The Future of Diplomacy After COVID-19: Multilateralism and the Global Pandemic 9780367764036, 9780367764029, 9781003166801

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“COVID-19 has brought home, besides human vulnerability, another painful story of global mismanagement. The authors argue persuasively that if we want to “build back better” and achieve peace, development and respect for human rights, there is no other option but to work together in a multilateral setting and make use of the tools available to us in the United Nations and its Charter. An important and enlightening read for all those who are interested in a better world.” — H.E. Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1997–2009) “After all the 75th anniversary calls for a recommitment to multilateralism in an era of pandemic and climate crisis, what is needed is exactly what these authors from different regions provide: translation into specific detail that is actionable, drawn from real experience, and yet as idealistic as the UN Charter itself.” — Mr. Ian Martin, Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Libya, Nepal and East Timor and former Secretary General of Amnesty International (1986–1992) “A book that brings the wealth of experience by diplomatic and UN practitioners to the effects of COVID-19 to the reader interested in global governance. The authors discuss the consequences of the pandemic in several critical fields and offer practical recommendations for a coordinated and effective response by international actors. An important read for all who believe in our common humanity and want to do better for future generations.” — Ms. Angela Kane, Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and Former Under-Secretary-General for Management of the United Nations

The Future of Diplomacy After COVID-19

This book considers the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international diplomacy, and the challenges and opportunities it presents for the future of multilateralism. Global cooperation and solidarity are central to responding to and mitigating the health and socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, yet, to many, this was slow to mobilize and lacking in political leadership. This book takes a practical look at the lessons learned from the period spanning the World Health Organization’s first declaration of a public health emergency of international concern in January 2020, to the commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations in October 2020. This timespan covers a critical period in which to consider key areas of diplomacy, covering a range of tools of global cooperation: multilateral diplomacy, the rule of law, sustainable development, economics and financing, digital governance, and peace and security. Each chapter in this book introduces readers to the current situation in their respective areas, followed by a constructive consideration of lessons learned from the pandemic’s impact on that field, and key recommendations for the future. The practical focus and future orientation are particularly important as the book injects pragmatism and guidance that will facilitate “building back better” in COVID response plans, while creating space for continued focus on global commitments around sustainable development and the future of the UN. Written by a team of authors who have worked directly in International Public Policy and the establishment of global agendas at the United Nations, this book will be essential reading for professionals and policymakers involved in diplomatic roles, as well as students and scholars interested in the future of international relations, global governance and sustainable development. Hana Alhashimi is an Emirati member of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Internet Governance Forum Multistakeholder Advisory Group, and a former Senior Advisor in the Office of the President of the General Assembly. Andres Fiallo is an Ecuadorian diplomat who has contributed to central processes within the United Nations as a negotiator, coordinator and senior advisor on international law, human rights, social affairs, peace and security.

Toni-Shae Freckleton is a Senior Adviser in the Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly, and Director of the Population and Health Unit Planning Institute of Jamaica. Mona Ali Khalil is the Director of MAK LAW, an Affiliate of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, and a former Senior Legal Officer of the United Nations. Vahd Nabyl Mulachela is an Indonesian Diplomat who served as Senior Adviser on Partnerships to the 73rd and 74th Presidents of the General Assembly. Jonathan Viera is an Ecuadorian diplomat who has served as negotiator in the key economics and sustainable development processes of the United Nations. He has taught at universities in Ecuador and the United States.

The Future of Diplomacy After COVID-19 Multilateralism and the Global Pandemic

Edited by Hana Alhashimi, Andres Fiallo, Toni-Shae Freckleton, Mona Ali Khalil, Vahd Nabyl Mulachela and Jonathan Viera

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Hana Alhashimi, Andres Fiallo, ToniShae Freckleton, Mona Ali Khalil, Vahd Mulachela and Jonathan Viera; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Hana Alhashimi, Andres Fiallo, Toni-Shae Freckleton, Mona Ali Khalil, Vahd Nabyl Mulachela and Jonathan Viera to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-76403-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-76402-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-16680-1 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Taylor & Francis Books

To our families, and future generations of humankind.

Contents

List of Editors and Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction

x xiii 1

HANA ALHASHIMI AND VAHD NABYL MULACHELA

1

COVID-19: Where public health and diplomacy converge

16

VAHD NABYL AND ACHMAD MULACHELA

2

Future of sustainable development

36

TONI-SHAE FRECKLETON

3

Future of economic diplomacy and financing for development

62

JONATHAN VIERA

4

Future of digital cooperation

84

HANA ALHASHIMI

5

Future of international peace and security: From the Spanish Flu to COVID-19 and to the next pandemic

115

ANDRES FIALLO

6

The future is multilateralism

140

MONA ALI KHALIL

Index

153

Editors and Contributors

Editors Hana Alhashimi coordinated The Future of Diplomacy After COVID-19 book project. She is an Emirati member of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Internet Governance Forum Multistakeholder Advisory Group, and has served as Senior Advisor on Frontier Technologies in the Office of the 73rd President of the General Assembly. Andres Fiallo is an Ecuadorian diplomat, with 15 years of experience in International Human Rights, who has contributed to central processes within the United Nations for over a decade as a negotiator, coordinator and advisor spanning human rights, social affairs, peace and security. Toni-Shae Freckleton is a Jamaican civil servant with 17 years of experience in policymaking on matters of social and sustainable development, both at the multilateral and national level. She has served as Senior Advisor on Sustainable Development in the Office of the 73rd, 74th and 75th Presidents of the General Assembly. Jonathan Viera is an Ecuadorian diplomat who has served as negotiator in the main design and follow up processes of the United Nations agendas on financing, urban and sustainable development. He has taught on finance, economics and international relations at universities in Ecuador and the United States. Vahd Nabyl Mulachela is an Indonesian diplomat with experience in bilateral and multilateral affairs covering strategic partnerships, social development and health issues. He has served as Senior Advisor on Strategic Partnerships in the Office of the 73rd and 74th Presidents of the General Assembly.

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Mona Ali Khalil is a public international lawyer and former Senior Legal Officer of the United Nations Office of the Legal Counsel. She is an Affiliate of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict and a Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research.

Contributors Doreen Bogdan-Martin was elected Director of the ITU Telecommunication Development Bureau in 2018. She is a strategic leader with 30 years’ experience in international relations and a long history of success in policy and strategy development, analysis and execution. Sarah F. Cliffe is the Director of the Center on International Cooperation (NYU). She was previously the Special Representative for the World Bank’s World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development, and the Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities to the United Nations. Joe E. Colombano is a senior international development executive with over 20 years’ experience in the multilateral system, including as economic advisor in the Executive Office of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. His Excellency Modest Jonathan Mero served as Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the United Nations in New York from 2016 to 2020, and in Geneva and Vienna previously. A Senior Economist, Ambassador Mero has held several posts in Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade. His Excellency Tijjani Muhammad-Bande is a Nigerian diplomat, academic and political scientist. He served as the President of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly from September 2019 to September 2020. Ambassador MuhammadBande is currently the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations. Dr. David N. Nabarro is the Special Envoy to the World Health Organization Director-General on COVID-19, co-director of the Imperial College Institute of Global Health Innovation and founder of social enterprise 4SD. He has served as Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Special Advisor of the United Nations Secretary-General for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Climate Change. He has worked in over 50 countries since securing his medical qualification in 1974.

xii Editors and Contributors Werner Heinrich Obermeyer has extensive experience on the promotion of health priorities in the General Assembly including universal health coverage and non-communicable diseases, among others. His career also included positions in the United Nations Environment Programme, and as South African Diplomat serving across Africa and South America.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the special contributors: H.E. Mr. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, Mr. Werner Heinrich Obermeyer, Mr. Joe Colombano, Mr. David N. Nabarro, H.E. Mr. Modest Jonathan Mero, Ms. Doreen Bogdan-Martin, and Ms. Sarah Cliffe. For strategic guidance, we thank H.E. Ms. Ohood Al Roumi and H.E. Mr. Luis Gallegos Chiriboga. For advice and collaboration from the beginning of the book project, we thank Ms. Khalilah Hackman. For their valuable insights, we thank Mr. Joseph (JD) D’Cruz and Mr. Felix Dodds. For their support, we thank Mr. Eisa AlHashimi, Mr. Sayed Ahmad Alhashmi, Mr. Faisal Ibrahim, Ms. Elaine Murphy, Mr. Daniel Bergheim, and Ms. Amanda Le. We thank colleagues in the Offices of the Presidents of the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, and 75th sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN Secretariat, and the United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Indonesia and Jamaica.

Introduction Hana Alhashimi and Vahd Nabyl Mulachela

We live in a time of great paradoxes, and transformational shifts in our societies, economies and our environment. The COVID-19 pandemic struck in the midst of what has been termed as a crisis of multilateralism. While global cooperation was most needed to mitigate the spread of the virus and develop a vaccine, multilateralism has been portrayed in the media as slow to mobilize, lacking in political leadership, and disappointing for many. The repercussions run deep, with tragic losses of life in the first few months of the pandemic due to overwhelmed healthcare systems. Socio-economic recovery is set to need four years to recover at least. As such, public health and multilateral diplomacy have been placed in the spotlight of the international stage. As a practice dating back to ancient civilizations ranging from the Chinese empire to ancient Greece and early medieval Europe in the 13th century, diplomacy and the “communication and mediation between human collectives” has long been part of our world order.1 Following the establishment of formal permanent missions with the rise of the Westphalian state order between the 15th and 18th centuries, the practice of diplomacy was largely bilateral up until the First World War. Multilateralism, or the collective consideration of global matters by world nations, emerged as a relatively new concept in 1919 with the establishment of the League of Nations, and in 1945 the United Nations (UN). Multilateralism, as the keystone of the “new diplomacy” since the Second World War, is grounded in the belief that global matters were best addressed through diplomacy, and that there was a need for platforms for dialogue and supranational governance.2 Every September, world leaders convene at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, headquarters to the most universal multilateral body, to reaffirm their commitment to the ideals of multilateralism, and set the collective agenda for the year ahead. In September 2019, they convened under the theme of Galvanizing multilateral efforts for poverty eradication, quality education, climate action and inclusion, underscoring that the world still needed a rules-based international order and cooperation to survive.3 A similar message applauding the pre-eminence of international cooperation vis-à-vis unilateral actions was voiced by world dignitaries in the 2018 General Debate, and in countless debates prior. Year after year, world leaders acknowledge global cooperation as

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the only answer to global challenges, emphasizing the need to strengthen the multilateral system, with particular focus to revitalize the United Nations. In January 2020, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, called on all nations to seize the opportunity of commemorating the 75th anniversary of the UN to change the way governments and the UN do their business, so that they could address emerging challenges of the 21st century. According to the Secretary-General, the threats to progress and development were global geostrategic tensions, the existential climate crisis, deep and global mistrust, and the dark side of the digital world.4 At the time, no-one could predict that those words calling for the UN to conduct its business differently would have a completely different meaning in a matter of months. The onset of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) brought a completely unanticipated shift in business practices of the UN. The disease’s speedy transmission and far-reaching coverage wreaked havoc on health and economic systems that eventually unfolded multidimensional crises in many countries. Established social and economic orders have been shocked by the impacts of the coronavirus, with long-lasting effects. Responses to this public health emergency were inextricably linked to diplomacy, and specifically multilateral diplomacy. For diplomats in the Permanent Missions of their countries to the United Nations in New York, the first briefing on the Novel Coronavirus took place on 10 March 2020. The irony of the packed, overfull hall in a briefing on the need for social distancing and precautions was not missed by many, however it was not immediately clear that this would be the last full room they would see for the rest of the year. Shortly after, negotiation processes and meetings shifted to video teleconference services (VTCs), with some postponed due to challenges in reaching consensus without informal face-to-face options. When diplomats returned to the UN six months after it closed its doors for meetings, they were limited to one representative for each country, or one for every six seats.5 Disruptions in the practice of diplomacy, as brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, were clearly demonstrated in at least three dimensions: global, national and individual. At the global level, the socio-economic and geopolitical landscapes that provided substantive and conceptual grounds for the work of international diplomacy have been significantly affected by the pandemic. Immediate, medium- and long-term goals of international cooperation such as promoting social and economic development, tackling root causes of poverty, creating peace and security, ensuring equality, as well as the targets in the Sustainable Development Goals faced new global narratives regarding unprecedented challenges that emerged with the advent of pandemic and how to address them. These will be unpacked further throughout the book. Moreover, added pressure has come from the impact of the pandemic and economic downturn on people’s lives – putting at risk progress made in multilateral promises and global agreements. Amidst the abundance of economic uncertainties, the world is set to be drawn by the crisis into the worst economic fallout in decades.6 In the second quarter of 2020, an estimated 195 million jobs were lost.7 Like many other global issues that occur across political

Introduction

3

boundaries, a pandemic at a global scale requires global attention to address it effectively. This is especially the case in our globalized world, where international and domestic mobility enabled the spread of the virus. As the United Nations marked its 75th anniversary in 2020, expectations for seizing the moment to review and improve the multilateral cooperation system had to be adapted to ensure relevance with the newfangled global challenges caused by the pandemic. The Secretary-General launched the UN75 initiative in January 2020 as the world’s “biggest conversation on the future we want and the UN we need.” Throughout the year, the team, led by Under-Secretary-General Fabrizio Hochschild, listened to people in all 193 Member States, seeking their perspectives about global challenges as well as ideas to tackle them.8 The results of the survey, dialogues and consultations demonstrated the shift in global priorities in 2020. Up until March 2020, the majority of respondents listed environment and climate action as the biggest priorities for the future, and by the April report, global health became the top priority.9 Proponents of multilateral cooperation saw the fight against COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to call for increasing global solidarity; while others that are less inclined to multilateral endeavours supported unilateral approaches. The majority of the world, however, over 90 per cent of respondents, supported greater global cooperation and solidarity. The second dimension is at the national level. A shift of national priorities set by governments in their efforts to deal with the pandemic has also altered their diplomatic goals, priorities and strategies. It is notable that, while pursuing enormous efforts to deal with the pandemic domestically, governments involved the entire public sector and not only the foreign ministry, state department, or its equivalents. Nonetheless, since national interests are generally accepted as the guiding compass that indicates the direction of each country’s foreign policy, diplomatic machineries were tasked with new responsibilities in line with national strategies to tackle COVID-19. The pandemic has brought immense pressures to national budgets. It jolted considerations that policymakers usually made when allocating resources at their disposal. Saving as many people’s lives as possible had to be prioritized by national and local governments, particularly in the early days of the pandemic when health sectors were overwhelmed, and when little was known about appropriate medical responses. Providing health systems with sufficient human resources, expertise, medical supplies and other related equipment were crucial in the effort to contain the spread of the virus and the collapse of the health system. Protecting fellow nationals abroad during the pandemics was also treated as a priority by many countries. Access to medical supplies, including eagerness to secure potential future vaccines, protection of citizens abroad from the impact of the pandemic, while at the same time trying to maintain world peace and economic cooperation, have informed the formulation of foreign policymaking in many countries. These are like adding new ingredients to the already mixed cocktails of national priority goals to be served by their diplomatic corps.

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This brings us to look at the individual level on how COVID-19 has changed the way diplomats perform their day-to-day duties – the third dimension in which the pandemic has affected diplomacy. In the interest of promoting public health and preventing the spread of coronavirus, activities such as in-person meetings for negotiations, lobbying, networking or other related purposes in the meeting rooms, corridors, cafes and seating areas of the United Nations Headquarters building and indeed, anywhere in the city of New York, were no longer options available for diplomats to use. Travels were cancelled. Indeed, all the restrictions that were in place for social distancing requirements affected a broad spectrum of professional work, not limited only to diplomats. This became the new normal vis-a-vis, face-to-face interaction, which has been one of the most recognizable features of diplomacy. In-person meetings have been considered critical in networking, lobbying, and ensuring successful negotiations in diplomatic processes. In multilateral negotiations and international organizations, convening plenary meetings and break-up groups were considered normal methods of working to ensure effective deliberation. Attending the celebrations of national day anniversaries was a customary, meaningful political gesture of respect in diplomatic interactions. Traditionally, these activities required the physical presence of diplomats. However, COVID-19 and social distancing requirements have prevented these practices from taking place in their regular format. Instead, “virtual receptions” were convened for national days, where participants were present on-line to watch video performances and speeches through computer or phone screens. Some delegations even took to hosting “game nights” as part of election campaigns. Virtual meetings, briefings and webinars became a new accepted normalcy. Although digital platforms provided a viable option for business continuity in diplomacy, there have been wide-ranging consequences, to be further elaborated in ensuing chapters. Seen from the altitudes of these three perspectives – the global, national and individual levels – this book examines the challenges, opportunities, and future prospects of international diplomacy as evident in the midst of the pandemic. It takes a practical look at the lessons that can be teased out from series of events in January 2020, when the World Health Organization’s issued first advisories related to the COVID-19 pandemic, until the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations on 24 October 2020. As world leaders representing over 7 billion people virtually gathered in the “parliament of humanity” – the General Assembly – they set the agenda for the road towards the 100th anniversary of the UN in 2045, and for the year ahead.10 This timespan from January to October 2020 covers a critical period in which to consider key areas of diplomacy, covering a range of tools in the toolkit of global cooperation: multilateral diplomacy, sustainable development, economics and financing, digital governance and peace and security. Written and structured primarily by expert practitioners who have been involved in the core system of the United Nations, in their own personal capacities that do not reflect the policies of the UN or any specific government, this book

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presents insights and analytical assessments heavily drawn from experience, which may be useful as a resource for policymakers, diplomats, proponents of multilateralism, students and other relevant stakeholders who are interested in issues related to global governance, on how diplomacy may look after the COVID-19 pandemic. In the following chapters, this book will discuss the extent to which the wide-range effects of the pandemic absorbed or reinforced the social-political and economic capitals of nations; and, inversely, how the interplay in domestic and international circumstances informed the formulation of diplomatic priorities and goals. Each chapter will focus on introducing readers to the status quo in their respective fields by the end of 2019, followed by a constructive consideration of lessons learned from COVID-19’s impact on that specific substantive area, and ending in suggestions for the parameters needed for resilience in that sector in the future. The practical focus and future orientation are particularly important, as the book aims to inject pragmatism and guidance that will facilitate “recovery better” in COVID-19 response plans, while creating space for continued focus on global commitments around sustainable development and the future of the United Nations. Finally, each chapter features special articles written by eminent figures and field practitioners, sharing their knowledge and experiences for added depth. The first chapter of the book opens the conversation by looking back at the chronological sets of events following the detection of COVID-19 cases even before it was declared as a pandemic. It explores the extent to which the crisis influenced the emergency policies taken in responding to challenges in their domestic and international levels, with specific focus on policies related to diplomacy. It further looks at a broad picture of how increasingly nationalistic natures by some countries have put international cooperation under pressure. Chapter 1 further highlights the role of multilateralism and multilateral institutions in responding to the pandemic, including through health-related decisions taken in the United Nations General Assembly. Finally, it uses COVID-19 as a litmus test of the capacity, capability and readiness of multilateralism and the rules-based system to address global challenges effectively. This element of reviewing the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy will also be found in other following chapters, with emphasis on topics beyond health. Chapter 2 focuses on the most ambitious, far-reaching, landmark global development agenda of all time: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals. It sheds light on the unprecedented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the future, with a focus on the implementation and achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, from a developing country perspective, and based on information available by October 2020. It outlines the global response to the pandemic in light of the Decade of Action for delivery on sustainable development to accelerate collective action and build back better, more inclusive, resilient and sustainable societies, with a particular focus on three key areas: Governance, Inequalities and Climate Change. A critical milestone to assess the efforts of our actions is the next global stock-take of the 2030 Agenda in 2023, and the

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chapter therefore offers practical approaches for a positive trajectory for the future of sustainable development leading up to 2023. Chapter 3 focuses on the effects of the pandemic in the global economy and financing for development. The chapter sets the context by analyzing the scenario between the 2008 financial crisis and the global pandemic in 2020. It introduces the roadmap established by the international community in 2015 through multilateral agreements, from the perspective the negotiators that acted as the architects at the time. The chapter further illustrates through data available by June 2020 how the global economy was rocked by the COVID 19 pandemic, specifically in the main economic areas and “means of implementation” for sustainable development: industrial production, financial markets, access to finance, international trade, debt, fiscal health, among others. Finally, it offers a response to questions of economic diplomacy and financing for development, and lessons learned that may be used towards a new global economic architecture. Chapter 4 zooms in on another side of what is seen as “means of implementation” for sustainable development – a key enabler for diplomacy and development alike: digital technologies. The chapter outlines the challenges that digital technologies pose to diplomacy, including the lack of parameters for technology creators to engage in international public policy, and the ensuing lack of a system of internet governance. Following the structure of previous chapters, Chapter 4 outlines COVID-19’s amplification of the governance gap, noting implications of nearly half of the world remaining offline in the midst of global lockdowns. It also touches on the impact of technology on the practice of diplomacy in the time of COVID-19, including the democratization of diplomacy through digital means, the appointment of ambassadors to technology communities rather than countries, and a bridge to security issues and cybersecurity. Looking forward, Chapter 4 makes the case for multi-stakeholder and multilateral cooperation with the UN as a key convener, and outlines the main ingredients for future-readiness here, with a view to leveraging the potential of digital technologies as enablers for sustainable development. The fifth chapter of the book then brings in the side of the UN that makes most of the headlines: International Peace and Security, in the context of “realpolitik.” It explains how COVID-19 marked a “before and after 2020” for the UN’s role in peace and security – something that diplomats had been grappling with. The chapter touches on the 75th anniversary of the UN from the perspective of the anniversary of the Second World War and the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, arguing that justice is not the only missing ingredient for a global peace, while outlining what fragilities remain as potential sources of future conflicts. Chapter 5 also considers how the global pandemic is deteriorating the conditions of the population in areas of armed conflict, complicating humanitarian access, and potentially exacerbating the roots of violence and conflict. It points to the “wake-up call” that the pandemic has served for global priorities; a reminder of Emanuel Kant’s project of perpetual peace; arguing that the global pandemic is forcing UN Member States to rethink how to prioritize the organization’s work,

Introduction

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and making the case for a new Grand Bargain, while proposing what a “future-proof” peace and security architecture could look like. In the last chapter of this book, Chapter 6, key policy recommendations are summarized from previous chapters, with an elaboration on how they contribute to the implementation of the UN75 Declaration in supporting the UN’s three pillars: peace and security, sustainable development and human rights in a post-COVID world. The author then turns to human rights and the rule of international law, as well as policy implications for the principal organs of the United Nations. The chapter recommends reforms to mobilize the Security Council, revitalize the General Assembly and strengthen the independence of the Secretariat. The conclusion is reached that the future of diplomacy is multilateral, with the argument that to survive, as a human race, we must stand together and forge a multilateral response to these common challenges guided by our universally accepted principles.

Special Article by the President of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly The United Nations and multilateral diplomacy: the journey so far and the challenges ahead By H.E. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, President of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly The COVID-19 pandemic and its far-reaching consequences pose the greatest challenge in the history of the United Nations. The health emergency affects everyone, everywhere: we are facing unprecedented challenges and human suffering, which will have a devastating impact on the livelihoods of the peoples we serve. Worldwide, millions of lives have been tragically lost, and many more are suffering from the disease. Healthcare workers and those on the frontlines combatting the disease are rightfully hailed as heroes for their selfless and honourable service in keeping our communities safe and healthy. The United Nations, states, civil society and the private sector, continue to provide vital support and services in the fight to defeat the pandemic. In the face of mounting challenges, we are reminded of the indispensability of multilateral alliances, which have from the outset of this global challenge coordinated the global response. The Word Health Organization, in particular, continues to play a crucial role in the fight against the pandemic, coordinating the systemwide response of the United Nations. Early on in the pandemic, it became clear that all stakeholders had to support the World Health Organization (WHO) and one another to overcome this challenge and prevent future pandemics. In the midst of the global pandemic, we are called to consider role of the United Nations and, more broadly, multilateralism in addressing present, and anticipating future global challenges. To do so, I am of the humble view that we must reflect on our journey thus far and lessons learned.

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The United Nations came into existence at a time of great despair, when the penholders of its founding document dared to imagine a better world, one that would be defined by peace and equality.11 Visionary world leaders chose hope over cynicism, empathy over indifference and partnership over distrust when they came together in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 to sign the Charter of the United Nations.12 They embarked upon a new, rules-based international order, with an Organization of unrivalled legitimacy at its core. Over the past 75 years, the United Nations General Assembly has served as a “parliament of humanity.” As the primary deliberative, policy-making and representative body of the United Nations, the Assembly provides a forum to share perspectives, forge partnerships and build consensus. It is rooted in equality of both voice and vote. When there is disagreement, the Assembly provides space for respectful debate, where countries dialogue, generate understanding and reach compromise. Within its remit as a principal organ of the United Nations, the General Assembly has assisted in guiding the transformation of our world over the past three quarters of a century and counting. It has adopted resolutions across a wide breadth of issues that reflect the aspirations of humanity across the three pillars of the work of the United Nations: peace and security, development and human rights.13 General Assembly resolutions have helped create the building blocks for the normative development of international law. In 1959, Assembly resolution 1472 (XIV) created the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.14 This initiated the work that facilitated the use of modern technology and telecommunications. In 1957, the Assembly, through resolution 1105 (XI),15 decided to convene the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, paving the way for the adoption in 1982 of humanity’s first “constitution for the seas” – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.16 The Charter of the United Nations set out the objective to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Accordingly, the General Assembly has worked hard towards the goal of eliminating atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. This was the genesis of the normative development of the international regime of disarmament and non-proliferation. In 1948, the Assembly, by resolution 217 (III),17 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.18 This set of inalienable rights set out standards for equal treatment of all peoples and re-affirmed the preamble of the Charter: We the peoples of the United Nations determined … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women…. The world has changed significantly since 1945, with more than 80 former colonies joining the Organization. In response to the peoples of the United Nations yearning for independence, the Assembly, in its fifteenth year, adopted resolution 1514,19 which provided the most authoritative and comprehensive

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formulation of the principle of self-determination. In 1966, resolution 2202 A (XXI) declared apartheid a crime against humanity.20 The Assembly continues to promote equality and dignity for all, including through the mandated 2015–2024 the International Decade for People of African Descent with the theme “People of African descent: recognition, justice and development,”21 and the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, observed on 21 March.22 Indeed, the General Assembly has sought to end discrimination in all its forms. It adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons in 1975;23 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979;24 the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief in 1981;25 the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989;26 and, more recently, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.27 In 2015, the General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development via resolution 70/1.28 The Paris Climate Agreement, adopted in the same year, began in embryonic form as a General Assembly resolution. These twenty-first century milestones of multilateralism demonstrate the recognition of all Member States of the United Nations that collective action is required to combat an existential threat and safeguard the world’s citizens and the planet we inhabit for generations to come. When faced with global challenges, solidarity remains our first and best line of defence. Ultimately, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, more than ever, just how crucial multilateralism and the United Nations are for global peace, security, prosperity and cooperation. As a body for norm-setting, dialogue, partnership and, in a way, brainstorming solutions to evolving challenges, it is our only option, looking beyond individual interests, boundaries and borders. The World Health Organization (WHO) has led the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic since the onset of the crisis. The United Nations system has been most effective in galvanizing support for the most vulnerable. In the General Assembly, Member States rallied to adopt resolutions calling for solidarity and global access to medicines and medical equipment. They have also taken historic steps to enable the General Assembly to operate and uphold the vital work of the United Nations during this period by adopting decisions under new rules and procedures. The role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in leading the global response to COVID-19 cannot be overstated. Decades of efforts by the United Nations for inter-agency coordination were put to the ultimate test, as the pandemic resulted in both a public health crisis and an economic and social crisis. While faith in multilateralism was questioned at times, the multilateral institutions provided a lifeline for millions around the world. International cooperation will also be essential in guaranteeing universal affordability and access to vaccines as they become available. The United Nations, however, is not a panacea. Despite its best efforts, conflict and strife persists, and in some cases irreparable damage has been done

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to society. We could not prevent the genocide in Rwanda, and the question of Palestine remains unresolved. These are regarded by many as cases in which the international community has fallen short. Therefore, we must reflect and continue to work together in service of humanity and to honour our commitment to the Charter of the United Nations. The 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly I had the privilege to serve as President of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, from September 2019 to September 2020. As the Organization weathered its first global pandemic, I was trusted with the responsibility to shepherd the affairs of this most universal organ. COVID-19 revealed itself as a great equalizer, and demonstrated the interdependence of the world. Indeed, the measure of our resilience is that of the most vulnerable in our society. The first high-level meeting of the 74th Session of the General Assembly was focused on global health. In a landmark political declaration on universal health coverage, Heads of State and Government committed to scale up national and global efforts to build a healthier world for all. Communities around the world are now experiencing at a deeper level the message expressed by world leaders in September 2019: that health is an investment in human capital, social and economic development and the empowerment of all people. Indeed, the novel coronavirus is a reminder that humanity is only as safe as its most vulnerable groups. The related social and economic fallouts of COVID-19 threaten to plunge people deeper into poverty. We need to galvanize multilateral action now to protect gains made towards the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and also ensure that we safeguard those in the most vulnerable of contexts. We must reach those furthest behind first, including: least developed countries; landlocked developing countries; small island developing states; and conflict-affected states. In doing so we need to address the specific needs of women, children, youth, people with disabilities, and those who are often marginalized. The novel coronavirus does not recognise borders; thus, we must rise to this challenge as individuals and nations, united. I witnessed this abiding faith in multilateralism during my Presidency first-hand. I enjoyed the resounding camaraderie and support of my colleagues representing the 193 Member States of the United Nations, even during challenging negotiations. Though, at times, it seemed that all odds were against us, notably when the United Nations switched to remote working and undertook mitigation measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Nonetheless, we were still able to ensure timely and effective implementation of the mandates set for the 74th Session of the General Assembly, owing to the support of world nations. Working under extraordinary circumstances, the General Assembly resorted to innovative working methods for business continuity, and adopted over 70 essential decisions and resolutions through a silence procedure mechanism

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without physical meetings. The financial and budgetary committee (fifth committee) of the General Assembly adopted the first regular annual budget in over 40 years, which was essential to allow peacekeeping operations to continue through the pandemic without disruption.29 And in a historic first for the organization, the General Assembly held elections with physical distancing for its 75th President, the five incoming elected-members of the Security Council, and Members of the Economic and Social Council. Key processes continued. Most remarkably, perhaps, Member States agreed on a Declaration by consensus as to the meaning of the 75-year history of the UN, in spite of deep differences. This Declaration was adopted at the UN75 Summit on 21 September 2020, with the virtual participation of 128 Heads of State and Government, a strong show of solidarity, which itself acknowledges calls for global cooperation in light of the pandemic, as “the largest global challenge in the history of the United Nations.” Prior to this, on 9 September, I convened a Youth Plenary to hear the voices of those that would lead the future we frequently speak about. 2020 marked five years since the adoption of the Paris Climate Agreement, the only universally binding agreement to address the climate threat, one that demonstrated a feat of multilateralism incubated by a General Assembly resolution. At the 25th conference of parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, I joined Member States in calling for an economic model that provides prosperity for all, while disassociating economic growth from environmental degradation. The mobilization of a broad range of public, private, international and domestic financial resources and investments remains key to ensuring a transition to resilient low carbon economies. I have repeatedly called on developed countries to uphold their commitment to support climate action in developing countries by mobilizing 100 billion dollars per annum by 2020. My Presidency also coincided with the 25-year anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action – the most comprehensive and transformative global agenda for the achievement of gender equality. While progress has been made, notably with the unprecedented levels of girls’ education, and the decline of global maternal fatality by 38%, we have a long way to go. COVID-19 has seen funds previously allocated for women’s health redirected to the pandemic response, while women and girls have been disproportionately burdened by an increase in unpaid or informal care work, with alarming increases in rates of gender-based violence. Gender equality is not just an ideal but a necessity for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda. Further efforts were made to push forward priorities set during the session. In June 2020, we established an Alliance for Poverty Eradication with 40 Member States committed to my top priority as president to leave no one behind. Moreover, I collaborated with the President of the Economic and Social Council to launch the Financial Accountability and Transparency Initiative (FACTI) Panel. And while the world found digital means as the safest tool to continue their work in the pandemic, we created a dedicated platform for a

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virtual meeting on the Impact of Science, Technology and Innovation on the Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. All of these efforts will continue to be operational beyond the 74th Session of the General Assembly. Presiding over the 74th Session of the General Assembly, I formed the distinct impression that, far from being an outmoded principle, the United Nations remains an accepted and reliable forum for managing relations among nations. The fact that so many world leaders made time to participate in the deliberations which took place during the High-Level Week in September 2019 is, along with the quality of engagement at the General Debate, indisputable evidence of the United Nations’ relevance. Looking to history to chart the course for the future Regardless of the earliest and modest attempts at forging multilateral partnerships around specific issues, relations among states were largely bilateral and were founded on a system of competing alliances for most of history. The League of Nations, established in 1919, was the first forum at which nations got together to address pressing global challenges through multilateralism. It was an ambitious experiment in multilateral diplomacy and supranational governance. Its failure was demonstrated in its inability to erase inter-state suspicions, or to halt the drift to another devastating war, spanning the period 1939–1945. While the experiment that was the League of Nations was short-lived, the United Nations has proven to be more resilient. Considered objectively, the United Nations has demonstrated a remarkable staying power. The difference between today’s world and the conditions prevailing in 1945 clearly have a tremendous impact on the United Nations. As new states emerge on the scene, questions about the structure of the Organization have become frequent and insistent. Among the questions that keep coming up are those concerning the inclusiveness of the Organization’s decision-making bodies, the legitimacy of decisions that are not founded on the considerations of equity and sovereign equality, and the responsiveness of the existing arrangements to new and unfolding challenges. It may be of interest that, in deference to the pressures for change, mechanisms are now in place aimed at examining the burning questions regarding the reform of the United Nations from all possible angles, including its three pillars of security, development and human rights. The United Nations was created to galvanise collective efforts to address global challenges, and the nature of the problems keep evolving, making reform efforts all the more important. The 75th year of the United Nations takes place at a moment of reckoning for our shared planet and shared future. This is a time for action, ambition and partnership. As we celebrated United Nations day on 24 October 2020, over 42 million cases had been reported to WHO globally, with more than 1.1 million deaths.30 This pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing inequalities, and the socio-economic impact is unprecedented in the history of our Organization. The Executive Director of the World Food Programme, David

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Beasley, warns of a famine of “biblical proportions”; the United Nations Economic and Social Council reports that 1.6 billion children are unable to attend school in person;32 and the pandemic continues to disproportionately affect women and vulnerable groups, such as refugees and internally displaced persons. Our continued response will require a recommitment to multilateralism as we build back better in this Decade of Action (2020–2030) to implement the SDGs.33 In 2015, the membership of the General Assembly pledged to leave no one behind and shift the world onto a path of sustainable development and prosperity for all. We are in an unprecedented situation, and we must redouble our efforts to achieve the SDGs on time. This is a call to action for the United Nations as we reflect upon the future we want and the United Nations we need. Three quarters of a century ago, the founders of our Organization demonstrated fortitude at a time of crisis. They chose to trust one another and unite in pursuit of a better world. In the inaugural address of the first President of the General Assembly, His Excellency Paul-Henri Spaak stated, 31

It is possible that one day, in the future, the pessimists may be right; I do not know. But I do know that today they are wrong. In San Francisco, they announced that the Charter could never be established; in London, that the Organization would never come into existence; in the past few weeks, that we should never meet again, and now, no doubt, that we are going to tear each other to pieces. On the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, let it be clear that we will not let the founders of our Organization or ourselves down. “We the peoples” must remain steadfast in our resolve to advance the goals and principles of our Charter.

Notes 1 Batora, Josef. The Organizational Basis of Modern Diplomacy. Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution: going virtual? Leiden, 2008. 2 Berridge, G.R. The Counter-revolution in Diplomatic Practice. Quaderni Di Scienza Politica, Anno XII – Nuova Servie V – n. 1, April 2005, pp. 7–8. 3 United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (2019, September 30). World’s Survival Hinges on Multilateralism, President Stresses as General Assembly Concludes Annual Debate. GA/12199, Seventy-Fourth Session, 13th Meeting of the Plenary. Accessed 15 August 2020 at: www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12199.doc.htm. 4 Guterres, Antonio (2020, January 22). Secretary-General’s remarks to the General Assembly on his priorities for 2020. Accessed on 15 August 2020 at: www.un.org/sg/ en/content/sg/statement/2020-01-22/secretary-generals-remarks-the-general-assem bly-his-priorities-for-2020-bilingual-delivered-scroll-down-for-all-english-version. 5 Muhammad-Bande, T. (@UN_PGA) #HappeningNow: #UNGA and @UNECOSOC Joint informal meeting to hear a briefing by @UN Secretariat regarding measures to strengthen preparedness and ensure business continuity at #UN premises and of its operations in light of the evolving #COVID2019 situation. Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/UN_PGA/status/1237386028303998976?s=20. 6 Giorgieva, Kristalina (2020, April 9). Confronting the Crisis: Priorities for the Global Economy. Accessed on 16 August 2020 at: www.imf.org/en/News/Arti cles/2020/04/07/sp040920-SMs2020-Curtain-Raiser.

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7 International Labour Organization (2020, April 7). COVID-19 causes devastating losses in working hours and employment. Accessed on 15 August 2020 at: www.ilo. org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_740893/lang–en/index.htm. 8 United Nations (2020). UN75 and Beyond: Shaping our future together. Accessed on 15 August 2020 at: www.un.org/en/un75. 9 Update on the Work of the Office on the Commemoration of the UN’s 75th Anniversary. September 2020. Retrieved from: www.un.org/zh/inc/un75_update.pdf. 10 The UN General Assembly High-Level Week in September 2020 was the first time in history that takes the format of recorded video-message. Source: MuhammadBande, T., Elements for Consideration for the High-Level Week of the Seventy-Fifth Session of the General Assembly. Retrieved from: www.un.org/pga/74/2020/06/16/ elements-for-consideration-for-the-high-level-week-of-the-seventy-fifth-session-of-th e-general-assembly-2/. 11 This segment originally appeared in the UN Chronicle as a post by the author on 6 July 2020. Available at: www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/un-general-assembly-75-yea r-journey-towards-future-we-wantwe. 12 Charter of the United Nations (1945, June 26). Available at: www.un.org/en/sec tions/un-charter/preamble/index.html. 13 United Nations Website. What We Do: Protect Human Rights. Accessed on 1 July 2020. Available at: www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/ index.html. 14 United Nations General Assembly (1959, December 12). Resolution adopted on the reports of the First Committee: 1472 (XIV). International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Accessed on 1 July 2020. Available at: www.unoosa. org/pdf/gares/ARES_14_1472E.pdf. 15 United Nations General Assembly (1957, February 21). Resolution 1105 (XI): International conference of plenipotentiaries to examine the law of the sea. Accessed on 1 July 2020. Available at: https://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/RES/1105(XI). 16 Treves, Tulio (2008). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. Available at: https://legal.un.org/avl/ ha/uncls/uncls.html. 17 United Nations General Assembly (1948, December 10). Resolution 217 (III). International Bill of Human Rights: A Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available at: www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III). 18 United Nations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Accessed 1 July 2020. Available at: www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 19 United Nations General Assembly (1960, December 14). Resolution 1514 (XV) Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/Res/1514(XV). 20 United Nations General Assembly (1966, December 16). Resolution 2202 (XXI) The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2202(XXI). 21 United Nations General Assembly (2013, December 23). Resolution 68/237: Proclamation of the International Decade for People of African Descent. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/RES/68/237. 22 United Nations General Assembly (1966, October 26). Resolution 2142 (XXI) Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Available at: www.un.org/en/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2142%20(XXI). 23 United Nations General Assembly (1975, December 9). Resolution 3447 (XXX). Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. Available at: https:// documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/001/60/img/NR000160. pdf?OpenElement.

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24 United Nations General Assembly (1979, December 18). Resolution 34/180: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/34/180. 25 United Nations General Assembly (1981, November 25). Resolution 36/55. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/36/55. 26 United Nations General Assembly (1989, November 20). Resolution 44/25: Convention on the Rights of the Child. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/ RES/44/25. 27 United Nations General Assembly (2007, September 13). Resolution 61/295: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Available at: http s://undocs.org/en/A/RES/61/295&Lang=E. 28 United Nations General Assembly (2015, September 25). Resolution 70/1: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/291/89/PDF/ N1529189.pdf?OpenElement. 29 United Nations General Assembly 21st Meeting (2019, December 27). In First Annual Budget Since 1973, Fifth Committee Approves $3.07 Billion for 2020, Concluding Main Part of Seventy-Fourth Session. Accessed on 20 October 2020 at: www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaab4350.doc.htm. 30 World Health Organization (2020, October 27). Weekly Epidemiological Update. Accessed on 28 October 2020 at: www.who.int/publications/m/item/weekly-ep idemiological-update—27-october-2020. 31 UN News (2020, April 21). As famines of “biblical proportion” loom, Security Council urged to “act fast.” UN News. Accessed on 6 July 2020 at: https://news. un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062272. 32 UN/DESA (2020, June 11). Policy Brief #78: Achieving the SDGs through the COVID19 response and recovery. Accessed on 1 July 2020 at: www.un.org/development/desa/ dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-78-achieving-the-sdgs-through-the-covid-19-res ponse-and-recovery/. 33 United Nations (2019). Sustainable Development Goals Decade of Action: Ten years to transform our world. Further information available at: www.un.org/sustaina bledevelopment/decade-of-action/.

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COVID-19 Where public health and diplomacy converge Vahd Nabyl and Achmad Mulachela

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic on the contemporary global stage has prompted significant shifts in many countries’ domestic and international priorities. In an effort to control the spread of COVID-19, economic activities and peoples’ movements have been compelled to hastily stop through social distancing and lockdowns, causing ripple effects and restrictions that disrupted not only the conventional aspects of how people conduct their lives, but also the conceptual aspects of how to run businesses during and after the pandemic. While the full-range impact of the pandemic has yet to be seen at the time of writing, there are indications that the world will never be the same, with many pointing to a “new normal” and opportunity for a “great reset.” The pace the COVID-19 made its way to a global scale transmission was faster than the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in 2003. This reality could be seen in a chronology of events that occurred since December 2019, when the World Health Organization (WHO)’s Country Office in China picked up a media statement on cases of “viral pneumonia of unknown cause” by the Municipal Health Commission in Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China. On 5 January 2020, the WHO published detailed information about the pneumonia. The disease outbreak news explained what responses were taken by the national authorities in China that included tracing, retrospective investigation and sanitizing the environment. No specific recommendations were at first provided by the WHO. Instead, based on the available information on the outbreak at that time, the WHO advised against travel or trade restrictions on China. About one week later, on 13 January, the Ministry of Public Health of Thailand reported the first imported case of the coronavirus. It was followed by the second case reported outside China, which came from Japan on 16 January. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan confirmed the case of the coronavirus in a person who travelled to Wuhan City. Assessing from the pattern of global travel, the WHO predicted that more cases in other countries were likely. However, at that time most parts of the world did not foresee or prepare rigorously for the arrival of the coronavirus in their countries. The first confirmed case of the coronavirus in the Republic of Korea was reported

COVID-19 17 on 20 January, while the first case in the USA was reported on 21 January. At that time, the coronavirus was still several weeks away from being declared as a pandemic. Three days later, on 24 January, the first cases of coronavirus in France were announced. These were the first confirmed cases in Europe, and happened a day before the WHO Regional Director for Europe outlined the need for local and national governments to be prepared with testing, detecting cases and other clinical preparedness. By the end of January, there was some consideration of the need for countries to focus on their readiness for rapid detection of imported cases, and to prevent further spread. Following his visit to China on 28 January 2020, the Director-General of the WHO expressed his deep concerns on the continued increase in cases and evidence of COVID-19 human-to-human transmission outside China. With the purpose to listen to the voices of health experts around the world beyond formal mechanisms, the WHO convened for the first time its weekly informal discussion with a group of public health leaders from many countries on 29 January. That same day also marked the first reported COVID-19 case in one of the Gulf Countries as the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region announced the first confirmed test cases in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A day later, there were 98 known cases and no deaths in 18 countries outside China. Evidence of human-to-human transmission were found in five countries (China, Germany, Japan, the USA, and Viet Nam), and soon the WHO declared COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), but not yet as a pandemic. In Africa, the first confirmed case in Algeria was reported on 25 February. It was the second country in the continent with reported COVID-19 case after Egypt, which was reported earlier in the same month. One day later, on 26 February, the first reported case in Latin America was from Brazil.1 On 29 February, Ecuador had confirmed its first case.2 The novel coronavirus got its name “COVID-19” on 11 February, when the WHO announced that this name was chosen without referring to a specific geographical location, animal or individual or group of people, in order to avoid stigma. Throughout February, the WHO also issued several guidelines for a number of planning and operational tools to be used by countries, organizations and individuals. Lessons learned by the WHO from handling the Ebola, H1N1 and SARS outbreaks provided ample material to deal with COVID-19. To further assist the WHO Director-General with strategic advice and high-level political advocacy and engagement in different parts of the world, six special envoys on COVID-19 were appointed on 21 February. To investigate the epidemic prevention and control in China, and to rapidly report to national and international authorities on the next steps in response to the outbreak, the WHO and China formed a Joint Mission consisting of 25 national and international experts from China, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, the USA and the WHO. From 16 to 24

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February, the Joint Mission visited Beijing, Guangdong, Sichuan and Wuhan to conduct their work. In its final report that was issued on 28 February, the Joint Mission underlined that to reduce COVID-19 illness and death, certain measures must be taken including “the large-scale implementation of high-quality non-pharmaceutical public health measures” such as contact tracing, testing, isolation, and quarantining and community engagement. Recommendations were made for countries that experienced COVID-19 cases outbreaks and uninfected countries, the public as well as the international community. Operational considerations for managing COVID-19 outbreak on board ships during an international voyage were also made.

Domestic and international adaptation to COVID-19 During the months of February and March 2020, high demand and use of personal protective equipment (PPE), including gloves, medical masks, face shields, gowns, goggles, respirators and aprons, in healthcare and in community settings, prompted a sudden surge in global demand for these products. Shortage of PPE resulting from the rise in demand and, in some countries, panic buying and hoarding, resulted in an increase of virus spread risks. Healthcare workers who relied on PPE to protect themselves and patients from infections were particularly affected. Prices of PPE increased, caused by a combination of reasons such as limited supply and trade restrictions imposed on PPE, as well as speculative behaviour of hoarders. Compared to prices since start of the COVID-19 outbreak, the WHO noted in early March that prices for surgical masks increased sixfold, N95 respirators threefold and gowns doubled. Governments and industries were requested to increase manufacturing of PPE. Although in the first week of March COVID-19 was not yet categorized as a pandemic, calls for action to control, delay, limit and stop the impact of the virus had already been voiced. An independent high-level body established jointly by the World Bank and WHO, the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPNB) calculated that the COVID-19 outbreak was predicted to cause greater economic loss than those created by SARS, MERS and Zika virus combined. The monitoring body also requested leadership from the G7 and G20 countries to mobilize sources to fill funding gaps estimated at US$ 8 billion to support stockpiling vaccines and essential protective equipment; manufacturing and delivering treatments and diagnostics; research; and support to the WHO emergency responses. The number of confirmed cases worldwide passed 100,000 on 7 March. A few days later, on 11 March, COVID-19 was categorized as a pandemic by the WHO. It took almost three months since COVID-19 was identified in China in December 2019 to declare it as a pandemic. Concerned by the alarming impacts and spread of the virus, the WHO Director-General restated his call to all countries to save lives, prevent infections and minimize impacts through a comprehensive strategy involving whole-of-government and whole-of-society

COVID-19 19 approach. As the confirmed cases in Europe surpassed the combined numbers of reported cases and deaths in the world apart from China, on 13 March the Director-General of WHO declared Europe as epicentre of the pandemic. March 2020 saw the pandemic transformed the streets in New York City transformed. Eerie images of closed stores, restaurants, offices and empty avenues in Manhattan were seen in TV and the internet. The city’s lockdown went into effect and residents were required to stay home as the coronavirus cases have risen sharply. Those who must go out to buy food and essential groceries, went with high caution. Throughout the months of April, May, June and July, the UN Headquarters in Manhattan was practically closed. No in-person meetings were taking place, except on 17–18 June 2020 when the President of the General Assembly convened elections for five non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, the President of the 75th Session of the General Assembly, and members of the Economic and Social Council. These elections took place in the UN General Assembly Hall and attended by representatives of UN member countries. Staff of the UN Secretariat mostly had to work remotely. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic continued to spread, overwhelming the capacity of health systems in numerous countries. Lockdown measures, whether partially or full, were implemented in many countries. The aim was similar; to reduce pressures on health system capacities by containing the spread of the virus. By the second quarter of 2020, there was a growing understanding and widespread media focus on the global nature of the pandemic, and the need for the focus to be on supporting frontline workers under immense stress as hospitals in many countries exceeded their capacities. Civil society elements rallied to build support for these “front-line workers,” namely healthcare workers, pharmacy and grocery store staff and delivery services. In New York City, 7 PM was always marked with the sound of car honks and applause by the residents in many neighbourhood – a symbol of support and solidarity to the front-line workers. International advocacy organizations, often in collaboration with celebrities and the WHO, joined effort to fundraise for this goal of supporting the frontline workers. An example of such program was a virtual concert celebrating humanity “at home,” organized by the Global Citizen. The program, titled “One World: Together At Home” Global Special, was broadcast on television networks and streamed online on multiple global platforms on 18 April. It featured a line of performances by artists including Lady Gaga, Chris Martin, Paul McCartney, Shah Rukh Khan and many more. The concert received a total of $127.9 million support that was distributed to the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund and to local and regional responders. It is notable that similar fundraising efforts to support the fight against the pandemic were also taking place in local and national scales. Different forms of charity were blooming, ranging from free courses online offered by reputable educational institutions, online fundraising campaign to provide free food catered by restaurants for health and other essential workers, and many more.

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These overall global phenomena caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has multi-dimensional effects that trickled down and felt at individual level with considerable degree of psychological and social anxieties. With looming unemployment, disruptions to education calendar, food shortages, social unrest and increase of domestic abuse, governments around the world must adopt new plans to protect the lives of their citizens, the survival of their economies, and the maintenance of peace and security.

Redefining national interests: interplay between priorities: protecting the economy and people’s health Governments around the world adopted various strategies to adjust their development plans and mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Their aims were not only to address immediate public health and economic challenges such as providing emergency treatment facilities for saving lives, but also for achieving longer term goals such as obtaining access to potential future vaccines, as well as to recover better from the crisis. Although the direct impact of the pandemic may not affect every country in the same scale, it is obvious that all nations were affected by its overall consequences of it. This is all the more true when we consider the functioning of the global economy, which relies heavily on the interconnectivity among all stakeholders that do not operate in a vacuum. Policymakers have been looking at scenarios with longer timeframe trajectories, anticipating prolonged burdens that will exhaust their national resources after the pandemic is over. It is normal that countries embarked on different policy paths, employing varied strategies and approaches to address a problem that has universal characteristics such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods used in one country, even if they had been to some extent successful, would not necessarily be applicable or impactful in another. While all countries shared a similar goal to overcome the crises and rebuild better, each country had its own national priorities, domestic capacities, and unique internal processes that determined how to realistically steer its way out of the crisis. Nevertheless, there were similar patterns of policies taken by governments. The Blavatnik School of Government of Oxford University published a working paper that compiled data on various measures of government to COVID-19. Common strategies pursued by governments include bans of public gatherings, restriction of travel, closure of offices and schools, investment in healthcare facilities, and other forms of interventions to contain the pandemic and its impacts.3 In the first weeks following the detection of COVID-19 cases, the approach was to contain the spread by encouraging physical distancing, shutting down businesses except the essential ones, providing isolation for patients that contracted the coronavirus. The extent to which such policies were implemented varies from country to country, and in some instances within parts of the same country. As the coronavirus spread further from its first point of discovery in

COVID-19 21 China, the policies to restrain mobility followed. As an example, there were time lags between the moment this policy was implemented in China’s territory and in Italy and then further in the United States. The first cases were detected in each country at a different time, and therefore the implementation of the policies to contain the spread (such as through “lockdowns”) happened at different starting times. While the pandemic was viewed as a global threat, some national and local authorities showed more effective roles in guiding the comprehensive effort to tackle the pandemic. Detecting and monitoring the disease transmission, as well as efforts to contain further contacts, obtaining potential vaccine, as well as to mitigating the social impact of the pandemic, require enormous budget and inclusive national endeavours. To contain the economic fallout of COVID-19, many countries loosened their purse strings to provide stimuli in various forms. In general, government budgets prioritized ensuring the health and safety of people. Governments also issued policies to provide social-safety net to protect the most vulnerable segments of the society. On top of that, they also provided incentives such as tax holidays to business sectors to keep them from bankruptcy. These measures were taken with an aim to minimize long-term effects of the pandemic, to ensure food security as well as to restart the slowed down economy. In line with those policies, governments have attempted to mitigate the impact of the pandemic through other regulations such as prohibiting export of essential goods; prohibiting export of health products; easing the import process for medical equipment and essential products. They also took policies to support research to develop vaccine. Essentially, the aim of these regulations was to produce medical equipment domestically, develop the capacities of human resources, strengthen the facilities and capacities for hospitals to ensure that they had sufficient space and resources to treat coronavirus patients. Budget refocusing was not happening only at the federal or central government levels but also at the provincial, municipal, province and other levels. Although the role of governments was crucial, contributions from nonstate institutions such as business entities, civil society, and youth were also essential. The private sector, especially small-and-medium-sized enterprises and those that employed significant number of labours, were given capital support, tax reduction, extension of tax deadlines, as well as other forms of facilities. To facilitate the process of importing essential goods from other countries, governments simplified the regulations. Direct cash transfers were also pursued, both to give unemployment benefits as well as to support small industries. Apart from issuing domestic policies that served as remedy to treat domestic social, economic, health and safety concerns, governments also utilized foreign policy frontiers to embolden their efforts in facing the impacts of COVID-19. Examples of governments’ decisions that were in line with these endeavours include the closing of national borders for visitors from other countries – especially from countries with high number of COVID-19 cases.

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Essentially, border closing is comparable to imposing lockdown at a global level. A number of countries decided to close their international airports. Transatlantic travel ban was a striking case to illustrate this example. On 11 March, the United States announced a ban on travel from many European countries, which would be implemented within a few days. As the number of coronavirus cases in the US escalated, the European Union reciprocated the US decision by imposing similar ban on travel from other countries, including the USA. Border shutdowns have seen air passenger traffics plummeted and affecting major industries such as tourism, travel, lodging, restaurant. The economy was hit hard, and the losses were snowballing and resulting in millions of unemployment in many countries. However, the risk of economic pressure was taken by some governments on the pretext of saving people’s lives and preventing the health system from collapse. Many countries, including Russia, Japan, China, the USA, the UAE, and others, sent humanitarian aid as part of international responses to the pandemic. Some aid was channelled through bilateral mechanisms. A range of materials such as masks, personal protective equipment, medical supply, test kits and also financial support were offered. Other aid was channelled through international organizations or local organizations that deals with health issues directly in another country. Arduous conditions endured by societies around the world continued. In April 2020, the High Commissioner for Human Rights declared that the pandemic has exposed the damaging impact of inequalities in every society. As a result, collective international action was crucial to addressing the crisis.4 In similar tone, the United Nations Secretary-General announced a result of global survey involving 230,000 people from 193 countries portraying priorities in the time of coronavirus and beyond. In that survey, universal access to healthcare tops the priority list, followed by the strengthening of solidarity between people and nations. Rethinking global economy against equality comes next.5 Another foreign policy priority that emerged following the spread of the pandemic was repatriation. Bringing back home fellow nationals who were stranded abroad due to the COVID-19 pandemic has been one of the highest priorities of many countries. The success of protecting citizens abroad is seen as an indication that the government is present when the people needs it. Students, holidaymakers, and also migrant workers who were unable to continue staying abroad due to measures taken to deal with the coronavirus, were provided facilities to return by their governments. Embassies and consulates around the world were equipped with emergency budget and consular officers to provide information and services to the public. On 17 March 2020, Foreign Minister of Germany Heiko Maas announced his government’s decision to bring home tens of thousands of German nationals through chartered flights. The German government made EUR 50 million available for supporting this purpose.6 Another example was the evacuation and repatriation of over 100,000 Indonesian nationals by the government of Indonesia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Retno Marsudi announced

COVID-19 23 that the pandemic has made the foreign ministry and Indonesian diplomats work extraordinarily in extraordinary times due to COVID-19. In April 2020, Indonesia’s embassies and consulates distributed over 200,000 packages of essential goods, including hand sanitizers, masks, and disinfectants to Indonesian citizens abroad.7 Similar statements regarding repatriation were made by other governments, such as the Philippines’ government. As of 31 May 2020, a total of 31,528 overseas Filipinos were repatriated by the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs.8 The US State Department has also coordinated over 101,000 Americans through over 100 flights from 136 countries as of 10 June 2020.9 Apart from repatriation, rationalizing diplomatic missions’ size, by cutting the number of staff in embassies, consulates and other diplomatic posts was also done as an efficiency measure pursued by governments. Diplomats normally work on rotation basis, spending a few years abroad and home countries. Transfer of staff from one country to another is costly. Therefore, postponing new deployments or rotation of staff to and from diplomatic posts could reduce budget spending. In addition, some countries imposed 14 days self-quarantine requirement to visitors from abroad. In New York, permanent missions of some countries to the UN reduced the numbers of their diplomatic staff. This decision was taken to offer diplomats an option to get out from New York where the pandemic hit hard. Aside from that, since the UN did not convene in-person meetings, participating in virtual meetings could be done practically from anywhere with internet connection. What appears to be another foreign policy priority to many countries since the pandemic is access to vaccine. It is considered a strategic interest that many governments direct their diplomatic resources to explore and tap any opportunity from international cooperation to access vaccine. Whether through bilateral or multilateral means, diplomats were asked to support national efforts in obtaining potential vaccine, even though it has not existed yet. To facilitate global collaborative efforts in developing vaccines and treatment of COVID-19, on 18 March the WHO and its partners launched an international clinical trial called the “Solidarity Trial.”10 This joint endeavour was aimed at finding an effective treatment by enrolling patients in different countries to detect the effectiveness of drugs used in slowing the disease progression and in promoting survival. By July 2020, nearly 5,500 patients from over 20 countries participated in the trial, with over 100 countries indicating interest. Through donations from a number of manufacturers, developers and companies, the effort was to collaborate in ensuring availability as well as affordability of treatment if proven to be effective. Growing interest in collaboration to get the vaccine is not only on the aspect of research and development, but also in terms of financing to make sure the vaccine is affordable to as many people as possible. Gaps to accessing future vaccine that could exist between richer and poorer countries, as well as between communities within a country need to be closed. It needs financing mechanism that involves not only governments but also private sectors. During the UN High-Level Week in September 2020, virtual high-level events where

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presidents, ministers and other state leaders met were convened. On 30 September, the UN Secretary-General, the United Kingdom, South Africa and the WHO convened a virtual high-level event on “Accelerating the end of the COVID-19 pandemic.” A week earlier, on 25 September, Costa Rica hosted a high-level virtual event on “The Challenge of a lifetime: ensuring universal access to COVID-19 health technologies,” which was virtually attended by the President of Ireland, and Ministers from Ethiopia and Indonesia. The overall message articulated from these events is that “no one is safe until everyone is safe,” and that vaccine nationalism is self-defeating.11

Metamorphosing multilateral diplomacy The COVID-19 pandemic has brought nations across the globe to a temporary but consequential standstill. It has provided a momentum to reflect on how effective the way societies in many levels deal with the crises. The prominence and competence of multilateralism and international cooperation in addressing the global problem have also been scrutinized. Multilateral system that for over seven decades has been embodied by the United Nations has been placed on the spotlight. When the UN was created in 1945 – following the most devastating and deadly war in human history, the World War Two (WWII) – it was founded on a multilateral treaty embodying the aspirations of states to maintain peace and security, protect human rights and promote international cooperation. The founders and the members of the organization had the intention to utilize it, among others, to “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,” and “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.”12 In the UN Charter, it was clearly mentioned that the organization was founded with high ambitions to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”13 The Charter further described the purposes of the international body as promoting human rights, international law, and a higher standard of living around the world. However, even before the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, as historian Jussi Hanhimäki noted, that the UN’s greatest challenge has been the wide gap between its ambitions and capacities.14 There is still a long way to go to realize the vision of the Charter of the UN, as well as the ambition espoused in countless resolutions and declarations since the organization was founded. The world has been inundated by complex inter-related global crises such as climate change, humanitarian crises, migration, violence and other pre-existing challenges in more contemporary form. Yet despite mounting criticisms about the UN’s achievements, one could not assert a claim that the UN is having inferior goals. Quite the contrary, expressions of hope and optimism have been voiced by world leaders, citizens of countries, civil society organizations, indicating that the UN has been shouldering expectations that gets heavier from year to year. Journalist Stanley Meisler observed that even though the UN has not yet been able to fulfil the hopes of its founders, the UN has accomplished a good deal nevertheless.15

COVID-19 25 In order to meet those constantly changing expectations from the world, the UN must be able to continually adapt to current situation. The appeal to reform the UN is not something recent; in fact, numerous books have been written outlining the chronology of various reform processes of the UN. On the one hand, some of the ideas behind the demand to reform the UN suggested that the organization should limit and focus its activities to address humanitarian issues faced by humanity. On the other hand, numerous recommendations have been proposed suggesting the contrary: that the UN should be reformed to enlarge its scope, roles and authority. When Secretary-General António Guterres started his term in early 2017, he envisioned the reform of the UN should encompass the management aspects, the UN development strategy, and its peace and security endeavours.16 These areas of reform address the issues of the UN Security Council reform, the transparency of the UN Secretariat, financing reform and many other aspects. Since the earlier days of its creation, the UN has been going through various changes. As an example, in peace and security domain, during the 1940s and 1950s, there were progressive changes in creating peacekeeping missions as a means of resolving conflicts between states in various regions. Another overhaul of the UN took place following the end of the Cold War. The international community has managed to avoid a Third World War, and to uphold the norm of sovereignty for the most part with more recent conflicts occurring within states rather than between states.17 Since the Cold War ended, UN peacekeeping missions have been tasked with wider roles, including assisting implementation of peace agreements in civil wars or intra-State conflicts. Similarly, on the development side, the UN’s focus on assisting economic development gained wider attentions as its membership from Asian and African countries increased. The creation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which was established by the General Assembly in 1965, reflected this growing interest in development issue. UNDP was formed as a merging of the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund.18 In the twilight of 2019, the novel coronavirus that emerged and rapidly morphed into a global health crisis of unprecedented levels, compounding the woes of an already struggling world. The very biological imagery of the virus depicts a globe under attack on all fronts. The COVID19 pandemic has become the litmus test of the capacity, capability and readiness of multilateralism and the rules-based system to address global challenges of today decisively and effectively. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced the UN not to operate in the same way it has operated for 75 years. As New York City imposed lockdown and social distancing measures to control the pandemic’s transmission since March 2020, the UN Headquarters was closed except to essential personnel. It was not able to convene in-person meetings. The UN staff in Headquarters started telecommuting since 14 March. As a result, numerous activities that had been planned meticulously were no longer possible to take place. The UNGA calendar of meetings starting from March 2020,

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which was initially filled with various activities scheduled to take place in one of the conference room of the UN Headquarters, had to be significantly changed. Informal consultations, working group meetings, plenary meetings, briefings, commemoration events, and many more activities that were initially scheduled to take place during the 74th Session of the General Assembly, had to be either postponed, cancelled, or change format.19 The period of March-October 2020, when in-person meetings could not take place in the UN Headquarters in New York due to physical distancing restrictions caused by COVID-19, was surreal moment to be a diplomat in New York. It was unusual for many diplomats and UN staff to see outdoor national flags of UN Member States at full masts at night. They were not lowered daily at dusk, due to the minimum number of UN staff. Indeed, the UN Headquarters deployed measures to prevent the spread of virus, including by significantly reducing the presence of staff in the building. During that period, however, the business of the UN must continue despite numerous procedural, technical, logistical and legal challenges. On 27 March 2020, the UN Secretary-General together with the Presidents of ECOSOC, Security Council and General Assembly, briefed all UN Member States on how the UN maintaining the business continuity while at the same time mitigate the impact of the pandemic. It was the first time in history that such virtual joint briefing by the top UN leaders to Member States ever took place.20 To adapt with the situation, the UN General Assembly modified its decisionmaking process through a mechanism, which was adopted as Resolution 74/544, entitled “Procedure for taking decisions of the General Assembly during the Coronavirus disease 2019.” Essentially, this method of decision making functioned through the President of the General Assembly proposing a draft decision to all UN Member States, and give them three business days to react to it, and make sure there is no objection. Silence implies consent (“silence procedure”).21 It essentially means that all countries, no matter their size and power, have an equal ability to block a decision simply by breaking the silence, saying “no.” One “no” is what needed to prevent consensus. Any objection from any country would veto the decision. Therefore, the process of formulating wordings of a decision or resolution text could be a delicate matter. In some occasions, when a UN member state is not in favour of a resolution text, but unwilling to break the “silence procedure” for political or solidarity reasons, the country may issue a statement to voice its disassociation, while mentioning its intention not to break the silence. Under this mechanism, that lasted from the end March to the end of July, the GA resolutions and decisions which have been adopted through the mechanism of silence procedure must receive the consent of all the UN member states. The handover report of the President of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly noted that no mechanism for voting was available apart from the one agreed by UN Member States for election purposes. Even before the pandemic, when in-person meeting was allowed, coming to a consensus decision was hard. It was arguably more difficult for diplomats to negotiate a draft resolution or decision that needs to be accepted by consensus and without

COVID-19 27 in-person meeting, rather than passed by voting majority. As noted in the handover report of the President of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly: While the GA found ways to continue to informally operate throughout the pandemic with the help of modern technology, this achievement comes at a price. The distant virtual working environment will never replace the true value of human interaction which defines the nature of diplomacy and multilateralism. It must be acknowledged that the lack of direct contact and personal trust – and confidence building among Member States stripped diplomacy of its most effective tools for reaching consensus.22 Notwithstanding the challenges, up until August 2020, more than 70 resolutions and decisions were managed to be adopted by the UN General Assembly through this “silence procedure” method. Two of these resolutions were related to the COVID-19, namely Resolution 74/270 on Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) and Resolution 74/274 on international cooperation to ensure global access to medicine, vaccines and medical equipment to face COVID-19. While the decisions of the UN General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, they reflect some degree of shared interests and values among the UN member states. In the middle of so many uncertainties, this method of decision-making process by the General Assembly worked as a compromise lifeline acceptable by all Member States. The first UN General Assembly resolution related to COVID-19 that was adopted through silence procedure was the General Assembly Resolution 74/270 on Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease 2019, adopted on 2 April 2020.23 This resolution was initiated by Ghana, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland, and received co-sponsorship support from 188 countries. It was among the first UN resolutions that was successfully adopted through a special procedure which was established on 27 March to allow the General Assembly take decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic.24 This UN resolution recognizes that addressing the COVID-19 pandemic requires a global response, solidarity and unity, and calls for international cooperation to contain, mitigate and defeat the pandemic. Exchange of information, scientific knowledge and best practices are encouraged. It also emphasized that in responding to the pandemic, human rights must be respected fully, and that the effort should not be an excuse for discrimination, racism and xenophobia. Furthermore, the resolution calls upon the UN system under its Secretary-General’s leadership to work with all relevant actors in the effort to coordinate global response to the pandemic and its social, economic and financial impacts. The call for international collaboration for fighting the pandemic was voiced again by the UN Member States when the General Assembly on 20 April adopted its Resolution 74/274 on “international cooperation to ensure global access to medicines, vaccines and medical equipment to face COVID-19.”25 This resolution, initiated by the Government of Mexico, emphasized the

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importance of international cooperation and effective multilateralism and encouraged member states to work in partnership with all relevant stakeholders to increase research and development funding for vaccines and medicines. It also encouraged all governments and businesses to allocate resources for the purpose of developing, manufacturing as well as distributing items essential for fighting COVID-19. At the same time, this resolution underlined that speculation and stockpiling may hinder access to essential equipment, medicines, and vaccines, and therefore UN member states and relevant stakeholders were called to prevent them from happening. Not all UN General Assembly resolutions related to dealing with COVID-19 enjoyed consensus support. Two resolutions, namely the Omnibus Resolution on Comprehensive and Coordinated Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (A/Res/74/306)26 and the Resolution on United Response against Global Health Threats: Combating COVID-19 (A/Res/74/307)27 were adopted through voting on 11 September, after in-person meeting with limited capacity was already allowed in the United Nations General Assembly Hall.28 It was noted that after nearly six months since the COVID-19 pandemic was declared by the WHO, a holistic response to address it was adopted by the UN Member States through voting. The Omnibus resolution was adopted with recorded vote of 169 in favour to two against (Israel and USA), and two abstentions (Ukraine and Hungary); while the United Response resolution was adopted with recorded vote of 122 in favour to none against, and 31 abstentions. The COVID-19 pandemic has metamorphosed multilateral diplomacy. Stark evidence of such transformation could easily be noticed in the way the UN convened the 75th General Assembly General Debate, colloquially called as “UNGA high-level week,” from 22 to 26, and 29 September 2020. The theme of the General Debate was “The Future we want, the United Nations we need: reaffirming our collective commitment to multilateralism – confronting COVID-19 through effective multilateral action.” World leaders delivered their statements in pre-recorded video messages. With virtually no delegations travelling from foreign capitals to New York to attend the event, no civil society participants could be present in the UN premises, undoubtedly almost every aspect of the General Debate was different from the previous years.29 The transformation of UN multilateral diplomacy due to the COVID-19 pandemic was felt not only by diplomats from Member States but also by the civil society, private sectors and journalists. The participation of civil society in the General Assembly, unlike its participation in ECOSOC, is not addressed in the UN Charter.30 However, civil society meaningful participations in the meetings of the General Assembly is often linked to the UN Charter’s wordings such as “We, the people”; SDG’s principle of “leaving no one behind,” as well as the Goal 17 of SDG that emphasizes the importance of partnership. Civil society participation in the GA meetings has increased in the recent past, mostly by participation of organizations with ECOSOC consultative status. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society representatives were able participate in open General Assembly meetings, although the term “participation” has

COVID-19 29 different meanings: it can refer to attending, i.e., simply being present in the room, or to speaking. Under new circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society participation could be interpreted as providing access to online virtual platform used for the meeting. Besides the General Debate, there were four high-level meetings that took place during the high-level week of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly, namely: (a) The high-level meeting to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations on 21 September 2020; (b) The summit on biodiversity on 30 September 2020; (c) The high-level meeting on the 25th anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women on 1 October 2020; and (d) The high-level plenary meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 2 October 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all those gatherings were changed to virtual platform. To limit footprint and number of people in the UN buildings, a strict health protocol was made. Only one representative from each Member State, Observer State and the European Union were allowed in the meeting rooms. Non-governmental organizations, civil society, private sectors, and practically everyone else were invited to attend the meeting by viewing the proceeding through webcast. As comparisons, a year earlier, when the UN General Assembly with the support of the WHO convened the High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage on 23 September 2019, over 1,600 registrants from NGOs and civil society participants were recorded to attend the meeting in person. The High-Level Event on Convention on the Right of the Child on 25 September 2019 received 307 civil society and NGO registrants; SAMOA Pathway event on 27 September 2019 had 65 NGO and civil society participants, and the International Day of the Eliminations of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019 had 122 NGO and civil society registrants. From these comparisons, it is clear that in terms of civil society meaningful participation in the UN meetings, the pandemic posed a substantial and logistical challenge. Key recommendations At the time of this writing, there is no clear indication of when the pandemic effects will be over, and whether the coronavirus will evolve into something new. By then multilateral diplomacy might bear a different eminence, especially in the face of a growing tendency of unilateralism. The pandemic has impacted the way governments and societies set their priorities. While the circumstances in each country could be unique, and therefore the methods of addressing the pandemic could varies from one country to another, it would be essential to bear in mind that in the face of fast spreading pandemic, no-one is safe until everyone is safe. While attempts for self-reliance or self-sufficiency in fighting COVID-19 might be tempting for some governments, there is no guarantee that similar or worse situation may reoccur in the future. International collaboration would be the only path to address the problem.

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The world has seen how the COVID-19 pandemic has brought multidimensional destruction to economy and businesses. Multilateral diplomacy is one of them. It does not mean that multilateral diplomacy could not innovate and recover better. Multilateral diplomacy’s goals go beyond producing texts and documents, and setting norms. It is also to develop innovative ways and meaningful confidence that generate global solidarity while delivering tangible results. In envisaging the future of multilateralism, it is necessary to remember that diplomacy is a tool to achieve something. Adaptability to new situations, which has been a feature of many enduring invention, needs to also characterize a future system under which international cooperation operate. It would also be necessary to communicate to general public about multilateral diplomacy-related topics. Informing, educating, sharing knowledge and raising awareness about results of multilateral diplomacy are important, to let broader scope of people understand the correlation of actions or events in one side of the planet could affect others in the other side of the globe.

Special Article by Werner Heinrich Obermeyer Health diplomacy By Werner Heinrich Obermeyer Health diplomacy has been practiced for centuries, with many countries’ implementing quarantine restrictions to prevent the spread of diseases. But as the world became more interdependent and travel increased, it has shown that no country could effectively manage exposures to health threats or risks on their own, given the increase in movement of people, animals, skills and goods across regions. This has resulted in health being more frequently viewed through a security lens, both at national and international levels. At the same time, the role of health in economic development, trade, foreign policy and humanitarian policies have evolved. This realization was a main driver in the September 2006 launch of the Oslo initiative on Global Health and Foreign Policy.31 Ministers from Indonesia, Thailand, France, South Africa, Brazil, Norway and Senegal declared in 2007 that health issues were too often overlooked in foreign policy and committed to promote such concerns with a more strategic focus onto the international agenda. The group has sponsored annual resolutions on various topics in the GA since 2009. For the United Nations, the 2001 HIV/AIDS GA Special Session was a key event, elevating a health and epidemiological focus to a political level.32 In less than two decades this was followed by several other Heads of State level meetings, on non-communicable diseases, tuberculosis, anti-microbial resistance and universal health coverage. As the political discourse around health evolved, it has also strengthened awareness of social and particularly environmental health determinants and their impact on the global disease burden. The diplomacy of health had to take into

COVID-19 31 consideration that environmental factors were responsible for at least 25 per cent of vector and waterborne diseases.33 Coupled with biodiversity loss, desertification and especially climate change and its effect on transnational migration of people and animals, as well as the spread of pathogens, countries faced an ever-growing challenge to invest in preparedness and improved capacity to identify health threats and build resilient health systems to mitigate risks and protect populations. Access to health services and functioning health systems, with requisite infrastructure and a trained workforce, presents the first line of defence, not only at domestic level, but also against international threats. After all, the chain of preparedness is as strong as its weakest link, demonstrating that health security is a collective responsibility and not a national privilege. Healthy populations are essential for economic development, alleviating poverty, securing stability and peaceful co-existence within and among nations. Hence, health security and universal health coverage are recognized as two sides of the same coin. This premise is based on the realization that health is a precondition, outcome and indicator of sustainable development. With the formulation of the UN’s 2030 agenda the diplomacy of health has perhaps been most clearly demonstrated, with almost all goals containing health related targets. Similarly, a coordinated whole of government approach to health policies and diplomacy is central to the ability to negotiate a fair, equitable and transparent framework for the sharing of viruses and pathogens with human pandemic potential, and for the development and dissemination of benefits and supplies, and access to affordable and safe vaccines, diagnostics and treatments. The pandemic which the world faces today is likely to unravel much of the health and development gains achieved by the multilateral system since the adoption of the MDGs in 2000 and SDGs in 2015. In contrast with previous novel coronaviruses, such as SARS-1, MERS and the H1N1 swine influenza, COVID-19 has not spread mainly in developing countries but rapidly moved across the globe, killing more than 1 million people and causing daily economic losses totalling billions. Despite the existence of instruments such as the International Health Regulations, and frequent warnings issued by the World Health Organization, the world was simply not prepared. The pandemic has caused disruptions in essential health services in 90 per cent of countries, particularly in life-saving immunization efforts (70 per cent of countries), services for non-communicable diseases such as cancer and diabetes, (69 per cent) and family planning and contraception (68 per cent).34 Long term challenges such as loss of income, shrinkage of employment opportunities, decline in the quality of education, rising poverty levels and projected mental health burden will be felt for many years to come. Clearly the cycle of panic and neglect has had catastrophic health, social, economic and political consequences, especially for the vulnerable and disadvantaged. The irony of being under-prepared is stark. The WHO’s independent Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB) reported at the UNGA in September 2019 that the world was not prepared for the threat of a pandemic,

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calling on global leaders to take urgent and united action. A month ago, the Board issued a follow up report, focusing on a world disoriented by COVID-19, due in many ways to a lack of leadership and timely action.35 It reinforces that none are safe until all are safe and calls for a renewed commitment to multilateralism, including more empowered leadership of the WHO. The report contains several recommendations, some made in prior years, including engaged citizenship, strong and agile systems for health security, sustained investment, improved global governance of preparedness and responsible political leadership. Despite the bleak geopolitical situation, exacerbated by the pandemic, the multilateral system and the UN in particular, reacted with commendable haste and vigour. The system has come together to support countries, improve supply chains and establish social and financial safety nets. The coordination and leadership role of the WHO has also been elevated, being afforded wide ranging political support at the highest levels. This is demonstrated particularly by the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which is a unique international collaboration to fast-track the development, production, and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments and vaccines, while strengthening health systems.36 It harnesses the expertise of the private sector, and by pooling knowledge and investments, the ACT-Accelerator provides a chance for all countries to access a greater number of tools more quickly, sharing the risks and costs together. The ACT-Accelerator is already delivering substantial returns since its launch in April 2020, with some 170 countries engaging in the COVID-19 Vaccine Facility – COVAX, and 10 candidate vaccines under evaluation, nine of them in clinical trials. This is an astonishing achievement of health diplomacy, collaboration and action, leading to the fastest development of a vaccine regimen in human history. The current pandemic is far from over and will not be the last one we face. But it does present the best possible chance of taking hard earned lessons and implementing them for future generations. This will necessitate a collective approach to health security, with multilateralism at its centre and strong, inclusive alliances, cooperation and partnerships. It must be based on respect for national sovereignty, shared responsibility, accountability, fairness and the affirmation of the universal right to health for everyone, everywhere. Furthermore, a golden opportunity is presented to address the health governance problem, with nations struggling ever more to coherently navigate the fragmented multitude of global and regional actors active in this space, and how to effectively prepare for emergencies – whether natural or manmade. The close involvement of Foreign Ministries, with at least their counterparts of Health, Trade, Infrastructure, Social Development, Environment, Agriculture and Telecommunications, will be necessary to chart these turbulent seas. In many ways therefore, the importance of health diplomacy has never been greater than the present. The time has come to seize this moment.

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Notes 1 Gonzalez et al. (2020, October 21). The Coronavirus in Latin America. Americas Society Council Of The Americas. Retrieved on 24 October 2020 from: www.ascoa.org/articles/coronavirus-latin-america. 2 Ibid. 3 Hale, Thomas, Noam Angrist, Emily Cameron-Blake, Laura Hallas, Beatriz Kira, Saptarshi Majumdar, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips, Helen Tatlow, Samuel Webster. (2020, May 25). Variation in Government Responses to COVID-19 Version 7.0. Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper. Retrieved on 1 July 2020 from: www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/covidtracker. 4 Bachelet, M. (2020, April 9). COVID is “a colossal test of leadership” requiring coordinated action, High Commissioner tells Human Rights Council. United Nations Human Rights Office Of The High Commissioner. Retrieved on 8 June 2020 from: www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25785&LangID=E. 5 Guterres, A. (2020, June 25). Opening remarks to the Press on the launch of the UN Comprehensive Response to COVID-19. United Nations Secretary-General. Retrieved on 3 July 2020 from: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-0625/remarks-press-launch-of-un-comprehensive-response-covid-19. 6 Martin, N. (2020, March 17). Coronavirus: German government to fly home tens of thousands of tourists. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved on 13 June 2020 from: www.dw. com/en/coronavirus-german-government-to-fly-home-tens-of-thousands-of-tourists/ a-52811964. 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2020, April 29). Press Briefing with National Media on COVID-19 Measures, April 29, 2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Retrieved on 18 June 2020 from: https://kemlu. go.id/portal/id/read/1259/berita/press-briefing-dengan-media-nasional-perkembangan-penanganan-covid-19-29-april-2020#!. 8 Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (2020, May 31). DFA Brings Total Number of Repatriated Filipinos to Over 30K. Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on 12 June 2020 from: https://dfa.gov.ph/dfanews/dfa-releasesupdate/26872-dfa-brings-total-number-of-repatriated-filipinos-to-over -30k. 9 U.S. Department of State (2020, June 10). Department of State Coronavirus Repatriation Statistics. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved on 22 July 2020 from: www.state.gov/coronavirus/repatriation/. 10 World Health Organization (2020, March 18). “Solidarity” clinical trial for COVID019 treatments. World Health Organization. Retrieved on 7 April 2020 from: www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-researchon-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/solidarity-clinical-trial-for-covid-19-treatments. 11 Office of the President of Costa Rica (2020, September 25). Launch COVID-19 Technology Access Pool. YouTube. Retrieved on 28 September 2020 from: www. youtube.com/watch?v=SQBzFtv0VnI&feature=youtu.be. 12 Charter of the United Nations (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations. Retrieved on 5 May 2020 from: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf. 13 Ibid., Article 1. 14 Hanhimaki, J. (2008). The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. p. 3. 15 Meisler, S (2011). United Nations: A History. Grove Press. p. 390. 16 United Nations (2020, April 29). United To Reform. United Nations. Retrieved on 13 June 2020 from: https://reform.un.org. 17 United Nations (2020). Peace and Security. United Nations. Retrieved on 16 June 2020 from: www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peace-and-security/.

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18 United Nations Development Programme (2020). Frequently Asked Questions. United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved on 23 June 2020 from: www. undp.org/content/undp/en/home/about-us/faqs.html#being. 19 General Assembly of the United Nations (2020, September 15). Schedule of meetings of the General Assembly plenary and other related meetings. General Assembly of the United Nations, President of the 74th session. Retrieved on 18 September from: www.un.org/pga/74/schedule-of-meetings-of-the-general-assembly-plenaryand-other-related-meetings/. 20 Muhammed-Bande, T. (2020, September 15). Handover Report. General Assembly of the United Nations, President of the 74th session. Retrieved on 18 September from: www.un.org/pga/74/2020/09/15/handover-report/. 21 Office of the President of the General Assembly (2020, March 27). Step-by-Step process for consideration of draft decisions/resolutions in accordance with General Assembly decision 74/544 of 27 March 2020 entitled “Procedure for taking decisions of the General Assembly during the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.” General Assembly of the United Nations, President of the 74th session. Retrieved on 18 May 2020 from: www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 99/2020/04/Updated-Rev-Procedure-for-decision-via-silence-procedure-2.pdf. 22 Muhammed-Bande, T. (2020). Handover Report. p. 64. 23 United Nations General Assembly (2020, April 3). Resolution 74/270: Global solidarity to fight the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved on 24 May 2020 from: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/270. 24 United Nations General Assembly (2020). Step-by-Step process for consideration of draft decisions/resolutions in accordance with General Assembly decision 74/544 of 27 March 2020 entitled “Procedure for taking decisions of the General Assembly during the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.” General Assembly of the United Nations, President of the 74th session. 25 United Nations General Assembly (2020, April 20). Resolution 74/274: International cooperation to ensure global access to medicines, vaccines and medical equipment to face COVID-19. United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/274. 26 United Nations General Assembly (2020, September 15). Resolution 74/306: Comprehensive and coordinated response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved on 27 September 2020 from: https://undocs.org/A/RES/74/306. 27 United Nations General Assembly (2020, September 15). Resolution 74/307: United response against global health threats: combating COVID-19. United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved on 28 September 2020 from: https://undocs. org/en/A/RES/74/307. 28 United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (2020, September 11). General Assembly Adopts Omnibus Resolution Calling for Holistic COVID-19 Response, among 3 Passed on Global Health Threats, Malaria. GA/12262, SeventyFourth Session, 64th Meeting of the Plenary. Retrieved on 28 September 2020 from: www.un.org/press/en/2020/ga12262.doc.htm. 29 Muhammad-Bande, T. (2020, June 16). Elements for consideration for the high-level week of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly. Office of the 74th President of the General Assembly. Retrieved on 9 July 2020 from: www.un.org/pga/ 74/2020/06/16/elements-for-consideration-for-the-high-level-week-of-the-seventyfifth-session-of-the-general-assembly-2/. 30 The participation of civil society in ECOSOC is mentioned in Article 71 of the UN Charter: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation

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with the Member of the United Nations concerned.” Charter of the United Nations (1945) Art. 71. Republic of France (2019, August 22). Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative (22 August 2019). France Diplomacy. Retrieved on 28 August 2020 from: www. diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/health/news/ article/foreign-policy-and-global-health-initiative-22-08-19. United Nations General Assembly (2001, June 27). Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS. Retrieved on 5 August 2020 from: www.who.int/hiv/pub/advocacy/ungass_2001. The Health and Environment Linkages Initiative (2005). Priority environment and health risks. World Health Organization. Retrieved on 8 August 2020 from: www. who.int/heli/risks/en. World Health Organization (2020, August 27). Pulse survey on continuity of essential health services during the COVID-19 pandemic: interim report, 27 August 2020. World Health Organization. Retrieved on 1 September 2020 from: www. who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-EHS_continuity-survey-2020.1. Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (2020, September 14). A World in Disorder. Global Preparedness Monitoring Board Annual Report 2020. Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: https://apps.who.int/ gpmb/annual_report.html. World Health Organization (2020, April). The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator. World Health Organization. Retrieved on 14 September 2020 from: www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator.

2

Future of sustainable development Toni-Shae Freckleton

2020 marked a defining year for sustainable development, with the launch of the Decade of Action for delivery on the Sustainable Development Goals. Governments, the private sector, civil society and all other stakeholders marked the end of the first four-year cycle of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the global blueprint for “the future we want.” 2020 also marked the milestone for other multilateral agreements that form the sustainable development landscape, namely the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action (the SAMOA Pathway), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (for the advancement of women’s rights), and the World Summit on Information Society. The COVID-19 pandemic engulfed the world at a crossroads after the first comprehensive assessment of national and global efforts to create more inclusive, sustainable and resilient societies showed slow progress. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were gaining traction globally across countries and stakeholder groups. Progress, while slow, was being made. Considerable attention was being paid to the developing world, focusing on the regional nuances that marred development efforts of the past. The world was on a trajectory for growth when the pandemic, with its unprecedented impact, never experienced in our lifetime hit. The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the state of play of all countries in the race for sustainable development. As the situation evolves, the international community will have to undertake deep and thorough assessment of its implications, particularly for vulnerable countries and groups that had already been left behind. The response to COVID-19 at a local, national and global level will be a true test of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs.

Background: towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development In 2015, the world graduated from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), introduced in 2000 “as a set of values and broad objectives for

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poverty eradication to guide international relations in the twenty-first century.”1 Former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon defined the MDGs as the most successful anti-poverty movement in history – lifting some 1 billion people out of extreme poverty, while also addressing the concerns regarding hunger, gender equality, and the planet’s protection.2 Improvements were seen in primary level education, declines in maternal and child mortality, reductions in new HIV infections coupled with increasing access to anti-retroviral treatment, and increased access to improved drinking water sources. While success was tangible and evident across developing countries, gaps nevertheless remained, earning the moniker of “unfinished business.” Lessons learnt and the progress made from the MDGs were clear, but they were victims of their siloed approach, which limited the far-reaching results needed to transform the global development landscape and the lives of people in developing countries. Gender inequality persisted, with women being largely disadvantaged in the labour force and underrepresented in public and private decision-making. Disparities in the rural-urban divide and across the richest and poorest households remained stark across key indicators. Global assessment of the MDGs revealed that climate change and environmental degradation undermine progress achieved, with the poorest and most vulnerable being disproportionately affected. In addition, the unsettling global statistics of over 800 million people still living in poverty and suffering from hunger without access to basic services triggered momentum for a new, bold global agenda to transform the world.3 The introduction of the 2030 Agenda heralded a new era for development, recognizing the universal, indivisible, integrated and interlinked nature of the three dimensions of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental) and tackling the “unfinished business” of the MDGs. Learning from the past, the 17 SDGs and 169 targets serve as the blueprint for the development of people and the planet, and are grounded in the premise that all people matter, and human rights and dignity must be preserved. The ambition and scope for present and future generations for “Transforming Our World,” were far beyond the limited range of the MDGs. The dynamics and complexities of placing people at the centre of development were at the core – recognizing the inherent marriage of social development with economic and environmental sustainability. 2015 was a landmark year in international development policy and a milestone for multilateral diplomacy. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Paris Agreement, the SAMOA Pathway and the Sendai Framework all signalled a turning point and laid the foundation for a new system of international development cooperation. The adoption of the New Urban Agenda in 2016 rounded out the transformative agendas to give new impetus to affirm commitments and address the issues that plague the fragmented and rapidly changing development landscape. Collectively, these development frameworks refocused global attention on sustainable development, peace and security and human rights, avoiding the deficiencies of the MDGs. Cross-cutting issues of human rights, equality and

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sustainability were entrenched in the vision for the future. With strong political will and commitment, they frame a solid point of reference for accountability to citizens. The network of goals, targets and indicators set an effective stage for monitoring, measuring and mobilizing resources to tackle the most pressing issues of developing and developed countries.

Implementation of the 2030 Agenda up to 2020 Sustainable development is a global endeavour in its inception and outcome. The first four years of implementation of the 2030 Agenda were marked with great fanfare and optimism. Around 140 countries presented Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) during the in-depth follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda, its goals and targets at the High-Level Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF). 2019 marked the end of the first review cycle for the sustainable development goals, and the outlook thus far has painted a mixed picture of progress: On the one hand, there have been considerable efforts made by various stakeholders to rally efforts towards this most comprehensive and far reaching agenda: Governments have integrated the SDGs in national planning, policymaking and reporting at the federal and local levels, including cities; the United Nations Development System has undertaken the deepest reform in decades to be able to support the delivery of the SDGs; and stakeholder groups in the private and civic sectors, including youth, have spurred forward entry points to advance progress on the goals; On the other hand, progress has been slow on several SDGs, and the global response has been insufficient to protect the most vulnerable people and countries. The need for catalyzed, transformative efforts could not be starker.4 The megatrends of population dynamics, economic growth, environmental degradation, climate change and science and technological advancements have impacted the achievement of the SDGs on various levels – local, national, regional and global.5 The global population is expected to reach approximately 10 billion by 2050;6 regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing their demographic dividend with the largest proportions of youth and working-age populations in their history. This window of opportunity is typified by rapid economic growth and improved living standards, providing suitable conditions for achieving SDGs. On the opposite end of the continuum, regions such as Europe and East Asia are experiencing rapidly ageing populations. Environmental degradation prevails, in spite of efforts to protect more areas in parts of the world. One million species currently face extinction, and trends such as biodiversity loss and climate change are reaching tipping points.7 If we are to continue on the same path – there may be no going back. Whereas we do see some opportunities offered by rapid advances in science and technology, there are also risks of increased inequalities.

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Cumulatively, social and environmental megatrends have triggered multiple tipping points that can enable or destabilize our development efforts. A more forward-looking and systems-integrated response is required to address them. The general consensus on the assessment of implementation of the SDGs was lukewarm at best. While progress has been slow on several goals and targets, the most vulnerable people and countries continue to be the most impacted, and the global response has not been ambitious enough and the world remains off-track. Notwithstanding, a wealth of action has been taken by Governments and other stakeholders to respond to the 2030 Agenda. The Sustainable Development Solutions Network utilizing their SDG Index, ranked Asian countries as making the greatest advancements on the SDGs since their adoption.8 The 2020 Sustainable Development Goals Report appropriately describes the performance: …before the COVID-19 pandemic, progress remained uneven and we were not on track to meet the Goals by 2030. Some gains were visible: the share of children and youth out of school had fallen; the incidence of many communicable diseases was in decline; access to safely managed drinking water had improved; and women’s representation in leadership roles was increasing. At the same time, the number of people suffering from food insecurity was on the rise, the natural environment continued to deteriorate at an alarming rate, and dramatic levels of inequality persisted in all regions. Change was still not happening at the speed or scale required. The ambition to transform the world for people and the planet was not living up to its expectation. The central plank of the SDGs to reduce poverty remained off-track with projections reflecting approximately 6 per cent of people living higher than in extreme poverty by 2030; the target being 3 per cent. A greater number of people are living well below the poverty line, particularly in many Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, as well as in some Middle-Income Countries (MICs).9 Hunger was on the rise for four consecutive years. Some 821 million people – one in every nine – were undernourished, indicating a loss in the battle against eliminating hunger and ensuring food security worldwide. Advancements were slow or stalled in many areas. such as with efforts to stem the accelerating loss of biodiversity – with 1 million species facing extinction – to combat climate change and its effects, and to address rising and uneven inequalities within and among countries and regions. Political conflicts, the climate crisis, gender-based violence, and persistent inequalities are undermining efforts to achieve the SDGs. Compounded with uneven economic growth – rising debt levels, heightened global trade tensions and other systemic shocks have created new obstacles to realizing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

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Implications of COVID-19 on sustainable development and response from the UN At the beginning of 2020, the sustainable development sector seemed to be on a clear trajectory. Five years into the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, progress was lagging but positive, with regular calls at the annual UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development for a greater sense of ambition and effort.10 By the time of the 2020 UN General Assembly in September, the situation had changed dramatically. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the cascade of health, economic, social and political crises it generated appeared to upturn many of the prevailing assumptions around development progress and trajectories. For the first time in thirty years, progress on human development (as measured by the Human Development Index) was forecast to reverse. 170 countries were projected to experience negative per-capita annual GDP growth11, and between 70 and 100 million people were likely to be pushed back into extreme poverty.12 The impacts on health, education, food security, employment and livelihoods were felt in every country and community in the world. COVID-19 unmasked the fragility and insecurity of the sustainable development landscape in all countries across the world, but more-so in developing countries. It has exposed the vulnerabilities and inequalities of people and the planet, and made the implementation of the 2030 Agenda all the more critical. Compounded with the shortcomings of the first cycle of implementation of the SDGs – inequality, governance and the climate emergency – the world is confronted with a catastrophic development crisis that has not been witnessed in over a century. The social and economic consequences of the pandemic vary by region and country affecting people, health and well-being, and threatening human rights. By June 2020, the implications of COVID-19 on the SDGs painted a grim and gloomy picture. The global pandemic has:  

 



Pushed over 71 million people back into poverty. Triggered a global health emergency, eroding decades of health gains in communicable diseases, while placing a spotlight on hygiene limitations, whereby basic handwashing as a precautionary measure is a luxury for 3 billion people worldwide who have no access to clean water. Increased incidences of domestic violence by 30 per cent in the first three months; women face increased burdens as they navigate domestic unpaid work with formal employment. Plunged the world into the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. The International Labour Organization estimates losses in labour income in the range of US $860 billion to US $3.4 trillion, with small-medium enterprises, the self-employed, and daily wage earners being impacted the hardest. Disproportionately affected the most vulnerable people – women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, migrants and refugees. LDCs, LLDCs,

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and SIDS are particularly vulnerable to external shocks to their already fragile macroeconomic landscape. Threatened peace and security; and reduced the transfer of well-needed remittances for poor households.13

Some glimmers of hope could be seen with respect to the impact on the planet; Lockdowns as a result of the pandemic have breathed fresh life into the war against climate change. As mobility and industry geared to a near-halt, the world saw a 6 per cent drop in greenhouse gas emissions, and changes in individual and collective behaviours and social attitudes. While this has negatively impacted the economy, the signal is clear that it is within our reach to combat climate change for green and sustainable recovery. It is also worth noting that, although setbacks in global development run deep, developing countries demonstrated agility and preparedness. In 2019, the Global Health Security (GHS) Index14 had projected that the five countries with the strongest capacity to prevent, detect and manage an epidemic were the United States, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Australia and Canada. The real-time test of COVID-19 produced a markedly different result. As some advanced economies struggled, countries like Viet Nam (#50 on the GHS Index), Senegal (#95), Mongolia (#46) and Ghana (#105) mounted effective responses that minimized infections and deaths. Others such as Togo15 and Pakistan16 leveraged digital technologies to institute large-scale social safety nets in a matter of weeks, leapfrogging countries that had struggled to do this for years. Nonetheless, the global experience of the COVID-19 pandemic is likened to the twilight zone, emphasizing the global ill-preparedness for external shocks, irrespective of their genesis. Considering the development landscape pre-SDGs, one could surmise that the underachievement on the MDGs was a major contributor to the global ill-preparedness for COVID-19. Recognizing the fragility of the global community, the Secretary-General of the UN issued a call to action to “Build Back Better. ”17 Building back better is a starting point to building a safer, more resilient and equitable world, and to improving national and global preparedness for future crises. The UN COVID-19 Response and Recovery Plan was launched to lead a plethora of other multilateral and bilateral initiatives targeted “to help support low- and middle-income programme countries to respond to the pandemic and its impacts,” focusing on the most vulnerable to economic hardship and social disruption.18 Several countries, such as Germany, the United States, Italy, and Spain, have adopted economic measures and fiscal stimuli to respond to the crisis, including: state loans and loan guarantee for companies; unemployment subsidies; tax referrals; deferral and subsidization of social security payments; and deferral of loan payments. It is anticipated that these investments made during the economic recovery of the crisis can be leveraged to propel acceleration towards the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement and the Sustainable Development Agenda more broadly. Decisions on the deployment of post-COVID-19 stimulus packages will shape societies and economies over the next few years.

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“Transforming Our World” becomes even more relevant now as the rocket pace of development and solutions to place countries back on track must be sustainable and inclusive. Crises present opportunities for possibilities and change. In times of crisis, countries are faced with the undeniable penchant to take decisive action and make changes in the interest of well-being, economy, and the planet. In terms of the impact on sustainable development processes at the United Nations, the main change is that the Decade of Action for the SDGs has now become the decade of recovery. The cascading and devastating effects of COVID-19 have triggered the urgent global action on sustainable development beyond what was originally envisaged in 2015. Countries are positioned to reset priorities and tackle the most pressing issues exaggerated by the onset of COVID-19, as is the UN system. The review of the HLPF under ECOSOC has been postponed for a year, and resources re-allocated to urgent responses to the pandemic and its aftermath. For the purpose of this chapter, the discussion will focus on Governance, Inequalities and Climate Change/Action. These issues are at the “core of the systems of synergies and trade-offs” for sustainable development. Success of the SDGs and the recovery efforts from the pandemic will rely predominantly on effective governance. Inequality and climate cannot be treated as peripheral issues in sustainable development but addressed with urgency and transformative actions to prevent pushing people behind.19 Governance The pandemic underscored that an approach to sustainable development that remains largely sectoral is not sufficient for a world where shocks and crises cascade rapidly across sectors and geographies. COVID-19 began as an epidemic and a health crisis, but quickly morphed into an economic, social and political crisis all around the world. In many developing countries, the economic and social impacts of COVID-19 hit well before the disease itself, in the collapse in demand for key sectors such as tourism, the disruption of supply chains that caused local scarcities and export bottlenecks, and the social impact of lockdowns and border closures on countries that had grown to depend on external connections and exchange. With the advent of the 2030 Agenda in 2015, Dodds et al. already noted that “Traditional compartmentalized approaches, or ‘siloed’ thinking, will no longer be effective… whole-of-government approaches will be needed to do justice…” to realize our goals.20 Any sustainable development response that attempts to address these challenges as siloed, sectoral issues – that looks at the 2030 Agenda as a collection of 17 Goals and 169 targets rather than an integrated and universal system – will always be insufficient. The United Nations development system made great strides towards a more integrated approach with the Secretary General’s March 2020 report Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 21 and the

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operational UN Framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19, 22 which laid out an integrated approach to providing urgent socio-economic support to countries and societies. Such an approach begins to recognize that modern societies are complex, interconnected systems which need to be viewed and addressed through complex systems approaches. The future of international development cooperation hinges on building the tools, systems and capacities to approach development in this way. Huge transformations can be achieved with political leadership and aligned public support. The impact of COVID-19 has awakened the prospects of re-imaging national development. The multidimensional shocks have redirected the focus of many national policies, plans and programmes, balanced with the mobilization of well-directed financing, which provide a strong basis for building back better. On this new pathway, countries have to undertake a reality check to focus on a modern vision, whilst refraining from entrenching the systemic and structural challenges of the past. Leaving no one behind must be the central focus on re-imagining and building back better, particularly the translation of international agreements into local national actions to reach those who have been pushed furthest behind. It calls for re-imagining how nations cooperate and how governments functions to accelerate plans for the future. Policy coherence is key and arguably the most difficult element of sustainable development to achieve, as countries endeavour to align their mandates, resources and financing. Integrated and coherent approaches, as well as strengthening effective and inclusive institutions provides a solid framework for the implementation of well-needed solutions. Integration has remained largely a challenge for many countries in their national development planning frameworks. Scientists have recommended approaches that provide a greater appreciation of policy coherence and integrated approaches. The transformative pathways and levers of change identified in the Global Sustainable Development Report 2019 and the six SDG Transformations23 to inform the future of sustainable development and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic across the three dimensions collectively address the trade-offs and harness the co-benefits based on short-, medium- and long-term priorities. Systems thinking and leadership will also be key to building back better, and the axis on which to pivot for future-readiness. Building back better requires models that are future-ready, together with foresighting and future-casting. National planning frameworks and systems must be prepared for extreme scenarios, identification of new priorities, and successive approximations to adapt accordingly and apply the relevant measuring and monitoring instruments. Systems thinking requires keeping all relevant players in development highly motivated to enhance solidarity, multilateral cooperation and collective action. The future is dependent on the actions taken today, driven by innovative solutions. Multilateral frameworks must adapt to change. The approach of the United Nations in setting the normative frameworks, policy guidance and support for operationalization on the ground must reach countries at their point of need.

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No one-size-fits-all approach will work for this response. The current nationalistic response to the pandemic puts the achievement of the SDGs under threat. The disruptions from COVID-19 give new meaning to resilience. The 2030 Agenda can be viewed as a risk map of the future. Implemented with the complementary development frameworks can have tremendous impact on the deep rooted and long-standing inequalities which leave the vulnerable further behind. Enormous potential lies in making development more risk-informed. Governments must capitalize on evolving institutional capacity to deliver on a scale as never before. The future will require a different way of thinking, designing and investing in development, addressing the universality of the Agenda. We simply cannot go back to normal after this global shock. For many countries across the globe, particularly developing countries, the economic crisis has presented more disastrous and long-term implications than the health crisis. What will resilience look like in the future and what is needed? Coordinated implementation of development objectives that could deliver resilience to a wider range of threats and risks are needed. Building resilience to withstand present and future shocks will be a fundamental investment on several levels. Future resilience will manifest at the individual, family, community and national levels, being highly inclusive. Investment in resilience, protection and recovery of livelihoods are critical in guarding against shocks and systemic risks to reach the most vulnerable, bridge the digital divide and safeguard jobs for the future. New ways of thinking and partnerships are required to bring governance to the forefront of sustainable development. Evidence from the first round of VNRs recognize that local and regional frameworks for sustainable development remains weak. Local governance frameworks and stakeholders will play an integral role in the recovery and addressing shocks. Risk-informed development allows for development to become a vehicle to reduce risk, avoid creating risks and build resilience. Only resilient development can become sustainable development; sustainable development initiatives will fail unless they are risk-informed. Risk, resilience and sustainability knowledge and actions need to go hand-in-hand.24 Government will be required to allocate and prioritize funds and resources to effectively navigate their country-specific recovery efforts. In this regard, there is a call for International financial institutions to provide financial New financing mechanisms for risk-informed development that are to be designed to reduce vulnerability, exposure and risk creation, and help countries cope and recover better from the current and future crises. Leading up to the onset of COVID-19, there has been a heightened impatience, demanding greater accountability from global and national leaders. VNR presentations provide evidence that citizens are increasingly holding governments more accountable for what they are doing on sustainable development. UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner noted the following:25

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…as we move forward from the pandemic and support the socio-economic recovery, we are at a critical turning point – which I believe we must turn into a positive “tipping point”. We must influence change in a direction which is transformational for people and the planet. It is clear that securing the rule of law and human rights is key to achieving the transformational change we need – based on principles of trust, accountability and justice. This ultimately means forging a new, more inclusive “social contract” … through the 2030 Agenda to support people-centred justice; reduce violence – and build inclusive and effective institutions… advance a new “social contract” fully based on accountability, trust and justice. A key recommendation to practically achieve this social contract recognizes that it will “be critically important to take stock of how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected key dimensions of national institutional systems such as accountability, transparency and participation, in order to prevent reversals of progress on these critical institutional dimensions and to avert longer-term consequences on public institutions and human rights. Together with other key principles embodied in SDG 16, these institutional dimensions can provide signposts for increasing the resilience of national institutions to external shocks in the future.”26 Inequality The first four-year cycle of implementation of the 2030 Agenda revealed that progress is lagging. Over the years, globalization, technological development, and digitization contributed to monumental, unprecedented human progress, but still have side-effects, which multiplied inequalities, as elaborated in Chapter 4. Inequalities persist in relation to health, education, and employment based on gender, age, race, disability status, migrant status and ethnicity. COVID-19 has precipitated an “inequality dilemma.” In a matter of months, countries and regions that had previously made progress on addressing inequalities have been impeded. The rallying cry of the 2030 Agenda – “leaving no one behind” – is the central thrust of the COVID-19 recovery. An assessment of daily confirmed COVID-19 cases by region underscores that geographies have not been equally affected. Over 90 per cent of reported cases are in urban areas, the report notes that although infections seem to have peaked in several countries or regions, they continue to rise in others, and that a second wave in some places is already being observed. As a whole, the report finds that developing countries are less equipped to use information and communication technologies (ICT) to minimize the disruption caused by COVID-19, compounding inequalities within and between countries. Poverty eradication remains at the core of the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. During the thrust to build back better, it remains key to keeping the momentum around the SDGs.

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How can we tackle the root causes of our current system? By stopping and rethinking the systems and structural reforms that shape the nature of our societies. The future of sustainable development will be marked by placing SDG 10 on inequality at the forefront of national development and recovery plans postCOVID-19. Improving the life-chances and opportunities for people requires focus on progressive fiscal policies, robust social protection systems to prevent people from falling back into poverty, and a focus on lifelong education to prepare people for the future of work amid the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Investing in women’s economic participation and gender equality is not only the right things to do, it is also the smart thing to do. In 2018, the World Bank estimated that countries face losses of $160 trillion in wealth globally due to wage gaps between women and men.27 It is also important to note that the impact of the pandemic has clearly demonstrated that per-capita income is no longer sufficient as a yardstick for developmental progress. Instead, the multilateral community must solidify the move over recent decades to measure sustainable development using multidimensional approaches28 and to recognize vulnerability to multidimensional risks as a critical factor in identifying where to prioritize development interventions29, particularly for those who may be just above the income poverty threshold but who are vulnerable to falling behind when shocks and crises occur.30 Climate change Globally, there have been multiple crises with deleterious impacts, for which the fallout will be felt beyond the present generation. The climate crisis has been long in the making and widely recognized as an existential threat, which on its own can erode all advancements made so far in the 2030 Agenda. In the halls of the General Assembly, climate change is touted as the defining challenge of this era. The complementary manifestos of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement have at their core people and planet, which both have strong synergies and affirm the need to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication. In March 2019, the General Assembly convened the High-Level Meeting on the Protection of the Global Climate for Present & Future Generations of Humankind in the Context of the Economic, Social and Environmental Dimensions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which reflected “the nature of climate change as a cross-cutting and immediate threat to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and to the survival and wellbeing of island nations and coastal communities. Climate Change is, moreover, increasingly a direct burden on Member States, yet can be an opportunity for systemic change to ensure resilient, productive, and healthy environment for present and future generations.” The adverse impacts of climate change affect all, particularly the most vulnerable among developing countries. Manifestations of these impacts include rising sea levels, coastal erosion and ocean acidification, persistent drought and extreme

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weather events. These present a serious threat to food security, water, energy and health, and more broadly to the ongoing efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development. The intersection between the sustainable development and climate agendas, whilst complimentary, is complex and crosscutting. Multilateral climate action is key to achieving sustainable development aspirations for present and future generations. UNEP and other environmental watchdogs have all echoed that the coronavirus is an apparent retaliation and wake-up call from nature on the urgency to take decisive action on climate change. Blatant avoidance of scientific evidence presents certain danger. 2019 was the second warmest year on record; levels of carbon dioxide concentrations continued to increase; we are approximately 1°C above the pre-industrial baseline; sea levels continue to rise at an accelerating rate;31 and desertification renders 12 million hectares of land unproductive each year. In its recent call for a “one health strategy” to rebalance the needs of people, the planet and animals, UNEP warned of the impact of human activity on pandemics and the high probability of future outbreaks if decisive measures are not taken to prevent other zoonotic diseases from crossing into the human population.32 The report highlights that about 2 million people die each year from zoonotic diseases, and it is anticipated that with the death toll from COVID-19, 2020 will be a record year. The socio-economic impact of zoonotic diseases is astounding disproportionately affecting low- and middle-income countries directly and indirectly through the loss of lives and livelihoods. It is estimated that approximately $100 billion has been lost in economic activity over the past two decades to zoonotic diseases. The impact of COVID-19 pandemic has become a social and economic disaster and many countries are grappling with climate change-related disasters in the middle of a devastating pandemic. Climate change-induced disasters have continued to hit countries and communities, devastate peoples’ livelihoods, spur large-scale displacements, and weaken critical infrastructures, including health systems. Climate change is also aggravating natural variability and increasing water related disaster risks as 40 per cent of the world’s people are affected by water scarcity, and the increasing incidences of flooding threaten to destroy water points and sanitation facilities as well as contaminate water sources.33 The glimmer of hope with confronting the climate crisis is knowing that we are well-aware of what needs to be done to avoid this existential threat. The implementation of the Paris Agreement, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and all other relevant documents such as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction are critical to ensure sustainability, reduce inequality and end poverty. It is essential that disaster risk reduction and resilience building remain at the core of national recovery and rehabilitation efforts. Advancing the decade of action and delivery require astronomical commitments and efforts aligned with our ambitions to achieve

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climate resilient development and climate justice. The period 2020–2030 is a window of opportunity to tip the balance to a world of 1.5 degree Celsius. The World Commission on the Economy and Climate Change published a report in early September 2018 demonstrating that climate action and socio-economic progress are mutually reinforcing, with estimated gains of $26 trillion by 2030.34 That same year, the ILO predicted job losses in carbon-intensive industries would be offset by the creation of 24 million new jobs around the world in green economies by 2030.35 This was substantiated by the World Economic Forum, in its New Nature Economy Report 2020, which projected that tackling the nature crisis as part of COVID-19 recovery could potentially create 400 million jobs and $100 million in business value each year.36 Left unchecked, however, climate change compromises the ability of countries to pursue sustainable development, potentially even reversing gains. This is particularly apparent for Small Island Developing States and African countries. The Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit in September 2019 was the first of its kind, demonstrating political leadership from some 70 countries. “The Climate Action Summit set a clear direction for further climate action. Initiatives, launched in 12 areas, provide the foundation for scaled-up action. But the Summit also highlighted areas where much more action is needed to secure our footing on a path towards 1.5°C by the end of the century. This will require renewed leadership at all levels and across all sectors of society.”37 The war on climate cannot be won solely on the back of national ambitions. Collective global leadership and action is required to: i Ratchet up investment in adaptation – adaptation is not only the right thing to do, it is also the smart thing to do to boost economic growth and create a climate resilient world. ii Injection of climate financing – creating a financial ecosystem which simplifies the criteria for financing and facilitates access to concessionary financing for middle-income countries. iii Promotion of a circular economy. iv Adoption nature-based solutions. v Risk-informed resilience and green recovery. We must use the coronavirus crisis as an opportunity to reset humanity’s relationship with nature. My country has shown that the transition to carbon-neutral, nature-positive economy brings greater prosperity and jobs. It’s time to mainstream this model. H.E. Mr. Carlos Alvarado Quesada, President of Costa Rica The UN Secretary-General urges that “recent gains are protected as much as possible and a truly transformative recovery from COVID-19 is pursued, one that reduces risk to future crises and brings much closer the inclusive and sustainable development required to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.”

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Climate action presents a litmus test for global leadership and multilateralism. Despite the unforeseen setbacks, several opportunities in 2021 provide the space to move the needle on climate action and inject positive energy in the global climate governance landscape from water, biodiversity, oceans, desertification.

Future landscape in the UN During the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the lively engagement and flurry of diplomatic face-to-face negotiations screeched to a halt. With no physical presence in the UN Headquarters, negotiations, side events and meetings were shifted to virtual platforms, ushering in “Zoom-plomacy.” In order to maintain business continuity of the General Assembly and the Main Committees, two key decisions were adopted to facilitate the work of this critical organ of the United Nations. These decisions essentially allowed the General Assembly to adopt decisions through silence procedure in the instances when it was not possible to convene plenary meetings. Several key high-level events and processes were either rolled over to the 75th session, or faced the uncomfortable circumstance of exercising multilateral diplomacy in a virtual space. The use of virtual platforms certainly did not help to build the collegiality and trust among delegations. Key processes, such as the negotiations of the Political Declaration for the Commemoration of the 75th United Nations General Assembly were impacted by multiple broken silences, or stalemates, as delegations were unable to reach decisions on critical paragraphs and issues. We all learned just how essential informal corridor conversations and exchanges were to the practice of multilateral negotiations. All in all, the 75th session of the General Assembly inherited many mandates, and was challenged with managing their execution within an environment of great uncertainty and optimism. What will all this mean for the diplomatic community going forward? During the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, Member States negotiated several critical processes with implications on the response of the 2030 Agenda and its implementation: the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda and the review of ECOSOC, the “Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of UN system operational activities” (the QCPR), as well as the revitalization and alignment processes. The QCPR is meant to put the framework in place for the UN to drive the “build back better” recovery efforts. With only one decade of implementation for the 2030 Agenda, the UN Development system is called to be more effective and efficient in its operations to deliver for the people around the world. Systemwide coordination from the UN is paramount for this catalytic moment to be impactful. The success of the decade of action depends to great degree on whether the UN Development system can deliver the SDGs. Can the HLPF provide the relevant technical and political guidance in its current construct? The 75th session of the UN is pregnant with possibilities for setting the stage for recovery, building back better, and resetting implementation of the 2030 Agenda for all countries and all people. Recognizing the status of developing countries, a heavy burden will be placed on developing countries

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(represented by the “G77 and China” – a block of 134 developing countries) to push the needle on resolutions and processes of the General Assembly to realize this vision of the 2030 Agenda, while making the UN fit for purpose. The greatest success of the HLPF to date is the commitment demonstrated through the overwhelming evidence of presentations of Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs). The first four-year cycle of implementation saw some 144 countries making presentations on their implementation status of the 2030 Agenda. Member States consistently reaffirm their commitment. That being said, the emergence of COVID-19 has threatened to derail development prospects, particularly of SIDS, LDCs, LLDCs, and countries in vulnerable situations. Moreover, a vast knowledge gap remains: Reflections of the VNR presentation highlight that many of those left farthest behind across developed and developing countries still do not know about the SDGs, and the link to their rights, particularly children. Achievement of the SDGs will be hinged on greater traction on the awareness model for the SDGs and strengthening civic engagement. Behavioural change at the individual, household, community, local and national level must be driven by intense engagement through a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach. A whole-of-society approach is required to foster cooperation across different groups to build stronger partnerships, collaboration, and action, as well as to translate into real time implementation and impact. The rich evidence provided by the VNRs up to 2020 provide a solid base on the key transformative pathways for accelerated action, and the extent of multilateral support and final resources to places many developing countries on track to attaining their sustainable development prospects. A forward-looking approach of building back better, not regressing, can tackle the systemic challenges and financial issues required to make countries more inclusive, resilient and sustainable. At the beginning of the 75th session of the United Nations, the focus of the multilateral system included a healthy focus on the SDGs, and not COVID-19 alone. This was a timely development, providing the UN Development system (UNDS) with opportunities to respond to needs of countries in a coordinated and synergistic manner through its country and regional programming, linking up to the SDGs. This will be particularly important leading up to the mid-term review of the SDGs in 2023. The development challenges and issues highlighted by the disruptions of COVID-19 present new challenges to elaborate new statistics. Strengthening evidence-based policymaking is key in advancing the changes in leaving no one behind. Funding for producing official national statistics remains limited and poses significant challenges for developing countries who are at the embryonic stages of engaging with and harnessing big data. Not surprisingly, the situation in many developing countries is that statistics are produced in a decentralized system. The reality is, in order to generate data and produce statistics to respond to the complexities, synergies and trade-offs for transformation across the three dimensions of sustainable development, countries must ensure efficiency in the production of high-quality official statistics.

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Advancing the future of sustainable development post-COVID The world post-COVID will look and operate differently from the current dispensation. While sustainable development challenges remain, the scope, breadth and magnitude will be far greater than pre-SDGs. The world cannot survive multiple parallel crises without cooperation and the full respect of the rights of all people. A whole-of-society, whole-of-agenda response based on systems thinking, recognizing the integrated, indivisible and interconnected nature of the 2030 Agenda will be critical, if we are to emerge out of the quagmire of global development challenges. Stakeholder engagement will require more deliberate and defined structures. All stakeholders will require a shift in mindset from the traditional goals and value-systems to actualize the recovery as truly transformational. With less than 10 years to 2030, the transformation must take a dramatic shift and focus, likened to a sprint event at world record pace. Through innovation and more cooperation among governments, the UN and stakeholders, advancements in research and development, financing and technology can generate new possibilities for stability, resilience and growth. COVID-19 demonstrated that singularity of purpose by countries inevitably leads to individual demise and isolationism. To preserve multilateralism, we need to improve our performance and deliver. A reimagined multilateralism based on the principles of the UN Charter can redound in shared approaches, response and solutions to emerge from the ashes as the global community did from World War II. This should be our tunnel and peripheral vision as we seek to build back better, with more ambition, and elevate transformation to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Momentum to pursue implementation must gather steam and manifest the urgency reflected in the call to action to gear up for the decade of action and delivery for sustainable development. Third, COVID-19 has unpacked faults in prevailing assumptions and approaches to sustainable development: Unfortunately, there is still today a notion of development cooperation being a sharing of solutions “from-to”; from the wealthy to the poor, from the developed to the developing, from the Global North to the Global South. However, development practice has been evolving towards much more horizontal-sharing and networked-thinking, for instance through the movement for South-South and Trilateral Cooperation. The lessons of the pandemic reinforce the centrality of such models for knowledge sharing and cooperation, even if there remains a critical role for the Global North to provide the financial resources needed to tackle transboundary, global challenges and to help meet the needs of the poorest and those furthest behind. Countries across the Global South found, shared and scaled local solutions for producing personal protective equipment,38 tracking symptoms and mapping hotspots,39 and shifting formal and informal businesses to contactless digital payments.40 As such, development actors, both individuals and institutions, need to recognize themselves as agents of change in complex, multidimensional systems

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rather than as convenors and coordinators of deterministic development processes. The COVID-19 pandemic shows that development challenges in the world today are of a scope and scale that cannot be “solved.” Instead the multilateral development system needs to build the capacity to help countries and communities proactively identify the risks and hazards that future development is exposed to – the black swans and grey rhinos on the horizon 41 – as well as to assist with collective effort when they inevitably occur. Many such “grey rhinos” are evident; the climate emergency foremost amongst them but also the threat of further pandemics, ecosystem collapses and potential large-scale employment disruptions from technological change and shifting production patterns. Moving forward, policymakers, sustainable development practitioners, civil society, academia, and the private sector will have to adapt to the new realities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and switch the dial on development planning in the following areas: 







Demographic changes, technology, and global integration must be leveraged to maximize positive synergies across the SDGs. Equally important are emerging trends, which present both opportunities and challenges for the 2030 Agenda. In this regard, the science-policy interface must be strengthened to forecast and better prepare for new challenges. Greater attention will be required to modelling and forecasting scenarios to inform transformative solutions and responses to future possibilities. Platforms to facilitate this type of integrated approach to development are needed in LDCs and SIDS. Institutional, policy and partnership mechanisms are needed to ensure positive outcomes and to safeguard against future shocks by building resilient systems. Governments will have to forge new partnerships particularly with the private sector, the scientific and technological community, and civil society to develop and drive the solutions needed for the future. National policies, plans and programmes must be people-centred and reflect the hyperconnected and complex nature of development, including the relevant synergies, trade-offs and risk-informed resilience to address the flows of goods, services, people and information. A key priority for developing countries is to harness their demographic dividend, through investment in human capital, creating an enabling environment for private sector engagement and bridging the inequality and digital divides. Other critical areas of focus for building back better will include the reduction of barriers to female labour force participation, savings and investment (domestic and foreign), and designing social protection systems to address current and future needs (health, child care education and support to vulnerable elderly). From a governance perspective, improved justice systems and rules of law, and financial standards, must be in place to generate interest to invest in local economies while reducing corruption and improving efficiency. Climate resilient recovery: implementation of the Sendai Framework now resonates beyond the call of small island developing states to all countries as

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gears have been shifted. How can risk be mitigated in the context of the crisis? Implementation of the SDGs must be disaster- and crisis-risk informed. The evidence of job losses, instability in food security and more have brought to the forefront the relevance of investing in risk reduction and protection. It is simply more cost effective. Application of a risk-perspective in development planning requires a whole-of-society approach. There is a need for urgent and deliberate action directed to transformative and institutional change, coupled with a coordinated response across all sectors. Effective recovery will be hinged on a comprehensive understanding of what resilience looks like for the future and what is needed for that future. Bridging the digital divides and leapfrogging is a key plank to building back better for developing countries. Sustainable development hinges on people and, predominantly, on their health. Further details on the future of health diplomacy are elaborated in the special article on this topic.

In conclusion, COVID-19 has taught us many important lessons, quintessentially, the strength of multilateral action. The future of diplomacy will be largely dependent on our efforts at multilateralism and international cooperation, a stronger multilateral governance. The emergence of COVID-19 has been utilized to dismantle or dilute the multilateral system and prolong the ideological battles of nationalism versus multilateralism. The response to emerge from multiple crises like a phoenix from the ashes is global citizenship, consolidated solidarity, and a strengthened multilateralism. Caring for one’s own people is not enough to protect them, because a virus that exists anywhere is a virus that exists everywhere, making international cooperation a critical ingredient. Only together can the people and nations of the world rise stronger from the scourge of disease, just as our predecessors did 75 years ago from the ravages of war. United Nations Under Secretary-General Liu Zhenmin The Decade of Action and delivery for implementation of the SDGs presents a new opportunity for a fresh look on the revolution to achieve the transformative vision for the world. Seismic shifts are required to get the delivery. The global community has already committed to action and now is the time to push forward to get the impact on this transformative agenda. Key recommendations This chapter offers three key recommendations to achieve sustainable development in the present and future, with a focus on inequality, governance and climate change. First, this chapter has outlined that inequality is an obstacle to development, and this obstacle has been an albatross for LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. It is acknowledged that the success of the 2030 Agenda is dependent on the ability of

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these vulnerable countries to attain the SDGs. These countries face the greatest risk of losing development gains as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic impacts. It is therefore prudent that the Decade of Action up to 2030 be dedicated to accelerating implementation and solutions for development in LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. No effort should be spared in making this ambitious plan for people, planet and humanity, a reality. Whole-of-government, whole-of-society and system-wide coherence from the UN system will be key to take collective action and implement people-centred policies. These policies should allow for scaled-up investment in universal healthcare, education, social protection, equitable access to digital technology, support to small- and medium-sized businesses, investment in agricultural and inclusion of women and girls in decision-making. Measures must be taken to reach sustainable debt levels in these countries, in order to tackle the challenges of indebtedness. Second, countries must demonstrate political ambition to drive the transformation needed in many of the most vulnerable countries in the world. At the heart of governance across countries is confidence and trust. Future possibilities are limitless if global and national coordinated approaches are applied to build more equal, green, resilient and sustainable societies. Through integrated approaches, systems can be designed and implemented to improve recovery and build resilience to withstand future shocks. A key area for this urgent action is on strengthening health systems. Finally, climate change and biodiversity loss and their attendant consequences pose the gravest threats facing humanity’s survival. If we are to address the greatest planetary emergency of our lifetime and prevent environmental collapse, there is a need for mobilization of governments, peoples and financial resources at unprecedented scales. Nature-based solutions can catalyze major shifts in the path to achieving the Paris Agreement while protecting and generating livelihoods, ensuring food security, combating desertification, achieving land degradation neutrality and tackling global warming. National policies must reflect this imperative. Recognizing the importance of risk resilient societies, it is recommended for countries which have not done so to formulate and implement national and local disaster risk reduction strategies. In conclusion, we are at a tipping point whereby sustainable development is still achievable, however this window of opportunity is closing quickly. Let us be steadfast in our global efforts to achieve this most worthwhile ambition for people and planet.

Special Article by Joe E. Colombano and David N. Nabarro Strengthening global health diplomacy in the time of COVID-19: The case for adaptive leadership With almost 50 million contagions and over one million deaths globally,42 the COVID-19 crisis is a lot more than a health crisis: projections for global

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growth in 2020 at the time of writing are a dismal -4.9 per cent, a drop of almost 7 percentage points from 2019;43 poverty rates are expected to be on the rise for the first time since the late 1990s, thus reversing decades of progress henceforth;44 and forgone incomes have proven to be not just an economic cost, having impacted greatly on mental health, human relationships and the very fabric of our societies. Health is perhaps the one topic that brings the United Nations and multilateral systems closest to the people that they are there to serve. As both personal- and policy-priorities, health has been firmly cemented in the Development agenda from early in the history of the United Nations. A crown jewel of the organization’s achievements includes the eradication of Small Pox, declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1980, after 3,000 years.45 It was later enshrined in the aspirations of Member States as a dedicated Millennium Development Goal in 2000, and a Sustainable Development Goal in 2015 (SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.)46 At the time of writing, health remains central to understanding and addressing the larger COVID-19 crisis. Having long been denied the same priority as politics and economics, global health is now finally on top of policy makers’ agenda in every country in the world. Specifically, global health diplomacy, with its multidisciplinary roots in medicine, law, development, business and foreign affairs, represent a formidable instrument to safeguard the wellbeing of all people in a globalized world. If it is to navigate the complexity of the COVID-19 crisis, however, global health diplomacy needs to be revamped and professionalized, starting with the adoption of a new way of leadership, grounded in social learning, to anticipate future scenarios, articulate a collective understanding and adjust to ever changing dynamics. It is through such adaptive leadership that a pathway to action can be found and recommendations for policy issued, including beyond health, towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Addressing complexity The way in which the COVID-19 virus has spread and affected our lives has brought to the fore the complexity of the world we live in. When it jumped from the animal to the human world, the virus triggered a chain reaction with knock-on effects across that “system of systems” that connects all dimensions of our lives.47 Not only are the causes of the virus to be found in such complexity, but also its taming is made all the more consequential by the overlaps and interdependencies across systems: while helping to contain outbreaks, restrictions on people’s movement and daily life in general also resulted in sudden drops in economic output, stalled supply-chains, triggered growth in unemployment and poverty, exacerbated inequalities, and deteriorated social cohesion. Because it sits at the intersection of multiple fields, global health diplomacy is well suited to make sense of the interconnected dimensions of the crisis. Since Ilona Kickbusch’s seminal contribution to this field, global health diplomacy has been defined as the “multi-level and multi-actor negotiation processes that

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shape and manage the global policy environment for health.”48 The discipline considers policy-making across different sectors that influence health, such as transportation, agriculture, land use, housing, public safety, and education.49 It understands the relevance of all actors, both national and international, in the pursuit of global health goals. It acknowledges the importance of engaging with stakeholders in the private sector, not only as a way to differentiate its source of funding, but also to capitalize on their experience, expertise and influence, including with the members of general public. Most importantly, global health diplomacy has provided an effective way to manage the complexity that comes with an increasingly globalized world economy and highly interconnected societies. This is especially true in the case of developing countries, where the scarcity of national resources and expertise can precipitate a crisis, and contribute to its further spreading beyond national borders.50 When it comes to tackling the current COVID-19 crisis, however, global health diplomacy has only partially lived up to its potential. Perhaps because of the virus’ unprecedented impact on our lives and its reverberations on national politics, much remains to be done: a comprehensive and coordinated global response to the crisis is yet to be initiated; national responses are often hampered by a polarized political dialogue; science and medicine are questioned or manipulated or outright ignored; facts are misconstrued to accommodate political narratives; and people are left confused by drastic policies and all too often broke by their consequences. As a result, the space left for global health diplomacy to operate is shrinking while the level of complexity continues to increase. A pathway to action If it is to contribute to solve a complex adaptive challenge such as the COVID19 crisis, and contribute to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, global health diplomacy needs to embrace adaptive leadership. This requires social learning, being open and transparent, using collective decision-making processes and building trust with communities and individuals51. The following five common principles have been identified to guide this kind of leadership across the COVID-19 response:52 1

Ensure evidence-based learning and adaptation: Adaptive leadership means that health diplomats need to constantly assess their actions, recognizing that they will have to continuously iterate and adapt their interventions as they learn more about the outcomes of decisions. Such social learning was a crucial element in managing Ebola in West Africa, for example.53 This learning process must be open and diverse to be effective. For example, the German government enlisted the advice not just of epidemiologists and medical specialists, but also social scientists, philosophers, historians of science, theologians, and jurists as it navigated the delicate ethical balancing act of reopening society while safeguarding the health of the public.54

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Stress-test underlying theories, assumptions, and beliefs: Just as institutions such as banks regularly undergo stress testing to ensure they can deal with future crises, the assumptions and hypotheses guiding an adaptive response need to subject to robust and rigorous reflection and examination, including through the simulation of different possible scenarios, along an anticipation-intelligence-response model.55 These scenarios account for critical uncertainties in the public health situation, the impact of government measures, the wider economic environment and business-specific demand forecasts, and make use of real-time monitoring as the basis for decision-making. Streamline deliberative decision-making: With COVID-data changing all the time, there is a risk to revert to siloed responses as we seek the safety that comes from narrowly defined targets. Decision makers at different levels in health diplomacy need to explain what is being done and why, so that if errors are identified, trust can still be maintained in the process. The most acclaimed national responses, not only in South Korea,56 and Germany,57 but also in Vietnam,58 and Ethiopia,59 and in sub-national efforts such as those in Kerala, India,60 have used the pandemic as a catalyst for transforming the policy process, making it more open, dynamic and nimble. These responses have also improved integration across systems, from health care to transportation to energy, which resulted in unprecedented levels of joint planning, information sharing, and coordination. Strengthen transparency, inclusion, and accountability: People around the world have been asked to make major behaviour changes, at a significant cost. In turn, leaders, including in health diplomacy, need to commit to sharing their thinking at every stage, thus setting a benchmark for how to engage with constituencies and stakeholders as the pandemic progresses. All relevant stakeholders need to be considered, from professionals to affected populations. The European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention has advocated the use of after-action reviews to assess how public health decisions were taken and on what basis. More than that, by acknowledging their fallibility,61 leaders create an environment of candour, psychological safety,62 and mutual trust that is vital for effective crisis response. Mobilize collective action: Effective responses to a crisis as complex as the current one need to build on collaboration across different sectors, industries and professionals and between international, national and local levels. Collective action in this regard might be in the form of coordination (e.g. among businesses), partnerships among different interest groups (e.g. businesses and communities), or dialogue across a range of stakeholders. Adaptive leadership has a crucial role to play in helping to identify shared alignment of objectives and scope for collective action across different silos and levels of the response.

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Beyond health: strengthening multilateral leadership Beyond health and SDG 3, the crisis stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and its management provides the opportunity to reconsider the way in which the community of nations works together towards shared goals. Our multilateral system is designed to face multidimensional challenges and has decades of experience doing it, be it about health (WHO), food and nutrition (FAO, IFAD, WFP), finance (IMF), or reconstruction (World Bank), and more. And yet, all too often, the specialized nature of the system has given in to the natural tendency of experts, practitioners, academics, policy makers and politicians to work on each aspect of development separately in siloes. Instead, it is only when such expertise is dynamically managed as a part of a holistic and adaptive system that challenges such as the COVID-19 crisis can be addressed. After all, this was the intuition of the UN Member States when they devised the interconnected dimensions of the 2030 Agenda and the inter-linkages among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. In the year in which the UN turned 75 and one of its agencies, the World Food Program, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, we could not have missed the opportunity to build on such accomplishments, acknowledge our constraints and embrace adaptive leadership as a way to strengthen our multilateral system, and make it more responsive and modern.

Notes 1 Dodds, Donaghue, Roesch (2016). Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals. Routledge, New York. 2 Millennium Development Goals Report (2015). United Nations, New York. 3 Ibid. 4 Office of the President of the General Assembly (2019, September). SDG Summit Concept Note. United Nations. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://sustaina bledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/24933SDG_Summit_Leaders_Dialogue_ Concept_Note_FINAL.pdf. 5 Ibid. 6 World Population Prospects (2019). UN Population Division, New York, 2019. 7 Global Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) (2019, May 6). Retrieved on 24 July 2020 from: www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-unprece dented-report/. 8 Sachs, J., Schmidt-Traub, G., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., Woelm, F. (2020). The Sustainable Development Goals and COVID-19. Sustainable Development Report 2020. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 9 The Sustainable Development Goals Report (2020). United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. 10 President of the Economic and Social Council (2019, August 9). Summary by the President of ECOSOC of the high-level political forum on sustainable development convened under the auspices of the council at its 2019 session. United Nations. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://undocs.org/E/HLPF/2019/8. 11 Gopinath, G. (2020, April 14). The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression. IMFBlog. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://blogs.

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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-greatdepression/. Mahler, D.G., Lakner, C. et al. (2020, June 8). Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty. World Bank Blogs. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-gl obal-poverty. The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2020. Global Health Security Index (2019). Nuclear Threat Initiative, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, the Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2019-Globa l-Health-Security-Index.pdf. Government of Togo (2020). NOVISSI. Government of Togo. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://novissi.gouv.tg/en/home-new-en/. Government of Pakistan (2020). Ehsaas Emergency Cash. Pakistan Government. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.pass.gov.pk/Document/Downloads/ EECreportAugust10.pdf. Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19, United Nations, New York, 2020. Secretary-General UN COVID-19 Response and Recovery Plan (2020, April). United Nations, New York. UN Committee for Development Policy (2020, February 27). Report of the twenty-second session. Economic and Social Council, New York. Dodds et al. (2016). United Nations (2020, March). Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www. un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_report_socio-economic_impact_of_covid19.pdf. United Nations (2020, April). A UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19. Retrieved on 1 July 2020 from: https://unsdg.un.org/resour ces/un-framework-immediate-socio-economic-response-covid-19. Sachs et al. (2019). Risk-informed development: From crisis to resilience (2019, May). UNDP. Achim Steiner (2020, June 29). Discussing Human Rights, Rule of Law and the renewed social contract in the COVID-19 reality. UNDP. Accessed on 23 July 2020 at: www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/speeches/2020/ human-rights-and-rule-of-law-.html. United Nations (2020, May 15). Policy Brief No.74, Resilient institutions in times of crisis: transparency, accountability and participation at the national level key to effective response to COVID-19. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Accessed on 23 July 2020 at: www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-pol icy-brief-74-resilient-institutions-in-times-of-crisis-transparency-accountability-and-pa rticipation-at-the-national-level-key-to-effective-response-to-covid-19/. World Bank (2018, May 30). Globally, Countries Lose $160 Trillion in Wealth Due to Earnings Gaps Between Women and Men. Press Release. Retrieved on 24 July 2020 at: www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/05/30/globally-coun tries-lose-160-trillion-in-wealth-due-to-earnings-gaps-between-women-and-men. The 2020 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (2020, July 16). United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved on 23 July 2020 from: http://hdr. undp.org/en/2020-MPI. Naude, W. et al. (2009, August). Vulnerability in Developing Countries. UNU Press. Available at: www.wider.unu.edu/publication/vulnerability-developing-countries-3. Birdsall, N. (2020, September 25). The Curse of Falling Expectations. Project Syndicate. Retrieved on 30 September 2020 from: www.project-syndicate.org/commenta ry/falling-expectations-in-developing-countries-threaten-political-stability-by-nancybirdsall-2020-09.

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31 World Meteorological Organization (2019). Statement on the State of Global Climate Report. WMO. 32 UNEP (2020, July 6). Preventing the Next Pandemic: Zoonotic Diseases and How to Break the Chain of Transmission. United Nations Environment Programme. 33 UN Foundation (2020, July 23). Building Back Better: Risk-informed Covid-19 Recovery and Rehabilitation and Strengthening Resilience to Climate Change related disasters in Africa and the Caribbean. 34 New Climate Economy Report (2018). Available at: http://newclimateeconomy. report/2018/. 35 World Employment and Social Outlook (2018, May 14). 24 million jobs to open up in the green economy. International Labour Organization. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_ 628644/lang–en/index.htm. 36 New Nature Economy Report II: The Future of Nature and Business (2020, July 14). World Economic Forum. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.weforum. org/reports/new-nature-economy-report-ii-the-future-of-nature-and-business. 37 United Nations (2019). Climate Summit. United Nations. Retrieved on 24 July 2020 from: www.un.org/en/climatechange/un-climate-summit-2019. 38 Derso, B. (2020, September 29). Ethiopia: Local Production Reduces Imports of Face Masks. The Ethiopian Herald. Retrieved on 30 September 2020 from: https://a llafrica.com/stories/202009290760.html. 39 UNDP (2020, April 28). From symptoms to solutions – new local innovation helps Iraqi communities manage Coronavirus concerns. UNDP. Retrieved on 1 September 2020 from: www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/blog/from-symptoms-to-solu tions–new-local-innovation-helps-iraqi-com.html. 40 Mugema, B. (2020, July 16). Mobile Money and COVID-19: What can we learn from East Africa? UNDP Accelerator Labs. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: https://link. medium.com/1lCHBHVgtab. 41 Of Black Swans and Grey Rhinos (2020, March 15). The Wisdom Project. Retrieved on 1 July 2020 from: https://wisdomproject.substack.com/p/of-bla ck-swans-and-grey-rhinos. 42 Worldometers (2020). Coronavirus. Retrieved on 30 October 2020 from: www. worldometers.info/coronavirus/. 43 International Monetary Fund (2020). World Economic Outlook Update, June. Washington, D.C.. 44 World Bank (2020). Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune. Washington, D.C.. 45 World Health Organization (2020). Small Pox. Health Topics. Retrieved on 20 October 2020 from: www.who.int/health-topics/smallpox#tab=tab_1. 46 World Health Organization (December 2015). Health in 2015: from MDGs to SDGs. World Health Organization. Retrieved on 20 October 2020 from: www. who.int/data/gho/publications/mdgs-sdgs. 47 Colombano, Joe and David Nabarro (2020). COVID-19 and the Sustainable Development Goals: Preliminary Considerations about a Dynamic Symbiosis; Emerging Economies Newsletter, No. 16, September. Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Italy. 48 Kickbusch I, Silberschmidt G, Buss P. (2007). Global health diplomacy: the need for new perspectives, strategic approaches and skills in global health. Bull World Health Organ 85(3): 230–232. 49 Chattu, Vijay K. and Georgina Chami (2020). Global Health Diplomacy Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Strategic Opportunity for Improving Health, Peace, and Well-Being in the CARICOM Region—A Systematic Review, Social Sciences, 9, 88. MDPI: Basel, Switzerland. 50 Ibid., p. 9.

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51 Ramalingam, Ben, Leni Wild and Matt Ferrari (2020). Adaptive leadership in the coronavirus response Bridging science, policy and practice, Coronavirus Briefing Note, April. ODI, London, UK. 52 Adapted from Ramalingam, Ben, David Nabarro, et al. 5 (2020). Principles to Guide Adaptive Leadership, Harvard Business Review, September. 53 Tolbert Nyenswah, Cyrus Y. Engineer and David H. Peters (2016). Leadership in Times of Crisis: The Example of Ebola Virus Disease in Liberia, Health Systems & Reform, 2:3, 194–207. 54 Matthews, D. (2020, April 22). German humanities scholars enlisted to end coronavirus lockdown. Times Higher Education. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.timeshighereducation.com/news/german-humanities-scholars-enliste d-end-coronavirus-lockdown. 55 Risk communication simulation exercises (2020). World Health Organization. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.who.int/emergencies/risk-communica tions/simulation-exercises. 56 Ariadne Labs (2020, June 30). Emerging COVID-19 success story: South Korea learned the lessons of MERS. Exemplars in Global Health. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-south-korea. 57 Wieler, L. et al. (2020, June 30). Emerging COVID-19 success story: Germany’s strong enabling environment. Exemplars in Global Health. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-germany. 58 Pollack, T. et al. (2020, June 30). Emerging COVID-19 success story: Vietnam’s commitment to containment. Exemplars in Global Health. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-vietnam. 59 Oqubay, Arkebe (2020, June 5). Ethiopia’s unconventional COVID-19 response. World Economic Forum. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.weforum. org/agenda/2020/06/ethiopia-covid19-response/. 60 World Health Organization (2020, July 2). Responding to COVID-19 – Learnings from Kerala. WHO. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.who.int/india/ news/feature-stories/detail/responding-to-covid-19—learnings-from-kerala. 61 Stoller, J. (2020). Reflections on leadership in the time of COVID-19. BMJ Leader, 4: 77–79. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: https://bmjleader.bmj.com/content/ 4/2/77. 62 Edmondson, A. (2020). The importance of psychological safety. The Kings Fund. Retrieved on 20 October 2020 from: www.kingsfund.org.uk/audio-video/importa nce-psychological-safety.

3

Future of economic diplomacy and financing for development Jonathan Viera

“The medical record” of the global economy History, as the adage goes, has a history of repeating itself. Over the past century, there have been several economic shifts that may be referenced in order to better understand the present day, while offering indications for what we might expect in the future. This includes the Great Depression of the 1930s, ranging to the “dot com bubble” of the turn of the century. This chapter looks specifically at the most recent global economic crisis of 2008 with the view to better understand how the global responses at that time foreshadowed the post-COVID-19 global economic situation. The recovery process that the world economy went through, and the response of the multilateral system, as well as international financial institutions, left many lessons for the benefit of recovering from the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. “Economic globalization renewed tensions between developed and developing countries, generating intense and increasingly heated debates in the corridors, meeting rooms, and halls of the United Nations, and in national legislatures. Clearly, the world in the twenty-first century is more complex, confusing, and uncertain that had been expected.”1 Following the bursting of the debt-fuelled housing bubble, in 2008, the United States and much of Europe began to experience a systemic financial crisis, which soon reached developing countries.2 The main causes were systemic imbalances and deregulation of the financial system. The non-payment of thousands of mortgages put banks in a bind, as they had allocated large funds to investment packages with fragile financial backing.3 In the same year, a milestone for the multilateral financing for development track at the United Nations took place: the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development in Doha, Qatar. There, Member States requested the President of the 63rd General Assembly to organize the United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development. The objective was to determine emergency responses and to mitigate the effects of the crisis, especially on vulnerable populations, and initiate a necessary dialogue on the transformation of the international financial architecture, taking into account the needs and concerns of all Member States4.

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As a result of the Conference, Member States committed themselves to collaborate in solidarity to provide a global and coordinated response to the crisis and agreed to adopt measures that could be applied to the 2020 crisis, such as providing sufficient support to developing countries to cope with the social effects of the crisis; ensuring the long-term debt sustainability of developing countries; promoting and revitalizing trade and investment; strengthening the role of the United Nations in responding to the economic crisis; and finally, reforming and strengthening the international financial and economic system and architecture to adapt to crisis challenges and promoting good governance at all levels, including in financial institutions and international financial markets.5 Thereafter, progress has been slow in the fulfilment of the development financing commitments, both to overcome the effects of the 2008 crisis, and to create an environment conducive to sustainable development at all levels, in a spirit of global partnership and solidarity.6 As mentioned in previous chapters, 2015 was a historic year for multilateralism. Although the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (September 2015) enjoys more fame and fanfare, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA, July 2015) played an essential supporting role from the perspective of developing countries on how to finance global development. It also renewed the discourse around the important role of international public financing, in particular Official Development Assistance, as well as the need to mobilize additional sources of financing, including private sector investments. It was a very intense time for those of us negotiating such agendas, for several reasons: first, we were creating holistic agendas incorporating several political visions and perspectives in an almost surgical balance; second, the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda had to be consistent with each other, while remaining autonomous, which required complex coordination between negotiating groups, states’ delegations in New York and their respective capitals, among other challenges.; and third, the workload on the negotiators was very heavy, since many days of negotiations lasted more than 24 hours. It was one of the most important negotiation exercises on development financing in multilateral history. Up until 2019, the global economy had shown some stability, albeit without progress in the financing for development arena. Though digital technologies transformed key aspects of financial systems, and interest in sustainable investing – in part due to greater awareness of the impact of climate and other non-economic risks on financial returns7 – the landscape of financing for development had not significantly changed since the Addis Ababa Action Agenda was adopted. The High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development, held on 26 September 2019 showed systemic vulnerabilities: economic growth remained uneven, debt levels continued to rise, and financial volatility, limited fiscal space, illicit financial flows, and rising tensions in world trade complicated progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Notably, Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels fell by 4.3 per cent in 2018, while ODA to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) fell by 2.1 per cent.8

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At that stage, we were walking a winding road, but we knew the challenges and we advocated political decisions that would allow us to change certain paradigms. As the Decade of Action and Delivery for the Sustainable Development Goals began in 2020, the global economy was rocked by the COVID-19 pandemic. Most industrial production was paralyzed for several months, financial markets dropped to unthinkable levels, and the prospects for economic growth for the next few years turned bleak. Massive losses of employment and income owing to the crisis exacerbated global poverty, especially in developing countries with limited social protection. It is estimated that between 71 million and 100 million people might be pushed into extreme poverty in 2020, wiping out any progress made since 2017.9 This chapter analyzes the effects of the pandemic, focusing in particular on three areas of the global economic spectrum: trade, debt and decent work, considering the multilateral and economic diplomacy response taken, and proposing policies that could help to move the economy out of the “intensive care unit.” The practice of economic diplomacy and its “active ingredients and side effects” “Economic diplomacy” has been part of the United Nations since its founding in 1945, and adapting to the economic aspects that have become more relevant over time. In fact, as Mahfuzur Rahman points out, “no other international body has discussed so many world economic issues for so long or proclaimed the case for international cooperation so vigorously.”10 Like most issues in multilateralism, the results of meetings, deliberations and resolutions on economic issues and financing for development are not legally binding. Rather, they represent reference lines and roadmaps for governments and, in the case of economic diplomacy, for international financial institutions. Each year, after the General Debate of the General Assembly, the strongest work for diplomats in the United Nations begins. Economic issues are discussed in the Economic and Financial Committee (referred to as the “Second Committee”), which starts with a debate that lasts several days. Although they can be repetitive and predictable, these statements mark the national position of each country in the face of negotiations that will take place in the coming months (every autumn). “Only insiders with a trained ear for nuances, such as the ears diplomats have, can hear subtle shifts in positions.”11 The first drafts of the resolutions are introduced (“tabled”) by the Group of 77 and China to the rest of the membership or “partners” (European Union, United States, Russian Federation, Japan, CANZ, among others). This first draft is the result of intense negotiations within the G77, because despite the fact that its 134 members are developing countries, there are significant differences that must be agreed upon or at least acknowledged. Within the Group, firstly coordinators are nominated and then “red lines,” “bargaining chips,” and strategies are defined. The G77 represents the principle negotiating space for many countries, since the coordinator is the one who negotiates with the

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partners on behalf of the entire Group, therefore, the establishment and agreement of mandates for the coordinator requires many hours of deliberation. The coordinators of each resolution are diplomats with expertise in each issue or delegates from countries that prioritize or have a key interest in a given resolution. Negotiations between the G77 and partners take place in the so-called “informal-informal” meetings, characterized by less strict rules of procedure and conducted in English only without interpretation or the display of country name plates. Delegates spend several hours negotiating a sentence or even a word to ensure that it carries the intention of the proponent both in spirit and on paper. For example, while one group of countries may want to “endorse” a report from the Secretary-General, another group of countries only wants to “take note” of said report. Each word carries with it different connotations, and different levels of political commitment. Caveats in the draft resolutions serve to bring the parties closer to a consensus, for example, the caveat “within existing resources” leaves aside any budgetary implication and “as appropriate” could help a country to distance itself from a resolution, arguing that it considers that a specific issue is not appropriate or in tandem with its priority, needs or reality. Reading the negotiation texts requires training, as they contain a specific nomenclature. There are other even more informal negotiation spaces. The Delegates’ Lounge, located in the UN building, receptions, cafeterias, and chat groups like those on WhatsApp are other platforms where diplomats not only reiterate their positions, but also show their interests. It is in these spaces where agreements are “pre-cooked,” and where civil society and United Nations agencies also meet with negotiators to present their interests and points of view. After several “informal-informals,” consultations within the groups, instructions from capitals and a lot of coffee and snacks; either agreements are reached or it is concluded that there is no agreement on paper and therefore the resolution will go to a vote, rather than being adopted by consensus. The culture within the second committee is to strive for consensus, and for the most part that has been achieved, however, since 2017 Member States began to adopt some of them through the modality of recorded vote, due to lack of agreement. The resolutions reflect a minimum common denominator, so in many cases they are not clear or relevant to governments. Likewise, “the fact that resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly are not legally binding does also not help to increase their relevance and does not put pressure on the negotiators to make resolutions intelligible.”12

The global economy “symptoms” The pandemic will leave the world economy in its worst recession since World War II, with the largest fraction of economies experiencing declines in per capita output since 1870.13 The quantification will not be known until the virus has been controlled, through a vaccine or treatment, but in the long term.

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A look at other pandemics, since the Black Death of the 14th century, allow us to observe that the economic effects reach the medium and long term.14 The only certainty is that asymmetries within and between countries have deepened and that the structural and systemic problems of the world economy worsened the recession. How did the pandemic infect the world economy, in its initial stage? COVID-19 contracted the world economy by 5.2 per cent, according to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospect report. The countries most affected by the confinement were those that, to a large extent, depend on international trade, tourism, exports of commodities and external financing.15 In fact, there are countries on the verge of collapse with 80–90 per cent deceleration.16 Similarly, the onset of the pandemic was devastating for the stock markets. Stock market indicators fell to historic lows. The S&P500 index, for example, experienced the sharpest drop since the Great Depression of 1930, going from 3,373 on 20 February to 2,237 on 25 March (-34 per cent).17 The abrupt economic slowdown in the United States and China disrupted the supply chains of many emerging economies, causing a sharp drop in exports from commodity-producing economies.18 International investors began to leave so-called emerging markets at a rate not seen since the 2008 financial crisis, causing currencies to decline and forcing people to pay more for imported goods like food and fuel.19 In addition, the expected drop in global flows in the period 2020–2021 is estimated at between 30 per cent and 40 per cent.20 International trade and its “quarantine” With the spread of the virus and ensuing confinement, uncertainty, closed airports, and cancellation of maritime routes; world trade collapsed during the first six months of 2020. Faced with this, the international trade landscape was marked by individual trade measures, such as the restriction, including prohibition, of exports of medical supplies; the elimination or reduction of tariffs applicable to imports of medical supplies; and the implementation of trade facilitation measures aimed at streamlining imports of medical supplies.21 For its part, the already weakened World Trade Organization (WTO) was not in a position to offer “global solutions to global problems.” In fact, world trade was already decreasing before the COVID-19 outbreak. In 2019, the volume of world merchandise trade fell 0.4 per cent – its first decline since the 2008 global financial crisis. This was due to the progressive accumulation of trade barriers since early 2018 – mainly between the United States and China – and its effect dominated in highly interconnected global value chains.22 Nevertheless, it helped as a forum for the transparent exchange of information among its Members on their trade policies, which was agreed at the political level to include an immediate common goal: to guarantee the continuous flow

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of both medical and agricultural supplies, in order to protect the health and food security of populations. Nearly two-thirds of the notifications of WTO members in response to COVID-19 were related to technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Their objectives are streamlining certification procedures; ensuring that medical products are safe; making food available by relaxing technical regulations; and addressing the risks of COVID-19 from the international trade in live animals. The volume of merchandise trade generally decreased at a rate of 3 per cent in the first quarter of 2020.23 Initially, the forecasts for the end of the year were very pessimistic, with estimations of -32 per cent in world trade. WTO Director General Roberto Azevêdo indicated that, whereas the deployment of trade reached a historic low, it could have been much worse.24 Interestingly, world trade showed to have a not-so-weak “immune system” against the virus. Although there was no coordinated and global response to the pandemic, world trade was less sensitive to changes in global GDP. The WTO outlines three factors to explain this: i) fiscal and monetary policies were adopted more quickly and on a larger scale compared to 2008; ii) support to household incomes and the expectations that, in the long run, the pandemic would weaken, may have encouraged consumers to keep consumption levels higher than anticipated; and iii) much of the decrease in production has been concentrated in non-marketable services, such as hospitality, personal and leisure services, whose import component is usually much less than that of manufacturing. On the other hand, exports from LDCs proved to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of COVID-19. The participations of LDCs in world trade was already well below international targets and the crisis is likely to worsen this situation. Restrictions on the export of medical items and food could also hamper the recovery efforts of countries that are net importers of these products.25 Rising debt with “pre-existing conditions” The “immune system” of many economies suffered from high fiscal pressure due to inadequate levels of debt well before the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated this condition, as budgets had to be allocated to emergency response measures, in order to meet urgent health needs, and to respond to the growing unemployment rates catalyzed by lockdowns and the loss of business in many sectors. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2020, the relation of debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), on a global level, will increase by 13 percentage points in one year, from 83 per cent to 96 per cent. The average fiscal deficit for middle-income countries will be 9.1 per cent.26 For many developing countries, the pandemic represents the perfect storm, encapsulating a deteriorating long-standing fiscal situation, and additional needs for spending and collapsed incomes. This was particularly the case in countries dependent on commodity exports or imports, such as those relying heavily on the tourism industry.

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These economies were not ready for the crisis. In fact, according to the United Nations, initial estimates indicate that Africa may be in its first recession in the last 25 years, while the Latin America and Caribbean region is facing the worst recession in history. Similar slowdowns are affecting many countries in Asia and the Arab Region.27 These recessions undoubtedly respond to high debt services, which in addition to limiting their response to COVID-19, have deepened the need for investments to achieve global objectives. Unlike the financial crisis of 2008, developing countries face the pandemic with records of global debt and a general accumulation of public debt, the result of low global interest rates and access to financing in the last decade. According to the United Nations, public debt in developing countries went from 35 per cent to 51 per cent of GDP between 2012 and 201928. The inertia of the financial market in the face of the pandemic meant that, despite global interest rates being close to zero, borrowing costs increased in most developing countries. Credit spreads on emerging market sovereign bonds more than doubled from January to April 2020. On the other hand, according to the Capital Flows Report, non-resident portfolio outflows from emerging market countries amounted to almost $100 billion since 21 January 2020.29 The debt situation is also a bottleneck in developed countries: since the start of the pandemic, they have experienced a sharp deterioration in their public finances. The United States government for example, will have a deficit of 15 per cent of GDP in 2020, which could increase if stimulus policies continue. According to the IMF, in developed countries, gross public debt will increase by $6 trillion to reach $66 trillion by the end of 2020, representing an increase from 105 per cent of GDP to 122 per cent.30 Looking forward, developed countries would do well to learn from experiences of the past. After the Second World War, rich countries reduced their debts over the course of decades, but only through the use of a combination of high capital taxes, financial repression with artificially low interest rates and inflation, which eroded the real value of debts over time. The future of work and the “new strain” of challenges Much like debt, the labour market had already been changing rapidly, due to several factors such as globalization, technological advances and demographic changes. In 2015, the international community took an important step by including decent work in Sustainable Development Goal 8: “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all” (SDG 8). Member States agreed on its inclusion following lessons learnt from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which did not address this issue. In the same vein, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda also highlighted the importance of generating full and productive employment and decent work for all – placing decent work as a central objective in national development strategies.

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Many forecasts warned about the need for public policies that address the situation of 190 million unemployed people, and create 600 million new jobs by 2030, necessary for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.31 Without a doubt, the pandemic has marked a historical milestone in the labour market in several spheres. The worst-case scenario of the International Labour Organization (ILO) foresees the loss of 24 million jobs, similar to the job losses following the 2008 crisis. In a more conservative scenario, the ILO estimates that the pandemic will close more than 13 million people out of work. Regarding the global loss of income from work, the ILO forecasts that these will range between US $860 billon and US $3.44 trillion, which will lead to a reduction in aggregate demand and will hinder the recovery of the business sector, which will have repercussions negatively in the fiscal accounts of each country32. According with OECD, even in the more optimistic scenario for the evolution of the pandemic, the OECD-wide unemployment rate may reach 9.4 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2020, exceeding all the peaks since the Great Depression. Average employment in 2020 is projected to be between 4.1 per cent and 5 per cent lower than in 2019. The share of people in work is expected still to be below pre-crisis levels even at the end of 2021.33 These figures are likely to be bleaker in developing countries, many of which did not have the infrastructure in place to ensure business continuity through the global pandemic. The effects of the pandemic on lost working hours are even more discouraging. In the first quarter of 2020, that is, at the time of the greatest uncertainty and most rapid spread of the pandemic, working hours around the world were reduced by 5.4 per cent, compared to the previous quarter, which is equivalent to 155 million full-time jobs. At the time of writing, projections for the end of the year foresee that this figure will reach 400 million (-14.0 per cent). Lower-middle-income countries would be the most affected, as the ILO forecasts a 16.1 per cent decrease in working hours in this group of countries.34 Although the ILO projections are preliminary and, by their nature, can have a very wide range of compliance, in all cases a substantial increase in unemployment worldwide is highlighted. These figures and unemployment in general, should not only be viewed from an economic perspective but also from a social and even emotional perspective. Labour is about much more than an employee earns, it is a central pillar of each individual’s life, giving people meaning, purpose and dignity, and providing a platform for social interaction and integration. It allows you to make an active contribution to society. One of the most robust findings in the economics of happiness is that unemployment is destructive to people’s wellbeing. We find this is true around the world. The employed evaluate the quality of their lives much more highly on average as compared to the unemployed. Individuals who are unemployed also report around 30 percent more negative emotional experiences in their day-to-day lives.35

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The unemployment statistics have human faces and many of them are from working women, many of them in frontline jobs. According to the ILO, there is a risk that there will be a setback from some of the gains made in recent decades, and that gender inequality in the labour market will be exacerbated.36 Consequently, the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout are having a regressive effect on gender equality. Women’s jobs are 1.8 times more vulnerable to this crisis than men’s; in fact, according to McKinsey Global Institute, women make up 39 per cent of global employment and 54 per cent of total job losses.37 The main reasons for the impact of COVID-19 on women is the increase in unpaid work as a result of confinement, as many women are permanently leaving the labour market to care for children, in the context of school and day-care closures, as well as the higher risk of elderly populations (that provide limited childcare possibilities). Undoubtedly, the effects of these trends and setbacks in the insertion of women in the labour market will translate into reductions in world GDP. It is therefore essential that the economic empowerment of women is integrated into recovery policies and plans, such as the financial inclusion of women, equal pay for men and women doing the same work, and the promotion of responsible business conduct and an inclusive culture that promotes gender equality as an effective response to the crisis. Economic diplomacy during the pandemic and towards the new paradigm of implementation Every spring, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the Forum on Financing for Development takes place in New York. It aims to follow up on the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda and discuss the global economic situation among high-level government representatives, heads of United Nations agencies and Bretton Woods institutions. In this space, organized back-to-back with the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, compliance with the commitments made by the Member States in 2015 is evaluated. Several weeks in advance, the diplomats in charge of macroeconomic issues negotiate a resolution that, in addition to monitoring and defining policies aimed at financing the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, generates mandates for the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Plan. The outcome document of the 2020 Forum was the first one to be negotiated electronically and approved through a tacit agreement procedure. It also included a set of universally agreed United Nations policies to fund the COVID-19 response and recovery initiatives38. The negotiations for this document were very different from previous years. For many it was a “lost year” in terms of the implementation of resolutions and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, not only because the priorities of governments were focused on recovering from the pandemic and the urgency of obtaining credit lines to alleviate all fiscal pressures, but because the spaces did not exist to achieve a true negotiation.

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However, the crisis created opportunities for the future. As mentioned in other sections of this chapter, international financial organizations implemented debt relief policies for developing countries; likewise, the United Nations established a fund for response and recovery against COVID, aimed at low- and middle-income countries. Both cases are related to contentious aspects of the development financing agenda and leave lessons for their implementation: i) it is possible to implement policies towards debt sustainability; and ii) a paradigm shift is necessary in the measurement of development, beyond per capita income, and in meeting the specific needs of middle-income countries. These issues are raised in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, but no progress had been made in their implementation, mainly due to a lack of agreements and political decision. Undoubtedly, once the pandemic passes and there are no longer restrictions on social distancing, it will be necessary to return to traditional methods of negotiation, face to face, in which the lessons left by the pandemic will be taken into account, as important steps towards the implementation of the global financing for development agenda. Additionally, as part of the diplomatic response to face the pandemic, in May 2020, Canada, Jamaica and the Secretary-General convened a high-level event to enable discussions of concrete financing solutions for the COVID-19 emergency and beyond. Discussions addressed questions of external finance and remittances, jobs and inclusive growth; recovering better for sustainability; global liquidity and financial stability; debt vulnerability; private sector creditors engagement; and illicit financial flows. Outcomes include policy interventions for the short, medium and long term.39 The United Nations “analgesics” The pandemic came at a difficult time for multilateralism and for the United Nations as an institution. Interrogations about the world body, effectiveness and criticism of its bureaucratic burden were on the scene. Nonetheless, the response of the United Nations focused on three global elements: i) a comprehensive health response coordinated on a large scale by the World Health Organization; ii) an initiative to protect life from the economic, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights consequences; and iii) a recovery towards transformative changes40. In terms of funding, a significant portion of the $17.8 billion apportioned to the United Nations package of sustainable development programs was reallocated to needs related to COVID-19. In addition, the Secretary-General launched three response plans to help people on the ground: 

The Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan ($1.74 billion) to meet immediate health needs, which was financed from government budgets and various funds that received contributions from businesses and individuals.41

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The Global Humanitarian Response Plan COVID-19 (raising goal: $2.48 billion) was created to mitigate the effects of the pandemic in more than 63 highly vulnerable countries.42 The United Nations COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund (raising goal: $1 billion), which was designed to finance socio-economic response and recovery measures in low- and middle-income countries.43



While the latter two plans did not receive donor support at the speed expected by the Secretary-General, the response was swift enough and adapted to an enemy that was very unknown at the time. COVID-19 forced a rethinking of the priorities designed at the beginning of 2020. For example, the World Bank responded by focusing on four priorities: i) saving lives threatened by COVID-19; ii) protecting vulnerable people; and iii) consolidating the foundations of the economy to shorten the recovery time, and strengthening policies and institutions to achieve resilience based on transparent and sustainable investments and indebtedness. To support these emergency programs, the financing granted by the entity was significantly increased, which made commitments amounting to US $74 billion (+19.7 per cent compared to 2019).44 For its part, the IMF focused on financial assistance and debt service relief, in order to help developing countries face the economic effects of the pandemic. Since the end of March, its Board of Directors approved the opening of various credit lines and made available to member countries around $250 billion, a quarter of its credit capacity of $1 trillion.45

Proposed “prescriptions” for the financing for development While the COVID-19 pandemic and global economic downturn is still evolving at the time of writing, projections seen thus far shed light on the future. With the benefit of hindsight from history, this Chapter offers some recommendations and potential “prescriptions” to address the economic situation and build an enabling economic global environment. Trade in the “new normal” Trade will undoubtedly be an important component in the recovery post-2020, along with fiscal and monetary policy. In order to revive the investments needed, it will be essential that markets remain open and predictable, and foster a more favourable business environment in general. Progress must be made towards greater regional coordination in production, trade and technology. We expect lags to continue in 2021, as the threat of second waves of the virus and weaker economic growth persists. However, once the economic situation produced by COVID-19 begins to stabilize, governments should carefully analyze the measures in force to ensure that they have not become sources of unfair competition and distortions in the global economy. Today,

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more than ever, a “universal, rules-based, open, transparent, predictable, inclusive, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO)” is required to recover the economics around the World.46 There are several reports about intellectual property rights hindering or potentially hindering timely provisioning of affordable medical products to COVID-19 patients. One of the lessons of the pandemic will be the importance of ensuring that intellectual property rights such as patents, industrial designs, copyright and protection of undisclosed information do not create barriers to affordable, timely and accessible medical products including vaccines and medicines or to scaling-up of research, development, manufacturing and supply of medical products essential to combat COVID-1947. India and South Africa promoted a proposal in this regard in the framework of the WTO. At the time of writing, a draft resolution was under discussion. In conclusion, the future of international trade depends on the appetite of Member States to collaborate in favour of agreements on common rules and a predictable trade policy environment. Trade is the engine of the economy, therefore it must be strengthened and rescued from the pressures it has been facing since before the pandemic.48 “Debt Treatment” in three phases and the middle-income countries challenges Debt situations are heterogeneous, requiring tailor-made solutions that consider countries’ diverse vulnerabilities. That being said, there is one “medicine” that may be administered generally: leadership and political decision. Beyond diagnoses and prescriptions, the international community, within the framework of the United Nations, has agreed on principles for debt sustainability, most recently laid out in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. These principles also reflect best practices in the IMF and World Bank; including shared responsibility between debtors and creditors for unsustainable debt situations; timely and fair debt restructurings; and debt workouts that “aim to restore public debt sustainability, while enhancing the ability of countries to achieve sustainable development.”49 The first step of an intensive fiscal therapy for developing countries is a debt service moratorium. This approach seems to have been taken was taken as part of the COVID-19 response strategies of the G20, World Bank, IMF and others. Debt service payments have largely been suspended to provide the most vulnerable countries with the necessary fiscal space to respond to the crisis, without affecting their credit ratings, and thereby providing them with access to better credit lines in the medium term. Partial debt service suspensions were offered to 76 low-income developing countries, which includes all LDCs and 13 small island developing states. The IMF also offered more debt service relief to 25 of the poorest countries.50 Moreover, many of the cancellation and moratorium actions exclude middle-income countries that, after a decade of low global interest rates, have registered an abrupt growth in public debt, particularly the issuance of international bonds.51

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Given the debt structure in developing countries, which has increasingly given room to private creditors, there is a clear need for a moratorium policy similar to those used by other parts of the world. If this were to happen, it would lessen the burden on public creditors, and might favourably impact the creditworthiness of developing countries (that allows them to make payments in the future). The use of collective action clauses and other developments in bond markets since the early 2000s could be applied as well. In highly indebted developing countries, a moratorium will not suffice. A second step should take into account their investment needs for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The creation of healthy environments that attract investment will be essential here. Additionally – while not a solution for countries with unsustainable debt situations – debt swaps can free up resources for the COVID-19 response in developing countries and improve social investments. There are successful cases that can be replicated such as debt swaps to support the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.52The third step must be projected into the future. Debt sustainability will depend on better contractual terms and a greater use of debt instruments such as linking payments to GDP growth or natural disasters. The future of post-COVID-19 diplomacy should require a neutral forum for inclusive dialogue, both technically and politically, where the positions of sovereign creditors and debtors and other stakeholders can converge. The steps taken to address debt crisis in the context of the pandemic should be a starting point for discussions on more comprehensive options towards debt sustainability and the achievement of the SDGs. It is necessary to address, in a committed way, the situation of middle-income countries (MICs). The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the vulnerabilities of this group of countries. The first step is the fulfilment of one of the commitments made in Addis Ababa in relation to the development of measurements of progress on sustainable development – beyond per capita income – which recognize the multidimensional nature of poverty.53 It is now time to initiate a constructive dialogue between the groups of countries (LDCs, MICs and even China) to take a step forward on this issue. The “new normal” and the future of work With reference to the labour market and its perspectives; recovering from the pandemic will require policymakers to address the challenges of the future of work holistically. Achieving full, inclusive and equal decent work will require policies, including lifelong learning and social protection that support all workers, regardless of sector, or whether they are in the formal or informal economy.54 In addition to the effects of the pandemic, there is a risk that gaps in the world of work will widen due to new technologies, including automation and digitization, putting many out of jobs quickly and often unpredictably. The World Economic Forum notes that 75 million jobs can be displaced by a

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change in the division of labour between humans and machines. While the same report indicates that 133 million new roles may emerge more adapted to the new division of labour between humans, machines and algorithms; the roles are unlikely to be transferrable, and point to the need for upskilling, reskilling, and life-long learning, particularly for the most vulnerable. The new future of work demands that countries create synergies with private sector partners and educational institutions to minimize the negative effects of this phenomenon. On a positive note, environmental and climate action may provide new job opportunities when moving towards a green economy. Although green economies can cause significant job losses in carbon-intensive industries, according to the International Labour Organization, this will be offset by the creation of 24 million new jobs worldwide by 2030.56 The pandemic and unemployment will cause the informal sector to grow, so the application of incentives to address inequalities and structural gaps must be strengthened. Not only does this help protect those in the informal economy, but by incorporating them into the formalized economy, those countries strengthen their tax base, increasing much-needed revenues for capital investments, education, healthcare, and other social services. This, in turn, leads to even more skilled workers who again drive further growth and innovation. In the same vein, well-designed and effective minimum wages can contribute to the achievement of the targets of the SDGs to improve formalization. Looking forward: international tax cooperation, private finance and cities The recovery from COVID-19 and financing for development require national public resources that minimize the shocks to the fiscal systems that have occurred as of March 2020. Looking forward, governments may consider addressing tax evasion and illicit financial flows; boost the adoption of taxes to the digital economy; create environmental taxes to move towards the decarbonization of the economy and productive reconversion; revaluate tax expenditures; and strengthen personal income tax and property taxes. Member States have already committed themselves in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda to scaling up international tax cooperation, strengthen transparency and progressively advance towards automatic exchange of tax information among tax authorities.57 While some progress was made to strengthen the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters in 2017, after a determined action by the G77 and China (under Ecuador’s chairmanship), and pressure from civil society, more concerted efforts are urgently needed. Looking to the private sector, in 2019, Nigeria led a resolution on promoting investments for sustainable development, calling for cooperation to foster investments in the economies of developing countries.58 In 2020 however, the global economic downturn and subsequent uncertainty in business prospects have also depressed private investments. It is estimated that Global flows in foreign direct investments (FDI) may decline by up to 40 per cent in 2020,

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reaching the lowest levels since 2005. As usual, developing countries are expected to experience the biggest fall in FDI.59 As such, while private companies could play a role, their exposure to the pandemic means that they are likely to be more risk-averse than previously, particularly in undertaking investments in areas that need them the most, such as LDCs. Beyond existing and future compacts between the public and private sectors, regulations and legal stability are needed to avoid scaring away investors. On the other hand, systems need to be in place to not leave transnational corporations immune to relevant national regulations, responsibilities and standards, in particular those related to Human Rights. There is an important initiative in this regard: the negotiation process under the Human Rights Council Working Group on the elaboration of a treaty on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, established in 2014 by the HRC Resolution 26/9 led by Ecuador and South Africa. Post-COVID-19 may be the right time to engage in the negotiation of a legally binding instrument, to overcome existing gaps and barriers faced by victims to have access to justice and effective remedy in cases of business-related human rights abuses. Finally, local governments featured prominently in the midst of the pandemic. According to UN-Habitat, more than 95 per cent of COVID-19 contagions came from urban areas.60 In this sense, COVID-19 highlighted and exacerbated inequalities within and between cities around the World. Success in to confronting the virus depended on the state of public hospitals and even public transport of a given city, as the foundation for the mobilization of essential frontline workers, unpacking a renewed focus on sustainable urban development. Fortunately, the roadmap was defined in the New Urban Agenda, adopted by the Member States at the Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), in Quito, Ecuador, in 2016. Now, its implementation is urgent. For local governments’ recovery, financial support mechanisms will be essential, through access to credits in national and development banks. Recovery must take into account that the particular economic effects of the pandemic on local governments. It is necessary to rethink cities and promote the diversification of their economies in a sustainable way. This conversion takes time, but as in other pandemics, its end will mark the beginning of a new socioeconomic stage at all levels. Key recommendations This chapter has demonstrated that, more than ever, the world needs a strong and inclusive economic multilateralism. Developed and developing economies have suffered devastating shocks by COVID-19 crisis, demonstrating that systemic financial and economic problems have to be addressed head-on to minimize the recovery period. For developing countries, the “prescriptions” for economic restoration are the same as internationally designed before the pandemic.

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The most effective medicine is the political decision of all actors at all levels to fulfil their commitments, in particular those reflected in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which is key to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Before COVID-19, the fulfilment of developed countries’ unmet Official Development Assistance was a necessity, now it must be a global priority. In the same vein, it is essential to mobilize domestic and international resources to support the shocked fiscal systems, science, technology and innovation.

Special Article by Ambassador Modest Jonathan Mero The role of Bretton Woods Institutions and COVID-19 By Ambassador Modest Jonathan Mero Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) – the World Bank and the IMF – were established in 1944, in the context of a shattered post-war economy. The architects had the vision to establish an economic order based on consensual decision-making and cooperation in the realm of international trade and economic relations, based on the assumption that such cooperation was necessary to maintain international peace and security.61 Since their establishment, and particularly from the 1960s to date, BWIs have provided support to countries through grants (IDA), concession loans (IBRD and IMF) and commercial loans (IFC). In the medium term, these institutions have been very helpful to the developing world, particular through the provision of economic and social policy advice and financial support.62 Countries have been receiving grants and loans to fill the gap of their budgets and address fiscal challenges including, inter alia, meeting the targets of their planned development goals. The challenge of financing countries for development through Loans, be it concessional or commercial loans, has always been riddled with debts particularly in least developing countries (LDCs) and Middle-Income Countries (MICs). Efforts to develop appropriate social economic policies, particularly appropriate fiscal and trade policies, have always pre-occupied governments in the developing world. Unfettered market forces meant that developing countries could not address inequalities that result from policy failures, and the outcome of such interventions are yet to yield positive results. The Economic and Financial Crisis of 2008 threatened to bring the world economy to a halt, despite various efforts by governments, multilateral organizations like the United Nations, BWIs and others. BWIs: during and post pandemic The challenge of COVID-19 emerged in the late 2019 with far reaching impact at global level. So far, many countries have been affected by number of lives lost and lockdowns that have slowed down the global economy. While

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waiting for a vaccine to be developed, financial resources are also crucially needed to mitigate the spread of the virus through effective COVID-19 testing and tracing systems. The responsibility to help each country to achieve low infection rates remains an extremely cheap alternative to the costly lockdown measures which have destroyed so many livelihoods. The sudden fall in income and sharp increase in public spending has vastly compressed the fiscal space for economies. Economies that had a high risk of over-indebtedness before COVID-19 will probably worsen, and debt service obligations could fall in defaults. A reorganization of fiscal policies will be fundamental.63 The G20 recently responded swiftly by implementing the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), the IMF by raising lending to the poorest countries, and the World Bank and regional development banks by increasing financial resources available to developing economies. While undoubtedly steps in the right direction, these measures were regarded as insufficient in light of the depth of the debt crisis.64 To address global liquidity problems, experts have proposed a new issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which are an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’ official reserves.65 These would include more flexible disbursement requirements and the extension of central bank swap lines, as well as a fund to provide financing concessional finance and investments to developing economies from multilateral development banks.66 The pandemic has demonstrated a fact that has been discussed for several years: that each group of countries, and even each economy, faces unique challenges. Regarding debt, it is essential to involve private sector creditors in debt standstills that take these singularities into account and to promote policies that could help maintain market access for countries.67 In the very short term, policies must be adopted to free up liquidity and potentially restore access to credit markets – including an extension of the DSSI at least until the end of 2021.68 Global coordination and cooperation mechanism are called for to address the reverse in private financial flows, remittances and ODA, and to promote joint trade and investment for recovery and reconstruction. Remittance services could be declared essential for the short term, while seeking further reduction in remittance transfer costs (e.g. by subsidizing transactions or providing relief/ support to businesses in exchange for them offering reduced/no fees), and mobilizing underutilized diaspora investments.69 Likewise, developed economies must protect current ODA levels given its crucial role, particularly in least developed countries and other vulnerable countries. As discussed by Mr. Viera in this Chapter, political will is needed need to stop illicit financial flows globally. With adequate definition and commitment, this could free up much needed resources, especially in the context of the pandemic where emergency policies have freed up large amounts of resources and increased the risk of misappropriation of funds. It is fundamental to apply transparent responses to aid disbursement, protection of stimulus measures, financial inclusion, public procurement and fraud.70

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On the basis of the foregoing, the impact of COVID-19 requires interventions of financing for development, investments and trade in order to support the ailing global economy. The global priority should be:      

Creating strong, resilient and inclusive health systems, underpinned by Universal Health Coverage; Building environmentally sustainable, inclusive and dynamic economies, including the promotion of sustainable consumption and production patterns; Investing in digital technologies, with a focus on open, inclusive, affordable and secure access and developing digital literacy and skills for all; Prioritizing accountable, inclusive, transparent and resilient institutions; Creating fairer, more equal societies, especially for women and girls, children, people with disabilities and marginalized and crisis affected groups; and Expanding support for the most vulnerable, including through social and financial protection, and education and health systems, to ensure that noone is left behind.

Notes 1 Brinkman, Henk-Jan (2005). International Economic Diplomacy at the United Nations. Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today. Westview Press. p. 118. 2 Reinhart, Carmen (2017). Eight Years Later: Post-Crisis Recovery and Deleveraging. The Clearing House. 3 BBC (2020). Coronavirus y la economía: 3 diferencias clave entre la Gran Recesión de 2008 y la actual crisis causada por la pandemia. Accessed on 1 September 2020 at: www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-52987816. 4 United Nations (2009). Los gobiernos se reúnen esta semana en una Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas para adoptar a un acuerdo sobre medidas dirigidas a enfrentar la crisis económica. Accessed on 1 August 2020 at: www.un.org/es/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/Press_Release_Spanish24.pdf. 5 United Nations (2009). Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development. Resolution A/RES/63/303 of July 2009. 6 United Nations (2015). Outcome document adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. Resolution A/RES/69/313 of July 2015. 7 United Nations (2020). Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2020. Interagency Task Force on Financing for Development. Accessed on 3 September 2020 at: https://developmentfinance.un.org/sites/developmentfinance.un.org/files/FSDR_2020. pdf. 8 United Nations (2020). Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2020. Interagency Task Force on Financing for Development. Accessed on 3 September 2020 at: https://developmentfinance.un.org/sites/developmentfinance.un.org/files/FSDR_2020. pdf. 9 World Bank (2020). Projected poverty impacts of COVID-19 (coronavirus). Accessed on 10 September 2020 at: www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/ projected-poverty-impacts-of-COVID-19. 10 Rahman, Mahfuzur (2002). World Economic Issue at the United Nations: Half a Century of Debate. p. xii.

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11 Brinkman, Henk-Jan (2005). International Economic Diplomacy at the United Nations. Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today. Westview Press. p. 118. 12 Ibid. p. 118. 13 World Bank (2020). COVID-19 to Plunge Global Economy into Worst Recession since World War II. Accessed on 10 July 2020 at: www.worldbank.org/en/news/ press-release/2020/06/08/covid-19-to-plunge-global-economy-into-worst-recessionsince-world-war-ii. 14 Jordá, Óscar, Singh, Sanjay R. and Tylor, Alan M. (2020). La larga resaca económica de la pandemia. International Monetary Fund. Accessed on 10 August 2020 at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/spa/2020/06/pdf/impacto-economico-alargo-plazo-de-la-pandemia-jorda.pdf. 15 World Bank (2020). Global Economic Prospect. World Bank Group. 16 Garofali, Alejandro (2020). International economic Outlook in times of COVID-19 – A SWOT analysis – The World before and after COVID-19. European Institute of International Studies Press. Accessed on 10 September 2020 at: www.ieeiweb.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Full_book_FINAL_EN2.0-UNIDO.pdf. 17 Salazar, Andrés and Viera, Jonathan (2020). COVID-19 y los mercados bursátiles: ¿Quiénes ganan? y ¿Quiénes pierden?. Ekos. Accessed on 2 October 2020 at: www. ekosnegocios.com/articulo/covid-19-y-los-mercados-bursatiles-quienes-ganan-y-qu ienes-pierden. 18 World Bank (2020). Perspectivas económicas mundiales: América Latina y el Caribe. Accessed on 8 October 2020 at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/ 657071588788309322/Global-Economic-Prospects-June-2020-Regional-OverviewLAC-SP.pdf. 19 Goodman, Peter S., Politi, Daniel, Raj, Suhasini, Chutel, Lynsey and Dahir, Abdi Latif (2020). El preocupante efecto del coronavirus en las economías más vulnerables del mundo. New York Times. Accessed on 8 October 2020 at: www.nytimes.com/ es/2020/03/26/espanol/negocios/economia-coronavirus.html. 20 Garofali, Alejandro (2020). International economic Outlook in times of COVID-19 – A SWOT analysis –. The World before and after COVID-19. European Institute of International Studies Press. Accessed on 10 September 2020 at: www.ieeiweb.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Full_book_FINAL_EN2.0-UNIDO.pdf. 21 Toro, Sergio (2020). Medidas comerciales y Covid-19: identificación de tendencias. Paper. 22 CEPAL (2020). América Latina y el Caribe ante la pandemia del COVID-19. Accessed on 8 October 2020 at: https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/ 11362/45337/4/S2000264_es.pdf. 23 World Trade Organization (2020). Trade falls steeply in first half of 2020. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr858_e.pdf. 24 Blenkinsop, Philip (2020). WTO says record trade plunge could have been worse. Reuters. Accessed on 2 July 2020 at: www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto/wtosays-record-trade-plunge-could-have-been-worse-idUSKBN23U125. 25 United Nations (2020). Follow-up to and implementation of the outcomes of the International Conferences on Financing for Development. Report of the Secretary –General. Document A/75/146. 26 International Monetary Fund (2020). Fiscal Monitor April 2020. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2020/04/06/fiscalmonitor-april-2020. 27 United Nations. (2020). Debt and COVID-19: A Global Response in Solidarity. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: www.un.org/en/coronavirus/UN-response. 28 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020). COVID-19 and sovereign debt. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: www.un.org/development/ desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-72-covid-19-and-sovereign-debt/.

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29 Institute of International Finance (2020). Capital Flows Report April 2020: Sudden Stop in Emerging Markets. 30 The Economist (2020). After the disease, the debt. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/2_IIF2020_April_CFR.pdf. 31 United Nations (2020). COVID-19: impact could cause equivalent of 195 million job losses, says ILO chief. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: https://news.un.org/ en/story/2020/04/1061322. 32 Organización Internacional del Trabajo (2020). COVID-19: Repercusiones ¿En qué medida va a afectar el COVID-19 al mundo del trabajo? Accessed on 15 August 2020 at: www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/impacts-and-responses/WCMS_739398/ lang–es/index.htm. 33 OECD (2019). OECD Employment Outlook 2020: Worker Security and the COVID-19 Crisis. OECD Publishing. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: https://dx.doi. org/10.1787/9ee00155-en. 34 Observatorio de la OIT (2020). La COVID‑19 y el mundo del trabajo. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_749470.pdf. 35 De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel and Ward, George (2017). Does Work Make You Happy? Evidence from the World Happiness Report. Harvard Business Review. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: https://hbr.org/2017/03/does-work-make-youhappy-evidence-from-the-world-happiness-report. 36 International Labour Organization (2020). The COVID-19 Response: Getting Gender Equality Right for a Better Future for Women at Work. Accessed on 15 May 2020 at: www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/WCMS_744685/lang–en/ index.htm. 37 Madgavkar A., White, O., Krishnan M., Mahajan,D., and Azcue X. (2020). COVID19 and gender equality: Countering the regressive effects. McKinsey Global Institute. Accessed on 5 October 2020 at: www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-ofwork/covid-19-and-gender-equality-countering-the-regressive-effects#. 38 United Nations (2020). Summary by the President of the Economic and Social Council of the forum on financing for development follow-up. Document A/75/ 93–E/2020/64. 39 United Nations (2020). Initiative on Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond. Accessed on 5 October 2020 at: www.un.org/en/coronavirus/financing-development. 40 Naciones Unidas (2020). Respuesta Integral del Sistema de las Naciones Unidas a la COVID-19: Salvar Vidas, Proteger a las Sociedades, Lograr la Recuperación y mejorar el Mundo. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/ files/un-comprehensive-response-covid-19-exec-summary-spanish-translation.pdf. 41 World Health Organization (2020). 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019‑nCoV): Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. Accessed on 8 May 2020 at: www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/strategic-preparedness-and-response-plan-for-the-new-coronavirus. 42 United Nations (2020). Global Humanitarian Response Plan COVID-19. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Global-HumanitarianResponse-Plan-COVID-19.pdf. 43 United Nations (2020). The Secretary-General’s UN COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund. Accessed on 5 May 2020 at: https://unsdg.un.org/resources/ secretary-generals-un-covid-19-response-and-recovery-fund. 44 World Bank (2020). En medio de múltiples crisis, el Grupo Banco Mundial reorienta programas e incrementa el financiamiento. Accessed on 7 August 2020 at: www.bancomundial.org/es/news/press-release/2020/07/10/amid-multiple-crisesworld-bank-group-refocuses-programs-and-increases-financing-to-74-billion-infiscal-year-2020.

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45 International Monetary Fund (2020). COVID-19 Financial Assistance and Debt Service Relief. Accessed on 5 October 2020 at: www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-andcovid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker. 46 United Nations (2020). Follow-up to and implementation of the outcomes of the International Conferences on Financing for Development. Report of the SecretaryGeneral. Document A/75/146. 47 South Center (2020). Action at the WTO is needed to accelerate research, development, manufacturing and supply of medical products to combat Covid-19. Southnews. 48 United Nations (2020). Follow-up to and implementation of the outcomes of the International Conferences on Financing for Development. Report of the SecretaryGeneral. Document A/75/146. 49 United Nations (2020). Debt and COVID-19: A Global Response in Solidarity. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: www.un.org/en/coronavirus/UN-response. 50 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020). COVID-19 and sovereign debt. Accessed on18 September 2020 at: www.un.org/development/ desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-72-covid-19-and-sovereign-debt/. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 United Nations (2015). Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. Resolution A/69/313. 54 According to the International Labour Organization, 2 billion people work informally, most of them in emerging and developing countries. The majority lack social protection, rights at work and decent working conditions. 55 The World Economic Forum (2018). The Future of Jobs Report 2018. Accessed on18 April 2020 at: www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2018.pdf. 56 Informe de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (2018). Perspectivas sociales y del empleo en el mundo 2018: ecologizar con empleos. Accessed on18 April 2020 at: www. ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/—publ/documents/publication /wcms_638150.pdf. 57 United Nations (2015). Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. Resolution A/69/313. 58 General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/74/199). 59 United Nations (2020). Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2020. Interagency Task Force on Financing for Development. Accessed on 3 September 2020 at: https://developmentfinance.un.org/sites/developmentfinance.un.org/files/FSDR_2020. pdf. 60 UN-Habitat (2020). OPINION: COVID-19 demonstrates urgent need for cities to prepare for pandemics. Accessed on 3 September 2020 at: https://unhabitat.org/ opinion-covid-19-demonstrates-urgent-need-for-cities-to-prepare-for-pandemics. 61 Bretton Woods Project (2020). What are the Bretton Woods Institutions? Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/01/art-320747/. 62 Driscoll, David (2020). The IMF and the World Bank How Do They Differ? International Monetary Fund. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm. 63 United Nations (2020). Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond Menu of Options for the Considerations of Ministers of Finance Part I. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/part_i_executive_summary_menu_of_options_financing_for_development_covid19.pdf. 64 G20 (2020). Communiqué G20 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors Meeting. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/FMCBG%20Communiqu%C3%A9_English_14October2020_700pm.pdf. 65 According to the IMF Website, so far SDR 204.2 billion (equivalent to about US $281 billion) have been allocated to members, including SDR 182.6 billion

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68 69

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allocated in 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. The value of the SDR is based on a basket of five currencies – the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling. Accessed on 10 September 2020 at: www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/ Special-Drawing-Right-SDR. United Nations (2020). Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond Menu of Options for the Considerations of Ministers of Finance Part I. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/part_i_executive_summary_menu_of_options_financing_for_development_covid19.pdf. United Nations (2020). Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond Menu of Options for the Considerations of Ministers of Finance Part II. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/part_ii_detailed_menu_of_options_financing_for_development_covid19.pdf. Ibid. United Nations (2020). Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond Menu of Options for the Considerations of Ministers of Finance Part I. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/part_i_executive_summary_menu_of_options_financing_for_development_covid19.pdf. United Nations (2020). Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond Menu of Options for the Considerations of Ministers of Finance Part I. Accessed on 26 September 2020 at: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/part_i_executive_summary_menu_of_options_financing_for_development_covid19.pdf.

4

Future of digital cooperation Hana Alhashimi

Digital technologies are increasingly blending into every aspect of human life – from how we interact, to how we work, learn, organize and entertain ourselves. To consider the digital field today is, for many parts of the world, to consider absolutely everything. As we reflect on this systemic shift, listed by many as similar to the invention of the Gutenberg Press, which brought with it the age of accessible information for millions around the world; the question arises as to whether our policy mechanisms, international relations and diplomacy have managed to keep up, beyond the surface-level of “Zoom-plomacy” and “WhatsApp negotiations.” In 2017, the United Nations Secretary-General flagged that digital cooperation was one of the defining questions of our time. By 2020, that proved to be true. With widespread lockdowns and the breakdown of social structures, digital technologies provided a lifeline for half the world to continue to function, while demonstrating the reality that the other half of the world remained offline, and at risk of further development losses as a result. Challenges of digital connectivity, privacy and security captivated the attention of policymakers and media alike, across the world, in both developed and developing countries. We stand at a crossroads in the standoff between the ‘regulators’ and the ‘regulated’– COVID-19 has brought into sharp focus the need to overcome that standoff, with risks magnified and increasingly dangerous. What digital technologies and COVID-19 have in common are twofold: on the one hand, both are entirely transboundary in nature, with little regard to borders and political structures. On the other hand, both amplify existing inequalities, and exacerbate global governance gaps. While there has been much attention over the past few years on the impact of technological advancements on our systems, structures and strategies, the implications of COVID-19 remain to be seen.1 This chapter will consider both, with a view to the future of cooperation on – and in – the digital space. The chapter makes two key arguments: first, the importance of people-centred policy. Digital technologies must be designed, disbursed and regulated with people in mind, so that they may fulfil their potential as a catalyst for sustainable

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development for all. COVID-19 made it clear that it is no longer acceptable or economically feasible for 3.6 billion people (around half the world population in 2019) to live offline.2 As we consider the uses of technologies and privacy and security issues, the human element remains integral. The second argument highlights the importance of multistakeholder cooperation in the question of how we govern digital technologies. What are the roles and responsibilities of the public, private and civic sectors? How can technology developers, regulators and users ensure that the benefits of digital technologies are widely enjoyed, while risks are also mitigated? Ultimately, the chapter makes the argument for global digital cooperation as essential to the future of diplomacy and humanity alike. “Digital cooperation” refers to “ways of working together to address the societal, ethical, legal, and economic impacts of digital technologies to maximize benefits to society and minimize harms.”3 In addition to being the focus of this chapter, it raises one of the most exciting yet contentious pillars of the future of diplomacy, namely, systems of cooperation between and within the public, private and civic sectors. This can be understood to reflect the increasing shift to multistakeholder governance models that have implications on the social contract between and within these sectors.

The state of Digital up to 2020: the good, the bad and the ugly The Digital file is usually considered in broad buckets of development, rights and security, which, we argue, loosely correspond to “the good” (tech as a leapfrogger for development, an enabler of diplomacy and communication, and a lifeline in pandemics); “the bad” (tech as deepening inequalities, as those behind are left further behind, and risking of privacy infringement); and “the ugly” (tech as a medium for new forms of threats, attack, warfare, and crime). While digital technologies are neither “good” nor “bad” in and of themselves, human experiences certainly cover a broad spectrum, with at times unintended consequences that society grapples to deal with. The good There can be no doubt that digital technologies have transformed lives and livelihoods of billions around the planet for the better, and has the potential to continue to do so. The internet has spread faster than any other technology over the last 25 years – with a global penetration rate increase from 17 per cent in 2005 to over 53 per cent in 2019 (an average increase in internet users of 10 per cent every year).4 As outlined in Chapter 2, technology is a key lever for transformational development.5 The contributions of the digital revolution can, as a general statement, “raise labour, energy, resource and carbon productivity; reduce production costs; expand access to services; and may even dematerialize production.”6

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Much of the promise of technology lies in the pace of its development: The nature of exponential technological change is explained by Peter Diamandis through the three D’s: Digitization, de-monetization (breaking from capitalist models), and democratization (access to a broader base). To give the example of the music industry, streaming apps and even YouTube have digitized (brought online), de-monetized (provided for free), and democratized (provided to anyone with an internet connection) music in a way that forever altered the business model of the industry, in the span of a decade. Similar transformations are anticipated as Artificial Intelligence (AI) is embedded in everything from diagnostics, to tourism, and more.7 The term “leapfrogger” itself has emerged with numerous case studies of technology offering new pathways for developing countries (as opposed to exploitative models of the past) – creating new industries, business models and access to finance. For example, mPesa, Kenya’s mobile money marvel, had 30 million users in the first 10 years, such that nearly half the country’s GDP was processed by the app in 2017. This provided 93 per cent of the Kenyan population with access to mobile payments.8 Now active in ten countries, the app has been linked to poverty eradication and particularly women’s empowerment, enabling new avenues for income and economic empowerment for an estimated 185,000 women from 2008 to 2014.9 With unique mobile subscriptions expected to rise from 444 million to 634 million in sub-Saharan Africa between 2017 and 2025, the potential for growth continues.10 Technology has also radically transformed the practice of diplomacy. Delegates at the United Nations passing between chambers and the famed “delegates lounge” for caffeine sustenance may notice a dark chamber with the shells of 20th century telephone booths, and marvel at how their predecessors would have had to leave in the middle of gruelling negotiations to phone their capitals and request instructions or guidance on international public policy. Nowadays, the standard protocol is to send encrypted electronic cables – or WhatsApps. Indeed, coordination between countries is also increasingly seen through WhatsApp, albeit not formally. For example, while negotiating an annual resolution on Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for Development, the author of this chapter had the task of coordinating the position of a group of 134 developing countries – the “G77 and China.” The task was to hear out countries within the G77 and China on their priorities, propose and forge a group position, and then defend that position as the voice of the “developing south” in negotiations. With around 60 ongoing negotiations to be completed between September and December, delegates had a lot to juggle, and this “burden sharing” concept of having one representative was also used by the European Union. After noticing that delegates were not always able to be in the negotiating or coordinating meetings with country positions, the author made sure to WhatsApp delegates that were known to have positions on certain topics and test the waters before meetings, to avoid a need to change positions at a later stage when the delegate had time to join the meetings. Group positions were also circulated through email mailing lists to ensure all were on board.

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By the third year of coordinating the topic, the author tried a new tactic to try and push forward an agreement while saving time in negotiating rooms. Bearing in mind that colleagues negotiating were tied by the positions of their constituents, and had to stick to those positions in the negotiating rooms, the author worked with delegates representing the EU and US, among the most vocal in the negotiation, to brainstorm potential bridging positions. Instead multiple iterations of stating positions, reverting to the groups we represented for positions and then coming back with more positions to be stated, we met as a group of three to think about proposals that might work for all of us. We then took those back as “something suggested in the room” or “suggested by the facilitator/mediator,” and kept each other updated over WhatsApp if there were further changes needed, or any other updates. In this way, we could work collaboratively to meet the needs of the south on acknowledging the depth of digital divides and the need for support to ensure that “those behind are not left further behind,” while also meeting the needs of the North to acknowledge that the inequalities that exist are not the “fault” of technologies themselves, and that there is a role for all stakeholders in the way forward. Interestingly, the G77, EU and US delegates were questioned by their constituents on why they were such good friends even though they were on opposite sides. It was a good reminder of the importance of remembering that all nations are equal in the eyes of the UN, and all are there because they believe in international cooperation as a way forward, in spite of individual differences. The will to engage dates back to 1945, while the means were catalyzed more recently by “WhatsApp diplomacy.”11 As a general note, high-level global engagement in multilateral platforms have grown at unprecedented levels with the introduction of teleconferencing and other digital technologies. As a result, topics are not just increasingly digital, engagement can be too, opening avenues for greater inclusion of those not represented in a given city. In this way, a diplomat could (and many did) simultaneously work to find agreements on five processes without leaving their chairs, all while coordinating their children’s school pickup and calendars and, at times, online shopping for groceries. The flexibility that this has afforded for parents and specifically, women diplomats, is increasingly seen, as technology can provide tools for the balance between work and life (as opposed to it being an “either/or”). Ergo, digital technologies provide opportunities to empower people with access to them to live fuller lives. The bad The nature of rapid technological change is such that those that are currently behind in the development race are being left even further behind. Unfortunately, complex inequalities are also exacerbated, as can been seen through the gender digital divide. A woman in South Asia is 58 per cent less likely to be a

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user of mobile internet than a man. The average gender digital divide across developing countries is estimated at 23 per cent.12 While the origins of these trends include a range of cultural, financial, and skills-related barriers, technology is a clear amplifier of those barriers, and even more-so during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in section 2 of this chapter. Overall, 46.4 per cent of the world remained offline in 2019. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are home to the majority of the unconnected, with just two out of every ten people being online.13 This figure is far bleaker if we delve into the multidimensional aspects of connectivity, including reliability, affordability, relevance, and access. To illustrate the need for these aspects: living in an area with broadband coverage does not mean that people have the hardware to use it, or indeed that they can afford it. Moreover, for them to use it in a meaningful way, they would need relevant content, ideally in their own language. As such, access for empowerment is inherently linked to the ability of people to be content creators, rather than just users, hence the importance of capacity building, and the push for “meaningful connectivity.”14 While there is global consensus on the need to bridge digital divides between and within countries, the question of “how” remains tricky. “Means of implementation” – the financing, policy reform, and other action required to realize targets set by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Connect 2030, and other agreements – continue to be contentious. UN development-related processes tend to follow similar patterns: developing countries emphasize the need for additional financial support from developed countries, who in turn call for the creation of “enabling environments” through policy reform and governance as a precondition for support. With so many parallel processes, negotiators can, at times, cling to these positions without even considering the context or having explicit instructions from capitals. As such, updates to resolutions are largely incremental. In a negotiation around ICT’s for development, for example, a coordinator of a group of developed countries stated confidentially that “I haven’t heard back from capital, but there are rural areas in my country with poor connectivity and so we can’t say that developing countries are the only ones that need help.” This comment was seen as a direct threat to a delegate from a developing country, who also had not received instructions, but was quick to remind developed countries of their commitment to official development assistance. A tug of war ensued on how much of the divide to mention and how many times, without reaching clear agreement on who would address the issue on the ground, and instead asking for a customary report of the Secretary-General. Further challenges in digital governance include privacy, freedom of expression and human rights in the digital age, particularly when coupled with cybersecurity. The euphoria around “data being the new gold” was closely followed by legitimate questions on what right private companies had to sell and aggregate data, and to what end? To provide a hypothetical example, a conglomerate may own both an insurance company and a grocery chain. In theory, they could have access to data from John Doe’s cardiologist, as well as

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information about his food purchases and lifestyle choices. Aggregating the data from different areas might allow them to estimate John Doe’s life expectancy based on the amount of frozen pizzas bought, without his knowledge or consent. A question raised by a distinguished technology regulator in a private meeting was “who owns this data? The insurer? John Doe’s wife? His boss?” Over time, growing questions of the use of technology for surveillance, particularly in authoritarian states, have evolved, along with individual breeches of privacy.15 This challenge is expected to mushroom – with an anticipated “Big Data Bang” that will increase the number of smart devices able to communicate wirelessly (IoTs) from 2 billion objects in 2006 to 200 billion by the end of 2020.16 As the technologies develop, so do the risks, as we learned in 2017 when a baby monitor was hacked and took down the electricity grid in the West coast of the US.17 As such, clear efforts are needed to be able to achieve the “Internet of Good Things.”18 Growing concerns also include the Future of Work. While technologies have the potential to create opportunities, particularly for developing countries, to participate in new sectors and diversify their economies, concerns about the distribution of productivity gains, job losses due to automation, and widening inequalities remain, as outlined in Chapter 3. Moving forward, it is essential that policymakers and the private sector cooperate to support displaced workers. …and the ugly As much as digital technologies create opportunities, they can also be tools for crime, debauchery, and in some instances, mischief with dire consequences. Cybercrime cost the world $3 trillion in 2015, and was anticipated to double by 2021, representing the “greatest transfer of economic wealth in history” from the damage and destruction of data, stolen money, lost productivity, intellectual property theft, embezzlement, fraud, disruption, investigation and recourse.19 In 2016, 150 countries were shocked by the “WannaCry” ransomware attack, affecting the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) as well as FedEx and other global entities, until it was halted by an “accidental hero” and former hacker aged 22.20 The impact on human lives was most pronounced in the shutting down of emergency rooms in the United Kingdom – one of the most technologically-advanced countries on the planet – due to the loss of access to patient data on the system. In 2017, cybersecurity experts reported a growth rate for ransomware in the dark web marketplace of 2,500 per cent per year.21 As many developing countries have expressed then and since – “we don’t stand a chance.” To date, there are no resolutions that establish the definitions of cybercrime or cyberattack. As such, there is no clear international agreement on how to address them. Broadly speaking, cybercrime covers criminal activities by nonstate actors, ranging from online child sexual exploitation, money laundering,

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funding, and promotion of terrorist activities, and the sale of criminal substances such as drugs over the dark web.22 Cyberattack (or, indeed, cyberwarfare) falls into a separate category involving state actors. The challenges of ascertaining “blame” for attacks in cyberspace mean that data on state-sponsored national attacks remain, largely, inconclusive: Although there is by some accounts “significant evidence” that North Korea was behind the WannaCry attack, this was never proven and recourse never formally made.23 Much attention has been given, more recently, to alleged attempts of interference in electoral systems, and the potential for digital technologies to be used to influence voter preferences or hack systems in a number of countries. Again, systems for accountability and recourse are lacking. One frustrated Permanent Representative of a Small Island Developing State pointed out the elephant in the room, in a meeting of the Forum of Small States at the United Nations, by posing the question on everyone’s minds: “When a state experiences a cyber-attack, who can we call?”24 Numerous attempts have been made by states and stakeholders alike, creating an ecosystem of cyber-norm processes aimed at operationalizing normative standards of behaviour for states and/or other stakeholders in cyberspace.25 In the case of cybersecurity, these include: 1 2 3 4

UN groups: the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity; Expert commissions: the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace; Industry coalitions: the Cybersecurity Tech Accord and Charter of Trust; Multistakeholder collectives: the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.

Of these, the UN GGE on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security have reached agreement on a few occasions: In 2013, its 15 Governmental experts agreed on the applicability of international law and confidence-building measures in cyberspace; and in 2015, they proposed 11 voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, including against damaging critical infrastructure, and responding to requests for help by states whose critical infrastructure has been harmed by a cyberattack. The latter were endorsed by the G20 and the General Assembly.26 From 2015 to the time of writing, however, the group has been unable to achieve consensus on the question of “how” implementation may occur. In 2018, the General Assembly established the Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, in parallel with the sixth GGE. On 1 October 2020, France and Egypt proposed a Programme of Action as a new format for UN cybersecurity deliberations, to replace the dual processes of the GGE and OEWG with a single, permanent UN forum.27 The complexity of the “ugly” side of digital technologies requires a deep knowledge of the technology itself, the regulatory environment and ethics to

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protect people in the digital space. No one stakeholder group – whether its innovators or regulators – holds these competencies entirely. As such, any solution requires cooperation across sectors of some sort, if we are to achieve policies that benefit and protect people. Internet Governance therefore poses questions to the classic model of diplomacy, which is based on sovereign states. State of governance Digital technologies and their governance cover a vast array of seemingly very technical elements. Fundamentally, it has brought up the question of stakeholder diplomacy and the role of non-governmental entities in a state-led organization such as the UN. Of all the changes that have arisen since the creation of the United Nations in 1945 – the altered power balance with technology giants cannot be denied. In 2019, the five largest tech giants enjoyed combined revenues of $801.5 billion, of which $139 billion was net income.28 Their operations and presence across national jurisdictions pose a direct challenge to the multilateral system based on borders, posing several governance challenges regardless of the technologies created.29 The topic of Internet Governance has teetered at the edges of the multilateral system for nearly two decades.30 The first head-of-state-level attempt to form international public policy on who, how, and what parts of the internet may be governed took place in a two-part summit held in Geneva in 2003 and in Tunis in 2005. In some ways this was diplomatic juggling at its finest – the two cities allowed for both the North and the South to host, and as such to be on their own turf while defending the multistakeholder and multilateral models of internet governance respectively, which at the time was a polarizing debate. The UN definition of Internet Governance itself evolves from the Working Group on Internet Governance in 2005 as “the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.”31 Over the next decade, various attempts were made to strike a balance between privacy, freedom of expression and cybersecurity. Brazil and the European Union convened the “Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance” (NETMundial) in an attempt to try to progress on agreed principles for Internet Governance, with a focus on privacy.32 Conversations did not make it into the UN or result in binding agreements. Instead, as more incidents unravelled, including the Wikileaks and Snowden allegations, there was a growing loss of public trust in traditional authority from the early 2010s.33 A frequent question posed was: What role could governments play in something as technical as the internet? Accordingly, what could a multilateral system representing government voices alone, such as the UN, have to do with the internet? The counter-argument, mainly from the global south, was how adequate representation in decision making would be possible without one voice per country?

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As a result of the gridlock, the internet continued to spread without a global governance system, but with multistakeholder agreements on the logical and infrastructure layers, which cover the cables, satellites, wireless systems and internet exchange points, as well as the registries and protocols.34 The logical system that allows the internet to function as “one internet” falls under the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a California-based entity that originated under the US government and was still affiliated with it until the “IANA stewardship transition” in 2016, which created a distributed, multistakeholder governance system with no single country or entity in “charge.”35 It should be noted that multistakeholderism is not an end-goal but rather an evolving consideration of a shifting power balance between businesses, the technical community, governments and civil society, the balance of which varies depending on the most effective form of governance in a given context.36 For the purposes of this book, we will not delve too deeply into the infrastructure or logical layers of cooperation – the cables and servers, nuts and bolts are adequately covered elsewhere; however, the multistakeholder/ multilateral debate remains relevant, as the agreement reached for ICANN has not extended to other aspects of governance – the economic, social, and political layers of governance remain piece-meal. In 2015, at the 10-year anniversary of the World Summit on the Information Society, Her Excellency Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh (UAE) and His Excellency Ambassador Janis Mazeiks (Latvia) steered an international process, which showcased that while there remained disagreement on how and who should govern the internet, there was universal agreement on meaningful ICT access as critical to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, and the need to bridge digital divides, including achieving gender equality in internet users and content creators. This was supported by the establishment of the “Technology Facilitation Mechanism” by the 2015 Addis Ababa Agenda for Action and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.37 There was also agreement on the need to engage all stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities, particularly in addressing growing challenges posed by the use of ICTs to human rights and cybersecurity. The WSIS+10 outcome document in 2015 showcased the international consensus for “both” for multistakeholderism and multilateralism, and was hailed as an important achievement driving the next decade of digital policy. However, there was no clear agreement on mechanisms for how these two models would function, and where decisions would be made. Then came 2016: when the international community shifted from the pinnacle of multilateralism (landmark international agreements from the SDGs to Paris and Addis and indeed WSIS+10), to the apparent rise of polarizing politics, nationalism, and ultra-right-preferences. Delegates covering the digital file in the United Nations, as multilateral idealists trying to reach consensus in negotiating rooms in the basement with no windows, were not sure what to do with ourselves. Most of our peers

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remained defensive of agreements from 2015, and some wondered if they should switch careers entirely. The lack of windows was there seemingly by design, as a tool to isolate negotiators from the world and any distractions such as the sun or stars, such that they might reach a compromise earlier. In this instance, the removal from the world made it even more difficult to negotiate, as positions previously argued so vehemently seemed to be likely to change imminently, in line with the times, and potentially because negotiators were increasingly conscious of their apparent disconnection from the evolving digital space. Shortly after, investigations were made into Cambridge Analytica. The power of influence of Big-tech companies led to allegations of spreading disinformation, profiteering from trade in private data, and stirring anxiety among youth. Silicon-valley elites were called in for questioning by the United States government, which United Nations delegates watched with great interest, given that the same government was strongly against intergovernmental intervention in digital affairs, and had been in their Foreign Policy for over 20 years. Yet suddenly the question of whether governments had a right to interfere with matters that they did not “understand” seemed no longer relevant. The founder of Facebook Mark Zuckerberg’s statement before the Senate in 2018 described the shift in perspective: The real question as the internet becomes more important in people’s lives is what is the right regulation, not whether there should be [any] or not.38 The European Union adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in April 2016, bringing it into effect in 2018. This was a landmark for international law, protecting privacy and security rights of Europeans beyond the borders of the European Union (EU). Suddenly, any company in the world that may have an online presence with potential visitation from any European citizen had to adhere to the GDPR standard, and grant that visitor the “right to be forgotten,” else face hefty fines of up to tens of millions of Euros. Since most companies found it impractical to have a different policy for EU and non-EU visitors to their websites, they offered data preferences for all visitors instead, resulting in privacy protection opportunities well beyond the EU.39 Ambassadors at the UN saw the opportunity for relevant discussions in different ways. Estonia and Singapore established a “Group of Friends on e-Governance and Cybersecurity,” swiftly followed by an initiative by Mexico for a “Group of Friends on the Impact of Exponential Technologies on Sustainable Development and Peace” (with a subsequent resolution excluding the peace aspect), and considerations of what role the SecretaryGeneral might play in internal meetings of the forum of small states and the EU delegation, among others. The “group of friends” concept was more frequently seen in the lead-up to the SDGs, with groups of countries across regions rallying around causes that they felt the UN should be more involved in. This proliferation of groups was further evidence of states feeling the need to be seized of digital matters at the UN.

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In May 2017, the Permanent Representatives of the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland initiated a discussion with the then newly-appointed SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations on the state of digital governance, and how the international organization and the good offices of the Secretary-General might support progress. Recalling that multilateralism is designed to address matters than states cannot address in isolation, the question was how the UN might support. The UAE and Swiss ambassadors consulted with over 120 countries, as well as broader stakeholders on what might be a helpful way forward. They supported the Secretary-General in his decision to appoint a High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation in July 2018, including eminent persons with geographic, gender, age and background balance, to work for a period of one year and address a way forward. The process was kept outside of the UN organs in order to keep it multistakeholder and non-duplicative of other processes, which was seen as a welcome and necessary move to uphold trust of all stakeholders. The report produced by the panel in 2019 identified gaps in the digital cooperation architecture, and opportunities to bridge them moving forward.40 Further efforts for multilateral commitment were also made in 2018, with French President Emmanuel Macron launching a “Paris Call for trust and security in cyberspace” on the sidelines of the inaugural Paris Peace Forum, significantly marking the centenary of the 1918 Armistice, including “84 heads of state and government from once warring nations.”41 The symbolism was particularly important, given the reminder of the fragile peace at the end of the First World War in 1918, and the failure of the first experiment in International Cooperation (the League of Nations), which was thwarted by unilateralism. The significance continued in the view for the future that the forum offered, highlighting multistakeholder participation as important for the future of peace and global governance broadly, perfectly coupled by the hosting of the multistakeholder Internet Governance Forum next door.42 Calls to action and aspirations of governance still did not result in action, however, and the question of internet governance and who might govern remained unanswered. The results of this governance deficit became clearer in March 2019, with the gruesome attack against mosques in New Zealand streamed live on social media for 17 minutes. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern acted expeditiously in convening a “Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online,” working with President Macron. For the part of the tech community, this served as an “inflection point,” and inspired the growth of a “Cybersecurity Tech Accord” that had been launched in 2018 as a set of voluntary principles for technology companies to abide by, which were self-imposed. In the words of Brad Smith, President of Microsoft, the goal was to “support multilateralism” as a necessary basis for global cooperation, security, stability, and prosperity.43 It should be noted that individual countries have also made various attempts to enhance their engagement with the tech sector, recognizing the growing need for collaboration. In 2016, the UAE appointed a Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, with a mandate to prepare the country for the Fourth

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Industrial Revolution, and work towards necessary governance aspects in collaboration with technology creators. In 2017, Denmark appointed a tech ambassador to serve as an envoy to a sector for the first time, rather than a sovereign state.44 These high-level government positions were welcomed as early explorers of the future of diplomacy – called “digital diplomacy” by some, and “techplomacy” by others, but arriving sooner than anticipated by many with the onset of COVID-19.

COVID implications, key debates Enter COVID. Half the world stumbles into being online full-time, enabled by cloud technologies and voice-over-internet-platforms; the other half (in terms of population) appear to enter a twilight zone – unable to continue business while confined to their homes in lockdowns without access to the internet. As such, the COVID-19 pandemic compounded what digital technologies have done to the rest of the world – acting as a force multiplier and magnifying glass for existing trends. In places and sectors with the foundation, it has acted as a catalyst for pipeline projects formerly considered “nice to have,” including digital infrastructure and remote applications. Sadly, the opposite is also true. The pandemic and ensuing global response also shone light on which economic sectors proved to be resilient and which were doomed to fail, with digital transformation technologies coming out as a clear winner at the time of writing. Large technology companies (frequently referred to as Big tech) are seen to have powered the “ferocious stock market rebound… bringing the S&P 500 up by 400 per cent from its 2009 low to the beginning of 2020… [and the] more tech-oriented Nasdaq 100 index… more than 700 per cent over the same period.”45 In multilateral platforms, notably the United Nations, the transition to digital platforms has actually facilitated balanced and representative discussions from March to October 2020. Invitations focused on gender and geographic balance in meetings and webinars have had a greater instance of success, as the time required for participation no longer includes transport or travel. Some have suggested that the transition to digital may also have an effect on rebuilding the social contract in a far more inclusive way, as a silver lining, due to the capacity of virtual events to reach a broader global audience.46 If anything, video-telecommunications have resulted in more, not less, multilateral gatherings, to the point of the widespread use of the term “zoom fatigue.” Despite the pragmatic approach taken by diplomats worldwide to adjust or embrace the digital “new normal,” there was a global feeling of regret at the loss of the physical United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) High-level Week in September, an annual landmark in the calendars of heads of state and government around the world. While virtual messages were aired from 123 Presidents and Prime Ministers at the Summit marking the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, the lack of bilaterals, informal consultations, and personal “nudges” between world leaders and their teams was palpable.47

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In the past, physical behind-the-scenes efforts at UNGA included French President Macron working the corridors of New York Hotel Suites in an effort to mediate and persuade U.S. President Trump and Iranian President Rouhani to put aside differences on the Iran nuclear deal.48 In 2020, with the virtual format decided on in line with efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the significance of the parliament of humanity was normatively the same, but its impact was practically far less. Nonetheless, as the adage goes – “absence makes the heart grow fonder.” The next section will consider the impact on multilateralism, while this section will focus on the global impact of COVID-19 in the digital space. COVID-19 “locking down” the good It was clear early on in the pandemic that clear winners and losers would appear as a result of lockdowns, travels restrictions, and other precautions in place globally. Aviation, tourism and hospitality took the biggest hit, while “Big Tech” (and Telcom more broadly), healthcare, and insurance are set to come out on top.49 Countries and companies with digital infrastructures stood to gain the most, with some arguing that the pandemic made “every company now think of themselves as a fintech start-up,” as digital platforms often provided the only option for business continuity.50 As such, digital technologies have been a determinant of success. On the plus side, lockdowns and physical distancing measures have highlighted business opportunities in bridging digital divides, and shone a spotlight on the need to harness technologies.51 They have altered demand as well. In 2019, it was estimated that ecommerce would jump 19 percentage points to reach 16 per cent of all retail sales worldwide in 2020.52 With measures put in place to mitigate the spread of the pandemic, e-commerce skyrocketed, with an estimated 146 per cent growth in all online retail orders by August 2020, and projected sales of $4.2 trillion by the end of 2020.53 Amazon (online retail), and Netflix (online entertainment streaming) made clear wins with 30 per cent growth by May 2020.54 As the global recession and mounting unemployment levels loomed, Jeff Bezos, founder, CEO and president of Amazon became the world’s first trillionaire, after his company earned $96 billion in sales in three months.55 It should be noted that, while ecommerce does provide avenues for small and medium enterprises to have a chance at business continuity, inequalities are clearly exacerbated: it is estimated that 58 per cent of global e-commerce is concentrated in six companies, and that four Chinese companies account for nearly half of sales.56 To demonstrate the speed of acceleration in some sectors; it took Instagram two years to reach 100 million users when it was born at the helm of the 2008/9 financial crisis. It took Zoom (online cloud-based videoconferencing) less than three months.57 The interesting part is that Instagram was already considered a massive success, together with Uber, Airbnb, Slack, Pinterest, WhatsApp Inc, Square, and Venmo, all start-ups founded during the last global recession (2008–2010).58

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“Experimentation” with remote work applications uncovered some opportunities for various sectors. The added benefits of demonstrating the viability of flexible work could have multiple benefits ranging from a reduction in emissions and traffic, to gender empowerment (providing opportunities for caregivers), and “shrinking” the world by bringing people closer. The demand for labour and re-skilling has also shifted. Digital technologies became a key factor of COVID-19 response strategies across the UN Development System, and across strategies for “building back better.” Technologies have helped “shrink” the world by bridging gaps between hard-to-reach regions and populations otherwise left “behind.” In Rwanda, Tanzania, and elsewhere, existing drone technologies were expanded on to transport lifesaving blood, medicines, test kits, and vaccines.59 ICT infrastructure investments received a considerable boost across the globe to enable remote opportunities where possible, with many telecommunications entities noting that they had pushed forward regulations and approvals that would normally take three years in the span of three weeks from March 2020. Digital technologies rely on energy access to work, of course, and have benefitted from the existence of technologies that connect hard-to-reach areas – for example offgrid renewable energy solutions that empower communities, often at much cheaper rates than network extensions.60 As these trends have demonstrated, technology may catalyze positive or negative trends. Clear policy coordination is necessary to support technologies that enable sustainable development for the benefit of people; for example, addressing policies that subsidize fossil fuels in the order of $5 trillion per year (compared to $150–200 billion for renewables).61 Technology has great potential, but relies on government policies and incentives to encourage necessary investments.62 COVID-19 as a “booster shot” for the bad While we marvel at the potential of digital technologies to enable diplomacy, remote work, learning, healthcare and vital services; we cannot forget that only half of humanity currently enjoys this potential. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the reality that “those currently behind will be left further behind.” When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sharply revised their projections for the world Economy from January to June 2020, from a projected global grown of 3.3 per cent (pre-pandemic) to -4.9 per cent, they coined the term “The Great Lockdown” – a reference to the magnitude of the crisis as the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s.63 This uncertainty was most pronounced in emerging and fragile economies, particularly those without established digital economies. Estimates on the impact of being left behind are clearest in projections of the economic impact on sub-Saharan Africa, the geographic region with the largest digital divide, where growth rates are anticipated to plummet to up to -5.1 per

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cent in 2020 (compared to growth of 2.4 per cent in 2019), bringing on the first recession in 25 years, according to the World Bank.64 While the health impact remained relatively minimal by June 2020, the economic impact of the inability to remote work, as well as the complete shift in focus from service-oriented sectors (e.g. Tourism) to Big Tech, meant that the livelihoods and lives of people were at stake. Moreover, the UN was fast to point out that the health pandemic was increasingly challenged by an “infodemic of misinformation” enabled by the speed and scope of reach of digital technologies and exploited by opportunists.65 This infodemic, mainly spread through social media, was in part seen as an implicit form of attack and the latest ramification of US-China tensions, whereby both sides used social media to criticize, blame, or delegitimize each other. The virus provided a “booster shot” for existing geopolitical tensions.66 Governments, International Organizations, and technology companies, including search engines, scrambled to address new challenges of rumours about the virus not surviving hot weather, or that 5G somehow facilitated its spread. The latter myth was so widespread that it inspired people to destroy telecommunications transmitters, including 70 arson attacks in the United Kingdom by May 2020, numerous in the United States, and as far as the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Bolivia.67 While Governments and Big Tech companies worked closely to implement contact tracing and other initiatives to curb the spread of the virus in many countries, two new questions of trust emerged: the first, regarding the door opened for government surveillance of citizens which could easily extend beyond the pandemic;68 and the second, regarding the ability of Big Tech to exploit their position and support to governments to drown out competition and amalgamate power.69 The latter argument resulted in an inquiry by the antitrust subcommittee of the House judiciary committee in the United States, where the CEOs of the top four Big Tech Companies (Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Apple) were summoned in a historical hearing on 29 July 2020 with concerns on their reach, ability to manipulate information, and potential danger to the American Economy. In the words of the Democratic Chair David Cicilline: “Many of the practices used by these companies have harmful economic effects. They discourage entrepreneurship, destroy jobs, hike costs, and degrade quality. Simply put: they have too much power.”70 Antitrust cases present clear examples of the governance challenges posed by digital technologies: the timeframes of classic governance and regulation are far outpaced by the development of technologies. For example, the Department of Justice sued IBM in January 1969, arguing that it tried to monopolize the market for digital computers.71 The case lasted for almost thirteen years, and by the time the trial began, “more than half of the practices the government raised as antitrust violations were related to products that did not exist in 1969.”72 More agile, multistakeholder governance models are needed to keep up with the pace of change in the field.

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The dichotomy reached in the pandemic is stark: for those with extensive connectivity, the privacy and security risks have amplified extensively to the risk of abuses of power at the detriment of the people that technology was designed to empower. Yet challenges of misinformation, privacy, and security are seen as “nice to have” by the half of the world that is offline, for which the economic reality of being unable to continue in the midst of lockdowns has meant a regress to even before the millennium development goals, as pointed out by Fabrizio Hochschild, Under-Secretary-General and special advisor to the UNSG on digital cooperation, in numerous occasions throughout the pandemic. In spite of complications, particularly around data privacy, some diplomats and stakeholders alike did find ways to overcome the lack of trust on the use of citizen’s data by foreign governments or companies, in part by using Blockchain technologies to establish credibility and transparency.73 As a result, some mechanisms were created to identify and track infectious diseases, in areas where data was available and shared. COVID-19 “unmasking” the ugly Unfortunately, cybercriminals seemed at times to be the most equipped to “work from home.” Cybersecurity risks increased by 33 per cent in the first month of lockdowns, while phishing attempts increased 300 per cent by April, according to Vodafone alone. This took place in the context of not one, but two, working groups in the UN dedicated to cybersecurity.74 In its report “Catching the Virus – cybercrime, disinformation and the COVID-19 pandemic,” Europol noted a rise in several types of cybercrime including the spread of fake news and an increased interest from sex offenders in online child sexual abuse material.75 This pandemic brings out the best but unfortunately also the worst in humanity. With a huge number of people teleworking from home, often with outdated security systems, cybercriminals prey on the opportunity to take advantage of this surreal situation and focus even more on cybercriminal activities… I would also like to draw special attention to the most vulnerable among those victims; I am very concerned about the rise of child sexual abuse online. Europol is investing resources and capacities to support Member States in countering cyber-dependent crime during this difficult situation. Catherine De Bolle, Executive Director, Europol Most tragically, perhaps, the one area where there is global consensus on the need for action, the topic of child online safety, also has no resolution. Reports of child sexual abuse imagery online went from 3,000 in 1998 to 45 million images and videos flagged in 2018.76 Current figures are likely much higher, as not all companies have mechanisms in place for detection and reporting, and no international legislation exists for action. As such, the number in 2020 could

100 Hana Alhashimi be as high as 100 million, according to Alex Stamos, who has served as chief of information security at Facebook and Yahoo.77 Digital Cooperation remains elusive in the international level, and necessary of multistakeholder cooperation for the benefit of people.

What do we need to be future-ready The future and its promises have long been a human fascination, from the oracles of ancient times to the plastic and silicon revolution of the 20th century and worldwide obsession at times with the Fourth Industrial Revolution.78 Similarly, the concept of preparedness is no modern invention. However, with the technology and data collection capabilities we have today, scanning the future for the next wave of opportunities and risks is more possible than ever – as is pivoting in response. As COVID-19 has sadly underscored, it is also essential. The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly accelerated policies and plans for the future of work, education and public services, while demonstrating the necessity of global cooperation for the benefit of people. We have clear opportunities to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by leveraging economic potential with human impact. For Example, the Future Possibilities Report launched by the UAE and the UN75 initiative outlines six transformational trends with the potential to add about $30 trillion to the world economy by 2025, largely through leveraging digital technologies. This would be an increase of 32.4 per cent of the world economy (or one-third).79 The trends including big data and low-carbon technologies offer tools for positive disruption for governments and all stakeholders to lead the way towards a positive global future. Technology can power a significant amount. In terms of leveraging the Big Data or “exabyte” economy: approximately 1 million people join the internet each day.80 With the rise of smart phones, smart cities, the Internet of Things, and numerous other innovations, data is being produced at unprecedented rates. The exabyte economy, at $8 trillion by 2025, can harness data for good, with multiple applications in development, health and research and development.81 Moving forward, Artificial intelligence (AI) shows great potential to catalyze a new generation of sustainable development solutions, powered by 5G. Appropriate regulations and codes of conduct are required to balance between technological progress and the right to privacy and human dignity of those who use it.82 The challenge will be to integrate inclusion, dignity, global collaboration and sustainability, in order to shape the digital revolution for the good of humanity.83 This brings us to the second point: a clear lesson learned this year is that humanity is our greatest global asset, and must be at the core of our future. Around the world, human ingenuity was behind the opportunities embraced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments that had mechanisms in place for future readiness were able to leapfrog. In the past four months, much of the world has pushed forward advancements that may have taken four years, or even decades, particularly in infrastructure development.

Future of digital cooperation 101 We therefore have a historic opportunity to curtail years of work by accelerating the development of new models – in digital cooperation and transformation, in government, in business, and in partnerships. We must harness that human ingenuity and cooperate better moving forward. And we must do so in a more sustainable, inclusive way, so that those behind are not left further behind. We must effectively reconsider the social contract between citizens, businesses, and governments, for our common interdependent and interconnected future. Global digital cooperation The UN Secretary-General engaged member states and all stakeholders broadly towards the design and launch of his Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. During the launch in June 2020, the UNSG delivered call for action for all “to connect, protect and respect people in the digital age.” As part of this effort, the UAE and Germany consulted over a hundred countries and numerous stakeholders from November 2019 to July 2020 on the future of global digital cooperation. They found that the world is aligned on the need for effective global cooperation that is transparent and agile, and that enables us to maximize the potential of technologies as force multipliers for good across all walks of life and across industries.84 Interest was also garnered in building on existing platforms through the UN’s Internet Governance Forum, with provisions to support inclusion and meet development needs, and bridging multiple initiatives at the regional and national levels. Members of the IGF community have been proactive through the Working Group on Strategy and Strengthening in working towards this goal. Nonetheless, it is clear that the piecemeal approach to digital governance is insufficient, and that any shocks exacerbate what we currently have. What is needed is a systemic approach, an honest consideration of HOW we govern. This has emerged in the logical layer of governance – where no one “owns” the internet but we have a way to collectively benefit from it. Former concerns by states about the US Department of Commerce having the final say on ICANN activities have been mitigated, and the multistakeholder model works well. The economic and social layer, however, are unsolved. There are regional ways of cooperating, and some national efforts. Yet no system currently exists with the ability to develop regulations that can keep up with internet speed. The IGF itself is not designed for that. The top-down historic UN approach may not meet the speed either. So perhaps a mechanism is needed to identify protocols that we might work with? A renegotiated social contract could also pave way for decentralized governance, where people are empowered to develop protocols and solutions. Shifting the paradigm of power from power over countries to power with other countries could be a strong opportunity to strengthen multilateralism, and address global challenges as climate action, pandemics, and digital cooperation, as advocated by Joseph S. Nye.85 Nye has advocated for a focus on “smart

102 Hana Alhashimi power” – defined as a powerful blend of defence, diplomacy and development in the toolkit of global influence, the authors here would add a fourth “d” for “digital” as a force catalyst moving forward. Digital holds numerous possibilities for diplomacy. To note one example: big data may be used to digest information and insights, with diplomats identifying what constitutes “relevant” information. Media analysis may be used to predict and prevent threats before they happen, and by having a stronger pulse on what people want, governments may be able to respond more effectively.86 As such, one could foresee opportunities for public trust in authority to grow. Former UK Ambassador to Lebanon Tom Fletcher poses an optimistic way forward, as new technology provides opportunities to jump-start the connection between the public and public servants, dependent on “authentic, engaging, purposeful” communication. Fletcher famously tweeted 10,000 times in his four-year term in Lebanon, explaining “I’m in a battle with ISIL in the digital space [who sent 40,000 tweets in a day as they overtook Mosul]… Digital has transformed our work as diplomats, if we don’t fill the digital space, others will.”87 Ultimately, in looking to the future, we must consider the human element, and how technology can ensure that no one is left behind. The future of digital cooperation must include voices from around the world, particularly from developing countries, in the dialogue on global digital cooperation, so that the models we build are representative of the world, and the hopes and aspirations of all people. If technology is changing the relationship between governments and citizens, it is on governments to drive a positive, empowering change. It is also clear that a multistakeholder approach is more relevant in the “new multilateralism” that has emerged in recent years.88 The standing of non-state actors working hand-in-hand with diplomats on matters of governance both online and offline also becomes increasingly relevant.89 Hierarchies become less relevant than “networks” of cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world.90 Key recommendations Ultimately, the promise of digital technologies depends on digital cooperation that is people-centred and multistakeholder. Three key recommendations are, first and foremost, meaningful access and education. People all around the world should have the capacities to be content creators and participate fully in the digital space. The numerous efforts underway, including the GIGA public-private partnership led by UNICEF and the ITU to connect all schools, is an excellent start. This must remain at the top of the policy agenda. Second, in order to allow for the enjoyment of technologies by all people, adequate, coordinated regulation is necessary. These regulation mechanisms need to benefit from lessons learned around the world, and remain agile to be able to evolve at the same speed as technology itself. Regional agreements on privacy and cybersecurity may offer a baseline for normative agreements, with more needed at the global level.

Future of digital cooperation 103 Finally, all of the above is dependent on cooperation between and within states, companies, user communities and the United Nations. This chapter has demonstrated that no single actor can address the growing challenges or harness growing opportunities alone, and the promise of the Charter of the UN agreed in 1945 depends on our ability to cooperate in the digital space. Will the future of diplomacy be digital? Unlikely. However, the future success of diplomacy depends on our ability to adapt the practice to a hybrid model that better leverages digital technologies as a complement to in-person interactions. Much of history has been dominated by a narrative of power “over” one another. The United Nations was one of the first global attempts at a concept later defined by Joseph Nye as “Smart Power,” or power “with” one another.91 With COVID-19 and digital technologies acting as great equalizers, it is clear that the same cooperative spirit is needed for our digital future, driven by diplomacy.

Special Article by Doreen Bogdan-Martin Building back better with broadband: how COVID-19 has supercharged digital cooperation By Doreen Bogdan-Martin, Director, Telecommunication Development Bureau (BDT), International Telecommunication Union (ITU) There is no doubt that COVID-19 has upended lives as we knew it. However, for those of us with a mission to bring the power of digital technologies to everyone – it has also provided an opportunity. An opportunity to leverage the spotlight that the pandemic has thrown on the importance of digital connectivity, in order to galvanize global action and bring everyone online. As the chapter on “Future of Digital Cooperation” expertly written by Hana Alhashimi, rightly explains, never before did we have such a vivid realization of how crucial digital services have become to our lives. As physical interactions had to be replaced by the digital connectivity, people started realizing how much can actually be done online – often cheaper, faster and more efficiently than offline. Yes, many of us long for the times when it was normal to browse physical shops, bump into our colleagues at a proverbial “watercooler” and mingle at conference coffee breaks. At the same time, we discovered the convenience of home-delivered groceries, ease of video-calling our friends and family across the world, as well as the speed and effectiveness with which we could switch from one Zoom, Meet, Teams, Chime, etc., room to another. Those of us, that is, who have the privilege to take connectivity for granted. Being offline means being left behind As Ms. Alhashimi notes, too many people are still offline. For them, a lockdown means that they are no longer able to keep working, studying, shopping and staying in touch with their families and friends, without risking their health and

104 Hana Alhashimi lives. As this has disproportionally affected poorer and less educated people as well as women, the situation has become a stark reminder of the unfortunate power of the digital divide to exacerbate other inequalities. Leading digital economy experts brought together by the ITU noted that countries with top connectivity infrastructure could mitigate up to half of the negative economic impact of the pandemic.92 Regretfully, there is a strong disparity among countries; while 87 per cent of individuals in developed countries used the Internet in 2019, only 19 per cent did in the least developed countries (LDCs).93 The COVID-19 crisis made it clear – it is our duty to not leave anyone behind, and this means, not leaving anyone offline. Seizing the moment The moment to seize the opportunity for digital transformation is significant not just because of the COVID-19 crisis – there are at least three other reasons. First, this year marks an important milestone in the life of the United Nations, as we celebrate the 75th anniversary of the organization that epitomizes global diplomacy. Second, we now have less than ten years left to achieve the sustainable development goals. Finally, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched his Roadmap for Digital Cooperation this year. All these markers provide an opportunity to reflect on where we are coming from and what we have been able to achieve together, renew our commitment to collaborative action, discover the most effective ways to cooperate, identify the most pressing priorities, and, together, double-down on our work to achieve them. Digital connectivity is one such priority. In the words of Secretary-General Guterres94, it “is indispensable, both to overcome the pandemic, and for a sustainable and inclusive recovery.” This past year has taught us a lot on how we need to respond to his call to “achieve the target of ensuring that every person has safe and affordable access to the Internet by 2030.” Lessons of the pandemic The COVID-19 crisis has forced us to find ways to adapt and achieve results, in the face of radical changes to the way we work. Takeaways from our experiences in adjusting to and responding to the pandemic, offer rich learning on how we can set and achieve common goals moving forward. Innovation and agility First, we learned to innovate – fast. From 16 March 2020 to the time of writing, all ITU meetings and events moved online. We have not only transitioned smoothly to virtual events, but also achieved, in most cases, higher participation in them than in physical meetings. Of course, this move required significant effort on our side. ICT infrastructure had to be upgraded to support all staff working from home and

Future of digital cooperation 105 accommodate the substantial increase in virtual events and meetings. The remote participation team had to be strengthened with more virtual meeting moderators, to help delegates to connect to the web-conference platforms and assist the chairs, secretaries, and all other participants during virtual meetings. A virtual service desk was established, and web-conference tools were upgraded to support multilingual meetings. Interpretation booths in our conference rooms were set up with web-conference platforms to allow interpreters to continue providing their service from their usual environment, while respecting social distancing requirements. Finally, interpreters were provided training on using remote simultaneous interpretation tools to allow them to conduct remote interpretation from home. The transition presented some teething challenges in the beginning. Many participants were initially unfamiliar with web-conference platforms and some faced technical connectivity challenges from their locations. However, the learning curve was steep, technical platforms were improved swiftly and everyone adapted quickly At the same time, all our staff moved to remote working. ITU Management undertook efforts to equip staff with mobile phones and laptops with second screens. Staff quickly moved to using video-conferencing tools for calls and work coordination. E-signature was rolled out to facilitate the approval process. ITU staff has been fully committed and cooperative in achieving these objectives, with dedication and solidarity. Moving to exclusive remote working does carry the risk that interactions between colleagues become task-focused, such that there is a loss of team connectivity and camaraderie, as well as loss of broader capabilities to brainstorm and generate new ideas. In times when our social lives are already impacted by social isolation measures, reduced work interactions that focus solely on tasks at hand could also negatively impact our staff’s general well-being. We instituted a number of practical measures to somewhat compensate for that, including regular virtual coffee chats, often including family members. We also organized regular virtual town hall sessions with quizzes, polls, murals and other virtual interactive tools. Importantly, we have not reduced the level of support to our members. We quickly learned how to deliver technical assistance remotely, and in many ways be even more efficient, responsive and effective. Broad collaboration Second, we renewed our appreciation for broad multi-stakeholder diplomacy and collaboration as a key instrument to achieve results. In April 2020, the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, which ITU convenes together with UNESCO (and which brings together over 50 government, business, academia and civil society leaders), adopted an Agenda for Action for Faster and Better Recovery, outlining immediate measures that governments,

106 Hana Alhashimi industry, the international community, and civil society can take to reinforce digital networks and boost digital access and inclusion. Furthermore, in September 2020, the Broadband Commission published a Commission Manifesto, in which it called on world leaders to prioritize universal connectivity for sustainable development and global recovery. In April 2020, ITU joined the World Bank, GSMA, and the World Economic Forum to set in motion concrete and immediate actions, ranging from promoting network resilience to ensuring access and affordability of digital services. A Digital Development Joint Action Plan and Call for Action were launched and discussed by a high-level dialogue of Finance as well as Information and Communication Technology (ICT) ministers, ICT regulators, and CEOs of telecom and technology companies from around the world. We have also leveraged the UN75 Global Governance Forum to convene the Partnership Dialogue for Connectivity, comprising of the EMEA Satellite Operators Association, Facebook, GSMA, Loon, Microsoft, SpaceX, UN Global Compact, UNICEF and the World Economic Forum, which have agreed on concrete actions to accelerate digital connectivity in the wake of COVID-19. Multilayer digital diplomacy Importantly (and naturally), all those joint initiatives have been agreed via remote participation tools only. We also learned to find replacements for offline means of negotiations and leverage digital technologies to make such negotiations as efficient as possible. Yes, video conferencing does not allow walking up to another party during a coffee break to discuss a contentious issue. However, make no mistake – all-to-all discussions in the video conferencing screen is merely one layer of online diplomacy. If one were to peak through that layer, they would find a buzz of direct chat messages and instant messaging communications between participants. In between formal sessions, it is normal for parties to engage in direct communication over calls, messages and emails, in order to find consensus solutions. Clearly, effective multi-tasking skills are a must to succeed in digital diplomacy. There are of course other challenges that come with a move to digital diplomacy. “Can you hear me…” and “you are on mute” are probably the most frequently used phrases in our online world in 2020. Switching to completely online diplomacy is not easy. Some may be left at a disadvantage if English is not their mother-tongue, if they do not have access to digital skills, or if they have poor broadband connectivity. We must ensure that everyone can fully participate and represent their view on a level playing field. Common knowledge base A shared understanding of issues is necessary to work collaboratively and find effective solutions. In order to address issues brought about by the pandemic, we launched our Global Network Resiliency Platform REG4COVID in

Future of digital cooperation 107 record time. It has collected over 400 regulatory, policy and industry responses that countries and other stakeholders have taken to ensure that digital networks and services continue to serve people and businesses in the face of COVID-19. We have also organized a series of knowledge-sharing events, including webinars on “Digital Cooperation during COVID19 and beyond,” launched in collaboration with UN Under-Secretary-General Fabrizio Hochschild. Additionally, we brought together leading economic experts to share their insights on the “Economic Impact of COVID-19 on Digital Infrastructure.” Such knowledge-sharing produces real results by itself – sometimes, especially during fast-changing situations, even better than formal agreements or joint initiatives. It enables national policy makers and other stakeholders to adopt measures that have been proven effective elsewhere. When stakeholders coalesce around what works, best practices emerge to become common practices. Focus on results Finally, our actions in the face of COVID-19 have proved the importance of focusing on tangible results. We have developed and published guidelines for the development and implementation of national emergency telecommunication plans (NETPs) to help countries take immediate actions, especially as the pandemic underlined the need to be prepared. We leveraged our BeHealthy BeMobile collaboration initiative with the World Health Organization (WHO) to ensure that reliable and trustworthy information on COVID-19 reaches people not only via the broadband Internet but also through 2G mobile networks. We have also supplemented our GIGA initiative in collaboration with UNICEF, to connect every school to the internet and every young person to information, opportunity, and choice, with an added focus on health centres as well as extending connectivity to communities around schools. We recognized that this increasingly used digital world brings new or increased risks. For this reason, we developed CYB4COVID, a comprehensive repository of cybersecurity expertise related to COVID-19, to assist countries, businesses and citizens to respond to amplified and new threats in the digital space during the COVID-19 pandemic. We have also launched an updated version of ITU’s Guidelines on Child Online Protection (COP) – a comprehensive set of recommendations for children, parents, educators, industry and policymakers, on how to ensure a safe and empowering online environment for children and young people. We have paid special attention to building digital skills. Without these, using or adopting digital connectivity becomes even more challenging. Skills such as remote teaching, have become a key focus of the Digital Transformation Centres Initiative, which we developed in collaboration with Cisco. Additionally, we launched the Digital Skills Assessment Guidebook, which is a comprehensive and practical tool for national digital skills assessments.

108 Hana Alhashimi I am really happy that our actions have been recognized, not only in words, but through the tangible support of our Member States, who ask and trust us to do more. With the kind support of Japan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we were able to launch the Connect2Recover initiative to help less connected countries strengthen their digital infrastructures and ecosystems so that they are able to better cope with COVID-19, reinforce their recovery efforts and better prepare for the “new normal.” “New normal” The COVID-19 pandemic has definitely changed our lives, economies and the world in general. Until we have confidently defeated the pandemic, the “new normal” for many people continues to imply manifold restrictions and uncertainty. However, I believe that this “new normal” could and actually should also bring about lasting positive changes for digital cooperation as well as for the future of diplomacy in general. It should mean our reinforced ability to be innovative and agile, our renewed appreciation for the importance of broad multi-stakeholder cooperation, our developed skills and capacity to conduct multilayer digital diplomacy that could be even more effective than offline, our capacity to converge on what works through knowledge-sharing, and finally our sharpened focus on tangible results. I also hope that the current spotlight on digital connectivity and technologies will induce a strong and lasting consensus that our future depends on building back (or forward) better with broadband, to be leveraged by all and for all.

Notes 1 The General Assembly specifically considered the impact of rapid technological change on the SDGs and their targets in resolutions 72/242 and 73/17. 2 International Telecommunications Union (5 November 2019) New ITU data reveal growing Internet uptake but a widening digital gender divide: Some 4.1 billion people are now online, but in developing countries women’s Internet use is falling behind. Press Release. Accessed on 15 October 2020 at: www.itu.int/en/ mediacentre/Pages/2019-PR19.aspx. 3 UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation (2020). The Age of Global Interdependence. Retrieved from: www.un.org/en/pdfs/DigitalCooperation-report-for%20web.pdf. 4 ITU Telecommunication Development Bureau (2019). Facts and Figures 2019. International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Retrieved from: www.itu.int/en/ ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf. 5 Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019). Global Sustainable Development Report 2019: The Future is Now – Science for Achieving Sustainable Development, United Nations. New York. pp. 29 and 36. Accessed on 10 and 20 July 2020 at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/ 24797GSDR_report_2019.pdf. 6 Nakicenovic, N. (2018). The World in 2050. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

Future of digital cooperation 109 7 Diamandis, P. and Kotler, S. (2020). The Future is Faster Than You Think: How converging technologies are transforming business, industries, and our lives. Simon & Schuster, New York, NY. 8 Nation (2020, June 28). Transactions through mobile money platforms close to half GDP. Nation Africa. Accessed on 20 July 2020 at: www.nation.co.ke/business/ Yearly-mobile-money-deals-close-GDP/996-4041666-dtaks6z/index.html (based on data from the Central Bank of Kenya, 2017). 9 Suri, T. and Jack, W. The long-run poverty and gender impacts of mobile money. Science Vol. 354 (6317), pp. 1288–1292. Retrieved from: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/354/6317/1288.full. 10 Bengtsson Stephanie E.L., Bilal Barakat and Raya Muttarak (2018). The role of education in enabling the sustainable development agenda. Routledge. New York; and Nunes, Ana Raquel, Kelley Lee and Tim O’Riordan (2016, November). The importance of an integrating framework for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals: the example of health and well-being. BMJ Global Health Vol. 1, No. 3. 11 Authors’ experience – while the origin of the term “WhatsApp diplomacy” remains unknown – it is informally credited for agreements around Rio+20 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and most processes since. 12 Rowntree, Oliver (2019, February). Connected Women: The Mobile Gender Gap Report 2019. GSM Association. Accessed on 1 August 2020 at: www.gsma.com/ mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/GSMA-Connected-WomenThe-Mobile-Gender-Gap-Report-2019.pdf. 13 International Telecommunications Union (2019, November 5). New ITU data reveal growing Internet uptake but a widening digital gender divide: Some 4.1 billion people are now online, but in developing countries women’s Internet use is falling behind. Press Release. Accessed on 15 October 2020 at: www.itu.int/en/ mediacentre/Pages/2019-PR19.aspx. 14 Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019). Global Sustainable Development Report 2019, p. 37; and several multilateral agreements including WSIS+10. 15 Kendall-Taylor, A., Frantz, E. and Wright, J. (2020). The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy. Foreign Affairs, 99(2), 103–115; and Harrari, Y. H., The World After Coronavirus: The storm will pass. But the choices we make now could change our lives for years to come. Financial Times. 20 March 2020, available at: www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75. 16 IDC, Intel, United Nations (2016). A guide to the Internet of Things: How Billions of Online Objects are Making the Web Wiser. Intel. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.intel.co.uk/content/dam/www/public/emea/xe/en/images/iot/guideto-iot-infographic.png. 17 Van der Meulen, Rob and Amy Ann Forni (2017, August 24). Gartner Says Worldwide Wearable Device Sales to Grow 17 Percent in 2017. Gartner Press Release. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3790965. 18 Term used by Henrietta Fore, Executive Director of UNICEF at thematic discussion on “our digital future” during the World Government Summit’s virtual event: 75 Minutes for Global Collaboration. Available at: https://vimeo.com/472179782. 19 Morgan, Steve (2017, October 16). Cybercrime Damages $6 Trillion by 2021. Cybersecurity Ventures Official Annual Cybercrime Report. Accessed on 1 August 2020 at: https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/. Updated on 26 October 2020, available at: https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybercrimedamages-6-trillion-by-2021/. 20 Khomami, Nadia and Olivia Solon (2017, May 13). Accidental Hero Finds Kill Switch to Stop Spread of Ransomware Cyber Attack. The Guardian. London and San Francisco. Accessed on 20 July 2020 at: www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/13/ accidental-hero-finds-kill-switch-to-stop-spread-of-ransomware-cyber-attack.

110 Hana Alhashimi 21 CarbonBlack (2017). The Ransomware Economy: 2017 Report. Retrieved on 23 July 2020 from: www.carbonblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CarbonBlack-Ransomware-Economy-Report-101117.pdf. 22 Hathaway, O. and Crootof, R. (2012). The Law of Cyber-Attack. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 3852. Retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.law. yale.edu/fss_papers/3852. 23 Smith, Brad and Carol Ann Browne (2019). Tools and Weapons. Hodder & Stoughton. p. 64. 24 The Forum of Small States is a platform formed by Singapore in 1992 that now includes 108 member countries representing all major geographical regions. The forum meets numerous times a year to discuss matters of interest to small states, and to provide opportunities for engagement with decision makers at the UN. Further details may be found here: www.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGNPOLICY/International-Issues/Small-States. 25 Ruhl, C., Hollis, D., Hoffman, W., Maurer, T. (2020, February 26). Cyberspace and Geopolitics: Assessing Global Cybersecurity Norm Processes at a Crossroads. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 26 General Assembly Resolution 70/237. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. A/RES/70/237 Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/237. 27 Net Politics (2020, October 29). Competing U.S.-Russia Cybersecurity Resolutions Risk Slowing UN Progress Further. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 30 October 2020 from: www.cfr.org/blog/competing-us-russia-cybersecurity-resolutions-risk-slowing-un-progress-further. 28 Desjardins, Jeff (2019, June 29). A Visual History of the Largest Companies by Market Cap (1999-Today). Visual Capitalist. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.visualcapitalist.com/a-visual-history-of-the-largest-companies-by-market-cap1999-today/. 29 Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019). Global Sustainable Development Report 2019. p. 54. 30 DeNardis, L. (2014). The Global War For Internet Governance. Yale University Press. New Haven. 31 Report of the United Nations Working Group on Internet Governance (June 2005), Chateau de Bossey, p. 4. Retrieved from: www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf. 32 Information may be found at European Parliament Think Tank (2015, October 30). EU-Brazil cooperation on internet governance and ICT issues. European Parliament. Retrieved from: www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EP RS_BRI(2015)571309. 33 Fletcher, Tom (2017). The Naked Diplomat: Understanding Power and Politics in the Digital Age. William Collins. pp. 120–130. 34 ICANN have commissioned a helpful illustration of the layers of digital governance, available on: www.icann.org/news/multimedia/1563. 35 Decision-making is concentrated in a board made up largely of non-governmental entities. Governments play an advisory role to this board. At the time of the transition, many developing countries called for a migration of the governance system from ICANN to the UN, where only governments would have a say. By contrast, many developed countries wanted to ensure that non-government stakeholders maintain decision-making power (in this context, it is worth noting that these nongovernment “stakeholders” were and still are almost exclusively Western-based NGOs, universities, and importantly, companies like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, etc.). Further information on the transition may be found on the ICANN website: www.icann.org/iana-transition-fact-sheet.

Future of digital cooperation 111 36 DeNardis, Laura (2014). The Global War on Internet Governance. Yale University Press. pp. 222–248. 37 The TFM covers a bank for Least Developed Countries, an Inter-Agency Task Force in the UN System, and an annual multistakeholder forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the SDGs. As described in United Nations (2015). Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development. 38 Foer, F. (2020, July/August). What Big Tech Wants Out of the Pandemic. The Atlantic. Retrieved from: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/bigtech-pandemic-power-grab/612238/. 39 Wolford, Ben. What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR.EU. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/. 40 The author had the privilege of supporting the Ambassador of the UAE in this process. Further information on the panel and its report may be found here: www. un.org/en/digital-cooperation-panel/. 41 Macron, Emmanuel (2018, November 11). Introductory Speech by Mr. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic of France. Paris. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: https://onu.delegfrance.org/Emmanuel-Macron-s-speech-at-ParisPeace-Forum; and Paris Call for trust and security in cyberspace, retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: https://pariscall.international/en/. 42 Ibid. 43 Smith, Brad and Carol Ann Browne (2019). Tools and Weapons. Hodder & Stoughton. p. 22. 44 Gramer, R. (2017, January 27). Denmark Creates the World’s First Ever Digital Ambassador. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/27/denmark-creates-the-worlds-first-ever-digital-ambassador-technology-europe-diplomacy/. 45 Wigglesworth, R. (2020, May 1). How Big Tech got even bigger in the Covid-10 era. Financial Times. Retrieved from: www.ft.com/content/d2e09235-b28e-438d9b55-0e6bab7ac8ec. 46 Robinson, J. (2020, May 7). Will COVID-19 Change Governments Forever? World Government Summit COVID-19 and Government Webinar, in conversation with Mina Oraibi, Editor-in-Chief, The National; and Patrick Wintour (19 September 2020). Bye bye bilaterals: UN general assembly to embrace Zoom diplomacy: Conditions that will make the annual event a diplomats’ playground will be absent as it goes mostly online. The Guardian. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/19/bye-bye-bilaterals-un-generalassembly-embrace-zoom-diplomacy. 47 Mauldin, William (2020, September 9). UN gathering will be virtual: hampering informal diplomacy. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: www.wsj.com/ articles/u-n-gathering-will-be-virtual-hampering-informal-diplomacy-11599648970. 48 Wintour, Patrick (2020, September 19). Bye bye bilaterals: UN general assembly to embrace Zoom diplomacy: Conditions that will make the annual event a diplomats’ playground will be absent as it goes mostly online. The Guardian. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/19/bye-bye-bilaterals-un-general-assembly-embrace-zoom-diplomacy. 49 BQ Research (2020, March 23). Three Sectors Remain Unscathed (So Far) From Covid19 Hit. Bloomberg Quint. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: www.bloombergquint.com/markets/three-sectors-remain-unscathed-so-far-from-covid-19-hit. 50 Schroeder, C (2020, May 31). The Role of Innovation in Global Crises. World Government Summit COVID-19 and Government Webinar, available at: www. youtube.com/watch?v=dLnKNEdsVcA&feature=youtu.be. 51 Dutta, Soumintra (2020, May 31). The Role of Innovation in Global Crises. World Government Summit COVID-19 and Government Webinar, available at: www. youtube.com/watch?v=dLnKNEdsVcA&feature=youtu.be.

112 Hana Alhashimi 52 Lipsman, Andrew (2019, June 27). Global Ecommerce 2019: Ecommerce Continues Strong Gains Amid Global Economic Uncertainty. eMarketer. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: www.emarketer.com/content/global-ecommerce-2019. 53 Wertz, J. (2020, August 1). 3 Emerging E-Commerce Growth Trends to Leverage In 2020. Forbes. Retrieved on 15 August 2020 from: www.forbes.com/sites/ jiawertz/2020/08/01/3-emerging-e-commerce-growth-trends-to-leverage-in-2020/ #70f233a66fee. 54 Wigglesworth, 2020. 55 Helmore, E. (2020, October 29). Amazon third-quarter earnings soar as pandemic sales triple profits. The Guardian. Available at: www.theguardian.com/technology/ 2020/oct/29/amazon-profits-latest-earnings-report-third-quarter-pandemic. 56 Koetsier, John (2020, October 21). 44% of Global eCommerce is Owned by 4 Chinese Companies. Forbes. Retrieved on 26 October 2020 from: www.forbes. com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/10/21/44-of-global-ecommerce-is-owned-by-4-chinesecompanies/#7a78b27e1645. 57 Kim, T. (2020, April 30). Facebook Defies Gravity But Can’t Deny Reality. Bloomberg Opinion. Retrieved on 1 July 2020 from: www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/ 2020-04-29/coronavirus-facebook-earnings-win-but-faces-big-ad-headwinds?utm_con tent=view&cmpid=socialflow-facebook-view&utm_source=facebook&utm_campaign =socialflow-organic&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR1465nTzYJuvoFcglNCO6in x7oTUVHAcM1Nc1hpTX3n5QQtaMml53XY2iY. 58 Howes, L. (@LewisHowes). (2020, March 24). Startups founded during the last recession (08–10): Uber, Airbnb, Slack, Pinterest, WhatsApp Inc., Square, Venmo. Some of the most iconic companies of the next decade will undoubtably be launched during these surreal times. (Thread 1/3). Retrieved on 1 July 2020 from: https://twitter.com/LewisHowes/status/1242467877191475202. 59 UNCTAD (2017a). Information Economy Report 2017: Digitalization, Trade and Development. 60 UNCTAD (2019c). The Role of Science, Technology and Innovation in Promoting Renewable Energy by 2030, Current Studies on Science, Technology and Innovation. United Nations; International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Global Energy Transformation: A Roadmap to 2050. IRENA. Abu Dhabi, 2019. 61 International Energy Agency (2019). Fossil Fuel Subsidies, IEA, 2019. 62 Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019). Global Sustainable Development Report 2019. p. 80. 63 IMF (2020, June). World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved on 1 July 2020 from: www.imf.org/~/media/Files/ Publications/WEO/2020/Update/June/English/WEOENG202006.ashx?la=en. 64 World Bank (2020, April 9). COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Drives Sub-Saharan Africa Towards First Recession in 25 Years. Press Release. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/09/covid-19-coronavirusdrives-sub-saharan-africa-toward-first-recession-in-25-years. 65 United Nations Department of Global Communications (31 March 2020). UN tackles ‘infodemic’ of misinformation and cybercrime in COVID-19 crisis. United Nations. Retrieved on 1 September 2020 from: www.un.org/en/un-coronaviruscommunications-team/un-tackling-%E2%80%98infodemic%E2%80%99-misinformation-and-cybercrime-covid-19. 66 Riordan, S. (2020). Covid-19 and the digitalization of diplomacy. In Gardini, L. The world before and after Covid-19: Intellectual reflections on politics, diplomacy and international relations. European Institute of International Studies. p. 41. 67 Ankel, S. (2020, May 17). Law enforcement officials fear that the US will see an increase in arson and violence linked to 5G conspiracy theories, according to reports. Business Insider. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.businessinsider. com/coronavirus-violence-feared-as-5g-conspiracy-theories-reach-us-abc-2020-5.

Future of digital cooperation 113 68 Hariri, Y. (2020, March 20). The world after coronavirus. Financial Times. 69 Foer, F. (July 2020). What Big Tech Wants Out of the Pandemic. The Atlantic. Retrieved on 1 September 2020 from: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 2020/07/big-tech-pandemic-power-grab/612238/. 70 https://on.ft.com/3jUNr7e. 71 Stapp, Alec (2020, February 3). The Ghosts of Antitrust Past: Part 2 (IBM). Truth on the Market: Scholarly commentary on law, economics and more. Available at: https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/02/03/the-ghosts-of-antitrust-past-part-2-ibm/. 72 Taylor, P. (1982, January 24). Law Firm Waged 13-Year War for IBM. The Washington Post. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1982/01/24/law-firmwaged-13-year-war-for-ibm/59761e40-ea31-430d-ab0b-c084b69e3a63/?utm_term =.6669a9671379. 73 Riordan, S. (2020). Covid-19 and the digitalization of diplomacy. In Gardini, L. The world before and after Covid-19: Intellectual reflections on politics, diplomacy and international relations. European Institute of International Studies. p. 43. 74 The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity, mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. 75 Europol (2020). Catching the Virus – Cybercrime, Disinformation and the COVID-19 Pandemic. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Retrieved on 21 September 2020 from: www.europol.europa.eu/publicationsdocuments/catching-virus-cybercrime-disinformation-and-covid-19-pandemic. 76 Keller, M. and Dance, G. (2019, September 29). The Internet is Overrun With Images of Child Sexual Abuse. What Went Wrong? New York Times. Accessed at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html. 77 Dance, G. and Keller, M. (2020, February 20). Tech Companies Detect a Surge in Online Videos of Child Sexual Abuse. New York Times. Accessed at: www.nytimes. com/2020/02/07/us/online-child-sexual-abuse.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 78 Science History Institute (2020). History and Future of Plastics. Science History Institute. Retrieved on 25 October 2020 from https://www.sciencehistory.org/thehistory-and-future-of-plastics; and Klaus Schwab (2016, January 14). The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond. World Economic Forum. Retrieved on 1 October 2020 from: www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/thefourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/. 79 Centennial Lab and UN75 Initiative (2020, July 20). Future Possibilities Report. UAE Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and the Future and the Initiative for the Commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/20200720_un75_uae_futurepossibilitiesreport.pdf. 80 World Economic Forum (2020). Global Risks Report 2020. World Economic Forum. Retrieved on 1 September 2020 from: http://reports.weforum.org/globalrisks-report-2020/wild-wide-web/#view/fn-2. 81 Future Possibilities Report (2020). UAE Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and the Future and the Initiative for the Commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations. Retrieved on 1 August 2020 from: www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/ 20200720_un75_uae_futurepossibilitiesreport.pdf. 82 Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019). Global Sustainable Development Report 2019. p. 37. 83 Bruns, A. and Alba, R. (2016). Submission to UN survey among scientists on technology and the SDGs. 84 Author’s experience; details on this process may be found here: www.global-cooperation.digital/GCD/Navigation/EN/Follow-up/follow-up.html. 85 Nye, J. (2020). Do morals matter? Presidents and foreign policy from FDR to Trump, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. 86 Fletcher, Tom (2017). The Naked Diplomat: Understanding Power and Politics in the Digital Age. William Collins, pp. 110–112.

114 Hana Alhashimi 87 Ibid. pp. 199–221 and 233. 88 The wisdom of youth (2020, June 20). The Economist. Special report: The new world disorder. 89 Sending, O., Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (2011). The future of diplomacy: Changing practices, evolving relationships, International Journal 66(3), pp. 527– 542. Retrieved from: www.jstor.org/stable/23104366. 90 Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2017). The Chessboard & the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World. Yale University Press. 91 Smart Power term coined by Joseph Nye (2020). 92 ITU (2020). Economic Impact of COVID-19 on Digital Infrastructure. Report of an Economic Experts Roundtable organized by ITU. Retrieved on 30 October 2020 from: www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Conferences/GSR/2020/Documents/GSR20_Impact-COVID-19-on-digital-economy_DiscussionPaper.pdf. 93 ITU (2019). Measuring digital development. Facts and Figures 2019. Retrieved on 30 October 2020 from: https://itu.foleon.com/itu/measuring-digital-development/home/. 94 United Nations Secretary-General (2020). Secretary-General’s remarks to the Virtual High-Level Event on the State of the Digital World and Implementation of the Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. Retrieved on 30 October 2020 from: www.un. org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-06-11/secretary-generals-remarks-the-virtualhigh-level-event-the-state-of-the-digital-world-and-implementation-of-the-roadmapfor-digital-cooperation-delivered.

5

Future of international peace and security From the Spanish Flu to COVID-19 and to the next pandemic Andres Fiallo

Chapter 5 also considers how the global pandemic is deteriorating the conditions of the population in areas of armed conflict, complicating humanitarian access, and potentially exacerbating the roots of violence and conflict. It points to the “wakeup call” that the pandemic has served for global priorities; a reminder of Emanuel Kant’s project of perpetual peace; arguing that the global pandemic is forcing UN Member States to rethink how to prioritize the organization’s work, and making the case for a new Grand Bargain, while proposing what a “future-proof” peace and security architecture could look like. As with previous chapters, we are departing from the notion of COVID-19 as a force multiplier for all aspects of diplomacy. In this chapter, we will see that the COVID-19 pandemic and existing insecurities mutually reinforce one another. To begin, however, we will return briefly to 1918, and consider the impact of the Spanish Flu on security. By doing so, we will unpack the general relation between pandemics and international peace and security, in context of realpolitik. The Spanish Flu pandemic occurred towards the end of the First World War, when global context itself was already one of conflict. In fact, the alleged origin of the pandemic was a military camp in Kansas.1 On 4 March 1918, hundreds of American soldiers presented the symptoms and illness, which they transported to Europe just one month later.2 The trenches, the overcrowding, and the displacement of troops and workers linked to the war effort were the perfect cradle for the spread. At the same time, the measures taken to contain the pandemic included derogations to certain fundamental rights and freedoms; the living conditions of the poorest people were exacerbated and the lack of access to health services did not help. The loss of employment, and the disruption of production led to the increase of food insecurity. Poverty and hunger on the rise, led to the displacement of people towards urban centres causing national instability, and struggle and rebellion against colonial powers.3 As a result, the Spanish Flu caused an extreme deterioration in food security, due to problems in supply chains not only during the pandemic but until at least two years later.4 The pandemic also seriously undermined health security and affected public order and peace. The disorder generated also contrasted with a resurgence of the consciousness of the world community, and of the solidarity needed to overcome this transnational threat.5

116 Andres Fiallo

International peace and security up to 2020 The COVID-19 pandemic arose in the context of a resurgence of nationalism, and of great challenges for multilateralism and the United Nations during a landmark year – that of its 75th anniversary. In multilateral diplomacy, progress takes time. It is normal. If we take national examples, parliamentary work involves long processes. This happens in parliaments with only three political parties as much as it does in those with 10 or 30 parties. Multilateral processes in the United Nations encompass the 193 States, each with their own perspective, in addition to regional or transregional visions and shared interests. Often those interests may be conflicting. In the Security Council, 15 countries vote, including five with individual veto power, but in the General Assembly the 193 Member States have one vote, on equal terms. That is why it takes time to arrive at specific agreements. Ideally those agreements are made on a consensual basis, which will allow for a stronger political commitment and an easier implementation, though they could also be reached by a vote. Therefore, processes and transformations in the UN require different motivations, and substantive or often symbolic factors, as well as the leadership of one or more countries pushing for a specific initiative. Sometimes it could rely on the leadership of a diplomat -not necessarily a country. The President of the General Assembly can also boost or lead a process, as can the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which is seen more frequently. A recent example is the Secretary-General led reform processes on peace and security, which aimed to prioritize prevention and sustain peace; enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions; and continue moving towards a single, integrated peace and security pillar, more closely aligned with the development and human rights pillars, in order to create greater coherence and cross-pillar coordination.6 Although it may seem simple or banal, anniversaries are among the driving forces, because they favour a greater involvement of relevant stakeholders and media, as well as monitoring and follow up. That is why in the United Nations the declaration of international days, or years or decades are relevant. What better anniversary to promote the great transformations that multilateralism requires today than the commemoration of the 75 years of the United Nations Organization? Among examples of substantive elements that have accompanied, caused, or even resulted in transformations, are the decolonization process; the fall of the Berlin Wall; and the 9/11 attacks in 2001. These occurred a year after a symbolic moment such as, in the case of the latter, the beginning of a new century and a new millennium in 2000. Of course, the material circumstances absolutely determined the development of security diplomacy, regardless of what the symbolic landmark of the western calendar could have expected or generated.

Future of international peace and security 117 Today, the substantive factor – that is, the COVID-19 pandemic – fully coincided with the symbolic milestone of 75 years of the United Nations. On the one hand, it pulverized some organized and planned diplomatic preparations and efforts, often bureaucratic but needed. On the other hand, it shook the international community – and with it the United Nations. At the time of writing, we see two alternative futures: the first being that of a possible lost year 2020, with the subsequent setbacks on the ground; and the second that of a definitive leap into a new era for multilateralism, which would benefit peace and security. This book privileges the second option, while recognizing that the story will continue to be written by all the States in the world, and most of it will revolve around persistent conflicts and the implications of COVID-19 for peace and security. In other words, whether the new era on peace and security is better or not depends on countries, governments, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, academia. Simply put, it depends on people. Another point of relevance to the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations comes from recalling its origins. The core purpose of the United Nations in 1945 was the maintenance of Peace and Security. In a way, its role has been key to avoid a third World War. The year 2020 also marked 75 years of humankind healing from the horrors of World War II. Yet, significant challenges continue to emerge with regards to the UN objective of a global peace. Indeed, the understanding of peace in and of itself has evolved. Peace is not only limited to the absence of disturbance, or the absence of war, but rather the presence of justice, freedom and development.7 Sustaining peace8 is key in framing the focus of this chapter – there can be no peace without development and no development without peace.9 The perception of threats has also evolved over time. In 2003, the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to deep divisions among the Member States on the nature of existing threats and the possibility of using force to address them collectively.10 In their report, the Panel stated: We endorsed the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect (R2P), exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. While the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (commonly referred to as “R2P”) was adopted during the 2005 World Summit,11 further consensual agreement on its implementation has not been achieved, due to the concern of a number of Member States that it could be used as a pretext to justify military intervention. Interestingly, in spite of the lack of consensus, a highly influential Permanent Representative to the United Nations and supporter of the responsibility to

118 Andres Fiallo protect confided in the President of the General Assembly in 2019, stating that the concept of Sustaining Peace is so successful, that without causing major difficulties, it actually quietly incorporated all the substance from the concept of R2P. The 15th anniversary of the Responsibility to Protect in 2020, contrasted with its inclusion in the provisional agenda of the United Nations General Assembly only by a vote.1213 121 countries supported it, 13 were against and 32 abstained, on 4 September 2020, during the second in-person meeting of the 74th General Assembly since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 18 September 2020, during the second meeting of the 75th General Assembly, The only item not to be adopted by consensus out of 183 was the responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,14 which was included again by a vote of 110 in favour; 13 against and 22 abstentions. The Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was also at the genesis of the current United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, as it proposed the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office, created in 200515 and strengthened in 2016.16 We will see in the next section how the COVID-19 pandemic affected the 2020 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture. Today, justice and equality are not the only ingredients missing for a global peace; while no other World War has arisen, violence, conflict and war have not disappeared. Today, war is still a reality, and many sources of future conflicts persist. With this, the sources of today’s war and conflict cannot be attributed to the pandemic. Instead, the pandemic could be attributed to existing insecurities resulting from the insufficient sustainability in development and the overexploitation of nature. It is understood that the environmental conditions have caused the development and spread of the virus. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 60 per cent of emerging infectious diseases reported globally are zoonoses, and in the last three decades 75 per cent of all new human pathogens have originated in animals.17 At the same time, this shows that zoonoses are a threat to public health, and therefore to security, if we look at it from the lenses of the concept of “sustaining peace.” The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed the potential international security threats posed by the natural outbreak of an infectious disease in its 2004 report. The report notably suggested the need for the WHO Director-General to keep the Security Council informed of any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease, stating also the responsibility of the Security Council to be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or even to deploy experts reporting directly to the Council:18 If existing International Health Regulations do not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance. In the event that a State is unable to

Future of international peace and security 119 adequately quarantine large numbers of potential carriers, the Security Council should be prepared to support international action to assist in cordon operations (…). Among its findings and recommendations, the report of the above-mentioned Panel, transmitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Member States on 2 December 2004, raised concerns about the deterioration of the global health system.19 As such, 15 years before the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations was already addressing issues related to global vulnerability to new infectious diseases. The Panel called for a major initiative to rebuild global public health. Although additional efforts for a more robust global health system were developed in the United Nations since 2004, they do not seem to have been enough to overcome the existing obstacles and challenges. It is fair to mention the indispensable role of national efforts by Member States, as illustrated in Chapter 1. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change called to start with “building public health capacity at the local and national levels throughout the developing world.” Among its main objectives, it aimed to support the global defence against natural outbreaks of deadly infectious diseases. Notably, the panel stressed the urgency of these issues, emphasizing the need for action ahead of September (2005). The same report considered that the attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed the failure of Member States and multilateral institutions to “keep pace with changes in nature of threats.”20 This included the impact of health crises on eroding borders: The security of the most affluent State can be held hostage to the ability of the poorest State to contain an emerging disease. Because international flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for many infectious diseases, any one of 700 million international airline passengers every year can be an unwitting global disease-carrier. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread to more than 8,000 people in 30 countries in three months, killing almost 700. The influenza pandemic of 1919 killed as many as 100 million people, far more than the First World War, over a period of a little more than a year. Today, a similar virus could kill tens of millions in a fraction of the time.21 Fifteen years later it is clear that the world was insufficiently prepared to immediately counter the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects. As Bill Gates reflected on lessons from the Ebola Crisis in 2015 and again with COVID-19: “we [were] not ready for the next epidemic.”22 But what is the actual impact of COVID-19 on security? What are the longterm implications of emerging issues? How is the global pandemic deteriorating the conditions of the population in areas of armed conflict? What fragilities remain as potential sources of future conflicts? These questions will be further considered below.

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5.2: Implications of COVID-19 on international peace and security The Spanish Flu pandemic spread so rapidly in the world due to security conditions, in the context of the First World War. Almost one hundred years later (2014–2016), the Ebola epidemic also gave a place to global health in the field of international security. While the COVID-19 pandemic itself was less the result of a conflict context, it still radically affects security and peace from different analytical frameworks. On the one hand, the pandemic has deteriorated peace and security and the living conditions of the population in the field. On the other hand, the pandemic also affected the United Nations machinery on peace and security. The impact of the pandemic on the United Nations peace and security machinery Disarmament and security The circumstances of little to no preparation before the COVID-19 pandemic spread forced the United Nations to postpone until 2021 several key meetings. The Biennial of States of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons was postponed while the illicit transfer of arms and ammunition continues to affect peace and security around the Globe. The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which commemorated its 50th anniversary in 2020, was postponed until 2021, first to January, then to August 2021 (the final date is still to be determined at the time of writing). Different proposals have been put on the table to downscale the Review Conference due to COVID-19, however States, in particular those against the existence of nuclear weapons, are insisting on the importance of a full-fledged meeting. At the same time, a full meeting in its regular format (in terms of days for negotiations of the outcome), with the traditional main committees and subsidiary bodies, including the participation from delegations from capitals, remains uncertain at this point. This is in part due to travel restrictions, as well as due to elements as practical as the insufficient number of conference rooms in the United Nations Headquarters due to the massive postponement of other relevant meetings. While the challenges seem only logistical, the consequences could be substantive when we face an unbalanced implementation of the three pillars of the NPT. In the absence of the Review Conference, programs to modernize these weapons continue as well as the quantitative increase in various arsenals around the world, despite general progress previously achieved in the frame of the NPT implementation. The timing to put pressure on the need to strengthen the implementation of the NPT was significant in 2020, being 75 years after the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the

Future of international peace and security 121 symbolic of dates can provide the momentum depending also on other circumstances. Experts know that a nuclear war cannot be won. Along these lines, the collective security of all States requires the elimination of these weapons, as recognized by consensus in the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly dedicated to Disarmament in 1978: The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and the tremendous build-up of armed forces and the competitions for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted pose incalculable threat to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of detente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war.23 Far from changing, this reality is actually worse in the context of threats of a new nuclear test, in the midst of the current pandemic. To put it into context: while the WHO budget for the biennium 2018–2019 was $4.4 billion, it is estimated that the nine armed countries expended $72.9 billion on their more than 13,000 nuclear weapons in 2019 alone.24 This means that a year of nuclear weapons budget can fund more than 30 years of the WHO operations. The budget for Nuclear weapons and military expenditure is even more obscene in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. To add further perspective: one day of world military expenditures25 is higher than the biennial WHO budget.26 The Fourth Conference on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones was also postponed as was the Disarmament Commission. The year 2020, the first of the decade of action was also the year of the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture. The latter slowed down due to restrictions on in-person meetings and consultations. Member States preferred to have as an outcome only a procedural plus resolution, not to open the pandoras box, in particular in the challenging circumstances of virtual negotiations. The pandemic also affected several other consultations, and the work of Geneva-based disarmament Conventions. Though the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) programme was affected, several virtual briefings where organized on the impact of COVID-19 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Lake Chad Basin, Pacific Islands, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Papua New Guinea, Liberia, West Africa and the Sahel respectively. During the first meeting on COVID-19, held on 8 April 2020, the Chair of the PBC also regretted the Security Council was acting as if the pandemic did not represent a threat to peace and security.27 In this, different United Nations organs showed different levels of flexibility or even creativity to ensure the continuity of their work.

122 Andres Fiallo The main committees of the General Assembly, including the First Committee on international security, did not reconvene in their full format in the Fall of 2020. Dynamics in negotiations were strained as well, with delegations blocking introductions of new substantive language to periodical resolutions, preferring to rollover discussions until such a time as they could be held in person. This put to question the value of their deliberations. As a result, the United Nations really faced an institutional emergency break in this domain. Some Member States took it upon themselves to push forward new proposals; the United Kingdom introduced a resolution on outer space, and Russia on the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, neither of which reached consensus, although the first one was perceived as less controversial. The Second one was rejected by a vote. In general, consultations were held by virtual means and therefore did not offered the advantages of an in-person negotiation. The only advantage was that subject-matter experts could participate in negotiations regardless of their duty stations, and without needing to travel. For example, an expert handling the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna could tune in to negotiations in New York on weapons of mass destruction – a clear benefit for countries with limited experts in different parts of the world, particularly developing countries. This provided a temporary solution for previous budget restrictions, in particular for developing countries, that did not facilitate their delegates’ travel. In 2020, the General Debate of the First Committee was held in the General Assembly hall. Almost every delegation connected the efforts on disarmament and international peace and security with the challenges from COVID-19. The thematic debates would have been a good opportunity for delegations to deepen their conversations on specific issues, including on specific impacts of COVID-19 on different domains, however they were suspended, although delegations sent written statements to be included in a general report. The interactive debate with multiple stakeholders was held through virtual platforms, with no real opportunity for delegates to really interact and coordinate with the non-governmental organizations and academia, for example. The disarmament and international security committee had planned to adopt all 73 decisions and Resolutions from 27 October to 4 November 2020. When the United Nations Headquarters reopened in early September 2020, everything was moving slowly but in the right direction, until all in persons meeting were suspended for a week on 26 October due to a reported case of COVID-19. This affected, once again, the disarmament and security portfolio of the United Nations, ironically during the disarmament week, celebrated every year from 24 to 30 October. It is interesting to note that, for the most part, coffee and corridor coordination efforts were replaced by phone calls, emails and even by WhatsApp messages. These included delicate questions that, in the pre-COVID-19 world, would not have been asked through those platforms: “how are you voting?” or “I believe we should proceed in that direction, however please read and delete my message.”

Future of international peace and security 123 Diplomacy also depends on coffee and corridor interactions. Even at the few inperson meetings, with distancing measures, the use of masks limited proper interaction and the subtleties of body language – notably facial expressions – leaving everything to the eyes. The Security Council and COVID-19 Another defining characteristic of the year 2020 was that it began with one of the greatest geopolitical tensions of the Century in the Middle East – as described by the UN Secretary-General with reference to the US-Iran crisis, for which he called for maximum restraint from all parties. In a Security Council Debate, on 9 January 2020, there was a general call for peace and to focus on development during this decade.28 Three months later, the work of the Security Council was carried out exclusively by Videoconference for four months, from March to July 2020, and started to work on a hybrid basis only since the middle of July 2020. As such, some meetings were held through virtual means, while those convened in the United Nations headquarters had to be moved from the Security Council Chamber to the Economic and Social Council Chamber, because of the size of the room. Interestingly, in February 2020, during the negotiations on the Security Council Reform Process cochaired by the United Arab Emirates and Poland, the representative of Ecuador went beyond mentioning the ideal composition of a more democratic, transparent and effective Security Council, and its methods of work, and addressed something that usually is not in the menu of that discussion: the shape of the Security Council Chamber. The Ecuadorian delegation insisted on the importance of flexibility to achieve a council without the barriers that even its Chamber has, in which there is a strong division between the semicircle where permanent and non-permanent members have a seat and a table, while the rest of the United Nations Member States have just a chair without a microphone and without a table. In contrast, the ECOSOC Chamber was designed in a way that offers member states and observers more or less the same facilities. While that could have been addressed 10 years ago within the capital master plan of the building, the point was to highlight the multidimensional nature of the Council’s exclusionary dynamics, that need to be surmounted. Unfortunately, that key process was not spared by the COVID-19 pandemic. Coming back to the work of the Security Council, it was only in October 2020 under the Russian Presidency, that the main organ returned to its Chamber, albeit with social distance measures, and plastic panels separating each of the 15 members. The other 178 Member States were not allowed to enter the room during 2020, not even to deliver individual national statements in Open Debates – a privilege afforded to non-members of the Council by rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedures29 of the work of the Security Council. Instead, only written statements have been compiled and circulated in a

124 Andres Fiallo posteriori report, with little-to- no impact as the debate has been held between the 15 members of the Council alone. Although the question of the end of traditional diplomacy has been raised30 as well as the new “Zoom-plomacy,” the reality is that negotiating by virtual means such as Videoconferences, is not the same. To put this into perspective: the Security Council took four months to reach consensus on resolution 2532 on the COVID-19 pandemic, originally planned for adoption in early April. The COVID-19 pandemic has directly impacted Peacekeeping Operations, as have humanitarian support mechanisms in conflict zones. To overcome these challenges, the Secretary-General called for a global ceasefire, as a first step to permanent peace in the first quarter of 2020. It took four months for the Security Council to demand a general cessation of hostilities in all situations. It called to all parties to armed conflicts to engage immediately in a durable humanitarian pause for at least 90 days to facilitate humanitarian assistance and requested the Secretary-General to instruct peace-keeping operations to provide support to the countries hosting them, to help contain the pandemic.31 It is relevant to note that the Resolution does not mention the World Health Organization. In fact, the reason for the delay in the adoption of the resolution from March 2020 was the lack of agreement on whether to reference the WHO. The position of the host country with regards to the WHO was made clear early in 2020, whereas every other member of the Council differed in their perspective from the host. Though the impasse was seen as a reflection of broader geopolitical tensions, it did raise questions among the public about the agility and effectiveness of the Council. Right before the Security Council adopted the above-mentioned resolution 2532, Ecuador, Malaysia, Jamaica, Japan and Sweden, with a few other delegations, brought together 172 countries in support of the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire. The delegations applied one of the diplomatic tools that were used the most during the COVID-19 pandemic: a joint communiqué, with the aim to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance in conflict zones.32 This brings us to our next point: the impact of COVID-19 on peace and security in the field. The impact of COVID-19 on peace and security in the field The pandemic has already changed the way the UN works to ensure international peace and security. This will force the UN system, and more so its Member States, to rethink how to prioritize the organization’s work. In the field, the pandemic has put a lot of pressure, deteriorating the conditions of the population in armed conflict, complicating humanitarian access as well as the situation of women, girls, youth, the elder, persons with disabilities, and Indigenous Peoples. With the resolution 2532, the Council recognized that conditions of violence and instability in conflict situations can exacerbate the pandemic, and that, inversely, the pandemic can exacerbate the adverse humanitarian impact of

Future of international peace and security 125 conflict situation. The Council went further and considered that the pandemic is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security33. During a landmark debate of the Security Council on the impact of the pandemic on international security, in July 2020, the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres confirmed that the COVID-19 had profound effects on peace and security across the globe with consequences even in traditionally “stable” countries34 in addition to those already in conflict or emerging from it. The Secretary-General clearly alerted that collective security and shared well-being were under assault on many fronts “led by a relentless disease and abetted by global fragilities.”35 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the COVID19 pandemic exacerbates vulnerabilities and violence. During the Security Council debate on pandemic and security, Peter Maurer President of the ICRC stated that pandemics undoubtedly change humanitarian work. The ICRC is well aware of the growing complexities, in particular in the context of near 100 armed conflicts involving 60 States in the World and more than 100 non-state armed groups as parties to those conflicts, which represents a rise in the total number of classified conflicts over recent decades.36 Unfortunately, women and girls suffer the most: starting with the increase of domestic violence due to the lock down and quarantine, and the disruption of justice services. In the zone of conflict, women and girls are particularly affected, especially with disruptions to access to humanitarian assistance. This was also acknowledged in the operative section of the Security Council Resolution 2532 (2020), as well as the critical role that women are playing in the response efforts. This is even more relevant as the year 2020 commemorated the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325 on “Women and Peace and Security” adopted on 31 October 2000. Unfortunately, while 2020 should have boost the global efforts for the development of Action Plans, where needed, and implementation of the resolution itself, COVID-19 could have also affected the way Governments prioritize their own efforts on this regard, including in Europe, in the midst of their -often desperate efforts- to counter the pandemic. When we ask ourselves where implementation is today and what can be done, no one can illustrate it better than the first woman Legal Adviser appointed to a peacekeeping mission, Nina J. Lahoud37 on the genesis of Resolution 1325, when she recalled the appeal made by Jamaica’s Permanent Representative in her statement at the Security Council open debate on 24 October 2000: The time has come for us to move from rhetoric to action. The women of the world expect no less from the Security Council. The pandemic also exacerbates the root causes of violence and conflict, by potentially disrupting ongoing peace processes due to insufficient follow up or implementation of the post conflict road maps, but also because of the weakening of social fabric as a result of growing inequalities, unemployment, poverty, hunger.

126 Andres Fiallo With the Spanish Flu there were protests and violence, and a similar or even stronger trend has been seen in the context of COVID-19 as people’s living conditions have deteriorated, together with their trust in institutions. Political stability and democratic processes have also been affected all around the world. While elections were held in Burundi, Malawi, Mongolia, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Mali, South Korea, Malaysia, Syria, among other countries, despite the challenges of the pandemic, other elections were postponed, for example in Botswana, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,38 and other countries. As of September 2020, the report on the United Nations Comprehensive Response to COVID-19 stated that the pandemic’s impact on conflict dynamics remained in flux, with forecasts largely dependent on the spread of the virus and broader political or military developments.39 As such, the full extent of disruption fuelled by the pandemic remains to be seen. In general, during the pandemic, the protection of human rights has been affected. Raids and protests have faced stronger responses from police forces around the globe, sometimes with excessive use of force. Civil and political rights are not the only ones affected; as we saw with the Spanish Flu, the COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating food insecurity around the globe. According to the World Food Programme Chief David Beasley, globally 821 million people go to bed hungry and by the end of 2020, due to coronavirus 130 million people may join other 135 million that already risk starvation.40 Africa, in addition to conflict and pandemic, is suffering of desert locust infestations41, which further deteriorates the food supply chain and food security with it. At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that the deployment of troops around the world was responsible for the spread of Spanish Flu. Today efforts are made so that the United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions deployed around the world do not become a source or a vector of contagion. The peacekeepers are facing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is surprising that the resolution on safety and security of peacekeepers, adopted in March 2020, while being a very important tool, failed to mention COVID-19 pandemic. In any case, the peacekeeping operations continue to take place under strict measures established to help protect the civilian populations but also to avoid scenarios such as the one involving the peacekeeping camp as a source of cholera spread in Haiti, in 2010. While terrorism and violent extremism are affected by the lockdowns and emergency measures by States, their organizations could also be benefiting from a tactical perspective as Member States focus on the fight against the pandemic. With the disruption of schools, youth are more targeted by the propaganda of terrorist and extremist groups.42 In addition to the terrorist threats, one out of four young people live in a conflict zone or is affected by violence. In July 2020 (also a couple of months late), the Security Council adopted a resolution on Youth, Peace and Security, where it recognizes that young people play a unique role in strengthening the national, local and community-based capacities in conflict and post-conflict

Future of international peace and security 127 situations to respond to public health challenges including the COVID-19 pandemic, while at the same time being affected by those very circumstances. In another landmark debate of the Security Council, held on 12 August 2020, the current and former Secretaries General Antonio Guterres and Ban Ki-Moon came together in a united front, together with Sarah Cliffe, Director of the Centre on International Cooperation, New York University. Ms. Cliffe outlined for delegations how the pandemic dynamics affect conflict risk, including through economic shock, the deepest since the Second World War and the broadest since 1870.43 With more global contraction, there is an increase in conflict risk. In her conclusions to the Council, Sarah Cliffe was clear: There has of course been well-merited resistance to “securitizing development.” But these issues are not really non-traditional-if you were to ask the world’s military agencies, most of them have planned for years for the impact of pandemics, extreme natural disasters, and so forth, as potential security risks. Analysing the risk does not, of course, mean that the Council should try to direct health or economic activities, but this is an example of an extreme public health and economic shock, which deserves to qualify as a peace-building risk. Let the Security Council raise its voice not to “securitize” the issue, but precisely so that it does not become an international peace and security disaster.44 The high-level open debate, held in the format of an open videoconference was chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, member of the Security Council for the term 2019–2020 and permanent Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement Disarmament Group. The meeting aimed to explore how more effective support might be harnessed for countries affected by conflicts or emerging from them.45 Six days before, on 6 August 2020, at the Security Council High-Level Open Debate on “Addressing the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime,” Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, reported the increase cybercrime during the pandemic.46 The opportunities and threats of the virtual world were addressed in the previous chapter, however, is worth looking at Telecommunications and Information Technologies in the field of international peace and security, particularly in the midst of the rise of cyberattacks suffered by States and the United Nations since the start of COVID-19 pandemic. Today there is no legally binding treaty on cyber in the field of international peace and security. While such a tool could be very helpful to boost international cooperation and implementation by member states, there is no consensus on the need for one due to the rapid development of technologies, among other reasons. It might be interesting to note that the difference between legal systems, common law versus civil law, also influence to some degree the positions of Member States on this issue. However, at this point even if consensus existed to start the drafting of a legally binding treaty, the content of that international instrument would be very difficult to agree on at this stage.

128 Andres Fiallo While there is agreement that international law and the United Nations Charter apply in cyberspace, one of the recent problems in this domain has been the lack of consensus within the Group of 25 Governmental Experts on key issues. This includes the question of “how” international law applies, what constitutes a “critical infrastructure,” and what an “armed attack” is in cyberspace, among other elements. In 2015, however, the Group agreed on key recommendations and eleven non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible state behaviour, which was later endorsed by the General Assembly. The Group acknowledged, however, that the application of these norms may not be immediately possible, in particular for developing countries, because of insufficient capacities. This could actually be an additional reason for the hesitation by some States in advancing a legally binding treaty, before developing capacities and addressing digital divides. While some member states want to focus on the development of norms, others prefer to focus on the implementation of existing norms of responsible behaviour. The vast majority of states prefer to focus on both the implementation and the development of a robust framework in tandem, to advance in capacity building and confidence building. More recently, a number of countries have supported the idea of adopting a Political Declaration and establishing a Programme of Action for advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace as a permanent UN forum. The forum would have the capacity to boost efforts by Member States on the implementation and development of norms in the field of ICT in the context of peace and security.47 The year 2020 should have delivered a clearer picture of the preferred direction of the international community, yet – somewhat ironically – the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on the developments on the field of information and telecommunications in the context of peace and security was also disrupted by the pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic raised the profile of the discussions and defined the centrality of cybersecurity in the field of international peace. With the digital response to COVID-19, including with the United Nations and its member states working through digital tools, cyberthreats exponentially increased. Targeted acts of cybercrime against medical facilities around the globe have shocked the world and highlighted the governance gap in cyberspace. This has made all the more relevant the efforts and the mandate of the above-mentioned Open-Ended Working Group. On the other hand, the pandemic prevented the Group from completing its mandate given by the General Assembly to adopt a consensual report with recommendations for member states in 2020. It would also be fair to note that, despite the specific challenges posed by the digital age, one of today´s advantages in comparison with the Spanish Flu is precisely the potential to reduce the disruption of peace and security processes, using virtual means. This is why the international community needs to maintain an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.

Future of international peace and security 129 The virtual dialogue on the opportunities and challenges for peace in Yemen illustrates this. So does the work of the United Nations verification mission in Colombia, or even the fact that the Security Council was able at least to meet and take decisions, as well as the administrative and financial Committee of the General Assembly (Fifth Committee) whose decisions are key for the peacekeeping missions to be able to implement their mandate. Secretary-General Guterres explained the increasingly challenging task for diplomacy posed by COVID-19, stating that mediation can be a very personal endeavour “an almost-tactile reading of a person or a room.” He further explained that, with restrictions limiting such contacts, and with online discussions often the only alternative, it can be harder to establish the trust and nurture the willingness to compromise that are at the heart of preventive diplomacy.48 It is clear that COVID-19 has changed the methods of work in the field of peace and security and that there is no return to the past on these, but it is also evident that diplomacy for peace cannot be limited to a screen. It is more important than ever to continue developing hybrid mechanisms and close the digital divides, in order to be more “future-ready.” Realpolitik and international security in the context of COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic emerged in a highly hectic international context. We already covered this in the chapter on the future of digital cooperation, a highly interconnected world. The scenario of global trade and trade liberalization was suddenly seen against the wall. The COVID-19 pandemic forced the world to close borders, interrupt or decrease production and trade. Health networks and systems were insufficient in the most developed countries. Suddenly the question on the need for strong States, for national and for global governance came back to the table. All this occurs amidst the greater economic and political power of transnational companies. Here, too, an existential question is posed for States, particularly for developing countries, as some transnational corporations have more financial capabilities and influence over authorities in other States. This undoubtedly represents a great challenge for the different components of security. In this context, two key elements come together. First, international cooperation becomes a matter of life and death, and second, there is a global understanding that as long as the pandemic has not been controlled worldwide, insecurity will persist throughout the planet, including in the most powerful countries. In an article published on 26 May 2020, by Global Security Review49, Zoltan Feher, stated: What the different international actors do not realize is that more cooperation would have helped avert the current pandemic or at least mitigate its spread and consequences. Theorists in international relations have long sparred over whether states are inherently more or less prone to cooperate. Realpolitik argues that cooperation is

130 Andres Fiallo the exception, not the rule. A country will work with another country only if it is in its national interest. In this case, ironically, a Realpolitik lens would tell us that it is in countries’ national interests that they cooperate against the COVID-19 pandemic. In our perspective, international cooperation expands positively, but it has two vectors: the first one is the need to contribute to the global fight against coronavirus, and the second one, is the desire to increase political and strategic influence in the world. But how is all this relevant to peace and security? Well, this takes place amidst an arm-wrestle between the United States and China, one to maintain and the other to expand its global influence. This has been coloured by very heavy accusations between these two countries. On Friday 24 July 2020, China ordered the closing of the United States consulate in Chengdu, in response to the decision of the USA to close the Chinese consulate in Houston, alleging espionage among other accusations, raising the already existing tensions to another level. Only two days earlier, on 22 July 2020, the Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, held a special meeting by videoconference with his peers from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which is made up of 33 countries and currently chaired by Mexico. At the meeting, the Chinese and Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Ministers pledged to expand their cooperation in the fight against the pandemic. Minister Wang Yi proposed several cooperation projects. If analyzed, those projects are aimed at ensuring food security, global public health security, disaster reduction and development in general. China’s will to promote strategic and long-term relations with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States will not change, its determination to deepen solidarity and cooperation and achieve common development will not change, its vision of jointly promoting South-South cooperation and improving global governance will not change. Wang Yi, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister50 At the end of the meeting, a joint declaration was adopted with which the States of the region acknowledge that China has decisively acted to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and made positive progress. They further thanked China for the cooperation and strong support. This trend is not only valid in Latin America and the Caribbean, but rather in the whole world, including in developed countries. Italy received assistance from China earlier than the EU. All this was also carefully captured at the General Debate of the 75th General Assembly, on 22 September 2020, in the statement by United Nations SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres to world leaders. The Secretary-General stressed that we need a “global ceasefire to stop all ‘hot’ conflicts.” He went on to note the risks of current trends resulting in a new Cold War, with the two largest

Future of international peace and security 131 economies splitting the globe in a “Great Fracture – each with its own trade and financial rules and internet and artificial intelligence capacities.” He warned that economic and technological divides would inevitably result in a military divide, that should be avoided at all costs51 As if the Global Health Crisis was not enough, on Sunday 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan and Armenia resumed hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, with regrettable loss of life, including civilians. Despite the call from the Secretary-General52 and the international community to immediately stop fighting, de-escalate tensions and return to meaningful negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group, the attacks continued and the rhetoric of war was also fuelled from third countries, affecting the stability of the region, and challenging the United Nations efforts for a global ceasefire.

What do we need to be future-ready? With an omnibus resolution on the Comprehensive and Coordinated Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic adopted on 11 September 2020, the United Nations General Assembly addressed the issue of food security, in addition to challenges for peace and security and safety. The Resolution supported the Secretary-General’s appeal for an immediate global ceasefire, and corridors for life-saving aid. It further shed light on the dual threats of violence and instability exacerbating the pandemic, while the pandemic itself also exacerbated conflict situations. With this, the United Nations is trying not only to coordinate the global efforts to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, but also to rebuild better: to build a more resilient and future-ready world, which brings us to the last section of this chapter. So far, we have seen the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on security: It affects food security, global health security, peace and security; it deteriorates the leaving conditions of people; and it exacerbates violence; it limits and disrupts humanitarian access in conflict zones. If we go back 100 years ago, we realize that after the Spanish Flu, multilateralism – at that time essentially the League of Nations – did not have a prosperous future. On the contrary, the League’s future of peace and security ended up being darker than during the First World War. Indeed, just 20 years after the Spanish Flu, World War II happened. This is clearly not the post-COVID-19 world that we want. But we know we can never take peace for granted. Today it is essential not only to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, but especially to build-better. We need to avoid at all costs falling into a dramatic post-pandemic scenario. After the Spanish Flu, multilateralism did not strengthen, and cooperation dwindled. One hundred years later, amid the Coronavirus pandemic, questions were raised on how multilateralism would fair once again, as the Trump administration in the United States withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO). As it was mentioned before the Security Council was unable to

132 Andres Fiallo adopt the resolution on the pandemic in March 2020 because it positively mentioned WHO. To be future-ready, we need to strengthen multilateralism. The best way to counter attacks against multilateralism is by feeding it, giving it tools and content, making it more effective. We also need to preserve and strengthen the WHO. The budget reportedly expended by nine countries on nuclear weapons, only in 2019, would be enough to design a global future of global health security that would include food security. It is interesting to note that at the moment when the New York authorities established the lockdown and social distancing, due to COVID-19, delegates raised the question if the United Nations work on international peace and security could be considered within the exceptions excluded from the lockdown, in the category of essential businesses. Obviously, the criteria for “essential businesses” did not apply for the United Nations, and the questions were only raised ironically. However, this shows precisely what the general idea and perceptions are with regards to the vital work of the organization. Already in the context of the novel zoom diplomacy but already used WhatsApp diplomacy on 21 March, one of the delegates leading the work of the United Nations on Peace and Security looking at a heavy load of work ahead suggested registering the United Nations disarmament business as “essential” (referring to the need for “essential workers only” to return to workplaces during the lockdowns in 2020). This seemed all the more appropriate as the term commonly used in the United Nations work is “disarmament that saves humanity.” The answer by other delegates (likely more grounded in reality) was “I do not think they will buy it.” At the same time, the Commander of U.S. nuclear arsenal said that the virus had “no impact” on the ability to accomplish their mission,53 in other worlds to launch nuclear weapons.54 In reality the point is not that the United Nations is not vital. The organization showed a capacity to continue its work by digital means, although it was only partial and resulted in a massive postponement of international meetings. All this was already addressed by Member States during the debates on the revitalization of the Work of the United Nations General Assembly: we need to build a more resilient Organization and methods of work by incorporating a greater use of digital technologies. On the question if this is possible, the answer is the Organization is already adapting to the digital dimensions, and the first digital or at least hybrid High-Level week and General Debate proves it. The United Nations peace and its security machinery was put to the test by the COVID-19 pandemic. In a post-pandemic evaluation, we must do a retake of the consequences of postponing the various United Nations meetings and processes related to peace and security, including the NPT, and contrast them with the development of the situation on the ground. If the trend shows that the evolution of the situation did not deteriorate, for example on arms trafficking or on nuclear disarmament, it may be an indication

Future of international peace and security 133 of the level of effectiveness of UN High-Level meetings and processes, although other elements should be carefully looked at. In those cases where the impact has been significant, the international community should make all efforts to catch up. On the other hand, in processes with little or no impact, the international community should rethink them. Digital diplomacy will not replace in person diplomacy, including the hall diplomacy, but circumstances will force the latter to be even more substantive. Now, diplomacy is nothing more than a sophisticated instrument of politics. What the international community needs is for international politics to change, to be ethical, with no double standards. It is not easy to imagine that international solidarity will govern relations between States ignoring the factors of realpolitik, but global challenges are undoubtedly a common factor that require concerted and coordinated attention from all. Fighting those challenges such as the pandemic may become a point of confluence for national interests, but it is still something the United Nations should push towards. In the same article from Global Security Review 55 mentioned above, Zoltan Feher considered: Once the immediate crisis is over, countries will need to rethink their cooperation in the fight against pandemics. A Realpolitik lens, however, shows that individual countries will only do this when they realize that such cooperation is in their wellconceived self-interest. Let’s hope they realize it. The sooner they do, the sooner our captivity ends. The United Nations Secretary-General early in March 2020 referred to the COVID-19 pandemic as a Global Wake Up call.56 When he launched his appeal for a global ceasefire, he explained that it would facilitate humanitarian access in conflict zones, but it would also be a first step for permanent peace. This idea, dating back to the work of Emanuel Kant on a perpetual peace, had not been raised for a long time, as if humanity had resigned itself to the permanence of war and conflict. In this context, the resurgence of the idea is positive. Member States can pretend to continue to do business as usual. If that is the case, violence and conflict will be exacerbated. Alternatively, they can instead listen to the wake-up call by increasing the level of efforts they put to sustaining peace, and conflict prevention and solution, and change the way they do it. The Secretary-General has been trying to move towards a preventive approach to peace. If we want to be future-ready, we need to accelerate our efforts to switch to that approach. We need to strengthen preventive diplomacy. We need to spread a culture of peace. It is crucial to finally head towards the future that was designed in 2016, based on sustaining peace and focused also on prevention. The peacebuilding architecture offers that opportunity, building on what was achieved in 2016 and 2020. We must continue implementing and taking full advantage of the reforms of the UN Secretary-General, but we must also go further.

134 Andres Fiallo That being said, in 2005, multilateral literature on “the future” stated that, despite dramatic changes since the Cold War, “the conventional mechanisms of diplomacy have survived.”57 The same statement was used in 1995 as in 2019.58 But can we say this is still the case after COVID-19? In its essence yes, but in many other ways the mechanisms of diplomacy are transforming. Multi-stakeholder engagement is key for a future-ready peace and security architecture, and to promote a diplomacy for peace. While an international taxation on arms trade is idealistic, an easier alternative would be for people to put pressure on their own governments to halt expenditures on arms, in particular nuclear weapons. After all, the perception of international security has changed (potentially forever), where our neighbours should not be seen as a threat but as partners against our common enemies: the pandemic, climate change, and increasingly complex future challenges. Key recommendations Big changes require big commitments. We need to consider making new “Grand Bargain,” a new social contract between member states59 based on solidarity. In the digital age, one of today´s advantages in comparison with the Spanish Flu is precisely the potential to reduce the disruption of peace and security processes, using virtual means. We should build and advance on ICTs. Digital diplomacy will not replace in person diplomacy, but circumstances will force the latter to be even more substantive. Less institutional reforms should be considered in the near future, and more focus should be put to implementation and adaptability. We need to build stronger processes, and equip diplomatic headquarters and Missions with modern technologies that would favour resilience and response capacities in the next lockdown. It is crucial to finally head towards the future that was designed in 2016, based on sustaining peace and focused also on prevention. This future must be inclusive for it to be resilient. The Women, Peace and Security agenda needs to be implemented. It is time for Member States to stop using this as a “photoop” and really advance it on the field. Moreover, inclusion of youth is also important to address future challenges. Stronger partnerships are needed between the United Nations and Academia as well. Finally, empathy and high values are central. The following quotation attributed to Montesquieu illustrates better what diplomacy and politics need for a future proof peace and security: If I knew of something that could serve my nation but would ruin another, I would not propose it to my prince, for I am first a man and only then a Frenchman, because I am necessarily a man, and only accidentally am I French. … If I knew something useful to my country, and harmful to Europe, or useful to Europe and harmful to Mankind, I would look upon it as a crime. Charles de Montesquieu (1899)60

Future of international peace and security 135

Special Article by Sarah Cliffe Turning a lost year into a leap forward By Sarah Cliffe Andres Fiallo, the author of the chapter you have just read, notes with regard to COVID-19’s impact on international peace and security that “At the time of writing, we see two alternative futures: the first being that of a possible lost year 2020, with the subsequent setbacks on the ground; and the second that of a definitive leap into a new era for multilateralism, which would benefit peace and security.” To date, the track record over 2020 looks more like a lost year than a leap forward. The Security Council has struggled simply with keeping its own discussions going – most recently restricting again in-person debates due to COVID-19 infections within delegations. It gave only late and lukewarm support to the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire to facilitate public health efforts, and took months to hold a full discussion of the peace-building impact of COVID-19. On the ground, the UN’s peace operations, humanitarian and development assistance linked to peace-building have continued to deliver important life-saving assistance, but the pressure to disburse funds in the face of COVID-19 has often meant less time for the good analysis, inclusive national ownership and partnership that are crucial for peace-building success. It is not too late, however, to transform this into a leap forward in multilateral discussions. Here are three ideas to do so: 1

2

In the Security Council, use the depth of this shock to finally embrace a regular review of non-military international peace and security threats, such as pandemics, climate-induced displacement and natural disasters and vulnerabilities in globally-connected digital systems. Advanced militaries regularly review these factors in their own strategic planning, and a modernized multilateral peace and security system needs to do so. The UN could liaise closely with other entities, such as the African Union peace and security commission, to develop a methodology for these reviews. Anchor a game-changing shift in digital cooperation in relation to mediation and peace processes. The pandemic has exposed deep inequalities in digital connectivity both within and between countries. As lockdowns have decreased physical connections, virtual communications and social media traffic have dramatically increased. Some of this is positive and an important outlet for isolated individuals and distanced families. But the pandemic has also seen a rise in digital misinformation. In turn, major tech companies have engaged in new self-regulating initiatives and partnerships to avoid criticism that they act as platforms for polarization, including efforts to support the responsible use of social media in peace processes. These endeavours lack a multilateral anchor: the UN could build on its High-Level Panel for Digital

136 Andres Fiallo

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Cooperation to provide this, as well as directly supporting a major increase in the social media capacities of its peace operation. Engage in ambitious partnership campaigns to halve global violence. The UN has been successful in the past in supporting campaigns that get into popular consciousness, such as the movement to halve global poverty. The next decade is a period where we are likely to see much social instability and volatility in the risks of violence – the trend towards more disorder in middle- and high-income countries, not only least developed economies, is likely to continue. The UN cannot address this alone: only a major partnership movement, incorporating not only national Governments and the United Nations system, but actors as diverse as cities, chambers of commerce, multilateral development banks and the IMF, multinational companies, trade unions, faith-based organizations, NGOs, ratings and remittance agencies, and foundations will be able to act on sufficient different fronts at once. The SDGs, by adopting a specific target to reduce violence, provide the basis for this type of ambitious movement.

Notes 1 Dorothea Hoehtker (2020, May 29). La grippe espagnole et le COVID-19 – Y a-til des leçons à tirer pour le monde du travail? Retrieved from: www.ilo.org/global/ about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_746050/lang–fr/index.htm. 2 Toby Saul (2020, March 25). Gripe española: la primera pandemia global. Retrieved from: https://historia.nationalgeographic.com.es/a/gripe-espanola-primera-pandemia-global_12836. 3 Other researchers claim that there was also human mobility from the cities to the rural zones, running away from the pandemic. 4 Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique, Les leçons de la pandémie de grippe espagnole de 1918–1919 en Afrique (2020, May13). Retrieved from: https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/les-lecons-de-la-pandemie-de-grippe-espagnole-de-19181919-en-afrique/. 5 Howard Phillips (2014, October 8). Influenza Pandemic (Africa), International Encyclopedia of the First World War. Retrieved from: https://encyclopedia.1914-1918online.net/article/influenza_pandemic_africa. 6 United Nations Secretary-General (2017, October 13). A/72/525 Restructuring of the UN peace and security pillar. 7 Office of the President of the General Assembly (2018 September). Striving for peace. Retrieved from: www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2017/ 12/18-12095-PGA-Book-Striving-For-Peace-web3-small.pdf. 8 Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016) and General Assembly Resolution 70/272 (2016) and 72/276 (2018). 9 Cedric de Coning (2018, April 24). Sustaining Peace: Can a New Approach Change the UN? Retrieved from: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/04/sustaining-peace-can-new-approach-change-un/. 10 A more secure world: our shared responsibility (2004, December 2). Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, p. 1. Retrieved from: https:// undocs.org/A/59/565. 11 World Summit Outcome (2005, October 24). General Assembly Resolution 60/1. 12 Fifteen years of the responsibility to protect -a collective commitment to humanity (2020, October 7).

Future of international peace and security 137 13 Office of the Special Adviser, on Genocide Prevention and the R2P (2020). Why is the responsibility to protect still relevant today? Retrieved from: www.un.org/en/ genocideprevention/15th-anniversary.shtml. 14 Organization of the seventy-fifth regular session of the General Assembly, adoption of the agenda and allocation of item (2020, September 16). Retrieved from: www. undocs.org/A/75/250. 15 General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security Council 1645 (2005) establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, December 2005. 16 Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016) and General Assembly Resolution 70/272 (2016) and 72/276 (2018). 17 WHO Eastern and Mediterranean Regional Office, Zoonotic disease: emerging public health threats in the Region. Retrieved on 25 September 2020 from: www. emro.who.int/about-who/rc61/zoonotic-diseases.html. 18 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004, December 2). A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Para. 144, pp. 44 and 45. Retrieved from: https://undocs.org/A/59/565. 19 Ibid., p. 2. 20 Ibid., para. 16. 21 Ibid., para. 19. 22 Gates, B. (2015, March 18). Lessons From Ebola, We’re not ready for the next epidemic. Retrieved from: www.gatesnotes.com/health/we-are-not-ready-for-thenext-epidemic. 23 Outcomes of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (1978, June 30). Retrieved from: www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/05/A-S10-4.pdf. Para. 11. 24 ICAN (2020, May). Enough is Enough: 2019 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending. Retrieved from: www.icanw.org/global_nuclear_weapons_spending_2020. 25 SIPRI (2020, April 27). Global military expenditure sees largest annual increase in a decade—says SIPRI—reaching $1917 billion in 2019. Retrieved from: www.sipri.org/ media/press-release/2020/global-military-expenditure-sees-largest-annual-increase-de cade-says-sipri-reaching-1917-billion. 26 World Health Organization (2020). About, Budget. Retrieved from: www.who. int/about/finances-accountability/budget/en/ and Center for Arms Control and Non Proliferation: https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/security-spending/nuclearweapons-spending/. 27 Virtual Meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission (2020, March to October). Retrieved from: www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/peacebuilding-commissionvirtual-meetings. 28 Secretary-General’s remarks at the Security Council Open Debate on “Upholding the United Nations Charter to Maintain International Peace and Security” (2020, January 9). Retrieved from: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-01-09/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-open-debate-upholding-the-united-nations-chartermaintain-international-peace-and-security-delivered. 29 Provisional Rules of Procedure (1980, December 17) of the Security Council. Retrieved from: www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/provisional-rules-procedure. 30 Shapiro Daniel (2020, May18). Will Zoomplomacy Last? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/18/will-zoomplomacy-last/. 31 Resolution 2532 (2020, July 1). Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 6. Retrieved from: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2532(2020). 32 Statement of support by 171 UN Member States, Non-Member Observer States, and Observers to the UN Secretary-General’s appeal for a global ceasefire amid the COVID-19 pandemic (2020, June 22). Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/ world/statement-support-171-un-member-states-non-member-observer-states-andobservers-un.

138 Andres Fiallo 33 Resolution 2532, preambular paragraphs 4 and 11. Retrieved from: https://undocs. org/en/S/RES/2532(2020). 34 Guterres Antonio (2020, July 2). Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council Open Video-Teleconference on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Implications of COVID-19. Retrieved from: www.un.org/sg/en/content/ sg/statement/2020-07-02/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-open-videoteleconference-the-maintenance-of-international-peace-and-security-implicationsof-covid-19-delivered. 35 Ibid. 36 Maurer Peter (2020, July 2). Six essential lessons for a pandemic response in humanitarian settings, ICR. Retrieved from: www.icrc.org/en/document/six-essentiallessons-pandemic-response-humanitarian-settings. 37 Lahoud Nina J. (2020, September 12). What Fueled the Far-Reaching Impact of the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action as a Milestone for Gender Mainstreaming in UN Peace Support Operations and Where Is Implementation 20 Years Later? Journal of International Peacekeeping, 24 (2020) 1–52, New York. Retrieved from: https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/aop/article-10.1163-1875411220200005/article-10.1163-18754112-20200005.xml?language=en. 38 Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections (2020, March 18). IDEA. Retrieved from: www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overviewcovid-19-impact-elections. 39 United Nations Comprehensive Response to COVID-19 (2020, September). United Nations documents. 40 Global Network Against Food Crises (2020). Global report retrieved from: https:// docs.wfp.org. 41 DW, How East Africa is fighting locusts amid coronavirus. Retrieved on 25 September 2020 from: www.dw.com/en/locusts-hit-east-africa-during-coronavirus/a53357078. 42 United Nations Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate CTED (2020, June). The impact of Covid-19 on Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremis. Retrieved from: www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/ uploads/2020/06/CTED-Paper%E2%80%93-The-impact-of-the-COVID-19-pandemic-on-counter-terrorism-and-countering-violent-extremism.pdf. 43 Cliffe Sara (2020, August 12). Remarks to the United Nations Security Council: Pandemics and the Challenges of Sustaining Peace. https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/ default/files/cliffe-unsc-pandemic-sustaining-peace-remarks-delivered.pdf. 44 Ibid. 45 UN Security Council (2020, July 30). Concept note for the open debate on “Pandemics and the Challenges of Sustaining Peace.” Retrieved from: www.undocs.org/ en/S/2020/765. 46 Voronkov Vladimir (2020, August 6). Statement on Addressing the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime. Retrieved from: www.un.org/counterterrorism/. 47 The future of discussions on ICTs and cyber space at the UN (2020, October 1). Proposal for a Programme of Action on Cybersecurity. Retrieved from: https:// front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/joint-contribution-poa-future-ofcyber-discussions-at-un-10-08-2020.pdf. 48 Guterres Antonio (2020, July 2). Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council Open VTC on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Implications of COVID-19. Retrieved from: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/ statement/2020-07-02/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-open-videoteleconference-the-maintenance-of-international-peace-and-security-implications-ofcovid-19-delivered.

Future of international peace and security 139 49 Zoltan Feher (2020, May 26). Realpolitik & Cooperation in the Age of COVID-19. Retrieved from: https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-cooperation-covid-19/. 50 CGTN (2020, July 23). China, Latin-American countries agree to explore new collaboration opportunities in post-COVID-19 era. Retrieved from: https://news. cgtn.com/news/2020-07-23/COVID-19-economy-and-trade-tops-agenda-of-ChinaLatAm-meeting-Sm5OaxC9eo/index.html. 51 Guterres, Antonio (2020, September 22). Address to the Opening of the General Debate of the 75th Session of the General Assembly. Retrieved from: www.un.org/ sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-09-22/address-the-opening-of-the-general-debateof-the-75th-session-of-the-general-assembly. 52 Dujarric Stephane (2020, September 27). Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Retrieved from: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-09-27/statement-attributable-thespokesman-for-the-secretary-general-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict. 53 Tomlinson L. twitter @LucasFoxNews, Commander of U.S. nuclear arsenal says tours have ended at headquarters amid coronavirus outbreak. Virus has “no impact” on ability to launch nuclear weapons. 54 Kingston Reif (2020, May 20). Coronavirus Affects U.S. Nuclear Forces. Retrieved from: www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-05/news/coronavirus-affects-us-nuclear-forces. 55 Zoltan Feher (2020, May 26). Realpolitik & Cooperation in the Age of COVID19, How can the world escape captivity? Retrieved from: https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-cooperation-covid-19/. 56 Guterres, Antonio (2020, June). Global Wake Up call. Retrieved from: www.un. org/en/coronavirus/global-wake-call. 57 Rienk W. Terpstra (2005). Multilateral Diplomacy, multilateralism and the United Nations, The Future, II ed. 58 Hamilton Keith and Richard Langhorne. The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, 1995, London. Routledge. 59 Nusseibeh, Lana, UAE, Virtual Discussion on Diplomacy in the Age of Coronavirus, with Eliot A. Cohen, Dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. 29 April 2020. 60 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1899). Pensées et Fragments Inédits de Montesquieu.

6

The future is multilateralism Mona Ali Khalil

By all accounts, 2020 was a terrible year – but was it worse than 1920?1 In 1920, World War I – which killed 16 million people – had just ended. The two-year influenza pandemic which followed killed 50 million more. By December 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had killed nearly two million people and infected nearly 80 million more. Deaths and infections were still surging worldwide. With 20/20 hindsight, the 20th century was a horrible century. It heralded two world wars which together took more than 85 million lives. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire ushered in a century of colonization and decolonization. It was a century of genocides – including the Holocaust in Europe, which was the worst and most remembered – as well as other genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and elsewhere. It was also a century of partitions – India, Palestine and the Korean Peninsula – all divided in failed attempts to resolve conflicts that lingered into the 21st century. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union also led to more wars in Europe and Asia. When we look back at the last century, however, we forget the millions who died in the pandemic and celebrate the medical, technological and digital revolutions. We forget the demise of the League of Nations and celebrate the establishment of the United Nations. We forget the millions of slaughtered innocents and celebrate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 Since the start of the 21st century, we have endured the deadly 9/11 terrorist attacks; wars in Afghanistan and more recently in Nagorno-Karabakh; aggressions in Iraq and Ukraine; genocide in Darfur and Myanmar; mass atrocity crimes in Syria and elsewhere; the terror of Al Qaeda and the barbarity of ISIL; the accelerating climate change crisis; and the COVID-19 pandemic, which continued to the 21st year of the 21st century. With 2020 foresight, the answer to our descent into cynicism, chaos and crisis, can once again be found in the UN, its Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN can rise to the challenge, using new information and communication technologies, to live up to its founders’ vision of being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to coordinate an effective and humane response to coronavirus and to protect civilians from terrorism, nations from aggression, peoples from genocide and the planet from climate change.

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In their Declaration on the Commemoration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations (the UN75 Declaration3), the Heads of State and Government recognized that “[t]here is no other global organization with the legitimacy, convening power and normative impact of the United Nations. No other global organization gives hope to so many people for a better world and can deliver the future we want. The urgency for all countries to come together, to fulfil the promise of the nations united, has rarely been greater.” Convening in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, which in their words, “manifested itself as the largest global challenge in the history of the United Nations,” they concluded that “[m]ultilateralism is not an option but a necessity as we build back better for a more equal, more resilient and more sustainable world.”

The UN75 declaration as a turning point The UN75 Declaration enumerates the actions the Member States are committed to taking “to ensure the future we want and the United Nations we need.”4 The Chapters of this book have, each in their own way, echoed the calls of the UN75 Declaration. Boosting partnerships at all levels and with all relevant stakeholders The Member States vow to boost partnerships; to make the United Nations more inclusive; and to engage with all relevant stakeholders, including regional and subregional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia and parliamentarians as well as youth to ensure an effective response to our common challenges.5 In Chapter 1, Mr. Vahd Nabil A. Mulachela (Indonesia) also explores the impact of the global pandemic both as it disrupts international diplomacy and as it offers an opportunity for growth and redefinition. He describes how governments and societies adapted to COVID-19 and reprioritized their interests. At the time of writing, he recognizes that by the time the pandemic is over, it is not clear whether multilateral diplomacy would have the same meaning and role in international relations as it did before the pandemic. While the circumstances in each country are unique, and therefore the methods of addressing the pandemic could vary from one country to another, he argues that, in the face of a fast-spreading pandemic, no-one is safe until everyone is safe. While attempts for self-reliance or self-sufficiency in fighting COVID-19 might be tempting for some governments, there is no guarantee that similar or worse situations may reoccur in the future, and international collaboration would be the only path to overcome the crisis. In order to survive, he says, multilateral diplomacy must evolve and develop innovative ways to restore confidence and to generate global solidarity while delivering tangible results. Mr. Mulachela is a former Senior Adviser on Strategic Partnerships in the Office of the 73rd and 74th Presidents of the UN General Assembly.

142 Mona Ali Khalil Delivering for sustainable development The Member States refer to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as their “road map and its implementation a necessity for our survival…. The next 10 years, which have been designated as the decade of action and delivery for sustainable development, will be the most critical of our generation. It is even more important as we build back better from the COVID-19 pandemic.”6 In Chapter 2 on sustainable development, Ms. Toni-Shae Freckleton (Jamaica) takes stock of the COVID-19 pandemic’s effect on national, regional and international efforts to achieve the UN SDGs. She notes that the COVID-19 pandemic coincided with the start of the “Decade of Action and Delivery” for implementation of the UN SDGs. Rather than focusing on the negative, she sees a new opportunity for a fresh start to achieve a transformative vision of the world and for the world. The international community has already committed to action and, she says, it is now time to push for implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In her view, the quintessential lesson provided by the COVID-19 pandemic is the recognition of the need for strong international cooperation and multilateral action. A stronger multilateral governance system will be key to peace and prosperity in the future. Ms. Freckleton is a former Senior Adviser and Team Leader for Sustainable Development and Liaison to the Caribbean Community in the Office of the 73rd and 74th Presidents of the UN General Assembly. Economic diplomacy and financing for development The Member States also emphasize the need for sustainable financing and predictable funding of the Organization. They commit to full and timely payment of their assessed contributions; to further enhanced transparency, accountability and efficient use of resources; to full and timely implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development; and to the centrality of joint public-private financing in their “efforts to make the United Nations deliver better on its purposes.”7 In Chapter 3 on the future of economic diplomacy and financing for development, Mr. Jonathan Viera (Ecuador) argues that, more than ever, the world needs a strong and inclusive economic multilateralism. He notes that both developed and developing countries have suffered severe economic shocks as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. He offers several “prescriptions” to resolve systemic financial and economic problems in order to minimize the recovery period. For developing countries, he finds that the “prescriptions” for economic restoration are the same as before the pandemic. While the political commitment of all actors is required at every level – national, regional and global – he proffers that the “new normal” should come with new morals. He identifies the following new morals as corporate social responsibility, fulfilment of Official Development Aid commitments, financial inclusion within and among countries, public-private collaboration of creditors worldwide and

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cooperation against tax evasion and illicit financial flows, among others. Mr. Viera is a career diplomat, former Vice President of the UNDP/UNFPA/ UNOPS Executive Board, and former Senior Adviser on economics in the Office of the President of the UN General Assembly. Improving digital cooperation The Member States seek to improve digital cooperation and to use digital technology for beneficial purposes, including to enhance connectivity and socioeconomic prosperity and to tap their potential to accelerate the realization of the 2030 Agenda, while mitigating risks and harmful uses. They also seek safe, meaningful and affordable digital access for all, including effective mechanisms for all relevant stakeholders to participate in deliberations.8 In Chapter 4 on the future of digital cooperation, Ms. Hana Alhashimi (United Arab Emirates) seeks to capitalize on digital technologies to catalyze global cooperation and multilateral solutions. She argues that digital technology, like the COVID-19 pandemic, has had both positive and negative trends and hopes that looking to the future, the international community must recognize and maximize the positive impacts, enhance inclusivity and ensure that no one is left behind. To that end, she says that the dialogue on the future of digital cooperation must put people at the centre, including voices from around the world, particularly from developing countries. In her view, the “new multilateralism” also depends on a multi-stakeholder approach with non-state actors working hand-in-hand with state actors both online and offline in an increasingly interdependent world. Ms. Alhashimi is a former Senior Adviser on Information and Communications Technologies in the Office of the 73rd President of the UN General Assembly, and is a member of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Multistakeholder Advisory Group for the Internet Governance Forum. Maintaining international peace and security The Member States pledge to “build, keep and sustain peace” and to prevent conflicts; to uphold international arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements; to better address all forms and domains of threats including terrorism and violent extremism; and to request the Secretary-General to use and expand the diplomatic toolbox to prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace.9 In Chapter 5 on the future of peace and security, Mr. Andres Fiallo (Ecuador), sheds light on how the pandemic has exacerbated the root causes of violence and conflict around the world. In his view, it has pulverized some of the UN’s diplomatic and other peace and security efforts. As a consequence, 2020 would have either broken the UN machinery or served as a wakeup call and call to action for a new era of peace and security. Mr. Fiallo sees that the digital age offers advantages today – during the COVID-19 pandemic – that were not available in 1918–1919

144 Mona Ali Khalil during the Spanish Flu pandemic which have the potential to reduce the disruption of peace and security processes, using virtual means, as illustrated by the virtual dialogue on the opportunities and challenges for peace in Yemen. While he does not think that digital diplomacy can replace in person diplomacy, he recommends that the UN and the broader international community must work to strengthen capacity and preparedness for the former while bolstering the substantive results of the latter. Mr. Fiallo, career diplomat, is a former Senior Political Adviser at the Office of the President of the UN General Assembly, and former Director for International Relations at the Ecuadorian Ministry of National Defence.

Upholding human rights and restoring the rule of international law In this chapter, we turn to elements of the UN75 Declaration dedicated to promoting human rights and the rule of international law. In their UN75 Declaration, the Member States affirm that “the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law remain timeless, universal and an indispensable foundation for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world.”10 While the COVID-19 pandemic does not impact these time-tested principles, it has tested the ability of the General Assembly and the Security Council to fulfil their purposes – to convene and to take action. The General Assembly, and its 193 Member States, rose to the occasion as early as 2 April 2020; they met remotely and adopted a consensus resolution11 by written correspondence which declared global solidarity to fight COVID-19. In that resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed “its commitment to international cooperation and multilateralism and its strong support for the central role of the United Nations system in the global response” to COVID-19. It also emphasized the need for full respect for human rights, and stressed that “there is no place for any form of discrimination, racism and xenophobia in the response to the pandemic.” On a practical level, the Assembly called for “intensified international cooperation to contain, mitigate and defeat the pandemic, including by exchanging information, scientific knowledge and best practices and by applying the relevant guidelines recommended by the World Health Organization.”12 The Assembly has since adopted three further resolutions on COVID-19, inter alia, ensuring global access to medicines, vaccines and medical equipment; acknowledging the key leadership role of the WHO and the fundamental role of the UN system in catalysing and coordinating the comprehensive global response to the pandemic; and emphasizing the need to address the adverse social, economic, humanitarian and financial impacts of COVID-19 in a timely and non-discriminatory manner.13 In these resolutions, the General Assembly also supported the SecretaryGeneral’s appeal for an immediate global ceasefire, noting with concern the impact of the pandemic on conflict-affected States;14 called upon States to protect and ensure respect for human rights while combating the pandemic;15 acknowledged “the critical role that women are playing in COVID-19

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response efforts,” and urged Member States to ensure full, equal and meaningful participation in decision-making and equal access to leadership and representation for women, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).16 The Security Council – with only 15 members – was much slower to adopt a resolution on COVID-19. While it held a closed meeting to discuss the pandemic on 9 April 2019, it did not adopt a resolution until three months later on 1 July 2020. In its resolution 2532 (2020), as mentioned in Chapter V, the Council, inter alia, demanded a general and immediate cessation of hostilities in all situations; called upon all parties to armed conflicts to engage immediately in a durable humanitarian pause in order to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and requested the Secretary-General to help ensure that all relevant parts of the UN system accelerate their response to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to instruct peacekeeping operations to provide support to host country authorities in their efforts to contain the pandemic. Like the Assembly, the Council also acknowledged the critical role that women are playing in COVID-19 response efforts; recognized the disproportionate negative impact of the pandemic, notably the socio-economic impact on women and girls, as well as on vulnerable people; and called for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in the development and implementation of an adequate and sustainable response to the pandemic. In the face of the pandemic, the whole world looked to the World Health Organization for technical guidance and to the United Nations for political leadership. No State or group of States has the convening power, coordinating power or mobilizing power that the United Nations and the organizations of the UN system each have in their respective areas of competence. It is imperative that the Security Council, General Assembly and the Secretariat are able to meet, virtually if necessary, to carry out their deliberations and decisionmaking, regardless of any crisis – as they did in New York on the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks; as they did as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic; and as they will have to do again in the face of other pandemics and increasingly extreme weather events due to the accelerating climate crisis. The pandemic has revealed the need to adopt special procedures to ensure that the conduct of the work of the principal organs may continue, even when it is not possible to meet in person. It was not sufficient for the General Assembly to adopt decisions and resolutions by consensus only. The right to vote is a right of membership of all Member States, and they should always be able to exercise that right in the absence of consensus – either through technological means or by written correspondence17. The same applies to the Security Council18. Threats to international peace and security do not stop because of a pandemic, a terrorist attack, an act of war or an act of God. The Security Council must be able to take action by other means in order to respond to any such threats. Last but not least, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that the frictions and fissures between the permanent members of the Security Council can paralyze the Council. On the positive side, it has also revealed that results can be achieved when the Secretary-General exercises his moral authority, and when elected members mobilize with the support of the broader membership.

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Resurrecting the roles and responsibilities of the principal organs19 It is therefore comforting that the UN75 Declaration recognized the need for reform of the principal organs of the United Nations.20 To the extent that the UN75 Declaration does not specify any particular reforms, Member States can look to each other and to the Secretary-General for a path to resurrecting their respective roles and responsibilities under the UN Charter. In his remarks on 9 January 2020, well before the UN75 Declaration was adopted, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, welcomed a discussion on the UN’s founding document, and directed a “special message” to the Security Council. At this time when global fault-lines risk exploding, we must return to fundamental principles; we must return to the framework that has kept us together; we must come home to the UN Charter. Strengthening our commitment to that resilient, adaptable and visionary document – and thus to the very notion of international cooperation itself – remains the most effective way to collectively face the global challenges of this grave moment, and the decade before us.21 To achieve the objects and purposes of the United Nations, its three main principal organs should return to the promise and vision of its founding members.   

A Security Council willing and able to fulfil its primary responsibility by taking prompt and effective action against all threats to the maintenance of international peace and security; A General Assembly willing to exercise its residual authority when and where the Security Council fails to fulfil its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security; and A Secretary-General willing to proactively bring matters and make concrete recommendations for action to the attention of the Security Council.

Dag Hammarskjold, the former UN Secretary-General, once said that the UN “was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.”22 To avoid the descent into the hell of mass death – whether by pandemic, climate change, war, terrorism or genocide – each principal organ must fulfil its own role, while acting as a check and balance on the others. To that end, the following key recommendations seek to mobilize the Security Council, revitalize the General Assembly and strengthen the independence of the Secretariat. Mobilizing the Security Council Article 24(1) requires the Security Council “to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations” to fulfil its “primary responsibility for the

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maintenance of international peace and security.” The Security Council must be willing and able to act “promptly and effectively” to prevent or respond to any and all threats to international peace and security – whether arising from pandemics like COVID-19 or climate change, or from war, genocide or terrorism. Article 24(2) of the UN Charter further provides that, in discharging its duties, the Security Council “shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” Accordingly, the Security Council must ensure that any measures taken – by the Council itself or by States or other intergovernmental organizations – are in compliance with international law. To ensure the effective responsibility of the Security Council, and its permanent and non-permanent members, it is imperative to live up to the promise of Article 24 of the UN Charter which speaks of the Council’s responsibility not its discretion – its duties not its prerogatives. While all States are required to fulfil their international legal obligations, the permanent members – to the extent that they are permanently, entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security – have a heightened obligation to ensure that action is taken to respond to global threats regardless of their nature. When a permanent member fails to do so, it also undermines the entire Security Council’s ability to do so. Any abuse of the veto power can prevent the Security Council from fulfilling its responsibility under the UN Charter to take prompt and effective action and arguably betrays the responsibility to protect people in situations involving mass deaths – in particular in situations involving credible allegations of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.23 Finally, in respect of global pandemics or other science-based phenomena, it would be useful to use Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (SCPROP),24 and/or Arria-formula meetings to hear from scientific, medical or other experts as well as by persons affected by the pandemic or related-crises. Article 32 of the UN Charter and Rule 37 of the SCPROP, stipulates that “[a]ny Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.” Article 32 embodies fundamental fairness and recognizes that hearing from all those involved or affected in the crisis or conflict – regardless of membership in the Security Council or for that matter in the United Nations itself – enhances the prospects of success in addressing that crisis or resolving that conflict. As such, the principle should also apply to affected persons and to non-State parties to intra-State conflicts, provided the latter are legitimate representatives of a party to the conflict and committed to a political resolution to the conflict. We will never forget the power of seeing and hearing from the representative of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), during the Ebola crisis in 2014. His face and voice were beamed from Monrovia, Liberia, into the Security Council Chamber across a large screen over the heads of the fifteen members. Although, the day before, the Council had already determined that “the

148 Mona Ali Khalil unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security,”25 the magnitude of the crisis became more tangible to the Council members when someone on the ground told them about individual victims and the individual heroes trying to rescue them. He paid a grateful tribute to President Obama’s Ebola response plan, including the all-important contact tracing, and issued an urgent plea for help to mobilize Member States. “If the international community does not stand up, we will be wiped out” he said.26 They acted immediately and, with the endorsement of the General Assembly, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) was established the same day.27 Revitalizing the General Assembly Pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly has the right “to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs” including any questions relating to, the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly may also, except as provided in Article 12, “make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.” The General Assembly can carry out its responsibilities in its regular sessions – as it did in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in both the 74th and 75th regular sessions. It could also convene a special session on COVID-19, as it did in July 2020.28 With regard to Article 12 on matters of which the Security Council is seized, there are occasions where the General Assembly may have to act in order to save lives. By according the Security Council primary as opposed to exclusive responsibility, the drafters of the UN Charter entrusted a measure of residual authority to the General Assembly. As explicitly stated in the preamble to General Assembly resolution 377(V) (also known as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution), the failure of the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility “does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility,” nor does it “deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.”29 The General Assembly therefore “resolve[d] that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security…, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.”30 Whenever the Security Council is prevented from acting due to differences among the permanent members, as it was for four months before the adoption of resolution 2532 (2020), Member States may wish to consider invoking “Uniting for Peace.” If a global pandemic or other threat to international peace and security emerges and one or more vetoes or threats thereof, prevents the

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Security Council from fulfilling its primary responsibility to take prompt and effective action, Member States could invoke “Uniting for Peace” to convene an emergency special session. Strengthening the independence of the Secretariat The UN Secretariat also must live up to the UN Charter’s vision of a strong, principled, impartial and independent Secretariat – one that practices the UN values it preaches, and stands up for “We the Peoples” in whose name the UN Charter was adopted. The founders foresaw situations where the Security Council may wish to evade its responsibility and, in Article 99,31 endowed the Secretary-General with the self-determining authority to bring to the Security Council’s attention matters involving its primary responsibility and requiring its prompt and effective action. From the start of the pandemic, as early as 23 March 2020, the current Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, issued an appeal in which “urged warring parties across the world to lay down their weapons in support of the bigger battle against COVID-19: the common enemy that is now threatening all of humankind.”32 On 2 April 2020, the General Assembly supported his call, and on 1 July 2020, the Security Council did so too. The Secretary-General promulgated his call for a global ceasefire on twitter and other on-line social media platforms. He also communicated this appeal to the principal organs putting forth a concrete recommendation of a humanitarian pause to allow delivery of humanitarian assistance. When he led, they followed. Accordingly, the Secretary-General should regularly exercise his self-determined authority to remind the Security Council of matters deserving its attention and make concrete recommendations on measures to achieve “prompt and effective action” to maintain international peace and security and to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law.

Conclusion In the UN75 Declaration, UN Member States have, at least in word, seized the opportunity to recommit to the promise of the UN Charter and accepted the imperative to fulfil their roles and responsibilities, individually and collectively, as envisioned therein. They must now rise to the moment – not only in word but also and more importantly in deed - not only to limit the spread and socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic but also to combat climate change, to alleviate poverty and hunger, and to prevent and stop genocide and other mass-atrocity crimes. To survive the pandemic, we, as individuals, must stand apart for the time being. To survive, as a human race, we must stand together and forge a multilateral response to these common challenges guided by our universally accepted principles. Imagine if the Security Council took the reins and, relying on the guidance and recommendations of the World Health Organization, led a global response to address the peace and security impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Imagine

150 Mona Ali Khalil if the General Assembly adopted a universal basic income to ensure that no one is left behind in the socio-economic crisis unfolding as a result of the pandemic. Imagine if the Secretary-General held a pledging conference to ensure that all countries have the means to provide protective equipment to the first responders; to ensure supplies of therapeutics to the afflicted; and to distribute a safe, effective vaccine. Imagine if Member States implemented the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions as well as the WHO recommendations without discrimination and with respect for the human rights of all. To those ends, the UN can use digital cooperation, relying on new information and communication technologies, to live up to its founders’ vision of being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these object and purposes. The UN can and must put these technologies in the service of its three pillars: peace and security, sustainable development and human rights for all. Moments of crisis are also moments of opportunity – provided we are interested in pursuing multilateral solutions not provoking populist divisions; inspired by the power of principles, not by the principles of power; and guided by our common humanity, not by narrowly-defined national interests. On behalf of “We the Peoples,” the founding members came out of World War II and adopted the UN Charter to offer a way out of the scourge of war and genocide – and a way to peace, development and human rights for all. Similarly, in their UN75 Declaration, world leaders have vowed to return to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to build back a post-pandemic world defined by greater security and dignity, less hunger and poverty, and larger freedom and justice. In 2020, we celebrated the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations; we commemorated the 20th Anniversary of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security; and we embarked on the Decade of Action for Sustainable Development. Let us hope that, by the time we celebrate the 100th Anniversary of the United Nations, world leaders live up to the vision of the UN Charter and the promises they made in the UN75 Declaration. Our lives and the future of the planet depend on it.

Notes 1 The introduction and conclusion to this chapter first appeared in an essay by the author of this chapter, Mona Ali Khalil, entitled The Path to Ending Our Global Chaos Is Through the UN, in Passblue, 22 October 2020. Available at: www.passblue.com/2020/10/22/the-path-to-ending-our-global-chaos-is-through-the-un/. 2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 217 (III) on 10 December 1948. Available at: www.un.org/en/ universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html. 3 UN General Assembly resolution 75/1 of 21 September 2020. Available at: https:// undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/1. 4 Ibid., operative paragraph 6. 5 Ibid., operative paragraphs 16 and 17. 6 Ibid., operative paragraphs 6 and 7.

The future is multilateralism 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

21

22 23

24 25 26

27 28

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Ibid., operative paragraph 15. Ibid., operative paragraph 13. Ibid., operative paragraph 9. Ibid., operative paragraph 10. UN General Assembly resolution 74/270 of 2 April 2020. Ibid., paragraphs 1, 2 and 5. UN General Assembly resolutions 74/274 of 20 April 2020, 74/306 of 11 September 2020 and 74/307 of 11 September 2020. UN General Assembly resolution 74/306, paragraph 3. Ibid., paragraphs 4 and 5. Ibid., paragraph 28. See GA/12287 announcing the adoption of the decision in A/75/L.7/Rev.1 setting out the special decision-making procedure on remote electronic voting. Available at: www.un.org/press/en/2020/ga12287.doc.htm. See S/2020/253 and S/2020/372. Available at: undocs.org/S/2020/253 and undocs.org/en/S/2020/372. This section draws on published works by the chapter’s author, Mona Ali Khalil, including Reforming the UN Security Council, a report commissioned by the UN Association of the United Kingdom (UNA-UK) and Together First, published in April 2020, available at: www.una.org.uk/reforming-un-security-council and Restoring the Values and Spirit of the International Civil Service, published by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation in May 2019, available at: www.daghammarskjold. se/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ics_100_no_2_m_khalil_web.pdf. UN General Assembly resolution 75/1 of 21 September 2020., operative paragraph 14. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/1. It should be noted that the UN75 Declaration refers to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. In this chapter, we address recommendations for the reform of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ Remarks in the Security Council Open Debate on “Upholding the United Nations Charter to Maintain International Peace and Security,” held in New York on 9 January 2020. Available at: www.un.org/ press/en/2020/sgsm19934.doc.html. Address by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at University of California Convocation, Berkeley, California, 13 May 1954. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1291161?ln=en. The “Responsibility to Protect” civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was articulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. See paragraph 139 of General Assembly resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1. Rule 39 provides that “[t]he Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.” UN Security Council resolution 2177 (2014) of 18 September 2014. Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2177%20(2014). Mr. Jackson KP Naimah, Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF), spoke to an emergency session of the Security Council from Monrovia, Liberia, at the invitation of the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, Ms. Samantha Power, on 19 September 2014. Available at: www.msf.org. uk/article/ebola-msf-addresses-un-security-council-emergency-session. UN General Assembly resolution 69/1 of 19 September 2014. Available at: https:// undocs.org/en/A/RES/69/1. Information available at: www.un.org/pga/74/2020/07/02/special-session-of-thegeneral-assembly-on-covid-19/. See also Rules 8(a) and 9(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.

152 Mona Ali Khalil 29 GA resolution 377(V) of 3 November 1950. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/ RES/377(V). 30 Ibid. 31 Article 99 of the UN Charter provides that “[t]he Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” More information available at: https://legal.un.org/repertory/art99.shtml. 32 UN Press Release, 23 March 2020. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/ 2020/03/1059972.

Index

11th of September 140 2005 world summit 117 2008 economic crisis 6, 62–3, 66–9, 77 2020 economic crisis 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 5, 9, 11, 36–58, 63, 69, 77, 92, 142–3 75th Anniversary of the UN 2–6, 13, 29, 49, 95, 104, 116–7, 150 75th Anniversary of the UN declaration for the 49 75th Anniversary of the UN summit 29 access to COVID-19 tools accelerator 32 Addis Ababa Action Agenda 36–7, 47, 63, 68–77 Afghanistan 140 Africa 17, 24, 38, 56, 68, 97, 121, 126, 148 Al Qaeda 140 Amazon 96–8 ambition 12, 24, 37–40, 47–8, 51, 54 Annan, Kofi 117 António Guterres 2, 25, 104, 125–30, 146, 149 apartheid 9 Apple 98 Armenia 131 arms 120, 132–4, 143 Arria-formula meetings 147 Artificial Intelligence (AI) 94, 100, 131 Azerbaijan 131 Ban Ki-Moon 37, 127 Barack Obama 148 Beijing 11, 18, 36 Beijing Declaration 11, 36 Berlin Wall 116 Big Tech 95–8 biodiversity 29, 31, 38, 40, 49, 54

Biodiversity Summit 29 Black Death 66 Blavatnik School of Government 20 border closing 22, 42 Bosnian genocide 140 Botswana 126 Brazil 17, 30, 91 Bretton Woods Institutions, BWIs 77 build back better 5, 13, 41, 45, 49, 51, 141–2 building trust 56 Burundi 126 business (see private sector) Cambodian genocide 140 Cambridge Analytica 93 Canada 41, 71 CANZ countries 64 ceasefire 124 Central African Republic 121 Chad 121, 126 Charter of the United Nations 8–10, 24, 103 Chengdu 130 China 16–22, 50, 64, 66, 74–5, 86, 98, 130 Christchurch Call 94 Cicilline, D. 98 Cisco 107 cities (see urban development and New Urban Agenda) civil society 7, 19, 21, 24, 28–9, 36, 52, 65, 75, 91–2, 105, 141 climate: action 1, 3, 11, 47–9, 75, 101, change 36–49, 134–5, crisis 140, 145–7, 149 coherence 43, 54, 116 Cold War 25, 130, 134 colonial powers 115 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 130

154 Index conflict 6, 9, 25, 39, 115–136, 140, 143–7 Connect 2030 88 connectivity 84, 88, 99, 103–8, 135, 143 consensus 2, 8, 11, 26–8, 39, 65, 88, 90–2, 99, 106–8, 117–8, 121–4, 127–8, 144–5 Costa Rica 24, 49 COVID-19 pandemic 1–9, 16, 19–30, 36, 42–3, 45, 52–4, 58, 67, 70, 72, 95, 97, 100, 108, 115–20, 124, 126, 129–31, 133, 140–5, 148–9 COVID-19 pandemic recovery 41–53, 62, 67–72, 75–78, 106, 108, 142 COVID-19 the Global Humanitarian Response Plan 72 COVID-19 Vaccine Facility – COVAX 32 cyberattacks 89–90, 127 cybercrime 89, 99, 109, 127 cybersecurity 89–94, 99, 102, 107, 128 Cybersecurity Tech Accord 90, 94 Dag Hammarskjold 146 Darfur genocide 140 data 20, 50, 56, 88–90, 93, 99–102 debt 67–74, 77–8 debt sustainability 73 decent work 64, 68, 74 Delegates’ Lounge 65 Democratization of Diplomacy 6 Desertification 31, 47–9, 54 developed countries 10–1, 38–9, 50, 62–3, 68, 77–8, 84, 88, 104, 128–130, 142 developing countries 10–1, 36, 40–56, 62–77, 84–9, 102, 122, 128–9, 142 development 36–79, 85–87, 96–99, 103 development financing 62, 71 Diamandis, Peter 86 digital: diplomacy (see diplomacy), 144, divides 52–3, 87–8, 92, 96, 128–9, infrastructure 95–6, 107–8, revolution 85, 100, 140 digital cooperation: 84–108, 129, 135, 143, High-level Panel on 94, 117–9, 135, Secretary-General’s Roadmap for 101, 104 diplomacy: 1–7, 30–1, digital 95, 106, 108, 133–4, health 31–2, economic 64–5, 142, multilateral 116, 141, preventive 129 Diplomat 2–6, 23–8, 49, 65, 87, 99, 116 disarmament 8, 120–2, 127, 132, 143

disaster 47, 53–4, 74, 130, 135 Disaster Risk Reduction (see Sendai Framework) discrimination 9, 27, 144, 150 disinformation 93, 99, displacement 47, 115 dissolution 140 disturbance 117 Doha, Qatar 62 Dominican Republic 126 Ebola 17, 56, 119, 120, 147–8 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 11, 13, 19, 29, 42, 49, 65, 70, 123 economic crisis 44, 62–3, 150 economic diplomacy 62–79 economic globalization 62, 72 Ecuador 17, 75–6, 123–4 Egypt 17, 90 Emanuel Kant 6, 115, 133 environment 1–3, 16, 52, 56–7, 72–5, 90, 105 epicenter 19 Ethiopia 24, 57, 126 Europe 17–19, 38, 63, 115, 126, 140 European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 57 European Union 22, 29, 64, 86, 91–3 Europol 99 Facebook 93, 100, 106 FFD International Conference on Financing for Development 62, 142 financial markets 6, 63–4, 68 Financing for Development 36, 62–79, 142 First Committee of the UN General Assembly 122 fiscal and monetary policies 67, 72 Fletcher, Tom 102 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) food security (see security) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 75 foreign policy (see policy) Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) 46, 100 Fourth World Conference on Women 29 fragilities 6, 119, 125 France 17, 31, 90 Future Possibilities Report 100 G-20 18, 73, 78, 90 G-7 18 Gabon 126

Index 155 Gambia 126 Gender 11, 37, 39, 45–6, 70, 87–8, 92, 94–5, 97 General Assembly High-level Week: 12, 23, 28–9, 95, 132, General Debate 1, 12, 28–9, 64, 122, 130, 132 General Assembly resolutions: resolution 74/306 (Omnibus on COVID-19 response) 28, 74/544 (procedures during COVID-19) 26, resolution 74/270 (Global Solidarity to Fight COVID-19) 27, resolution 74/274 (access to medicine to face COVID-19) 27 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 93 Geneva, Switzerland 91, 121 genocide 117–8, 140, 146–7, 149–50, Rwandan 10, 140 geopolitical 2, 32, 98, 123–4 Germany 17–8, 22, 41, 56–7, 101 Ghana 27, 41 Global Citizen 19 global economy 6, 13, 20–2, 56, 62–6, 72–9 Global Network Resiliency Platform REG4COVID 106 Global North 51 Global Preparedness Monitoring Board 18, 31 Global South 51, 91 Google 98, 110 governance: climate 49, cyber 128–9, digital 84–5, 91–5, 98, 101–2, 106, supranational/ multilateral 1, 4–6, 12, 32, 142–3, of the Sustainable Development Goals 40–5, 52–4, 63 Grand Bargain 7 Great Depression (of 1930) 40, 58, 62, 66, 69, 97 green recovery 41, 48 Gross Domestic Product, GDP 40, 67–8, 70, 74, 86 Group of 77 and China (G77 and China) 50, 64–5, 75, 86–7 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cybersecurity 90 GSMA 106 Guangdong 18 Guinea-Bissau 121 Guterres, Antonio 2, 25, 104, 125, 127, 129–30, 146, 149 H1N1 pandemic 17, 31 Hanhimäki, Jussi 24

health: global health diplomacy 56–60, public 1, 9, 16–22, 118–9, 127, security 31–2, 41, 115, 130–2, services 31, 115, women’s 11 hierarchy 102 High Commissioner for Human Rights 22 High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development 6, 36, 62–83, 142 High-level Event on Convention on the Right of the Child 9, 29 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 117–9 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) 38, 40, 42, 49–50 Hiroshima 6, 120 HIV/AIDS 30, 37, 74 Hochschild, F. 3, 99, 107, 123 Holocaust 140 Hubei Province 16 human development 40 human rights: Council 76, pillar 12, 24, 116, protection/ respect of/upholding 27, 37, 45, 93, 126 144, threats to 40, 115, Universal Declaration on 8, 140, 150 humanitarian access 115, 131–5, 145, assistance/response 22,71–2, 81, 124–5, 149, crises 24–5, 115, law 117, 149, policy 30, 144, 149 Hungary 28 IBM 98 IFAD 58 illicit financial flows 63, 71, 75, 78, 143 in-person meetings 4, 19, 23, 25–6, 28, 121, 123 inclusion 54–57, 68, 70, 78, 87, 100–1, 106, 118, 134, 142 indebtedness 54, 72, 74, 78 inequality: gender 37, 70, pre-existing 12, 87, 135, exacerbated/rising 22, 39–40, 45–6, 52–3, 70, 75–7, 84–5, 96, 104, 125 inflation 68 infodemic 98 Information and Communication and Technologies (ICTs) 45, 86–92, 97, 104–6, 128, 134 insecurities 39–40, 115, 118, 121, 126, 129 instability 53, 115, 124, 131, 136 interest rates 68, 73 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 125 International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 29

156 Index International Financial Institutions 44, 62–4, 71 International Labour Organization (ILO) 48, 69–70 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 58, 67–8, 70, 72–3, 77–8, 97, 136 International Peace and Security see peace and security International Tax Cooperation 75 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 103 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 92, 101 Internet Governance 6, 91–4 Internet Governance Forum 101, 143 Internet of Things (IoTs) 89 Investment 10–1, 20, 32, 41, 44, 48, 52, 54, 62–3, 68, 72, 74–6, 78–9, 97 Iran 96, 123 Iraq 140 Ireland 24 ISIL 140 Israel 28 Jamaica 71, 124–5, 142 Japan 16–8, 22, 64, 108, 124 Kenya 86 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 108 Lady Gaga 19 Lake Chad Basin 121 Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) 10, 39–40, 50, 53–4 Latin America and Caribbean 38, 68, 130 League of Nations 1, 12, 94, 131, 140 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 39–40, 50–4, 63, 67, 73–7, 88, 104 Liberia 121, 147 Liechtenstein 27 Maas, Heiko 22 Macron, Emmanuel 94, 96 Malawi 126 Malaysia 124, 126 Mali 126 Manhattan (see New York City) Marsudi, Retno 22 Martin, Chris 19 McCartney, Paul 19 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) medical equipment 9, 21, 28, 144 Microsoft 94, 98, 106

Middle East 123 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 18, 31 Middle-Income Countries (MICs) 74 Military Expenditures 121 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 31, 36–7, 41, 55, 68, 99 Momentum 24, 37, 45, 51, 121 Mongolia 41, 126 mPesa 86 multilateral: action 27–8, 46, agreements 36–7, diplomacy 2, 7, 12, 16, 23–32, 49, future 140–9, system 9, 24–5, 31–2, 43, 50–5, 71, 91–6, 102, 131–5 multistakeholder 85, 90–94, 98–102 Myanmar 140 N95 respirators 18 Nagasaki 6, 120 Nagorno-Karabakh 131, 140 nature-based solutions 54 Netherlands, the 41, 98 NETMundial 91 New Urban Agenda 37, 76 New York City 1–2, 19, 23–8, 63, 96, 132 New Zealand 94, 98 Nigeria 18, 75 Nobel Peace Prize 58 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 29, 136 Norway 27, 30 Nuclear 6, 8, 96, 120–1, 132, 134 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 8, 120 Nye, J. S. 101, 103 Observer State 29, 123 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 63, 77–8 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 69 OSCE Minsk Group 131 Oslo Initiative on Global Health and Foreign Policy 30 Ottoman Empire 140 Oxford University 20 Pacific Islands 121 Papua New Guinea 121 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace 90 Paris Climate Agreement 9, 11, 36, 37, 41, 46–8, 54, 92

Index 157 parliament 116, 141 Parliament of Humanity 4, 8, 96 partition of India, Palestine and the Korean Peninsula 140 partnership: global 8, 9, 63, 136, national 135, mechanisms 32, 44, 52, multilateral 12, with the private sector 57, 75, 101, 102, with stakeholders 28, 50, 52, 101, 141 Partnership Dialogue for Connectivity 106 peace: agreement 25, and security 2, 4, 7–9, 20, 24, 41, 77, 115–36, 143 peacebuilding: Architecture Review 118, 133, Commission 118, 121, Support Office 118 Peacekeeping: missions 25, operations 11 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 3, 18, 22, 27, 51, 150 Philippines 23 Poland 123 policy: agenda 102, coherence 43, 54, 116, coordination 97, digital 92, foreign 3, 22–3, 30, 73, 93, makers/ making 8, 20, 38, 50, 58, 89, monetary 72, public 6, 37, 86, 91, reform 77, 88, responses/ interventions 7, 71, 74, 84, 107 population 38, 47, 57, 85, 97, 126 Poverty: alleviate 31, 136, 149, 150, causes 2, eradication 11, 37–40, 47, 86, exacerbation (rise) 10, 46, 55, 64, 115, 125, multidimensional 74 President of the General Assembly (PGA) 7–13, 19, 26, 62, 116, 118 private sector 21, 32, 63, 77 creditors 74, 78, investments 71 partners 75, 78, 85, with governments and civil society 7, 23, 28–9, 36, 38, 52, 91, 141 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (SCPROP) 123, 147 public health (see health) public order 115 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) 49 Quito, Ecuador 76 racism 27, 144 realpolitik 6, 115, 129–31, 133 receptions 4, 65 repatriation 22–3 Republic of Korea 17, 18, 57, 61, 90, 126 resilience, 10, 44–8, 51–4, 72, 134 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 117–8, 147

risk: health 30–2, 67, of increased inequalities 38, reduction 44, 48, 52–4, security 99, 127, 136 Rouhani, Hassan 96 Russian Federation 18, 22, 64, 110, 122–3 Sahel 121 SAMOA Pathway 29, 36, 37 San Francisco 8, 13, 93, 100 SARS-Cov 16–8, 31, 119 Secretary General of the United Nations (see UNSG) security: health 30–3, food 21, 39, 47, 53–4, 67, 99, and peace 115–35, 143–50 (also see peace and security) Security Council: reform 25, permanent five members 19, president 26, 116–36, resolution on COVID-19 (2020) 124–5, 145, 148, veto 116, 147–8 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 36, 47 Senegal 30, 41 Shah Rukh Khan 19 Sichuan 18 Singapore 27, 93 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 10, 36–9, 41, 49–8, 50–4, 73 Smart Power 103 social contract 45, 85, 95, 101, 133 social protection 46, 52–4, 64, 74 solidarity 3, 9, 19–31, 43, 53, 63, 105, 115 Solidarity Response Fund 19 Solidarity Trial 24 South Africa 24, 30, 73, 76 South-South Cooperation 51, 130 Sovereign Equality 12 Soviet Union 140 Spanish Flu pandemic 115, 120, 126, 128, 131, 134, 144 Special Political Missions 116, 126 stability 51, 63, 94, 126, 131 stimuli 21 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan 71 Supply chains 32, 42, 55, 66, 115, 126 Suriname 126 sustainable development (see development) Sustainable Development Goals 36–46, 55–8, 63–4, 70, 74, 92, 100 Sustaining Peace 117–8, 121, 133 Sweden 124 Switzerland 27, 94 synergies 42, 46, 50, 52, 75

158 Index Syria 126, 140 systems thinking 43, 51 Taxes 21, 41, 68, 75, 134, 143 Tensions 39, 62–3, 98, 123–4, 130–1 Terrorism 90, 94, 126–7, 140, 143, 145–6 Terrorist attacks of 9/11 119 Thailand 16, 30 Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, Habitat III 76 trade 32, 63–7, 72–3, 78–9 trade-offs 42–3, 50–2 transformation 8, 28, 43, 50–4, 62, 86, 104, 116 transnational corporations 76, 129 transnational threat 115 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT, Review Conference 120 Trump, Donald 96 Ukraine 28, 140 UN COVID Response and Recovery Plan 41 UN Development System 49–50, 97 UN Machinery 143 UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) 148, UN Secretary-General 24–6, 48, 101, 123, 133 UN Sustainable Development Goals 36–9, 46–7, 55–7, 64–70, 74, 92, 100 UN75 Summit 11 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see Soviet Union United Arab Emirates (UAE) 17, 22, 92, 94, 100–1 United Kingdom 24, 41, 89, 98, 102, 122 United Nations: 100th Anniversary 150, comprehensive response to COVID-19 126, COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund 72, headquarters 120, 122–3, World Summit (2005) 117 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 25, 44 United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 105 United Nations General Assembly (see General Assembly) United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 102, 106–7

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 122 United Nations Security Council (see Security Council) United States of America 17–8, 22, 28, 130 Uniting for Peace (resolution 377(V)) 148–9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see human rights) Universal Health Coverage 10, 29–31, 79 urban development 76 Video Teleconferencing Services (VTCs) 2 Vienna, Austria 122 Viet Nam 17, 41, 57 Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) 38, 44, 50 vulnerable groups 10–2 WannaCry 89–90 weapons: of mass destruction (WMDs) 8, 122 West Africa 56, 121 WhatsApp 65, 84, 86–7, 96, 122, 132 Whole-of-Government 19, 42, 50, 54 Whole-of-Society 19, 50–3 Wikileaks 91 Women, Peace and Security (WPS) resolution (1325) 125, 145, 150 World Bank 18, 46, 58, 66, 70, 72–3, 77–8, 98, 106 World Economic Forum (WEF) 48, 74, 106 World Food Programme (WFP) 58 World Health Organization (WHO) 9, 16, 31, 71, 107, 144–5 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 36, 88, 92 World Trade Organization (WTO) 66–7, 73, World War I (WWI) 94, 115, 119, 131, 140 World War II (WWII) 24, 51, 65, 68, 127, 150 Wuhan, China 16–8 Xenophobia 27, 144 Yemen 129, 144 Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) 126 Zika virus 18 Zoom: video-teleconferencing 95–6, 103, 132, for diplomacy (zoom-plomacy) 49, 84, 124, 132 Zuckerberg, Mark 93