Government 2016). Second, the UAE successful placed its Al-Amal probe on the Martian orbit in 2021. The UAE also aims to utilize the space segment in modernizing and restructuring its economy towards a more sustainable model (ESPI 2021, 37). It is thus highly likely that the UAE will become, at least junior, party to the settlement and economic projects targeting celestial bodies – it targets to operate an inhabitable Martian settlement on Mars by 2117.

50 Actors Other relevant regional initiatives definitely include the Iranian space programme. Iran has placed its first satellite in orbit with Russian help from its Plesetsk spaceport in 2005. Iran conducted its first domestic launch already in 2009. Nonetheless, the Iranian space programme is widely perceived as a dummy for tests of ballistic missiles and thus reacted upon rather negatively. It is likely that Iran will not become involved in the deep space missions and will utilize its space programme to develop launch and dual-use capabilities instead (Lele 2013, 30–33, Moltz 2014, 55–57). Another actor that is to a degree active in the space domain is Turkey. It, however, lacks independent launch capacities. While Turkish space activities were historically mainly focused on the provision of communication services (Lele 2013, 40), it recently announced a plan to construct a spaceport in Somalia to spur its lunar programme (Soylu 2021), utilizing Somalia’s favourable geographic location allowing for the eastward launches near to the equator. While being deeply involved in Somalia, the security situation in the country disallows for any such project to realistically take place, and the Turkish involvement in the development of the celestial bodies also seems highly unlikely. While still underdeveloped, the Middle East can play an interesting role in the studied dynamics. Due to the wealth and ambitions of some of its leaders, the selected countries might get involved on a limited scale in selected efforts towards the celestial bodies. Additionally, the important legal provisions made by the UAE might turn the Emirates into a magnet of private asteroid mining for private entities with a poor relationship with the Western and East Asian countries aiming to legalize the conduct as well. It is highly unlikely that the Middle Eastern countries will play a major role in the foreseeable future, but their particular impact might be very well visible and worth consideration. 3.6  Commercial actors and New Space Since the beginning of the 21st century, we can observe a high level of commercialization and privatization of many segments of the space industry, space applications and provision of space-based services. While the incorporation of a private and business sector into the development of space flight capabilities is nothing new, the increasing level of independence and specialization is arguably setting a scene for a new era in the space age – New Space. New Space is tied to the process of the massive proliferation of actors in the space arena that has been evident since the end of the Cold War. While this proliferation initially included mainly state actors, after the 2000s, we can see the same development involving commercial activities of private entities or more or less independent entrepreneurs. Such a development decreases the impact of governmental space agencies in the domain and changes the inherent working of space politics and economy. These entrepreneurial actors are motivated by cost considerations, and unlike state actors, they are motivated by profit. State agencies are able to undertake non-profit activities

Actors 51 tied to national security or science, while the aim of the private entities is economic profitability, and thus, they spur the innovations leading towards the decrease of cost of space travel and provision of space services. This can be done, for example, through the development of cheap small massmanufactured satellites. Such private operations involve, among others, the introduction of so-called mega-constellations composed of thousands of small cheap satellites providing some form of service to ground users. An example of one such project is SpaceX’s Starlink and provision of spacebased Internet connection. Another important innovation includes the reusability of space launchers that is tied to the push towards decreasing the price of space launches. The ultimate goal is, yet again, increased profit from space activities. Private entities are also involved in opening new markets that would not be otherwise developed by the state actors like space tourism. Private commercial entities are thus not only decreasing the prices of the already existing services but also providing new services that might bring them profit (Paikowsky 2017, Quintana 2017, Weinzierl 2018). Examples of New Space companies, besides the well-known SpaceX, Blue Origin or Virgin Galactic, include, for example, Tyvak Nano-Space constructing cheap satellites for a wide array of clients (Baiocchi and Welser IV 2015), LeoLabs developing solutions for on-orbit collision prevention, Orbital ATK active in the space launch market, Bigelow Aerospace that develops inflatable modules that might be useful basic components of the construction of space settlements, Sierra Nevada Corporation dedicated to the development of reusable Dream Chaser spacecraft, or NanoRacks operating in the market of satellite deployment (James and Roper 2018, 28–32). The majority of the private space companies are, nonetheless, interested in suborbital and orbital space, where the majority of the opportunities for generating income is currently located. The deep-space missions additionally require higher financial input that is generally available only to the largest state-space agencies. Nevertheless, we can also identify more or less successful companies dedicated to participation in the missions to the celestial bodies. The most impactful among these is by the time of writing Space Exploration Technologies Corporation better known as SpaceX. While SpaceX is currently most famous due to the provision of both cargo and human spaceflight services, including launches to the ISS, its ultimate goal is the piloted mission to the surface of Mars. The company was in 2020 able to reinstate the US domestic capacity of human space travel and was contracted by NASA with the deliverance of cargo and parts for the Gateway space station.3 Additionally, the company was awarded a contract for the development of a lunar lander that will be used as a part of the Artemis programme to land piloted missions on a lunar surface.4 SpaceX is thus currently presenting commercial solutions to the transportation needs for the mission connecting the Earth and its orbits with the potential to be included in the US-led lunar mission. This would aid its development of technologies for the Martian mission. It is thus possible that besides participation in state-based deep space projects, SpaceX will

52 Actors attempt to develop an independent mission or become contracted by NASA to provide it with solutions for reaching the Martian surface with a piloted lander. Other companies involved in the development of technologies or other capacities include, for example, the already mentioned Bigelow Aerospace that develops inflatable modules that might be used for the construction of settlements. Planetary Resources, Deep Space Industries, Kepler Energy and Space Engineering, or Asteroid Mining Corporation were for a time dedicated to developing necessary technologies and procedures for space mining missions. Japanese ispace wants to participate in the lunar missions, while NanoRacks, Bigelow Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK and the Sierra Nevada Corporation were selected to support NASA’s effort to reach Mars with a piloted mission by 2030 (James and Roper 2018, 27, 34, Paikowsky and Tzezana 2018, 10–11). NASA further aims to incorporate private solutions into its framework for lunar landing, including development of capacities to survive lunar night with a fuel cell (Goswami and Garretson 2020, 148). We can also identify non-governmental organization Moon Village Association that attempts to follow through with the vision of ESA’s Moon Village and turn it into practice. There is clearly a difference between the private effort to boost state-based efforts and the fully independent development of deep space missions. It can be argued that the private entities will be involved in such missions that promise profit, no matter whether through an independent journey to mine an asteroid or as a support to a state agency’s lunar mission. Such support is crucial, especially in the West, and it is these countries that primarily press on changing the state-centric framework of space operations (Baiocchi and Welser IV 2015). As evident from this brief overview, private space companies are tied mainly to the space programmes in the United States and Europe rather than in China and Russia. While China is utilizing private space entities in its geoeconomic strategy as a tool of foreign policy rooted in the state capitalistic model (Milhaupt and Lin 2013), the United States and Europe pursue the liberalization of the space economy in order to enable the private companies to make use of the potential markets and available resources. This difference is clearly evident just by looking at official documents dedicated to commercial activities. The Chinese documents mentioning private entities include, for example, Document 60 from 2014 that briefly mentions the topic and allowed for the limited appearance of Chinese private space entities (Liu et al. 2019, 14). The 2016 White Paper then focuses mainly on the international cooperation and level of activities of such entities (The State Council, The People’s Republic of China 2016). Furthermore, the Chinese private space entities are tightly connected to the state not only legally but also through financing and provision of infrastructural capacities (Klein 2019, 185). On the contrary, the United States and European approach is rooted in the support for independent private commercial activity as noted, among others, in the 2020 US National Space Policy (US Government 2020, 20–22), US Space

Actors 53 Policy Directives 1,5 26 and 37 or the European Commission’s Space Strategy for Europe (European Commission 2016) and EU Space Industrial Policy (European Commission 2013). These involve possible participation of the private entities on state-controlled projects and financial support to these, but the companies act, in general, independently. As evident, the impact of the private entities on the state-centric nature of space travel is uneven and mainly tied to the United States, Europe and their allies. The private actors will likely play three major roles. The first lies in their impact on the overall focus of the space age. They highlight the economic rationalization of the space projects and decrease tensions rooted in statebased power competition. Second, they will participate on selected deep space missions, mainly of the North American and European space agencies. Especially for NASA, the inclusion of private entities seems to be of crucial importance. Thirdly, some entities might attempt to conduct independent missions, including lunar landing or asteroid mining. Given the high price tag of such missions, however, this development is in the foreseeable future unlikely to become a massively pursued option. 3.7  Actors and celestial bodies As evident, the pallet of the approaches and capacities of different actors towards the studied objects is rather colourful. On the one hand, we can identify major space agencies with significant budgets, undertaking a wide variety of activities. On the other, there are smaller actors who might participate in the deep-space projects but not initiate their own missions. The former group, firstly, include the United States mainly through activities and missions of NASA. The United States is not only the sole country to ever successfully land a piloted mission to a celestial object, but also an actor undertaking or planning missions to all celestial bodies studied in this book. The Moon is to be settled through the Artemis scheme. Mars is currently under research by, among others, rovers Curiosity and Perseverance. There are several missions undertaken or planned to the minor celestial bodies as well. The United States holds full-scale space launch capacities and is developing new launchers in order to meet its goals in deep space. It also possesses political motivation and support in order to undertake such a challenging goal as is a mission to a celestial body that includes the construction of a settlement or other permanent installations. It additionally collaborates with the private sector to decrease the price tag of its missions and fill existing gaps. This includes, among others, the provision of piloted launches by SpaceX. The United States thus possesses capacities and holds motivation to become one of the major players in the short and mid-term sustainable activities on the selected bodies. The second prominent state actor involved in colonization and other schemes is likely to be China. While still catching up with the US programme capacity-wise, the Chinese space programme is on the rise. China clearly

54 Actors holds ambitions to partake in the activities to and on the celestial bodies, potentially overcoming the United States as the next actor to land an astronaut on the Moon or Mars or in building the first lunar settlement. This is evidenced by the signing of the Sino-Russian Memorandum of Understanding on the development of lunar settlement or its robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, including the landing of a rover on both of these bodies. The Chinese programme does not differentiate between the military and civilian parts and is significantly less tied to private efforts. This distinction is quite clear if we compare general political structures and institutions in China and the United States. While not holding such developed capacities as the United States, China is also to be counted among the major actors in the power competition over the celestial bodies and will be very likely to hold major independent efforts or stand as a main pillar of a wider cooperative project. Both of these actors are also likely to become the central nodes of wider cooperative efforts to settle the celestial bodies. Next, there are four impactful but likely not central actors that will likely partake in the more sophisticated activities to the selected celestial bodies – Europe through ESA, EU and national programmes, Russia, India and Japan. Europe and Japan are critical technological powerhouses with developed capacities, India is a space power in ascendance, and Russia is the one in decline. Europeans are able and willing to develop some relevant independent capacities but will likely participate in collaborative missions with the United States. ESA specifically is in its activities often very closely cooperating with NASA, while the EU and national space programmes are more security-oriented. In the context of Artemis Accords, ESA’s project Moon Village is seemingly not the main candidate for a collaborative effort to settle the lunar surface. Similarly, Japan is likely to become a partner in wider efforts. As the Japanese space programme is, since its inception, closely tied to the United States and as the Japanese government agreed to participate in Artemis Accords, Japan is very likely to provide specific technological solutions for the project. The role of India is yet to be set, and some combination of independent efforts and participation in collaborative efforts is also the most likely way forward. The Indian space programme is on the rise, and its capacities to operate in the space domain are increasing, yet it still lags in many vital features, including financing and political will to lead the mission to settle the celestial bodies. Finally, Russia is likely to be increasingly dependent on cooperation with China in its capacity to conduct frontier missions. The Russian space programme is still mainly living off its past with a very low capacity for massive innovations. All four are, however, likely to possess relevant independent space capacities and will not be fully dependent on cooperation with their partners. The level of independence will be in the future decided by the internal political, economic and technological development and based on the actors’ goals and capacities. Thus, it is more likely that possible Europe and India independence might enhance, while Japan and Russia are to be

Actors 55 left more dedicated to the foreign-based collaborative efforts regarding more sophisticated missions to celestial bodies. A third set of actors includes those states with limited capacities but still some potential relevance for the development of settlements and installations on the celestial bodies. Examples include technologically progressive states with little foreign policy capabilities, financial support to space programmes, and goals in space development. To give an example, Canada is in this respect providing important technologies as a part of cooperative efforts with NASA and ESA, including on the ISS. Israel is supportive of the commercial space sector that might provide some solutions to the wider cooperative efforts to operate on celestial bodies. The UAE is presenting an ambitious resource-rich state aiming to modernize its economy through the support of space efforts. It is likely that the country will be able to attract investments from private ventures and to aid with the financing of less complex missions to the studied celestial bodies, similarly to the success of the Al-Amal Martian probe. Nonetheless, these actors will likely not be able to shape the general direction of the efforts but would be able to participate in them. Smaller space actors, however, may also affect the efforts in a different way. As the missions into deep space are currently not high on the agenda of the major space powers, any disruptions in Earth’s orbital space would further push away any of the plans to develop sustainable installations on the Moon, Mars or minor objects. Especially limited space powers located in critical geopolitical flashpoints like North Korea or Iran might initiate conflict that would further steer priorities of the major space powers away from the deep space missions to the solutions of the ignited crisis. In case such a crisis would lead to a kinetic conflict, the negative effects, including a massive increase in the amount of space debris, would likely further decrease the probability of any more complex deep space missions taking place. For this reason, even actors with very limited space capabilities must be taken into account even though their direct participation in the settlement projects is very unlikely. Last but not least, the private actors will play their roles in the process. While the majority of the space market is currently located on Earth’s orbits, it is highly likely that the private ventures will, in some form, participate in the more complex deep space missions. Be it as a major provider of some services like SpaceX, developer of key infrastructure or source of more specialized technological, software or other solutions, the role of the private sector is crucial. Especially the Western efforts most prominently institutionalized in Artemis scheme are to be tightly connected to the development of private solutions. On the contrary, despite the efforts of SpaceX and others, it is improbable that a private company will be, in the near or mid-term, able to independently develop a lunar or Martian settlement or develop an installation on an asteroid. While such efforts have been signalled by several companies, the technological sophistication and price tag of such an endeavour is so far too high for a single private entity lacking any governmental backing.

56 Actors As evident, the canvas of space international relations is as varied as the international politics on Earth. While maintaining a more cooperative nature and more considerable technological unevenness, the basic logic remains very similar to the terrestrial international relations, including the appearance of two main competing power blocs. The future development is to be dynamic, and many surprises might appear, including the role of private actors or potential spoilers. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned basic setting presents an important starting point for an analysis of the upcoming contest over celestial bodies. Notes 1 Japan is not covered in this section despite its matured space technology as it is still tightly connected to the US space programme. In the settlement efforts it constitutes an integral part of the Artemis scheme and thus is for the purposes of this work considered a regional rather than global spacepower. 2 The Artemis project can be subdivided into Artemis Accords as a legal document and Artemis Program as a technical and practical part. However, for the purposes of this book the Artemis Accords is used as a common name for both interdependent parts of the initiative. 3 Available at https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-artemis-contract-forgateway-logistics-services 4 Available at https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/as-artemis-moves-forward-nasa-picksspacex-to-land-next-americans-on-moon 5 Available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialmemorandum-reinvigorating-americas-human-space-exploration-program/ 6 Available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/space-policydirective-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space/ 7 Available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/space-policydirective-3-national-space-traffic-management-policy/

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Actors 57 CNSA. China and Russia sign a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Cooperation for the Construction of the International Lunar Research Station. March 9, 2021. http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6811380/content. html (accessed March 20, 2021). ———. China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective. January 28, 2022. http://www. cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6813088/content.html (accessed March 3, 2022). Crotts, A. 2014. The New Moon: Water, Exploration and Future Habitation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davenport, C. Trump pushed for a moon landing in 2024. It’s not going to happen. January 13, 2021. washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/13/trump-nasamoon-2024/ (accessed March 23, 2021). Doboš, B. 2018. Geopolitics of the Outer Space: A European Perspective. Cham: Springer. ———. 2022. “Tortoise the Titan: Private Entities as Geoeconomic Tools in Outer Space.” Space Policy 60: 1–9. ESA. Moon Village. 2016. https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Ministerial_Council_2016/ Moon_Village (accessed March 20, 2021). ———. Lunar satellites. November 16, 2020. https://www.esa.int/Applications/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Lunar_satellites (accessed May 30, 2021). ESPI. Artemis Accords: What Implications for Europe? November 2020. https://espi. or.at/news/espi-brief-46-artemis-accords-what-implications-for-europe (accessed July 3, 2021). ———. ESPI Briefs No. 07 – China’s 2016 White Paper on Space: An Analysis. 2017. https://www.espi.or.at/briefs/chinas-2016-white-paper-on-space-an-analysis/ (přístup získán April 2, 2021). ———. ESPI Report 79-Emerging Spacefaring Nations-Full Report. June 2021. https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-public-reports (accessed July 3, 2021). European Commission. Eu Space Industrial Policy: Releasing the Potential for Economic Growth in the Space Sector. February 28, 2013. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0108&from=EN (accessed February 4, 2021). ———. Space Strategy for Europe. October 26, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN-MAIN.PDF (accessed February 4, 2021). Goswami, N., and P.A. Garretson. 2020. Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Handberg, R. “China’s Space Strategy and Policy Evaluation.” In Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy, edited by E. Sadeh, 249–262. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. Harding, R. C. 2013. Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development on the Final Frontier. Abingdon: Routledge. Hays, P.L. 2011. Space and Security: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Howell, E. Russia wants to build its own space station, as early as 2028. July 28, 2022. https://www.space.com/russian-space-station-ross-2028-timeline (accessed September 18, 2022).

58 Actors Hufenbach, B., T. Reiter, and E. Sourgens. 2014. “ESA Strategic Planning for Space Exploration.” Space Policy 30 (3). James, T., and S. Roper. 2018. “Launching from Earth: The Science Behind Space Law and Technological Developments.” In Deep Space Commodities: Exploration, Production and Trading, edited by T. James, 21–52. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnson-Freese, J. 2007. Space as a Strategic Asset. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ———. 2016. Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. London: Routledge. Klein, J. J. 2019. Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space. London: Routledge. Krige, J., and A Russo. A History of the European Space Agency 1958–1987. Volume I. April 2000a. http://www.esa.int/esapub/sp/sp1235/sp1235v1web.pdf (accessed May 22, 2015). Krige, J., A. Sebesta, and L. Russo. A history of the European Space Agency 1958– 1987. Volume II. 2000b. https://www.esa.int/esapub/sp/sp1235/sp1235v2web.pdf (accessed May 22, 2015). Lele, A. 2013 Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?. Heidelberg: Springer India. Lewis, J. S. 1997. Mining the Sky: Untold Riches from the Asteroids, Comets, and Planets. New York, NY: Helix Books. Liu, I., E. Linck, B. Lal, K. W. Crane, X. Han, and T. J. Colvin. Evaluation of China’s Commercial Space Sector. September 2019. https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/ publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx (accessed February 8, 2021). Milhaupt, C. J., and L.-W. Lin. 2013. “We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China.” Stanford Law Review 65 (4): 697–759. Moltz, J. C. 2013. “Space and Strategy: From Theory to Practice.” In Space Strategy in the 21st Century, edited by E. Sadeh, 15–38. Abingdon: Routledge.: ———. 2014. Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. NASA. Gateway. February 11, 2021. https://www.nasa.gov/gateway (accessed March 19, 2021). ———. The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes. October 13, 2020. https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed13Oct2020.pdf (accessed March 19, 2021). Němečková, M. 2020. The concept of security dilemma in the environment of outer space: The case of the Galileo system. Master Thesis. Praha: Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut politologických studií. Oberg, J. E. 2009. “International Perspectives: Russia.” In Towards the Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, edited by C.H. Lutes and P.L. Hays. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. Pace, S. 2015. “U.S. – Japan Space Security Cooperation.” In Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs, edited by K.-U. Schrogl, P. L. Hays, J. Robinson, D. Moura and C. Giannopapa, 337–354. Cham: Springer. Paikowsky, D. 2017. “What Is New Space? The Changing Ecosystem of Global Space Activity.” New Space 5(2): 84–88.

Actors 59 Paikowsky, D., and R. Tzezana. 2018. “The Politics of Space Mining – An Account of a Simulation Game.” Acta Astronautica 142: 10–17. Paikowsky, D., R. Levi, and I. Ben Israel. 2013. “Israel’s Space Strategy.” In Space Strategy in the 21st Century, edited by E. Sadeh, 322–344. Abingdon: Routledge. Paracha, S. 2013. “Military Dimensions of the Indian Space Program.” Astropolitics 11 (3): 156–186. Perfilyev, N. 2010. “The Sino-Russian Space Entente.” Astropolitics 8 (1): 19–34. Pollpeter, K., T. Ditter, A. Miller, and B. Waidelich. China’s Space Narrative: Examining the Portrayal of the US-China Space Relationship in Chinese Sources and its Implications for the United States. 2020. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Conference-2020/CASI%20Conference%20China%20Space%20 Narrative.pdf?ver=FGoQ8Wm2DypB4FaZDWuNTQ%3d%3d (accessed September 3, 2021). Pražák, J. 2021. “Dual-Use Conundrum: Towards the Weaponization of Outer Space?” Acta Astronautica 187: 397–405. Quintana, E. 2017. “The New Space Age: Questions for Defence and Security.” The RUSI Journal 162 (3): 88–109. Reddy, V. S. 2017. “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: Balancing Act between the U.S. Congress and President.” Astropolitics 15 (3): 235–250. Schmitt, H. H. 2006. Return to the Moon: Exploration, Enterprise, and Energy in the Human Settlement of Space. New York, NY: Springer. Soylu, R. Revealed: Turkey plans spaceport in Somalia for $1bn moon mission. February 18, 2021. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-space-programme-somalia-base-cost-revealed (accessed April 4, 2021). spacewatch.global. UAE Space Law Details Announced To Facilitate Space Sector Development. February 2020. https://spacewatch.global/2020/02/uae-space-lawdetails-announced-to-facilitate-space-sector-development/ (accessed March 21, 2021). Suzuki, K. 2013. “The Contest for Leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese Approaches to Outer Space.” Space Policy 29(2): 99–106. Tellis, A. 2007. “China’s Military Space Strategy.” Survival 49(3): 41–72. The State Council, The People’s Republic of China. Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016. December 28, 2016. http://english.www.gov.cn/ archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm (accessed February 8, 2021). UAE Government. UAE National Space Policy. September 2016. https://space.gov. ae/Documents/PublicationPDFFiles/UAE_National_Space_Policy_English.pdf (accessed March 21, 2021). US Congress. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. November 25, 2015. congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW-114publ90.pdf (accessed March 23, 2021). US Embassy in Japan. Joint Statement – The Seventh Meeting of the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space. August 27, 2020. Joint Statement – The Seventh Meeting of the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space (accessed March 20, 2021). US Government. National Space Policy of the United States of America. December 9,2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/National-Space-Policy.pdf (accessed February 4, 2021).

60 Actors Vidal, F. Russia’s Space Policy: The Path of Decline? January 2021. ifri.org/sites/ default/files/atoms/files/vidal_russia_space_policy_2021_.pdf (accessed March 23, 2021). Wang, S.-C. 2009. “The Making of New “Space”: Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics.” Geopolitics 14 (3): 433–461. ———. 2013. Transatlantic Space Politics: Competition and Cooperation Above the Clouds. Abingdon: Routledge. Weintraub, D. A. 2018. Life on Mars: What to Know before We Go. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Weinzierl, M. 2018. “Space, the Final Economic Frontier.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 32(2): 173–192. Wingo, D. 2009. “Economic Development of the Solar System: The Heart of a 21st Century Spacepower Theory.” In Toward the Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, edited by C. D. Lutes and P. L. Hays. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. Yoshimatsu, H. 2021. “Exploring the China Factor in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in Outer Space.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 75 (3): 1–18. Zak, A. Russia approves its 10-year space strategy. March 23, 2016. planetary.org/ articles/0323-russia-space-budget (accessed March 23, 2021). Zhang, Y. 2013. “The Eagle Eyes the Dragon in Space – A Critique.” Space Policy 29 (2): 113–120.

4

Environmental Factors

It took only a little more than a decade following the end of the Second World War for humanity to begin its operations in outer space, but the 21st century international space relations are still heavily determined by the physical factors affecting the ability of space powers to utilize foreign policy tools in the space domain. Outer space establishes an environmentally unique and demanding domain of international politics. Not only that it is challenging to reach the domain from the Earth’s surface, but also the movement in it and specifics of the studied celestial bodies provide a completely different framework to the terrestrial physical conditions that can be overcome only by the utilization of very advanced technology. This section will highlight several topics that will present the physical characteristics and constraints crucial for the geopolitical analysis provided later on. It first looks at some fundamental general astrophysical and environmental factors applicable to the domain. The second part deals with lines of communication and general movement in outer space. Finally, it presents crucial physical characteristics of the studied bodies. Before dwelling into the details of the physical characteristics of the studied region, it is first essential to settle some conceptual questions. If we want to debate the geopolitics of celestial bodies properly, it is crucial to understand the difference between these. Following the decision of the International Astronomical Union made at its 2006 General Assembly taking place in Prague, the organization decided to change the definition of a planet in order to exclude the ever-growing group of newly defined dwarf planets, including Pluto, to “a celestial body that (a) is in orbit around the Sun, (b) has sufficient mass for its self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium (nearly round) shape and (c) has cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit (IAU 2006)”. Following this change, the category of dwarf planets includes bodies fulfilling criteria (a) and (b) but not (c). In the inner solar system, this includes only Ceres located in the asteroid belt. A celestial body called “moon” is any object orbiting a celestial body other than a star, the Sun, in the case of the solar system. Finally, we can identify smaller objects orbiting the Sun, with asteroids being the irregularly shaped rocky DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-4

62  Environmental Factors bodies, while comets being the bodies made primarily of ice and dust with very elliptical orbits that usually take them close to the Sun, thus entering the inner solar system, but also into the trans-Neptunian region. 4.1  Space environment All astropolitical considerations, no matter the actual theoretical framework, should take into account the physical specifications of outer space activities. If not, their practical applicability remains very limited. Outer space, despite the appearance of empty vastness, holds specific geography and presents humankind with an environmental framework, unlike any domain on Earth. Even entering the domain – conventionally defined as any location above the 100 km Kármán line – is an enormously challenging task for any terrestrial being achieved, according to records, for the first time only in 1942 and mastered on a regular basis only since the 1950s. The main issue related to the ability of any artificial object to leave the surface of the Earth and its atmosphere is the deep gravity well of the Blue Planet. Each and every object in the universe holds a gravitational pull that is defined by its mass. The Earth’s mass is calculated at 5.9722 × 1024 kg, which transfers into a gravitational pull of 9.807 m/s2. Earth also possesses a rather dense atmosphere, thus creating a drag on the launching systems. This means that the launcher leaving the Earth’s surface must reach a speed of about 11 km/s (40,000 km/h) to enter its orbit. In comparison, the lunar escape velocity is only 2.38 km/s and Martian 5.03 km/s. To meet these ends, space missions are currently dependent on the use of expensive chemical propulsion systems based on the blueprints of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles that offer only a limited perspective for a reduction of launch costs. Of course, there are other proposed methods of reaching terrestrial orbits, such as space elevator or beamed energy systems, but these have not been experimentally tested yet (Coopersmith 2011). The location of the spaceport itself must also be taken into consideration. Earth is an irregularly shaped ellipsoid that rotates around its poles. This means that the closer to the equator one gets, the faster the rotation of the planet beneath one’s feet as it needs to cover a longer distance in the same time period. As Earth rotates to the east, this presents an opportunity for launchers set to begin their journey from spaceports closer to the equator that allows for eastward launches. The eastward launch must not be prohibited by the presence of population concentrations or massive air traffic and, in the best-case scenarios, will include a massive body of water. From this perspective, sites like Brazilian Alcantara or French/European Kourou (located in French Guyana) allow for the maximization of this effect, thus saving the most considerable portion of energy necessary for reaching the escape velocity as the launchers are aided maximally by the rotation of the planet itself. The launchers hold a comparatively larger initial velocity to launchers beginning their journey further away from the equator (France and Sellers 2009). On the other hand, the territory of Israel, as mentioned earlier,

Environmental Factors 63 allows for political reasons only for the westward launches, thus necessitating more significant energy expenditure and related fuel costs on the launch operators. The only exception is set by the launch sites like Russian Pletsesk in the polar regions that provide more efficient launches to specific (near) polar orbits via launching directly to the north or south (Dolman 2002, 68). Exceptions also include launches of small satellites or commercial suborbital flights that might use some alternative methods and locations which are, however, not useful for a more massive cargo. Once in outer space, gravity, again, plays a crucial role. Not only that it affects the mobility of objects through the comparatively higher efficiency of orbital movement, as will be seen below, but it also establishes “gravity wells” whose “depth” relates to the mass of the given body, “high grounds” on top of them and other notable locations. An example is the Lagrange Libration Points (L-points). In a system of any two bodies that gravitationally affect each other, five such points will appear. These points are specific orbital slots, and once an object is located inside them, it will remain in a stable position to the relative position of the two specific bodies (Dolman 2002, 65–66, Nelson and Block 2018, 53–55). As such, an object located in the Earth-Moon L2-point will always be, from the terrestrial perspective, located “behind” the Moon without a need to spend an excessive amount of energy. Similarly, Earth-Moon L1-point allows an object to be perpetually stationed between the Earth and the Moon. The space environment is additionally affected by the impact of charged particles that are, with limited exceptions, blocked from reaching the surface of the Earth by its magnetic field. The majority of the radiation in the inner solar system is produced as an outcome of solar activity in the form of the socalled solar wind. It contains mostly charged particles of light elements and is not so penetrative as the radiation caused by heavier elements coming from the exterior of the solar system (Fry 2012, 180–181, France and Sellers 2009). The intensity of the solar wind is directly tied to the activity of the Sun and, as such, is relatively unstable. It, however, affects both living organisms and technology through specific events caused by the increased solar activity and long-term effects related to the lasting operations in a high-radiation environment. Additionally, the interactions between the solar wind and the magnetic field of Earth (or any other body with a magnetic field) leads to the creation of the so-called van Allen radiation belts that are characterized by higher levels of radiation caused by the capturing of the charged particles in specific regions around the planet (France and Sellers 2009). For these reasons, the activity of the Sun is monitored both from Earth and by space-based probes.1 Another environmental factor that needs to be taken into account is the presence of a near-perfect vacuum. On the one hand, a vacuum presents challenges to both piloted and non-piloted missions, but on the other also allows for orbital movement. As there is only limited drag in the domain, objects generally keep their velocities, thus not requiring constant propulsion for their movement. Additionally, we must account for the presence of the

64  Environmental Factors free-fall environment that not only limits the ability of astronauts to manipulate with tools but also has profound effects on the body structure and health in general. Many of these effects are still not fully understood (France and Sellers 2009). Any mission to deep space thus must take into consideration several restrictions that will affect its planning and execution and cannot be wished away. First, all missions beginning on the terrestrial surface will have strict limits on the mass of the cargo, thus presenting mission planners with clear trade-offs. Any additional protection against the environmental hazards or additional features increasing the comfort of the crew on long missions will lead to an increase in already very high launch costs. Nonetheless, protection is crucial for mission success in both robotic and crewed missions. For robotic missions, the environmental hazards mainly include those affecting the structural integrity of the probe and electrical and optical systems on board. The spaceships and probes are affected by vacuum through the processes of outgassing, cold welding or heat transfer that might damage the integrity of the structure of the object. Additionally, radiation may disturb electrical, optical and other systems on board, and the spaceship must be protected against rapid increases in radiation levels manifesting as a consequence of solar storms tied to higher levels of activity of the Sun or incoming galactic radiation, but also against the continuous, lasting impact of the everpresent radiation that is a constant factor in the environment (Fry 2012, 180–181). Next, probes must be at least semi-autonomous as deep space missions disallow for real-time communication with the object, thus preventing manoeuvring from Earth due to the time lag caused by the necessity of the signals to cross vast distances. Crewed missions are, nonetheless, even more challenging. Added to everything above that remains applicable, humans are additionally affected by the long-term effects of the free-fall environment. While not all the health impacts are fully understood, we can mention at least bone and muscle loss, changes to the cardiovascular system, effects on the immune system, challenges to psychology, or imbalance of microbiological environment as already described effects of the long-term space missions. Consequently, there are measures that need to be taken to allow for lasting piloted missions. The first includes enhanced radiation protection that would allow a crew to survive possible high-radiation events, like the Coronal Mass Ejections, once outside of the Earth’s protective magnetic field. This also includes protection of living organisms once on the surfaces of the studied celestial bodies2 as none of them provides sufficient protection against radiation, but also impact of (micro)meteorites and larger objects that in the terrestrial context burn in the atmosphere but are impacting the surfaces of the studied celestial bodies with full force. The thin Martian atmosphere presents some limited protection, but that is incomparable to that of Earth and insufficient regarding the security of settler communities or terrestrial visitors. Additionally, future settlers will be needing enhanced protective measures against bone and

Environmental Factors 65 muscle loss as they will be spending enormous amounts of time in the free fall or low gravity environments throughout the journey and on the surface of celestial bodies. Additionally, the longer the astronauts remain in the low gravity environment, the more will their bodies adapt to the environment making their return to the Earth with its larger gravitational pull harder. This effect will likely be the most visible among the potential newborns of Mars or the Moon. Nonetheless, at this point, the specifics remain speculative (Bear 2010, Phillips 2012). Current efforts to counter these adversarial effects are undertaken throughout the long-term missions at, for example, the ISS. Nonetheless, they seem insufficient for deep space missions. Other health effects must also be understood correctly in order to counter as many of them as possible. Finally, the psychological issues must not be disregarded. Proposed spaceships that will undertake the piloted deep space missions will keep the potential settlers and miners in close quarters, and the situation on the surface of the celestial bodies will not be much better. The limited privacy combined with the intensive interaction among a small number of people might cause a wide array of issues that might affect not only a specific person itself but the whole mission. The further away from the Earth, the more impactful these issues will be as the distances would not allow for a real-time conversation with anyone outside the ship itself (Phillips 2012). The environmental factors are thus clearly presenting a set of limiting factors that mission plans must account for. If they are disregarded, they will cause any mission to fail. 4.2 Movement As hinted above, the dominant type of movement of outer space objects, including artificial probes and other vehicles, is orbital movement. All celestial bodies inside the solar system are located on more or less stable orbits, and orbits establish the most efficient type of movement from the point of view of energy expenditure, thus decreasing the cost of travel of space vehicles. In order to reach an orbit, a given object must reach sufficient speed that differs according to the gravitational pull of a given body. In case an orbited body has an atmosphere, the orbiting object is also required to be located above the gaseous wrapper of the planet or moon at hand. Stable orbital movement is achieved only once the orbiting object is in the correct distance from the body and with sufficient speed so that it will not fall back on the body’s surface but neither leave the gravitational pull of the body altogether. Given the near-perfect vacuum, once such conditions are achieved, a constant speed is kept allowing the body to maintain its orbit indefinitely. At least in theory. In practice, the vacuum is not perfect thus steadily slowing down the objects. Orbits are additionally impacted by the effects of space weather and collisions, and in the case of smaller bodies, also by the gravitational effects of larger objects. Nevertheless, an orbital movement can be imagined as constantly falling beyond the horizon – being indefinitely in the “free fall”.

66  Environmental Factors For the majority of currently conducted space missions, terrestrial orbits are the most important ones. We can distinguish between low (approximately 150–800/2,000 km depending on the author), medium (end of low earth orbits to around 35,000 km) and high earth orbits (higher), each used for specific types of missions. A specific orbit can be found at approximately 35,786 km – a geosynchronous orbit. An object located at the particular height of the geosynchronous orbit will match the rotational period of Earth. If located directly above the equator, it will reach so-called geostationary orbit and will be located over one specific region throughout the whole orbital period. Similar orbits can be found around many celestial bodies. While such an orbit is unreachable in the case of the Moon due to its slow rotational period and presence of the Earth in its vicinity, the areostationary orbit (geostationary but Mars) is located at approximately 17,032 km above the Martian surface. Other types of orbits relevant for movement around the Earth are polar, highly elliptical or sun-synchronous orbits. Another important orbit is the so-called Hohmann transfer orbit that allows for the most efficient transit between two orbits by increasing the speed of an object at a precisely given time and slowing it with another burn upon reaching the designated higher orbit (or the other way around). The same process can apply in reverse as well. Using this technique, an object spends very little precious fuel compared to direct transfer requiring constant propulsion. This manoeuvre can be applied to transfer between terrestrial orbits but also between orbits of two celestial bodies, including, for example, trips from Earth to Mars. Evidently, fuel savings are the most important reason for utilizing orbital movement by artificial probes. Given the restrictions mentioned above on mass upon launch, spaceships and probes are to carry as little fuel as possible and moving along the orbits saves precious energy. While the direct transfer might present time savings, it also requires more extensive fuel deposits on board. There is also a difference among the time and energy requirements on reaching specific locations in the inner solar system. According to Crotts (2014, 95), based on acceleration needed to reach the relevant regions in our planetary vicinity, the locations are ranked from the easiest to most demanding as follows: low earth orbits, lunar flyby/orbital mission, Earth-Sun and Earth-Moon L-points, near-Earth objects (NEO), Mars flyby, lunar landing, Mars orbit, landing on Martian moons, Venus flyby/orbit, landing on Mars. For the robotic missions, energy expenditure constitutes the most important variable. For the piloted missions, time spent in the hostile environment is, however, also likely to impact the mission planning. Additionally, orbital dynamics plays a crucial role in mission planning through the relative positions of celestial bodies in question. The situation is the simplest in the case of lunar missions. Given the proximity of the Moon to the Earth, the relative position plays only a minor role. The situation is different regarding the other two studied cases. Martian orbit lies approximately half an astronomical unit (AU)3 further from the Sun than Earth’s. It, additionally, orbits on a very elliptical orbit compared to that of Earth. This means

Environmental Factors 67 that it orbits the Sun once every 687 (terrestrial) days compared to Earth’s 365. The window to reach Mars from Earth using Hohmann transfer orbit thus opens once every 26 months, with the same distance cycle between the two bodies reappearing once every 15 years (Schuster 2012, 23). This principle, for example, led to the “space traffic jam” by Mars in early 2021 when it was reached by the United States, UAE and Chinese probes making use of the available launch window that opened in summer 2020. The situation is even more complex in regard to smaller celestial bodies where we need to know the exact orbital parameters (James 2018, 75). The most efficient transit appears once a NEO reaches the closest point to the launching site. Restricting ourselves to Earth/Moon-based launches that are to remain the most relevant launching pads in the mid-term future, this means the part of the flight of a NEO in the vicinity of Earth. These launch windows reappear in varied time periods depending on the specific orbital characteristics of a given object. The orbital mechanics is especially relevant in the planning of a piloted Martian mission. Currently, the most energetically efficient type of transit would involve utilizing the same type of Hohmann transfer orbit used in the robotic missions. Zubrin (1996, 62–65) calculated that there are two possible plans for a piloted mission that must take into account both transfer windows (one for each trip) as well as seasonal characteristics of the Martian atmosphere (including sandstorms) and highly elliptical parameters of Martian orbit (Langevin 2007, 573, 591). Counting with approximately 150 days-long trip in the nearest approach transit scenario, such a mission would require an extended 550 days-long stay of the crew on the Martian surface before it could return to Earth using another energetically efficient Hohmann transfer orbit. Zubrin, however, also presents a shorter option that would make use of the slingshot around Venus (using its orbital speed to increase that of the spacecraft throughout the fly by) upon the return of the astronauts, thus reducing the mission duration by some 300 days as the astronauts would not need to wait for the appearance of another Earth launch window for the nearest transfer. This mission design would, however, expose the crew to a higher radiation dose given the closer proximity to the Sun (Zubrin 1996, 62–65). There is also an option of establishing a stable large cycler station on an orbit between the Earth and Mars that would allow for regular, yet slow, transit between the two planets that might be further operated by smaller ships from the surface of the two planets or the Moon.4 Such an option would allow for standardization of the transit but would prolong the piloted mission to some four years in case only one cycler is maintained (Okutsu et al. 2015). Additionally, the large distance disallows for real-time communication with Mars, including the complete impossibility of direct communication in times the two planets are on different sides of the Sun. This would require establishment of further communication infrastructure that would allow sending signals around the Sun similarly to relays utilized to communicate with the far side of the Moon.

68  Environmental Factors As evident, the motion in outer space is dependent on specific orbits and locations, thus presenting into picture celestial lines of communication (CLOC) and chokepoints similar to those identified in the naval strategy by Mahan. Around the Earth, such chokepoints include low Earth orbits or the geostationary orbit through which the majority of the space travel passes. Additionally, Earth-Moon L1-point, located between the two bodies, allows for the control of the transit between Luna and the Blue Planet, thus establishing a crucial chokepoint in servicing the Moon (Dolman 1999, 96–98). Martian CLOCs include the pathways that allow for economically viable transit between the two bodies – most importantly, the Hohmann transit orbit is available once every 26 months. The CLOCs to asteroids and possibly comets are highly variable. As was established, outer space is not an empty domain of completely random travel that would disallow for strategic approach given its sheer vastness. Gravitational effects, principles of orbital movement and varied energy efficiency of selected transit routes set up clearly identifiable CLOCs, including chokepoints, that might be controlled similarly to the maritime and terrestrial analogues. These communication lines and chokepoints might be avoided, but that would require comparatively higher energy consumption and also, likely, time-period spent for such a mission that clashes with the current incapacity to transport large mass from the terrestrial surface. This makes the CLOCs very similar to much better understood sea lines of communications on Earth. The situation is likely to change with technological progress in the field of propulsion and the growing capacity to manufacture fuel from celestial objects. But for the given analysis and selected timeframe, these developments are so far without any significant impact. 4.3  Geography of the Moon The Moon is the only natural satellite of Earth and the only celestial body ever visited by a crewed mission. Its origins are arguably tied to a catastrophic event that took place throughout the period of formation of planet Earth when it was likely hit by a body of the size of Mars called Theia that likely formed in the proto-Earth-Sun L4/5-point. As a consequence of the collision, an enormous amount of debris was ejected from the proto-Earth and later formed the Moon (Crotts 2014, 161–177). The Moon is currently located on average 384,400 km away from the Earth – about a three-day journey using current technology. This is very close given the comparative distances of other bodies in the solar system and allows for testing of necessary skills and technology for further deep space missions (Phillips 2012, 10). Moon’s diameter is about 3,747 km, making it the 13th largest object in the solar system located between the Jovian moons Io and Europa and being larger than dwarf planet Pluto (Crotts 2014, 17, Spohn 2007, 3). It harnesses a gravitational pull of 1.62 m/s2 equalling some 16.6% of terrestrial gravity. The Moon almost completely lacks a magnetic field and atmosphere (Phillips 2012, 208).

Environmental Factors 69 The surface of the Moon is composed of volcanic (dark) maria (about 16% of the surface (Crotts 2014, 182)) and (lighter) highlands. One of the most critical features of the Moon regarding this study is its tidal lock with Earth. Due to the proximity of the two bodies and the relatively larger mass of the Earth, the Moon always faces the Earth with one side. This does not only disable visibility of one side of the body from the Earth’s surface – the first, even though low quality, picture of the far side of the Moon was taken by Luna 3 only in 1959 – but also affects the illumination of the surface. The Moon orbits the Earth approximately once every 27 days. Given the tidal lock, the daytime and nighttime on its surface take approximately 14 days straight. Given the lack of atmosphere, these extreme conditions lead to heating up of the surface at the equator up to 106°C per day, cooling it to −183°C by night. These inhospitable conditions, however, change as we near the lunar poles. Unlike the Earth, the Moon does not hold a very inclined axis, meaning that we do not observe major changes in temperatures along the terrestrial seasons (Crotts 2014, 221). These conditions are leading to stable illumination conditions even at poles that, given the high latitudes, are only witnessing temperature differences of −10 to 50°C. Additionally, their geography establishes two types of very important regions. The first is the permanently illuminated areas. These very restricted regions are located around the poles in higher altitudes and are under (almost) constant solar illumination. The second type is the permanently shaded regions, that are constantly shielded from the solar radiation and, given the fact that the Moon lacks atmosphere, are reaching temperatures near absolute zero, probably allowing them to store substantial quantities of water ice (Crotts 2014, 235, Spudis 2009, 2015). Geologically, the Moon is very similar in its composition to Earth. Being very likely composed of the debris ejected from the planet, it is composed of very similar minerals to the Earth. As such, the Moon provides all the necessary materials for the construction of structures or spaceships. The majority of the oxygen on the lunar surface is bound in oxides. If sufficient technology and energy sources are available, such a configuration will allow for the extraction of oxygen to meet the needs of settlers and manufacture rocket fuel and minerals and ores necessary for on-site construction like silicon (crucial for the manufacturing of solar panels, which are the key source of energy production in the inner solar system) or aluminium. The possible production of oxygen, rocket fuel and construction materials from in-situ resources significantly decrease the price-tags of any sustainable lunar operation. Additionally, by mixing the lunar regolith with lunar water, it should be possible to produce a lunar concrete that would be useful for the construction of habitats and other structures. The Moon thus likely contains all the necessary resources for sustainment of life (but for the production of food), production of fuel, construction of habitats and manufacturing of technologies, including fibreglass, necessary for satellite repairs, or even construction of spaceships in the context of low gravity and no atmosphere that allows for

70  Environmental Factors new, more efficient designs to appear (Brearley 2006, Crawford 2015, Crotts 2014, Spudis 2009, Wingo 2009, 175–202). On the other hand, the economic incentive for lunar colonization is lower due to the lack of presence of precious resources. There are two possible exceptions to this. The first is helium-3 (He-3), an isotope of helium that cannot be found on Earth in higher concentrations. He-3 is produced by the solar activity and spread throughout the solar system in the solar wind. As the Earth is shielded from solar radiation by its magnetic field, it is not holding significant reserves of the isotope. On the contrary, the lunar surface (similarly to, for example, Mercury or the Martian moons (Lewis 1997, 141)) is constantly bombarded by the solar wind, thus holding vast reserves of the isotope. Even though the extraction of the solar-wind implanted materials is, in general, energy-intensive, the projected price of He-3 might make the process viable. While currently, He-3 is utilized only in healthcare and research, it holds vast potential in nuclear fusion energy production schemes. Energy production through a fusion of light elements (mimicking solar activity) has enormous hope to generate tremendous amounts of energy through a process that creates only lightly radioactive waste. While this expectation is based on the utilization of deuterium and tritium (hydrogen isotopes) in the process, He-3 fusion would, according to the theoretical models, greatly increase the efficiency of the process while simultaneously avoid the creation of radioactive waste altogether. Additionally, He-3 extraction should create other useful by-products like oxygen or hydrogen. A second prospective economically viable object might be a large asteroid composed of rare minerals that would be found on the surface of the Moon. This might be possible due to the lack of atmosphere that would disintegrate the objects upon entry, as is the case on Earth. Finally, in case a sophisticated manufacturing base is established, the added value in a decrease of environmental pollution on Earth by producing some goods on the Moon from the lunar resources might bring additional positive impact for life on Earth (Brearley 2006, Crawford 2015, 9–26, Wingo 2009, 45–46). Activities on the lunar surface are complicated by several factors. The first is the 14-day day/night cycle that also creates the above-mentioned temperature differences. Second, the lunar surface is composed of very fine dust that complicates movement (Phillips 2012, 208) but also risks compromising potential habitats on its surface. Following are the effects of low gravity that create problems, especially for the movements of astronauts. Additionally, all activities will lack natural shielding from environmental effects like radiation and kinetic impacts, including micrometeorites that, given the high velocities, might threaten the technology or human life (Phillips 2012, 208). Next, the lunar surface is very dry and holds limited potential for energy generation, but given the soil composition, also the production of crops that might be used to feed future lunar settlements. Moon holds several geographical features that might turn out to become crucial in the geopolitical competition over the celestial body. As noted

Environmental Factors 71 earlier, of considerable importance are the lunar poles due to the milder temperatures and presence of permanently illuminated regions that are useful for stable energy generation, and permanently shaded regions with the presence of water ice. The size of the permanently illuminated regions is very small, estimated at 1/100 of a billionth of the lunar area and are composed of edges and rims of several craters. It must be pointed out that nearly-permanently illuminated regions that allow for the potential generation of solar power might be enhanced in their size by placing solar panels on extended structures (Elvis, Milligan and Krolikowski 2016, 31–32). The regions present a very precious territorially bound resource, critical for the establishment of permanent settlements. It is estimated that the most promising region regarding the number of (almost) permanently illuminated regions is the South Pole Aitken basin – an extremely large and deep impact crater with 2,500 km in diameter and, at maximum, 8km in depth (Sohl and Schubert 2007, 44) –, especially the Shackleton-de Gerlach Connecting Ridge that holds the most considerable promise of near-permanent illumination of sufficient surface area to become a viable energy-producing region (Crotts 2014, Koebel 2012, 218). The exact calculations, including the possible technological solutions aiming to increase the size of the permanently illuminated regions, will, however, still need to be conducted prior to energy generation. The area covered by permanently shadowed regions is larger – cumulatively estimated by Crawford (2015, 12) at 31,059 km2 with 13,361 km2 on the northern hemisphere and 17,698 km2 on the southern. Nonetheless, the permanently shaded regions are not likely to become such a contested territorial resource. They are more widespread but also, they are likely not the only, while prominent (Helbert, Hauber and Reiss 2007, 378) source of water on the Moon. This is, of course, true in case it will not become clear that these regions are dried up due to, for example, the effects like micrometeorite impacts (Burke 2012, 341). It is estimated that the majority of the lunar water is located underground. As these water reservoirs might be easier to access, due to the temperature in the permanently shaded regions, and less contaminated, they might become the preferred water source (Crotts 2014, 238–249). The water concentrations, as mapped by NASA’s Moon Mineralogy Mapper placed onboard the Indian Chandrayaan-1 probe, are in general more profound at the poles. Unfortunately, the mission could not have measured water quantities in permanently shaded regions (Brown University 2017). Nevertheless, the presence of significant quantities of water in permanently shaded regions is supported by other data sources (Song et al. 2021, 2–3). Brown et al. (2022) then estimated that one of the highest probabilities for finding significant water resources is in de Gerlach crater’s permanently shaded regions. The crater is conveniently located close to the most prominent permanently illuminated region as identified above, thus further highlighting the strategic role of this area. In any case, additional research in this respect needs to be conducted, including on-site tests. These might be tied to the first missions to the lunar surface that should be also used to identify the

72  Environmental Factors optimal location for the construction of the permanent exploratory settlement that will be mostly dependent on these conditions, itself reflected in the planning of Artemis III. Important territorial locations also include areas with valuable resources. A large part of the useful minerals and ores are distributed across the body and will need further on-site investigations in order to determine the specific high-deposit locations. He-3 seems to be available in larger quantities in regions rich in titanium, which are located mainly in the lunar maria. In this sense, Mare Tranquillitatis (a site of the first lunar landing in 1969) on the eastern part of the near side of the Moon and Oceanus Procellarum to the west of the same hemisphere seem to be the most promising mining sites (Crawford 2015, 10, Kuhlman and Kulcinski 2012, 24–26). Additionally, the equator might become a site generating beamed solar energy for terrestrial purposes in case a system covering both sides of the Moon is established, including transfer mechanisms to beam the generated energy to Earth (Crawford 2015, 26, Lewis 1997, 132–133). Finally, the far side of the Moon establishes a very specific region unlike any other in the solar system. It is the only area permanently shielded from the electro-magnetic “noise” constantly produced by humanity’s activity on the Earth. This presents scientists with a unique opportunity to utilize this characteristic for extremely precise observations of deep space. One of the proposed projects aiming to exploit this advantage is the Lunar Crater Radio Telescope that would be constructed in a selected crater on the far side of our only natural satellite (Bandyopadhyay 2020). Nonetheless, given the physical characteristics, it is challenging to communicate with bases or other installations located in the hemisphere. Direct communication is impossible, and thus communication relays need to be established in order to facilitate communication. The Chinese Chang’e 4 lander operating on the averted part of the South Pole Aitken basin is, for example, communicating via Queqiao relay satellite operating on a halo orbit around the Earth-Moon L2-point. Despite the progress in our understanding of lunar geography, many factors still remain an enigma and will require further research. Specific localization of important natural resources and accessible (ice) water reservoirs will to a large degree, affect the operations on the lunar surface. What seems to determine the settlement projects rather clearly is, however, the challenging energy production. As solar energy is the most efficient power generation scheme available to space actors today, we can expect the contest over permanently illuminated regions to become the primary condition of the settlement projects, thus highlighting the importance of polar regions, especially the south pole. This is reflected in the pre-selection of the thirteen landing sites on the south pole for the Artemis III piloted landing by NASA that aims at regions that has the largest potential to combine the presence of permanently illuminated regions and areas with water ice at the south lunar pole (NASA 2022b). On the other hand, NASA has in 2022 announced a concept award for the development of small nuclear reactors that might be used on

Environmental Factors 73 the lunar surface thus aiming at providing an alternative solution to power generation needs (NASA 2022a). It is highly likely that accessible water reservoirs, which might include permanently shaded regions if the technology to mine from these regions is mature enough, will become the next contested resource. Finally, the locations of valuable resources might also become targets of territorial contestations, but currently, it seems that the distribution of the ores and minerals would allow for an equal approach by a larger number of actors. Nonetheless, as we will see later on, this geographic framework plays only a partial role. How it affects the geopolitical contest over the Moon will highly depend on the nature of the colonization efforts. 4.4  Geography of Mars Mars is the second smallest discovered planet in the solar system, located on orbit between the Earth and the asteroid belt. As mentioned earlier, its orbit is elliptic with an aphelion (most distant point from the Sun) at approximately 1.6 AU and perihelion (closest point to the Sun) at approximately 1.4 AU, with an average orbital distance of 1.524 AU. It is also located between the Earth and the asteroid belt, making the possible missions to large asteroids and dwarf planet Ceres more manageable from its orbit rather than from Earth. The distance between the two planets establishes a communication delay between Earth and any communication device on the Martian surface of 3 to 24 minutes. The establishment of permanent communication would also require the setting up of relay probes similar to the communication with the far side of the Moon for situations when the two planets are located on opposite sides of the Sun. Mars completes one orbit around the Sun in 687 terrestrial days. Mars rotates once every 24.6 hours, and its axis is inclined at 25.19°, making it very similar to Earth (23.9 hour-long day and tilt at 23.5°). This means that the day/night conditions on the planet are almost the same as on Earth, and Mars also witnesses seasonal changes. These are, however, given the elliptical orbit of unequal duration. The planet’s diameter is 6,779 km, and its gravitational pull is 3.721 m/s2. That is only about 38% of the gravity on Earth. Martian surface area is in size comparable to the total of all of the landmass of Earth. Mars has two moons – Phobos and Deimos. Both of them are very likely captured asteroids and are thus rather small but might present a base for remote control over robotic missions on Mars or refuelling and mining sites. Larger Phobos is only 22.5 km in diameter and orbits closer to the surface of Mars, while Deimos is located further away and has a diameter of 12.4 km. They both orbit Mars relatively fast in 7.6 and 30.3 hours, respectively (Lewis 1997, 176, Spohn 2007, 3, Zubrin 1996, 103, 119). Mars has a rather thin atmosphere. The average surface pressure on the Red Planet is less than 1% of that of Earth. The atmosphere is additionally predominantly composed of carbon dioxide [some 96% (Weintraub 2018, 112)]. The Martian atmosphere is witnessing weather patterns, including

74  Environmental Factors sandstorms (though significantly lighter than on Earth) or the presence of clouds. Such an atmosphere brings only limited protection against meteorites on a collision course with the planet. It, however, allows for at least basic aerodynamic flight as experimentally tested for the first time in April 2021 by Ingenuity helicopter. The planet also has an ionosphere that should allow for long-range communication on the surface using radio technology but lacks a magnetic field that would protect the surface against incoming radiation. The temperatures on Mars depend on the latitude and season. They can rise as high as 20-35°C on the equator but fall as low as –150°C at poles throughout winter. Mars also has its own permanently shaded regions in caves and other similar structures that might become important as water reservoirs but also as potential habitats. Similarly to the Moon, the Martian surface is very dusty, which will likely complicate any activities and movement on its surface (Phillips 2012, 208, Zubrin 1996, 114). Mars is very likely also containing an important amount of water. While the early speculations of astronomers about the presence of surface water, including seas, oceans and canals but also vegetation and intelligent life, did not turn out to be true (Weintraub 2018), the planet itself holds important ice water reservoirs. One source of ice water is located on the Martian poles. The polar caps are partially composed of so-called dry ice consisting of frozen carbon dioxide, but the majority of their mass constitutes water ice. It is thus clear that at minimum polar regions allow for the extraction of water crucial for the survival of living beings but also for the manufacturing of rocket fuel. There are very likely subsurface water deposits as well. With large probability, more significant amounts of water are located underneath the lowlands on the northern hemisphere that might have held a significant mass of surface water in the past. Subsurface water ice can be, according to measurements available by the time of writing, located under around 15% of the surface of the Red Planet. The likely historical presence of liquid water on the planet and especially in the northern lowlands is additionally supported by the presence of valleys, some of which are an outcome of water dynamics and other physical evidence of historical water flows. Additionally, according to the data obtained by ESA-Roscosmos ExoMars Trace Gas orbiter and made available by late 2021, there is an important amount of underground water present in the central parts of the Valles Marineris.5 Third, water ice is likely found in permanently shaded regions, including large caves and glaciers scattered around the Martian surface. Additionally, some water ice might also be present on the two Martian moons (Head 2007, 25–26, Helbert, Hauber and Reiss 2007, 378–394, Wingo 2009, 169). Unlike the Moon, Mars does not have to deal with the issue of a 14-day day/night cycle that affects the production of energy from solar panels. Nonetheless, given the larger distance from the Sun and the presence of an atmosphere, solar energy production is inferior to illuminated regions on the lunar surface or in terrestrial orbits. It is thus highly likely that the more developed Martian settlements will seek additional sources of energy to the solar panels.

Environmental Factors 75 These alternatives might include nuclear energy in case uranium is found or nuclear fusion is mastered, geothermal energy if conditions allow for it, or some other source like limited use of wind energy. Nonetheless, given the favourable rotational period of Mars, first settlers will very likely make full use of solar panels that might be later manufactured from indigenous resources. Mars is also a deposit of all necessary minerals and ores needed for constructions and technology production, thus allowing the development of independent settlements. These include carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen and oxygen in forms that should be more readily available compared to lunar oxides. It also likely holds highly concentrated mineral ores as a consequence of the historical volcanic activity. The settlers will very likely be able to grow their own food as it is estimated that the Martian soil is conductive to the food production (Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 203–204, Zubrin 1996, 12, 112, Zubrin 2009, 230–231). According to the National Research Council (2002), we can identify several types of hazards that must be taken into account while planning a crewed Martian landing mission. The first are geological. The landing site must be properly investigated to ensure its stability. There exists a risk that the lander might be placed on an unstable surface that would cause an accident. Additionally, the above-mentioned issue of dust spoiling cannot be disregarded. Second, there are hazards connected to the atmospheric effects like electrostatic charging or wind dynamics. Nonetheless, these are not too worrisome as the atmosphere is very thin and the effects are weak. The third set of hazards are radiation effects from both solar and galactic radiation. The thin atmosphere and lacking magnetic field offer only minimal protection against their impact. Last but not least, there are chemical and potential biological hazards in place. It is important to ensure that the habitats and homegrown food are not exposed to toxic elements present on and inside the Martian soil. Additionally, potential microbiological life might cause unforeseen contamination. Nonetheless, given the growing experience with robotic landings, the majority of these risks is already known and accounted for. The geography of Mars is very diverse. The polar regions are very cold and affected by seasonal changes mainly in connection to the size of the polar caps. These changes are similar to those known on Earth, but the changes are tied to the freezing and sublimation of carbon dioxide. Mars is further divided between two dissimilar hemispheres. The northern is mainly composed of lowlands that developed very likely as a result of the past water activity, while the southern is in the majority composed of highlands. Mars also lacks tectonic activity, which allows for the existence of huge geological features that can maintain on its surface. One example of this is the giant volcanic Tharsis bulge, covering up to 25% of the surface, respective to its exact delimitation, located around a part of the Martian equator (Sohl and Schubert 2007, 51). It, among other features, is a site to the largest known volcano in the solar system Olympus Mons (peak at about 21 km above the surface) and three massive volcanos located very close to each other – Arsia Mons,

76  Environmental Factors Pavonis Mons and Ascraeus Mons with peaks at 14 to 18 km. Another significant feature is the Valles Marineris that creates the largest known valley system in the solar system and is located east of the Tharsis bulge. It creates a 4,000 km long crack with a maximum depth of about 5.7 km stretching from east to west near the equator. The construction of Martian habitats or other missions to the Red Planet will need to take these factors into account. They will need to be constructed nearer to the equator due to the climate conditions and in a location with accessible water. This, together with the geology and geography of the planet, favours colonization efforts to begin in the northern hemisphere. It is not only more likely to contain subsurface water ice but is also flatter, thus likely easier for construction of structures and landing a larger number of spaceships in general. Additionally, the discovery of important deposits of necessary or valuable minerals will further affect the site selection for more sustainable missions. However, large parts of the planet might be interesting mainly for the purposes of scientific research as they are geologically and geographically very challenging and include deep valleys and large volcanos or ancient features that would allow for a better understanding of the origins of the planet. Another possible constraint is to be the search for Martian microbiological life, as the probable sites of the discovery are likely to be kept free of direct human interference due to the risk of contamination. 4.5  Geography of asteroids and comets The third case analysed in this book consists of smaller bodies like asteroids, comets and the dwarf planet Ceres. As they constitute a very heterogeneous group, it is impossible to develop a universally applicable overview of their physical characteristics. Nonetheless, this section still makes an effort to develop some generalizations that will affect the mission planning tied to the specific objects. In this brief introduction to the geographic features of smaller bodies, we must begin with the so-called Near Earth Objects/Asteroids (NEO). NEOs are bodies whose orbit brings them to at least as close as 1.3 AU from the Sun, thus within 0.3 AU from Earth’s orbit. They consist of the most accessible subset of smaller bodies for missions beginning from Earth or the Moon. A specific subsection of the NEOs are Potentially Hazardous Objects/Asteroids (PHO), that are located in a part of their orbit at least 0.05 AU to Earth’s orbit (some 7.5 million km) or less and have a diameter of at least 140 m (measured, however, in absolute magnitude (visual magnitude for an observer at specific conditions) as the measurements of diameters of smaller bodies are often extremely challenging or impossible without close approach (Morrison 2019, 24)) (Crowe 2019, IAU 2013, 35). According to NASA, as of April 2021, from the total number of 25,701 discovered NEOs, 6,247 are smaller than 30 m in diameter, 8,040 are between 30 and 100 m, 6,004 between 100 and 300 m, 4,520 between 300 m and 1 km, and 890 are having diameter over 1 km (NASA 2021). However, many of the NEOs,

Environmental Factors 77 especially those with a diameter below 1 km, still remain undiscovered. It seems that no asteroid large enough to cause mass extinction is on an orbit that might pose a threat of collision with Earth (Morrison 2019, 29) but as evidenced by many surprising near misses or collisions, including the 2013 Chelyabinsk incident, there is still not a hundred per cent certainty on this. The first asteroid – currently known to be a dwarf planet – Ceres was discovered in 1801, but in 1900 already 545 asteroids were known, including the first NEO Eros that was discovered in 1898. Since 1992, the NEOs have been recognized as a potential threat by the US Congress that mandated NASA to search for these objects and this project improved the knowledge of the objects from 649 identified by 1998 to the current numbers (Vereš 2019, 71). NEOs are further subdivided into three categories along their orbital characteristics – Amors crossing Martian orbit but not the Earth’s (some orbits reach as far as the asteroid belt, thus making objects on them theoretically usable as a transport option (Lewis 1997, 186–187)), Apollos crossing Earth’s orbit and having an orbital period longer than one year, and Atens crossing Earth orbit and having an orbital period shorter than one year (Sommariva 2015, 26). Given these specifics, some of the NEOs with the potential economic value, that might even for smaller asteroids range in tens of trillions of dollars in current prices (Goswami and Garretson 2020, 13) prior to the decrease of the price of the minerals due to flooding of the terrestrial markets, might be, from the energy expenditure point of view, easier to reach compared to the Moon with its comparatively deeper gravity well (Wingo 2009, 168). Another relevant subset of asteroids is composed of those located in the asteroid belt between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. This group includes, based on current estimates, about 1.1–1.9 million asteroids larger than 1 km in diameter, including the largest known inner solar system asteroids like Vesta (about 525 km in diameter), Pallas (about 512 km in diameter) or Hygiea (about 434 km in diameter) and an enormous number of smaller objects (NASA 2019). Following, we can identify two other asteroid groups. The first is Trojans, composed of asteroids locked to the orbit of a larger object. These asteroids are located in the solar L4, 5-points of the given planets and thus do not collide with the planet but “follow” or “precede” it along its movement around the Sun. The most significant population of Trojans is tied to Jupiter’s orbit, but the similar, yet smaller, population is located on orbits of other planets as well, including Earth – the first Earth’s Trojan discovered was 2010TK7 in 2010 (Lewis 1997, 188–189, NASA 2019). A specific type of objects are Centaurs. These bodies are with their characteristics combining those of asteroids and comets and are located on unstable orbits among the gas giants of the outer solar system. Another important geographical feature is the 2.5 AU water line. Asteroids orbiting closer to the Sun than 2.5 AU are generally dry, while those further away may contain ice water that did not evaporate due to the heating up caused by the solar activity (Elkins-Tanton 2010, 79).

78  Environmental Factors Asteroids are also divided according to their composition. The C-type asteroids are composed mainly of carbon with the dark surface are a dominant type of asteroids in the outer parts of the asteroid belt (around 80%) and comprise some 40% of asteroids located closer to the Sun. In total, it is estimated that they constitute some 75% of the total asteroid population and are important carriers of ice water. They also likely contain important amounts of valuable resources. Due to their trajectories, many might be better accessible than the lunar surface, including for water mining. The second major type of asteroids is S-type, as the asteroids are dominantly made of silicate compound rock that is less dark and more dominant in the inner regions of the solar system. It is also deemed the type of asteroid containing relevant quantities of valuable metals like gold, platinum-grade metals, or germanium. The third dominant type of asteroids is M-type objects comprised mainly of iron and nickel and other materials valuable for space constructions. They, however, establish a minority of the known asteroids. There is currently no consensus over which type of asteroids is generally containing the largest amount of valuable metals, and further investigations need to take place. A concentration of valuable resources on an appropriate asteroid is probably much higher than that found in the deposits on Earth. It is likely, that it will be impossible to make precise estimates regarding the actual amount and purity of valuable materials by distant observations only, making in-situ research a necessity. Nonetheless, only a minority of the objects are actually composed of high-value materials (ESA n.d., Froehlich 2018, 4, 11, James 2018, 90, Krolikowski and Elvis 2019, Sommariva 2015, 26, Xie, Bennett and Dempster 2021, 259–264). Comets are much more rarely spotted in the inner solar system. Their orbits are taking them to the proximity of the Sun but also as far as transNeptunian space. While the orbital characteristics of comets differ, including comets with shorter and longer periods, they are generally less predictable, and especially those coming from the Oort cloud are impossible to monitor prior to their entry to the nearer parts of the solar system. Their orbit might be affected by the gravitational fields of gas giants or other non-gravitational effects like outgassing connected to the reaction of water ice, and other elements comet is made of to the heating caused by the Sun (Morrison 2019, 22). They are, additionally, generally faster compared to asteroids as they are “falling” into the gravity well of the Sun. Many of the comets also either collide with some of the gas giants (importantly, the largest Jupiter) or disintegrate throughout the close encounter with the Sun. They, however, might become valuable sources of water or provide transport for smaller robotic missions. Comet might also become a threat in case it is on a collision course with Earth. Ceres is the largest of the smaller celestial bodies of the inner solar system. It is a dwarf planet located in the asteroid belt and the only dwarf planet in the inner solar system. All of the other discovered dwarf planets are located in the trans-Neptunian space, with the exception of Pluto that in the part

Environmental Factors 79 of its orbit crosses Neptune’s orbital plane, taking it closer to the Sun than the eighth planet. As of February 2021, there were ten objects beside Ceres which nearly certainly are dwarf planets (listed according to estimated diameter) – Eris, Pluto, Makemake, Gonggong, Haumea, Quaoar, Sedna, Orcus, (307261) 2002 MS4 and Salacia. Additionally, there are 27 objects highly likely to be dwarf planets, 68 likely, 130 probable and 741 possible dwarf planets. From the known (nearly certain) dwarf planets, Ceres is the smallest one (Brown 2021). Ceres has a diameter of 950 km, orbits on average 2.766 AU from the Sun and has an orbital inclination of 10.59°. It orbits the Sun once in approximately 4.6 terrestrial years and rotates once every 9 hours (0.3781 terrestrial days). It also has a very low gravitational pull of only 3% of Earth. It does not have any significant atmosphere or magnetic field but holds important quantities of water (Doboš 2018, 24, Spohn 2007, 3). As evident, the wide variety of the objects’ characteristics requires additional observations to be made according to the particular aims of the given mission. These include an orbital period of an object, its composition and distance from Earth (Sommariva 2015, 36). Especially the orbital characteristics will define the ability to conduct missions to an object and will determine the mission planning process (Cohen 2009, 9). About 55% of known NEOs allow for a four-year or more extended stay in six-years missions thanks to their orbital characteristics, thus being suitable for mining operations (Xie, Bennett and Dempster 2021, 267). It is of utmost importance to sustain a sufficient situational awareness regarding the celestial bodies not only for economic and strategic reasons but also from the perspective of the planetary defence. Currently, the most viable missions seem to target NEOs. They might be quite easily reached throughout the period of near approaches to the Earth, and (semi)autonomous robotic missions would allow for sustained operations on their surface, as evidenced from numerous scientific missions already conducted. It is plausible that an actor interested in a mining mission might identify a valuable target with a regular near approach to Earth and develop a mission that would robotically and automatically extract the resources from an asteroid and return to Earth in its next fly by. Depending on the characteristics of the given object, such a mission might take between a year to a couple of years. Also, smaller objects might be transported to Earth’s L-points or lunar orbit and mined there (Sommariva 2015, 30). In this context, Froehlich (2018, 33) speaks about a mission to bring an asteroid 7 m in diameter (with an estimated weight of about 500,000 kg) to high Earth orbit. Nonetheless, given the small size of the objects, it must always be taken into account that any activity on their surface might change their orbital dynamics or rotational characteristics that might lead the object to collide with Earth (Craig, Saydam and Dempster 2014, 1042) or another object of interest. On-orbit manipulation also faces issues with debris creation (Froehlich 2018, 42). There must be all precautions taken to avoid such a scenario. In all cases, the issue of operations in extremely low gravity will further complicate the task as well (Cohen 2009, 9).

80  Environmental Factors Monitoring of asteroids and other smaller bodies is also crucial from the point of view of planetary defence. Objects large enough to survive the entry into the terrestrial atmosphere might pose a danger upon collision with the Blue Planet. The first line of defence is the monitoring of their movement and on-time identification of the risk of such a collision that would give sufficient time to change the orbital characteristics of the object, thus avoid the event. If an asteroid’s parameters are well known, then not only is the need for rapid deflection decreased, which increases the likelihood of success, but such a knowledge might make some deflection efforts redundant as the calculations might ensure safe burning of the object in the atmosphere or impact into an uninhabited region. This would allow for using of our knowledge, for example, for tourism purposes – burning of a larger asteroid in the atmosphere is a great spectacle (Morrison 2019, 30, Schmidt and Švec 2019, 256). The basic technology used for planetary defence purposes is in general very similar to the one that is likely to be used for economic or scientific missions. The planetary defence also requires monitoring of objects’ orbits and composition and ability to conduct activities on its surface (Lewis 1997, 102, Schmidt and Švec 2019, 258). One example of an asteroid mission aiming to improve our knowledge on PHAs is the sample-return OSIRIS-REx6 to PHA Bennu (diameter of 490 m) that threatens to collide with Earth between 2175 and 2199 (Morrison 2019, 25). No matter the reasons for researching the smaller bodies and conducting missions to their proximity or surface, the understanding of these objects will be in the foreseeable future clearly terracentric – tied to the protection of or prosperity on the Earth – thus mimicking the role of outer space in terrestrial geopolitics in general (Wingo 2009, 152). Notes 1 See, for example, ESA’s programme available at https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Monitoring_space_weather2, or NASA’s that can be accessed at https://www. nasa.gov/content/goddard/monitoring-solar-activity-with-sdo. 2 Bodies in the solar system generating more significant independent magnetic field include Mercury, Earth, the gas giants and Jovian moon Ganymede (Spohn 2007, 20). 3 1 AU equals the average distance between Earth and Sun 4 A possible model of utilizing lunar missions has been, among other, presented in Je zadán neplatný pramen. 5 See https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/ Exploration/ExoMars/ExoMars_discovers_hidden_water_in_Mars_Grand_ Canyon. 6 See also https://www.nasa.gov/osiris-rex.

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5

Normative Considerations

Normative considerations are not as impactful on the political processes in outer space as the physical conditions described above or the level of technological progress of studied actors. Nonetheless, they play a relevant, if divergent, role in shaping the behaviour of actors involved in space activities. Furthermore, they are reflected in the body of international law, based primarily on the so-called Outer Space Treaty. The body of space law also holds its consequences for deep space missions. While outdated and often vague, international space law is still relevant and includes provisions directly tied to the activities on celestial bodies. In the following chapter, we will first look at international space law in general, followed by specific provisions dedicated to the celestial bodies and broader normative debates on activities on these objects. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the impact of the legal and normative arguments and documents on the geopolitical competition over the studied celestial bodies. The aim is to develop a set of soft restrictions that need to be considered in the decision-making process regarding the inner solar system colonization missions even though they are often amended by the space powers due to the collision with their goals or broader strategic vision. As we can see in the text of the national legislatures, many provisions of the international space law are, at least in words, still recognized by space powers and must be understood in order to grasp the space settlement and other projects in their entirety. 5.1  Space international law The basic legal framework of space operations is mainly drawn from a set of treaties developed at the peak of the Cold War competition in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and reflects the bipolar geopolitical system of the era. Logically, the main provisions of the legal framework are rooted in a state-centric reading of outer space missions, limited capacity of space actors to conduct such operations, especially outside the LEO, and bipolar division of power in the international system, reading of global diplomatic relations and basis of the main security threats. As will be observed below, the legal framework thus constitutes a set of practices useful for the purposes of limiting DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-5

Normative Considerations 85 the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protecting astronauts or developing liability over damages caused by spacefaring actors, but does not reflect on topics like private operations, mining or congestion on orbits and space traffic management. Any provisions in this direction are very vague. While we will look at the specific points related to the studied celestial bodies later on, it is first crucial to develop the main contours of the basic framework of space law in general. The most important piece of space legislation and the central document regarding the legal management of space activities is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, better known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) (UNOOSA 1966), that is effective since October 1967. OST is the only comprehensive piece of legislation covering the whole of space activities, and all the consequent treaties either build on its wording or must at least respect it. While being outdated and suffering from many imprecisions, OST is still the most important legal document that necessarily shapes the activities of space actors. It establishes the main principles governing space travel. OST is composed of sixteen articles. It presents outer space as a province of all mankind that shall be free for exploration and use to all states without discrimination, celestial bodies as open to all states and scientific investigation and international cooperation as an effort that should be promoted (Article 1). Outer space and celestial bodies are not objects of national appropriation by claims of sovereignty (Article 2). Activities in outer space are still subjected to existing provisions of international law with respect to international peace and cooperation (Article 3). OST prevents parties from placing weapons of mass destruction on orbits, further into outer space and on celestial bodies that should, furthermore, remain free from military uses in general (Article 4). Astronauts must be protected, helped in need, returned after landing to other state’s territories and provided information on any incoming dangers by any party that obtains such data (Article 5). States are responsible for the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities in outer space (Article 6) and are liable for any damage an object launched under its registration causes to another party (Article 7). States carry jurisdiction and control over any object they launched, and in case it is needed, these must be returned to the state that registered it (Article 8). States should explore outer space in cooperation, with mutual assistance and without negative interference (Article 9). Such cooperation should also include assistance to other states (Article 10). States should inform the Secretary-General of the UN of conducted activities (Article 11), and installations on celestial bodies should be open to visits by representatives of other states (Article 12). The treaty is applicable to intergovernmental space initiatives as well (Article 13), and the treaty can be accessed by all states even after it comes into force (Article 14) (UNOOSA 1966). Wolter (2006, 88) identified five core principles of international space law that stem from the text of the OST and establish the basis of the legal space

86  Normative Considerations system. The first is that outer space is to be used in the interest of all mankind irrespective of their level of development. Secondly, the OST prohibits national appropriation and occupation of (parts) of celestial bodies. OST also promotes freedom of exploration and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes by every state. The fourth central principle presents a call for the preservation of the outer space environment for future generations. Finally, OST promotes international cooperation. Other treaties dedicated to specific topics of outer space activities that were often in general terms determined by the OST include the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (UN 1963), Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1968 (Rescue Agreement) (UNOOSA 1967), Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (Liability Convention) (UNOOSA 1971) or Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1976 (Registration Convention) (UNOOSA 1974). Partial Test Ban Treaty provided the first step towards the limitation of the utilization of weapons of mass destruction in the domain that was completed with the inclusion of Article 4 into the text of OST and prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, on the ground (in the atmosphere) and under the sea (UN 1963). The three other treaties mentioned above provide details on basic provisions of OST, namely rescue and return of astronauts, specifics of liability for damages done throughout space missions, and details on registration of launched objects by states at the UN. They establish the core of the documents, legally framing activities in the domain. Based on these and other legal documents, Gangale (2009, 23–30) identified basic legal principles of the general space international law. They include exploration of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind, freedom of exploration of space and celestial bodies for all actors, prohibition of national appropriation including through sovereignty, state responsibility for all space activities, natural resources as a common heritage of mankind, promotion of international cooperation, freedom from interference in activities of states in the domain, ownership of launched objects and personal in outer space and after landing, and openness of bases in outer space and on celestial bodies to visits by other states. Gangale also claims that commercial mineral resources’ extraction is legally possible even if contested. However, this issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section. What is also a consequence of this analysis is that in outer space, sovereignty is claimed over space objects and personal and not the territory (Gangale 2009, 174). As evident, the international space law establishes a significantly different framework to the rules applicable in terrestrial international politics reflecting the physical specifics of the domain. Not only that it reflects the environmental limitations, allowing, among others, for free overflight over any territory due to the ban on territorial appropriation and impossibility to stretch sovereignty of territories of states on the ground and in the air into the orbital space, but it also discourages or bans certain military activities.

Normative Considerations 87 Its aim is to develop a cooperative framework that would be guiding the relations among the states. On the contrary, it is also very vague regarding many crucial aspects of space activities, including provisions on the common heritage of mankind or peaceful uses of outer space, and outdated, thus not reflecting the post–Cold War development, including the proliferation of activities or privatization of many space-based services. While the space legal framework to a degree follows the legal approaches to other common international spaces like high seas or Antarctica that are to be administered for the common good, it remains insufficiently developed what such a common good means and how any of the benefits should be shared (Gallagher 2010, 259). Additionally, the provision on space being the province of all mankind has very limited applicability as its interpretation remains unclear. As will be seen below, this has its direct effects on some planned activities on celestial bodies, including very divergent interpretations of some key legal provisions. What might also establish issues for the nearfuture activities in the domain is the unclear demarcation of the boundary between airspace and outer space in the context of the existence of different legal systems in each of them. Commonly such a division is set at 100 km above average sea level, but such a demarcation is not included in the main treaties (Leib 2015, 5). The technological development that would allow for the flyers to operate along this line thus might present new challenges. Another unclear provision is that of peaceful uses of outer space. While pointing towards the normative goal of freeing the domain of terrestrial conflicts, it is currently not interpreted by spacefaring powers as an obstacle to military uses of outer space (Leib 2015, 8). As mentioned above, the only explicitly prohibited technology in outer space outside of the surface of celestial bodies are weapons of mass destruction. Other types of military hardware are not only generally allowed but also widely used. These include both passive and active systems. Passive systems are multiplying capabilities of ground troops but lack the ability to impact the integrity of systems of other parties directly. They include navigational systems like GPS, GLONASS, Galileo or BeiDou, communication systems, photoreconnaissance satellites or weather satellites. Active systems are intended to interfere with other objects directly and might include land-based kinetic anti-satellite weapons (by 2022 tested by the US, Russia/Soviet Union, China and India), satellites with rendezvous-and-proximity capacity or means of cyber or electronic warfare. They do not always aim to disable the satellite physically but might also disable communications with such an object or attempt to overtake ownership of it. While hostile activities against other state’s objects are illegal, the means themselves are not. What also remains one of the crucial unsolved legal issues is the incorporation of private spaceflight into the international legal framework. The current strongly state-centric approach is unfit for the proliferation of activities tied to space launch, space tourism or sub-orbital private travel. The current subordination of private entities under states needs some reformation to better

88  Normative Considerations reflect the realities of space travel and increased privatization of its many aspects (Von der Dunk 2011). On the one hand, it is logical that the primary position is given to states as subjects of international law. On the other, the current inflexibility might provide unnecessary restrictions to many activities and often lacks clarity. It also establishes unnecessary legal uncertainties for private operators. To sum up, as noted by Gallagher (2010, 265), “in space law, very few national security activities have been explicitly prohibited (e.g., weapons of mass destruction in orbit and military uses of celestial bodies) or protected (e.g., satellites used to verify treaty compliance and for the crisis “hotline”)”. This, nonetheless, does not mean that there were no attempts to adapt the legal space regime either as a way to tackle identified shortcomings or to promote national or personal interests. The most well-known such an effort is The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, better known as the Moon Treaty. As directly tied to activities on celestial bodies, it will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Another Cold War attempt to amend international law was, in 1976, the Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, better known as the Bogota Declaration. The equatorial countries (Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Congo, Zaire (today’s Democratic Republic of Congo), Uganda, Kenya and Indonesia) challenged the definition of parts of the geostationary orbit located above their territories as outer space and claimed sovereign rights in these locations. The claim, however, did not receive wider support. Similarly, attempts of private entrepreneurs to claim unowned asteroids or parts of other celestial bodies were also claimed void (Leib 2015, 10–13). They include instances of three Yemeni men suing NASA in 1997 for invading Mars by landing their rover on what they claimed was their heritage passed to them from ancient ancestors, or parking and storage fees being sent to NASA in 2001 as a result of NEAR Shoemaker spacecraft landing on Eros asteroid by G. Nemitz who claimed the asteroid to be his property (James 2018, 5). Next, we can identify two significant attempts to change the space legal framework through new post-Cold War pieces of legislation. The first was the Sino-Russian proposal of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (UN 2008). The aim of the treaty was to prevent the placement of weapons to outer space and make use or threat of the use of force against objects of other states explicitly illegal. The treaty proposal was, in the end, refused not only for political reasons but also due to the fact that its definition of space weapon1 did not include land-based kinetic anti-satellite systems utilized by the two proposing states. It was thus clearly aimed at shifting the power balance in outer space politics towards Russia and China, whose technological ability to place weapons to orbits was, at the time, limited compared to the US. The second major attempt to adapt the existing legal framework manifested in the EU-proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EEAS

Normative Considerations 89 2014). The European proposal was not only more comprehensive but was also not to become legally binding, thus more likely to pass and become widely accepted by all spacefaring nations even in the context of deteriorating relations in international politics and general unwillingness to adhere to new legally binding treaties. The purpose of the Code of Conduct was to enhance the safety, security and sustainability of space operations (para 1.1). The states would agree to refrain from the destruction of space objects until justified and even at that point with regard to minimizing the creation of space debris. They are also to avoid collisions in space by any means available and follow the International Telecommunication Union’s regulations on the allocation of radio spectra to avoid harmful radio-frequency interference (para 4.2). States should have further restricted to a minimum possible extent creation of space debris that has the potential to stay on orbits for a protracted period of time (para 4.3) and adopt and implement measures in accordance with Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217 (2007) (para 4.4). The states should have had also improved communication of and on their space activities (Chapter 3). The main aim of the proposal was thus to improve transparency and confidence in outer space and minimize debris creation. Despite the fact that the proposal was after long debates and reworkings widely accepted (Su and Lixin 2014), it was in the end not ratified due to the deterioration of the international situation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula and blocked by Russia in 2016 (Doboš 2018, 39). While not exhaustive, this overview should allow us to understand the most crucial aspects of the international space law applicable for the spacefaring nations and affecting their decision-making. While there are attempts to regulate outer space activities older than our ability to utilize the domain and to prevent space arms race dating into the 1950s (Wolter 2006, 11, 87), the regime is unlikely to be fully able to mitigate competition among the space powers or cover all necessary aspects of space operations. The way forward might include new treaties or codes of conduct. Alternatively, as Chrysaki (2020) proposed, the private entities might strive to self-regulate their activities based on the no harm principle and push towards sustainability of their activities to improve their reputation, enhance branding opportunities and lure ethical investors. Be it as it may, the regulations regarding the celestial bodies are, in many respects, even vaguer. 5.2  Space law and colonization OST has brought up several issues related to the sustainability of the establishment of space settlements, including the openness of bases for visits of other parties to the treaty, reciprocity of such visits and precaution taken throughout scientific experiments on celestial bodies (Elvis, Milligan and

90  Normative Considerations Krolikowski 2016, 32). Nonetheless, moving to the specifics of the legal provisions tied to the activities on celestial bodies, we must introduce two principles that lie at the core of disagreement among the spacefaring states over the legal aspects of the settlement of and activities on celestial bodies. These are the most likely to spur debates and disputes in the foreseeable future. The first principle is that of prohibition of national appropriation of celestial bodies or their parts and explicit ban on the claims of sovereignty over these. This principle is based on Article 2 of OST and, by the time of writing, was still fully adhered to by all the spacefaring nations and never challenged. As mentioned above, the claims on ownership were refused in cases of private entrepreneurs or other actors who did not reach the objects nor conduct any activity on them. Furthermore, such claims were not raised by the spacefaring nations that reached the bodies via piloted or robotic missions as well. Different state agencies manage to land their probes on such a variety of objects such as Venus or Mars, the Moon and Titan or several asteroids and comets. Even the human landing on the Moon, including the planting of the US flag, did not lead to the US claims over the Earth’s only natural satellite. This broke the history of taking over “unclaimed” lands on Earth by the seemingly first scouts who reached them (Gottmann 1973, 5). Nonetheless, the universal approval of the ban on the sovereign claims outside Earth’s atmosphere does not transform into an authoritative settlement of the possibility of territorial division of the surface of celestial bodies. It remains to be established how to practically solve the inherent dispute between the legal principle banning territorial appropriation and practical need to build and protect any base located on the surface of a celestial body. This includes issues like the management of its sources of power or water and the development of potential mining or scientific sites. While this is not a pressing issue at this point, as we currently cannot observe any construction process taking place, once a settlement process begins in earnest and given the lack of some resources such as access to sunlight at the lunar poles, territorial issues will necessarily appear and currently remain unsolved. One solution to this problem is being developed in the text of the US-led Artemis Accords (NASA 2020). Its Section 11, para 7, develops a notion of “safety zones” that should prevent harmful interference among the parties that utilize the lunar surface. The aim of the declaration of such “safety zones” is to coordinate activities and ensure no harm is being done by one party’s activities to another. The size and scope of such a zone should reflect the nature of the activity and the environment in which it is being conducted. It should follow reasonable scientific and/or engineering principles. These zones do not have indefinitely set borders, and these might change in size according to the needs and might also disappear once no longer required for the conduct of a given activity or when the given activity ends. The UN Secretary-General must be informed on the establishment and changes of such zones. Para 8–11 then sets up additional specifications of these zones such as informing about their nature, protection of the environment and other

Normative Considerations 91 parties’ interests and objects, coordination in order to avoid harmful interference and openness of zones to other parties. As such, these zones are interpreted as not to contradict the principle of the ban on national appropriation but spurring the necessary scientific and economic activities as these would be protected in officially temporary “safety zones”. In this respect, Leib (2015, 14–18) presented three possible scenarios of solving the territorial question. The first does not count on any change in international law. In this sense, the partition of the territory would be done de facto without explicitly breaking off with the provisions of OST on a first comes, first-served basis. This approach would, however, very likely lead to the development of overlapping claims with very limited legal backing. The second scenario involves the partitioning of the surface among the space powers based on the mutual agreement without claiming sovereignty over such territory. This approach would prevent negative interference among the states and allow their missions to use resources for support of human activities. The claims over such zones would be mutually exclusive but not account for sovereign claims. This second scenario is rather close to the proposed “safety zones” in Artemis Accords, yet the US initiative includes a smaller number of actors compared to Leib’s proposal. Finally, the international solution rooted in the suprastate approach and equal share on the control of the surface can be envisaged. According to Leib, the legal provisions might vary for different celestial bodies depending on their specifics. The principle of territorial non-appropriation might be, additionally, in the long-term challenged by the, likely self-sufficient, colonies constructed on the surface of the celestial bodies themselves. It remains unclear what will be status of permanent colonies – most likely tied to the process of Martian settlement – that would become independent on terrestrial support. Given their status and geographic location, it is likely that they might strive for independence and claim that they are not bound by terrestrial international law (Leib 2015, Szocik et al. 2016, 19). As a consequence, they might claim sovereignty over the celestial object or part of it without tying such a claim to sovereignty of a state on planet Earth, rather developing their unique fully extra-terrestrial sovereign claims. This principle would also provide a challenge to the universality of the principle of the national non-appropriation but coming from a different direction than is the case of the “safety zones” included in the Artemis Accords. The second major issue related to an unclear wording of the international space law is the issue of space mining – specifically, the ability of (commercial) actors to retain extracted minerals or any other material that would be returned to Earth and to make a profit out of its sale on the terrestrial market. The main issue is the applicability of the principles of national nonappropriation, province of all mankind and development of outer space for the benefit of all states irrespective of their level of development. It remains unclear whether natural resources are banned from appropriation and if space mining breaks the benefit of all mankind clause (Bhattacharya 2018).

92  Normative Considerations The main line of contention lies around the legality of non-state mining as private ventures are not subjects of international law (Bhattacharya 2018, Gangale 2009, 44), but their activities must be registered by a state who is liable for any damages done throughout such activity and responsible for their behaviour. Given the vagueness and multiple possible interpretations of the main principles, it remains disputed whether the international law will be interpreted as allowing for space mining and retaining profit by the private actors or not. According to Bhattacharya (2018), it is also unclear whether asteroids fit into a legal definition of a celestial body which might bring another uncertainty into the issue. Given the high costs of any projected space mining missions (Jakhu and Buzdugan 2008, 209), the legal framework needs to be clarified prior to any mission taking place (Lin 2007, 286), especially when led by a private actor seeking maximum profit. There are several possible responses to the issue drafted in the academic literature. Sachdeva (2018, 210–214) presents four legal solutions to increase certainty over the legalization of space mining. The first is the so-called “Outer Space Treaty solution”. This approach would require the remaking of OST to clarify challenged provisions and thus ensure a clear legal framework for the activities. This change would not necessarily require a grand remaking of the treaty. Only a more minor amendments done through a limited-purpose resolution by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space might suffice. The second approach would require approval of the Moon Treaty and working out the details of the provision defining celestial bodies as a common heritage of mankind. The third approach would place all the celestial objects under the trusteeship of the UN that would consequently decide on the utilization of the resources from the global perspective. The final set of solutions are so-called “pragmatic solutions” that do not require changes of the international law that is unnecessarily slow and complicated. One possible solution is for the private entities to share part of the profit with states, for example, through a UN scheme, thus following one possible operationalization of the benefit of all mankind clause. Muzyka (2018, 126–133) develops another two sets of possible solutions to the legal regime of space mining. The first includes solutions based on the UN framework. In this category, three possible ways forward are drafted. The first is “The UN-Miner Contract Model”, which presents the establishment of the UN body that would be responsible for tasking asteroid mining missions and selling the asteroids. Mining companies would not own the resources but would be paid by the organization for the mission. The UN would then be responsible for selling the extracted minerals and distributing the profit. The second model is called “Retrieving the Salvaged Common Heritage”, in which the miners might claim the compensation for the extracted resources as returned salvaged common heritage, similar to provisions in the maritime law. Third, the “Agency Assigned Missions” model is presented. In this approach, companies would enter tenders for mining a specific asteroid. Such a model would be similar to the International

Normative Considerations 93 Telecommunication Union’s rules for orbital slot assignment. The second set of solutions are developed outside of the UN framework. The first involves the development of an intergovernmental entity that would be composed of representatives of space agencies. The second includes a solution based on an extra-governmental entity, where miners themselves would set norms and guidelines. Finally, there is a possible scenario in which there would be a lack of any rules and mining would be conducted in a legally unsettled context. Such a solution would, however, be problematic for would-be miners and the international environment in general. Another approach claims that the rules on space mining will be in the end settled by the party that will begin with the activity first or throughout settlement of conflicts among the involved actors (Crotts 2014, 384). As there might not be necessarily as many resources accessible as we might think today (Elvis, Milligan and Krolikowski 2016, 33–34), as evident from the discussion on the availability of permanently illuminated regions on the Moon, the mining operations might be limited to just handful of actors. This might also lead to the domination of the process by the strongest actors (Lin 2007, 288) based on the leverage developed by, for example, occupation of permanently illuminated regions as a part of an early scientific mission or experiment (Elvis, Milligan and Krolikowski 2016, 33). Nonetheless, finding the solutions along the way might be a practical endpoint as the international negotiations over the large questions are currently stalled. This, as mentioned earlier, however, creates issues for the private actors whose activities are less robust and more dependent on the predictability of the international legal framework. One major initiative that aimed to provide more clarity into the activities on celestial bodies was the Moon Treaty. While technically in force among the signatories, it was never ratified by any space-faring nation2 (Leib 2015, 10–13). For the purposes of the treaty, other celestial bodies than the Moon are not named later on, but the treaty is applicable to them as well, as “the Moon” stands in this respect for all celestial bodies. The Moon Treaty states that the Moon is to be used for peaceful purposes only, cannot be used or threatened by any hostile activity or be used as a basis for such an action, cannot be placed weapons upon including its orbits and the placement of military bases or equipment is also forbidden with the exception of using military equipment and facilities for peaceful purposes (Article 3). Exploration and use of the Moon shall be carried in the interest of all countries, and it shall be a provenance of all mankind promoting cooperation and mutual assistance (Article 4). It encourages communication of states’ activities and early warning of incoming threats (Article 5). The Moon shall be open to scientific exploration. Extraction of samples for scientific purposes including their export is allowed, and the countries should cooperate on a maximum practical level (Article 6). Parties to the agreement should prevent harmful activities to the environment, and upon international agreement, some sites might be designated as international scientific preserves with special

94  Normative Considerations protective arrangements (Article 7). States might freely move across and under the surface of the Moon as long as they do not interfere with the operations of another actor (Article 8). Participants are allowed to build stations on the Moon but must not interfere with others’ ability to explore the body or take unnecessarily large space freely. They must also inform SecretaryGeneral of the UN of its location, purposes and any changes in its activity (Article 9). All personal on the Moon shall be protected and helped upon need in accordance with Article 5 of OST (Article 10). The Moon and its resources are the common heritage of mankind, the Moon is not a subject of national appropriation, and none of its parts shall become a property of any of the states. An agreement to establish a framework to exploit natural resources is to be developed by participants of the treaty later on (Article 11). All objects and personal remain property of a launching state (Article 12) and shall be returned in case of an accident (Article 13). States remain liable for activities on the Moon (Article 14). Bases and other sites should remain open to inspection. If a party feels that another state is not fulfilling its obligations, it might request consultations that should lead to a mutually acceptable deal (Article 15) (UN 1979). As evident, the treaty is in many respects similar to the provisions of OST but accents the problematic notions like the “province of all mankind” and “benefit of all countries” even stronger. It thus requires further specifications even if accepted by a relevant number of states. The likely UN restrictions upon activities on the celestial bodies, including mining, tied to these unclearly defined and interpreted provisions, make the treaty an unlikely candidate for a wider acceptance. Nonetheless, it remains an important source of normative argumentation in the discussion over the nature of the settlements on the Moon and other celestial bodies or space mining and the responsibility of those conducting the mining activities to the rest of humanity. Given the uncertainties highlighted above, several nations’ legislators decided to incorporate provisions on space mining into their legal systems to spur private space mining efforts. As such, the private entities would operate inside a clearly defined national framework (and pay taxes in a given country). The possible international legal disputes over their activities would be handled by a given state. The legality of such an activity is generally based on understanding space mining as a “use” of celestial bodies rather than their ownership or claim on the property. In the case of Luxembourg, for example, the understanding is analogous to fishing in high seas – one cannot claim the environment but can claim the resources (Listner 2018, 114–116). The first and arguably most impactful legal measure is, in this respect, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, better known as SPACE Act. While covering a wider array of topics, its fourth part deals with space resource exploration and utilization. It first states that the government should remove any obstacles to private exploitation of space resources. US citizens are consequently explicitly allowed to retain any space resources that are obtained through commercial recovery. SPACE Act, nonetheless, clearly

Normative Considerations 95 states its adherence to international law that must be followed in such an endeavour and includes a disclaimer that any mining activity and the appropriation of resources is not to assert any sovereign rights over the celestial objects (US Congress 2015). The second country to develop similar legal protection of private space mining activities was Luxembourg in 2017. This presents an attempt to lure into the country potential investors in an emerging profitable market despite the low level of domestic space capabilities of the state. The law does not allow for the appropriation of celestial bodies or their parts but allows for the resources to be owned. The mining activities must be approved by the Luxemburg government and a licence can be given only to a private company operating under the Luxembourgian law or a European company registered in the country (Luxembourg Space Agency 2019). The law is more detailed compared to the provisions of the US SPACE Act and includes a more precise procedure for obtaining the approval of a mission. It thus makes the whole process more predictable and being more likely to avoid possible contention regarding unauthorized missions (Muzyka 2019, 152). Additionally, while the US SPACE Act speaks of US citizens, the Luxembourgian law is applicable to a wider array of private ventures that register in the country. The United Arab Emirates have highlighted their interest in the field of exploration and exploitation of space natural resources already in their National Space Policy from 2016 (UAE Government 2016). The UAE space law then strengthens a focus on the privatization of space activities. It includes the exploitation of space resources, including for commercial purposes, under activities regulated by the law. Article 18 consequently states that the UAE will, upon its decision, provide permits allowing for the exploitation of space resources, including for commercial purposes (UAE Government 2019). Additionally, in November 2020, the ruling party in Japan, Liberal Democratic Party, approved a bill allowing for the ownership of mineral and other samples collected outside of Earth (nippon.com 2020). In June 2021, Japan passed the Law Concerning the Promotion of Business Activities Related to the Exploration and Development of Space Resources that allows companies to obtain a permit by the Japanese government to mine space resources. As evident, countries trying to develop the private space mining market are increasingly taking domestic routes to lead the progress in settling the legal aspects of the space mining process. This follows the reading of international law as giving the right to own extracted resources but not of those still located on the bodies or left there. According to such an interpretation, mining is allowed and meets the equitable sharing principle (Leib 2015, 10–13). These four governments aim to allow the ownership of resources that is justified through the work put into extracting them (Lin 2007, 287). Such an approach is based on the liberal reading of economy. While it is far from certain that the discourse on the ability of private entities to control resources will prevail (Tronchetti 2014, 194–195), it still remains an important approach

96  Normative Considerations to the issue. This perspective is, nonetheless, countered on the basis that protection of one’s right to mine means to disallow others to do the same and mining on smaller objects would de facto disallow others from operating on the body or disintegrate it all together. In this sense, the activity would lead to a de facto appropriation of the bodies (Listner 2018, 116–117). The dispute is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. 5.3  Normative framework of space colonization Covering the “soft” framework of space operations, an overview of the legal measures is by itself insufficient. It is also crucial to present some major normative arguments behind space colonization efforts, including space mining. These arguments are not only introducing divergent motivations behind the pursuit of such activities but also the ways humanity should undertake to conduct activities on celestial bodies. Alternatively, the section will also present some arguments against the development of space settlements also rooted in a normative approach to social sciences. Similar to the previous sections, this part is not aiming to exhaustively cover all the approaches but presents some major streams of thought that might include the decision-making of relevant actors. Regarding the motivations for space colonization, Schwartz (2014, 204) identifies survival of the Earth’s species, finiteness of Earth habitation that is incompatible with the rise of population, an increase of welfare tied to utilization of space resources, and finiteness of terrestrial resources incompatible with the development of terrestrial economies as main reasons behind proposed space settlement projects. Similarly, Muzyka (2018, 135) argues for the development of asteroid resource mining schemes as a way to overcome the limits of terrestrial mineral deposits. Generally, these two authors’ ideas highlight the main normative argument supporting space colonization as a general idea – the finiteness of Earth’s ability to support life and humanity’s progress, including economic development. One of the most often noted reasons for the development of settlements on other celestial bodies is the ultimate survival of the human species (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 33, Crotts 2014, 392, Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 220, Schwartz 2014, 204, Sommariva 2015, 83–84). In the literature, two major themes tied to the issue reappear. These are the complete extinction of humankind as a species due to some catastrophe or less impactful collapse of current civilization (Smith and Davies 2012, 115–123). According to the authors, the chance of survival of terrestrial biosphere would increase through a development of self-sustaining space settlement(s). There would be a spare homeland independent on Earth that would preserve humankind and other species in case of a natural or human-caused catastrophe would occur on Earth. It is simply always smart not to have all the eggs in one basket. Such diversification would allow humankind to survive not only natural catastrophes, including, for example, massive volcanic activity or major

Normative Considerations 97 space-based threats but also potentially annihilating human self-destructive behaviour, including nuclear war or irreversible spoiling of the terrestrial environment. Additionally, in an extremely long-term perspective, interstellar travel is the only option for the survival of terrestrial species past the end of the stable activity of the Sun that will be connected to its rise into a red dwarf and destruction of the planet Earth. Alternatively, a similar argument, taken from a different perspective, might be set in a fact that the ability to operate on celestial bodies might allow us to deflect an asteroid on a collision course with Earth, thus also enhancing the chance of survival for humans and other terrestrial species (Crotts 2014, 392). One of the great propagators of space colonization normatively rooted in the survival principle, is, at least verbally, Elon Musk, who wishes to turn humanity into a multi-planetary species (SpaceX n.d.). This argumentation clearly works from a very long-term perspective. If we are to analyse normative arguments relevant for the time frame selected for this book, the only candidate for a self-sufficient human habitation is Mars. Other celestial bodies are either too hostile or do not allow for the construction of self-sufficient settlements that would be able to support life beyond Earth’s capacity to do so and without some form of interaction with Earth. This, however, might change with further technological and scientific development. Mars is near enough for a potential encounter using near-future technology, while far enough to likely become unaffected by any potential global catastrophe that would appear on Earth or target it from outer space. It is thus likely that the survival principle will be used as one of the reasons why to enhance the support for missions to the “Red Planet”. However, it is unlikely to work for other studied celestial bodies – at least not directly. While providing a clear justification for the expansion of humankind and other species into interplanetary space in the far future, the survival motivation is, in the short and mid-term perspective, unlikely to trump other reasons behind the deep space missions such as economic activity, prestige or adventure. While being promoted by SpaceX in its effort to establish settlements on Mars, it is unlikely to drive many space actors in their planned and proposed activities unless some immediate disaster is on the horizon. However, in that case, it might be too late to develop a self-sustainable space settlement of relevant size anyway. It will thus likely remain a very alluring partial (importantly public) justification for any long-term colonization missions and development of self-sufficient settlements but unlikely the only one. Another normative reason for proceeding with activities on celestial bodies is environmental protection. It is being argued that given the pursuit of continuous growth, the only solution for the sustainability of human existence is further expansion into outer space (Smith and Davies 2012, 148–149). The basic argument is based on the fact that mining activities are negatively impacting the environment of the sites in the region where the resources are extracted not only through the activity itself but also due to the utilization of hazardous substances in the process. This leads to air pollution and

98  Normative Considerations decreasing availability of fresh drinking water. This often happens in areas that are already under-developed and fragile, thus with very limited capacity to seek alternative sources of basic needs or with limited or no access to at least primary health care. Additionally, mining of some specific materials has negative effects on climate change as it produces a significant amount of greenhouse gases. The argument is specifically tied to the normative justification of asteroid mining. As the amount of available rare-earth minerals, importantly including platinum, are depleting, it will require more intrusive methods to mine additional, less accessible sources on Earth, thus further stressing the negative environmental impact in the regions where these metals remain available. Additionally, mining activities are having a global impact on the production of greenhouse gases that further enhance climate change. If the legal regime was amended and mining technologies allow for it, moving harmful mining to outer space would, according to this approach, greatly benefit humankind. Asteroids are uninhabitable, and their mining would protect scarce habitable regions of Earth from further destruction (MacWhorter 2016). The preliminary calculations show that off-Earth mining of rare-earth metals would have a significantly smaller impact on climate change than current production methods. The impact is tied mainly to the burning of fuel through the launch phase of the mission and the creation of greenhouse gases due to the re-entry of the material into the atmosphere and related airbrake. According to the authors’ calculations, these effects are to be significantly less disruptive compared to the production of greenhouse gases throughout the mining process on Earth (Hein, Saidani and Tollu 2018). Nonetheless, any such activity will additionally need to take into account disruptions to celestial bodies’ environments, including contamination, waste production, changes to landscape or depletion of water ice (Dallas et al. 2021). These changes are further enhanced by the lack of tectonics or atmospheric effects, so changes to the environment of the celestial bodies will become permanent (Kramer 2020). This argument thus brings a relevant normative ground to otherwise mainly profit-oriented debate on space mining. After a brief overview of two normative arguments justifying reasons to reach, settle and mine celestial bodies, it is also important to provide a basic overview of the normative frameworks that are to guide actors in their activities. The first such basis was already implicitly presented above and is written into the legal provisions that are applicable for the space activities in the ratified international treaties. This framework is rooted inside the UN Charter (UN undated) and attempts to regulate international politics through supranational regulations and negotiations on an international level. It highlights principles of non-aggression, development and equality. The relations among states are to become more peaceful through the use of diplomatic channels opened by the UN, which should act as an ultimate authority ensuring global development, prosperity and sustainability. Outer space should remain free of armed conflict, and major decisions should be done on an international

Normative Considerations 99 rather than the national level. The common good is to be incorporated in the final decisions. Celestial bodies, including their natural resources, must be developed with respect to the needs of all humankind. Applicability of the basic UN principles in outer space thus strengthens internationalization of the space activities, development of non-space faring nations and promotion of peaceful coexistence. The liberal notion is, in general, stretched forward by the normative stream of cosmopolitanism that finds a breeding ground in the thoughts on space policy. Cosmopolitanism calls for overcoming the limitations of national states and globalizing politics in order to make the decision-making more equitable and just. Following the principles of the globalist approach to policymaking, the cosmopolitan argument stresses a need to coordinate space efforts not only to allow humanity to prosper but also survive in the face of global challenges. It highlights the need to coordinate a global response to incoming challenges and to develop a stable international framework (Švec, Boháček and Schmidt 2020) that would overcome the problems and challenges that are relevant for the outer space development unsolvable by a single nation. The cosmopolitan argument highlights the need to develop a truly cooperative framework in which all voices will be heard. This basic assumption opens doors to many interpretations that, nonetheless, aim to reach the same goal. Some authors use a theoretical and normative approach based on an understanding of mutual benefits in cooperation. Some develop more realistic designs to change the current working of the international system in order to improve cooperation in international politics. One fault line can be identified along the need to develop global authority in order to spur cooperative efforts in outer space. While one approach highlights the possibility to cooperate amongst terrestrial communities through a non-state body like an international organization (Schmidt and Boháček 2019), the other deems the non-governmental approach as unworkable and call for the emergence of a global state (Dufek 2019). Cosmopolitanism in outer space affairs thus develops a counterargument to a self-centred Westphalian state system and calls for an inclusive global political setting. It, further, develops an idea of extraterritorial responsibility (Shapcott 2019) that is relevant in the prevention of cosmic-based threats. Cosmopolitan decision-making thus presents opposition to the nationalistic and populist foreign policy approaches (Linklater 2019). It represents a reading of outer space as a region of shared responsibility and global importance that should be governed in the interest of all humankind and in the best interest of even those communities that are not directly represented in space development. Nonetheless, the finer details are often contested and sometimes left out altogether. Moreover, the cosmopolitan critique sometimes targets an idealized realist system with quasi-autarkic units in a constant conflict that is not observable in real life (Beardsworth, Brown and Shapcott 2019). A kind of a counternarrative can be found in the libertarian approach to outer space development. In the theoretical realm, the approach is also based

100  Normative Considerations on the call for a peaceful development of interhuman principles. Libertarianism, however, is opposed to the principle of compulsion that is rooted in state-based societies. Taxing is believed to be immoral, and the authority of the state is based not on superior efficacy but access to means of violence. Libertarianism is based on a non-aggressive principle and voluntary economic exchange leading to maximum possible personal freedom and larger sustainability of efforts, including space travel (Nelson and Block 2018). Libertarian argument calls for truly private development of outer space, including ownership of celestial bodies on a first comes, first-served basis. It aims to promote humankind’s survival and development through outer space development unhindered by states’ involvement. The basic idea lies in the fact that the justest approach is that of free exchange and that the state intervention is always negative and deforming. Libertarian normative argument claims that the way for humanity survival is in developing outer space free of state interference. Private entities unshackled from the state restrictions would become more just and effective (Nelson and Block 2018). It, however, similarly to less practically oriented streams of cosmopolitanism, bases its suggestions on the precondition that all humans will follow the idealized ideas of non-interference and non-violence. In their pure versions, both of the normative arguments covered above are highly impractical as blueprints for the development of any mission to celestial bodies. Their importance, however, does not lie in the practical applicability of their idealized versions but rather in the ability to steer the thinking of decision-makers towards a more economic-oriented or communitarian approach to space projects. While only two were presented, many other normative arguments lie behind the thought of those developing the schemes and frameworks of outer space activities. Cosmopolitan ideas might steer the discussion towards the more substantial role of the UN. On the contrary, libertarian thinking would likely enhance the privatization of space activities and lower the regulations of these efforts. The normative arguments are thus not determining for the environment, yet still relevant. Lastly, we must also overview some main arguments challenging the focus on space colonization or other types of activities on celestial bodies. These in general stretch from a critique that aims at the development of more modest Earth-based projects instead to anti-technological visions of the future (Deudney 2020, 225). To give specific examples of some of these approaches, we may start with an approach that criticizes the ideology behind expansionism and argues for a shift in the approach that would allow peaceful coexistence on Earth. It also highlights the connection between economic disparities and the ability to travel in outer space, which would further enhance the differences among terrestrial societies. The space development would thus only increase the socio-economic issues on Earth and not solve them (Billings 2019). The topic of the potential increase of inequalities is also sometimes tied to the predicted impact of space mining and the import of new resources on Earth (Schwartz 2014, 205). The main arguments against the missions to celestial

Normative Considerations 101 bodies are thus connected to the necessity to solve terrestrial problems prior to expanding into space and the larger push towards the development of peaceful relations in the limited context of finite Earth rather than in outer space. In case more resources and more space are available, it would, according to the authors, discourage the development of sustainable solutions to the terrestrial ills rather than solving them. Additionally, there exist arguments tied to the inability of humanity to settle other worlds. These arguments are based on the assessment of the technological proves of current civilization or the fact that humans are biologically not meant to live outside of Earth (Smith and Davies 2012, 152–165). The next points of critique include the fallacy of ultimate survival thesis as it is theorized that the universe itself will one day cease to exist. We can also find perspectives that criticise the utopic perspectives on space colonization who are, in this opinion, just a façade for money-making enterprises (Slobodian 2015). 5.4  Soft framework The legal and normative framework plays its definite role in shaping behaviour and means used by relevant geopolitical actors in outer space. While not presenting such clear constraints as the physical environment, it is still a force to be reckoned with. The normative framework is built upon the geopolitical realities of the Cold War and is thus in dire need of amendment to the current political and economic context defined by the massive proliferation in number of activities, actors and objects in the domain. It, nonetheless, sets basic principles that are still, at least verbally, followed. These include a prohibition of territorial appropriation, peaceful (generally understood as nonaggressive) uses of outer space, protection of astronauts, state responsibility for objects in the domain, preservation of outer space for future generations, and promoting international cooperation or development of outer space for all humankind. Many of the legal provisions are, on the one hand, vague and lacking widely accepted interpretation of their practical impact. They, however, still need to be respected in the proposed missions, and there must be at least a verbal commitment to their fulfilment which pushes actors towards less disruptive activities. This push, nonetheless, is not perfect or very restrictive, and we can see attempts to creatively work around the specific provisions among all the space actors. Be it the development of safety zones in Artemis Accords, omission of anti-satellite weapons from the ban on space weaponization in the Sino-Russian proposal, or development of disruptive dual-use technology, the grey zone is rather large and very important for all of the space activities, including the future operations on celestial bodies. This, additionally, creates significant legal uncertainties that will mainly affect private activities in spheres like asteroid mining. The normative arguments for and against further expansion of humanity into deep space may play several roles. First, they are important for securing

102  Normative Considerations financing of the very complex projects and their sustainable political support that is necessary even in cases of private enterprises. Second, the logic behind the mission will to a degree, affect its goals and thus the nature and politics of the space settlements that will be discussed in the next section. Third, the normative arguments will be used as soft-power tools that will enhance the international standing of a given actor. Finally, the normative framework might also provide some restrictions on the behaviour of actors, but these are even softer than in the case of the legal framework. Notes 1 The term “weapon in outer space” means any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them (Article 1 (c)). 2 The treaty was by May 2021 accessed to by Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Venezuela; ratified by but not accessed to by Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines and Uruguay; and signed but not ratified by France, Guatemala, India and Romania (UN 2021).

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6

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements

After introducing the geographical, legal and political framework of the development of space settlements, it is also crucial to start a probe into the construction of the installations themselves. In order to understand the divergent proposed projects, we must tackle several topics that will ensure a holistic overview of the settlement activities. First, we need to look at the infrastructure of the installations constructed on the studied celestial bodies. The first section will thus focus on the engineering and other aspects connected to the construction of habitats or mining sites. Second, we must understand the differences among different types of bases. Depending on the type of body colonized and the actor(s) pursuing the activity, the bases will have to provide a divergent set of services. These will be surveyed in the second part. Based on these prerogatives, the chapter also looks into the internal working of settlements, their politics and potential future development. 6.1  The infrastructure of space settlements While the infrastructural parameters of the space installations will be, as will be evident from the next section to a large degree, driven by the purpose or size of these installations, there are still some generalizations that need to be made prior to a more fine-tuned analysis. These are driven by the basic needs of such projects but also by the above-mentioned specifics of the divergent studied celestial bodies. In any case, the installations supporting permanent human presence will require a higher level of sophistication compared to robotic mining missions to asteroids or other similar robotic missions. What is also challenging is the fact, well-known from previous stages of the space age, that many of the challenges faced by the constructions simply cannot be safely predicted. Even the detailed terrestrial and orbital tests of crucial systems and equipment might omit some factors present on the surface of selected objects. For this reason, it is crucial for the models to remain flexible, and for some alternative solutions to be readily available to protect the habitats and their inhabitants as much as possible from these unexpected risks (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 34). They also need to take into account the fact that the environments are, unlike the Earth, non-renewable DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-6

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 107 as the celestial bodies lack tectonics or biosphere that would leave the bodies active (Mendenhall 2018, 10). There are several basic models of habitats that might become relevant for missions to different objects or different types of missions. The first type is composed of inflatable modules or erectable structures (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 36–37). This type of structure was already mentioned above in relation to the activities of Bigelow Aerospace who developed such type of module that was tested on the ISS already in 2016. An inflatable, or semiinflatable, construction are also assessed as the preferred primary engineering solution in the ESA’s proposed Moon Village project (ESA 2020). The most significant advantage of this solution is the decrease in the weight of the materials needed to be transported to the celestial bodies. While the structures might be more fragile, they would probably establish a crucial first step towards the development of more complex structures whose construction will require the ability to utilize local resources. The second, more complex, durable, but also technologically demanding type of installations would include structures built from local resources (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 36–37). Given the price-tag put on the transport of construction materials from Earth’s gravity well, it is of utmost importance to master the skill as it presents the only viable solution for the construction of larger structures. Both the Moon and Mars offer numerous available materials suitable for the construction of settlements and are thus viable places for the development of such installations. Additionally, the two methods might be combined with prefabricated modules establishing a basis of the newly constructed settlement that will be finished using local materials that would bring the newly erected structure with additional protection and shielding. Sen, Carranza and Pillay (2010), for example, in this respect, provide a concept of structures built from polyethylene synthesized from the Martian resources. Such structures could be built in situ and thus not require costly transportation of resources from Earth. The polyethylene structures would then be multipurpose and provide needed ballistic impact resistance and other protection. Another solution might include the construction of rudimentary prefabricated structures on Earth that would be later enlarged using local Martian resources (Zubrin 1996, 127). Lastly, the habitats might make use of the geological and environmental features present on the surface of the selected bodies – mainly the lava tubes (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 36–37). Lava tubes present natural protection against environmental impacts, and some are likely large enough to be suitable for the construction of even more complex installations. Surely their interior would need adaptations, and they would have to be properly sealed from the external environment but would very likely provide superior protection against kinetic impacts and radiation shielding. Taken to its extreme, asteroids might be used as a habitat themselves once excavated and filled with proper infrastructure. The possible concepts taking into account the additional protection awarded by the terrain might include tunnel

108  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements outposts, terrace village, crater city or tubular town as developed in (Kozicka 2008, 131–136). On the contrary, the structures of lava tubes are still understudied. Additional research into their specific characteristics is required to manifest their suitability as sites for potential future habitats properly. There is also a potential disadvantage of these tubes being located far from ideal locations for habitats or important sites for the sought-after activity (Phillips 2012, 38). In case larger lava tubes are found, they might allow for the construction of relatively comfortable living quarters, including “terraforming” of underground areas where Earth-like facilities, including parks, might exist (Crotts 2014, 348). That is, however, a very long-term consideration. The habitats will, in general, need to provide extremely high standards regarding safety for their inhabitants and reliability of their systems. They will need to be adapted for the operations in low-gravity environments and no or very low atmospheric pressure. They will have to provide shielding against impacts of micrometeorites and against the incoming radiation (both of which are of the most significant importance on the surface of the Moon). Additionally, the near-perfect vacuum of the lunar surface or in the vicinity of asteroids must be considered. Last but not least, lunar and Martian surfaces are also affected by the presence of dust that very much complicates activities on these objects and whose entrance into the habitats must be prevented. This all in the context of the need to make the construction of the settlements as easy as possible due to the presence of a harsh environment and to use as many local resources as possible (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 34–36). It is also very advantageous to factor in a well-equipped workshop for repairs and modifications (Heincke and Foing 2020, 7–8). Location of habitats will also bring additional specifics to their needs. In the case of the Moon, construction of the habitat on the southern pole, on the one hand, increases the availability of illuminated regions and permanently shaded regions, thus improving access to necessary basic resources but decreases the ability of the base to communicate with Earth and across the lunar surface compared to the northern alternative. It also reduces the manoeuvrability around the region as the terrain is much more difficult to traverse. The two poles might, in the end, serve to meet the different needs of the space actors (Wingo 2016, 21–35). In any case, the habitat needs to be built in the vicinity of water resources, and energy sources, taking into account the temperature changes and location of valuable resources or scientifically and strategically important locations, including geologically interesting places, locations suitable for the construction of observatories, or L-points enabling control of movement between Earth and the Moon (L-1 point) or allow for the hovering over the lunar far side (L-2 point). A Martian settlement must first consider the larger distance which further prohibits transportation of significant building parts. There is thus likely to be larger focus on utilization of local resources. Available or transportable building materials might include metal, multilayer membrane structures, bricks or concrete from the planet’s soil or soil blocks (Kozicka 2008, 129–131).

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 109 Additionally, despite the presence of a weak atmosphere, Mars is not sufficiently protected against incoming radiation (Sen, Carranza and Pillay 2010, 583). The subsurface water resources are more likely to be available in the northern hemisphere due to the likely past presence of an ancient ocean. Water is to be found on the poles, subsurface or in shaded caves (Zubrin 1996, 133–147). The water presence is highly diversified, and further research on its availability is necessary (Shishko 2017). For the development of sustainable settlement, the habitat needs to be built in the vicinity of the required minerals and metals on soil suitable for the growth of crops with sufficient sunlight available. It is also advantageous to locate the base in the vicinity of energy resources – either deuterium for nuclear fusion, near the equator where solar power is the most suitable, or in places where geothermal power is the most viable due to the geological structure (Zubrin 1996, 133–147). Given the high variability of the Martian surface, the exact location needs to be also very much mission-specific (Chamitoff et al. 2005). Asteroids are not large enough to allow for multiple mutual constructions to exist on and around them, but their number highlights the need for a selection of a proper target for any mission. The selection is based on either the economic parameters or the strategic importance of a given object’s orbit. Economically valuable asteroids might be deflected near Earth for easier mining (James 2018b, 93) or into solar L-points where they would be stabilized and would allow for more sophisticated efforts like production of basic goods from the mined materials on site (McInnes 2016). Any basic mission proposal will be composed of four common phases – a departure from terrestrial orbits, rendezvous with an object and mission on its surface, departure from an object, and return to Earth. Extraction and processing of the minerals might also include the production of the fuel that would be used for the return and thus decrease the cost of the mission (Xie, Bennett and Dempster 2021, 250, 254). Another savings might be brought by the utilization of alternative propulsion systems like solar sails instead of chemical propulsion (Vergaaij, McInnes and Ceriotti 2021). Changes to orbital proprieties, including tumbling, might be conducted by utilization of swarm of cubesats (Nadoushan, Ghobadi and Shafaee 2020). The communication with the robotic missions might be conducted via lasers instead of radio communications as it would allow for larger data transfer (James and Roper 2018, 55). An important discussion is also held over the advantages of robotic and piloted missions for specific infrastructural projects. In general, while the piloted missions, for example to asteroids, hold important technological and other value for preparation of missions, including landing on Mars, the risks are increasingly higher, the foremost being fatal irradiation of the crew as a consequence, for example, of a strong solar flare (Crotts 2014, 101) or other mortal hazards. In the context of the necessity to test systems for piloted missions to deep space, there are several advantages and disadvantages of piloted missions compared to robotic versions. Robotic missions tend to be faster, more consistent and well adjusted for repetitive activities. Piloted missions,

110  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements however, bring the advantage of improvisation rooted in the ability to place data received on-site into a broader context and in adaptation to unexpected realities. On the contrary, robotic missions are superior in fast quantitative analyses and computing (James and Roper 2018, 66). It is thus highly likely that programmable or cutting-edge missions are to be conducted robotically, while more complex missions to better-known regions might include a human component that, nonetheless, makes any operation much more expensive. Nonetheless, the construction of the habitats themselves will not suffice, at least in the long term. The installations constructed on the surface of celestial bodies will need to bring some benefits to their owners, be it scientific discoveries, mineral production or military-strategic advantage. To fulfil these goals, there will be a dire need for the construction of additional infrastructure besides the settlements themselves. The infrastructure will make use and will need to take into account the different physical conditions on the studied celestial bodies. For example, Benaroya, Bernold and Chua (2002, 39–40) predict that the road construction on the lunar surface might be restricted by the physical characteristics of the lunar regolith, but the construction of cable-ways across shorter distances might be eased due to the low gravity environment. Crotts (2014, 249) additionally projects utilization of ballistic hoppers as the easiest way to transport goods across the surface of the Moon, once again thanks to the lower gravity and lacking atmospheric drag of our celestial companion. Additionally, the infrastructural projects will need to take into account the extremely wide range of temperatures that is experienced on the lunar surface. Equatorial temperatures, as already mentioned above, reach from −150 to 110°C, with equatorial craters floor temperatures going even higher over 120°C and permanently shadowed regions crucial for water mining going as cold as −250°C (Crotts 2014, 307–308). Similar solutions might be available for the construction of the infrastructure on the Martian surface with the difference in higher gravitational pull and the existence of a thin layer of atmosphere. These, on the one hand, bring necessary improvements like the possibility of airborne flight or easier adaptation of the human body to the local conditions. On the other, the existence of atmosphere and larger gravitational pull decreases the advantage of the utilization of hoppers and other types of infrastructural projects suitable for the surface of the Moon. In general, the infrastructural projects will need to effectively connect habitats, sites of interest and regions with important construction or other material. A completely different picture is then connected to the infrastructure of asteroid utilization – mainly their mining. There are two main issues tied to the infrastructure of asteroid activities – their small size and specific physical characteristics. The first issue is relevant for the long-term settlement projects as well as the mining activity. These smaller bodies cannot become independent colonies like the Martian projects are promising to. Also, any significant activity on and around an asteroid might adjust its orbital proprieties in a way harmful to the aims of the human population. Additionally, the orbital

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 111 period might be inconvenient or very useful for several types of activities. This all calls for the development of solutions regarding meeting specific needs for specific objects. As noted above, an asteroid that is to be mined might be brought to some close, stable position next to Earth, like solar or lunar L-point or lunar or high Earth orbit. The asteroid might be targeted by a swarm of small satellites or be mined by a more complex single larger mission. It might have its orbit changed in order to allow for the refuelling of deep space missions or patrolling of strategically important CLOCs. All of these functions would require specific additional infrastructure that is often tied to the projects presented above. The differences are also evident in energy production solutions for the bases. Clearly, the most significant source of energy in inner solar system remains solar power. Alternatively, nuclear power seems also as a rather workable solution (Phillips 2012, 194). Nonetheless, its utility in some areas of the Moon or for some more complex projects on Mars seems limited. There are thus other proposed solutions for energy generation in more challenging regions. For the Moon, these can include a thermocouple heat engine buried sufficiently deep to provide energy throughout the lunar night or heated by decaying low-grade plutonium, the introduction of fuel cells that would turn hydrogen and oxygen into electricity and water throughout the night and be electrolysed back to the original elements in the daytime (Crotts 2014, 311), or thorium reactors in regions with more significant quantities of the element available (Crotts 2014, 382, Wingo 2016, 35). In the case of Mars, other solutions might include limited use of wind power or, in some cases, geothermal power sources (Zubrin 1996, 133–147). Solutions for some types of hazards are also to a degree developed, at least on the theoretical or conceptual level. For example, the potentially threatening and hazardous dust that is present both on the surface of the Moon and Mars can be kept out of the bases by the introduction of magnets, airlocks, showers or specific surface materials. The solutions should then be applicable for bases on both of the bodies. Dust issue would, however, additionally be problematic for any observatory on the lunar surface, as evidenced by the changing capacity of Apollo reflectors left on the surface (Heincke and Foing 2020, 2). Thermal requirements would be likely better met by the construction of underground facilities. The occurrence of quakes on the Moon or Mars will require some flexibility of the construction (Crotts 2014, 337–341). It is also safe to assume that the requirements placed on the bases will change as the settlement projects progress. It is very likely that the first settlements will be just exploratory, with a focus being placed on scientific and basic engineering purposes. As the knowledge on the construction improves, other more sophisticated and purpose-driven settlements are likely to occur. These later bases will be exposed to more extensive requirements regarding their equipment and facilities but also living conditions. Ryan and Kutschera (2007, 49, 51), in this respect, envisage four phases of the development of

112  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements lunar settlements. The first will be frontier installations. These are characterized by a limited size of crews present at any given point and a rather short duration of their stay. These would consequently develop into settlements that allow for more specialized missions to take place. They would also be able to sustain the crew for a more protracted time period. The third phase is called a colony and would be able to meet the growing living expectations of a larger number of employees and residents working on long-term projects. Finally, according to the authors, it is likely that the installations will turn into self-sufficient entities able to support lunar citizens with a robust living and economic basis that would suffice to keep the operations running for a protracted period of time without any external support. At all of these phases, a proper selection of applicants will be crucial in order for the settlements to meet the demanding conditions. A similar development might be observable also in the case of Martian settlement, with the added advantage of more settlement-friendly environment given the larger likelihood of possibility to grow crops or easier access to energy or water sources. More complex settlements will require the introduction of additional services for their population. Of dire importance is in this respect self-sustainable healthcare provision (Ryan and Kutschera 2007, 46). One of the possible developments that might aid these needs is the mastering of bioprinting that would allow improvement of the medical care both on board of spaceships and in the settlements themselves (Cubo-Mateo et al. 2020). Production and reproduction of plants should be possible even in microgravity. However, it will be very likely needed to genetically modify the plants and possibly animals in order to improve their chances to aid the self-sustainment of the colonies (Phillips 2012, 178–182, 224). In addition, the larger and more permanent settlements will also require the provision of entertainment and recreation for its inhabitants, which might make use of the specific physical conditions. Additionally, child-care services in case the installation is to become fully self-sufficient will be also needed (Ryan and Kutschera 2007, 46–49). 6.2  The why of space settlements A second sub-topic relevant for the construction of space settlements or other types of installations is the reason(s) behind their sustained presence. For the majority of the installations, this issue will become relevant mainly after the first phase of the development of permanently inhabited structures, as the first exploratory missions will likely lack a significant differentiation. This is likely to be slightly different for the robotic missions which already possess such a differentiation that will further deepen with the extractive missions to asteroids. Such an assumption can be made due to the difference of the currently planned missions compared to Cold War Apollo-type missions. Apollo was conducted in a tight time schedule that was motivated by the global struggle over ideological attraction and prestige. As such, the project was

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 113 unsustainable in the longer run (Launius 2011, 171). The current projects aim for a more sustainable and long-term presence on the celestial bodies, are thus slower to develop but likely to remain in place for a significant time period allowing for specializations to occur. What will be very important is the cost-benefit analysis of different projects. For the majority of the proposals focused on scientific, security, strategic or political goals, the analysis will need to consider non-financial factors as well. On the other hand, the economic projects tied to resource extraction are much more straightforward. Several studies have already been made that need to be accented in the following discussion on the economically oriented installations on all three selected bodies. In general, the most considerable obstacles at this point seem to be high prices of space launches, low interest in such activities, a small number of space launches and unclear payback time. While some analyses, like (Jakhu and Buzdugan 2008), are supportive of the efforts, many issues and factors remain unsolved and unknown. The possible reasons for the construction of facilities are, similarly to the previous text, context sensitive. The following text will thus be internally sub-divided into three parts dedicated to the Moon, Mars and smaller bodies. It was already established that the role of prestige in space projects decreased after the 1960s lunar race. It, nonetheless, still remains a relevant motivation behind the projects. That is especially the case of early exploratory phase of the development of lunar settlements. The role of prestige, or simply the establishment of the presence of one’s state on the Moon (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 33), still constitutes evidently a driver for such activities. The motivations are clearly fuelling the two most likely projects to materialize in the short-term perspective – Artemis Accords led by the United States and Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station. Moon Village, designed by ESA that is an agency tied to the activities of a geopolitical actor, not that invested in prestigious projects, including piloted missions, is unlikely to be pushed forward so strongly by similar motivation and is thus lagging behind the two. The first actor to return to the lunar surface and establish a permanent settlement will gain a soft power boost in the international competition. It, however, must be noted that the prestige boost will be less significant compared to the 1960s space race, and while the return to the Moon is from this perspective relevant, it is not strong enough to motivate the efforts by itself. In order for the base to provide the prestige boost, it must simply be constructed, sustained and avoid any fatal accidents that would lead to the loss of human life. The second prominent motivation for the construction of even exploratory settlements is definitely scientific and technological progress (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 33, Launius 2011, 173). Moon is extremely interesting from several perspectives. The first is the presence of a low gravity environment. This is a similar advantage to experiments conducted currently on the ISS. Contrary to the space station, nonetheless, the environment is not free fall but low gravity and allows for more complex experiments given

114  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements the larger potential size of bases and presence of many resources that might enable more complex efforts. Second, the Moon is very important from the geological point of view. A deeper understanding of lunar geology would improve knowledge on the development of the planet Earth itself. NASA, in this respect, identified areas of interest for Artemis Accords regarding likely locations of material of significant scientific importance (NASA 2021). Another scientific value of the settlement on the lunar surface is determined by the tidal lock of the Moon to Earth. This means that the far side of the Moon is an excellent location for observations of the deep space as it is permanently shielded from the radiocommunication and other noise constantly escaping the Earth. An establishment of a telescope or other installation on the averted side of the polar regions might become a relatively easy first step towards the improved capacities of deep space observation. This might include utilization of a crater as a basis that would be filled by a structure of an installation and provide additional structural support (Bandyopadhyay 2020). Moreover, a station located in the L-2 point might also provide the sought-after services and aid projects located on the lunar surface. A lunar surface might also be installed with a particle detector, system for stable monitoring of Earth or an installation for sensing of electromagnetic frequencies from space on the far side of the Moon again using the shielding from Earth’s disruptions (Crotts 2014, 289–291). Scientific reasoning is prominently featured in any planned lunar settlement projects. However, similarly to prestige, it is not a sufficient driving force behind the projects alone. The scientific value of a lunar base has been well-known for a very long time but is not strong enough featured in the decision-making of the governments providing funding for complex projects like the lunar landing. Lunar settlements will also be developed with the goal of providing crucial infrastructure to the development of cislunar economy and operating of the terrestrial orbits. A low-gravity environment, presence of natural resources and location on the top of the Earth’s gravity well brings with itself many advantages for the sustainability of infrastructure in the Earth’s orbital space (Crotts 2014, 249). The lunar surface allows for the construction of satellites and their easier transportation to final locations on selected Earth’s orbits. Given the fact that the Moon holds lower gravity, no atmosphere and is at the top of terrestrial gravity well, launching a satellite from its surface built from in situ resources would decrease the price of development of space infrastructure (Launius 2011, 173). Another decrease in the price of terrestrial space infrastructure is tied to the relatively cheap repair and refuelling capacity that a lunar base can provide. Currently, it is generally, with exceptions like the Hubble Telescope, more feasible, despite the high cost of the hardware, to replace the whole satellite, compared to repairs or refuelling on orbits. Developing a system of smaller satellites capable of conducting the needed repairs and refuelling using lunar resources would change this logic. The Moon allows for the extraction of all needed metals, manufacturing of solar panels or preparation of fuel from lunar water. Improving the reliability

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 115 and lifetime of, especially larger, satellites further enhance the economic viability of terrestrial space systems. An important piece of infrastructure will be the L-1 base located permanently between Earth and the Moon that might serve as a transit point for the above-mentioned economic, but also other infrastructural or strategic purposes (Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 206). In the mid-term future, the improvement of the economic viability of terrestrial orbital activities will very likely become one of the crucial motivations for further development of the lunar infrastructure and bases beyond their exploratory phase. A L-1 base might also be important from the military-strategic point of view. Firstly, the owner of the base controls the most advantageous CLOCs connecting Earth and the Moon, including the lunar-based terrestrial orbits’ infrastructure. The station would also allow for monitoring other traffic between the two objects and overview over a significant part of the terrestrial orbital space that is crucial for the security considerations of the space actors. Lunar production of small satellites primarily developed for the servicing of terrestrial orbits might also utilize their dual-use potential and be used for military purposes as well. The ability to cheaply rendezvous with objects on terrestrial orbits would bring additional military capacity to a given actor. The lunar surface itself might additionally be used for the development of sophisticated Earth observation systems. These would once again make use of the lunar resources but also the stability of the lunar surface compared to the systems located on the terrestrial orbits. On the contrary, the system would be extremely distant from Earth’s surface compared to currently operated constellations and immobile respective to the Earth-Moon location. Lastly, the lunar surface might also serve as a location for a gun system that would make use of the same advantages with the added value of compensations for recoil the large systems would encounter in orbital space or utilization of lunar rocks as ammunition. Nonetheless, given the legal, normative and military considerations, the development of such a weapon is highly unlikely. Military considerations will remain important in the development of the lunar space projects and will very likely accompany other motivations, even if not publicly propagated (Doboš 2015, Dolman 2002, 65–66). We must also not disregard purely lunar economic activities that will require specific installations to be constructed. The first potentially viable economic activity is mineral extraction (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 33, Crotts 2014, 378, Launius 2011, 173). Unlike asteroids, given the likely origin of the Moon, lunar minerals are not likely to be composed of a larger amount of those rare on Earth. If there are some, they are likely to be included in impacted asteroids. Other valuable resources are likely to involve He-3 (Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 219, Schmitt 2006, 63), beamed solar energy (Rapp 2007), or strategically important materials geographically localized on Earth to regions located on a territory of a hostile state that might be imported in order to strengthen one’s supply chains. It is likely that mining installations will not only be developed in order to obtain resources

116  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements necessary for construction on the lunar surface but also the limited number of economically important minerals. The lunar economy is also likely to be developed around shipyard(s) that will make use of the environmental specifics of the Moon to construct more sophisticated and larger spaceships. Finally, the Moon is also likely to become a stepping stone connecting Earth and Mars in the potentially more complex solar system economic model or beginning a long-term sustainable model of solar system colonization aiming at improving humanity’s chances of survival (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 33, Burchell 2014, 165, Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 219). While these considerations will very likely take place in the future, they are not likely to inspire the first wave of construction of the exploratory settlements. Last but not least, specific installations might be built in order to meet some more particular needs. One is likely to be space tourism. The Moon is a relatively easily achievable location that might, in the foreseeable future, also serve as a vacation spot providing a unique outlook on Earth, original landscape, but also deep space observation that might be tied to the previously developed scientific capacities on the far side of the body. As evident from the recent spur of activities aiming to open parts of outer space to tourism like Virgin Galactic or Blue Origin “flea jumps”, to paraphrase N. Khrushchev, it is safe to assume that in case the lunar surface becomes a site of regular activities, tourism will at some point follow (Crotts 2014, 373–375). Secondly, potential installations might be used to store biological samples safely from Earth in case of a catastrophe happening on or to the Blue Planet. The safely stored biosamples might be used to protect biodiversity or restore life in case the worst-case scenario planetary-scale catastrophe materializes (Shapiro 2009). The far side of the Moon might also be used as a site for a laser used for planetary defence purposes. In that case, it could not be used directly against the Earth, and its inherent dual-use nature would be decreased (Launius 2011, Schmidt et al. 2019, 173). Other types of installations might also be thought of and will be developed. The development of lunar settlement projects would also be used in media campaigns to inspire youth to pursue a carrier in science (Benaroya, Bernold and Chua 2002, 33). The motivations behind the development of Martian settlements and other installations are, in general, in many respects somewhat similar to the Moon, but like many other issues developed above, are context-sensitive. A context is extremely important when it comes to prestige as a motivation behind the construction of Martian outposts. As Mars, unlike the Moon, did not witness piloted landing yet, the first landing, including the development of an exploratory settlement, that will be necessary even for the short-term missions given the transport possibilities between Earth and the Moon, will be much more medially attractive compared to the repeated lunar landing. It is physically almost impossible to conduct even the exploratory missions without constructing some rudimentary settlement and thus the prestige of being the first on the “Red Planet” as an important motivation behind the activities of both state (the United States-China competition) and non-state (SpaceX)

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 117 actors, is unlike the lunar race necessarily tied to the settlement construction. Unlike the lunar settlement, it is thus likely that the construction of the first settlement will be motivated by prestige and might be less sustainable compared to the lunar bases. The exact location of a base developed in order to “just be first” will be determined by other factors, mainly science. Scientific discoveries are a crucial aspect behind the construction of Martian bases. Similarly to the Moon, science is not by itself sufficient enough to lead to the development of the settlements while playing a crucial role behind robotic missions to the “Red Planet”, but will play a crucial role behind specifications of a potential base. The primary scientific, as well as ethical or religious, reason for exploring the Martian surface is the search for the alien, albeit microbiological, life. Prior to any mission, it will be crucial to determine the most probable sites where (at least fossils) of life forms might be discovered. These sites must be at the same time protected from biological contamination necessarily connected to human exploration and properly researched in order to, hopefully, help answer the question of the creation of life outside of Earth. This might also be an argument towards constructing first bases not directly on the Martian surface but instead on the two moons, Phobos and Deimos. This way, it would be possible to avoid spoiling the environment but also to decrease the velocity needed to escape the planets gravity upon return while retaining the ability to operate robotic missions without unnecessary time delay tied to operations controlled from Earth (Crotts 2014, 404–408). Another scientific factor relevant for the settlement construction will be geology. Given the lack of tectonic activity and biosphere and low atmospheric pressure and influence on the surface, the Martian surface is extremely interesting in order to discover not only evidence on the origins of the “Red Planet” specifically but also the creation of planets in general. Other scientific but also technological inputs will come into play as well. So, while the scientific motivation is not to be the reason why to construct a settlement on Mars, it will very likely affect a localization of such an installation. An often-repeated argument in support of Martian colonization is the survival of the human species. As established earlier, a self-sufficient human colony on Mars would improve the chances of humankind to survive any potential catastrophe and aid its goal to migrate further into solar and deep space (Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 220, Zubrin 2018, 159). Famously, this argument for the development of a Martian settlement is used by SpaceX’s Elon Musk. SpaceX, as noted above, is using this argumentation as a basis of its activities towards the Martian landing. Unlike the exploratory settlements, survival-based colonization should lead to the establishment of larger, more complex habitats. It will also push the scientific, engineering or medical research much more forward as the requirements of the survival base will be much higher compared to first, potentially temporary settlements. Nonetheless, in a likely case that SpaceX will not lead an independent Martian mission, and even in case it does, as it is hard to predict the actual nature

118  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements of the company’s settlement efforts once technologically mature enough, the survival motivation will not be the primary driver of Martian settlement meaning that the first habitats will be less complex. In case SpaceX’s official vision of Martian settlement holds, it might so happen that the first settlements will be, similarly to the recent lunar projects, sustainable and even more, potentially self-sufficient. Another “why” of Martian settlements, nonetheless only in the phase of enhanced diversification, might very likely be economic activity. Unlike the Moon or asteroids mentioned below, Mars is not likely to serve as a source of natural resources or a direct source of some economically viable activity. While probably holding some reserves of deuterium or rare-Earth materials (Zubrin 1996, 154–155), what comes as an obstacle in direct economic exchange – relatively high gravity and distance from Earth – might also become an economic advantage. Mars holds the potential to become an infrastructural and manufacturing base for asteroid mining in deeper parts of the inner solar system, including the asteroid belt (Zubrin 1996, 156). It might produce necessary mining equipment, food for smaller colonies or become a place for refining the pure ore into a better transportable form. It is also possible to transport many such activities on Martian orbits to decrease the price of launches from the depth of the planet’s gravity well. Mars’ role in the solar economic system thus might be of a very impactful, even focal infrastructural hub (Dudley-Flores and Gangale 2012, 199, Zubrin 1996, 159, Zubrin 2018, 166). Mars might also, in the long run, become a sought-after tourist destination. Nevertheless, it is not likely to become the primary motivation, but only one of the specializations in case more complex settlements are being constructed. A Martian base might also develop a military-strategic raison d’être. Due to the comparatively smaller size of Mars to Earth, it might be possible to control access to the planet either through the monitoring of the launch windows or via the construction of a system that would monitor the vicinity of the planet. Of a larger potential benefit, however, is the obtainment of a strategic depth unmatched by any territory on the planet Earth. An establishment of a self-sustainable military-able Martian base is likely to improve the military capacity of any spacefaring nation that might find itself in a dire need to retreat in sufficient number to a base that cannot be reached by its adversary. Additionally, the long distance adds to the warning time and decreases vulnerability against nuclear mutual assured destruction logic, thus giving an actor additional strategic option (Hickman 2010, 67). Similarly to above, while such reasoning is unlikely to drive the Martian settlement project, it might occur as one of the outcomes of the specializations of the habitation programmes of the major spacefaring agencies, this time the state-based only. Asteroids and other smaller bodies’ bases and robotic missions might also be guided by several motivations. As clearly observable from the previous text, one of the major reasons behind any activity is going to be economic profit. Many of the asteroids are very likely of significant economic value

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 119 for the terrestrial economy (Sommariva 2015, 28), especially factoring in the environmental damage that is tied to terrestrial mining compared to the mining of asteroid resources. Be it mining of rare-Earth elements, platinumgrade metals or other valuable resources, the economic potential of bringing rare resources in high quantities back to Earth is very likely to become the primary motivation for any sustainable activity on asteroids either on their original orbits or transported closer to Earth. An installation might use several mining techniques ranging from surface mining solutions to magnetic rakes, vaporizers, shift mining or explosive disaggregation, to name a few (James 2018a, 86–88). As pointed out by Paikowsky and Tzezana (2018, 12), the import of space-mined platinum-grade metals is to become crucial for the further development of terrestrial industries due to their importance for modern technologies. This is the case despite the fact that import of large quantities of any mineral might hold an effect on prices of the materials and will not necessarily become profitable in the early period of asteroid mining (Dahl, Gilbert and Lange 2020)1 as the costs are to include research and development phase, exploration and prospecting, construction and infrastructure development, operations and engineering in a context of significant time spent on the mission (James 2018a, 89). Additionally, less valuable materials might be used for construction purposes in a microgravity environment (Lewis 1997, 193–198). Unlike the previously studied two bodies, asteroid mining is highly likely to be robotic only. Given the relatively long time periods of mining missions and extremely hostile conditions, a presence of a human crew would bring only little benefit compared to any benefits from having a human brain readily available to solve any potential issue. This might change in case the solar system economic system becomes more developed, including mining of the largest asteroid belt objects. In any case, the development of asteroid economy would radically change the economic system on Earth, and it is very likely that we will see in the foreseeable future at least attempts to develop the mining installations on some of the smaller bodies (Lladó et al. 2013, 176–177, Tardivel et al. 2015, 18). Of major importance is also monitoring and testing of deflection to prevent any potential collision with Earth or any other settled body of the solar system – a planetary defence (Tardivel et al. 2015, 18). Deflection of an object on a collision course with Earth or any other object of interest cannot be dealt with in last resort. It is crucial to constantly develop monitoring and rendezvous technology that would give early warning and enough capacity to prevent any such situation. It is thus likely that missions aiming to increase observation capacity but importantly to test either nuclear and nonnuclear options for deflection (Doboš, Pražák and Němečková 2020, 75–80, Morrison 2019, 115–118) will occur in increased numbers. While we can see some projects taking place even nowadays, their number is likely to increase as the number of available deflection technologies increases. An example of one mission that just led to a successful test of deflection capabilities in late September 2022 is the Double Asteroid Redirection Test mission that is a

120  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements collaborative project between NASA and ESA. The mission deflected the moon Dimorphos of the Didymos asteroid and measured the success of the attempt to kinetically change its orbit (Cheng 2015). Also China announced its own mission testing the asteroid deflection capabilities to take place by 2025 (Jones 2022). Similarly to the previous case, it would be implausible that any mission testing planetary defence capacities or deflecting an object on a collision course would include a crewed mission. Some of the asteroids or comets might appear to be on strategically important orbits or possess scientifically extremely valuable information. These objects might be flowing around strategically (Dolman 2002, 65–66) or scientifically important locations (L-points, overviews of objects from previously unexploited perspectives, enhancing travel to less accessible parts of solar system) or be composed of materials relevant for the study of the origins of the solar system, alternatively be of extrasolar origin. In this case, it is much more likely that the objects would be targeted by a piloted mission. Both scientific and military decision-making often requires swift and out-of-thebox thinking that cannot be programmed into the currently available robotic probes, and the delayed or, for times, unavailable communication would not suffice. Nonetheless, any piloted mission must be necessarily predated by a robotic mission that would map gravity interactions of the asteroid and an incoming object, behaviour of volatiles or regolith and select proper landing site on a given object (Tardivel et al. 2015, 20–26). Additionally, the technological obstacles posed by the development of some installations might serve as a test site of some necessary skills for Martian missions (Burchell 2014, 165, 167, Tardivel et al. 2015, 18). While not likely to become the primary motivation for setting up asteroid infrastructure, these reasons might play a role in promoting a piloted exploration of these bodies. Finally, there are other less prominent reasons for developing, mainly robotic, bases around selected smaller objects. One might include refuelling of deep space missions. Asteroids of the right composition, able to produce fuel, might serve as strategically crucial bases for both civilian and military purposes. The asteroids that allow for manufacturing of fuel from water ice could be used as fuel stations for deep space probes or even piloted missions that might use the water for other purposes as well. Unlike fuel produced on larger objects, which would be useful mainly for self-sustainability of bases on these objects, their populations and economies, asteroid fuel would mainly aid space missions passing by (Lewis 1997, 127). Selected asteroids might also be targets of the space tourism industry as well, but such an aim is even more futuristic than the tourism industry on Mars. 6.3  Politics of space settlements Last but not least, this section must also cover the political context of the space colonization efforts. This question includes two major issues. The first is the internal political setting of the space colonies. There are several models

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 121 of administration of specific types of installations that must be overviewed in order to bring a fuller picture of the development of the settlement projects. The second includes relations among the bases of divergent actors. As the principles of space international law disallow the clear-cut division of space into sovereign territories that enable to split jurisdictions on Earth, alternative models of cohabitation must be developed. The internal political setting of space colonies will be roughly determined by three main factors – physical characteristics of the settled object, size of the base, and preferences of an actor developing such an installation. The physical characteristics will firstly affect the possible size of a settlement. Secondly, they might determine the purpose of a base. Thirdly, the distance between a base and Earth would limit the ability of a central government to influence the decision-making of the colony as the time lag increases the independence of the settlements. It will be hard to enforce decisions in distant locations. This section will not be revisiting the already mentioned specifics of different bodies developed above, but their context must be kept in mind in discussion over possible political regimes of space colonies. The second important variable is the size of the settlement that will necessarily vary throughout the different periods of colonization but also in relation to the purpose and location of a given installation. In this respect, Schmidt and Boháček (2021, 2) developed three types of settlements divided according to their size. The first is a “crew” with a maximum of ten people participating. Such a settlement must be composed of specialists, with each and every one of them possessing some form of critical knowledge that is required for the specific mission goals. Such a group is to be dominated by hierarchical leader-based governance and will be focused on an accomplishment of a given mission. The loss of a single member might be fatal for the mission’s success, and the issues with psychological stability will necessarily increase with the length of the mission. Connecting this to the previous text, such projects are most likely to materialize frontier missions or very specialized projects. The second type of settlement according to size is “community”, with a size of over a hundred people. Once a settlement reaches this size, it allows for a competition or comparison of expertise. Communities will necessarily need to develop other forms of political legitimacy that cannot be purely based on mission goals and clear hierarchy. The third type of settlement according to size is “society” with over a thousand people. Such a settlement would be large enough to develop specific values and a political system that might be already divided along the branches of power knew from Earth. While some specialists might be more respected, this might cause conflict between expertise and democratization in case the democratic values are sought after. That final notion opens up a crucial third factor, the political features of an actor that develops the settlement. We can generally observe three types of actors that are in a position to potentially create larger settlements – liberal-democratic state actors, authoritarian state actors, and private actors. In

122  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements the frontier or exploratory phase, the differences in the internal organization are unlikely to be driven by the difference in the political organization or ideological notions of colonizing actors. As noted above, given the low specialization and limited capacity, they are all likely to develop quasi-military hierarchical orders based on clearly developed relations. Nonetheless, with larger settlements, the situation might change. The liberal-democratic states are more prone to develop some form of responsible governance that will be more open to the settlers, authoritarian-based settlements are more likely to be strictly hierarchically ordered even once their size increases, and the private colonies would be affected by the worldview of their head which might vary significantly. The ideas on the internal organization of larger settlements might spread from libertarian notions of completely state-free internal decision-making rooted in free-market principles towards colonization (Nelson and Block 2018) to military-inspired hierarchical and heavily statecentric solutions to the communitarian, cooperative framework that would disregard origins of the specific astronauts and develop new inclusive regime (Schmidt and Boháček 2021, 3). Based on the nature of current space actors, we can identify purely state, international, purely commercial, private-government cooperative or private with governmental economic support models of developing settlements. Differences among these will necessarily reflect in the internal political setting (Schmitt 2006, 150–153). The base constructed by a single actor will be more prone to be hierarchically organized. Simultaneous colonization by more actors would then more likely spur a larger level of cooperation. There are generally three types of actors able to undertake or participate in settlement projects – leading actors, emerging and supporting state actors and New Space commercial actors. The first is likely to lead the process, the second to enhance the capacities of the projects, and the third to bring more economically sensitive and commercial thinking into its development (Sherwood 2017). It is thus very likely that the internal political setting of the settlements will be determined by the first group, most likely to include either the United States and Europe or China and Russia, or alternatively SpaceX if its vision of an independent Martian colony succeeds. In this case, Elon Musk envisioned the development of a settlement ruled as a direct democracy (Wagner 2016). For many authors, the process of development of settlements in the context of their increasing size and independence on Earth presents an option for the development of new unique political models. This is, however, unlikely to materialize. The settlements are not to suddenly pop up out of nowhere. They will be developed by an existing actor with already established ideas on political theory and the organization of society. These preconditions will be applied under very harsh conditions and remade according to factors like the necessity of survival, level of independence on the terrestrial homeland, wishes of the population, or personality of crucial figures present in the development of larger settlements. This will lead to a steady evolution of the political system that might stir towards a more hierarchical, communitarian

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 123 or liberal organization but does not possess the necessary ability to shift from the terrestrial political forms swiftly and radically. Another crucial political issue for the development of space settlements is the cohabitation among installations of different actors in the context of the ban on territorial appropriation. Despite that, it is likely that territorial disputes will occur, especially on lunar poles and over valuable asteroids located on advantageous orbits. As we know from the terrestrial experience, conflicts over territory tend to have larger escalation potential and are generally more likely to become violent compared to other types of conflicts (Kahler and Walter 2006, 2). This means that there must be some solution to the relations among the settlements located in contested regions. Possession of extra-terrestrial territory is, additionally, likely to become a source of prestige and resources, both, as mentioned earlier, an important motivation for the establishment of such a settlement in the first place. A low level of technological development is then even more likely to push the bases, especially on the Moon and on the small number of accessible and valuable asteroids, geographically close to each other, further increasing the conflict potential over limited sources of water, energy or valuable minerals (Hickman 2010, 65–67). On the other hand, the cause of the conflicts is to be in its core primarily material, meaning that they are divisible and thus easier to solve (Toft 2003, 19–23). Space settlements are a long way off developing their independent territorially bound identities that would turn the conflicts into indivisible and thus more dangerous. The distances among the bodies even in the inner solar system are large for current transportation options and thus the settlements will need to construct the necessary infrastructure rather swiftly. It is likely that at least primary territorial spread might be relatively rapid as well (Hickman 2010, 64–65) and involve strategically significant points necessary for the running of even exploratory settlements. The importance of agreeing on territorial issues is thus clear and should be a part of any project. The potential for a conflict over specific locations is also dependent on the importance given to a body. For example, if the United States sees the Artemis Accords and lunar colonization as only a stepping stone towards Mars (Szajnfarber 2011, 133), the issue might not be so pressing compared to missions having the Moon as a primary target. It is also likely that the conflicting potential over resources or other goods necessary for survival (Szocik, Wójtowicz and Braddock 2020, 10, Lempert 2011, 90) – especially those located further away from the Earth than the Moon – might be overcome by cooperation among the settlers otherwise living in isolation and physically as well as the psychologically harsh environment (Hickman 2010, 69). Nonetheless, counting on the good nature of settlers in a context of a demanding environment is an insufficiently stable way forward, and some solutions for the territorial division should be presented. The first solution might include some form of international system of land division similar to the ITU’s assignment of orbital slots that might be

124  Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements developed by the UN. Nonetheless, as the major geopolitical actors all have their issues with following or developing new legally bounding rules, such a solution is hardly likely to materialize in time to become relevant, at least for the development of the first lunar settlements. Another proposal, which is hardly practically achievable, is an unrestricted private competition based on a first-come, first-served basis. An actor who would occupy and work the land would have a rightful claim on such a land (Nelson and Block 2018). Again, this libertarian notion disregards the role of the state in space exploration, and it is extremely unlikely that states will not be present in any settlement project, including the division of territories. While the territorial logic of the Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Centre is so far not specifically publicly determined, the other two main lunar projects, Artemis Accords and Moon Village provide better guidance. Artemis Accords operates, as noted earlier, with a notion of safety zones. Such a solution is very close to the territorial delimitation of space on Earth, albeit being temporary. It would allow participants to claim quasi-sovereign territorial rights and would clearly benefit the early comers over actors joining the settlement projects later, as it might happen that access to critical resources would be already impossible or controlled by a potentially adversary actor. On the contrary, this logic of spatial division is easy to understand, rooted in the political development of past centuries and would provide a clear guideline over the rights of divergent settlements located on the lunar surface. What is, however, crucial is for such zones to become accepted even by rival projects of actors that will not be parties to Artemis Accords and might thus not intended to follow such a delimitation. Moon Village project, on the contrary, does not operate with territorial delimitation following specific needs of particular projects. It aims at collaboration of these specific parts in one large unit that would be sharing the available resources. The project is widely open and would allow even less capable or dedicated actors to participate with their limited projects that would be supported by the central, more significant habitat development conducted by major actors and centred around ESA’s own programme. As such, it aims to create essential synergies that would aid scientific and technological progress. That would mean that, unlike Artemis Accords, the resources would need to be shared according to some, yet unspecified, internal mechanism, but in the end, the southern lunar pole would be dominated by a single, even if multinational, actor, rather than divided into separated zones that would be controlled by alternative projects. As evident, the questions on political setting of the celestial missions remain largely unsolved. They will continue to evolve according to the actual progress of the settlement projects. The political system of a larger settlement is likely to evolve as an interplay between the original political ideas brought to the celestial bodies by a colonizing actor and the needs and wishes of the settler population that will likely grow more independent throughout the time, especially on Mars. While the exploratory outposts are likely to have

Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 125 somewhat similar internal organization, the larger settlements will likely differ in their socio-political setting. As for the “international relations” of space colonies, a system is also likely to develop according to the actual process of space settlement. The issue is then most pressing for the Moon as the most suitable regions for the construction of habitats seem to be rather limited in size, and competing projects aim to begin in a similar timeframe. The territorial question of lunar and deep space colonization is thus also likely to evolve based on ongoing political realities rather than by design. Note 1 Planetary Resources in this respect estimated that a 30 meter-long platinum-rich asteroid might be worth 25 to 50 million USD in current prices (Froehlich 2018, 34).

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Politics and Infrastructure of Settlements 127 Phillips, R.W. 2012 Grappling With Gravity: How Will Life Adapt to Living in Space?. New York, NY: Springer. Rapp, D. 2007. “Solar Power Beamed from Space.” Astropolitics 5 (1): 63–86. Ryan, M.H., and I. Kutschera. 2007. “Lunar-Based Enterprise Infrastructure— hidden Keys for Long-Term Business Access.” Space Policy 23 (1): 44–52. Sen, S., S. Carranza and S. Pillay. 2010. “Multifunctional Martian Habitat Composite Material Synthesized from in Situ Resources.” Advances in Space Research 46 (5): 582–592. Shapiro, R. 2009. “A New Rationale for Returning to the Moon? Protecting Civilization with a Sanctuary.” Space Policy 25 (1): 1–5. Sherwood, B. 2017. “Space Architecture for Moon Village.” Acta Astronautica 139: 396–406. Shishko, R. 2017. “Mars Colony In Situ Resource Utilization: An Integrated Architecture and Economics Model.” Acta Astronautica 138: 53–67. Schmidt, N., and P. Boháček. 2021. “First Space Colony: What Political System Could We Expect?” Space Policy 56: 1–10. Schmidt, N., C.M.E. Utrilla, P. Boháček, J. Silva-Martinez and P. Worden. 2019. “The Multipurpose Lunar Base as a First-Line Biosphere Defense and as a Gateway to the Universe.” In Planetary Defense, edited by N. Schmidt, 419–452. Cham: Springer. Schmitt, H.H. 2006. Return to the Moon: Exploration, Enterprise, and Energy in the Human Settlement of Space. New York, NY: Springer. Sommariva, A. 2015. “Rationale, Strategies, and Economics for Exploration and Mining of Asteroids.” Astropolitics 13 (1): 25–42. Szajnfarber, Z. et al. 2011. “Moon First Versus Flexible Path Exploration Strategies: Considering International Contributions.” Space Policy 27 (3): 131–145. Szocik, K., T Wójtowicz and M. Braddock. 2020. “The Martian: Possible Scenarios for a Future Human Society on Mars.” Space Policy 54: 1–11. Tardivel, S. et al. 2015. “Human Exploration of Near Earth Asteroids: Architecture of Proximity Operations.” Acta Astronautica 110: 313–323. Toft, M. D. 2003. The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vergaaij, M., C.R. McInnes and M. Ceriotti. 2021. “Economic Assessment of HighThrust and Solar-Sail Propulsion for Near-Earth Asteroid Mining.” Advances in Space Research 67 (9): 3045–3058. Wagner, K. 2016, June 3. Here’s how government will work on Mars, according to Elon Musk. https://www.vox.com/2016/6/3/11852148/elon-musk-mars-government-direct-democracy (accessed August 10, 2021). Wingo, D. 2016. “Site Selection for Lunar Industrialization, Economic Development, and Settlement.” New Space 4 (1): 19–39. Xie, R., N.J. Bennett and A.G. Dempster. 2021. “Target Evaluation for Near Earth Asteroid Long-Term Mining Missions.” Acta Astronautica 181: 249–270. Zubrin, R. 1996. The Case for Mars: The Plan to Settle the Red Planet and Why We Must. New York, NY: Touchstone. Zubrin, R. 2018. “The Economic Viability of Mars Colonization.” In Deep Space Commodities: Exploration, Production and Trading, edited by T. James, 159–180. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

7

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies

Having overviewed the main factors affecting the upcoming settlement projects, it is finally time to develop a holistic scenario-based geopolitical analysis of the likely activities of the selected celestial bodies. This section is divided into three parts, each covering one specific (type of) object. As a clear-cut prediction of the future is not possible given the variability of the possible developments, we will be looking at some most likely scenarios rooted in the above-mentioned factors that are crucial for specific bodies. As such, this chapter aims to present the most likely courses of future action. 7.1 Moon The first object to be overviewed is the Moon – the closest object to Earth and the only one that witnessed a visit by a member of humankind. Unlike the Apollo project, current efforts, be it the Artemis Accords, International Lunar Research Centre, or Moon Village, are to be more long-term and sustainable and will require much higher utilization of in situ resources and the development of more technologically advanced infrastructure. Looking at all of the settlement projects drafted by the major space powers, it can be safely assumed that they reflect the physical characteristics of the Moon well as they all aim to develop settlements in polar regions, most likely on the south lunar pole. The Moon is gravitationally locked to Earth and thus always facing the planet on the same side. This also means that its surface faces an approximately 14-day day/night cycle. In the context of lacking atmosphere, this leads to extreme changes in temperatures and disallows for constant utilization of solar energy which is extremely important for the continuous activities of any space colony, at least at its beginnings prior to the development of other more expensive alternatives. Lunar poles are, in this context, rather specific. Given the angle of the solar rays’ impact, the temperature differences are not that extreme. The poles are also sites of permanently illuminated and shaded regions. The first is allowing for (near) constant production of solar energy, thus likely solving the energy needs of at least the first colonies. The latter is very likely reservoirs of iced water, however, stored in near absolute DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-7

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 129 zero conditions. Both are important preconditions of settlement construction. It is also likely that some part of the settlement will be developed on the near side of the polar regions which would allow for continuous, direct communication with terrestrial homelands. The three main settlement projects are all publicly open to international cooperation. None of the three projects is participated by only one state, and they can all be joined by new actors. The Artemis Accords is a US-led project. Unlike the other two, it explicitly allows for the territorial division of the lunar surface and the mining of its resources. It sets up a cooperative project on both sides of the continent with partners in Europe and East Asia and further. International Lunar Research Centre is a China-led project participated by Russia. It is officially also open for cooperation and is targeting to lure partners away from Artemis Accords. The specifics of the project are, nonetheless, not as publicly available as is the case of the US-led project. We must also not forget about the ESA’s Moon Village idea that calls for an initiative open to voluntary participation based on the needs and capacities of contributing parties. It thus presents an alternative to the two projects but seems less likely to materialize. The first exploratory settlements are likely to focus on technological progress and scientific discovery and be relatively small and limited in their role. As such, they will require physical proximity to limited sources of power – meaning (nearly) permanently illuminated regions – and less rare but not yet fully mapped sources of water. This fact creates a first potential cause of contention for the first phase of lunar colonization. The second is the possible competition over interesting, scientifically important locations like rare geological structures or advantageous sites for the construction of deep space observatories. Nonetheless, the early settlements are very likely to look alike and compete over the same geographic regions and resources, including orbital infrastructure that might include space stations supporting the lunar base. This might lead to several likely scenarios of early lunar colonization. This text will work with four of them – competition, prevalence, unification, and parallel colonization. The first identified scenario is competition. It would require at least two uncooperative settlement models to be developed in the same timeframe and aiming at a similar location – the same, very likely southern, lunar pole. It would very likely be composed of adversary US and China-led projects that are currently under development. Such a scenario would lead the two (or more) projects to contest over the utilization of scarce access to (nearly) permanently illuminated regions. As the two would be unable to compromise over the common access to the scarce resource, this would cause a conflict between the two projects, which is, however, unlikely to develop into an open kinetic confrontation on the lunar surface itself. Nonetheless, minor acts of sabotage cannot be discarded. Such a scenario would undoubtedly increase tensions in international politics and might lead to endangering the settlement project altogether due to the increased risks of sending human personnel on a contested base.

130  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies On the one hand, this scenario, while limiting the ability of actors to utilize (nearly) permanently illuminated regions in their fullness, might push the parties involved to develop new sources of energy generation and diversify sources of water. It is also perceivable that in case of an accident, the presence of another base geographically located nearby due to technical necessity would allow for faster facilitation of help, following the provisions of the Rescue Agreement. It might also push for faster development of new installations. If the original space race is any guide, it might also lead to pushing the scientific community closer together. However, given the contemporary space developments on Earth’s orbits, we might witness a heightened risk of minor incidents aiming at espionage or sabotage, mainly via cyber and electronic means. The situation might also be less threatening if private entities are heavily included or operating their independent settlements. Exploratory stations around the poles will not possess any major military or economic capacity, though. The second possible scenario of the exploratory phase of lunar colonization is prevalence. In such a future, repetition of success of Apollo is envisioned. One of the projects would get a boost over the others due to economic, technological or political advantages, or problems of the others to manage their own project on time or altogether. One actor will thus decide the location of its base unopposed and will not have to deal with sharing agreements on power production sites or water ice reservoirs. This might allow for the construction of larger settlements in quite a short amount of time as it would be possible to utilize all of the limited available resources for just one major project. On the contrary, the development will not be spurred by competition with another project. If such a development materializes, the first settlements would not only obtain uncontested access to the crucial resources but would also develop an “administrative” model of the lunar surface that would be then very likely dominant for the latecomers as well. Instead of creating an international agreement, the base would follow the dominant political model of an actor successful in the colonization efforts. It would thus place the first settlement into an advantageous role over its competitors, and a given actor would be in a preferential position to develop the cislunar infrastructure in a later stage of lunar colonization. That might lead to a control of the economic interaction between the Moon and Earth and of strategically important points in the lunar vicinity. It would, additionally, improve its power position on the Earth. The third possible scenario is unification. This scenario is rooted in the same timeframe and geographic scope as the first scenario – more than one of the main competing projects is targeting the same polar region at the same time. Only at this point, the projects will be able to develop a common framework for utilizing the scarce resources under some commonly agreed administrative model. Such a scenario would interconnect the efforts and lead to the identification of common goals and means, or a more specified legal framework, for example, along the legal framework governing the

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 131 ISS (UNOOSA 2013). Such a scenario might facilitate synergies among the strengths of divergent space programmes. This might aid cooperative efforts in other space projects. This might involve common infrastructure along the lines of the proposed Moon Village project or a sharing agreement, mainly on utilization of the illuminated regions and development of further infrastructure so as not to interfere with each other along the lines of the Outer Space Treaty. Moon Village-like base would be highly cooperative but still led by a single space agency. On the contrary, the supranational alternative would be based on more well-known UN-like governed projects or the ISS model. Such a scenario would require improvement of relations among the leading spacefaring nations. It would make the settlement project safer compared to the first scenario of exploratory colonization but might cause troubles in the longer run, in case the agreements are not followed. However, it would increase the defection price as a construction of an alternative base would be extremely difficult, costly and would lack access to already exploited scarce resources. The final likely scenario is parallel colonization. In this case, more settlement projects take place at the same time but are located in geographically different regions. This would most likely involve parallel colonization of both polar regions in order to avoid confrontation and might present a workable solution for a situation in which two large competing projects are unable to develop a common sharing framework. An actor that perceives its position as weaker might opt for the development of its settlement on the opposite pole compared to a faster one. As such, its slower development would not lead to an ultimate failure to construct a settlement but would also not risk further competition over geographically concentrated scarce resources. In this case, both projects would target different sites with valuable resources and could develop competing administrative models without getting in direct contact with each other, thus minimizing the risk of confrontation and decreasing risks stemming from tensions in international politics. Competing settlement projects might therefore develop around the two lunar poles and consequently spread geographically further across the lunar surface. Such a scenario might present challenges for the later stages of colonization when more developed and specialized installations are built on a larger geographic area. It would, nonetheless, provide at least temporary solutions to tensions between different legal models developed at this point in time. By the time of writing, it seems that the first two scenarios are more likely to materialize than the latter two. It currently appears that all of the major projects aim to develop settlements in the southern lunar polar region as a more promising site for the sustainment of permanently populated bases. It is not impossible that one of the projects would, in the end, change its localization, but from the current viewpoint, such a situation seems less likely. The third cooperative scenario is also of lower likelihood to materialize given the heightening tensions between the United States and China, who are also leaders of the two settlement projects most likely to take place. Such a possibility

132  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies is further decreased following the Russian aggression against Ukraine that started in February 2022. The first two scenarios thus present the most likely future developments, at least for the exploratory phase of lunar colonization. The development of more developed lunar installations and specialized complex infrastructure will be further determined not only by the outcome of the exploratory phase but also by other contextual factors as well. The first is tied to the potential domination of the exploratory phase by one actor. The characteristics of the actor would, to a large degree, affect the ongoing settlement. The “Western”-led efforts are more likely to involve economic liberalization and inclusion of private actors compared to efforts dominated by China and Russia. The construction of infrastructure will be further determined by the needs of the terrestrial centres. It is highly likely that many scientific observatories and other types of installations will be constructed no matter the actor prevalent in the early phase of lunar settlement. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether military-strategic or economic-oriented infrastructure will play a primary role. As evident from the previous chapters, Moon can play a crucial role both in military operations on terrestrial orbits and in the development of the cislunar economy and management of Earth’s orbits in order to improve the sustainability of space operations. It seems useful to develop four scenarios of further progress in settlement projects that would be rooted in two givens – the first exploratory phase successfully took place and no global conflict that would prevent the development of more complex installations engulfed the Earth. Further, all the scenarios are to include progress in the development of scientific outposts that are common to all the future. The scenarios are developed based on two critical uncertainties – the ability of one actor to dominate the settlement process on the Moon and the nature of the relationship among the space powers. The first scenario of mid to long-term development of lunar settlements is hegemony. This scenario is based on the prevalence of a single major actor/ project that other space powers do not or cannot challenge. This scenario would give an actor in control a significant advantage over its competitors and allow for more economically oriented development of lunar infrastructure. A single actor would lead the development of sophisticated lunar infrastructure, be it on the lunar surface – including mining operations, shipyards, or energy production sites – and above – including management of terrestrial orbits, on-orbit mining of asteroids, or management of lunar orbital base(s). A single actor will be in control of the strategically important locations and CLOCs and will dominate traffic management. It will also be dominant in setting up rules of commerce and political management of the lunar settlements. The hegemony of one actor does not necessarily mean the exclusion of others, but these will have to follow the rules established by the hegemon. Given the harsh environment and high costs of the development of lunar infrastructure, it is extremely unlikely that it would be maintained by a single actor even in the longer run. However, in this scenario, one major space power dominates the strategically important points and holds

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 133 disproportionally more developed capacities on the lunar surface and orbits. Depending on the political and economic preferences of the dominant actor, the consequent system might be more economically open and liberal or more authoritarian and state-centric, based on formal intergovernmental contracts. Nonetheless, this scenario would be, from a power balance point of view, rather stable and would allow the dominant actor to use the lunar economy to boost further its terrestrial dominance which is a likely prerequisite of the lunar hegemony. The lunar surface would also be used as a stepping stone for further deep space missions, including the Martian landing. It is more likely, but not determined that this scenario would follow the “prevalence” scenario of exploratory settlement. One dominant actor might crystalize throughout the development in all other three scenarios, but none would have a priori early start. Cooperation among a larger number of similarly powerful space powers sets up a second possible scenario. Such a development envisages agreements over the management of not only energy and water sources as in the exploratory phase but also other resources, access to strategically important locations like L1-point, economic infrastructure including management of terrestrial orbits and legal compromises on issues like mining. It is thus rooted in the cooperative framework being developed already in the exploratory phase or in synchronization of activities of relevant actors in the context of a harsh environment that pushes states and companies towards cooperation. An outcome might be a single grand project along the lines of ISS where all of the participants would add their capacities to a single larger cooperative project or a compromise division of the lunar surface, orbits and resources among more complementary projects. As long as the agreements are being followed, such a configuration would be rather stable and might spur further development making use of synergies among capacities of different participants. However, such stability would be highly dependent on the terrestrial relations among involved actors. Such a scenario would be likely based on a formal cooperative agreement either rooted in currently existing supranational structures like the UN framework or in a completely new agreement specifically developed to meet the needs of the dominant actors on the Moon. Such an agreement would likely allow for a more profound economic and scientific development of lunar installations but might be somewhat fragile. Any breach of agreed-upon rules might lead such a framework to become unworkable and potentially to conflict. Trouble might appear if an agreement on the management of strategically important locations is lacking or challenged. On the contrary, having such a framework in operation would significantly increase the price of defection as there would be an even lesser possibility to develop an independent installation. Developing a workable solution for all actors currently interested in the lunar settlement would probably necessitate a shift in relations among space powers in international politics. This mainly stands for relations between the United States and China. It would also likely follow

134  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies exploratory scenarios of “unification” and “parallel colonization” rather than the other two. Both configurations might also appear in the context of more conflicting relations among the relevant parties to the lunar settlement. In case one actor dominates, we will witness a scenario of a challenge to the position of the hegemon. It is likely that this scenario will develop in case there are more alternative settlements located on the surface, with the one developing faster and becoming challenged by its alternatives later on. Another possibility is that the early hegemon’s relative power might decrease, and its position will become less safe. Such a scenario would be more focused on military-strategic competition and securing strategically important CLOCs and locations. Meeting the economic potential and pursuit of science projects might be limited in order to sustain the power position of the challenged actor. While a direct military clash over the lunar infrastructure is highly unlikely, hostile operations might appear. The role of private entities will be more restricted compared to most outcomes of the two cooperative scenarios. This, nonetheless, does not mean that the economic potential would remain untapped or that scientific projects would halt altogether. The challenged hegemon would just become more aware of the military-strategic plane and dedicate more of the scarce resource in this direction. The opposition would likely not primarily be economic or scientific as in the earlier scenarios but more military-oriented as well. This scenario is most likely to materialize if the current challenge of China to the United States global position is not solved by the time of development of more specialized and complex bases. The United States might, at that point, be faster in the development of lunar settlements but still under threat by its competitor. The fourth scenario is defined by competition of more relevant projects of similarly powerful actors. Such competition might include a power contest only or, more likely, will cover a larger segment of general legal and political issues, including involvement of private entities, regime of mineral extraction and political-administrative model on the Moon but also on Earth. Such competition might speed up the development of more complex installations but could also lead to conflict over scarce resources and control over strategic locations. Less of a conflicting potential is to be expected if this longer-term scenario develops from that of “parallel colonization” mentioned earlier. Geographical separation of the competing projects would likely improve the stability of such a setting. And the competition might turn out to be geographically rather limited and held mainly over control of key CLOCs and L-points. This development might lead to low-level incidents among the competing projects or involve territorial division of the Moon in order to prevent such events from posing a high risk for crews of the lunar bases. The competition is also likely to be held in the economic domain. Attempts might be held over the development of new industries and production of goods unavailable on Earth to get the edge in the likely wider competition among the space powers.

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 135 If the competition grows from a more geographically concentrated setting, it might turn out to be more threatening to the sustainability of operations on the lunar surface. Either the exploratory phase “competition” maintains, placing constant challenge on any new developments, or a cooperative framework might break down. In that case, the geographic limits will return to the picture. Depending on the technological possibilities at the time, it can be perceived that some methods of conflict might be utilized. Still, similarly to all predictions done above, it is unlikely that even at this point they would include direct kinetic clashes as even at the point of higher specialization of installations, the life on the lunar surface and orbits would be very risky as it is. Any kinetic operation would leave its perpetrator with additional reputational damage. In any case, there are several determinants that should be monitored to predict the likely chain of events in the next years and decades. The first is geographical. It will be crucial to who and how will be able to settle and utilize important locations – mainly lunar poles and L-points with the prominence of L-1 and 2 points that will serve important communication, economic and strategic roles. The second is the technological development among the major space powers that would allow them to construct sufficiently safe and developed installations allowing them to settle these locations. Differences in the level of technological development will be crucial for identifying actors actually participating in the “hot phase” of lunar settlement and their role in it. Next is the development of terrestrial politics. Similarly to other developments in the space domain in general, lunar settlement projects and relations among participants will heavily depend on their relations in much more impactful terrestrial domains. The other two interconnected factors are then relative power distribution and speed of colonization. Suppose one of the projects is backed by a relatively stronger state and proceeds rather swiftly. In that case, it might significantly decrease the potential for its competitors to independently settle in the remaining available parts of the surface, lacking important access to energy and water resources. Finally, a broader context of the space missions’ development and priorities of the settling actors in the domain will be crucial for the consequent specialization of the lunar bases. They might either be developed in order to improve their value for the Earth or be primarily used as a stepping stone for the Martian mission that might prove to be the ultimate political goal of 21st-century astropolitical competition. 7.2 Mars If the future of lunar projects lies extremely likely in the development of sustainable permanently habitable bases, the outcome of the Martian missions is less clear cut. There are two main reasons for that, even if we disregard the ethical question of sending a piloted mission to the surface in the context of a search for alien life that might be spoiled by the presence of organic material arriving from Earth. The two main factors are distance and the more prominent role prestige is likely to play in the development of any piloted mission.

136  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies As debated in larger detail earlier, the relative position of Earth and Mars allows for the utilization of Hohmann transfer orbit once approximately every 26 months1 and includes approximately 150 days-long trip and 550 days-long stay on the Martian surface prior to possible return utilizing yet another Hohmann transfer orbit back to the “Blue Planet”. This means that any piloted mission would be extremely more demanding compared to even sophisticated lunar missions. Even a simple landing would require the crew to undertake a multiple-year journey that would keep it on the Martian surface for a prolonged time period, compared to the maximum of just around 75 hours by Apollo 17. This brings with it major technological challenges, including ensuring the well-being of the crew on such a long mission. But it would also force any actor willing to conduct a rudimentary mission to the Martian surface to develop at least basic infrastructure, including habitats, and water and energy production. This makes even simple landing for prestigious reasons from a mission planning point of view significantly different from the early lunar landings. Second, the role of prestige itself makes the 21st-century Martian projects different from their lunar compatriots. Being first always counts, especially in periods of heated international power competition. The outcome of the space race was the lunar landing which gave the United States a massive prestige boost. Similarly, current Sino-US competition could well lead to a race to send the first human to the Martian surface, which would undoubtedly bring much more attention compared to the repetition of the lunar landing. Even though, given the long history of spaceflight at this point in time, the effect is unlikely to be as strong as the Apollo landing or the “Sputnik moment”. Nonetheless, simple landing and return might be an important goal in itself compared to such an event on the lunar surface where it might be just a precondition to a more sustainable presence that will be likely the ultimate goal. In any case, the early phase of Martian colonization will be even less determined by economic or military-strategic factors than the exploratory phase of lunar settlement. Also, given its physical characteristics, the contest over resources is not likely to be an issue. Mars has an approximately 24 hours long rotation period allowing for sustainable generation of solar power around its surface and likely widely accessible resources of water reserves. What thus comes as more important determinants are technological capacities, willingness to conduct such a mission and selection of landing site according to scientific needs. Once again, we get to distinguish the settlement efforts into two parts – the exploratory and specialization phase. The exploratory phase will be, to a large degree, defined by several attributes – number of participants, type of infrastructure being developed, whether independent private projects will succeed, and general success of the first mission(s). The first factor will likely change the deadlines of the Martian missions. More acute competition is likely to put additional funding into a Martian mission that might otherwise be placed into other projects, with the landing being lower on the list of priorities.

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 137 A more lenient timeframe might also aid in developing more complex first habitats. It will be to a degree determining whether the first base(s) will be constructed as reusable for the next missions or will be abandoned for good. While in the lunar context, the polar bases necessarily establish a core of the further colonization of the body, such an issue is not the case for a much larger and better colonizable Mars. However, a decision to develop a reusable habitat – that might be logical from the technological and financial point of view – would determine starting positions for the development of more complex settlements and become the basis of any possible Martian population pattern. In an unlikely but possible scenario that such a base would be developed by a private entity, especially in the context in which state agencies decide not to pursue a Martian landing, such a settlement might establish a basis for the development of an independent community that might in the future mature into a political community disconnected from terrestrial politics. Similarly, as the lunar colonization holds some promise for the supporters of cosmopolitan societies in need to share scarce resources, Mars, due to its remoteness and potential self-sustainability, might motivate libertarian entrepreneurs to construct settlements free from centralized governments. Finally, a success of the first mission would likely spur interest in further development of the settlements on the “Red Planet”, failure likely leading to the death of astronaut(s) might cause a strong pushback against further efforts to send piloted missions into the deep space. We can thus draw scenarios mainly around two key variables – participation in and sustainability of the missions. All of these scenarios must be understood under the condition of the success of the first landings, as failure might significantly postpone further settlement efforts. The first scenario is a simple rush to become the first actor to land a human on the Martian surface purely for prestigious and limited scientific purposes. The mission’s only goal would be to successfully bring a small crew to the Martian surface and back, likely utilizing some alternative and shorter but more energetically demanding or risky transport options – like Venus flyby or new propulsion systems – to shorten the mission as much as possible. Such a scenario would very much follow the logic of the space race of the 1960s and not bring much of progress towards sustainability of the Martian operations. It is likely that the landing site would be selected to provide the simplest access to the necessary resources and the safest possible landing. Habitats would not be developed to become the basis of further settlement efforts, and their facilities would be limited. Such a scenario would likely be an outcome of the high tensions in international politics that reached the level of the Cold War. Alternatively, such a mission might serve as a very complex and prominent public relations stunt of a company hugely improving its visibility on the market. Such activities are in a much lesser level of complexity visible in activities of SpaceX, Virgin Galactic or Blue Origin already by the time of writing of this text. Nonetheless, such a development would not leave a permanent mark for further settlement efforts and might even end the efforts

138  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies for the foreseeable as the landing itself is the ultimate goal of all interested actors, and none is motivated to finance Martian missions beyond, instead focusing, for example, on lunar or asteroid projects. This scenario might thus lead to the repetition of the Apollo moment. The second scenario would be again dominated by a single actor whose activities, however, would aim at the development of a sustainable settlement. Unlike a similar scenario concerning the Moon, this would not lead to hegemony but rather an early start for the actor at hand. Having a permanently populated outpost on the Martian surface, including developed communication and supply lines connecting such habitat to Earth, would bring much experience and technological and scientific progress necessary to develop permanent humanity’s presence on the Martian surface. A selection of a landing site would have to be even more careful to allow the settlers the possibility to develop the habitat into a self-sufficient base. This might include the production of some food or obtaining a capacity for some rudimentary manufacturing allowing growth and repairs using local resources. It would also need to provide some substantial scientific benefit that would be surely expected from such an establishment. This scenario might appear basically in three cases. First, Mars might not be perceived as such a valuable target, and there will be only one agency/project aiming to reach its surface. In this case, the role of prestige might not be felt as strong enough motivation. The habitat would not be facing any competition and would be used as a soft power tool on the Earth while providing a basis for further exploration of the “Red Planet”. Second, Mars might be targeted by an actor not involved in the lunar mission as an alternative for a missed chance to participate in lunar colonization. While, compared to lunar colonization, not bringing substantial short-term tangible benefits, it might be used as a bandage on the shattered image of an actor. Lastly, the mission might be perceived as unviable by the state agencies but pursued by a private entity. At this point, the role of the settlement would be to a high degree affected by the company’s and its owner’s goals and motivations. From a political point of view, such a base would be more important as a possible alternative to state-based societies rather than a tool in international competition. Nonetheless, it is also possible that the Martian colonization efforts will begin with several parallel projects taking place. As noted earlier, these would not get into competition with each other over scarce resources, so a conflictfree environment remains the most likely pattern of the exploratory phase. It is possible that more actors would conduct one-time-only missions in a sort of show of. The only reason for multiple missions would be to remain a part of cutting-edge development and not lose touch with competitors in the international arena. Private entities might participate in order to supplement state-led efforts or to manifest that their independent capacities are equal to those of state-led agencies. Nonetheless, none of the bases would be constructed as a planned first step to more sustainable habitats. All the incoming parties would be mainly interested in being included in the group of most developed space actors that managed such a feat.

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 139 This scenario might decrease the risks of an actual stay on the “Red Planet” as all the missions would need to be launched in the same launch window, placing the landers on the planet in a very similar period of time. As such, in case they are not located too far away, cooperation in case of emergency might be possible, and communication among the bases might decrease the sense of loneliness that will be tied to the deep space missions. Nonetheless, different actors might also opt for different types of missions, developing capacities to either return more swiftly back to Earth, decreasing dependency on scarce launch windows or, on the contrary, to sustain the crew on-site for a protracted period of time, highlighting the potential to construct long-term habitats in the future. It is also possible that one or more actors will develop habitats in a way that would support more sustainable settlement efforts. Such a scenario would establish a basis for proper colonization that might develop from these multiple settlement efforts. These might, again, be composed of private entities’ bases as well and would likely, in the longer run, develop contesting political and administrative regimes. Unlike the Moon, it seems likely that the territorial question would not become an issue in the short run, and the richness of site selection might allow competing actors to develop alternative settings in order to avoid mutual interference, thus not only following their preferences but also following the relevant provisions of international space law. In the longer run, it might prove that some sites are more conducive to sustainable independent colonization than others. Also, support for the efforts by some actors might cease due to high costs or low political will. It is likely that these outposts would bring higher scientific and technological benefits compared to the one-time-only sites. It would also further increase the safety of the projects as there is a larger probability that more sustainable habitats would be better prepared for the provision of aid to other settlers in need. The mutual relations among the settlements would then likely be less contentious compared to the terrestrial relations of their respective governments, similar to other space projects due to harsh environment but also as a result of delayed or lacking communication with Earth. The Martian settlement efforts might become increasingly independent, providing the haven sought after by many contemporary propagators of Martian missions. The level of independence will actually play one of the key roles in how the situation might develop. It is likely that with increasing sophistication, Mars will elevate to an important position in the inner solar system economy and infrastructure, as described in larger detail earlier. Martian bases and orbital stations could be used to refine materials brought from asteroids or manufacture basic technology necessary for further missions into the outer solar system. It could serve as a vital service point for mining activities in asteroids on orbits located further away from the Earth or those found in the asteroid belt. Mars could also serve as a base giving an actor ultimate strategic depth in case of a massive terrestrial armed conflict. The role of Mars in the potential quest for the survival of terrestrial species can also come to a fore.

140  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies The actual outlook of the Martian colonization in the later stages will be mainly affected by several factors. The first is the number and relative power difference of actors participating. This is the same as in the previous scenarios and remains one of the key variables in analysing the geopolitical situation everywhere. Similarly, we need to revisit the relations among the given actors on Earth to identify a conflict-cooperation potential. Then, there is the independence of the settlement in the terrestrial centre. What might also play a role is the outcome of the lunar projects as the solutions to potential territorial disputes might prove relevant in the case of Mars as well. While not as pressing, territoriality might become an issue of developed Martian settlements. In any case, taking into account lower conflict potential in outer space missions, especially in such high-risk environments with extremely limited return options as Mars, the scenarios including direct kinetic conflict or more subtle, yet destructive activities are unlikely. The scenarios are thus developed along the lines of one actor-more actors and larger-smaller independence. The arguably least likely scenario is the development of a sort of Martian state that would become a dominant entity on the planet’s surface and be largely self-sufficient and independent of terrestrial states. Such an entity might develop as an outcome of both state-led projects or private ventures. In case the planet is not colonized by states due to a high price tag and small projected rewards, a private entity might in time develop an independent political entity that would develop the planet, establish an alternative political community but still remain in contact with Earth through economic or scientific cooperation. State-based projects might, in time, seek independence with the centre being unable or unwilling to pressure them to retain stronger subordination. Such an entity would remain freer of terrestrial international politics but would for a longer time need to sustain supply lines as the development of genuinely self-sufficient settlements that would provide even more sophisticated goods is not perceivable even in the long-term perspective. The ability to develop sophisticated asteroid mining missions can prove to be an important bargaining chip in such a relationship. Internal working of such a settlement would be highly dependent on its evolution. It will be definitely affected by the type of actor that developed the original exploratory habitat. In the case of state actors, it is likely that the system will to a degree, mimic the terrestrial political systems. Private actors might develop more radical alternatives that might turn out to be workable in the Martian context or be reversed to traditional patterns of administration. Such an entity would play an important role in the solar system’s geopolitical system as it would establish an alternative actor. It would be weaker from the point of view of power potential but would bring unique capacities that would turn it into a relevant geopolitical actor, as described earlier by Cohen. It would thus establish the first step towards the establishment of an astropolitical system that would not be fully terracentric. A second possibility is for the single dominant settlement to remain dependent on the terrestrial centre. Such a base would become an important

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 141 geopolitical outpost of a given actor. It would provide it with economic benefits and strategic depth, thus increasing its weight in the terrestrial international system. Such a settlement would need to hold a level of independence in its everyday running simply for practical reasons but would be more directly controlled by the Earth in its strategic development. Due to that, it could also rely upon reliable supply lines. It is thus likely that the centre would dominate in strategic decisions and primary direction of enlargement both in size and activities, and the specifics would be much better dealt with on the ground. It is also possible that other actors would have their minor outposts located on the Martian surface, but they would be dwarfed by one major installation. This scenario would not amend the terracentric nature of contemporary astropolitics and strengthen the position of one dominant power in it. Nonetheless, given the fact that the Earth would still remain the key and only relevant object with Mars playing only a supportive role and remaining dependent on Earth, such a settlement would not allow an actor to dominate the landscape or even necessarily prevail in the terrestrial international system. It might also happen that the rapid development on Earth would disallow an actor to continue to support the Martian settlement forcing it to become self-sufficient or cease its operations, depending on the actual level of sophistication. In case of cessation of its operation, Mars would reopen to other actors. The third scenario counts on the construction of several sophisticated settlements that would be more or less dependent on Earth, thus developing an early Martian international system. It would be based on the existence of few settlements shattered around the Martian surface with their own independent political systems, specialization and diverse level of cooperation with terrestrial actors. This might encourage further specialization of such units and the establishment of a Martian economic and political system that would be significantly more varied compared to the previous two scenarios but not compared to Earth. Especially in earlier phases of such a scenario, the relations are likely to be somewhat cooperative as to protect the settlers against the inherent environmental threats and to improve the quality of life on the “Red Planet”. In such a constellation, Mars might become an alternative actor to Earth in case an UN-like institution is established, or the settlements might opt for independent dealings with specific actors. That might have its roots in the origins of the settlements and historical ties to competing parties on Earth. In any way, such a scenario would decrease the terracentric nature of astropolitics and give Martian settlements a higher level of actorness, especially in case they are able to provide Earth with crucial goods and services ranging from rare metals to strategic access to Mars. The Martian bases might develop their own understanding of territoriality or import a terrestrial understanding of borders. They could also develop an alternative method of cohabitation or evolve into power competition known from Earth. However, that would all depend on context and major events affecting the evolution of such settlements.

142  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies Finally, Mars might also become a target of proxy competition among terrestrial actors developing several sophisticated settlements with close ties to the Earth. The actual working of this scenario would be highly dependent on the nature of the relations among the colonizing powers on Earth. In case the relations are more conflicting, it is likely that the settlements would aim at as large independence from others as possible, developing independent capacities for as many activities they want to achieve as possible. If cooperation prevails, the sharing of capacities would be a more financially viable option. It could allow for some level of specialization and interdependence that would lead to the development of a cooperative framework on Mars. In any case, the nature of the relations among the settlements would depend on terrestrial international politics. This scenario would deepen the terracentric nature of astropolitics. Not only would the relations among settlements mimic those on Earth, albeit in different conditions, but also the activities of the settlements, including their specialization and relation to others, would also be directly decided from Earth. As the activities would engage terrestrial geopolitical actors directly, the level of independence would likely be lower than is the case of the “geopolitical outpost” scenario where independent decision-making does not risk directly interfering with the terrestrial interests of space powers. The Martian settlements would thus serve further to expand the terrestrial political system into the solar system. 7.3  Asteroids and comets Geopolitics of smaller bodies is to be less clearly tied to utilizing specific geographic locations on their surface. The bodies, furthermore, themselves do not provide sufficient background for the construction of sophisticated, let alone self-sufficient, habitats and installations. They will also be more likely targeted by robotic missions, with piloted landing or close encounters being rare. Their value in an economic or strategic sense is largely to be defined by the orbital characteristics of the given body, and their role in the overall inner solar geopolitical system is to be to a high degree determined by the development of settlements on the two larger bodies. The Martian settlement, including the development of sophisticated infrastructure, would open the Asteroid Belt to human activity compared to scenarios in which Mars is not colonized. The scenarios developed for smaller bodies are thus to be less specific and more contextually driven. Despite that, we can still identify some major factors affecting the nature of missions to these bodies and their impact on power distribution on Earth and beyond. The first important factor is the aim of the mission which will determine the selection process of the bodies encountered and potential competition by spacefaring actors over such a body. The most publicized type of mission is mineral extraction. An aim of such an encounter would be to extract as many valuable resources with a high price on Earth as possible and return it back

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 143 with profit. The second type of mission is a deflection of an asteroid as a part of a planetary defence system. Next, there are scientific and technological missions that are already being conducted today. These will either aim to understand the composition of asteroids or test deflection or mining technology. Last, we can predict the establishment of installations on strategically located objects that would be used for refuelling or as a monitoring station or other type of military installation. The second factor is the orbit of an object, including the orbital period, the closest approach to inhabited bodies or other places of interest. The third is composition, important mainly for economic activities but also for the selection of effective deflection methods if needed. For some types of missions, size might also be of importance. An additional factor that might come into effect is the number of actors being interested in the same object as mutual interest might lead to a conflict. The mining missions are initially to aim at NEOs as the easiest accessible objects from Earth/Moon. It is likely that at first, the actors undertaking exploration for mining purposes and mining itself are to be private actors based in countries that allowed space resource extraction in their national laws (by the time of writing the United States, Luxembourg, the UAE and Japan). Contest to such activities might come from the states that will either challenge the legality of such endeavour or attempt to develop their own state-controlled missions. What will be crucial at that point is whether the alternative missions will target the same asteroid due to its supreme physical characteristics (composition and orbit) or will select different NEOs. Mars-based missions to more distant objects are too far in the future for the scenario thinking to be relevant. Based on the current situation, we can identify three major scenarios of further development – private mining, asteroid golden rush, and holy grail. The private mining scenario follows the current division of space powers and smaller space actors between those facilitating private mining endeavours and those opposing it without developing domestic alternatives. The private entities from North America, Europe, Middle East and East Asia would develop technologies in order to monitor NEOs, identify valuable and mineable asteroid, approach it, extract resources and return them to the Earth to obtain profit. They will operate in national legal frameworks and be shielded from international opposition by states interpreting international space law as allowing for mineral extraction and selling for profit. There will be significant legal opposition from those disagreeing with such an approach that might be weakened by the utilization of some redistribution tool, like donating part of the profit to the UN development programmes, to meet the “benefit of all mankind” clause. Nonetheless, the opposition would include legal challenges and possible boycotts and sanctions but will, in fact, not hamper the mining efforts as long as these are supported by the dedicated states. This scenario would likely bring significant profit to those involved and increase the economic inequalities but might also aid the environmental

144  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies protection programmes in areas of significant mining and spur technological development that depends on the availability of rare-Earth metals. From a power distribution point of view, additional funds would be made available to dedicated actors if the projects are successful, further strengthening their geoeconomic power. However, such a development would not necessarily change the astropolitical considerations as the mining efforts would be primarily terracentric even if utilizing Mars as an infrastructural node would not lead to the development of permanent structures. On the other hand, it would require the development of additional technologies that would give the actors involved new capacities to reach smaller objects, increase their ability to operate on them and add experience in conducting such finer types of movement in challenging conditions. The asteroid gold rush is adding one more factor to the previous scenario – the participation of state actors not allowing private space mining. Despite opposition to the provisions legalizing private space mining, the alternative state actors (most likely China and Russia) will develop their own statecontrolled initiatives to conduct space mining. That would allow them to participate in the technological development and redistribution of wealth from the extraction of precious metals that are to a large degree also necessary for the sustainment of technological development on Earth. They would realize that being left behind is not a viable strategy and would be able to technologically catch up with the private entities described above. Nonetheless, enough approachable and valuable asteroids will be identified, and thus all of these actors will select different objects, not only minimizing the risk of conflict or interference but also enhancing the variety of minerals brought to Earth, thus improving the price characteristics of the extracted materials. Such a development would likely call for an agreement among the space powers on the basic mining framework. This could have a form of a new treaty, a UN decision, the establishment of a new international organization, a code of conduct, or an implicit understanding of current legal provisions as enabling the activity, including some redistribution mechanism that would allow to follow the current international law provisions on sharing benefits. This scenario would not lead to massive redrawing of the power relations among the space actors based on changes in geoeconomic potential but might further increase economic disparities between spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations. It would support the terracentric understanding of astropolitics but might spur the development of infrastructure on/around the Moon or Mars in order to enable actors to access a wider array of asteroids and give them a comparative advantage. Such a scenario has only a low potential to increase international tensions, let alone become a cause of conflict. The last scenario is holy grail. Similarly to the previous scenario, more actors are interested in mining activities, but one significantly more valuable and approachable asteroid is being identified by more/all of them as a target of the mission. Such a scenario would put more pressure on everyone involved and would highly increase the risk of interference or even a conflict

Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies 145 over the object. Two solutions might come up from such a situation. First, a common extraction mechanism might be developed. That could be produced either under the UN or be based on an intergovernmental agreement with some states delegating their functions to commercial actors via further subcontracting. Second, a race might appear over the mining that might either lead to an agreement over sharing of the resources with each party mining only part of the object or conflict over the utilization of the resources. All of these outcomes would create an important precedent for the future of space mining. The agreement over sharing the resources would pave the way towards more consensual development of space mining operations. Such an agreement might be a part of a broader attempt to reconcile interests in the extraction of lunar and Martian resources as well or can be an ad hoc solution to a specific problem. Nonetheless, it would pave the way to a systematic cooperative framework regarding the management of space resources. On the contrary, a conflict would encourage clashes among the largely robotic missions. An occurrence of a conflict in such a context is more likely compared to the previously developed celestial bodies as it would not include loss of human lives even though any damage to sophisticated space infrastructure would be very costly. The introduction of conflict into the space domain would further push the redlines of acceptable behaviour in the domain and decrease future reputational damage of aggressive behaviour. Scenarios tied to planetary defence are mainly divided between unilateral and multilateral solutions. These would depend on the ability of actors to conduct a successful deflection mission and thus on the technological sophistication of these. Once a threatening asteroid or comet is discovered, it might be an actor with developed deflection capabilities either as a result of mining activities or dedicated research and development that might volunteer to conduct the mission, leaving others at its mercy. They could not possibly check the functioning of the deflection capacity, nor strongly protest against the utilization of methods they see as problematic, including a nuclear option. On the contrary, the multilateral solution might lead to the utilization of commonly accepted deflection capacity, and in case such a solution is not readily available, even spur its development. On the other hand, a multilateral solution might also paralyse the decision-making in case too many different issues are raised. Nonetheless, a planetary defence mission does not hold significant potential of an immediate threat of conflict among space powers but for cases of intentional deflection on adversarial states’ territories. Finally, there are other missions, including scientific missions analysing asteroids or comets themselves or using them as carriers. Additionally, asteroids might be developed into refuelling or observatory installations with systems being placed on their surface and making use of their orbital characteristics. These would be likely developed according to the needs and capacities of involved actors. In case one object is targeted by more actors, these might either share the installation or develop parallel bases. If a body is large enough to host all of them, this might not cause trouble and might even

146  Geopolitics of Celestial Bodies enhance trust as the two would be able to monitor each other’s activities. If the body is not large enough, it might cause conflict, but predicting actual outcomes is extremely context-specific and depends on many of the abovedescribed processes. As evident, the future of settlement and other projects to celestial bodies is far from certain. Nonetheless, a lot can be understood by utilizing geopolitical analysis and forward-looking scenario-based thinking. Such a methodology will not give us clear answers to what the future will look like but highlights some important factors to follow in order to identify potential points of contention ahead of time. These can help both commentators of the space developments and its actors to better identify the key decisions and their risks and opportunities. The aim of the presented scenarios is thus to allow decision-makers to make more informed judgements and for the academicians and other interested public to highlight one perspective on how to understand these. However, in general, the following three factors are crucial. First, it is important to identify the resources that will be sought after by the contestants. For crewed missions, these include water and energy resources. Robotic missions are to be mainly concerned with massive storage of rare minerals. Their quantity and location will prove crucial for the mission planning of all three types of bodies. Second, it is the number of actors able and willing to participate in such projects that determines the political dimension of space colonization. Finally, it is the nature of terrestrial international politics that will determine the ability of actors to cooperate and share these resources if necessary. For the time being, the extremely vast majority of the projects will be terracentric and strongly supported and controlled by the planet Earth. What must be kept in mind, however, is that other contextual factors always come into the picture, developing a more plastic image of the future of contention over the celestial bodies in the Earth’s vicinity. Note 1 The nearest being November 2024.

Reference UNOOSA. 2013, April 17. The Legal Framework for the International Space Station. https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2013/tech-05E.pdf (accessed August 23, 2021).

8

Conclusion

The colonization of the inner solar system should, in the upcoming decade, turn from the realm of science fiction into a firm reality. From the planned establishment of the first exploratory settlements on the lunar surface by the end of the 2020s or in the early 2030s to possible asteroid mining and Martian missions, deep space is no longer to be an area of imagination and science only. As a consequence of the increased density of space traffic, proliferation of space actors and rise of technological sophistication, reaching the Moon, Mars, or asteroids is to be increasingly achievable for numerous agencies and organizations. This includes the development of sustainable installations, taking another step towards turning humankind into an interplanetary species. Nonetheless, such a development will not magically transform the political realities of space travel and astropolitics that will manifest themselves in environmentally challenging and radically novel geographies and places. And as the previous text argued against a likelihood of a major transformation of global politics towards the development of cosmopolitan and generally more cooperative structures that is argued by some authors, the power competition is likely to further progress from the area of Earth’s orbits to the celestial bodies. It is for this reason that an in-depth neoclassical systemic geopolitical analysis, leading to the development of plausible scenarios of such efforts, was provided by this book. Geopolitics, as noted earlier, presents a unique viewpoint on political processes rooted in geographic, historical or technological realities, thus setting an empirical basis for the development of the plausible futures of celestial infrastructure. For the purposes of this analysis, the text selected the three most likely candidates for near and mid-term colonization, the Moon, Mars and NEOs. It then developed the most likely courses of action to be taken in the foreseeable future. Due to its physical characteristics, the Moon is the logical candidate for constructing the first settlements and developing more complex and specialized installations and infrastructure as planned by the Artemis programme or the International Lunar Research Station project. Such an infrastructure would not only be connected to the activities on the DOI: 10.4324/9781003377252-8

148 Conclusion lunar surface itself but, more importantly, also to the development of the cislunar and Earth’s orbital economy, placing further incentives to build sustainable bases on its surface by both state and commercial actors. However, lunar colonization is to be highly affected by the environmental factors that turn geographically limited regions around its poles into extremely precious and potentially contested resources due to difficult habitability and energy generation on the majority of the lunar surface. While the direct kinetic clash over these locations seems unlikely, this fact clearly increases the overall conflict potential. It remains to be seen how the competing powers will deal with the situation, especially in the context of conflicting readings of legal provisions on activities on its surface that might bring further clashes. The Moon thus establishes a case defined by the presence of contested, clearly defined geographic locations targeted by several missions. The scenarios of further development on the lunar surface clearly highlight the advantage of the prime mover. Any actor that is to develop meaningful infrastructure on the lunar surface is to gain an important advantage over its competitors in the development of the more complex structures. This very importantly relates not only to the construction of such sophisticated infrastructure on the surface of our only natural satellite but also to the advantage given to such an actor in the development of deep space activities. Any mission launched from the surface of the Moon faces much more favourable environmental conditions compared to Earthbound space missions. Lunar projects are thus not vanity projects. They need to target the regions allowing for the sustainable presence of habitable bases and their development towards manufacturing of additional space technology. Disputes similar to the potential confrontation over the construction of settlements over the scarce permanently illuminated regions on the lunar poles are, however, unlikely to appear on Mars. Not only is it much more complicated to reach the planet, to begin with, but its physical characteristics are much less constraining as far as the construction of bases is concerned, thus decreasing the likelihood of competition over limited energy generation or other crucial resources. Additionally, the specialization of the settlements that might lead to such a contest is also likely to take place much further into the future compared to the lunar colonization schemes. Besides prestige, the Martian mission does not hold any geopolitical pressure regarding its timeframe. Mars, in the long run, however, holds a larger potential to become an alternative political entity, potentially establishing an important infrastructural node in the inner solar system economy and developing a political system that might operate independently on Earth. While still in the domain of the far future, the physical characteristics will always affect the possibilities of disconnection between the Earth and Mars no matter the progress in the thruster and other technology. The problems the British had with maintaining the American colonies in the 18th century due to the necessity to cross the Atlantic Ocean might be well mimicked and exacerbated in the case of

Conclusion 149 more sophisticated and, importantly, independent Martian settlements. Such a development would bring one of the largest shifts in astropolitical considerations since the 1950s. While Mars is not likely to become a source of conflict in the earlier phases of the settlement process, it is possible that it will develop into a (quasi-)independent geopolitical actor in the further future once it obtains the necessary self-sufficiency. However, unlike the asteroids located near the terrestrial orbit, Mars is not in the foreseeable future a geopolitically important site. Asteroids and especially the NEOs are, on the contrary, establishing a potential solution to many terrestrial problems connected to the technological progress and environmental damage tied to the mining of rare-Earth metals and simultaneously a potential source of threat. Their economic development seems to be affected not only by their composition and orbital characteristics but also by a clash of competing readings of international law regarding the legality of private commercial extraction and selling of the resources very likely located on some of these objects. The situation is likely to be less heated but similarly contested in the case of planetary defence schemes, as the issue of the permissibility of utilization of nuclear planetary defence and the specifics of the deflection mission are also to be affected by political disputes on Earth. Nonetheless, both will need to be overcome one way or the other if humanity is to expand beyond the confines of the “Blue Planet” and protect its celestial homeland. The role of smaller objects in the unravelling geopolitical system of the inner solar system is, however, to remain supportive. If a valuable asteroid is safely identified, it will very likely become a target of a geoeconomic contest between adversarial projects. Unlike the Martian missions, asteroid mining will very likely present a limited option to obtain very specific gains. Returning to the beginning, any actor possessing manufacturing capacities on the lunar surface, no matter for what type of mission, either to the NEOs or Mars, will always be in a prime position to gain the spoils. Throughout the modelling of the plausible futures of space colonization, it was established that the scenarios of the future of space colonization are very likely to be mainly affected, besides the predetermined environmental factors, by the goals, technological progress and relations among space powers. The actual number of participating projects will, to a high degree, influence how the situation on different celestial bodies develops. Following the realist reading of space politics, the relations among space powers are to be less conflicting yet mirroring, in general, their terrestrial goals and perceptions about one another. The actual strategies are then to affect whether we will observe a conflict over scarce locations, some parallel development not only when it comes to a single body but also possibly completely divergent tracks, including parallel settling of the Moon or Mars, or a rapid shift in terrestrial power disputes and development of some wider cooperative framework. Generally, the lunar settlement seems to be more pressing due to the environmental limitations compared to the Martian missions where, at least in the early phases of settlement construction, one actor cannot effectively block access to the

150 Conclusion planet’s surface from the other contenders. As the technologies mature, it will also be increasingly pressing to obtain precise data on the NEO population in order to develop early mining technologies that would bring significant economic benefits to the first mover. The geopolitical analysis highlights that the geographic restrictions turn the lunar poles and selected NEOs into primary targets of power competition for the next two decades. This must be clearly highlighted in the strategies of spacepowers as the Martian landing, while important from a prestigious and scientific point of view, holds very limited potential for an actual contest. Its surface provides sufficient opportunities for the construction of numerous infrastructural projects, and its role in the possible inner solar system geopolitical landscape involves the development of such sophisticated technologies and procedures that it should not become a priority for any meaningful development of the inner solar system infrastructure. Prioritization of a Martian mission over a NEO programme would thus contradict geographic and geopolitical realities of the inner solar system and divert scarce resources from strategically crucial locations towards a vanity project. If an actor acts rationally, it will attempt to first move to the scarce regions and utilize the limited resources, no matter whether permanently illuminated regions of the Moon or easily accessible, valuable NEOs. And, preferably, in this order, as the lunar bases will clearly stand as a stepping stone towards a major decrease of the price tag of further inner solar system missions. That is all besides its relevance for the cislunar infrastructure and management of the satellites on Earth orbits. The Martian mission is high on the agenda of numerous space agencies and companies but is, however, of low importance from a geopolitical point of view. It further does not rank high in any of the scenarios developed based on the geographic or political criteria relevant to contemporary and near-future space politics. Based on the presented analysis, the strategic advice to any geopolitical actor aiming at the development of solar system settlements would thus be to rush to the Moon and use it as a stepping stone to the development of an asteroid mining scheme and, later, a Mars mission as other alternatives are clearly disadvantageous. Currently, it seems that the project more likely to follow the geopolitical logic of the inner solar system is the Artemis project. The second conclusion is to develop technologies for space mining and prioritize such activity over the Martian landing. While the development of at least a partially self-sufficient Martian base might be the ultimate goal of the mission planners, based on the geopolitically informed scenarios, it is crucial to progress to that goal in a reasonable order. Besides that, asteroid mining might bring numerous direct advantages to the inhabitants of the Earth as a collective, disregarding its role in the Martian landing. Access to cheap materials is crucial for the modernization of terrestrial economies and longterm solution to climate change, to name just a few. Of course, all the presented recommendations would turn void in case of a dramatic black swan event taking place that might include global war, such as a consequence of

Conclusion 151 the militarization of the dispute over Taiwan between the United States and China, imminent collision with a massive asteroid and so on. It is due time to honestly think about the issues of space colonization if not for strategic purposes, then, at minimum, to ensure a safe way forward, no matter whether in the form of cold peace or warm embrace. The presented analysis should aid with the identification of the major points of contention to allow the geopolitical actors to prevent the most negative interference and select the most advantageous way forward. There are numerous ways how to deal with the issues tied to the necessity to find a common agreement over the development of lunar infrastructure, mining of the minerals from asteroids or protecting the potentially biologically precious sites on Mars. Be it through hegemonic pursuit, cosmopolitan agreement or, very likely, some arrangement in between, the cosmic missions are not to be peaceful, cooperative pursuits disregarding terrestrial interests and relations. Only through understanding these dilemmas in the different scenarios as developed in this book can the decision-makers promote informed decisions on the future of the inner solar system projects. Per aspera ad astra!

Index

Agency Assigned Missions 92 air power 12 air warfare 12 Aldrin, Buzz 34 Amors 77 analogies 27 Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics 8–11; policy-making decisions 9; role of geography 10–11; role of sea 9 anti-geopolitics 22 Arab Satellite Communications Organization 49 areostationary orbit 66 Armstrong, Neil 34 Arsia Mons 75 Artemis Accords 36, 39, 44, 46, 56n2, 90–91, 101, 123–124, 128 Ascraeus Mons 76 Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) 43 Asteroid Mining Corporation 52 asteroids 3, 37, 73, 90, 149; composition 78; C-type 78; deflection, monitoring and testing of 119–120; economically valuable 109; geographic features of 76–80; geopolitics of 142–146; location 77; mining missions 1; mission to bring to Earth orbit 79; monitoring of 80; M-type 78; normative justification of mining 98; parameters 80; resource mining schemes 96, 98; S-type 78 astropolitics 4, 24–27; Dolman’s model 24–25; spacepower theory 26; terracentric nature of 142; transatlantic space relations 25

Berlin Wall 15 Bigelow Aerospace 51–52, 107 Blue Origin 51, 137 Blue Planet 29, 62, 68, 80, 116 Boeing 52 Bowen, Bleddyn 26 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 13; The Grand Chessboard 14 celestial bodies 1, 27, 29, 36, 38, 61; actors exploring 33–35; space actors and 53–56; sustainable non-scientific projects on 3 celestial lines of communication (CLOC) 68, 111, 115 Ceres 61, 73, 76–78 Cernan, Eugene 34 Chaffee, Roger B. 34 Chelyabinsk incident, 2013 77 Chinese anti-satellite test, 2007 44, 47 Chinese space programme 38–39, 42–44, 47, 52–53; BeiDou navigation system 39, 43; Chang’e mission 48, 72; Long March launcher series 39; lunar missions 43; Russian assistance 47; Tianwen-1 48; Tianwen-1 mission 39; vs United States 39, 42–43 chokepoints 11, 13, 68 classical geopolitics 6–13, 21; Anglo-Saxon tradition of 8–11; neo 21; sea and air domains, role of 11–13 Cohen, Saul 15 Cold War 2, 13, 23, 50 comets 37; geographic features of 76–80; orbital characteristics

Index  153 79; orbital characteristics of 78; speed of 78; as threat 78 commercial space actors 50–53; aim of 51; Chinese private space entities 52; deep-space missions 51–53; private 51; roles of private actors 53; United States and European approach 52–53 constitutional order 6 Continental Asian space international relations 46–47 Coronal Mass Ejections 64 cosmopolitanism 99–100 critical geopolitics 20–24; as anti-environmental 23; in context of world politics 21; non-physical factors 22; perceptions of geopolitical actors 21–22; significance of maps 21, 23 C-type asteroids 78 Deep Space Industries 52 deep-space missions 51–53, 65, 68, 101; psychological issues 65; restrictions in 64 deflection, monitoring and testing of 119–120 de Gerlach crater 71 De Seversky, Aleksander 12 Dolman’s model of astropolitics 24–25; division of outer space 25; physical features of strategic environment 24–25 Double Asteroid Redirection Test 37 Double Asteroid Redirection Test mission 119–120 Douhet, Giulio 12 Dream Chaser spacecraft 51 Dussuoy, Gerard 23 dwarf planets 61, 78–79 Earth 62; mass of 62; orbits relevant for movement around 66 Earth-Moon L1 and L2-points 63, 68, 72, 79, 108 Earth space 25 East Europe 10 Easton, David 23 eastward launches 62 elliptical orbit 66 ethnopolitics 6 EU Agency for Space Programme (EUSPA) 40 Eurasia 9–11, 14

Eurasian Balkans 14 European Defence Agency 40 European Launcher Development Organization 45 European Space Agency (ESA) 40, 45, 55, 120; Ariane launcher 45; communication system 40; criteria for launch needs 38; development of Galileo 40, 45–46; ExoMars 41; focus of 40; Galileo navigational system 45; In-Situ Resource Utilization demonstration mission 41; lunar navigational and communication satellite system 41; Lunar Resurs sample return project 41; Mars Express 35, 41; members and non-members 40, 45; Moon Village project 40, 52, 54, 107–108, 113; navigational system 40; relationship with China 40; Rosetta satellite 35, 41; SMART-1 35; strategic capabilities 45–46; United States and 45–46 European space policy 40 European Space Research Organization 45 ExoMars Trace Gas orbiter 74 explicit geopolitical analysis 13–15 fifth-order states 15 fourth-order states 15 gateways state/regions 15 geographical knowledge 20 geographical limits 15 geography, role in international politics 10–11, 13–15, 21 geopolitical competition 14 geopolitical thinking 5 geopolitics 2, 4–5, 147; classical 6–13; critical 20–24; “German” geopolitical school 6; organic theory of statehood 6–8; origins 5–6; physical characteristics and constraints 28; post-classical 13–20; research model 27–29; in Sweden 6–7; systemic 23–24 geostationary orbit 66 geosynchronous orbit 66 “German” geopolitical school 6 Germany 10 global power distribution 14

154 Index gravity wells 63 Grissom, Gus 34 Haushofer, Karl 8 Heartland 9–11; powers 9–10 helium-3 (He-3) 70, 72, 115 Hérodote 5 Hess, Rudolf 8 historical development 16, 23 Hohmann transfer orbit 66–67, 136 Hubble Telescope 114 Huntington, Samuel 17; The Clash of Civilizations 17 Hygiea 77 Indian space programme 41, 54; Chandrayaan lunar missions 41, 48, 71; GPS augmentation system GAGAN 47; independent piloted mission, 2023 41; for internal developmental purposes 47; Martian Mangalyaan-1 mission 41; outer space technology 41; participation in Russian GLONASS system 48; Soviet and Russian aid 46, 48; space competition with China 47 inner solar system 1–2, 4, 28–29, 66, 147; power contest in 3 inner solar system colonization missions 84 International Astronomical Union 61 International Lunar Research Centre 128 International Lunar Research Station project 147 international space law 28 international space relations 41–42, 61 International Space Station (ISS) 37–38, 46, 51, 55, 65, 107, 113, 131, 133 International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) 36, 42 Iranian space programme 50 Israeli space programme 48–49; celestial bodies’ missions 49; cooperation with India 49; industrial and social development through space applications 49; military application 49; strategic space cooperation with United States and European states 49 Japanese space programme 43–44, 54; cooperation with US 43–44;

satellite launches 43; securityoriented space services 43–44 Japan-US Comprehensive Dialogue on Space meeting 44 Johnson, Lyndon 33 Kaplan, Robert 14; Coming Anarchy thesis 17; The Revenge of Geography 14; role of environment in political processes 14–15 Kargil War, 1999 47 Kármán line 24, 62 Kennedy, President 33 Kepler Energy and Space Engineering 52 Kjellen, Rudolf 6, 8; state for 7; world politics 7 Lagrange Libration Points (L-points) 25, 36, 63 land power 9 launch costs 64 launch sites 62–63 lava tubes 107–108 Lebensraum 7–8 LeoLabs 51 Lévy, Jacques 23 libertarianism 100 Lisbon Treaty 40 Lockheed Martin 52 lunar colonization 70, 148. see also Moon Village project; space settlements; geopolitics of 128–135 Lunar Crater Radio Telescope 72 lunar escape velocity 62 lunar missions 52–53, 90, 148; Indian Chandrayaan programme 35, 48; Japanese SELENE mission 35; Luna-Glob missions 38; military utility of 33; orbital dynamics 66; Soviet Luna mission to 33– 34; Soviet Venera 9 mission 34; US Apollo 11 mission 34; Viking 1 mission 34 Mackinder, Halford 8–10, 14 Mahan, Alfred 11–12 map-making 21–22; physical map 23 Mare Tranquillitatis 72 Mars, geography of 73–76; atmosphere and average surface pressure 73–74; day/night cycle 73–74; diameter 73; gravitational

Index  155 pull 73; hazards connected to atmospheric effects 75; hemispheres 75; ionosphere 74; Phobos and Deimos 73, 117; polar regions 75; surface area 73; surface of 74; temperatures on 74; Valles Marineris 76; volcanos 75–76; water concentration 74; weather patterns 73–74 Martian missions 1, 3, 29, 37, 53, 74, 97, 148–150; Chinese Tianwen-1 mission 35; ESA’s Mars Express 35; Indian Mars Orbiter Mission 35; Japanese Hayabusa missions 35; United Arab Emirates’ Al Amal mission 35; US Deep Impact or Dawn missions 35 Martian orbit 66–67 Martian settlements 74–76, 91, 97, 108–109, 112, 141; exploratory and specialization phase 136– 138; infrastructure construction 110; parallel projects 138; prestigious reasons for 135–136; scientific reasoning for 116–118 Mercury 2–3 Mexican Zapatistas 22 Middle Eastern outer space awakening 48–50; Iran 50; Israel 48–49; Turkey 50; UAE 49 mission planning 66 Moon 1, 3, 25, 29, 37, 66–67, 69, 90, 114, 147. see also lunar colonization; lunar missions; composition 69; critical features of 69; daytime and nighttime 69; diameter 68; distance from Earth 68; geography of 68–73; geopolitics of 128–135; helium-3 (He-3) 70; important regions 69; important territorial locations 72; of Mars 73; minerals and ores 69–70, 72; nearlypermanently illuminated regions 71; oxygen in 69; resources for sustainment of life 69; solar wind 70; surface of 69; water concentrations 71 Moon Treaty 93–94 Moon Village Association 52 Moon Village project 40, 52, 54, 107– 108, 111–113, 124, 128, 131 movement of outer space objects 65–68 M-type asteroids 78

NanoRacks 51–52 NASA 51–53, 72, 114, 120; Moon Mineralogy Mapper 71 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 36 natural sciences 6–7 naval battles 11 Nazi expansionism 7 Nazi Germany 13; genocidal expansionism of 8 Near Earth Objects/Asteroids (NEO) 66–67, 76, 79, 143, 149. see also asteroids; comets; Eros 77; orbital characteristics 77 neorealism 25 Neptune 79 New Space 50; companies 51; impact of governmental space agencies 50 non-racial understanding of nation 7 North Korean ballistic missile programme 44 occidentalism 22 oceanic transport 11 Oort cloud 78 Orbital ATK 51–52 orbital movement: by artificial probes 66; communication lines and chokepoints 68; fuel savings in 66; gravitational effects and 68; stable 65 organic theory of statehood 6–8; analysis in natural sciences 7; idea of panregions 8; of Nazi regime 8 orientalism 22 OSIRIS-REx 80 outer space 26–27, 61; gravity, role of 63; movement of outer space objects 65–68; physical specifications of 62 outer space activities, normative and legal framework of 4 Outer Space Treaty 84, 91–92, 94 Pakistan space programme 47 Pallas 77 Pavonis Mons 76 Pax Americana 26 PHA Bennu 80 physical characteristics of studied region 61 piloted mission 1, 35, 39, 41, 51–53, 67, 120, 135–136

156 Index piloted missions 109–110 planet, definition 61 planetary defence 80 Planetary Resources 52 Pluto 61, 68, 78 polar orbit 66 political communities’ spatial dimension of behaviour 6 political context of space settlements 120–125; ban on territorial appropriation 123; division of territories 124; internal political setting 121; new legally bounding rules, development of 124; new unique political models, development of 122; types of actors participating 121–122; types of settlements 121 political economy 6 political geography 7 post-classical geopolitics 13–20; changes in natural environment and political impact 16–17; culture, role of 17; evolution of political systems 16; explicit geopolitical analysis 13–15; historical development 16; networking and globalization, impacts of 18–20; non-geographic factors, role of 17–18 Potentially Hazardous Objects/Asteroids (PHO) 76 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 47 racial basis of nation 7 Ratzel, Friedrich 7–8 Retrieving the Salvaged Common Heritage 92 Rimland 10 robotic missions 1–3, 39, 54, 64, 66–67, 73, 78–79, 90, 106, 109–110, 112, 117–118, 142, 145–146 Russian space programme 35, 37, 39, 47, 54; approach to outer space 38; competition between China and 39; decline of 38; ESA and 38; establishment of Roscosmos State Corporation 38; failure of Fobos-Grunt 38; financial issues 37; GLONASS navigational constellation 37;

International Space Station (ISS) 37; partnership with China 38; relationship with China 47; Roscosmos 38, 41 safety zones 90–91, 101 scenarios for early settlements. see also space settlements: asteroid gold rush 144; challenges 134; competition 129–130, 134; composition 143; cooperation 133–134; deflection of an asteroid 143; development of Martian state 140; early start 138; establish proper colonization 139; geopolitical outpost 141; hegemony 132–133; holy grail 144; Martian international system 141; orbit of an object 143; parallel colonization 131–132, 134; participation 137; planetary defence 145; prestige 137; prevalence 130; private mining 143; proxy competition 142; rush 137; show of 138; sustainability 137–138; unification 130–131 Schmitt, Jack 34 scientific missions, political or economic impact 2–3 sea power 11 sea powers 9 second-order states 15 Second World War 8, 13, 16 Shackleton-de Gerlach Connecting Ridge 71 Sheng-Chih Wang 25 Sierra Nevada Corporation 51–52 Sino-American competition in space programmes 39, 42–43, 46 Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Centre 124 Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station 42 Slavic nations 10 sociopolitics 6 solar space 25 solar wind 63 South Korean space programme 44 sovereignty 20–21 Soviet Union space programmes 33–34 space actors 33; celestial bodies and 53–56; China 35, 42–43;

Index  157 commercial 50–53; Europe 35, 39–42; France 45; India 35, 39, 41–42; Japan 33, 35; Korea 44; Middle Eastern countries 48–50; Russia 35, 42; Southeast Asian nations 47; Soviet Union 33–34; United States 33–35, 39, 42; Western European states 45–46 space-based Internet connection 51 space economy 52 space environment 62–65; crewed missions, challenges of 64; gravity 63; impact of charged particles 63; launching considerations 62–63; presence of near-perfect vacuum 63–64 space-faring actors plan 3 space international law 84–89; for activities on celestial bodies 90; colonization and 89; control of safety zones 91; cooperative framework 99; for development of settlements on celestial bodies 96–97; for environmental protection 97–98; equitable sharing principle 95; Japanese Law for Exploration and Development of Space Resources 95; legal and normative framework 101–102; Moon Treaty 93–94; notion of safety zones 90–91, 101; OST provisions 91–92, 94; outer space as a region of shared responsibility 99; pragmatic solutions 92; prevention of negative interference among states 91; principle of territorial non-appropriation 91; rules for orbital slot assignment 93; rules on space mining 91–95, 98, 100; for space colonization 96–101; UAE National Space Policy, 2016 49, 95; UN framework 92–93, 98; U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (SPACE Act) 94–95 space market 55 space mission proposal 109–110 spaceport 62 spacepower theory 26 Space Race 4; sustainability of space operations and development 34;

between United States and Soviet Union 33–34 space relations 28 space settlements 151; asteroid utilization 110–111, 118–119; cable-ways, construction of 110; cost-benefit analysis 113; development of sustainable settlement 109; dust issue 111; energy production 111; inflatable modules or erectable structures 107; infrastructural parameters 106–112; infrastructural projects 110; Martian settlements 74–76, 91, 97; plants, production and reproduction of 112; political context 120–125; polyethylene structures 107; provision of entertainment and recreation 112; rationale for 112–120; road construction 110; role of prestige 113; safety standards 108; scientific reasoning for lunar settlements 114–116; selfsustainable healthcare provision 112; space international law for 96–97; subsurface water resources 109; technologically demanding-type of installations 107; use of geological and environmental features 107–108 space technology 33, 44; chemical propulsion systems 62; development of 33; ITAR regulation 42 space traffic jam 67 Space Transportation System programme 35 SpaceX 51–53, 55, 97, 116–118, 137 Spykman, Nicholas 10, 14 S-type asteroids 78 Sun 61, 67 sun-synchronous orbit 66 systemic geopolitics 23–24, 26; Dussuoy’s 23; Lévy’s 23–24; methodological foundations of 27 Terra 25 terrestrial endeavours 1 terrestrial orbital space 4 terrestrial orbits 66; transfer between 66 territorial expansion 7 Theia 68 third-order states 15

158 Index Titan 90 2010TK7 77 transatlantic space relations 25 Trojans 77 Trump, Donald 37 Tuathail, Ó 20 Turkish space activities 50; for communication services 50; construction of spaceport in Somalia 50; involvement in development of celestial bodies 50 Tyvak Nano-Space 51 UAE space programme 49–50; Al-Amal probe on Martian orbit 49; geosynchronous orbit-based telecommunication system, development of 49; inhabitable Martian settlement, development of 49; missions to celestial bodies 49; National Space Policy, 2016 49, 95 UK Blue Streak rocket 45 Ukraine crisis, 2014 38 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 92 United States 12, 25; global network 14 United States space missions 33–34, 52–53; Apollo missions 34, 112;

competition with China 39, 42–43; Deep Impact or Dawn missions 35; Orion Crew Vehicle 37; policies in space security 35–36; Space Force 36; support to European space launches 45; Trump administration’s Space Directives 36; 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 36; US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 36; 2020 US National Space Policy 52; US Space Policy Directives 52–53; Viking 1 mission 34 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (SPACE Act) 94–95 van Allen radiation belts 63 Venus 2, 90; atmosphere 2–3 Vesta 77 Virgin Galactic 51, 137 weapon in outer space 102n1 White, Edward H., II 34 Wolf Clause 42 Zubrin 67