The French Welfare State: Surviving Social and Ideological Change 9780814705483

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THE FRENC H WELFAR E STAT E

THE FRENC H WELFARE STAT E Surviving Socia l and Ideologica l Chang e Edited b y JOHN S . AMBLE R

N E W YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S NEW YOR K A N D L O N D O N

Copyright © 199 1 b y Ne w Yor k Universit y All right s reserve d Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a The Frenc h welfar e stat e : surviving socia l an d ideologica l chang e / edited b y John S . Ambler , p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-0599- 5 (alk . paper ) 1. France—Socia l policy . 2 . Welfar e state . I . Ambler , Joh n S . (John Steward ) HN425.5.F74 199 1 361.6T0944—dc20 91-973 4 CIP

New Yor k Universit y Pres s books ar e printe d o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability .

CONTENTS

Preface vi i Contributors i x 1 Ideas , Interests , an d th e Frenc h Welfar e Stat e John

S. Ambler 1

2 Advantage s o f Complexity: Socia l Insuranc e i n Franc e Douglas E. Ashford 3 2 3 Continuit y an d Chang e i n Frenc h Socia l Policy : The Welfar e Stat e under Gaullism , Liberalism , an d Socialis m David R. Cameron 5 8 4 Th e Continuit y o f Crisis: Patterns o f Healt h Car e Policymakin g i n France, 1978-198 8 David W Us ford9 4 5 Famil y Polic y i n Franc e sinc e 193 8 Remi Lenoir 14 4 6 Frenc h Housin g Policie s i n th e Eighties : Complexity, Continuity , and Ideolog y Nathan H. Schwartz 18 7 7 Democrac y an d Socia l Policies : The Exampl e o f Franc e Bruno Jobert 23 2 Abbreviations 25 9 Index 26 5 v

PREFACE

Much o f th e worl d faile d t o notic e tha t i n th e 1960 s an d 1970 s Franc e developed int o one of the more generous welfare state s in the world, translat ing a n ol d commitmen t t o "solidarity " int o a bod y o f socia l policie s tha t rescued the elderly from poverty , drew virtually the entire population beneat h the ten t o f health an d old-ag e insurance , dramaticall y expande d opportuni ties fo r secondar y an d highe r education , an d increase d ai d t o th e handi capped an d t o singl e mothers . Th e purpos e o f thi s boo k i s t o describ e an d explain thi s transformation, a s well as to examine som e of the new problem s that hav e emerge d i n it s wake. Th e initia l chapter , whic h place s Franc e i n comparative an d historica l perspective , offer s a n overvie w o f th e cause s o f welfare stat e development . Th e thir d chapter , b y Davi d Cameron , present s statistical evidenc e an d analysi s of the growth o f French socia l expenditures , while Brun o Jobert' s concludin g essa y measure s th e Frenc h welfar e stat e against th e standar d o f social justice , wit h particula r referenc e t o unemploy ment. Th e othe r chapter s ar e devote d t o differen t fields o f socia l policy — pensions, health , housing , an d th e family . These essay s present n o centra l thesis , althoug h ther e ar e recurrin g themes . We find tha t i n th e cas e o f Franc e partisa n ideolog y ha s ha d a very limite d impact o n socia l policies . Althoug h th e Frenc h welfar e stat e wa s strength ened b y th e center-lef t government s o f th e immediat e post-Worl d Wa r I I years, conservativ e government s wer e primaril y responsibl e bot h fo r th e creation o f a genera l socia l insuranc e pla n i n 193 0 an d fo r th e dramati c expansion o f socia l benefit s i n th e 1960 s an d 1970s . Ther e i s essentia l agreement among the authors that the socialist governments o f the 1980 s did not fundamentall y chang e th e socia l policie s that the y inherited . Thi s i s not

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to say that ideas have not been important—particularl y th e concept of social solidarity, whic h i s considerably olde r than the welfare state. A secon d recurrin g them e i s the institutional complexit y o f the Frenc h social securit y system , attributabl e i n part to the mutual societ y (mutualite) tradition upo n whic h i t was built. Ou r authors are not wholly agreed o n the consequences o f tha t complexity . Dougla s Ashfor d an d Natha n Schwart z find tha t i t contribute s t o flexibility in policymaking , whil e Brun o Jober t concludes tha t th e "corporatist " element s i n th e administration o f Frenc h social securit y strengthe n organize d interest s and inhibit change s require d to meet ne w social neeeds . Th e difference amon g th e author s stem s i n par t from th e different specifi c policie s tha t the y examine , bu t als o fro m thei r different perspectives : Ashford , a carefu l studen t o f institutions , view s the diverse networ k o f plans a s an excellen t fit betwee n th e stat e an d Frenc h society; Jobert, judgin g from th e perspective of social justice , see s the present system a s a sourc e o f inequality . W e di d no t attemp t t o eliminat e suc h tensions from thi s collection. Le t the reader decide. This boo k grew out of a symposium i n the fall o f 198 8 on the impact of partisan ideolog y o n Frenc h socia l policy . Th e original papers , b y Douglas Ashford, Davi d Cameron , an d David Wilsford, al l have been revise d for this collection. I n orde r t o complement thi s se t of papers, w e were fortunat e t o be able to commission contribution s fro m thre e specialists: Nathan Schwart z on housing , Rem i Lenoi r on family policy , and , finally, Bruno Jobert, who, in a capstone essay , evaluate s the performance o f French socia l policy. I am particularly indebte d t o Douglas Ashford , wh o was instrumental i n locatin g our thre e additiona l collaborators , an d to Martin Schai n o f New Yor k Uni versity, wh o encouraged u s to turn th e symposium paper s int o a book. I a m also grateful t o the American Philosophica l Associatio n fo r summer researc h support in France, an d to Chris Salmon , wh o assisted with the translation of the chapte r by Rene Lenoir. I am responsible for the final translation o f that chapter an d of the one by Bruno Jobert . Th e Jobert chapte r i s an enlarge d version o f a n articl e tha t appeare d i n L'Annee Sociologique in 1990 . We thank the editors of that review for permission to reprint it here in translation. All other chapters appear here for the first time. Houston, Texas JOH

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CONTRIBUTORS

John S . Amble r i s Professo r o f Politica l Scienc e a t Ric e Universit y i n Houston, Texas . Hi s recen t wor k ha s focuse d primaril y o n th e politic s o f education i n Franc e an d Britain . H e i s autho r o f The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962; The Government and Politics of France; and edito r an d coauthor of The French Socialist Experiment. Douglas E . Ashford i s Andrew W . Mello n Professo r o f Comparative Poli tics, Universit y o f Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania . H e ha s writte n extensivel y o n policymaking an d politic s in France , mos t often i n compariso n wit h Britain . His majo r recen t book s ar e The Emergence of the Welfare States an d th e edited study, Political Discretion: Intergovernmental Social Transfers in Eight Countries. David R . Cameron i s Professor o f Politica l Scienc e a t Yal e University . H e has contribute d article s t o a numbe r o f journals , includin g th e American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics, European Journal of Political Research, International Organization, an d Journal of Politics, as well as to several edite d volumes . Hi s areas of research include comparativ e politica l econom y an d mas s politic s i n Europe , Nort h America, an d th e Pacific . H e i s currently writin g a book entitle d Essays on the Public Economy and i s coediting a book on Political Control of the Soviet Economy. Bruno Jobert is Director of Research with the National Cente r for Scientifi c Research (CNRS) . H e i s associate d wit h th e Centr e d e Recherch e su r l a ix

Politique, TAdministratio n e t le Territoire (CERAT) , whic h i s affiliated wit h the Fondatio n National e de s Science s Politique s an d wit h th e Institu t d'Etude s Politiques o f Grenobl e withi n th e Universit e de s Science s Sociale s i n Gre noble. Hi s extensiv e writing s o n Frenc h socia l polic y includ e Le social en plan and , wit h P . Muller , L'Etat en action. Remi Lenoi r i s maitre de conference a t th e Universit y o f Paris . H e i s als o affiliated wit h the Centre de Sociologie Europeenne i n Paris . H e is author of numerous publication s o n Frenc h society , man y concernin g famil y policy , and coauthor o f Initiation a la pratique sociologique. Nathan H . Schwartz, Associat e Professor o f Political Scienc e at the Univer sity o f Louisville , ha s previousl y writte n o n Britis h an d America n housin g policy. Hi s chapte r i n thi s volum e i s on e resul t o f a yea r o f field wor k i n France. A subsequen t yea r an d a hal f o f researc h i n German y unde r th e auspices o f th e Alexande r vo n Humbold t Foundatio n provide d additiona l material fo r hi s book-in-progres s comparin g housin g polic y i n France , Ger many, th e Unite d States , an d th e Unite d Kingdom . David Wilsfor d i s Assistan t Professo r o f Politica l Scienc e i n th e Schoo l o f International Affairs , Georgi a Institut e o f Technology . H e i s autho r o f a number o f articles on Frenc h policy and politics and of The Politics of Health in France and the United States.

X CONTRIBUTOR

S

1 IDEAS, INTERESTS , A N D TH E F R E N C H WELFARE STAT E JOHN S . AMBLE R

The welfare stat e commonly i s viewed as being a creation an d creatur e of the Left, associate d i n th e Unite d State s with th e Ne w Deal , i n Britai n wit h th e postwar Labou r government , an d i n Scandinavi a wit h th e politica l domi nance o f socia l democrati c parties . Thi s i s a n imag e tha t i s nurture d b y socialist leader s such a s former Prim e Ministe r Pierr e Mauroy , wh o i n 198 6 prefaced a book by a former membe r o f his staff with these words Our social protection wa s constructed b y means of a permanent battl e against conservatism and liberal dogmas, and it is primarily the Left that deserves the credit, for it was always at the front of the battle. The antagonism between liberals and supporters of progress has known its truces, it has never ended (Johanet 1986 , 5 ; translation mine). French conservative s di d indee d dela y a numbe r o f socia l program s i n th e nineteenth an d earl y twentiet h centuries ; ye t th e chapter s t o follow , an d particularly tha t o f Davi d Cameron , sugges t tha t partisa n ideolog y ha s ha d little impact o n socia l polic y i n th e Fift h Republic . Indeed , a s Camero n clearly demonstrates , i t wa s durin g th e lon g perio d o f conservativ e domi nance o f Frenc h governmen t fro m 195 8 t o 198 1 tha t Franc e ros e t o he r current posture as one of the world leaders i n commitment t o social welfare . In 1981 , when Frangoi s Mitterran d becam e president , Franc e wa s spending 29.5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on health, education , retirement , and other social programs. O f the nineteen industria l democracie s belongin g 1

to the Organizatio n fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Development , onl y five spent more (OECD 1985 , 21). How can one account for this apparent paradox? How and why has France become a leading welfare state , even though it s parties of the Left rarel y have been i n power ? Ho w ha s th e Frenc h welfar e stat e develope d an d i n wha t ways is it distinctive? Ho w does its manner o f development affec t it s contemporary effectiveness ? Thes e ar e th e question s t o which thi s chapte r wil l see k answers. C A U S E S O F TH E WELFAR E STATE : INDUSTRIALIZATION,IDEAS , INTERESTS, A N D INSTITUTION S

As Harold Wilensky , amon g others , ha s reminde d us , al l industria l societie s are welfar e state s whe n compare d wit h poore r societies , eve n thoug h th e form an d degre e of social protection var y considerably amon g wealthy coun tries (Wilensk y 1975) . Sinc e th e welfar e stat e i n Franc e share s man y com mon feature s wit h welfar e state s i n othe r countries , i t seem s appropriat e t o begin a search fo r cause s with a n analysi s o f the broade r phenomenon . Th e welfare stat e i s primaril y th e produc t o f thre e forces : th e socia l effect s o f industrialization, changin g idea s about th e prope r function s o f government , and th e constraint s o f existin g institutions . Thes e factor s sometime s ar e viewed a s alternativ e explanations , a s i n Anthon y King' s emphasi s o n idea s (King 1973) . They are more properly viewed as complementary explanations , each illuminatin g a portion o f a complex mosaic . Ye t another explanation of the continuin g sprea d o f the welfare stat e i n th e 1960 s and 1970 s centers o n the expansio n o f benefit s t o th e middl e clas s an d o n th e accompanyin g attachment o f tha t clas s t o thei r "entitlements. " W e wil l examin e eac h o f these explanations, lookin g first at the experience of other Western democra cies, then mor e carefully a t that of France. Industrialization

The fundamenta l condition s tha t mad e th e welfar e stat e both necessar y an d possible wer e create d b y th e industria l revolution . I n th e cours e o f th e nineteenth an d twentiet h centuries , i n thos e countries tha t ar e no w wealth y democracies, traditiona l suppor t systems for the care of the sick, th e old, an d the destitut e tende d t o brea k dow n i n th e proces s o f urbanization . Th e extended famil y graduall y gave way to the nuclear family. Worker s drawn of f 2 JOH

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the far m an d int o industria l firms foun d tha t thei r job s wer e vulnerabl e t o the busines s cycle . Th e cente r o f population shifte d fro m th e village , wher e family, friends , an d the church usuall y were available in time of need, t o the mass society o f the city . Th e industrializatio n tha t create d th e nee d fo r ne w collective suppor t system s als o provide d th e wealt h require d t o fun d them . Wilensky's stud y o f government spendin g pattern s i n sixty-fou r countrie s i n the mid-1960s foun d that , whe n th e countries were ranked according to per capita Gros s Nationa l Product , publi c expenditure s fo r socia l program s ros e regularly fro m 2. 5 percen t o f GNP i n th e poorest quartile t o 13. 8 percent i n the wealthiest quartile (Wilensky 1975 , 19). In France , a s i n Britain , th e traditiona l socia l welfar e syste m o f th e eighteenth centur y i s separate d fro m th e moder n welfar e stat e o f th e twen tieth by an era of laissez-faire liberalism , varyin g in intensity and consistency , in which al l forms o f social assistance that migh t weaken th e worker's incen tive to work and t o save were viewed a s harmful t o society (Rimlinge r 1971 , 35-86). (W e wil l us e th e ter m liberalism i n it s historica l an d Europea n sense, rathe r than i n its American meaning. ) I n prerevolutionary France , th e Church wa s th e primar y agenc y responsibl e fo r education , heat h care , an d care fo r th e poor . It s charitabl e activitie s wer e supporte d indirectl y throug h the stat e b y mean s o f legall y mandatory tithing . Beginnin g i n th e sixteent h century th e stat e extende d supervisio n ove r certai n o f thes e activities , whil e leaving thei r administratio n essentiall y i n Churc h hands . Th e first recorde d public assistanc e agency , th e Gran d burea u de s pauvre s d e Paris , adminis tered by the Church, wa s established i n 154 4 (Jambu-Merlin 1970 , 10) . The Revolution o f 178 9 destroye d thi s ancien t welfar e syste m withou t creatin g new institution s i n it s place (Jambu-Merli n 1970 , 11) . Despit e th e affirma tion i n th e Declaratio n o f th e Right s o f Ma n o f "th e righ t t o publi c assis tance," fo r a centur y an d mor e followin g th e Revolutio n proponent s o f liberalism fende d of f demand s fo r th e creation o f a nationa l syste m o f statesupported publi c assistance. It was the perceived failur e o f classical liberalism t o deal with the harmfu l social effect s o f industrializatio n tha t le d t o th e deman d fo r nationa l socia l insurance i n th e lat e nineteent h an d earl y twentiet h centuries . Th e libera l solution t o socia l risks—saving s an d privat e insurance—worke d onl y fo r workers wh o earne d wage s sufficien t t o permi t savin g an d onl y s o lon g a s savings banks , insuranc e companies , mutua l societies , an d companie s wit h pension funds remaine d solven t (De Swaan 1988 , 143-51) . The logi c o f industrializatio n contribute d i n a n importan t wa y t o th e THE FRENC H W E L F A R E STAT E 3

TABLE 1. 1

Social Expenditur e i n OEC D Countries , 1960-1981 a (Health, Education , Pensions , Unemployment , Welfare ) (i n percentages) 3 Expenditure Annual Growth Share of Annual Growth Rate of Deflated GDP Rate of Real GDP Social Expenditure I960 I98J 1960-75 J975-8I 1960-75 1975-1 12.1 13.4b 20.5 16.8 8.0 13.9 10.9

21.5 29.5 31.5 29.1 17.5 23.7 20.8

5.1 5.0 3.8 4.6 8.6 2.6 3.4

3.3 2.8 3.0 3.2 4.7 1.0 3.2

9.3 7.3b 7.0 7.7 12.8 5.9 8.0

3.1 6.2 2.4 5.1 8.4 1.8 3.2

Average of above countriese 13.7

24.8

4.7

3.0

8.3

4.3

Australia Austria Belgium Denmark Finland Greece Ireland Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden Switzerland

10.2 17.9 17.4 — 15.4 8.5 11.7 16.2 13.0 11.7 15.4 7.7

18.8 27.7 37.6C 33.3d 25.9 13.4C 18.4 36.1 19.6 27.1 33.4 14.9d

5.2 4.5 4.5 3.7 4.5 6.8 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.4

2.4 2.9 2.2C 2.2 2.9 3.5 3.5 2.0 0.4 4.1 1.0 1.7

9.6 6.7 9.3 — 7.5 8.4 9.1 10.4 5.5 10.1 7.9 7.6

2.4 5.0 7.9C 5.4d 4.8 9.4C 7.1 1.6 3.5 4.6 4.7 2.7d

OECD average6

13.1

25.6

4.6

2.6

8.4

4.8

Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States

Source: O.E.C.D. 1985 . Social Expenditure, 1960-1990. Paris : O.E.C.D., p . 21. Or lates t year available. b Excluding education. c 1980. d 1979. c Unweighted average .

a

development o f th e welfar e state , ye t i t i s a n incomplet e explanation , fo r levels o f socia l expenditur e var y substantiall y amon g th e industrialize d de mocracies. A stud y fo r th e Organizatio n fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Development (OECD ) showed that as of approximately 1980 , the percentag e of Gross Domesti c Produc t consume d b y public expenditures o n education , health, pensions , unemploymen t compensation , an d othe r incom e mainte nance program s an d welfar e services , a s show n i n tabl e 1.1 , range d amon g 4 JOH

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member countrie s fro m onl y 14. 9 percen t i n Switzerlan d an d 17. 5 percen t in Japa n t o 36. 1 percen t i n th e Netherland s an d 37. 6 percen t i n Belgiu m (OECD 1985 , 21). Some exceptional case s are partially explicable within th e context o f the industrializatio n argument . I n Japan , th e extende d famil y ha s remained mor e intac t tha n i n mos t urba n societies , whil e th e stron g socia l solidarity o f traditiona l Japanes e cultur e someho w ha s survive d i n th e for m of a sense o f community withi n moder n firms, a phenomenon tha t i s more rarely foun d i n othe r countrie s (Pempe l 1982 , 136 ; Maru o 1983) . Othe r differences i n th e exten t o f socia l expenditure s (e.g. , betwee n th e Unite d States and Europe , o r between Switzerlan d an d Scandinavia ) and i n the for m of social programs (e.g., ta x deductions fo r healt h cost s in th e Unite d States , government healt h insuranc e i n France , th e Nationa l Healt h Servic e i n Britain) call for exploration o f other possible causal factors, notabl y idea s and institutions. Ideas

The exten t t o whic h th e developmen t o f socia l program s i s linke d t o th e strength o f the political Lef t ha s been a subject o f vigorous academic debat e in th e pas t tw o decades . Althoug h th e majorit y o f studie s hav e show n a positive relationshi p betwee n th e strengt h o f the Lef t withi n th e governmen t and expansio n o f publi c socia l expenditures , researc h findings var y greatly , depending upo n th e tim e period , countries , an d measure s selecte d (e.g. , Wilensky 1975 ; Castles 1982 ; O'Connor 1988 ; Heidenheimer 1989 , 222-29 ; and Camero n chap . 3 below). A s we hav e alread y noted , partisa n ideolog y does no t offe r a goo d explanatio n fo r trend s i n socia l polic y i n th e Frenc h Fifth Republic . Yet , i f the welfare stat e is not simply the creation o f socialist reformers, clearl y i t wa s buil t wit h th e assistanc e o f politica l leader s wh o believed tha t th e stat e shoul d ten d t o the need s o f the sick , th e elderly , an d the destitute . Wh o wer e the y an d wh y di d the y pres s th e stat e int o ne w functions? Early leadershi p i n th e developmen t o f th e welfar e stat e di d no t com e from th e mos t democrati c countries , bu t rathe r fro m countrie s i n whic h suffrage wa s comparatively limite d an d parliamen t stil l playe d a subordinat e role (Flor a an d Alber s 1981 , 70) . Th e pioneer , o f course , wa s Ott o vo n Bismarck. Unde r hi s leadershi p a s chancellor , th e Germa n Empir e i n th e 1880s became th e leade r i n socia l insuranc e wit h th e establishmen t o f man datory program s fo r th e protectio n o f worker s fro m los s o f incom e throug h THE F R E N C H W E L F A R E STAT E 5

industrial accidents , disability , an d illness . Agains t th e oppositio n o f th e trade union s an d th e outlawe d Socialis t party , bu t wit h th e suppor t o f segments o f bi g business , Bismarc k sough t t o strengthe n th e loyalt y o f th e working clas s t o th e monarch y b y appealin g t o th e ran k an d file ove r th e heads o f thei r partisa n an d unio n leader s (Rimlinge r 1971 , 112-30 ; D e Swaan 1988 , 187-92) . I n essence , th e Bismarckia n socia l reform s repre sented an attempt to strengthen a conservative and authoritarian orde r against the growing threat of socialism. If socia l reformer s o f th e nineteent h centur y ofte n wer e conservative s seeking suppor t fro m th e workin g class, a s in Austria , Sweden , an d Finlan d as well a s i n Germany , reformer s o f the earl y twentiet h centur y mor e ofte n came fro m th e rank s o f liberals. I n Britai n th e Pensio n Ac t o f 1908 , whic h offered small , noncontributory , means-teste d pension s t o person s ove r th e age of seventy, an d th e Nationa l Insuranc e Ac t of 1911 , which establishe d a national contributor y pensio n plan , wer e th e wor k o f a libera l governmen t (De Swaa n 1988 , 192-97) . Althoug h bi g business played a lesser role in th e British reform s tha n i n the German, Britis h liberals who not long before ha d preferred privat e marke t solution s t o socia l problem s no w cam e t o believ e that privat e insuranc e wa s inadequat e t o solv e problem s o f poor healt h an d economic insecurit y i n th e workin g class , bot h o f whic h wer e perceive d t o threaten economi c efficienc y (Rimlinge r 1971 , 60) . Th e revelatio n o f th e pitiful stat e of health o f working-class youth i n recruitmen t fo r the Boer War; the strain o n private retirement plans caused by an increasin g lifespan an d by the bankruptcy o f employing firms; and th e influentia l Boot h stud y showin g that 3 8 percent o f persons surveyed ove r the age of sixty-five wer e paupers— all o f these contribute d t o the conversio n o f liberal leadership . Mot e impor tantly, an d i n shar p contrast to the Bismarckian reforms , a coalition o f trade union leaders , friendl y societ y official s an d Labou r politician s lobbie d har d for a nationa l pensio n system , convincin g libera l leader s tha t refor m wa s good politics (Heclo 1974 , 158-78) . In chapte r 2 below, Dougla s Ashford show s clearly that there wa s at least as muc h debat e abou t socia l insuranc e i n Franc e a s i n Britai n i n th e 1880 s and beyond . Thos e debates , an d th e successio n o f legislativ e proposal s tha t they concerned , wer e of great importance i n developin g th e notio n o f social solidarity. I n large r privat e firms, compan y insuranc e develope d rapidl y i n the first fou r decade s o f th e twentiet h century . N o genera l governmen t program wa s implemented , however , unti l th e la w of 3 0 April 1930 , whic h established health , maternity , disability , death , an d old-ag e insuranc e for al l 6 JOH

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workers belo w a certai n incom e level . Ther e wer e significan t precursers , including publicl y mandate d disabilit y an d old-ag e insuranc e fo r miners , sailors, and railroa d workers in the 1890s , establishment i n 189 8 of employer responsibility fo r victim s o f industria l accident s (bu t withou t th e creation o f an insuranc e fund) , an d a mor e genera l pensio n pla n tha t wa s enacte d i n 1910 but that died when the courts refused t o enforce contributions . I n 1930 , only som e 1 5 percen t o f th e employe d Frenc h populatio n wa s covere d b y public pensio n insuranc e (compulsor y o r subsidized b y the state) , compare d to 64 percent i n Germany an d 90 percent in the United Kingdo m (Flora an d Heidenheimer 1981 , 76). France adopte d genera l an d mandator y socia l insuranc e mor e tha n fort y years afte r German y an d som e twent y year s afte r Britain. Ho w ca n th e French dela y be explained? Why were ideas that were so much i n the air lef t so long without fulfillment? Th e industrialization argumen t is suggestive, bu t finally inadequate , fo r althoug h Franc e wa s les s industria l an d muc h les s urban tha n Britai n i n the early twentieth century , German y i n the 1880 s was only beginning her industrial boom. A partial answer to this puzzle is offered by Abra m d e Swaan : th e primar y clas s enem y o f th e welfar e state , smal l independent entrepreneur s an d landholders , wa s stronger politicall y i n earl y twentieth-century Franc e tha n i n eithe r German y o r Britai n (D e Swaa n 1988, 197-204 , 216-17) . Large-scal e employers in all three countries tended ultimately, i f reluctantl y i n th e Frenc h an d Britis h cases , t o accep t manda tory social insuranc e a s a way of improving labor-managemen t relation s an d of relieving employers of responsibility for unfortunate employees . I n France, small entrepreneurs, wh o enjoyed face-to-fac e relation s with their employee s and perceive d o f th e goo d societ y i n highl y individualisti c terms , sa w n o advantages an d man y inconvenience s fro m socia l insurance , includin g in creased cost s an d bureaucrati c interferenc e (Hatzfel d 197 1 chaps . 3 , 4) . Unsurprisingly, attitude s tende d t o reflec t economi c interests . Th e pett y bourgeoisie wa s particularly numerou s i n France . I n th e 190 1 Frenc h cen sus, 8 millio n peopl e classifie d themselve s a s patrons, o r owner s o f busi nesses, compare d t o 1 1 millio n worker s an d 7 millio n artisan s (D e Swaa n 1988, 80) . Small businessmen an d property holders were strongly represente d in center s o f politica l power , particularl y i n th e Senate , whic h overrepre sented rura l an d small-tow n Franc e an d whic h regularl y weakene d o r struc k down socia l legislatio n passe d b y th e Chambe r (Hatzfel d 1971 , 60-62) . De Swaa n explain s th e 193 0 refor m i n term s o f change s i n clas s struc ture: THE F R E N C H W E L F A R E STAT E 7

It was above all th e gradua l erosio n o f the politica l privilege s tha t privat e property conferred, th e irresistible increase of wage-earners and of the more privileged salaries among them, th e growth o f large enterprise and big government that finally shifted the balanc e an d allowe d a successio n o f center-righ t cabinet s a n opportunit y t o succeed where earlier governments had failed (De Swaan 1988 , 203). From 190 6 to 1926 , th e proportion o f the industria l wor k force employe d i n single-person firms droppe d fro m 26. 7 percen t t o 13. 8 percent , whil e th e proportion workin g i n firms of more tha n on e hundre d employee s increase d from 24. 8 percen t t o 36. 8 percen t (Hatzfel d 1971 , 259) . Polic y change d a s the idea s of policymakers changed . Idea s changed i n par t because o f experience, bu t also because the social context out of which the y emerged wa s also changing. If France lagged behind mos t of Western Europ e i n institutin g mandator y social insurance , sh e was a Europea n leade r i n elementar y educatio n i n th e last thre e decade s o f the nineteent h century . Th e percentag e o f childre n o f elementary schoo l ag e enrolled i n schoo l i n Franc e ros e from 5 7 percent i n 1870 t o 8 6 percen t i n 1900 , whil e i n th e sam e perio d i t ros e i n German y from 6 7 percen t t o onl y 7 3 percen t an d i n Englan d an d Wale s fro m 4 9 percent t o 7 4 percen t (Benavo t an d Riddl e 1988) . On e o f th e principa l motives behin d thi s massiv e effor t wa s to form loya l republican s outsid e th e now suspect Catholic schools, i n order to bind a new generation to the young Third Republi c (Pros t 1968 , 191-219) . Anothe r wa s to create th e onl y kin d of equality tha t was compatible wit h classical liberalism : equality of opportunity. Middle-clas s Franc e coul d understan d th e logi c of allowing each chil d the opportunit y t o ris e to a place i n societ y merite d b y his talent an d effort . In France , a s i n th e Unite d States , classica l liberal s coul d suppor t publi c education whil e denouncing mos t other government venture s int o the socia l arena. Ye t i n France , unlik e America , a ful l secondar y educatio n wa s re served fo r a smal l elit e unti l th e daw n o f mas s secondar y educatio n i n th e 1950s. Althoug h secondar y enrollment s o f girl s expande d unde r th e Thir d Republic, a s did enrollmen t o f both sexe s i n "highe r primary " courses , th e number o f boy s i n ful l secondar y program s (lycees an d colleges) wa s essen tially th e sam e i n 193 0 as i t ha d bee n i n 188 0 (Prost 1968 , 328-31) . I n it s perspective o n secondar y an d highe r education , Frenc h liberalis m i n th e early twentieth centur y was heavily laced with Malthusianism . If th e Frenc h bourgeoisi e wa s divide d ove r socia l insurance , s o to o wa s the Frenc h labo r movement . Unlik e th e Britis h labo r movement , i n whic h Marxism neve r playe d a n importan t role , Frenc h labo r alread y befor e th e 8 JOH

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turn o f th e centur y wa s divide d betwee n radical s lik e Jule s Guesde , wh o opposed al l measure s that migh t exten d th e lif e o f capitalism, an d reformer s like Jean Jaures , wh o believed tha t rea l improvement s i n th e lives of workers could b e achieve d withou t revolutio n (Hatzfel d 1971 , 184-216) . This , o f course, i s th e schis m tha t ha s weakene d th e politica l influenc e o f th e Lef t throughout mos t o f Frenc h republica n histor y (Amble r 1985 , 4-20) . I t was not until afte r Worl d Wa r I I that the Frenc h Communis t Part y rallied t o the idea o f mandatory socia l insuranc e an d participate d i n th e coalitio n govern ment that enacted th e social security reform s o f 194 5 and 1946 . In th e coalition s tha t hav e helpe d t o buil d Europea n welfar e states , on e often finds devou t Catholic s alongsid e moderat e socialist s an d progressiv e liberals. Sinc e World Wa r II , Christian Democrati c parties have contribute d substantially t o expansio n o f socia l program s i n countrie s suc h a s France , Germany, Austria , Belgium , an d th e Netherlands . Indeed , Christia n Dem ocratic support for the welfare state is one of the principal reasons why models that attemp t t o explai n expansio n o f socia l expenditur e i n term s o f th e strength o f partie s o f the Lef t hav e ha d suc h mixe d result s (Wilensk y 1981 ; Castles 1982 , 7-77, 83-88) . The Frenc h Catholi c Church , w e hav e seen , wa s th e principa l socia l welfare agency of the Old Regime. B y attacking the Church a s an institution , the Frenc h Revolutio n opene d a schism betwee n Frenc h Catholic s an d th e republic that was not fully breeched unti l 1944 , with the emergence of a new Christian Democrati c party, the Popular Republican Movement . Particularl y during th e pea k o f anticlericalism, beginnin g wit h th e Dreyfu s Affai r i n th e 1890s an d culminatin g i n forma l separatio n o f churc h an d stat e i n 1905 , devout Frenc h Catholic s wer e reluctan t t o support socia l reform s tha t migh t bind th e publi c t o th e secula r republi c an d exten d th e power s o f it s stat e apparatus. Nonetheless , ther e develope d i n th e nineteent h centur y a schoo l of social Catholicism tha t helpe d t o shape the Frenc h climat e o f opinion o n social polic y (Ashfor d 1986 , 82-85) . Amon g th e leadin g figures i n thi s movement wa s a n adviso r t o Napoleo n II I an d founde r o f th e influentia l journal, Reforme Sociale, Frederic L e Play , whos e socia l idea l wa s th e extension t o society a s a whole o f the virtue s of the devout family: affection , harmony, morality . Othe r Catholi c socia l reformer s issue d fro m th e Ecol e Polytechnique an d th e Ecol e de s Mine s t o pla y leadin g role s i n th e field of voluntary insuranc e an d i n th e hig h civi l servic e (Ashfor d 1986 , 83) . Th e Church hierarch y i n th e nineteent h centur y generall y wa s unfriendly t o any hint o f socialism ; ye t b y th e 1890 s ther e wa s a smal l grou p o f Catholi c THE FRENC H W E L F A R E STAT E 9

socialists in the Chamber o f Deputies. Mor e important , a n influentia l grou p of Catholi c reformers , wh o believe d tha t th e socia l obligatio n o f th e stat e extended wel l beyon d th e defens e o f property , mad e it s contributio n t o a growing national sens e of social solidarit y that provided th e base for th e late r development of social security. The grea t importanc e tha t Frenc h Catholic s attache d t o protection o f the family i s reflecte d i n thei r stron g suppor t fo r famil y allowances , which , a s Remi Lenoi r argues in chapter 5 , have been give n an especiall y high priorit y in France . Catholi c countrie s generall y hav e devote d mor e resource s t o family allowance s than hav e Protestant countries, bu t nowhere mor e than i n France, where , o n thi s issue , Catholic s foun d commo n caus e wit h republi cans wh o sough t t o stimulat e populatio n growt h throug h a syste m o f pay ments fo r eac h chil d i n a worker's family. Catholic s mad e thei r ow n impor tant contributio n t o th e popula r Frenc h doctrin e o f "familialism. " Famil y allowances first were introduce d b y Catholic employer s withi n privat e firm s before the y wer e generalize d unde r stat e mandat e i n 1932 . A s on e o f th e coalition partner s i n th e first government s o f th e Fourt h Republic , whic h sought to extend and integrat e the social security system, th e Popular Repub lican Movemen t insiste d tha t famil y allowanc e fund s shoul d continu e t o enjoy privilege d autonomy . In chapte r 5 below, Rem i Lenoi r examine s th e way s i n whic h Frenc h ideas and policie s regardin g the famil y hav e changed sinc e 193 2 in respons e to change s i n socia l structure . I n th e earl y year s o f th e famil y allowanc e program, famil y polic y reste d o n a broad consensu s i n suppor t o f a concep tion o f the "traditiona l family " i n whic h th e mothe r remaine d a t home wit h her thre e o r mor e children . B y th e 1970s , wit h th e divorc e rat e rising , cohabitation b y unmarried couple s becoming more commonplace, th e women's movemen t challengin g traditiona l paterna l privileges , an d almos t two thirds o f wome n unde r forty-fiv e i n th e wor k force , th e emphasi s o f polic y shifted fro m keepin g the mother a t home t o supporting cost s of childrearing, whatever th e occupationa l o r marita l statu s o f the mother . Althoug h famil y policy survive d an d retaine d som e o f it s initia l bia s towar d larg e families , i t increasingly becam e a vehicl e fo r aidin g low-incom e families . Her e i s a fascinating exampl e o f social polic y changin g t o reflec t ne w social structure s and ne w conceptions of social roles. Many social and political groups, including the reformist Left , contribute d to th e growin g consensu s tha t resulte d i n th e establishmen t o f a nationa l social securit y syste m i n Apri l o f 1930 . Th e final act , package d t o includ e 10 JOH

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government paymen t o f a portion o f the cost s for farmer s an d place d along side ta x reduction s t o hel p overcom e th e reservation s o f th e busines s com munity, wa s pu t i n final for m b y a center-righ t governmen t le d b y Andr e Tardieu an d passe d b y a Nationa l Assembl y i n whic h th e Cente r an d Righ t enjoyed mor e tha n a fifty-seat majority (Gogue l 1946 , 246 ; Hatzfeld 1971 , 150-53). I t was the Frenc h Right , no t the Lef t o f the Cartel de s Gauches o r of th e Fron t Populaire , whic h gav e Franc e a socia l securit y syste m afte r decades o f debate . Th e conversio n o f th e Frenc h Righ t apparentl y wa s th e result o f a convergence o f factors, includin g th e hop e fo r electora l gain , th e growing size of firms, the inadequacies of private insurance in an increasingl y urban society , th e search o f large employers for improve d worker morale and increased efficiency , an d th e influenc e o f reformis t Catholic s i n som e con servative circles . Fro m a Marxist perspective , th e Frenc h socia l securit y act , like th e welfar e stat e a s a whole , wa s a n attemp t b y th e ownin g classe s t o pacify th e workin g clas s (e.g. , Off e 1984) . Fro m th e perspectiv e o f socia l reformers wh o viewe d harmon y betwee n th e classe s as a desirable an d hon orable goal , no t a s a cove r fo r exploitation , socia l securit y serve d a hig h moral purpos e a s wel l a s a practica l one . I n fact , th e motive s o f Frenc h conservative social reformer s n o doubt were mixed, includin g a desire to win popular support (and in s o doing to deny the Left credi t for social security), a preference fo r socia l harmony a s a contributor t o economic efficiency , an d a Catholic conception o f the ideal society as a moral, carin g community . Interests

French conservative s no t onl y preside d ove r th e inauguratio n o f nationa l social security; they sometimes contribute d t o its expansion, a s did Christia n Democrats i n German y afte r 1949 , conservatives i n Britai n i n the 1950 s and 1960s, an d th e "bourgeois " governmen t o f Swede n fro m 197 6 t o 1982 . A s the welfar e stat e expanded , conservative s foun d a ne w motiv e t o protec t it : their predominantl y middle-clas s constituencie s becam e beneficiarie s alon g with th e workin g class . I n mos t o f Europe , socia l insuranc e program s origi nally designe d t o protec t limite d group s o f worker s (miners , steelworkers , railroad workers , civi l servants ) fro m ris k o f accident , illness , disability , o r poverty i n ol d age had a tendency t o expand ove r time to cover the whole of the workin g clas s an d ultimatel y th e entir e population . A s coverag e an d benefits expanded , s o to o di d th e socia l basi s o f politica l suppor t fo r th e welfare state . Onc e include d i n th e socia l suppor t syste m o f nationa l insur THE FRENC

H WELFAR E STAT E 1

1

ance, eve n mor e affluen t occupationa l group s develope d loyalt y t o it . A s Goodin an d LeGran d pu t i t i n th e titl e o f thei r book , i n th e develope d welfare stat e "No t Onl y th e Poor " benefi t (Goodi n an d LeGran d 1987) . Indeed, a s these authors show for Britain, relativel y affluent citizen s get more than thei r shar e o f such publi c service s as health an d educatio n beyon d th e age o f sixtee n (Goodi n an d LeGran d 1987 , 92) . I t i s no t surprisin g tha t conservative governments are almost as protective of the welfare state as those of the Left . The reformis t Lef t historicall y ha s viewed th e welfare stat e as a device fo r redistributing incom e fro m th e ric h t o th e poo r i n orde r t o creat e a mor e egalitarian society . Recen t research has begun t o shed some light on the very complex question o f who actually benefits fro m th e welfare state . Jean-Pierr e Jallade an d hi s associates , i n a stud y o f Germany , Grea t Britain , France , Sweden, an d Hungary , conclud e tha t socia l programs—particularl y cas h payments rathe r tha n services—d o indee d redistribut e income , althoug h more fro m youn g peopl e t o olde r peopl e (wh o ar e heav y user s o f healt h services, as well as the beneficiaries o f pensions paid for by employed workers) than fro m ric h t o poo r (Jallad e 1988 , introductio n an d conclusion) . The y find tha t th e redistributiv e effec t o f th e welfar e stat e ha s decrease d i n th e postwar period , largel y a s the resul t o f three trend s note d particularl y i n th e 1970s: "earnings-relate d benefit s expande d considerabl y a t th e expens e o f flat-rate benefits; relianc e o n social contributions, especiall y employers ' contributions, increase d a t th e expens e o f ta x revenue ; an d non-stat e socia l programmes gaine d significan t groun d i n th e area s of retirement an d healt h care" (Jallad e 1988 , 257) . Th e genera l tren d ha s bee n towar d wha t Jallad e calls the "Bismarckia n tradition " of the welfare state , i n whic h th e emphasi s is more o n maintainin g th e individual' s customar y incom e tha n o n equaliz ing incomes—that i s to say, more on security than o n equality . Jallade place s Franc e ver y muc h i n th e Bismarckia n traditio n i n tha t means testin g i s rare , mos t benefit s ar e universal , man y (pensions, unem ployment compensation, an d sicknes s pay) are linked t o former income , an d funding come s largely from contribution s o f employers and employees rathe r than fro m a progressiv e incom e tax . I n 1982 , socia l securit y contribution s made u p 43.2 percen t o f all Frenc h taxe s and pai d fo r ove r three-fourth s o f all socia l benefit s (Jallad e 1988 , 11 , 223). Althoug h som e two-third s o f th e social securit y contributio n i s paid by the employer, th e resul t is only mildl y redistributive i f one assume s tha t muc h o f the employer' s contributio n oth erwise would hav e gone t o the employe e i n highe r salary . Economist s diffe r 12 JOH

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as t o whethe r employers ' contribution s ar e shifte d t o consumer s i n highe r prices o r absorbe d b y employees i n lowe r wages , ye t figures on comparativ e wages in Europe , wher e wages typically ar e lower i n countries , suc h a s Italy and France , wit h hig h level s of employer contributions , sugges t that a t leas t within th e Europea n Communit y i t i s the employe e wh o bears th e primar y burden (Jallad e 1988 , 232). Social benefit s a s a percentag e o f household disposabl e incom e ros e dramatically i n France , fro m 19. 3 percent i n 196 0 to 35. 3 percent i n 1983 ; yet out o f thi s impressiv e total , i n th e latte r yea r onl y 6 percen t o f al l benefit s were means-teste d (Jallad e 1988 , 224 , 226-27) . Th e resul t i s a fairl y flat distribution o f benefits. I n on e study using 197 9 data, household s heade d by employed manua l workers , wit h a n averag e annua l primar y incom e o f 58,20 0 francs (no t countin g socia l securit y contributions) , receive d anothe r 24,30 0 francs i n socia l benefits , increasin g thei r primar y incom e b y 42. 7 percent , while households heade d b y professional an d manageria l personnel , wit h a n average primar y incom e o f 162,70 0 francs , receive d 19,40 0 franc s i n bene fits, representing 11. 9 percent o f their primary incom e (Gombert 1985 , cited in Jallad e 1988 , 229) . Apar t fro m th e retire d an d unemploye d population , for who m socia l benefits wer e almost double al l incom e fro m othe r sources , the ne t resul t was relatively "equal " in the sense that all occupational group s received roughl y simila r benefits . Sinc e socia l benefit s represen t a muc h larger share of income for workers than fo r professionals, income s after socia l transfers clearl y are more equal tha n ar e primary incomes , a s shown i n tabl e 1.2 (Jallad e 1988 , 231). If , however , on e views the purpose of social benefit s to be redistribution o f income from th e more affluent t o the less affluent, th e French welfar e stat e contribute s onl y modestl y t o thi s goal . Th e majo r beneficiaries ar e retire d an d unemploye d persons , whos e incom e inde x i n 1979 rose from 3 5 percent o f the average incom e before socia l benefits t o 72 percent after benefits . Th e incom e gap between occupationa l group s narrows somewhat afte r socia l benefits , largel y because o f the dramatic redistributio n to th e nonemploye d an d som e declin e i n th e relativ e positio n o f upper income occupations . Manua l workers , i t wil l b e noted , remai n i n virtuall y the sam e relativ e position—a t abou t 8 0 percen t o f th e averag e income — after socia l benefits hav e been distributed . Some socia l program s ar e mor e redistributiv e tha n others , althoug h mos t contain feature s tha t limi t redistribution . Amon g th e mos t redistributiv e ar e the "minimu m insertio n income, " create d i n 198 8 to suppor t certai n disad vantaged, unemploye d person s durin g jo b training , an d "socia l aid, " thi s THE FRENC

H WELFAR E STAT E 1

3

0 10

0 10

09 08 96 03

4 26 8 23 5 13 1 13

0 10

3 20 5 19 7 11 2 11

0 10

8 27 8 22 8 13 7 12 38 08 76 86

9

0 10

4 20 9 18 8 11 9 11 89 18 96 83 48 28 46 57 0

9 1 8 0 5 2 8 2

Primary Income Average Plus All Social Primary Benefits Income

5 197

Source: Jean-Pierre Jallade, ed . 1988 . The Crisis of Distribution in European Welfare States. Stoke-on-Kent : Trentham, 231 . Note: These inde x figures represent the income of each occupational group as a percentage of average income o f all groups combined.

TOTAL 10

Independent workers (Non-farm ) 26 1 21 Professional and manageria l worker s 239 20 Independent farmers 14 3 12 Middle-level manageria l workers 13 2 12 Clerical workers 9 39 Manual worker s 7 98 Agricultural wage-earner s 5 65 Nonactive persons 3 36

Average Primary Income Average Primary Plus All Social Primary Income Benefits Income

1970 197

Effects o f Social Benefit s o n Incom e Inequality , 1970-197 9 (primar y incom e excludin g employees ' social contributions )

TABLE 1. 2

Primary Income Plus All Social Benefits

being th e remnan t o f publi c assistanc e afte r mos t o f it s function s ha d bee n absorbed b y social security (Thevene t 1989) . Sinc e 198 8 social ai d ha s been primarily a responsibilit y o f th e departments ; i t offer s assistanc e t o man y o f those wh o fal l betwee n th e crack s o f social security , particularl y ol d people , children, an d the handicapped. I n 198 7 all benefits pai d out under social aid amounted t o les s tha n 4 percen t o f expenditure s unde r socia l securit y (IN SEE 1989 , 158,219) . The Frenc h syste m o f compulsory healt h insuranc e distribute s essentiall y the sam e leve l o f benefits t o al l incom e groups , wit h th e greate r deman d o f low-income group s for hospita l car e and sicknes s benefits bein g offse t b y the greater deman d o f high-incom e group s fo r specialize d medica l an d denta l care; ye t contribution s ris e wit h incom e (INSE E 1984 , 366 ; Jallade 1988 , 235). I n January 1984 , ceilings on wages subject to health contributions were eliminated, leavin g employer s t o pa y 12. 6 percen t o f gros s wage s an d em ployees a n additiona l 5. 5 percen t o n al l wage s paid . Th e resul t o f leve l benefits, combine d wit h contribution s proportiona l t o wages , represent s a significant redistributio n o f income . Redistributio n fro m ric h t o poo r i s limited, however , b y th e greate r lif e expectanc y o f high-incom e groups . A study b y the Nationa l Institut e o f Statistic s an d Economi c Studie s (INSEE ) found tha t i n the period 1975-1980 , th e probability o f death amon g men i n the thirty-five-sixt y ag e grou p varie d fro m 9. 3 percen t amon g teachers , liberal professionals, an d high level managers to 20.9 percent among agricultural workers , unskille d an d semiskille d workers , a differenc e attributabl e largely to higher deat h rate s in th e latte r group from cancer , cirrhosi s o f the liver, alcoholism , an d accident s (INSE E 1984 , 355-56) . I n Franc e a s i n most societies , olde r peopl e ar e th e heavies t user s o f healt h care . Thos e individuals fro m low-incom e group s wh o surviv e t o ol d ag e receiv e o n average fa r mor e i n healt h benefit s tha n the y pa y i n throug h contributions ; since i n fac t a disproportionat e numbe r o f olde r peopl e ar e fro m highe r income groups , th e overal l redistributiv e impact o f the healt h car e system i s more limited than i t might appear . Pensions unde r Frenc h socia l securit y ar e inherentl y les s redistributiv e than healt h benefits . Sinc e the y var y according t o pas t contribution s an d income, pension s serv e to perpetuate int o retiremen t difference s i n income s established durin g year s o f employment . Redistributio n i s mor e betwee n generations i n this pay-as-you-go system than betwee n incom e groups, agai n directing the greatest benefits t o those who live longest. Nonetheless , certai n features o f socia l securit y narro w incom e difference s amon g th e retired . A t THE FRENC H WELFAR E STAT E 1

5

the en d o f 1987 , 1. 4 millio n person s wh o ha d contribute d to o littl e t o b e eligible fo r a normal pensio n wer e receivin g an "old-ag e minimum " benefi t of 2,658 F r per month fo r a single person an d 4,74 6 F r for a couple (CER C 1988, 106) . Pushe d upwar d b y th e Socialis t Governmen t afte r 1981 , thi s minimum vieillesse reached th e level of the minimum regula r pension b y the mid-1980s. Amon g a numbe r o f policie s tha t particularl y improve d th e situation o f retirees from low-incom e groups in the 1970 s and 1980 s were the more rapi d increas e o f basi c pension s (12. 5 percen t annuall y fro m 196 8 t o 1979) compare d t o supplementar y pension s (10. 5 percen t annuall y i n th e same period) , th e differentia l i n compulsor y healt h contribution s owe d b y retired peopl e fro m 1 percent o n basi c pensions t o 2 percent o n supplemen tary pensions , an d lowerin g o f th e retiremen t ag e fro m sixty-fiv e t o sixt y i n the early 1980s , allowing workers who went to work at an early age the option of retiring at full pensio n a t age sixty (Jallade 1988 , 238-40 , 246-47) . Earl y retirement, whic h favor s thos e wh o lef t schoo l fo r th e jo b marke t a t ag e sixteen o r eighteen , i s partia l compensatio n t o th e workin g clas s fo r th e greater longevit y o f upper-incom e groups . B y the lat e 1980s , socia l securit y pensions provided replacemen t ratio s of 5 5 percent to 70 percent of preretirement income , wit h low - and middle-incom e pensioner s nea r th e top of that range. I n sum , althoug h pension s ar e designe d mor e t o allo w retiree s t o maintain thei r accustome d standar d o f living tha n t o equaliz e incomes , th e redistributive impact of the French syste m is not inconsequential . As shown b y Remi Lenoi r i n chapter 5 , family benefit s a s a proportion o f all socia l benefit s hav e decline d sharpl y sinc e th e 1950 s an d hav e bee n targeted mor e an d mor e towar d lowe r incom e groups . Basi c famil y allow ances ar e universal , bu t othe r type s o f famil y benefit s suc h a s th e housin g allowance, th e "complementary " famil y allowance , an d loan s to young cou ples, ar e means-tested . Th e downwar d redistributiv e effec t o f means-teste d programs i s overridden , an d eve n reversed , however , i f on e take s int o ac count th e effect s o f ta x deduction s fo r children , whic h awar d th e greates t benefits t o thos e i n highe r incom e groups . I n 1982 , a famil y wit h a gros s monthly incom e o f 6,597 F r pe r mont h an d wit h tw o children ove r the ag e of three wa s eligible fo r monthl y famil y benefit s o f 621 F r plus a tax advan tage of 17 8 Fr, fo r a net gain of 799 Fr, compare d t o a family wit h the sam e number an d ag e of children bu t wit h a gross monthly incom e o f 19,79 2 Fr , which wa s entitled t o benefits o f 466 Fr plus a tax advantage of 898 Fr, fo r a net gain of 1,36 4 Fr(INSE E 1984 , 211). The Socialis t Government s o f 1981-198 6 significantl y increase d famil y 16 JOH

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allowances an d limite d ta x deduction s t o 750 0 F r pe r child , ye t the y als o introduced tw o ne w benefit s availabl e t o al l familie s withou t restriction s o n income. Th e traditio n o f universa l benefit s i s fa r fro m dead . Althoug h th e various means-teste d benefit s administere d withi n famil y polic y ar e impor tant incom e supplement s fo r familie s a t th e lowe r en d o f th e incom e hier archy, Frenc h famil y polic y viewe d a s a whole , takin g ta x benefit s int o account, i s not an effectiv e mean s of income redistributio n fro m th e affluen t to the poor. Unemployment compensation , lik e pensions , blend s th e principle s o f income maintenanc e an d incom e redistribution . I t serve s a s a n importan t mode o f incom e redistributio n betwee n th e employe d an d th e eligibl e un employed. Ye t it s generosit y depend s largel y o n th e forme r salar y o f th e beneficiary. I n 198 2 replacement rate s were set at 77 percent of former salar y for workers earning onl y two-thirds of the average wage, 6 5 percent for thos e exactly o n th e average, an d onl y 5 4 percent fo r thos e whose salary had bee n double the average. The highest compensation wa s set at 2.7 times the lowest compensation, stil l a substantial rang e of incomes, bu t narrowe r tha n withi n the employe d populatio n (Jallad e 1988 , 241) . Face d wit h unemploymen t that eventually ros e above 1 0 percent an d a n accompanyin g ris e in th e cost s of compensation , th e Socialis t Governmen t i n th e fal l o f 198 2 tightene d eligibility requirements, wit h the result that the proportion o f all unemploye d persons receivin g compensatio n droppe d fro m 70-7 2 percen t i n 198 2 t o 6 0 percent i n 198 4 (Jallad e 1988 , 247) . Youn g peopl e wit h littl e o r n o jo b experience were particularly affected b y the tighter requirements. Th e growth in th e numbe r o f unprotecte d "unemployables " present s a proble m tha t Bruno Jobert addresses in the final chapter o f this book. Yet another polic y area with mixed effect s o n social equality i s education. The development o f the French welfar e stat e in the postwar period coincide d with a dramatic expansion o f secondary and highe r education, a s the government struggle d t o expan d facilitie s t o mee t rapidl y growin g demand . Som e scholars hol d tha t educatio n doe s no t belon g t o th e welfar e stat e phenome non i n that it is inspired mor e by the principle of meritocracy tha n b y that of equality (Wilensk y 1975) . A lon g serie s o f sociologica l studie s ha s demon strated that , eve n i n a n er a o f mas s secondar y education , school s ten d t o reproduce existin g elites , indee d t o legitimat e the m b y promotin g a fe w exceptional offsprin g o f the working class (e.g., Bourdie u an d Passero n 196 4 and 1970 ; Girard , Bastide , an d Pourche r 1963 ; an d Eiche r an d Minga t 1975). Highe r education i n particular i s in good part a service paid fo r out of THE FRENC H W E L F A R E S T A T E 1

7

general taxatio n revenu e fo r th e primar y us e o f th e middl e class ; that i s t o say, i t i s a negativ e incom e transfer . Minima l tuitio n fee s an d guarantee d access to the university fo r all holders of the baccalaureat are rights every bit as importan t t o middle-clas s a s to working-clas s students , a s shown b y thei r repeated mas s demonstrations against attempts to impose "selection. " Yet ther e ar e stil l goo d reason s t o conside r educatio n alon g wit h othe r social services . A s w e hav e seen , educatio n i s no t uniqu e amon g socia l services i n offerin g greate r benefit s t o th e affluen t tha n t o th e poor . More over, fre e o r low-cos t educatio n ha s com e t o be considere d a righ t ever y bi t as sacre d t o citizen s o f th e welfar e state s a s a pensio n o r unemploymen t compensation. Withou t th e socia l mobilit y tha t i t allows , eve n th e mode l welfare stat e could be led by a closed aristocracy of educated families . Even thoug h i n Franc e a s elsewhere childre n fro m affluen t an d educate d families succee d muc h bette r i n schoo l tha n thos e fro m poo r an d poorl y educated families, on e finds on close inspection that opportunities for upward mobility through educatio n hav e improved since 1945 . Important steps along the way were extension o f the school-leavin g ag e from fourtee n t o sixteen i n the Debre La w of 1959 , the creation afte r 196 3 of a common middl e school, the College o f Secondary Educatio n (CES) , wit h a common trun k o f liberal arts instructio n fo r grade s si x an d seve n (6em e an d 5eme) , an d th e forma l abolition o f tracking i n thes e middl e school s i n th e Hab y Reform s o f 1975 . Coupled wit h a growing popula r appetit e fo r educatio n i n a perio d o f afflu ence, thes e reform s helpe d t o transform Frenc h societ y from one , i n the lat e 1940s, i n whic h mos t childre n wer e ou t i n th e wor k forc e b y age fifteen, t o one in th e late 1980 s in which 8 7 percent of seventeen-year-olds wer e still in school (MEN , Note dlnformation 90: 02 , 2) . Th e percentag e o f th e ag e group passin g on e o f th e version s o f th e stat e secondar y examination , th e baccalaureat, ros e fro m approximatel y 5 percent i n 195 0 t o 3 6 percen t i n 1989 (Le Monde de I'Education, no . 168 , 4) . Enrollmen t i n highe r educa tion grew from 210,00 0 i n 1955-195 6 to 1,300,00 0 in 1989-1990 , e n rout e to a n officia l projectio n o f tw o millio n b y th e yea r 200 0 (Le Monde de I'Education, no . 172 , 116-19) . Forty years ago the long jump in one generation fro m industria l worker to the liberal professions wa s almost unthinkable. Toda y it is still rare, but more possible. Childre n fro m familie s heade d b y a n industria l worke r (whic h comprise over a third of the French population ) constituted 3. 7 percent of all university students i n 1959-196 0 an d approximately 1 3 percent i n the 1980 s (MEN, Note dlnformation 1979 : 42 , an d ME N 1985 , 41) . Thi s gai n i s 18 JOH

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partially nullifie d b y tw o factors , neithe r o f which i s unique t o France : th e tendency o f working-class student s t o leav e th e universit y soone r tha n middle class students , an d th e escalatio n o f educationa l credential s require d b y employers a s the poo l o f degree holder s expands . Dat a fo r 1978-197 9 sho w that student s fro m familie s heade d b y a n industria l worke r mad e u p 14. 9 percent o f al l universit y student s i n th e first two-yea r cycle , 1 0 percen t o f those i n th e second , full-degre e cycle , an d 7 percent o f those i n th e third , doctoral cycl e (MEN , Note dInformation 1979 : 42 , tabl e III) . The y ar e poorly represente d i n th e prestigiou s grandes ecoles an d i n program s leadin g to the mor e lucrative professions . Raymon d Boudo n ha s offered a persuasive explanation o f this phenomenon fro m a rational choice perspective: a student whose parents neve r too k the bac is likely t o feel himsel f a success at havin g completed a two-yea r diploma , whil e th e chil d o f professional parent s mus t push ahea d muc h furthe r i n orde r to avoid bein g the family failur e (Boudo n 1973). Incentive s fo r childre n t o succee d i n schoo l ar e als o partly th e func tion o f the relativ e valu e tha t familie s plac e o n educatio n i n differen t socia l milieux, whatever the educational achievements of the parents. Despite recurrin g warning s o f declinin g standards , th e educationa l leve l of th e Frenc h populatio n a s a whol e i s highe r tha n a t an y tim e i n histor y (Garin, Inciyan , an d Lamour e 1989) . Th e commo n middl e school , eve n taking int o accoun t th e informa l trackin g practice s tha t frequentl y hav e developed, ha s contributed t o equality o f opportunity b y delaying the ag e of academic segregatio n from eleve n t o approximatel y fourteen , allowin g slightl y more opportunit y fo r lat e bloomers t o prepare for th e bac and highe r educa tion. Nonetheles s Frenc h education , an d henc e Frenc h society , remain s clearly hierarchical . Th e massiv e influ x o f baccalaureat holder s int o th e universities ha s diminishe d th e prestig e o f thes e institution s an d enhance d that o f th e selectiv e grandes ecoles. I t i s th e latter , an d particularl y th e National Schoo l o f Administration (E.N . A.), tha t serv e as the roya l gatewa y into high position s no t onl y i n publi c administratio n bu t also in politic s and industry (Suleima n 1978) . I n fe w democrati c societie s ar e s o many nationa l leaders chose n fro m suc h a narro w educationa l elite . Th e grandes ecoles emerged fro m th e 1980 s with thei r prestig e and independenc e largel y intact , despite earlier threat s by the Socialis t Part y to merge them wit h th e universi ties. While stil l i n oppositio n i n 1978 , th e Socialis t Part y drafte d a pla n fo r education tha t acknowledged th e educational handicap s of children o f poorly educated parent s and rejecte d meritocrac y a s an objective : THE FRENC H WELFAR E STAT E 1

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It is in n o way a question o f "equality of opportunity" understood a s a kind of race where one tries to line up all candidates at the start and let the best one win. . . . The practice of class struggle teaches us that inequalities are primarily social in nature and that these are the ones that firstmust be remedied. To fightagainst inequalities is also to refus e a n ideolog y tha t privilege s th e cadr e o f th e nation , a s oppose d t o othe r citizens (Parti Socialiste 1978, 19; translation mine). More than a decade later, afte r experiment s with "Priorit y Educatio n Zones " and ne w secondary program s intende d t o bring "8 0 percen t o f the age group • to th e leve l o f th e bac, " accordin g t o th e sloga n o f Mitterrand' s secon d education minister , Jean-Pierr e Chevenement , Frenc h educatio n remain s meritocratic, wit h fe w secon d chance s availabl e t o thos e wh o fail . Socialis t governments i n th e 1980 s essentiall y continue d th e expansio n o f educatio n begun b y their conservativ e predecessor s (Amble r 1985 , 116-44) . A s baccalaureat program s multiply , a ne w hierarch y emerge s wit h th e science-mat h bacs at the peak. A s higher education enrollment s explode, programs open t o all bacheliers decline in value while those to which recruitment i s by competitive examination rise . Here , a s in othe r polic y domains, th e Socialist s see m to have accepted a goodly measure of inequality of results (Chariot 1989) . With th e exception o f the chronically unemployed , th e Frenc h safet y ne t provides effective protectio n agains t the risks of illness, accident, an d old age. If i t maintain s income s mor e tha n redistributin g them , i f i t i s pai d fo r b y regressive payrol l taxe s rathe r tha n b y a progressiv e incom e tax , th e reaso n may b e tha t th e leadin g political partie s as well a s the populatio n ar e accustomed t o this style of welfare state . I t emerged fro m th e era of strong socialist majorities (1981-1986 ) wit h a slightl y mor e egalitaria n impact , bu t wit h it s essential character intact: it is a system that lends security to the more affluen t as well as the less.

Institutions

While it is true that all industrialized societies have moved toward the welfar e state i n th e twentiet h century , th e rate s a t whic h the y hav e adopte d socia l protection an d th e form s tha t tha t protectio n ha s take n var y enormously . One o f th e cause s o f difference s betwee n nation s i s th e impac t o f existin g institutions, bot h governmenta l an d private . Dougla s Ashford , wh o i s a leading exponent o f an institutiona l approac h t o social policymaking , puts it this way : "Perhap s th e welfar e stat e wa s neithe r pushe d no r pulle d int o existence b y inexorabl e economi c an d socia l force s a s muc h a s i t wa s th e 20 JOH

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product o f institutionalize d searching , experimentatio n an d accumulatio n within th e democrati c framewor k o f eac h country " (Ashfor d 1986 , 27-28) . In chapte r 2 below , h e show s tha t i n th e Frenc h cas e th e welfar e stat e evolved out of a strong tradition o f mutual societie s (mutualites) an d took the form o f a complex system of multiple and partiall y self-administered plans in which th e boundarie s betwee n publi c an d private , stat e an d society , wer e blurred. Th e argument i s reminiscent o f that of Peter Hall, who suggests that economic policymaking is best understood by examining the nature of private institutions (trad e unions , employer s associations , banks ) a s wel l a s publi c institutions (Hall 1986) . According to another varian t o f the institutiona l perspective , th e development o f compulsory an d universa l socia l protectio n i s the resul t of efforts b y the state to strengthen it s legitimacy while expanding its controls over society (e.g., Rimlinge r 1971) . Whil e suggestive , th e "state-building " interpretatio n of th e growt h o f socia l protectio n overstate s bot h th e autonom y o f politica l power and the unity of the state. In inaugurating compulsory social insuranc e in Germany , Bismarc k di d indee d see k t o strengthe n th e state , bu t onl y because i t wa s servin g th e goal s o f a sociall y an d politicall y conservativ e monarchy. Frenc h Republican s i n th e Thir d Republi c clearl y favore d th e creation of mass elementary education a s an instrument for strengthening th e state, but only because the state was under their control. Rather tha n ris k reifyin g th e concep t o f the stat e b y assumin g tha t i t i s a single, autonomous actor , w e would do better to look closely at the variety of interests represente d b y governmental institution s (Suleima n 1987 ; Almond 1988; Ambler 1988) . I n th e Thir d Republic , a s we have noted , th e Senate , "the Gran d Counci l o f th e commune s o f France " i n th e famou s phras e o f Leon Gambetta , regularl y rejecte d socia l legislatio n approve d b y th e lowe r house. Whil e th e Senat e acte d a s a brak e o n th e developmen t o f socia l policy, representin g smal l entrepreneur s an d notable s i n France' s man y municipalities, th e national civi l service elite has played an importan t rol e in expanding socia l protection , particularl y sinc e Worl d Wa r II . A s show n b y Douglas Ashfor d i n chapte r 2 , Pierr e Laroqu e wa s one o f the ke y architect s of th e emergin g welfar e stat e i n Franc e afte r 1945 . Th e influenc e o f me n like Laroque and Frangoi s Bloch-Laine i s understandable onl y in the context of the enormou s prestig e enjoye d b y the hig h civi l servic e i n a country tha t long ha s take n prid e i n th e qualit y o f it s centra l administratio n (Suleima n 1974, 1978) . Few democratic countrie s hav e a stronger tradition o f centralized admin THE FRENC

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istration tha n doe s France, yet , a s Ashford shows , th e French welfar e stat e is a comple x mosai c o f distinct plan s with differen t level s of benefits fo r differ ent occupationa l groups . Th e institutiona l untidines s o f French socia l insti tutions can onl y be explained i n terms of the pattern o f private institutions i n existence during the formative years. Long befor e th e centra l governmen t sa w fit t o insur e worker s agains t accidents, illness , and death, apprentice s within medieva l guilds began pool ing thei r resource s t o assis t fello w workers . Th e guilds , lik e mos t othe r institutions survivin g fro m medieva l society , wer e outlawe d i n Franc e i n 1793 by a revolutionar y governmen t tha t viewe d the m a s restraints o n indi vidual right s and threat s to republican unity . I n the course of the nineteent h century, worker s i n France , a s elsewhere , sough t t o insur e agains t risk s b y forming mutua l societies . Empero r Loui s Napoleo n encourage d thi s devel opment i n th e 1850 s an d 1860 s and , b y 1902 , thei r numbe r ha d grow n t o 13,677, wit h a total membershi p o f over 2 million (Ashfor d 1986 , 89) . Th e mutualites wer e sufficientl y powerfu l t o impos e compromise s i n th e provi sions of social insurance bills in 191 0 and 1928 . The dela y i n enactin g socia l insuranc e i n Franc e allowe d privat e an d single-industry plan s t o develo p fo r muc h longe r tha n i n German y an d Britain, wit h th e resul t tha t whe n a comprehensiv e socia l securit y pla n wa s finally enacted in 1945 , the constituents of existing plans were strong enough to forc e majo r concession s fro m governmen t reformer s wh o ha d hope d t o create a unifie d socia l securit y syste m wit h unifor m benefits . Wit h th e support o f th e Genera l Confederatio n o f Labo r (CGT) , miners , railroa d workers, an d variou s categorie s o f civil servant s maintaine d thei r ow n sepa rate plans , withi n th e framewor k o f socia l security . A s w e hav e seen , th e MRP an d th e Churc h insiste d tha t famil y allowanc e fund s retai n thei r ow n autonomy. Th e resul t wa s grea t diversit y o f structur e an d o f benefits , wit h elected unio n representative s directly involve d i n the administration o f benefits alongsid e representatives of employers and of the state. The evolutio n o f social securit y institution s sinc e 194 5 i s summarized b y Ashford i n chapter 2 . Suffic e i t to say here that although there has been som e tendency ove r tim e towar d greate r centra l control s an d mor e standardize d benefits, complexit y an d diversit y o n a scal e tha t i s rar e i n industrialize d democracies hav e survived unde r th e vigilan t eyes of beneficiaries wh o priz e the privilege s an d distinctivenes s o f separat e plans . Accordin g t o on e coun t there wer e i n 198 4 n o les s tha n 11 7 distinc t retiremen t plan s withi n th e social security system , includin g th e "general plan, " "complementary plan, " 22 JOH

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and numerou s "specia l plans" for various categories of civil servants, specifi c occupational groups , farmers , an d self-employe d person s (M. Laroqu e 1986 , 78). Ther e ar e n o doub t instance s wher e complexit y allow s flexibility i n policy, a s shown by Nathan Schwart z (chapter 6) with regard to housing, an d by Dougla s Ashfor d wit h respec t t o th e financin g o f early retiremen t i n th e 1980s. Ther e also , n o doubt , ar e instance s wher e institutionalize d veste d interests inhibi t th e reallocatio n o f resource s t o group s tha t ar e no t alread y included i n the social security network , a s Jobert (chapter 7 ) argues to be th e case wit h th e growin g rank s o f the unemployable . Whateve r th e merit s an d demerits o f institutiona l complexit y i n th e Frenc h welfar e state , i t ha s sur vived Gaullis m an d socialis m t o becom e a par t o f th e Frenc h politica l tradition. SURVIVING TH E CRISI S

In France , a s in mos t countries o f Western Europe , th e dramati c expansio n of socia l expenditure s largel y coincide d wit h th e extraordinar y perio d o f almost thre e decade s o f economi c growt h tha t bega n no t lon g afte r Worl d War II . Unde r Presiden t Giscar d d'Estaing i n th e year s 1974-1981 , Frenc h social expenditure s continue d t o rise , a t th e rat e o f 6. 2 percen t annuall y i n constant francs , eve n a s th e econom y wa s slowin g an d othe r industrialize d democracies wer e holdin g thei r socia l cost s to a 4.8 percen t annua l increas e (OECD 1985 , 21) . Befor e Giscar d gav e u p th e Elyse e Palac e t o Frangoi s Mitterrand, Franc e had joine d th e international tren d by shifting th e priority of social policy to cost control. The Socialis t Part y cam e t o powe r i n 198 1 committe d t o changin g th e whole "economic and political system . . . o n which an unjust an d decaden t society is built" (Mitterrand, i n Parti Socialist e 1972 , 8 ; translation mine) . I n a first year of frenzied activity , th e government increase d th e minimum wag e by 2 5 percent , famil y allowance s b y 2 5 percen t (5 0 percen t fo r thos e wit h two children), ren t allowances b y 5 0 percent, an d minimu m pension s by 3 8 percent, whil e reducin g the allowable retiremen t ag e from sixty-fiv e t o sixty. By June of 1982 , an inflatio n rat e of 1 4 percent, a n internationa l ru n o n th e franc, an d a stagnan t econom y force d th e Socialist s t o adop t a polic y o f austerity. Nicol e Questiaux , th e Ministe r o f National Solidarity , wa s quoted in th e pres s as having tol d th e Cabinet, whe n challenge d o n th e larg e socia l security deficit , tha t "talkin g abou t number s o n thi s question i s talkin g th e language o f th e Right " (Ros s an d Jenso n 1985 , 45) . Sh e wa s replace d b y THE FRENC H WELFAR E S T A T E 2

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Pierre Beregovoy , wh o understoo d tha t socia l expenditure s coul d no t b e exempted fro m th e rigor s o f budgetary restraint . Henceforth , unti l th e con servative partie s regaine d th e majorit y i n th e Nationa l Assembl y i n th e legislative election s o f Marc h 1986 , socialis t government s postpone d costl y social program s an d searche d eagerl y fo r way s t o contro l risin g costs . A s shown by David Wilsford i n chapter 4, the French governmen t unde r socialist contro l pursue d policie s o f cos t contro l i n healt h tha t wer e basicall y similar to those designed by conservatives during the Giscard Presidency . The financial problem s o f the welfar e stat e wer e no t simpl y th e resul t of economic recession . Eve n i n period s o f economic growth , th e welfar e stat e in al l Western democracie s ha s been straine d b y an agin g population, risin g costs o f healt h technology , an d increasin g publi c deman d fo r socia l an d educational services . Fo r eac h Frenc h retire e i n 195 0 there were 4.62 work ers o n th e jo b payin g socia l security . B y 1975 , a s th e resul t o f increasin g longevity an d moderat e birt h rates , th e rati o ha d decline d t o 2.6 6 (Ros a 1982, 18) . Tota l Frenc h expenditur e o n healt h ros e fro m 4. 3 percen t o f Gross Domesti c Produc t (GDP ) i n 196 0 t o 8. 6 percen t o f a muc h large r GDP i n 198 5 (Heidenheimer , Heclo , an d Adam s 1990 , 85) . I n 195 0 th e majority o f Frenc h childre n lef t schoo l definitivel y a t age fourteen an d onl y approximately 5 percent entere d institution s o f highe r education . B y 1985 , 96 percent o f the twelve-seventeen ag e group were in school an d clos e to 30 percent o f the ag e group were continuing fo r highe r education . A t the lowe r end o f th e educationa l chain , 90. 2 percen t o f al l three-year-old s an d 34. 8 percent o f all two-year-olds wer e enrolled i n preelementar y school s i n 1981 . By 1988 , th e respectiv e figures wer e 97. 4 percen t an d 3 6 percent , makin g France a worl d leade r i n chil d car e an d preschoo l educatio n (MEN , Note d'Information 1989 : 28). As the proportion o f national wealth being spent on social and educationa l programs approache d o r surpasse d 3 0 percen t i n a numbe r o f countrie s i n the 1980s , th e "crisis " o f th e welfar e stat e becam e a commo n subjec t o f debate, eve n i n suc h welfar e leader s a s Sweden . Everywher e government s sought t o reduc e cost s i n th e 1980s , bu t i n Britai n unde r Prim e Ministe r Thatcher an d i n th e Unite d State s unde r Presiden t Reagan , conservativ e leadership mounte d a fundamenta l assaul t o n th e whol e concep t o f th e welfare state . I n thes e countries , a s i n som e conservativ e circle s o n th e continent, i t was argued tha t private, marke t solutions to social problem s ar e almost invariably mor e efficient tha n governmen t programs. Is i t the n th e cas e tha t i n th e 1980s , unlik e earlie r periods , th e welfar e 24 J O H N S

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state became exclusively an idea of the Left? The evidence generally does not support thi s conclusion . Eve n Britai n an d th e Unite d State s emerge d fro m the 1980 s with th e basi c structure o f social securit y stil l intact . I f there wer e reductions i n publi c housin g an d i n means-teste d programs , th e genera l entitlement program s i n health , unemployment , an d retiremen t survive d largely intact . Afte r a surve y o f th e "welfar e stat e crisis, " Hug h Hecl o con cludes, "Nowher e i n th e develope d OEC D nation s i s i t possibl e t o find evidence o f an y majo r dismantlin g o f th e basi c polic y structures " (Hecl o 1990, 265). France followe d thi s general pattern . Th e governmen t o f Jacques Chirac , which emerge d fro m th e legislativ e election s o f Marc h 1986 , wa s mor e dedicated t o a free-marke t econom y tha n an y othe r i n th e postwa r period , perhaps mor e tha n an y othe r i n moder n Frenc h history . Th e privatizatio n drive o f 1986-198 7 wa s as dramatic a s Mitterrand's nationalizatio n driv e of 1981-1982; ye t socia l polic y wa s largel y spare d th e privatizatio n cure , a s shown i n the chapters that follow . The surviva l o f th e welfar e stat e i s hardl y surprising , give n th e strengt h and breadt h o f the consensu s tha t support s basi c socia l securit y program s i n most Wester n democracie s (Smit h 1987) . I n 1969 , 1976 , an d 1983 , th e French pollin g institute , SOFRES , aske d respondent s t o evaluat e ho w seri ous i t would b e i f various right s an d institution s wer e abolished . I n eac h o f the three surveys, social security was perceived t o be more important than al l other right s an d institution s mentioned . I n 1983 , 8 5 percen t fel t tha t th e abolition o f social securit y woul d b e "ver y serious, " compared t o 8 1 percen t for th e righ t t o vote , 8 0 percen t fo r th e righ t t o choos e one' s plac e o f employment, 7 0 percent for freedo m o f the press, 49 percent fo r th e righ t to strike, an d 3 3 percent fo r politica l partie s (Schnappe r 1986 , 72 ; M. Laroqu e 1986, 13-14) . Onl y 2 percen t o f th e respondant s fel t tha t preservatio n o f social securit y wa s "not important " o r "no t a t all important. " I n vie w of this virtual unanimit y o f support, Jacque s Chira c wa s far to o skille d a politicia n to take on the welfare state , even i f he had been incline d t o do so. Within th e general consensus there is room for differences o f emphasis. I f moderate and conservative leadership was largely responsible for the dramatic increase of the real value of pensions in the 1970 s (4.4 percent per year fro m 1970 to 1984) , a s well as for accommodatin g th e explosio n o f school enroll ments at the preschool, secondary , an d higher education levels , it is nonetheless th e Lef t tha t talk s mos t ofte n an d mos t enthusiasticall y abou t socia l justice. I n th e wake of general disillusionmen t abou t government ownershi p THE FRENC H WELFAR E STAT E 2

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of industry as the basis of the just society, Europea n socialis t parties find little to distinguis h themselve s fro m liberal s an d conservative s othe r tha n a com mitment to greater equality among citizens. Upo n comin g to power in 1981, the Frenc h Socialis t Part y propose d a series o f reform s designe d t o rais e th e floor of benefits an d t o target them mor e effectively o n low-incom e families , including th e designatio n o f "Priorit y Educatio n Zones, " whic h receive d extra fund s t o reinforc e school s wit h larg e number s o f low-incom e an d immigrant families ; increase d housin g allowances ; an d a highe r floor o n pensions. Althoug h som e progress was made, th e result s hardly matche d th e socialist campaig n rhetori c o f the pre-198 1 years . Th e tota l valu e o f socia l transfers increase d b y 5. 4 percen t i n rea l term s fro m 198 1 to 1983 , but tha t must b e compare d wit h a n averag e increas e o f mor e tha n 6 percen t i n th e years 1974-198 1 (Hal l 1985 , 103) . The dramati c increase s i n socia l benefit s of 1981-198 2 wer e seriousl y erode d b y hig h inflation , whil e th e austerit y program o f 1982-198 6 force d postponemen t o f expensiv e ne w programs . Finally, th e natio n ha d becom e accustome d t o a syste m o f socia l insuranc e that maintains income s more than i t redistributes them . At the end o f the 1980s , Franc e clearly was not an egalitaria n societ y i n a class wit h Sweden ; ye t th e ga p betwee n ric h an d poo r wa s no t a s grea t a s suggested by several studies based on data from th e early 1970 s (Sawyer 1976 ; Van Arnhei m an d Schotsma n 1982 ; Muller 1989 ; World Ban k 1989 , 229) . Recent evidenc e gathere d b y th e Centr e d'etude s de s revenu s e t de s cout s (CERC), show s increasin g equalit y o f primar y income s afte r 197 0 an d a steady increas e i n socia l benefits . I n 1962 , th e disposabl e (afte r ta x an d transfer) incom e o f households i n which th e head wa s a senior manage r was 2.9 time s a s grea t a s tha t o f household s heade d b y industria l workers ; b y 1984, th e gap had narrowe d t o 2. 2 (CER C 1986) . The narrowin g of the gap was partly the result of a rapid increas e i n the number o f women i n the work force, particularl y thos e i n low - and moderate-incom e families . Th e bigges t winners wer e th e elderl y an d th e unemployed . Familie s heade d b y nonem ployed persons (most of them retired ) had a per capita household incom e that was more than 2 5 percent below the average incom e i n 1962 ; by 198 4 it was 23 percent abov e as the result of more than a decade of real annual increase s of 4.2 percen t i n pension s (CERC 1986) . While th e incom e ga p was widening in th e Unite d State s and i n Britain , i t seems to have narrowed i n Franc e in th e 1970 s and earl y 1980 s (CERC 1986 ; Fourastie an d Bazi l 1980) . Thi s trend wa s mos t clea r i n th e decad e befor e th e Socialis t part y cam e t o powe r (Canceill 1990) . Indeed , preliminar y evidenc e suggest s that th e incom e ga p 26 JOH

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has widene d slightl y sinc e 1984 , largel y a s a resul t o f dramati c increase s i n income fro m investment s couple d wit h stabilizatio n o f socia l expenditures (Chassard 1989) . In sum , th e Frenc h welfar e stat e emerge d fro m th e 1980 s stil l unde r financial pressure , bu t strengthene d b y having survive d (an d tamed) th e ol d socialism an d th e ne w liberalism . Th e presen t institution s ma y lac k th e uniformity an d centra l control s tha t on e migh t expec t o f a people who prid e themselves in their Cartesian logic ; yet, a s Douglas Ashford argue s in chapter 2, they seem to suit the preferences o f the French, wh o may acclaim equalit y in the abstract, bu t rarely want it applied t o their own particular privileges. In additio n t o th e imperativ e o f controlling costs , a problem commo n t o all industrialize d democracies , th e Frenc h welfar e stat e i n th e 1990 s wil l confront tw o relatively ne w problems. Th e first is structural unemployment . Unemployment rate s hovered around 1 0 percent in the last half of the 1980s , and were much highe r for young people. Brun o Jobert shows in the conclud ing chapte r tha t existin g institution s ar e designe d t o protec t thos e wh o hav e been folde d int o th e socia l securit y syste m throug h wor k experience. Youn g people wh o canno t find work , o r long-ter m unemployables , wh o d o no t qualify fo r specifi c benefit s lik e thos e fo r th e handicapped , ris k fallin g be tween th e cracks. They fal l bac k on the resource s o f their families o r of local public assistance, eac h of which impose s a certain cos t in social standing and self-esteem. Trainin g and work-study programs designed to ease the transition into th e wor k forc e wil l continu e t o hav e limite d succes s s o lon g a s th e economy fails to create new jobs. Policie s that seek to create jobs by reducing payroll taxes undermine th e already shaky financial basis of the welfare state . A secon d proble m i s pose d b y risin g anti-immigran t sentiment . Th e welfare stat e was built upo n a growing sense of social interdependenc e an d a resulting belie f tha t th e healt h an d welfar e o f all member s o f society consti tute publi c o r collectiv e good s (D e Swaa n 1988) . Publi c suppor t fo r means tested programs—alway s les s popular tha n entitlemen t programs—seem s t o depend upo n empath y wit h th e unfortunate , a sentimen t tha t i s stronges t when al l citizen s ca n imagin e themselve s i n th e plac e o f th e poor , th e disable, an d th e long-ter m unemployed . Thi s capacit y fo r empath y i s re duced whe n th e majorit y o f recipient s o f socia l benefit s ar e ethnicall y o r culturally distinc t fro m th e majorit y o f taxpayers . I t i s no t surprisin g tha t there i s greater resentmen t towar d "welfare " recipient s i n th e Unite d States , where man y belong to racial minorities , tha n i n Sweden , wher e the popula tion i s ethnically quit e homogeneous. I n France , th e immigran t population , THE FRENC H WELFAR E STAT E 2

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and particularl y th e Nort h Africa n population , becam e a permanent presenc e and a volatil e politica l issu e a t a tim e o f hig h unemployment . Espousin g such slogan s a s "tw o millio n unemploye d = tw o millio n immigrants " an d "the Frenc h first," Jean-Mari e L e Pe n an d hi s Fron t Nationa l wo n 1 0 t o 1 4 percent o f th e vot e i n a serie s o f election s fro m 198 4 t o 1989 . On e o f th e tests o f th e welfar e stat e i n th e year s ahea d wil l b e th e capacit y o f th e Frenc h to exten d th e traditiona l ide a o f solidarity t o thos e amon g the m whos e origin s are i n Algeria , Morocco , an d Tunisia .

REFERENCES

Albers, Jens. 1982 . "Som e Causes and Consequence s o f Social Securit y Expenditur e Development i n Wester n Europe , 1949-1977. " Pape r presente d t o th e Interna tional Politica l Scienc e Association, Ri o de Janeiro. Almond, Gabriel . 1988 . "Th e Retur n o f th e State. " American Political Science Review 82: 853-74. Ambler, Joh n S. , ed . 1985 . The French Socialist Experiment. Philadelphia : ISHI . . 1988 . "Frenc h Educatio n an d th e Limit s of State Autonomy." The Western Political Quarterly 41: 469-88. Ashford, Dougla s E . 1982 . Policy and Politics in France: Living with Uncertainty. Philadelphia: Temple Universit y Press. . 1986 . The Emergence of the Welfare States. Oxfor d an d Ne w York : Blackwell. Benavot, Aaron , an d Phylli s Riddle . 1988 . "Th e Expansio n o f Primar y Education , 1870-1940: Trends and Issues. " Sociology of Education 61 : 191-210. Boudon, Raymond . 1973 . Education f Opportunity and Social Inequality. New York: John Wiley . Bourdieu, Pierre , an d Jean-Claud e Passeron . 1964 . Les Rentiers. Paris : Editions d e Minuit. . 1970 . La Reproduction. Paris : Editions de Minuit . Canceill, Genevieve . 1990 . "L e Revenu d e menages." In INSE E (1990) , 138-144 . Castles, Franci s G. 1982 . The Impact of Parties. Beverly Hills: Sage. Centre d'etud e de s revenu s e t de s cout s (CERC) . 1976 . Dispersion et disparites de salaires a I'etranger; Comparaisons avec la France. Paris: Documents d u CERC, no. 29-30 . . 1986 . Le Revenu des menages, 1960-1984. Paris : Document s d u CERC , no. 80 . . 1988 . Constat de revolution recente des revenus en France (1984-1987). Documents du CERC , no . 89. Chariot, Bernard . 1989 . "1959-1989 : Le s mutation s d u discour s educatif. " Education Permanente 98: 133-49 .

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Chassard, Yves . 1989 . "L a Croissanc e de s inegalites. " Revue Politique et Parlementaire91:943, 34-38 . De Swaan , Abram . 1988 . In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era. Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press. Eicher, Jean-Claude , an d Alain Mingat . 1975 . "Education e t Egalite." In Education, Inequality and Life Chances. Vol I . Edite d b y O.E.C.D. Paris : O.E.C.D. Flora, Peter , an d Jen s Albers . 1981 . "Modernization , Democratization , an d th e Development o f Welfare State s in Western Europe. " In Flor a and Heidenheimer , eds., 37-80 . Flora, Peter , an d Arnol d J . Heidenheimer , eds . 1981 . The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. Ne w Brunswick and London : Transaction Books . Fourastie, Jean , an d Beatric e Bazil . 1980 . Le Jardin du voisin: Les inegalites en France. Paris: Librairie Generale Franchise . Garin, Christine , Eric h Inciyan , an d Jea n Lamoure . 1989 . "Enquete : L e Nivea u Monte." Le Monde de lEducation 156 : 34-57. Gamier, Maurice , Jeral d Hage , an d Bruc e Fuller . 1989 . "Th e Stron g State , Socia l Class, an d Controlle d Schoo l Expansio n i n France , 1881-1975. " American Journal of Sociology 95: 279-306. Girard, Andre , Henr i Bastide , an d Gu y Pourcher . 1963 . "Enquet e national e su r Tentree e n sixiem e e t l a democratisatio n d e l'enseignement. " Population 18 : 9 48. Goguel, Frangois . 1946 . La Politique des partis sous la IIIe Republique. Paris: Seuil. Goodin, Rober t E. , an d Julia n LeGrand . 1987 . Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State. London : Allen and Unwin. Hall, Pete r A . 1985 . "Socialis m i n On e Country : Mitterran d an d th e Struggl e t o Define a Ne w Economi c Polic y fo r France. " I n Socialism, the State and Public Policy in France, edite d b y Phili p G . Cern y an d Marti n A . Schain . Ne w York : Methuen. . 1986 . Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. New York: Oxford Universit y Press. Hatzfeld, Henri . 1971 . Du Pauperisme a la securite sociale, essai sur les origines de la securite sociale en France, 1850-1940. Paris : Colin. Heclo, Hugh . 1974 . Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale University Press. . 1990 . "Income Maintenance Policy. " In Heidenheimer, Heclo , and Adams. Heidenheimer, Arnol d J. , Hug h Heclo , an d Caroly n Teic h Adams . 1990 . Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe, and Japan. 3d ed. Ne w York: St. Martin's . Institut Nationa l d e l a Statistiqu e e t des Etude s Economique s (INSEE) . 1984 . Donnees Sociales. 5th ed. Paris : INSEE. . 1990 . Donnees Sociales. 7th ed. Paris : INSEE. . 1989 . Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1989. Paris: INSEE. Jallade, Jean-Pierre, ed . 1988 . The Crisis of Distribution in European Welfare States. Stoke-on-Kent: Trentham Books . THE FRENC H W E L F A R E S T A T E 2

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Jambu-Merlin, Roger . 1970 . La Securite Sociale. Paris: Armand Colin . Johanet, Gilles . 1986 . Coxites et Mecomptes de la Protection Sociale. Paris : Revu e Politique et Parlementaire. King, Anthony . 1973 . "Ideas , Institutions , an d th e Policie s o f Government : A Comparative Analysis. " British Journal of Political Science 3 : 293-313 , 409 23. Laroque, Michel . 1986 . Politiques Sociales dans la France Contemporaine. Paris : editions S.T.H . Laroque, Pierre . 1983 . The Social Institutions of France. Ne w York : Gordo n an d Breach. Maruo, Naomi . 1983 . "Th e Developmen t o f th e Welfar e Mi x i n Japan. " I n The Welfare State East and West, edite d b y Richar d Ros e and Re i Shiratori . Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press. Ministere d e TEducatio n (MEN) . Note dinformation. Paris : ME N (Th e first tw o digits indicate the year and th e second two the number. ) . 1985 . Tableau deBord. Paris : MEN. Monde de TEducation, he. 1990 : 168. Monde de I'Education, he. 1990 : 172. Muller, Edwar d N . 1989 . "Distributio n o f Incom e i n Advance d Capitalis t States : Political Parties , Labou r Unions , an d th e Internationa l Economy. " European Journal of Political Research 17 : 367-99. O'Connor, Juli a S . 1988 . "Convergenc e o r Divergence? : Chang e i n Welfar e Effor t in OEC D Countries , 1960-1980. " European Journal of Political Research 16: 277-99. Offe, Claus . 1984 . Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge , Mass. : MI T Press. Organization fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Developmen t (OECD) . 1985 . Social Expenditure, 1960-1990. Paris : OECD. Parti Socialiste . 1972 . Changer la Vie: Programme de gouvernement du Parti Socialiste. Paris: Flammarion. . 1978 . Liberer I'Ecole: Plan socialiste pour /'education nationale. Paris : Flammarion. Pempel, T . J . 1982 . Policy and Politics in Japan. Philadelphia : Templ e Universit y Press. Prost, Antoine . 1968 . Histoire de XEnseignement en France, 1800-1967. Paris : Armand Colin . Rimlinger, Gaston . 1971 . Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia. Ne w York: Wiley. Rosa, Jean-Jacques. 1982 . The World Crisis in Social Security. Paris : Bonnel. Ross, George , an d Jan e Jensen. "Politica l Pluralis m an d Economi c Policy. " i n Ambler (1985). Sawyer, Malcolm . 1976 . "Incom e Distributio n i n OEC D Countries. " I n OEC D Economic Outlook: Occasional Studies. July 1976. Schnapper, Dominique , Jeann e Brody , an d Riv a Kastoryano . 1986 . "Le s frangai s e t la securite sociale, 1945-1982. " Vingtieme Siecle 10: 67-82.

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Smith, To m W . 1987 . "Th e Polls— A Report : The Welfare Stat e i n Cross-Nationa l Perspective." Public Opinion Quarterly 51 : 405-21. Suleiman, Ezr a N . 1974 . Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France. Princeton: Princeton Universit y Press. . 1978 . Elites in French Society. Princeton: Princeton Universit y Press. . 1987 . Private Power and Centralization in France. Princeton : Princeto n University Press. Thevenet, Amedee . 1989 . L'Aide sociale aujourd'hui apres la decentralisation. Paris: E.S.F. Van Arnheim, J . Corina M. , an d Guert J. Schotsman . 1982 . "D o Parties Affect the Distribution o f Income ? Th e Cas e o f Advance d Capitalis t Democracies. " I n Castles (1982). Wilensky, Harol d L . 1975 . The Welfare State and Equality. Berkeley : University o f California Press. . 1981 . "Leftism , Catholicism , an d Democrati c Corporatism : Th e Rol e o f Political Partie s in Recent Welfare Stat e Development." In Flora and Heidenheimer(1981). World Bank . 1989 . World Development Report 1989. Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press.

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2 ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXITY : SOCIA L INSURANCE I N FRANC E DOUGLAS E . ASHFOR D

The natur e o f the Frenc h welfar e stat e is poorly understood i n most English speaking countrie s fo r tw o reasons . First , th e notio n o f a powerful, central ized Frenc h stat e ha s ofte n capture d th e imaginatio n o f bot h Frenc h an d non-French socia l scientist s s o that th e vas t organizations suc h a s the socia l security syste m tha t straddl e the public an d privat e sector s receiv e les s attention. Mor e recent scholarship has begun to uncover the complex institutiona l links betwee n th e stat e an d societ y tha t mak e arbitrar y definitio n o f "state " and "welfar e state " har d t o defen d (Ashfor d 1986) . Second , fo r man y year s France, rathe r lik e th e Unite d States , wa s treate d a s a laggar d amon g th e contemporary welfar e state s and ofte n exclude d fro m earl y comparative stud ies of welfare states. 1 Fro m a conservative perspective , i t was comfortable t o ignore th e networ k o f interdependenc y betwee n Frenc h socia l policie s an d French politics . Fro m a radica l perspective , i t wa s n o les s comfortabl e t o think that French welfare and social services were meager concessions squeezed by weak unions from a dogmatically capitalis t society. Both o f these interpretation s ar e historicall y untru e an d politicall y naive . According t o Rosanvallo n (1984) , th e concep t o f th e etat providence arose under th e Secon d Empire , fostere d b y Le Play and Napoleo n II I in the for m of expande d mutua l insuranc e plan s (mutualite) . Mos t o f th e majo r socia l debates i n Franc e tak e plac e a t roughl y th e sam e tim e a s similar debate s i n Britain, Germany, an d th e Unite d States : social assistance for children i n th e 1880s; workmen's compensatio n i n th e lat e 1890s ; social insuranc e experi 32

ments a t th e tur n o f th e century ; and , som e year s befor e thei r Nordi c an d Anglo-Saxon counterparts , famil y allowance s i n th e 1930 s (Levasseur 1903 , 1907). T o b e sure , th e produc t wa s no t alway s substantia l bu t importan t precedents wer e se t tha t ar e firmly imprinte d o n moder n Frenc h socia l institutions. Perhap s the best known i s the solidarity movement of the radical republicans i n th e 1880 s when th e Ligu e d e prevoyanc e wa s second onl y t o the Ligu e d e Tenseignemen t i n advocatin g a fervent , secula r republicanis m (Stone, 1980) . Preoccupie d wit h th e performanc e o f welfar e state s rathe r than thei r aim s an d meanings , socia l scienc e ha s seriousl y underestimate d both th e complexit y an d th e promis e o f th e Frenc h etat providence and i n doing so risks misinterpreting the meaning of the French stat e itself. Instead o f examining the Frenc h welfar e stat e by means of a conventional social scienc e design , thi s essa y wil l see k t o expres s th e meanin g o f th e French welfar e stat e i n term s o f Frenc h historica l experienc e an d Frenc h political tradition s (Ashford 1989) . See n i n the context of French histor y and politics the Frenc h welfar e stat e is an importan t affirmatio n o f French politi cal values and preferences , man y o f which ar e familiar t o students o f a wide variety o f Frenc h policymakin g situations. 2 Thoug h th e objective s an d sub stance o f policymakin g o n socia l protectio n an d socia l equit y ma y b e radi cally differen t tha n th e objective s an d substanc e o f policie s dealin g wit h economic management , industria l relations , o r education , i t shoul d no t b e surprising tha t th e French , lik e most nations , brin g fundamenta l value s an d traditions to bear on social problem solving . Thei r concer n wit h socia l issue s is i n man y respect s olde r tha n i n mos t democracies . Th e revolutionar y debates o f 179 3 outlawe d vagranc y (mendacite) a s a blo t o n society ; th e radical republican s an d th e earl y socialists fought bitte r battle s to replace th e bureaux de bienfaisance (privat e loca l charity ) wit h bureaux d'assistance publique (state-supervise d loca l socia l assistance ) (Ashfor d 1986 , 135-37) ; and Milleran d an d hi s successors in th e Ministr y o f Labor saw close connections between socia l insurance and labo r policies (Derfler 1977) . The Frenc h made socia l policie s a basi c instrumen t o f stat e formatio n wel l befor e th e more highly developed welfar e state s such a s Britain an d Germany . Other majo r Europea n welfar e state s mad e socia l insuranc e littl e mor e than a n appendag e t o existin g stat e structures . Th e Britis h welfar e stat e was left t o functio n largel y outsid e th e spher e o f governmen t eve n thoug h it s progress wa s nonetheles s frequentl y hampere d b y capricious , partisa n inter vention. Th e Germa n welfar e stat e neve r los t th e authoritaria n imprin t o f Bismarck an d eve n i n th e earl y 1950 s remained a n objec t o f intense discor d ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 3

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between worker s an d employers . Perhap s becaus e th e Frenc h neve r pro claimed thei r socia l intention s a s emphatically a s othe r democracies , thei r efforts attracte d les s attention an d o n th e whole are less well understood. Bu t it i s interestin g t o not e tha t fro m it s earl y stage s th e Frenc h concep t o f a welfare stat e wa s i n man y respect s mor e comprehensiv e an d mor e flexible than i n mos t othe r democracies . Ther e ar e n o simpl e behaviora l o r quanti tative measures of French "success " or "failure" but more accurately a variety of cross-cuttin g concern s tha t interloc k t o mak e th e syste m appea r mor e complex tha n i t is . Outlinin g wha t thes e governin g principle s ar e helps u s see why complexity make s sense to the French eve n i f it makes little sense to some critics. First, Frenc h socia l insuranc e i s based o n th e ide a o f mutualite, o r th e idea tha t eac h perso n shoul d voluntaril y d o a s muc h a s possibl e t o provid e for his or her own needs in cooperation wit h others. A s noted, mutualite ha s an unfortunate associatio n with the Second Empire , when the first legislatio n was passed, bu t mutua l insuranc e was enthusiastically endorse d b y the Third Republic and enormously popular in France well before there was state social insurance.3 I t i s significan t tha t i n explainin g th e postwa r socia l insuranc e legislation, th e French Beveridge , Pierr e Laroque (1961), assured the Frenc h people that th e ne w system o f national insuranc e wa s an extensio n o f mutualite. Neithe r radica l no r conservativ e critic s o f th e contemporar y welfar e state ar e likel y t o agree , bu t th e ide a o f mutua l suppor t enable d th e Frenc h to organiz e a syste m tha t permit s substantia l redistributio n amon g occupa tional groups . Th e Frenc h se e nothin g curiou s i n th e fac t tha t th e stat e retirement insuranc e (regime general) provides onl y a third o f all retiremen t benefits whil e anothe r thir d ar e provide d b y preexistin g retiremen t plan s (regimes speciaux), mos t fo r worker s considere d essentia l t o th e state , whil e about a fifth o f retiremen t benefit s ar e provide d b y specia l occupationa l pension fund s (regimes complementaires) (Netter 1965 , 1974) . Mutualite i s only one of many expressions in French policymakin g that demonstrates how the Frenc h seldo m polariz e individua l an d publi c interest s i n devising policy solutions. Helpin g onesel f an d helpin g other s ar e no t mutuall y exclusiv e activities. Second, th e Frenc h hav e n o difficult y acceptin g th e principl e tha t wag e earners an d th e self-employe d presen t fundamentall y differen t socia l prob lems. Socia l insuranc e i s basicall y divide d betwee n th e salaries an d th e nonsalaries. Thi s i s i n par t a n expressio n o f th e curiou s pragmatis m tha t permeates Frenc h policymaking . Collectin g fund s fro m th e self-employe d i s 34 DOUGLA

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more difficul t an d o f cours e th e wag e earner s initiall y ha d mor e nee d o f social protection. Th e resul t is that French socia l insurance i s occupationally bifurcated wit h differen t conditions , benefits , an d resource s attache d t o per sons i n th e tw o categories . Ther e i s one exceptio n o f great importance , th e agricultural sector , wher e thes e categorie s hav e been differentl y applie d an d where, as in most countries, i n one form o r another farmers and farm worker s get nearl y al l thei r socia l suppor t fro m th e state . Thi s account s fo r th e anomaly that Frenc h agricultura l nonsalaries (agricultural workers ) got social insurance befor e th e far m owners . Becaus e socia l insuranc e fo r th e entir e agrarian econom y i s almost totall y subsidize d b y th e stat e throug h a mini social syste m withi n th e Ministr y o f Agriculture, th e Mutualit e social e agri cole (MSA) , thi s i s largel y a n academi c distinction . Th e mos t importan t components o f the nonsalaries are of course the cadres, who have two majo r funds t o handl e thei r retiremen t plan s (AGIR C an d ARRCO). 4 A s wil l b e explained below , th e larg e reserve s buil t u p i n thes e prosperou s funds , intended t o supplemen t white-colla r pensions , enable d th e Socialist s t o finance th e cost s o f reducin g th e retiremen t ag e fro m sixty-fiv e t o sixt y i n 1983. I n assessin g th e socia l insuranc e system , an d othe r aspect s o f Frenc h policymaking, i t would b e misleading to convert Frenc h occupationa l differ ences into class differences . Third, th e Frenc h hav e alway s imagine d socia l insuranc e system s i n relation t o al l form s o f social risk . Thi s i s not t o sa y that al l risk s have bee n equally or even adequately treated , bu t since the late nineteenth centur y an d earlier th e governmen t bega n t o insur e high-ris k jobs , suc h a s the merchan t marine, mining , an d railroads , whil e benevolen t patrons established elabo rate mutua l insuranc e plan s fo r thei r employee s (Cheysso n 1902 ; Guillo t 1887; Hatzfeld 1971 ; Salais 1986) . Fo r example , ther e wa s neve r a n impas sioned debat e ove r providin g healt h insuranc e a s par t o f socia l insuranc e although th e libera l medica l professio n wa s fully protecte d an d th e hospita l system onl y slowl y brough t unde r nationa l supervisio n (Rodwi n 1984 ; Ja mous 1969) . Man y worker s ha d som e unemploymen t insuranc e wel l befor e de Gaull e create d nationa l unemploymen t insuranc e (UNEDIC ) i n 1958. 5 What i s interestin g i n understandin g th e meanin g o f socia l insuranc e i n France i s that thi s decisio n wa s no t considere d terribl y controversial . Mor e important t o a n understandin g o f ho w th e syste m acquire s flexibility i s th e fact tha t unemploymen t insuranc e wa s no t formall y attache d t o th e olde r system o f socia l insuranc e bu t rest s o n voluntar y agreement s (conventions collectives) betwee n th e employers, negotiate d b y the CNPF an d th e unions . ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 3

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Contrary t o man y neo-Marxis t interpretation s o f the welfar e state , th e weak ness an d fragmentatio n o f th e Frenc h labo r movemen t ha s littl e effec t o n unemployment benefits . Indeed , unemploymen t insuranc e i s perhap s th e most dramati c illustratio n o f free ridin g i n Frenc h policymaking . Th e thre e major unions , whic h represen t n o mor e tha n a fifth o f Frenc h workers , monopolize th e negotiation s wit h th e CNP F whil e th e Communis t union s accept th e benefit s whil e boycottin g th e procedure s an d condemnin g th e results. Al l thes e paradoxe s happil y coexis t becaus e socia l insuranc e i s de fined t o includ e al l form s o f socia l ris k whethe r o r no t i t lie s withi n th e formal stat e system. Lastly, an d i n som e way s mos t importan t i n enablin g th e Frenc h syste m of socia l insuranc e t o adap t t o th e stresse s an d strain s o f th e 1980s , th e French neve r single d ou t povert y a s a peculia r proble m no r hav e the y eve r placed fixed limits o n stat e subsidies for socia l insurance. 6 This i s partly du e to historical accidents . I n 1941 , for example , Vich y had n o funds t o provide pensions fo r th e thousand s o f unsupporte d elderl y lef t withou t job s an d without familie s becaus e o f th e war . Th e governmen t simpl y seize d th e modest pensio n reserve s that th e first and full y capitalize d pensio n pla n ha d been accumulatin g sinc e 1930 . Th e entir e pensio n syste m wa s shifted fro m capitalization t o pay-as-you-g o (repartition), thereb y openin g th e wa y fo r more generou s increase s i n bette r time s an d fo r inflatio n proofin g onc e retirement income s were threatened. Th e minimu m pensio n (allocation aux vieux travailleurs salaries, or AVTS) was extended t o the nonsalaries in 194 6 and furthe r supplemente d wit h stat e funds fo r thos e outsid e th e socia l insur ance syste m wit h th e Fond s nationa l d e solidarite (FNS ) i n 1956 . Ther e ar e to b e sur e poo r person s i n Franc e bu t th e exac t meanin g o f th e ter m i s unclear (Rappor t Ohei x 1981 ; Rapport Wresinsk i 1987) . Becaus e thes e tw o benefits wer e superimpose d o n th e entir e insuranc e syste m befor e povert y was aggravated b y recurrent inflationar y spiral s an d becaus e o f the elaborat e system o f specia l benefit s provide d b y th e famil y fun d (CNAF ) fo r singl e mothers, handicappe d children , disable d parents , etc. , man y o f th e mos t acute effect s o f povert y hav e bee n ameliorate d i f no t eliminated . Unlik e Britain, wher e povert y becam e a caus e celebr e a s earl y a s th e 1950s , th e French socia l insuranc e syste m doe s no t pivo t o n a single , class-base d issu e but o n th e sharin g o f ris k throug h multipl e form s o f benefit s an d divers e social funds . For all these reasons, i t is probably correc t to say that the Frenc h find th e distinction betwee n th e stat e an d th e etat providence highl y ambiguous . 36 DOUGLA

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Mutual support , socia l solidarity , ris k sharing , an d providin g fo r th e poo r interlock in a complex set of social institutions that are an inextricabl e part of French politica l institutions . Ke y socia l an d politica l group s ar e heavil y involved i n advisor y roles , th e mai n fund s hav e conseils d'administration where employer s an d employee s participat e alon g wit h officials, 7 an d th e legal syste m provide s a measur e o f semiautonomou s decisio n makin g whil e still enablin g governmen t t o provid e fiscal an d financial guidelines . Th e intricacies o f French socia l insuranc e appea r t o make i t obscure. I n fac t i t is through it s complexit y tha t thi s syste m i s abl e t o provid e numerou s polic y options, t o offe r alternativ e solution s t o ne w need s an d ne w risks , an d t o bridge, howeve r tentatively, th e interlockin g aims of wage and socia l policie s to make a step toward socia l democracy. 8 Thus, th e Frenc h socia l insuranc e system i s no t onl y a demonstratio n o f ho w a reluctan t welfar e stat e ca n become a leadin g welfar e stat e bu t i s als o a n importan t windo w throug h which t o view the nature of the French stat e itself. PUTTING TH E SYSTE M I N M O T I O N

Unfortunately, th e mos t detaile d accoun t o f th e postwa r reconstructio n o f the Frenc h welfar e stat e i s no t onl y i n Frenc h bu t end s wit h 195 2 (Galan t 1955). This make s it difficult t o trace the continuities o f practice and prefer ence that ru n throug h Frenc h socia l insurance . I n France , a s in Britai n an d Germany, ther e was until recentl y a tendency t o see the postwar structure i n isolation fro m earlie r development s an d t o overla y evaluation s o f Frenc h social insuranc e wit h receive d knowledg e o n th e deficiencie s o f th e Fourt h Republic. Indeed , fro m a comparativ e perspectiv e th e immediat e postwa r experience o f Franc e provide s a better guid e t o th e politic s o f policymakin g than d o events in Britai n and Germany . Th e Britis h welfare stat e was launched in th e euphori a o f victory an d wit h almos t n o seriou s politica l debat e whil e the resurrectio n o f th e Germa n welfar e stat e wa s a n od d combinatio n o f Allied indecisio n an d Adenauer' s gri m determinatio n t o se e th e prewa r German welfar e stat e reconstitute d (Hockert s 1980) . Thoug h certai n im provements were made by Vichy, constitutin g the Frenc h welfar e stat e was a dramatic shif t fro m th e pas t policies and require d a n intens e examinatio n o f French principles and preferences . From th e earliest days of the Liberatio n th e comprehensive vie w of social protection prevailed . I n Februar y 1945 , si x month s befor e th e first orde r (ordonnance) o n organizing social insurance, Blum' s prewar factory commit ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 3

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tees wer e revive d an d comites d'entreprise were establishe d i n al l firms wit h more tha n on e hundre d workers . Severa l month s late r anothe r ordonnance created th e service national de logement, the forerunner o f the French publi c housing agency. Earl y the same year social insurance refor m wa s introduce d by appointin g th e Motri n committe e t o examin e Laroque' s proposal s (Rap port Motti n 1945) . Th e mai n disput e wa s over Laroque' s pla n t o centraliz e all socia l insuranc e fund s (caisse unique), whic h th e committe e rejecte d b y nine vote s t o eight , wit h fourtee n abstentions . O n th e righ t th e olde r occu pational insuranc e fund s considere d th e singl e nationa l fun d a financial threat and , o n th e left , th e Catholi c part y (MRP ) an d well-develope d loca l family association s regarde d th e proposa l a s a threat t o the autonom y o f th e family benefi t system . Th e CG T wa s s o upse t a t seein g specia l retiremen t funds fo r miner s and railroa d worker s merged wit h othe r funds tha t they told the Communis t part y the y woul d leav e th e part y wer e thei r privilege s re moved (P . Laroqu e 1983) . Th e syste m o f election s t o th e managemen t committees wa s n o les s controversial . Th e CG T initiall y hope d t o captur e the syste m throug h factory-base d election s while th e famil y association s an d the mutualite representative s wer e furiou s tha t thei r loca l power s migh t b e jeopardized. Withi n a fe w month s o f Liberatio n socia l insuranc e wa s th e focus o f bitter political debate. Despite th e confuse d signal s from th e Motti n committee , th e provisiona l government presse d o n with it s plans for a fully centralize d system . Contrar y to th e notio n o f the Frenc h governmen t a s an omnipoten t cente r o f power , de Gaulle' s Ministe r o f Labor , Parodi , decide d t o compromise, dilutin g th e caisse unique principl e b y agreein g o n a singl e collectio n agenc y whil e restoring regiona l fund s fo r medica l an d acciden t insuranc e an d keepin g locally administere d socia l assistanc e (aide sociale). There followe d th e par liamentary committe e repor t by Buisson, a prewar social insurance official o f the then non-Communis t CGT . Th e rapporteur of the Consultative Assem bly socia l affair s committee , Croizat , wa s a Communis t deput y wh o late r became Ministe r o f Labor an d oversa w the final passage of the la w elevatin g the ordonnance t o regula r legislation . A moderat e Communis t a t a tim e when th e Part i Communist e Frangai s (PCF ) an d Stali n stil l hope d tha t tripartisme might conver t Franc e t o communism, Croiza t wa s the autho r o f the frequently misquote d tribut e t o French socia l insurance . "W e conceive d social legislatio n a s a vas t palac e tha t coul d contai n everyone . Yo u kno w what happened t o our palace: a number o f small and separate pavilions were substituted, som e b y conversion , other s withou t roofs , som e furnished , an d 38 DOUGLA

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others not . W e liv e i n thes e modes t lodgings . Afterward s w e trie d t o instal l every comfort " (Rappor t Buisso n 1945 , 727 ; m y translation) . Th e Rappor t Buisson endorse d mos t of Parodi's proposals: the ne w pension pla n wa s to be paid from annua l revenue s (repartition); collection was to be made by payroll taxes collecte d b y firms; an d th e disput e ove r th e autonom y o f th e famil y allocation fun d wa s postponed . Onl y afte r th e join t plea s o f Parod i an d Croizat, a strang e combinatio n o f mortall y oppose d guardian s o f nationa l virtue, di d th e leade r o f the Catholi c Left , Tessier , withdra w hi s complain t that the centralized procedur e still evoked "th e principles of Vichy." Early in 194 6 the Socialis t leader, Segelle , trie d to patch u p the scars that the socia l insuranc e debat e ha d lef t o n th e tripartit e governmen t (Rappor t Segelle 1946) . Hi s proposal wa s not to delay implementatio n entirely , a s the Catholic Lef t wanted , bu t t o stagge r implementatio n s o tha t sicknes s an d health insuranc e woul d begi n i n 1946 ; accident insuranc e i n lat e 1946 ; the reorganization o f the various funds i n 1947 ; and th e integration o f the famil y funds indefinitel y postponed . Anticipatin g tha t th e centralize d socia l insur ance syste m woul d b e defeated , h e promise d tha t th e governmen t woul d protect the preexisting insurance funds (regimes speciaux) fo r miners, railroa d workers, th e merchan t marine , an d th e civi l servic e (al l o f which ha d larg e Communist unions ) whil e th e alarme d cadre could kee p their occupationa l pensions (regimes complementaires). Whe n d e Gaull e resigne d i n Januar y 1946 part y competitio n ove r socia l insuranc e wa s vigorousl y revived . Th e electoral turnin g poin t wa s the secon d electio n o f the Constituen t Assembl y of Jun e 194 6 whe n Socialis t strengt h wa s deepl y erode d an d th e Catholi c Left, th e MRP, was substantially enhance d agains t a still strong PCF. Essen tially, th e ideall y nationalize d syste m o f socia l insuranc e die d wit h tripartisme. Croizat remaine d a t the Ministry of Labor but in the new governmen t all the choice ministries were taken by the MRP. From 194 6 each ste p toward enlargin g socia l insuranc e provide d anothe r opportunity t o restructur e Laroque' s pla n t o mee t Frenc h politica l necessi ties. Th e MR P socia l polic y spokesman , Prigent , too k hi s reveng e o n thos e who trie d t o merg e famil y polic y wit h nationa l socia l insuranc e whe n a law was unanimousl y passe d i n mid-194 6 enlargin g birt h benefit s an d redistri buting famil y allocation s t o rewar d parent s wit h large r familie s (Thebau d 1985; Ceccaldi 1962) . The MR P announced plan s to add all the nonsalaries to the socia l insuranc e rolls , t o restor e the ful l autonom y o f the famil y fun d (CNAF), an d t o enlarg e famil y fun d representatio n o n al l th e managemen t committees. A s so often happen s i n Frenc h polic y reforms, Croiza t had littl e ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 3

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alternative bu t to promise th e Constituent Assembl y that all the droits acquis would b e honore d unde r th e ne w system o f social insurance . Th e fata l blo w came i n earl y 194 7 when a parliamentary committe e unde r Surlea u investi gated bette r pension s t o the nonsalaries. The Rappor t Surlea u (Galan t 1955 , 113-15) recommende d tha t eac h self-employe d occupationa l group , th e artisans, th e professions , an d agriculture , hav e it s ow n collectio n agency . Driving home thei r politica l advantage , famil y benefit s wer e extended t o th e entire population , makin g i t a n irreversibl e concession . B y the en d o f 194 6 accident compensatio n insuranc e ha d bee n mor e effectivel y decentralize d and th e libera l profession s acquire d healt h an d sicknes s insurance . Frenc h pensions wer e irreversibl y diversifie d i n lat e 194 6 whe n th e number s o f retired i n the two branches, stat e pensions (regime generate) an d occupationa l pensions (regime complementaire) , becam e roughl y th e same. 9 A balance o f political force s ha d bee n achieve d withi n th e socia l insuranc e system . De pending o n one' s partisa n preferences , a familia r mode l o f policymaking i n France ha d bee n repeate d b y reproducin g withi n socia l insuranc e th e sam e political tensions , compromises , an d diversit y that characterized Frenc h pol itics. The sequel to the political fragmentation o f social insurance was to restore the interna l autonom y o f th e regimes complementaires, a tas k lef t t o th e "social partners " o f government . I n 194 7 th e employers , le d b y th e CNP F and th e mai n unio n o f th e cadre , th e CGC , signe d a convention collective converting occupationa l pension s to pay-as-you-go. Contribution s wer e onl y on the amount o f wages above the ceiling for state pension contribution s bu t cadre could voluntaril y agre e t o have large r portion s o f their salar y taxe d fo r occupational pensions . Startin g in 194 6 from tw o hundred thousan d persons, mostly highl y skille d whit e collar employees, b y 196 4 occupational pension s had grow n t o includ e 7 millio n person s wh o pai d supplementar y pension s for abou t 5 million retire d employees . I n muc h th e sam e wa y tha t th e stat e social insuranc e fund s develope d way s to transfer surpluse s t o accommodat e demographic and economi c shortages in particular state insurance benefits, a new organization , AGIRC , wa s establishe d t o mov e surpluse s amon g th e then fifty-eight different occupationa l fund s designe d t o fit the Frenc h occu pational structure . Becaus e unde r Frenc h la w thes e fund s wer e etablissements publiques, the y coul d retai n thei r surpluse s an d accumulat e larg e reserves that, a s we shall see , becam e crucia l t o the Socialis t pension refor m of 1983. Although incrementalis t explanation s o f th e growt h o f socia l spendin g 40 DOUGLA

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have tended t o lose favor i n recen t years, i t should b e clear that the interfun d and interoccupationa l complexitie s o f Frenc h socia l insuranc e ar e ideall y suited t o generat e uncontrollabl e growth . Havin g establishe d th e minimu m pension (AVTS ) for worker s who di d no t qualif y fo r pensions , i t was only a short step in 195 2 to extend it to the self-employed unde r the same handicap. Because worker s wer e entitle d t o sicknes s an d healt h benefit s unde r th e AVTS, i t wa s onl y logica l t o ad d thes e benefit s t o th e self-employe d wh o were unqualifie d fo r stat e pension s an d receive d th e AVTS . Thes e charge s against th e regime generale were passed o n t o the entir e workin g population , both salaries and nonsalaries, who contribute d t o al l thes e fund s u p t o th e ceiling on social insurance contributions . But unlik e the Britis h an d America n socia l insurance , whic h perpetuate d the stigma of poverty, the French mad e an additional provision for those who could no t participat e i n nationa l socia l insurance , i n par t because th e grow ing charges on the regime generate troubled thos e who wanted t o accumulat e supplementary o r occupational pensions . Thi s i s why the lo i Pleve n o f 195 6 created a national solidarit y fund (FNS ) to be paid from th e state revenues in order t o provid e additiona l means-teste d allocations supplementaires to lowincome noncontributors. 10 Becaus e a wide variety o f disadvantaged mothers , children, handicapped , an d disable d wer e alread y receivin g additiona l in come suppor t fro m th e famil y fun d (CNAF) , th e additio n o f means-teste d supplements fo r low-incom e worker s di d no t creat e a feelin g o f povert y or , much t o the disappointment o f some neo-Marxists, inflam e clas s politics. I n effect, hel p fo r thos e outsid e th e syste m wa s propelle d b y th e syste m itsel f rather tha n isolate d fro m th e socia l insuranc e a s i n Britai n an d th e Unite d States.11 I n a politica l sens e Franc e ha s a les s sever e povert y proble m tha n other democracie s becaus e socia l insuranc e interlock s with minimu m retire ment benefits . Becaus e the socia l assistanc e fund s com e fro m thre e differen t sources they can mor e easily respond to changing dimensions of poverty. PERFECTING TH E SYSTE M

In th e area s of foreign policy , an d t o a lesser extent economic an d industria l policy, th e transition fro m th e Fourt h t o the Fift h Republi c marke d substan tially polic y changes . I n retrospect , i t no w seem s clea r tha t muc h o f th e controversy thes e decision s generate d eventuall y focuse d o n importan t reor ganizations o f Frenc h socia l insuranc e ove r th e 1960 s eve n thoug h severa l French socia l securit y expert s (Rappor t Boutbie n 1974) , includin g Laroqu e ADVANTAGES OF COMPLEXITY 4 1

himself (Interview , Ma y 1987) , fee l tha t th e reform s o f 196 1 and 196 7 were not as fundamental a s de Gaulle's political adversaries on both th e Righ t and the Left chose to label them. O n returnin g to power de Gaulle commissione d two major economi c studies, on e of French finances by his trusted economi c advisor, Ruef f (1972) , wh o soundl y castigate d socia l insuranc e fo r it s waste and inefficiency , an d on e o f the future o f social insuranc e b y Laroque, wh o basically recommende d th e full fiscalisation or transfer o f social insuranc e t o the state budget. A n indication o f how successfully socia l insurance had been institutionalized unde r th e Fourt h Republi c wa s tha t th e extreme advic e o f both expert s was largely ignored . In assessin g th e progres s o f Frenc h socia l insuranc e ove r th e 1960 s i t i s important t o recal l tha t whe n th e Fift h Republi c wa s launche d ver y fe w democracies ha d highl y develope d welfar e states . German y wa s th e larges t social spende r bu t wa s stil l spendin g les s tha n a fifth o f GN P fo r socia l programs while Britain lagge d well behind. Sweden , ofte n appeale d t o as the model welfar e state , ha d no t begu n th e spur t o f social spendin g growt h tha t later dre w attentio n an d i n 196 0 spen t les s tha n Britai n o r Germany . Th e Benelux countries , whos e welfar e state s explode d ove r th e 1960 s an d 1970 s to over hal f thei r GNP , stil l lagge d behind th e large r democracies . I n aggregate terms , th e growt h o f socia l spendin g i n th e earl y Fift h Republi c wa s comparable t o change s takin g plac e throughou t Europe . I n fact , fro m 196 0 to 1965 , years often regarde d a s the height of social neglect in France , socia l spending increase d a t the rat e o f 1 5 percent pe r year an d continue d t o grow at almost 1 0 percent per year for the rest of the decade (Barjot 1971) . I n 195 8 pensions were increased roughl y 1 5 percent a t a cost of 1 4 billion francs , th e largest increas e sinc e th e war . Bu t th e interna l change s i n th e syste m ar e more indicativ e o f ho w socia l polic y wa s changin g th e basi c structur e o f French politics . Throughout th e stead y growth o f social insuranc e ove r the 1960s , Frenc h social institution s underwen t dramati c reorganization . I n par t because o f the bitter attack s o n th e Gaullist s fro m th e Lef t an d i n par t because o f scholarl y disinterest i n socia l polic y a t th e time, 12 th e institutionalizatio n o f Frenc h social welfare ha s been neglected . Th e first wave of reorganization consiste d of th e decree s o f 1960 , whic h mos t Frenc h socia l securit y expert s regar d a s more importan t tha n th e controversia l reform s o f 196 7 (Laroque Interview , January 1987) . The pligh t of the Gaullists, an d othe r governments wh o have wished t o restructure socia l insuranc e sinc e 1960 , i s suggested b y the furiou s rejection o f their 196 0 proposals by both the UIMM, th e major privat e sector 42 DOUGLA

S E . ASHFOR D

agency reportin g o n socia l insuranc e fo r businesses , an d th e unions . Bot h thought th e menac e o f etatisation completel y intolerable . Despit e thes e fears, th e overal l effec t o f the 196 0 reforms wa s to increas e th e politica l an d administrative statu s o f social institution s withi n th e government . Th e posi tion o f the Ministr y o f Labor a s a spokesman fo r socia l polic y was enhance d by givin g i t supervisor y power s ove r th e socia l budget . Th e prestig e o f th e neglected administratio n o f social services and socia l programs was enhanced by creating a n inspectio n corps , th e Inspectio n general e de s affaires sociale s (IGAS) t o attrac t high-qualit y youn g civi l servant s t o th e socia l sector . Th e organization o f socia l securit y civi l servant s wa s clarifie d b y creatin g a ne w management agenc y wit h th e sam e participator y contro l give n t o th e majo r social funds. 13 Fo r th e first time i n th e histor y o f sickness an d healt h insur ance the government persuaded doctors to sign a convention collective regarding thei r fee s an d duties . Thoug h outsid e th e organizatio n o f socia l insur ance, bu t nonetheles s overlappin g i n importan t ways , th e first nationa l unemployment agenc y (UNEDIC ) wa s create d b y voluntar y agreemen t be tween th e CNP F an d th e unions . I n 1966 , 4. 5 millio n person s wer e adde d to th e sicknes s an d healt h beneficiaries , makin g healt h insuranc e nearl y universal for the salaries. Although man y measures to modernize Franc e were resented b y the Right and despise d b y th e Left , economi c growt h mad e th e expansio n o f benefit s possible. Rathe r lik e th e Britis h Labou r governmen t o f th e sam e time , th e Gaullist government only became aware of the financial implication s of their rapidly expandin g welfar e stat e i n th e mid-1960s. 14 I n 196 6 de Gaull e an d Pompidou appointe d J.-M . Jeannene y ministe r o f th e strengthene d an d unified Ministr y o f Socia l Affair s t o tr y t o brin g th e syste m unde r contro l (Ferry 1972 ; Guillaume 1971) . The popula r outrag e that greeted hi s proposals suggests that socia l insuranc e i n France , a s elsewhere b y the 1960s , ha d acquired a politica l constituenc y o f it s own. Fe w too k tim e t o not e tha t th e Friedel inquir y (1966 ) clearl y reveale d tha t th e enormou s administrativ e structure managin g socia l insuranc e wa s virtuall y autonomous , nearl y im mune t o politica l guidelines , an d barel y accountabl e t o democrati c govern ment. I n hi s highl y technocrati c manner , Jeannene y understoo d th e under lying issue but totally failed t o realize its political significance . Primarily, hi s aim wa s t o follo w th e dictate s o f soun d microeconomic s b y separatin g ou t the variou s "risks " within differen t socia l insuranc e funds : CNA V fo r retire ment insurance , CNAMT S fo r sicknes s an d healt h insurance , an d CNA F for family benefits . ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 4

3

The vai n hope of the CNPF 15 t o restore the giant social security system to "insurance principles " becam e a travest y an d onl y serve d t o depriv e th e Gaullists o f th e credi t the y migh t hav e ha d fo r expandin g socia l insuranc e over th e 1960 s whil e makin g the m vulnerabl e t o th e charge s o f caterin g t o business. Bu t th e mos t offensiv e chang e wa s t o alte r representatio n o n th e management committee s o f the thre e mai n funds . Sinc e 194 6 labor (mean ing in fact only the four majo r labo r unions) had been given two-thirds of the seats an d th e employer s (meanin g th e CNPF ) ha d one-third . Jeannene y introduced parity , whic h mean t t o Frenc h socia l insuranc e contributor s an d unions tha t the y wer e bein g deprive d o f supervision ove r thei r ow n savings , however questionable i t may be whether socia l insurance i n 1966 , much les s 1986, was covered b y contributions. Indeed , th e roug h estimat e today i s that the Frenc h stat e budget provides roughly 40 percent o f retirement benefits. 16 With a view toward makin g th e unwield y an d almos t completel y subsidize d social benefit s fo r th e agraria n secto r visible , i f no t politicall y manageable , the Ministr y o f Agricultur e wa s directed t o construc t a singl e socia l budge t (BAPSA). Fo r a governmen t tha t actuall y mad e substantia l progres s i n im proving and expandin g socia l benefits, 17 Jeannene y wa s an enormou s politi cal handicap , a s h e agai n prove d t o b e i n 196 9 whe n h e wa s i n th e mai n presidential adviso r advocating the referendum tha t destroyed de Gaulle. Much les s attentio n i s paid t o othe r substantia l an d expensiv e modifica tions mad e b y the 196 7 reforms. Unemploymen t insuranc e wa s extended t o nearly th e entir e population . A specia l benefi t (indemnite de licencement) was create d fo r worker s losin g thei r job s fo r economi c reason s (industria l conversion an d adaptation) . A new national trainin g agency (ANPE) , largel y supported b y unemploymen t insuranc e contribution s fro m employer s an d employees, wa s established . Sensin g th e importanc e o f technica l educatio n in sustainin g Germa n competitivenes s an d labo r harmony , vocationa l train ing fund s wer e tripled . Lastly , th e first o f man y contractua l arrangement s provided ta x breaks for employer s encouragin g on-the-jo b trainin g program s for obsolet e workers , th e allocation de conversion. While clearl y no t o f th e proportions o f the mor e elaborat e labo r marke t policie s tha t interloc k wage s and socia l benefits i n Scandinavi a an d Germany , th e Gaullists mad e impor tant step s toward reshapin g industria l relation s an d socia l polic y alon g socia l democratic lines. 18 A second wav e o f majo r Gaullis t reform s cam e i n th e earl y 1970s , wit h finishing touche s adde d b y Giscar d d'Estaing i n th e lat e 1970s . I n Franc e

44 DOUGLA

S E . ASHFOR D

and elsewhere , alar m ove r inflationary damag e to social insuranc e and socia l services ha s almos t obscure d importan t politica l change s o f thi s period . B y 1970 th e administratio n an d regulatio n o f socia l insuranc e ha d achieve d political recognitio n equa l t o an y othe r majo r governmen t task . Abl e an d ambitious minister s establishe d thei r reputation s i n socia l ministries , amon g them Rober t Bouli n i n th e earl y 1970 s and Simon e Vei l i n th e lat e 1970s . Though viewe d wit h som e skepticis m b y Presiden t Pompidou , th e nouvelle societe of Chaban-Delma s elevate d socia l issue s t o th e to p o f th e politica l agenda an d suc h brigh t youn g civi l servant s a s Jacque s Delor s mad e thei r names designing program s intende d t o integrate social , wage , an d industria l policies i n way s distinctiv e o f a socia l democrati c state . Indicativ e o f th e changing attitudes, b y the late 1960 s the troisieme age had becom e a Frenc h political slogan . In the area of social insurance, th e most important change was the Boulin law o f 1971. 19 I t followe d a detaile d inquir y int o agin g b y th e Secretar y o f State fo r Socia l Action , a specia l repor t o n agin g b y th e socia l securit y inspectors (IGAS), and the massiv e four-party stud y of social problems i n th e Sixth Plan . Boulin' s subgroup , th e Intergroup e pou r Tetud e de s prestation s relatifs au x personnes agees, reporte d i n 197 1 and hi s law is among the mos t sweeping reorganization s o f retiremen t insuranc e amon g th e man y takin g place i n Europ e a t abou t th e sam e time . Fo r th e first time th e question o f retirement a t sixty years of age was broached, althoug h a t reduced rates . Th e base fo r calculatin g pension s wa s enhance d b y averagin g th e las t te n years . Essentially, Bouli n lai d th e groundwor k fo r th e integratio n o f stat e an d supplementary pensio n plans . Th e minimu m pensio n wa s to reach one-hal f of lifetime averag e earnings. Th e effec t wa s to make the ide a o f a minimu m income rathe r tha n a minimum pensio n th e basis for retirement . A n impor tant sid e effec t wa s t o avoi d institutionalizin g povert y withi n th e insuranc e system, a s di d th e British . B y puttin g benefit s fo r low-incom e retire d o n a more flexible foundation , socia l suppor t fo r elderl y nonsalaries was stimu lated. I n 197 5 the notio n o f a minimum de retraite garanti becam e la w and the governmen t compensate d th e socia l insuranc e fund s fo r retiremen t credit s lost fo r reason s o f maternity, militar y service , an d unemployment . Withou t resorting t o elaborat e means-testing , th e governmen t graduall y introduce d variable income s fo r vulnerabl e an d unfortunat e age d an d unemployed , thereby addin g a n entirel y ne w dimensio n o f equity t o socia l insuranc e an d avoiding the menace of unavoidable poverty .

ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 4

5

THE SOCIALIST S DISCOVE R TH E WELFAR E STAT E

When th e Socialist s cam e t o powe r i n 198 1 th e basi c structura l reform s making the French welfar e state indistinguishable from th e French stat e itself had bee n accomplished . Al l three majo r fund s operate d o n commo n princi ples o f contribution , th e compensatio n amon g th e thre e fund s a s wel l a s between salaries and nonsalaries had bee n worke d out , a variet y o f socia l assistance benefit s fo r single-paren t families , children , an d chil d car e ha d been merge d int o a singl e famil y suppor t benefi t (complement familial) t o support poo r families (no t includin g th e additiona l loca l socia l assistance, o r aide sociale)y an d virtually the entire French population wa s covered by social insurance. I t i s perhap s fo r thi s reaso n tha t th e Socialis t tria l bil l o f 198 0 (Journal Officiel 1980) , clearl y par t o f th e run-u p t o th e 198 1 elections , contains fe w majo r reforms . Indeed , th e readines s o f the Lef t t o accep t th e institutionalized welfar e stat e as complete i s all the more remarkable becaus e outside France , i n Britai n an d th e Unite d States , uncritica l acceptanc e became th e springboar d fo r th e arch-conservativ e attac k o n th e welfar e stat e over the 1980s. 20 Although Nicol e Questiaux, Mitterrand' s choic e for Secretar y o f State for Social Affair s an d Nationa l Solidarit y (th e latte r a Socialis t appendage) , wa s an ambitiou s an d activ e minister , sh e ha d fe w idea s abou t basi c structura l reform o f French socia l security. Th e mai n briefin g documen t (Blum-Girar deau 1981 ) prepared for her arrival at the place de Fontenoy i s sadly reminiscent o f a doctora l thesis . Ther e wer e o f course , a s i n mos t democrati c governments, importan t interna l politica l tension s limitin g he r possibilities . As a rathe r disappointe d Ministe r o f Agriculture , Rocard , wit h hi s ey e o n 1988, coul d no t b e expecte d t o mak e majo r concession s i n th e 6 0 billio n franc socia l budget for the agricultural sector . Wit h growin g unemployment , social insuranc e fund s coul d no t expec t concession s fro m th e Ministr y o f Labor o r unemploymen t insuranc e funds . Indeed , t o find additiona l fund s the part y reverse d it s preelection stan d an d adde d a ne w Fond s d e solidarit y pour Templo i t o b e financed wit h additiona l contribution s fro m secur e public secto r employees . Man y propose d reform s wer e blocke d b y the Min ister of Finance , Delors , wh o refuse d t o allow socia l expenditur e t o becom e the driving force o f inflation. 21 But before Beregovoy' s elevation t o finance i n 1982 , Questiaux' s ministr y had increase d socia l benefit s b y roughl y 4 0 billio n francs . Mor e innovativ e reforms an d mor e divers e socia l experiment s wer e foreclose d b y the natura l 46 DOUGLA

S E . ASHFOR D

TABLE 2. 1

Distribution o f Socia l Securit y Taxe s b y Type of Protection i n 198 4 (in percentages ) Total Taxes Regime

Pensions 4 Health 3 Family 1 Unemployment 1

12 45 42 1—

General 7 0 2

Source: L'Annee metallurgique 1985 , 125 .

tendency t o do th e mos t simpl e an d mos t visibl e increase s first. Questiaux' s future wa s no doubt sealed when she commented tha t she was not responsible for keeping the accounts. He r 1 percent reductio n i n social insuranc e contri butions o f Februar y 198 1 ha d t o b e rescinde d i n Novembe r 1981 . Perhap s the mos t importan t promis e mad e b y th e Socialist s wa s retiremen t a t sixt y years o f age , a promis e deepl y roote d i n Socialis t concer n fo r humanizin g labor and redistributin g income to the aged through pensio n reform . Further refor m wa s complicated a s well a s enhanced b y the intricacie s of French socia l insuranc e organization . B y 198 0 th e mai n fun d (regime general) accounted fo r only 2 7 percent o f pension contribution s an d wa s heavily committed t o providing huge transfers fo r the ever-rising costs of sickness and health insuranc e (see table 2.1). Nearl y half of all pension contribution s were for supplementar y pension s (regimes complementaires) and a fifth wer e fo r the privileged pensio n plan s for public employees (regimes speciaux). Lowering the pensio n ag e was obviously a problem o f persuading th e mor e viabl e funds t o contribut e t o th e cos t o f pension s fo r thos e wholl y dependen t o n state pensions , muc h lik e simila r pensio n reform s i n Britain , Sweden , an d West Germany. Bu t the politics were completely different. A second possibility was to raise the ceiling, o r plafond, s o that the cost of earlier pensions was directly shifte d t o highe r incom e persons . Th e mai n proble m wit h thi s solution wa s that i t would impos e a n enormou s disincentiv e o n employers , still payin g roughl y two-third s o f al l socia l insuranc e contribution s i n 198 4 (see tabl e 2.2 ) and , i n 1982 , bitterl y complainin g abou t th e cos t o f unem ployment insurance . Employe r cooperation wa s essential t o propel France' s economic recover y fro m th e oi l crisis . Wit h soarin g medica l cost s and hig h unemployment th e conventional rout e of interfund transfer s wa s closed. The only remaining choice, therefore , wa s to persuade the supplementar y ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 4

7

TABLE 2. 2

Division o f Socia l Securit y Taxe s amon g Contributor s (i n billion s o f franc s and percentages )

Employers Salaries Nonsalaries Total

1970

%

J975

%

1980

%

1984

%

73.3 18.7 7.5 99.5

73 19 8

160.7 45.2 13.2 219.1

73 21 6

399.7 128.9 32.9 501.7

68 26 7

546.8 223.1 61.6 831.5

66 27 7

Source: Minister e de la Financ e 1984 .

pension fund s (regimes complementaires) , unde r th e semiautonomou s man agement describe d above , t o shar e thei r reserve s i n orde r t o finance th e transition t o earl y retiremen t (Mecerea u 1987 ; Chadelat 1983 , 121-27) . B y the earl y 1980 s the y ha d becom e a n integra l componen t o f Frenc h socia l insurance, payin g ou t nearl y 8 billio n franc s i n pensio n benefit s i n 1984 , collecting contribution s fro m 2 0 millio n employee s i n mor e tha n 4 millio n firms (see tables 2. 3 an d 2.4) . Moreover , earl y retiremen t hel d attraction s t o the cadre and skille d employee s enrolle d i n supplementar y plans . No r wa s the issue entirely unknown. Civi l servants and militar y had long been able to retire a t sixt y year s whil e railroa d workers , miners , an d member s o f othe r hazardous profession s coul d retir e at fifty-five years and eve n earlie r i n som e cases. Th e estimat e wa s tha t o f the roughl y tw o hundre d thousan d person s retiring eac h yea r abou t eighty-fiv e thousan d woul d tak e th e sixty-yea r op tion. The anticipated cost of extending the pension system, essentially finding the money to pay contributions into the existing pensions of each early retiree TABLE 2. 3

Membership b y Adherents an d Firm s o f the Regimes Complementaires

Adherents (in millions) AGIRC ARRCO UNIRS Firms (in thousands) AGIRC ARRCO UNIRS

1966

1976

1981

1985

.9 7.4 4.8

1.9 15.1 5.7

2.4 14.0 5.8

2.8 15.7 6.5

195 1,600 370

336 1,946 456

556 3,000 577

391 3,200 680

Source: L'Annee metallurgique as indicated from th e respective annual publications .

48 DOUGLA

S E . ASHFOR

D

TABLE 2. 4

Division o f Contributions amon g Socia l Securit y Program s (i n percentages ) l

Regime general Regimes sta tu taires2 Regimes speciaux^ Regimes complementaires* Assurance chomage 5

197 S

1980

J98J

1982

1983

1984

66 A 7.5 8.5 — 17.7

66.6 6.6 9.0 12.5 5.3

65.9 6.9 9.0 12.9 5.3

66.5 6.7 8.9 12.4 5.5

65.3 6.5 8.9 12.3 7.0

65.1 6.3 8.8 11.9 7.9

Source: Minister e de la Solidarity National e 1984 . 1. Th e regime general received 54 5 of 831 billion franc s i n contributions i n 1984 , which i s distributed amon g the fou r caisses for pension s (CNAV) , healt h (CNAMTS) , famil y protectio n (CNAF) , an d acciden t compensation. 2. Th e regimes statutaires are funds organize d befor e th e nationalizatio n o f social insuranc e i n 1946 : SNCF, RATP, Banqu e de France, loca l government workers , EDF , an d GDF . 3. Th e regimes speciaux are privat e secto r worker s wh o organize d pensio n fund s befor e 194 6 and refuse d t o join th e regime generate: miners , merchan t marines , artisans , merchants , professions , etc . 4. Regimes complementaires are additional earnings-relate d pensio n fund s organize d afte r 194 6 for high-leve l cadre (AGIRC) , mid-leve l cadre (ARRCO), an d whit e collar worker s (UNIRS) , plu s a fe w smal l fund s o f technical experts . 5. Unemploymen t contribution s ar e hel d b y UNEDIC , organize d i n 195 8 to distribute fund s fo r unemploy ment and relate d labo r market programs, largel y through ASSEDIC .

for five years , bot h publi c an d private , wa s anticipate d t o b e 5. 3 billio n francs. Earl y retirement was not such a gigantic task as political and industria l rhetoric made i t sound. B y skillful manipulatio n o f the interdependent socia l insurance fund s i t was not to o difficult t o find an acceptabl e solution . Onc e policymakers agree d t o overlook ideologica l position s an d partisa n self-inter est, the complexity o f the system helped provid e a solution. Among employers the most detested benefit wa s the garantie de ressources, a cornerstone o f the unemployment insuranc e syste m erected i n the prosper ous day s o f th e earl y 1970s . A t sixt y year s o f ag e th e unemploye d wer e guaranteed 7 0 percen t o f thei r salaries . Wit h additiona l socia l benefit s thi s meant tha t som e salaries coul d retir e a t mor e tha n thei r salaries . Thi s generous agreemen t ha d n o forma l lega l foundatio n bu t wa s a voluntar y agreement betwee n employer s an d employee s tha t wa s rathe r unwisel y re newed i n 197 4 to attract labo r suppor t fo r th e Right . A more ras h extensio n was added i n 197 7 to when Giscar d agree d t o provide any worke r retirin g a t sixty with th e garantie de ressources t o tide him o r her ove r unti l th e regula r pension becam e availabl e a t sixty-fiv e year s (Chadela t 1983 , 335) . B y 198 1 the burde n o f th e garantie de ressources, two-third s o f whic h fel l o n th e employers, wa s 14. 5 billio n francs . Essentiall y earl y retiremen t wa s mad e ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 4

9

possible b y a compromis e betwee n tw o funds : unemploymen t insurance , which remaine d outsid e th e lega l orbi t o f socia l insurance , an d th e stat e pension system . Th e achievemen t i s the produc t o f interfun d solidarit y tha t had attracte d a Labou r part y socia l insuranc e exper t t o th e Frenc h syste m twenty year s before . Latera l transfer s withi n th e syste m helpe d rescu e socia l groups i n jeopardy . Th e regimes complementaires agree d t o borro w fund s against thei r substantia l reserve s ove r te n year s i n orde r t o permi t th e stat e system to absorb the costs of early retirement and t o reach a decade when th e burden o f retirement i s expected t o decrease. Paradoxicall y perhaps , unde r a Socialist governmen t th e patrons agree d t o a smal l increas e i n unemploy ment taxe s i n orde r t o finance th e change . Bot h governmen t an d patrons benefitted b y being relieved of the less predictable and countercyclical burde n of the garantie de ressources. In som e respect s th e earl y retiremen t agreemen t mark s th e frontie r o f social democrac y i n France , no t becaus e ther e i s an y highl y develope d welfare stat e mode l a s i n Sweden , bu t becaus e Frenc h socia l politic s permi t the movement o f funds betwee n th e public and private sectors. 22 The accor d of Februar y 198 3 i s no t eve n withi n th e real m o f publi c la w bu t i s privat e law. Startin g i n 198 4 th e supplementar y pensio n plans borrowe d 4 billio n francs thoug h norma l bankin g procedures . Les t anyon e thin k tha t thi s out come i s les s tha n mutuall y beneficial , interview s wit h th e Directo r o f th e UIMM socia l insuranc e researc h office , th e Directo r o f th e Socia l Securit y in the Ministry of Social Affairs, an d Mitterrand' s social security advisor were unanimous i n thei r approva l o f th e pla n (Moreau , 1987) . Th e successfu l outcome contribute d t o Beregovoy' s reputatio n a s Ministe r o f Socia l Affair s and opene d th e wa y fo r hi s promotio n t o Ministe r o f Finance . Hi s tw o equilibrium plan s for social insurance of 198 2 and 198 3 curbed socia l spending b y abou t 4 0 billio n francs , hardl y a n awesom e amoun t whe n Franc e was spending over 600 billion franc s o n social insuranc e o f all kinds. I n fact , the comin g o f age of French socia l insurance , a s in othe r democracies , wa s the realizatio n tha t socia l insuranc e i s integral t o th e stat e an d t o th e econ omy. T o b e sure, i t was becoming a matter fo r experts . I n 198 4 a . 5 percent error i n forecastin g socia l spendin g produced a deficit o f 6 billion francs ; th e loss of contributions from . 5 percent of the active population represent s a 1. 5 billion fran c los s of revenues. Perhaps mor e clearl y tha n an y othe r socia l insuranc e system , th e Frenc h experience ove r th e 1980 s reveal s ho w full y institutionalize d welfar e pro grams and policie s hav e become i n th e democracies , s o much s o that socia l 50 DOUGLA

S E . ASHFOR D

and partisa n politic s hav e i n som e ways become indistinguishable . Bu t eac h country make s th e metamorphosi s towar d th e merge r o f socia l an d labo r interests i n it s own distinct pattern . Muc h o f this accomplishment i s unanticipated, an d a t times , a s with th e costl y garantie de ressources, inadvertent . But certain feature s o f a social democrati c mode l wer e always visible withi n the French socia l insurance system. Fro m th e turn o f the century, employer s and employee s wer e importan t partner s i n developin g socia l benefit s an d social protection an d agreed that they should have a significant representatio n in th e managemen t o f the system . Whil e solidarity was always vulnerable t o partisan rhetoric , th e layere d fund s mean t tha t eve n th e so-calle d privat e o r occupational pension s ar e linke d t o government an d ye t able to enjoy man y advantages o f being organize d unde r privat e law . Th e Frenc h neve r permit ted th e socia l insuranc e syste m to off-load it s problems ont o social assistanc e and loca l charit y t o th e exten t foun d i n man y othe r countries . Thoug h th e question o f poverty ha s becom e a political issue , mos t recentl y addresse d i n the pla n fo r minimu m income s (revenue minimum d'insertion, o r RMI ) (he Monde 1988) , contrary to the fears of some conservatives and t o the hopes of some radicals , incom e policie s hav e no t polarize d aroun d th e socia l insur ance system . Whateve r th e earl y excesse s o f th e Socialis t government , th e system no w function s a s wel l a s o r bette r tha n mos t majo r socia l insuranc e systems o f Europ e an d Nort h Americ a whil e remainin g imbedde d i n th e republican principle s that first inspired it .

NOTES

1. Nearl y all the inadequacies found in American social security by Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (1988) could be found in France. Though the nature of the centrifugal politica l forces i s different i n the two countries, in both, i n the early years of national social insurance, the main issue was to keep the syste m fro m fragmenting . Th e similarit y cast s som e doub t o n th e Weir Orloff-Skocpol assertio n about America's retarded welfare state. 2. Th e intricacy of policymaking networks in France appears in many policy areas. See, fo r example , Pete r Hal l (1986) . Fo r a n evaluatio n o f additional case s of French policymaking complexity, see Douglas E. Ashford (1982). 3. Muc h a s the boundarie s betwee n th e publi c an d privat e economi c sector s are blurred i n Frenc h policymaking , th e distinctio n betwee n mutualite and socia l insurance i s also unclear . Historically , th e ide a o f earner s voluntaril y sharin g risks under state supervision blur s with nationa l socia l insuranc e partly because the myth of participant management and individual prudence, a s in the United A D V A N T A G E S O F C O M P L E X I TY 5 1

States, wa s preserve d fo r man y years . A t th e beginnin g o f th e Thir d Republi c there wer e twenty-si x hundre d mutua l insuranc e societie s wit h 289,00 0 mem bers. B y 190 2 there were 13,67 7 societies with about 2 million members . 4. AGIR C wa s created b y mutual agreemen t i n 194 7 as part of the reactio n agains t the nationalizatio n o f French socia l insurance . ARCC O was established i n 196 1 to exten d supplementar y pension s t o lower-leve l cadre. The final ste p wa s th e organization o f UNIRS to manage supplementary pension s to virtually all o f the salaries in smal l firms. Par t of the complexity o f French pension s arises from th e fact that French retiree s receive payments from thre e pension fund s o r more. 5. Contrar y t o th e frequen t assertio n tha t unemploymen t protectio n wa s lat e i n France, ther e i s a lon g an d suggestiv e histor y o f labo r protection . See , amon g others, Frangoi s Sellie r (1984) ; o n th e comple x histor y o f labo r la w an d labo r protection, Yve s Delamott e (1984) ; an d o n recen t progress , UNEDI C (1983) . Contrary t o th e commo n questio n abou t wea k Frenc h union s delayin g socia l insurance, a mor e interestin g questio n i s why the y ar e s o influentia l an d politi cally privileged i n social insurance policymaking despite their weakness. 6. Centra l t o th e Socialis t reform s o f socia l insuranc e afte r 198 2 wa s Mitterrand' s promise t o reduc e th e prelevement obligatoire, o r tota l ta x burde n o f socia l expenditure, b y 1 percent pe r year for th e nex t few years. The calculatio n o f the prelevement is itself an interestin g indication o f how the French generaliz e abou t social insurance . I t is the percentage o f GDP paid by individual contribution s o r social taxatio n t o socia l insuranc e fund s plu s th e contributio n fro m nationa l budget. I t rose from 3 9 percent of GDP in 197 6 to nearly 43 percent i n 198 1 and to 45. 6 percen t fro m 198 1 to 1984 . Se e Les Prelevements obligatoires (1986) . A readable histor y o f th e earl y struggl e t o contai n socia l securit y cost s i s Henr i Roson(1974). 7. Th e politica l quarrel s ove r contro l o f th e conseils d'administration ar e poorl y understood. Th e issu e was not, no r could i t conceivably hav e been, tha t partici pants should manag e such intricat e funds bu t that each caisse has a discretionary fund, sometime s runnin g t o million s o f francs , whic h ca n b e use d fo r summe r camps, vacatio n supplements , etc. , fo r person s employe d i n th e system . Sinc e 1953 unio n representatio n o n th e council s has , i n a characteristicall y Frenc h solution, bee n portione d out , wit h th e F O havin g CNAMTS , th e CG C give n the CNAV ; an d th e CFT C wit h it s old libera l Catholi c roots , th e CNAF . Th e best account o f these and othe r interna l politica l problem s i s Antoinette Catrice Lorey (1981) . A recen t stud y assessin g ho w power s ar e distribute d withi n th e various caisses is the annual IGAS. 8. Thoug h hardl y the intensive form o f social democracy familiar t o Scandinavians, the Frenc h hav e many links between socia l and wag e policy, th e most importan t being the SMIC, o r salaire minimum interprofessionel de croissance. Rathe r than make th e wag e gap, i.e. , th e differenc e betwee n th e minimu m wag e and mini mum socia l assistance , int o a n adversaria l politica l issue , a s i t ha s becom e i n Britain, th e Frenc h us e change s i n th e AVT S t o rache t th e SMI C upwar d an d vice versa. Povert y is not a zero-sum gam e in France . 9. Simila r to Britain, th e Unite d States , and Germany, socia l insuranc e was rapidly 52 DOUGLA

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expanded afte r th e wa r to includ e nearl y al l workers . I n earl y 194 6 the Nationa l Assembly did so at a cost of 38 billion ol d francs. Se e Journal Officiel (1946). 10. Despit e the Fourt h Republic's politica l instability , socia l polic y enjoye d remark able ministerial stabilit y and th e 195 6 law was instrumental i n avoiding grindin g poverty i n France . Fe w countrie s hav e sufficientl y flexible socia l institution s t o readily make such combinations of resources. Se e the high praise for this decision by Tony Lyne s (1967). I n contrast, th e only way British politicians could acquir e more fund s fo r th e age d poo r wa s t o increas e means-teste d socia l assistance , which i s paid entirely from Treasur y revenues . 11. Th e simpl e solutio n t o thi s proble m i s of cours e t o nationaliz e al l socia l insur ance, th e cours e favore d b y Weir , Orloff , an d Skocpo l (1988 , 287 , 423) , t o eliminate th e so-called bifurcatio n o f American socia l security . Equatin g territorial and social class divisions is a risky business and to some extent spatial tensions may actually help the worst off. I n some measure, al l systems of social insuranc e have awkwar d spatia l problem s that , a s the Frenc h cas e shows, ar e no t likel y t o become simpler simply by nationalizing social insurance . 12. I t i s interestin g t o not e tha t wha t wa s widel y regarde d a s a n authoritativ e intro duction t o development s i n Franc e a t th e beginnin g o f th e Fift h Republic , Hoffman (1963) , ha s n o articl e o n socia l polic y o r socia l insuranc e althoug h i t does include an article on family structure . 13. Thoug h a rather technical point , i t was regarded a s a fundamental chang e i n th e internal politic s o f socia l security . Th e postwa r organizatio n o f socia l securit y workers, FNOSS , o r th e Federatio n nationale s de s organisme s d e l a securit e sociale, wa s spli t int o tw o organizations : ACOSS , o r th e Agenc e central e de s organismes de la securite sociale, to handle personnel policies ; and UCANSS , o r the Unio n de s caisses nationales de securite sociale, t o be a collection agenc y fo r contributions t o th e regime general (family an d unemploymen t fund s hav e thei r own). O n th e unionizatio n o f the roughl y tw o hundre d thousan d Frenc h socia l security employees, se e Catrice-Lorey (1981 , 220-30) . 14. Th e Gaullist s actuall y kep t the earlie r MR P Ministe r o f Labor, Bacon , i n plac e until 1962 , when h e was succeeded b y Grandval, generall y thought to be a weak minister an d no t a Gaullist . Th e socia l insuranc e function s wer e merge d i n a single ministry , th e Ministr y o f Social Affairs , i n 1966 , whe n Jeannen y too k the post. 15. Durin g th e expansio n throughou t th e earl y Gaullis t year s the CNP F unsuccess fully lobbie d the government to restrict social spending. Th e formal proposa l was the Rapport Picketty submitted i n 1965 . When th e CNPF Socia l Committee was chaired b y a mor e libera l businessman , Chotard , i n th e lat e 1960 s an d earl y 1970, the CNPF dropped it s adamant opposition . 16. Thi s include s a charge of 1 0 billion franc s pe r year accepted b y the state in 198 3 to reduce the retirement ag e to sixty; about 2 0 billion i n various state subsidies to agricultural socia l insuranc e an d t o th e nearl y bankrup t regimes speciaux; and allocations throug h th e FN S t o to p of f lo w pension s an d t o pa y pensio n contri butions during pregnancy, militar y service and unemployment , etc . 17. Betwee n 196 2 an d 196 4 pension s doubled . I n 196 3 a n allocation deducation ADVANTAGES O F COMPLEXIT Y 5

3

speciale was added t o family benefit s fo r handicappe d children ; the allocation de logement gre w t o includ e ove r 2 millio n families ; an d medica l insuranc e wa s expanded t o includ e nearl y al l th e population . I n addition , supplementar y pen sion funds gre w hugely during the economic take-off o f the 1960s . 18. Ther e wa s a n entir e batter y o f socia l insuranc e studie s i n th e mid-1960s . Th e Rapport Ortol i unde r th e umbrell a o f th e Fift h Pla n recommende d a nationa l manpower trainin g progra m undertake n b y th e ANP E i n 1966 . Th e Rappor t Rivero studie d th e problem s o f reachin g agreement s wit h th e doctors . Th e Rapport Dobler , als o part of the Fift h Plan , studie d inequalitie s amon g benefits . In addition , talk s wer e underwa y betwee n th e CNP F an d th e union s t o reduc e the work week to forty-two hours. 19. Bouli n chaired the Sixth Plan Intergroup, Personnes agees (1971). Se e the discussion of his contribution i n Anne-Marie Guillemar d (1980 , 74-76) . 20. Ther e were to be sure important reflection s o n the Left abou t the future o f social security, suc h a s Jacque s Fournie r an d Nicol e Questiau x (1979) ; and , mor e moderate, Miche l Laroqu e (1984) . Characteristically , thes e studie s paid littl e o r no attentio n t o th e politica l an d financial implication s o f socia l insuranc e no r did the y attemp t t o realisticall y asses s political obstacle s an d popula r preference s that migh t qualify thei r suggestions . Though certainl y no t a repeat of lost oppor tunities afte r th e war , whe n th e politica l potentia l o f th e welfar e stat e wa s regularly underestimated , th e Frenc h scen e wa s no t unlik e th e situatio n i n Britain an d th e Unite d State s insofa r a s the Lef t faile d t o take ne w initiative s t o protect gain s agains t conservativ e attacks . Th e differenc e i n Franc e wa s that th e Right chos e no t t o mak e suc h a n attack . A sober post-morte m i s Gilles Johane t (1986); a fascinatin g accoun t o f changin g socia l definition s i s Jacques Donzelo t (1984). 21. Ther e wer e o f course som e aspect s o f Beregovoy's economie s tha t dre w stif f fire from th e Left , suc h a s mino r charge s o f medica l visit s fo r th e elderly , bu t the y were a ver y smal l decreas e an d wer e mainl y designed , lik e simila r restraint s i n Britain an d th e Unite d States , t o keep medical cost s under control . Th e cleares t exposition of the impact of his reforms i s found i n Jean-Frangois Chadelat (1983, 59-63). I t i s surprisin g wha t simpl e mistake s allowe d th e Socialist s t o los e th e initiative in 1981 . For example, the abrupt cancellation o f the 1 percent increas e in socia l securit y taxe s cos t 2 1 billio n francs , roughl y hal f th e socia l securit y deficit at the end of 1981 . Onl y 8 billion of the 40 billion franc defici t was caused by new initiatives. 22. Th e Frenc h hav e never subscribed t o the Swedis h ide a that pension fund s migh t be use d t o socializ e th e privat e secto r nor , asid e fro m thei r pragmati c effort s t o link pension s t o the cos t of living, hav e they see n pension s a s a form o f incom e redistribution. Thi s i s why the notio n o f "sectoral blurring " described b y Marti n Rein an d Le e Rainwate r (1986 , 202-14 ) i s inappropriat e fo r muc h o f Europ e and Nort h Americ a eve n thoug h dependenc e o n socia l insuranc e i n ol d age and many othe r critica l moment s o f lif e ha s substantiall y increase d clien t o r con sumer concer n wit h socia l insuranc e i n al l th e democracies . I t should b e note d that th e deficit s o f 1 0 o r 1 5 billio n franc s i n socia l securit y fund s tha t ar e 54 DOUGLA

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immediately emblazoned i n French headlines are about. 5 percent of total social expenditure.

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3

C O N T I N U I T Y A N D C H A N G E I N F R E N C H SOCIA L POLICY: TH E WELFAR E STAT E U N D E R G A U L L I S M , LIBERALISM , A N D S O C I A L I S M DAVID R . CAMERO N

The Frenc h socia l securit y syste m ha s bee n describe d a s a n "unfinishe d cathedral" (Dumont 1978b) . Lik e one o f the grea t cathedral s i n France , th e system i s a vast monument t o an epoch . I t is, a s Ashford note s (1982 , 228) , replete wit h numerou s chapels , altars , offices , an d a few ol d relics—a s wel l as the ever-presen t scaffoldin g fo r repai r wor k and, o f course, th e numerou s unobtrusive collectio n boxe s fo r contributions . Lik e a cathedral , i t i s somewhat must y an d poorl y illuminated . But , lik e a cathedral , i t offer s refuge , sanctuary, an d relie f fro m th e noise , din , an d traum a o f the worl d outside , and withi n it s walls, unde r it s vaults and arches , gathe r those seeking shelte r from th e tribulation s o f life . A s doe s th e cathedral , i t bring s togethe r me n and wome n o f severa l generations . Ther e ar e larg e number s o f the elderly , especially elderl y women. Bu t there are also many younge r persons , includ ing young parents with thei r children. An d there are the sick and infir m an d disabled o f all ages . Eac h ha s a reason fo r bein g there, althoug h th e reason s differ. If the tas k o f describing th e lon g proces s o f construction o f the cathedra l belongs t o th e ar t historian , th e tas k o f describin g th e long , gradual , an d An earlie r version o f this chapte r wa s presented a t the 198 8 Annual Meetin g o f the America n Political Scienc e Associatio n i n Washington , D.C . Th e autho r i s grateful t o John Amble r and Douglas Ashford for extensive comments and suggestions.

58

piecemeal constructio n o f th e syste m o f socia l securit y an d assistanc e i n France belongs to the student of politics and public policy. A full descriptio n of that system, eve n ove r the finite life o f one republic , woul d fa r excee d th e confines o f a single chapter and for such descriptions we must refer the reader elsewhere (see , amon g many , Ashfor d 1982 ; Ba r jot 1971 ; Double t 1971 ; Dumont 1981b ; Galan t 1955 ; Guillaum e 1971 ; Hatzfel d 1971 ; Laroqu e 1948, 1961 , 1971 , 1980 ; and Rustan t 1980) . I n thi s chapter , I shall pursu e the mor e limite d objectiv e o f outlinin g som e o f th e salien t feature s o f th e French syste m o f socia l securit y whe n viewe d fro m a comparativ e perspec tive. The comparisons will involve both spac e and time. I shall consider how the French system compares with those of other nations. And I shall compare how th e Frenc h syste m itsel f ha s change d ove r th e pas t fou r decades . Fo r these comparisons , I shal l us e measure s o f tota l spendin g effor t fo r socia l security an d socia l assistance . Whil e th e simplicit y an d crudenes s o f suc h measures canno t b e overstated , the y nevertheles s do enabl e on e t o mak e systematic and parsimoniou s comparisons across space and time. The chapte r i s organiz e i n thre e parts . I n th e first section , th e tota l spending effor t fo r socia l program s i n Franc e i s compared wit h tha t i n othe r nations. Thi s compariso n indicate s th e exten t t o whic h th e socia l securit y "cathedral" i n France , althoug h stil l incomplete , loom s abov e man y o f th e smaller "chapels " elsewher e i n Europe—includin g nation s tha t ar e usuall y presumed t o hav e highl y develope d "welfar e states. " I n th e secon d section , the total spending effort fo r social programs in Franc e is compared diachron ically ove r th e perio d 1950-1987 . Agains t a n incrementa l mode l tha t view s policy, an d aggregat e spending , a s highl y dependen t o n pas t polic y an d largely th e resul t o f smal l changes—usuall y additions—t o th e prio r base , this sectio n consider s whethe r regim e an d partisanshi p hav e discernibl e ef fects. I n particular, w e consider whether, how , and to what extent the change from th e Fourt h t o th e Fift h Republi c affecte d th e aggregat e spendin g fo r social programs. An d we consider whether, an d to what extent, th e tenure of the four presidents of the Fifth Republi c affected spendin g for social programs in a distinctive manner . Th e analysi s suggests that both th e change from th e Fourth t o the Fift h Republi c and, withi n th e Fifth Republic , thos e involvin g the occupan t o f th e Elysee palace ha d distinctiv e effect s o n spending . Th e chapter conclude s wit h a consideration o f the comple x relationshi p betwee n social spendin g an d distributiv e outcome s i n Frenc h society . I n particular , we not e on e o f the majo r paradoxe s tha t appear s whe n Franc e i s compare d

C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 5

9

TABLE 3. 1

Total Outlay s o f Government a s a Percen t o f Gross Domesti c Produc t I960

1970

J 980

J 986

Increase, 1960-86

France

34.6

38.5

46.1

51.8

17.2

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden United State s

22.1 32.1 30.3 32.6 28.9 24.8 26.7 32.0 28.0 30.1 17.5 33.7 29.9 17.0 31.1 27.8

26.8 39.2 36.5 38.8 34.8 40.2 30.5 38.6 39.6 34.2 19.4 43.9 41.0 22.2 43.3 31.6

33.8 48.9 50.7 44.9 40.5 56.2 36.6 48.3 50.8 41.9 32.6 57.5 48.3 32.9 61.6 33.7

37.9 52.4 53.5 45.5 46.4 56.0 41.9 46.9 54.7 50.9 33.1 59.4 49.9 41.7 63.6 36.9

15.8 20.3 23.2 12.9 17.5 31.2 15.2 14.9 26.7 20.8 15.6 25.7 20.0 24.7 32.5 9.1

Sources: OECD Economic Outlook 46 (Decembe r 1989) : table R-14 , p . 179 ; OECD Economic Outlook 32 (December 1982) : table R-8, p . 161 .

to othe r nations—th e juxtapositio n o f a n unusuall y hig h leve l o f aggregat e spending fo r socia l securit y an d socia l assistance , o n on e hand , an d a n unusually inegalitaria n siz e distribution o f income, o n the other .

I. FRENC H SOCIA L S P E N D I N G I N COMPARATIV E PERSPECTIV E

Government play s a significan t rol e i n th e economi c lif e o f al l o f th e advanced capitalis t nations . A simple, ye t illustrative , measur e tha t suggest s the importanc e o f tha t rol e i s provide d b y th e rati o o f publi c revenue s o r expenditures t o the economic produc t of a nation. Tabl e 3. 1 present s such a measure fo r seventee n o f th e relativel y develope d capitalis t democracie s o f Western Europe , Nort h America , an d th e Pacific . A s the dat a i n tabl e 3. 1 indicate, th e "publi c economy " i s larg e an d expansiv e throughou t th e ad vanced capitalis t world (se e Cameron 1978) . Three decade s ago, al l levels of government, take n together , spen t a n amoun t equivalen t t o approximatel y one-quarter t o one-thir d o f th e Gros s Domesti c Produc t i n mos t o f th e 60 DAVI

D R . CAMERO

N

seventeen nations . Bu t by the lat e 1980s , tha t proportio n ha d rise n dramati cally and total public expenditures exceeded 40 percent of G.D.P. i n most of the nations . Indeed , i n some , suc h a s Belgium , Denmark , Ireland , th e Netherlands, an d Sweden , aggregat e publi c spendin g ha d rise n t o wel l ove r one-half of G.D.P. Despite decades of conservative rul e unti l th e 1980s , th e fiscal role of the French government was, by the measure used in table 3.1 , among the largest in th e advance d capitalis t world . An d i t ha d hel d tha t ran k throughou t th e post-World Wa r I I era . Thus , i n th e earl y 1960s , whe n i t epitomize d th e activist, interventionis t state (see, among many, Shonfiel d 1965) , the Frenc h government spen t a larger shar e of the nation' s economi c produc t o n publi c programs an d service s tha n di d governmen t i n an y othe r capitalis t democ racy. And while a number of nations—Sweden, Denmark , Norway , Ireland , the Netherlands , Belgium , Spain , Austria , an d Italy—experience d un usually larg e increases i n publi c spendin g relativ e to their economi c produc t in recen t decades , Franc e remaine d amon g the highest-spendin g nations , i n terms of G.D.P. Thus , i n 1986 , fo r example , publi c expenditure s i n Franc e represented approximatel y 5 2 percent of its G.D.P. If th e fiscal rol e o f governmen t ha s bee n larg e an d expansiv e i n Franc e and throughou t th e advanced capitalis t worl d i n th e post-World Wa r I I era, so to o th e amoun t o f fund s spen t o n socia l program s ha s expande d mor e rapidly than th e economy i n most nations. Table 3. 2 presents the proportio n of G.D.P . spen t o n socia l program s i n 1960 , 1970 , an d 198 0 i n th e sam e seventeen nations . Th e dat a i n tabl e 3.2 , reporte d b y th e Internationa l Labour Organizatio n i n it s most recen t internationa l inquir y (I.L.O . 1985) , include benefit s fo r medica l care , sickness , unemployment , ol d age > wor k injury, families , maternity , invalidity , survivors , an d publi c assistance , a s well a s th e administrativ e expense s associate d wit h th e provisio n o f thes e benefits an d services . A s such, th e dat a i n tabl e 3. 2 represen t th e broadest , and mos t cross-nationally comparable , measure s of the relative magnitude of the welfare stat e in the advanced capitalis t world. The dat a i n tabl e 3. 2 sugges t tha t Franc e ha s on e o f th e mos t highl y developed welfar e states , i n a fiscal sense, i n th e advance d capitalis t world . In 1960 , mos t government s spen t betwee n 5 and 1 5 percent o f the nation' s economic produc t o n socia l securit y an d socia l assistance . France , whic h spent 1 3 percent o f its G. D. P. o n socia l program s i n tha t year , ranked , wit h Austria, Belgium , an d Germany , amon g th e leader s i n nationa l spendin g effort. CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 6

1

TABLE 3. 2

Total Governmen t Expenditure s o n Al l Socia l Security Scheme s a s a Percen t o f G.D.P.: 1960 , 1970, an d 198 0 I960

J970

J980

France

13.2

15.3

26.8

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden United States

7.7 15.4 15.3 10.8 9.2 11.1 8.8 15.4 9.3 11.7 4.9 11.1 9.4 na 10.9 6.8

8.0 18.6 18.1 13.8 11.8 16.4 12.8 17.0 11.6 16.3 5.4 20.0 15.5 na 18.8 9.6

12.1 22.4 25.9 17.7 15.1 26.9 18.6 23.8 21.7 18.2 10.9 28.6 20.3 16.1 32.0 12.7

Source: I.L.O . (1985 , 56-59) .

Over th e tw o decade s afte r 1960 , th e shar e o f th e economi c produc t devoted t o socia l program s ros e substantiall y i n ever y nation , an d b y 198 0 most nation s wer e spendin g betwee n 1 5 and 3 0 percent o f their G.D.P . o n such programs . I n spit e of the unusuall y larg e increase s i n spendin g i n suc h nations a s Denmark , th e Netherlands , an d Sweden , an d i n spit e o f th e decades o f rul e b y th e Gaullists , neo-Gaullists , an d othe r conservativ e par ties, Franc e remaine d amon g th e leader s i n it s fiscal commitment t o socia l policy. Thus , i n 1980 , i t spen t approximatel y 2 7 percen t o f it s G.D.P . o n social security and social assistance. The data i n tables 3. 1 and 3. 2 indicat e that total public expenditures, an d spending on social security and social assistance, expanded mor e rapidly than the economy i n all of the advanced capitalis t nations in the post-World Wa r II era . Wha t thos e dat a d o no t sho w i s tha t i n mos t nation s spendin g fo r social programs no t onl y grew more rapidl y tha n th e economy bu t als o grew

62 DAVI

D R . CAMERO N

TABLE 3. 3

The Proportio n o f All Publi c Expenditure s Allocated t o Socia l Securit y Scheme s i n Seventee n Nations, 1960-198 0 I960

1970

J980

France

38.2

39.7

58.1

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden United States

34.8 48.0 50.5 33.1 31.8 44.8 33.0 48.1 33.2 38.9 28.0 32.9 31.4 na 35.0 24.5

29.9 47.4 49.6 35.6 33.9 40.8 42.0 44.0 29.3 47.7 27.8 45.6 37.8 na 43.4 30.4

35.8 45.8 51.1 39.4 37.3 47.9 50.8 49.3 42.7 43.4 33.4 49.7 42.0 48.9 51.9 37.7

Source: Calculated from tables 1 an d 2.

more rapidl y than spendin g fo r othe r publi c programs and, a s a result, cam e to absorb a larger share of total public expenditures. Table 3. 3 present s th e shar e o f tota l governmen t spendin g allocate d t o social securit y an d socia l assistanc e i n th e seventee n nation s i n 1960 , 1970 , and 1980 . The data i n table 3. 3 suggest that i n almost every nation spendin g on socia l program s constitute d a significantl y large r shar e o f tota l publi c expenditures i n th e 1980 s tha n i n th e 1960s . Thus , wherea s spendin g fo r social program s range d fro m one-quarte r t o one-hal f o f al l publi c spendin g in th e earl y 1960s , b y th e 1980 s suc h spendin g generall y accounte d fo r a t least 4 0 percen t o f al l publi c expenditur e (excep t i n th e Unite d States , Canada, Australia , an d Japan) . An d i n severa l nations , socia l spendin g accounted fo r more than one-hal f of all public spending. The dat a i n tabl e 3. 3 clearl y demonstrat e that , a s was the cas e with tota l public expenditure s an d socia l spendin g relativ e t o the economi c produc t o f

CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 6

3

the nation , Franc e i s among th e leadin g nation s i n th e shar e o f total publi c spending devote d t o socia l policy . Indeed , tabl e 3. 3 suggest s tha t althoug h France lagge d behin d severa l o f it s neighbors—mos t notably , Germany , Belgium, Austria , an d Denmark—i n th e shar e o f it s considerabl e "publi c economy" tha t wa s devote d t o socia l program s i n th e 1960s , b y th e 1980 s France wa s leading all nation s i n tha t regard—eve n thos e suc h a s Belgium, the Netherlands , Sweden , an d Denmark , whic h ar e renowne d fo r thei r highly develope d welfar e states . Som e migh t argu e tha t i t i s somewha t misleading to speak of the "welfare state " in France , fo r reason s having to do with th e form s o f funding , organization , an d administratio n o f th e Frenc h social securit y syste m (se e Ashfor d 1982 , 229-35 ; an d Freema n 1985) . Nevertheless, t o the exten t tha t a state i s defined b y its activities, an d b y th e programs t o which i t devotes it s resources, th e data containe d i n tabl e 3.3 — especially th e mos t recen t entr y fo r France—sugges t that , mor e tha n i s the case in almost any other nation, th e French stat e is a "welfare state. " Correlates o f C r o s s - N a t i o n a l Variatio n i n Socia l S p e n d i n g Effor t

The precedin g comparison s amon g th e advance d capitalis t nation s demon strate th e universalit y o f increasin g publi c spendin g i n general , an d socia l spending i n particular , i n recen t decades . Tha t universa l experienc e implie s that th e source s of the expansio n i n th e fiscal role of the stat e were suprana tional, o r a t least presen t amon g mos t of the nations . That , i n turn , implie s that at least a portion o f any explanation o f the increase in social spending in a particula r nation , suc h a s France , lie s beyon d th e real m o f nationa l politics. Nevertheless , i t i s als o tru e tha t th e nation s revea l a remarkabl e diversity i n th e exten t t o whic h the y suppor t socia l programs , an d diversit y may reflect th e impact of politics or other attributes and characteristics of the nations. I n this section, I shall explore that diversity in an effort t o understand why, i n spit e o f the commo n patter n o f an expandin g fiscal commitment t o social policy , som e nations , o f which Franc e i s one, commi t a much large r share of their economic resource s to social programs than d o other nations . The mos t elementary wa y i n whic h t o comprehend wh y nation s diffe r i n this fiscal commitment t o social policy i s to compare the variation acros s the nations in such measure s as social spending as a fraction o f G.D.P. (reporte d in tabl e 3.2 ) an d o f tota l publi c spendin g (reporte d i n tabl e 3.3 ) wit h th e variation i n particula r aspect s an d characteristic s o f polit y an d economy . Table 3. 4 report s th e simple , bivariat e correlatio n coefficient s betwee n th e 64 DAVI

D R . CAMERO N

TABLE 3. 4

The Political , Social , an d Economi c Correlate s o f Spendin g o n Socia l Security i n Seventee n Nations , 198 0 Experiditures on Social Security

Percent of Cabinet Portfolios , 1965-85 , held by: Social Democrats & Labor parties Christian Democrati c partie s Centrist parties Conservative partie s Social Democratic, Labor , or Christian Democratic partie s Percent of Workforce Unionized , 1970-8 5 Organizational Unit y of Labor Movemen t Power of Labor Confederations ove r Union s Scope of Collective Bargainin g Exports as a Percent of G.D.P., 1965-8 5 Percent Change i n Constant-Currenc y ("Real") C D . P ., 1965-8 5 Percent of Population, 15-64 , i n Labo r Force, 1975-8 5 Percent Change i n Total Labo r Force, 1974-85 Percent Change i n Total Employment , 1974-85 Percent of Total Labo r Force , Unemployed , 1965-85 Federal Syste m of Government France ("dummy variable" )

As%of G.D.P.

As % of All Expend.

.53 .32 -.23 -.45

.39 .31 -.17 -.37

.64 .49 .51 .54 .65 .62

.52 .24 .30 .28 .50 .35

-.56

-.48

.03

-.14

-.42

-.57

-.32

-.53

-.17 -.36 .26

-.04 -.38 .50

two measure s o f socia l spendin g effor t an d measure s o f variou s aspect s o f political and economic lif e in the seventeen nations . Table 3. 4 include s measure s o f th e frequenc y wit h whic h distinctiv e families o f politica l parties , suc h a s Socia l Democratic , Labor , an d othe r leftist parties , o r Christia n Democrati c parties , o r conservativ e parties , hav e governed i n recen t years. (Fo r the technique o f constructing thes e measures , and thei r sources , se e Camero n 198 4 and 1988a. ) Include d als o ar e severa l measures tha t describ e th e density , inclusiveness , an d organizationa l powe r C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 6

5

of some of the most important political-economic actor s in advanced capital ist society; thus, I have included measure s of the degree of unionization, th e organizational unit y o f th e labo r movement , th e powe r o f labo r confedera tions ove r thei r affiliates , an d th e scop e o f collectiv e bargaining . (Fo r a n elaboration o f these measures, se e Cameron 1984. ) Table 3. 4 also includes a variety o f economic attributes , suc h a s the degre e o f openness (a s measure d by export s relativ e t o G.D.P. ; se e Camero n 1978) , th e rat e o f economi c growth, th e siz e o f th e activ e labo r force , growt h i n th e labo r forc e an d i n total employment , an d th e leve l an d increas e i n th e rat e o f unemployment . (The measure s o f th e labo r forc e an d unemploymen t wer e obtaine d fro m O.E.C.D. 1988. ) Finally , tabl e 3. 4 include s tw o "dumm y variables"—on e of whic h distinguishe s betwee n nation s accordin g t o whethe r thei r govern ments ar e federa l o r unitar y i n structure , th e othe r o f whic h distinguishe s between Franc e and all other nations. The dat a i n tabl e 3. 4 revea l that certain politica l an d economi c attribute s of th e nation s ar e clearl y associate d wit h th e variatio n amon g nation s i n spending effor t o n socia l programs—regardles s o f whethe r tha t effor t i s measured relativ e to C D . P. o r to total publi c spending . Thus , on e observe s that the partisanship of government over a long period ma y have a systematic effect o n socia l spending effort . Fo r example , nation s i n whic h leftis t partie s have dominated governmen t ten d t o spend a larger share of their C D . P . o n social programs (r =. 53) and tend, also , to spend a larger share of total publi c expenditure o n suc h program s ( r =. 39). Bu t leftis t partie s ar e no t alon e i n promoting th e welfar e state ; tabl e 3. 4 suggest s tha t Christia n Democrati c parties ma y hav e almos t th e sam e effec t a s leftist partie s i n promotin g socia l spending, an d tha t th e mos t importan t distinctio n amon g th e partisa n fami lies wit h regar d t o socia l spendin g i s betwee n th e leftis t partie s and th e Christian Democrati c parties, on one hand, an d the centrist and conservativ e parties, o n the other. 1 The partisa n correlate s o f socia l spendin g reporte d i n tabl e 3. 4 sugges t a plausible distinctio n amon g th e politica l parties . Bu t the y als o sugges t tha t the French experienc e i s somewhat anomalous an d devian t from th e genera l pattern observe d acros s th e seventee n nations . Fo r mor e tha n tw o decade s prior t o 198 0 (th e dat e fo r whic h th e socia l spendin g measure s wer e ob tained), Franc e wa s governed neithe r b y Socia l Democrati c o r Labo r partie s nor b y Christia n Democrati c parties , and , indeed , bot h o f thos e partisa n families hav e been quit e weak , relativ e to their strengt h i n severa l neighbor ing countries. Franc e is the only nation amon g the seventeen i n which socia l 66 DAVI

D R . CAMERO N

spending was highly develope d i n spit e of domination o f the government fo r several decades by various coalitions of conservative parties. If Franc e appear s a s an anomal y i n th e ligh t o f the partisa n correlate s o f social spending , tha t i s even mor e tru e whe n on e consider s th e socia l orga nizational correlate s o f spending . Tabl e 3. 4 indicate s tha t th e nation s i n which socia l spendin g effor t i s mos t highl y develope d ar e one s i n whic h a relatively larg e shar e o f th e wor k forc e i s unionized , i n whic h ther e i s a relatively hig h degre e o f organizationa l unit y (a s oppose d t o fragmentation ) in th e labo r movement , i n whic h labo r confederation s hav e considerabl e power over their affiliates , an d i n whic h collectiv e bargainin g i s centralized. France i s one o f th e nation s i n whic h th e wor k forc e i s least organized, i n which th e labo r movemen t i s most fragmented , i n whic h labo r confedera tions hav e relativel y few powers ove r thei r affiliates , an d i n whic h collectiv e bargaining i s decentralize d rathe r tha n concentrate d a t th e economy-wid e level. An d ye t Franc e i s one o f the leadin g spender s o n socia l programs , i n spite of the organizationa l weaknes s o f the labo r movemen t durin g muc h o f the post-World Wa r I I era. Beyond thes e politica l an d socia l correlates , tabl e 3. 4 als o suggest s tha t the leve l o f spendin g o n socia l programs , relativ e t o G.D.P . an d t o tota l public spending , i s associated wit h variou s economic attributes . Th e nation s in whic h socia l spendin g i s most developed ar e those i n whic h th e econom y is relativel y ope n an d export-dependent , i n whic h th e long-ter m rat e o f economic growt h ha s bee n low , i n whic h th e labo r forc e increase d b y a relatively smal l amoun t i n recen t decades , an d i n whic h tota l employmen t likewise increased by a small amount (o r even decreased). These correlates— especially thos e involvin g growt h an d employment—sugges t tha t th e devel opment o f th e contemporar y welfar e stat e ha s bee n greatl y influence d b y adverse developments i n the economy and that it expanded i n recent years— most notably , th e 1970s—a s th e economie s o f th e advance d capitalis t na tions deteriorated. In order to account for the variation amon g the nations i n social spendin g in a manner that is both mor e parsimonious and mor e complex than i s made possible by the compilation o f a large number of bivariate correlations, table s 3.5 an d 3. 6 repor t multipl e regressio n analyse s of the two measures o f social spending. Th e analyse s i n th e tw o table s ar e th e resul t o f a n identica l procedure: first, th e five mos t highl y correlate d variable s no t contaminate d by excessive amounts of multicollinearity were included i n a regression.2 The five variables ar e th e proportio n o f cabinet portfolio s hel d b y Socia l Demo C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 6

7

TABLE 3. 5

Multiple Regressio n Analyse s o f Spendin g o n Socia l Security , a s a Percen t of G.D.P., i n Seventee n Nations , 198 0

Constant Percent of Cabinet Portfolios, Social Democratic, Labor, or Christian Democratic parties Scope of Collective Bargaining Percent Change in CD.P. Percent Change in Total Labor Force Federal System of Government France Coefficient o f Determination (R2)

(2)

(3)

(4)

18.8 (3-18) 0.041 (0.89)

19.6 (3.38)

17.8 (3.21)

10.378 (1.48) -0.056 (1.66) -0.066 (0.39) -3.50 (1.38)

9.723 (1.48) -0.056 (1.73)

12.992 (2.41) -0.067 (2.28)

14.26 (2.78) -0.064 (2.31)

-3.83 (1.66)

-3.89 d-70)

-3.19 (1.46) 6.85 (1.65)

.66(.50)

•65(.53)

•63(.54)

.70(.60)

(i) 19.5 (3.03) 0.030 (0.54)

Notes: Parentheses contain f-statistics . Parentheses beside R 2 of equations contain th e R 2, adjuste d fo r degrees of freedom .

cratic an d Labo r or Christia n Democrati c parties ; th e scop e o f collectiv e bargaining; the rat e of economic growth ; the change i n th e tota l labo r force ; and th e "dumm y variable " for a federal for m o f government. Afte r conduct ing the analyse s with thi s initia l se t of variables, subsequen t analyse s delete d sequentially th e singl e mos t statisticall y insignifican t variabl e a s lon g a s th e coefficient o f determination adjuste d fo r degree s o f freedom (R 2) increased. 3 Once th e final, pared-dow n analysi s ha d bee n obtained , th e "dumm y vari able" fo r Franc e wa s include d i n orde r t o ascertai n th e exten t t o whic h th e analysis accounted fo r the relative magnitude of the French spendin g effort . Table 3. 5 present s th e result s o f th e multipl e regressio n analysi s o f al l public spendin g o n socia l securit y an d socia l assistanc e a s a fractio n o f G.D.P. Th e analysi s indicate s tha t th e thre e mos t significan t explanator y variables are the scope of collective bargaining, th e rate of economic growth , and th e distinction betwee n federa l an d unitar y system s of government. Th e presence o f highly centralize d collectiv e bargaining—bargaining tha t occur s at the economy-wid e leve l a s opposed t o bargaining tha t i s highly decentral ized an d occur s a t th e firm o r plan t level—i s strongl y associate d wit h hig h 68 DAVI

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TABLE 3. 6

Multiple Regressio n Analyse s o f Spendin g o n Socia l Security , a s a Percen t of Total Publi c Expenditur e i n Seventee n Nations , 198 0

Constant Percent of Cabinet Portfolios, Social Democratic, Labor, or Christian Democratic parties Scope of Collective Bargaining Percent Change in G. D. P. Percent Change in Total Labor Force Federal System of Government France Coefficient o f Determination (R2)

(i) 50.2 (6.39) -0.016 (0.24)

(2)

(3)

49.7 (6.88)

45.9 (8.01)

9.509 (l.H) -0.058 (1.42) -0.330 (1.59) -3.20 (1.04)

8.321 (1.26) -0.055 (1.48) -0.305 (1-78) -3.31 (1-13)

10.871 (2.10) -0.052 (1.82) -0.245 (1.83) -2.33 (1.02) 12.70 (3.01)

.58(.38)

•57(.43)

.77(.66)

levels o f social spending . Thus , mos t o f the countrie s wit h suc h centralize d bargaining—Austria, Sweden , Denmark , and , t o a lesse r extent , Belgiu m and th e Netherlands—spen d a t leas t one-quarte r o f their G.D.P . o n socia l programs. On e reason , o f course , ma y b e tha t centralize d bargainin g is , a t least i n part , th e produc t o f a stron g an d inclusivel y organize d labo r move ment tha t activel y advocate s th e developmen t an d fundin g o f socia l pro grams. Another , t o whic h I hav e allude d elsewher e (se e Camero n 1978 , 1984), ma y be the tendenc y fo r government s t o use social polic y a s a means of obtaining labor' s acquiescenc e t o policies o f wage restraint—policies tha t are mos t likel y t o develo p i n th e smalles t (an d thu s mos t open ) economie s and tha t depen d fo r thei r negotiatio n an d enforcemen t o n th e presenc e o f highly centralized collectiv e bargaining. Table 3. 5 indicate s that the rat e of economic growt h ha s a significant an d consistent effec t o n socia l spendin g acros s th e advance d capitalis t world . Social spendin g tend s t o b e high , relativ e t o tha t elsewhere , i n nation s tha t have experience d unusuall y lo w level s o f growth ove r th e lon g term . Ther e are, o f course , som e nations—mos t notably , Britai n an d th e Unite d State s —that appear at or near the bottom of both the measures of economic growth CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 6

9

over th e lon g term 4 an d th e measure s o f socia l spendin g a s a portio n o f G.D.P. I n general , however , socia l spendin g tend s t o b e highes t i n thos e nations, suc h a s Belgium , th e Netherlands , Sweden , Denmark , an d Ger many, tha t experience d th e lowes t rate s o f economic growt h ove r th e bette r part of two decades. Table 3. 5 als o suggest s tha t th e institutiona l structur e o f government ha s a consistent effect o n th e level of spending for social programs. In particular , social spendin g tends t o b e highes t i n nation s i n whic h governmen t i s organized o n unitar y rathe r than federa l principles . Thus, tabl e 3. 5 indicate s that th e presenc e o f federalism , independen t o f al l othe r factors , reduce s social spending levels by three or four percentage points of G.D.P. relativ e to those observed i n unitary systems. The last , an d mos t condensed, regressio n i n table 3. 5 include s the "dumm y variable" fo r France . Th e rational e fo r includin g thi s variabl e i s simpl y t o test the proposition tha t the high leve l of social spending in Franc e i s largely or solel y th e resul t o f political an d economi c force s tha t affec t socia l polic y throughout th e advance d capitalis t world . T o th e exten t tha t thi s wer e th e case, on e woul d hav e littl e reaso n t o resor t t o extensiv e analysi s o f socia l policy i n Franc e i n orde r to account fo r it s relatively hig h leve l o f spending. The result s reporte d i n tabl e 3. 5 suggest , however , tha t tha t i s not th e case . The f statisti c fo r th e "dumm y variable " i s quite significan t (1.65 ) an d th e regression coefficien t i s quit e larg e (6.85) . Tha t suggest s tha t th e general , cross-national explanatio n doe s no t full y accoun t fo r France' s hig h leve l o f spending—something tha t i s immediatel y apparen t i f on e consider s that , contrary t o mos t o f th e high-spendin g nations , Franc e ha s ha d i n recen t decades a relatively decentralized syste m of collective bargaining and (a t least until th e 1980s ) a relativel y high rat e o f economi c growth . I n short , then , France emerge s fro m thi s cross-national analysi s o f social spendin g as something of an anomaly o r a "deviant case" that warrants further examination . Table 3. 6 present s th e result s o f multiple regressio n analyse s o f spendin g on socia l securit y an d socia l assistanc e a s a fractio n o f total publi c expendi ture. Give n th e stron g associatio n acros s th e seventee n nation s betwee n th e two measures o f social spendin g ( r = .81), i t is not surprisin g tha t th e result s are similar to those reported i n table 3.5 . Thus, on e observes that a relatively high share of total public expenditure devoted to social spending is associated with centralize d collectiv e bargaining , a relativel y lo w rat e o f economi c growth ove r th e lon g term , an d a unitar y for m o f government. I n addition , however, th e analysis in table 3. 6 suggests that high levels of social spending, 70 DAVI

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relative to total public spending, ar e most likely to occur i n nation s i n whic h the labo r forc e ha s experience d th e slowes t rat e o f growth—an indicato r o f the exten t t o whic h th e developmen t o f socia l spendin g i n th e advance d capitalist worl d i n recen t decade s i s affecte d b y th e performanc e o f th e economy, define d no t onl y i n term s o f growt h bu t als o th e rat e o f jo b creation. Table 3. 6 also demonstrates, a s did th e precedin g analysis, tha t the crossnationally genera l explanatio n o f social spending a s a share of total spendin g does no t full y accoun t fo r th e Frenc h experience . Indeed , th e ver y hig h t statistic (3.01 ) an d regressio n coefficien t (12.70 ) fo r th e "dumm y variable " for Franc e indicat e tha t the cross-national explanatio n ma y be of limited us e in accountin g fo r wh y tha t natio n allocate s suc h a larg e shar e o f it s publi c spending t o socia l programs . Th e imag e tha t ha s alread y bee n invoked , o f France as an anomaly o r a "deviant case," is only reinforced b y the results in table 3.6 . An d a s with an y anomaly o r "deviant case, " these result s no t onl y arouse one' s curiosit y abou t th e dynamic s o f socia l polic y i n Franc e bu t imply that , i n orde r t o comprehen d wh y Franc e spend s a s muc h a s i t doe s on social policy, on e must examine i n detail the evolution o f social policy in France over the past decades. I t is to that subject tha t I now turn. II. FRENC H SOCIA L S P E N D I N G S I N C E 195 0

In mos t o f th e year s sinc e 1950 , socia l spendin g i n Franc e increase d b y a larger percentag e tha n th e economi c produc t o f th e nation , an d a s a resul t the ratio of spending to G.D.P. drifte d upwar d over time. Figur e 3. 1 presents the rati o o f total spendin g o n socia l securit y an d socia l assistanc e t o G.D.P . for eac h yea r betwee n 195 0 an d 1987. 5 On e observe s a gradua l upwar d movement ove r time in that ratio. Thus, whil e such spending was equivalent to about 1 1 percent o f G.D.P. i n 1950 , th e shar e o f G.D.P. ros e to slightl y more than 1 3 percent i n 1960 , 1 7 percent i n 1970 , 2 4 percent i n 1980 , an d by 198 7 represented roughl y 2 7 percent of G.D.P. As one woul d expec t o f a domai n o f polic y tha t i s very large—i n 1985 , for example , socia l securit y benefit s totale d 99 8 billio n francs , an d socia l assistance totale d anothe r 11 5 billio n francs—an d tha t i s organized , a s Ashford notes , i n a complex array of regimes, funding sources , an d adminis trative council s (se e Ashford 1982 ; 232-35), chang e i n th e shar e o f G.D.P . consumed b y these programs has been piecemea l an d incremental . A telling indicator o f th e degre e o f incrementalis m and , therefore , continuit y ove r C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 7

1

FIGURE 3. 1

Public Spendin g o n Socia l Securit y an d Socia l Assistanc e i n France , 1950-1987

time, i s the exceptionally high correlation between the share of G.D.P. spen t on social security and social assistance in each year and the share in the prior year; for the period 1951-1987 , th e correlation betwee n th e share of G.D.P . in yea r i and th e shar e i n yea r i-1 i s .995 ! Thus, i f one wer e t o regres s th e former upo n th e latter, on e could explai n full y 9 9 percent of the variation i n the leve l o f spendin g a s a functio n o f th e prio r year' s leve l o f spending . I n statistical terms , th e tim e serie s contain s a ver y hig h degre e o f autocorrela tion, whic h ca n b e taken a s a measure o f the hig h degre e o f continuity ove r time. Tha t bein g th e case , ther e woul d no t appea r t o be muc h roo m i n th e explanation o f spending , statisticall y speaking , fo r al l th e factors , suc h a s partisanship o f the government , th e identif y o f the president , th e proximit y of elections, o r even the distinction betwee n the Fourth an d Fift h Republics , that might plausibly cause social spending to fluctuate from yea r to year. The imag e o f continuit y i s reinforce d i f on e fit s a regressio n lin e t o th e data i n figure 3. 1 i n orde r t o estimat e th e annua l chang e i n th e shar e o f G.D.P. spen t o n socia l programs . Th e regression , i n th e for m y = a + b(x), where th e dependen t variable , y , i s th e shar e o f G.D. P spen t o n socia l security an d socia l assistanc e an d th e independen t variable , x , i s simpl y a time counte r (1950= 1 , 195 1 = 2, . . .) , explain s full y 9 5 percen t o f th e variation ove r th e period . I n tha t regression , a (th e estimate d valu e i n th e year prio r t o th e first i n th e series , i.e. , 1949 ) equal s 9.29 . Th e estimate d 72 DAVI

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annual incremen t i n spendin g a s a shar e o f G.D.P., b, equal s 0.461 . Tha t is, th e shar e o f G.D.P . absorbe d b y socia l spendin g increase d almos t one half o f one percentag e poin t every year ove r th e nearl y fou r decades . Pu t i n nonstatistical language , thes e result s sugges t a pattern o f dynamic incrementalism—that is , a proces s tha t i s highl y incremental , i n whic h eac h year' s spending i s largel y a functio n o f th e previou s year's , bu t on e tha t i s als o consistently expansionar y t o such a degree that the annual increments , whe n taken together , cumulat e int o a significantl y an d nonincrementall y large r share of G.D.P. spen t on social programs. However muc h th e tim e serie s o f th e shar e o f G.D.P . spen t o n socia l policy i s characterized b y continuit y an d a unifor m gradua l rat e o f change , there are significan t difference s i n th e rat e o f chang e ove r th e period . A s pervasive a s the autocorrelatio n an d seria l correlatio n are , a cursor y exami nation of the data in figure 3.1 suggests a wave-like oscillation i n the upwarddrifting series , wit h period s o f relativel y smal l annua l increas e followed , i n turn, b y late r period s o f relativel y larg e increase . Althoug h a t first glanc e there appeared to be little statistical space for such political factors as partisanship, th e presidency, o r even regime and republic , th e presence of that wavelike oscillatio n ma y provid e a n openin g fo r a mor e political , an d les s uni formly incrementalist , explanation . A first ste p i n establishin g whethe r ther e ar e difference s i n th e rat e o f change ove r tim e i n socia l spendin g tha t ar e significan t an d tha t ar e associated wit h suc h politica l factor s a s parties , presidents , an d republic s i s t o compare th e averag e rate s o f chang e fo r politicall y demarcate d period s o f time. Tabl e 3. 7 presents such a comparison. Th e table presents the results of regressions of the share of G.D.P. spen t on social policy upon a time counter for severa l differen t periods . Th e initia l value s liste d i n th e tabl e ar e th e constant terms in the regressions; the annual increase s are the slope estimates obtained fro m th e regressions . B y comparin g th e latter , on e ca n ascertai n whether politicall y distinctiv e period s wer e marked b y different averag e rate s of growth i n social spending relative to G.D.P . The result s presented i n tabl e 3. 7 sugges t that there were, i n fact , marke d differences i n th e growth o f social spendin g i n politicall y distinctiv e periods . Of course, spendin g increase d relativ e to G.D.P. i n all periods—somethin g that suggest s tha t politic s (a t leas t i n thi s domai n o f polic y i n thi s countr y over this period) did not involve choices over increasing or decreasing spend ing as much a s choices amon g policie s that , take n together , woul d alte r th e rate o f increas e i n spending . Nevertheless , i n som e politicall y demarcate d C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 7

3

TABLE 3. 7

Estimated Annua l Increase s i n Expenditure s fo r Socia l Securit y an d Social Assistanc e i n Politicall y Demarcate d Period s i n France , 1950-1987 Period 1950-87: Fourth Republi c (1950-59 ) Fifth Republi c (1959-87 ) Fifth Republi c President : De Gaulle (1959-69 ) Pompidou (1969-74 ) Giscard d'Estaing (1974-81 ) Mitterrand (1981-87 )

Initial Value

Annual Increase

R2

9.29 11.09 11.94

0.461 0.282 0.543

.95 .91 .96

12.76 16.84 18.72 25.40

0.476 0.274 0.779 0.325

.89 .82 .93 .66

Note: Estimate s ar e generate d b y regressio n o f social expenditure s a s a percen t o f G.D.P. upo n annual counter . Th e initial valu e i s the constant , a, i n th e regression . Th e annua l increas e i s th e regression coefficient , b, i n th e regression . Fo r simplicity , th e ^-statistic s hav e bee n omitted; al l ar e obviously very high.

periods, spendin g increase d a t a markedl y mor e rapi d rat e tha n i n othe r periods. Thus, fo r example, th e annual rat e of change, expresse d i n terms of the increas e i n the share of G.D.P. spen t on social policy, wa s twice as large in th e Fift h Republi c a s i t ha d bee n i n th e Fourt h Republi c (0.54 3 vs . 0.282). To giv e som e visua l meanin g t o thes e estimates , an d t o demonstrat e th e significant differenc e betwee n th e republics , on e ca n retur n t o figure 3.1 . The figure includes a broken lin e that represents the slope estimates from th e regressions reporte d i n tabl e 3.7 . A sense of the magnitud e o f the impac t o n social polic y o f th e chang e fro m th e Fourt h t o th e Fift h Republi c ca n b e obtained b y extrapolating the rat e of increase i n socia l spending as a share of G.D.P. observe d i n th e Fourt h Republi c throug h th e year s o f th e Fift h Republic. B y this obviously simplistic device, Franc e might now be spending roughly 1 8 percen t o f it s G.D.P . o n socia l programs , rathe r tha n th e 2 8 percent i t currently does . I n othe r words, th e difference betwee n spendin g at a level that now puts the country among the leaders, with Sweden, Denmark , Belgium, an d th e Netherlands , an d spendin g a t a leve l tha t woul d pu t it , with Britain , Canada , Spain , an d Italy , wel l below the internationa l averag e in terms of the portion o f G.D.P. devote d to social policy, ca n apparentl y be attributed t o the change from th e Fourt h t o the Fifth Republic . 74 DAVI

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If the change from th e Fourth Republi c to the Fifth se t in motion a variety of forces tha t cause d a marke d acceleratio n i n th e rat e o f increas e i n socia l spending, relativ e t o that o f the econom y a s a whole, th e estimate s reporte d in table 3. 7 indicate that spending did not increase at a uniform rat e throughout the Fift h Republic . Thus , th e annua l rat e of increase i n socia l spendin g increased dramaticall y durin g de Gaulle's tenur e a s president, relativ e to the rate of increase i n th e las t decade of the Fourt h Republi c (0.47 6 per year vs. 0.282), largel y becaus e o f a dramatic wav e o f reform s i n healt h an d unem ployment insuranc e i n th e earl y year s o f th e Fift h Republi c (o n thes e re forms, se e Ashfor d 1982 ; Barjot 1971 ; Doublet 1971 ; and Laroqu e 1980). 6 But a s de Gaull e wa s followed b y Pompidou, th e annua l rat e o f increase i n social spendin g a s a fractio n o f G.D . P. receded , fro m 0.47 6 t o 0.274—i n spite o f the commitmen t o f Chaban-Delmas, Pompidou' s first prime minis ter, t o the creation o f a "new society/ ' Figure 3.1 and the estimates reported i n table 3.7 , taken together, indicat e that afte r th e upwar d surg e i n th e rat e o f acceleratio n i n socia l spendin g i n de Gaulle' s first ter m a s president , an d the n th e slowdow n i n th e general' s last year s i n offic e an d throughou t th e Pompido u presidency , a secon d upward surg e occurre d durin g th e Giscar d presidency . Durin g eac h o f Giscard's seve n year s i n office , socia l spendin g increase d b y almost eight-tenth s of 1 percent of G.D.P. (0.779) . Bu t that second period o f accelerated expan sion wa s i n tur n followe d b y a perio d o f considerabl y slowe r expansio n (0.325) percen t annuall y durin g th e Mitterran d presidency—i n spit e o f th e partisan bas e of support an d programmati c commitment s Mitterran d an d hi s government brought to office i n 1981. This disaggregatio n o f th e rat e o f increas e i n socia l spendin g relativ e t o the economy durin g th e Fift h Republi c reveals , then , tw o period s o f espe cially dramati c increas e i n spending . On e occurre d i n th e earl y year s of the Republic, durin g th e d e Gaull e presidency ; th e othe r occurre d i n th e lat e 1970s, during the Giscard presidency. A s a result, th e two most expansionary presidents o f the Fift h Republic , fro m th e perspectiv e o f social polic y were , perhaps surprisingly, d e Gaulle himself and the fiscally conservative ministe r of finance who , afte r th e Pompido u interlude , followe d hi m t o th e Elysee . And the two least expansionary president s were Pompidou an d Mitterrand . The difference s i n th e rat e o f increas e i n socia l spendin g relativ e t o G.D.P. amon g th e republic s an d th e president s o f th e Fift h Republi c ar e certainly marked. Bu t are they significant? They may appear so at first glance. But i t i s possibl e tha t th e difference s reflec t othe r unspecifie d factor s tha t C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 7

5

TABLE 3. 8

The Annua l Chang e i n Gros s Domesti c Produc t an d i n th e Proportio n of G.D.P. Spent o n Socia l Securit y an d Socia l Assistanc e i n France , 1951-1987

Period 1951-87 Fourth Republi c (1951-59 ) Fifth Republi c (1959-87 ) Fifth Republi c President : De Gaulle (1959-69 ) Pompidou (1969-74 ) Giscard d'Estain g (1974-81 ) Mitterrand (1981-87 )

Average % Change in Constant-Price G.D.P.

Average Change in % of G.D.P. Spent on Social Security & Assistance

4.0 4.4 3.9

0.43 0.25 0.48

5.7 5.1 2.5 1.7

0.37 0.25 0.86 0.51

influence th e shar e o f G.D.P . spen t o n socia l programs , i n whic h cas e th e politically demarcate d difference s migh t disappea r onc e thos e othe r factor s were take n int o account . Perhap s th e mos t obviou s exogenou s facto r i s th e performance o f the economy. A s the cross-national analysi s discussed earlie r suggests, th e shar e o f G.D.P. spen t o n socia l polic y ma y fluctuate inversel y with th e rat e o f growt h i n th e economy , increasin g a t a mor e rapi d rat e i n economic downturn s (bot h becaus e o f th e relativel y fixed nature , a t an y time, o f old-ag e payment s an d th e large r amount s tha t mus t b e spen t o n unemployment compensation ) an d increasin g a t a slowe r rat e i n period s o f high economi c growt h (whe n th e denominato r o f th e rati o increase s b y a relatively larg e amount) . Whe n on e i s considering , a s w e ar e here , a lon g period tha t encompasse s periods of high growt h as well as world recession , i t would b e foolis h t o attribute th e differen t rate s of growth i n socia l spendin g to presidents, parties , ideologies , o r regimes without first taking into accoun t the fluctuations—both thos e that are short term an d cyclica l as well as those that are longer term—in th e economy. Table 3. 8 present s a summar y o f th e averag e rate s o f chang e i n th e constant-price G.D.P . ove r the entire period sinc e 195 1 as well as during the various politicall y demarcate d periods . Th e tabl e als o includes , fo r th e sak e of comparison , th e averag e first-order chang e i n th e proportio n o f G.D.P . spent o n socia l securit y an d socia l assistance . Thes e dat a suggest , i n a preliminary way , tha t som e o f th e unusua l growt h experience d durin g th e 76 DAVI

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Giscard presidenc y i n socia l spending relativ e to G.D.P. ma y be attributabl e to the drop i n th e rat e of economic growt h tha t occurre d durin g thos e seven years—largely th e produc t o f the recessio n o f 1974-1975 , th e slowdow n i n growth i n the late 1970s , and the second majo r recessio n i n 1980-1981 . While th e dat a i n tabl e 3. 8 sugges t tha t th e rat e o f increas e i n socia l spending relativ e t o G.D.P . ma y hav e varie d inversel y wit h th e rat e o f economic growth , thos e dat a als o sugges t som e anomalies . Fo r example , during th e d e Gaull e presidency , both the rat e o f economic growt h an d th e rate o f increas e i n socia l spendin g increase d relativ e t o wha t the y ha d bee n during th e Fourt h Republic . (Likewise , bot h decrease d durin g th e subse quent Pompido u presidency. ) An d i n contras t t o th e experienc e durin g Giscard's presidency, socia l spendin g increase d b y no mor e than th e averag e for th e three decades of the Fift h Republi c during the Mitterran d presidenc y —in spit e of the fac t tha t Franc e experienced , durin g hi s tenure, th e lowes t rate of economic growth over the long term i n the post-World Wa r I I era. In orde r t o ascertai n th e significance , i f any , o f th e distinction s I hav e noted i n the rate of increase in social spending between the republics and th e presidents o f th e Fift h Republi c onc e th e fluctuations i n economi c perfor mance have been take n int o account, tabl e 3. 9 presents the result s of several multiple regressio n analyses . Becaus e o f the exceptionall y hig h autocorrela tion and serial correlation i n the time series of the measure of social spendin g effort, an y estimate s obtaine d b y regressin g th e percen t o f G.D.P. spen t o n social program s upo n th e independen t variables—eve n i f on e o f thos e wa s the lagge d dependen t variable—woul d b e severel y biased . Th e bes t wa y of dealing with tha t problem i s to create a measure o f change i n th e dependen t variable an d regres s tha t measur e upo n th e independen t variables . Th e coefficient o f determination wil l be much lower , o f course, but the estimates will be more reliable. The regressio n analyse s reporte d i n tabl e 3. 9 trea t a s th e dependen t variable the first-order change i n socia l spending as a portion o f G.D.P. ove r the period from 195 1 to 1987 . All of the regression equation s reported i n that table include the percent change in constant-price G.D.P. a s an independen t variable. I n addition , the y includ e a s independent variable s a n election-yea r "dummy variable"—t o tes t for th e plausibl e hypothesi s tha t socia l spendin g tends t o increas e i n electio n year s an d ha s bee n drive n u p ove r tim e b y th e cumulative effects o f elections in the Fourt h an d Fift h Republics . Also , table 3.9 include s "dumm y variables " tha t distinguis h th e Fourt h fro m th e Fift h Republics and, withi n the latter, amon g the four occupant s of the Elysee. CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 7

7

TABLE 3. 9

Multiple Regressio n Analyse s o f Expenditure s fo r Socia l Securit y an d Social Assistanc e a s a Percen t o f G.D.P. i n France , 1951-198 7

Constant Change in G.D.P. Election Year

(i) 0.816 (4.42) -0.096 (2.29)

Fifth Republi c Fifth Republi c President De Gaulle

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.615 (2.39) -0.092 (2.18) 0.119 (0.82) 0.182 (0.94)

0.769 (2.29) -0.117 (1.75)

0.729 (2.08) -0.113 0.68) 0.068 (0.47)

0.266 0.25 (1.18) (1.12 0.038 0.03 (0.15) (0.14 0.421 0.42 (1.55) (1.54 -0.195 -0.17 (0.65) (0.56

Pompidou Giscard d'Estaing Mitterrand Coefficient o f Determination (Adjusted)

.11

.09 .1

9 .1

7 ) 6 ) 4 ) 3 ) 7

The result s reporte d i n tabl e 3. 9 sugges t tha t th e shar e o f G.D.P . con sumed b y socia l spendin g doe s indee d var y inversely , an d t o a statisticall y significant degree , wit h th e rat e o f economi c growth . The y indicat e tha t a change o f on e percentag e poin t i n th e rat e o f growt h ove r th e perio d wa s associated wit h a n invers e chang e o f abou t one-tent h o f 1 percent i n th e share o f G.D.P. consume d b y social programs . Tha t is , a drop in th e rat e of growth t o 1 percent belo w the long-ter m averag e rate of growth produce d a n increase i n th e shar e o f about one-tent h o f 1 percent o f G.D.P.; conversely , an increas e i n th e rat e o f growt h t o 1 percent abov e th e long-ter m averag e rate o f growt h produce d a decreas e i n th e shar e o f abou t one-tent h o f 1 percent. Thus , fo r example , i f (from tabl e 3.7 ) th e shar e o f G.D.P. devote d to socia l program s increase d b y 0.779 o f 1 percent eac h yea r o f the Giscar d presidency, abou t 2 0 percen t o f tha t annua l increas e (fro m tabl e 3.8 , [(4.0 - 2.5 ) x 0. l]/0.779) can b e attributed t o the lower rate of growth durin g the Giscard presidency. An d of course, muc h of the unusually large increases 78 DAVI

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in socia l spending , relativ e t o G.D.P. , i n suc h year s a s 197 5 an d 198 1 ca n be attributed t o the even lower rates of growth i n those recession years. Table 3. 9 als o contain s regressio n estimate s o f th e impac t o n socia l spending, afte r controllin g fo r th e fluctuating rat e o f economi c growth , o f the chang e i n republic s (th e secon d equatio n i n th e table) , th e impac t o f elections (th e secon d an d fourt h equation s i n th e table) , an d th e chang e i n presidents durin g th e Fift h Republi c (th e thir d an d fourt h equations) . Th e results suggest that election s ha d a consistent, albei t modest , effec t o n socia l spending, raisin g the rati o of social spendin g a fraction o f G.D.P., b y abou t one-tenth o f 1 percent i n eac h electio n yea r(Z > = 0.119 i n equatio n 2 an d 6 = 0.068 i n equatio n 4) . The y als o sugges t tha t bot h th e chang e fro m th e Fourth t o th e Fift h Republi c an d th e chang e i n Fift h Republi c president s had marke d consequence s fo r spending , abov e an d beyon d th e change s associated wit h th e performanc e o f th e economy . Afte r takin g int o accoun t the fluctuations an d longer-ter m trend s i n th e rat e o f economi c growth , a s well a s th e presenc e o r absenc e o f elections , th e analysi s indicate s tha t th e spending rati o increase d b y about one-fift h o f 1 percent durin g eac h yea r of the Fift h Republi c(Z > = 0.182 i n equatio n 2) , relativ e t o th e averag e rat e o f increase in the Fourth Republic. 7 The analyse s reporte d i n tabl e 3. 9 als o suggest , a s did th e earlie r perusa l of figure 3.1, that th e larges t averag e increase s i n spendin g occurre d durin g the de Gaulle and Giscard presidencies. Afte r controllin g for the fluctuations in th e econom y an d th e timin g o f elections, th e spendin g rati o increase d i n each yea r o f th e d e Gaull e presidenc y b y approximatel y one-quarte r o f 1 percent of G.D.P. mor e than i t had i n the Fourth Republi c (b = 0.257). An d it increase d i n eac h yea r o f th e Giscar d presidenc y b y almos t one-hal f o f 1 percent mor e tha n i t ha d i n th e Fourt h Republi c (b = 0.424). Fo r bot h o f these presidencies , th e rat e o f growth i n socia l spendin g associate d wit h th e presidency independen t o f the rat e of economic growth i s statistically signifi cant.8 In contras t t o th e estimate s reporte d i n tabl e 3. 9 fo r th e d e Gaull e an d Giscard presidencies, the estimates associated with the Pompidou an d Mitter rand presidencie s ar e quit e insignificant , whic h i s to sa y that virtuall y al l o f the modes t increas e i n socia l spendin g observe d durin g thos e presidencie s can b e attributed t o the rat e of economic growth , t o the presence o r absenc e of elections, o r to the various inertial forces present in social policy. Insignif icant a s they are, however , thos e estimate s ar e usefu l a s first approximations of th e magnitud e o f increas e i n socia l spendin g durin g thos e presidencies , C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 7

9

independent o f th e rat e o f economi c growth . Thus , the y sugges t that,.-afte r controlling fo r th e rat e o f growth , th e proportio n o f th e economi c produc t devoted t o social spending increase d durin g the Pompidou year s at about th e same rate as it did during the Fourth Republi c (b = 0.036). An d they suggest, surprisingly, tha t th e rati o o f socia l spendin g t o G.D.P . durin g th e Mitter rand year s actuall y increase d a t a markedl y lower rate tha n i n th e Fourt h Republic (b= — 0.173)—which, itself , experience d a rate of increase consid erably below that of the Fifth Republic ! In th e analyse s reporte d thu s far , th e dependen t variabl e wa s the rati o of all socia l spendin g b y the Frenc h governmen t t o the nation' s G.D.P . Thos e analyses accuratel y depic t th e exten t an d source s o f fluctuation ove r tim e i n the country' s aggregat e spendin g effor t i n socia l policy . However , i t i s possible tha t th e observe d increas e i n socia l spendin g effor t ove r th e lon g ter m may reflect , a t leas t i n part , th e simultaneou s growt h o f all public spendin g over th e lon g term . Tha t is , socia l program s ma y simpl y hav e receive d a constant shar e o f a governmen t budge t tha t wa s expandin g relativ e t o th e economic produc t o f th e nation . I f tha t wer e th e case , an y explanatio n o f growth i n socia l spendin g woul d hav e t o b e cas t a t th e leve l o f publi c expenditure i n general, rathe r than a t the level of social policy in particular . One mean s o f assessin g whethe r th e source s o f fluctuation i n aggregat e social spendin g effor t li e in the real m o f public expenditure i n general, o r in social policy i n particular, i s to replrcate the analyses presented earlie r with a dependent variabl e tha t measure s socia l spendin g a s a fractio n o f al l publi c expenditure rathe r tha n a s a fractio n o f G.D.P . I f th e growt h i n aggregat e spending effor t o n socia l program s wa s i n fac t simpl y th e produc t o f a constant shar e of an expandin g "publi c economy, " on e would expec t to find no significant increas e ove r the lon g term i n th e share o f all public expendi tures devote d t o socia l programs . An d on e woul d expect , also , tha t th e effects, note d earlier , o f th e chang e i n republic s an d i n occupant s o f th e office o f presiden t durin g th e Fift h Republi c o n socia l spendin g woul d b e greatly diminished o r altogether absent . Table 3.1 0 present s a n analysi s o f aggregate socia l spendin g a s a fractio n of all publi c expenditur e i n Franc e ove r the perio d 1953-1987 . Replicatin g the analysi s presente d i n tabl e 3.7 , tabl e 3.1 0 present s th e initia l value s fo r that measur e fo r eac h o f the politically distinctiv e periods considered earlier . And i t presents the regression-derive d estimat e o f the average annual chang e in th e rati o o f socia l spendin g t o al l publi c expenditur e fo r eac h o f thos e periods. 80 DAVI

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TABLE 3 . 1 0

Estimated Annua l Increase s i n Expenditure s fo r Socia l Securit y an d Social Assistanc e a s a Portio n o f Total Publi c Expenditure s i n France i n Politicall y Demarcate d Periods , 1953-198 7 Period

1953-87 Fourth Republi c (1953-59 ) Fifth Republi c (1959-87 ) Fifth Republi c President : De Gaulle (1959-69 ) Pompidou (1969-74 ) Giscard d'Estain g (1974-81 ) Mitterrand (1981-87 )

Initial Value

Annual Increase

34.7 35.6 38.3

.558 .189 .545

.96 .08 .93

37.2 42.4 47.1 51.6

.705 .786 .631 .021

.75 .96 .85 -.16

R2

Note: Calculated a s in table 7.

The analysi s i n tabl e 3.1 0 suggest s tha t th e increas e i n socia l spendin g effort ove r th e pas t fou r decade s i n Franc e wa s not simpl y th e produc t o f a constant share of the budget for social programs applied to an ever expanding "public economy. " Rather , th e shar e o f aggregat e publi c expenditur e allo cated t o social program s increase d i n ever y politically distinctiv e period—s o much s o tha t socia l polic y increase d fro m approximatel y one-thir d o f al l public expenditur e i n th e earl y year s o f th e Fourt h Republi c t o mor e tha n one-half by the advent of the Mitterrand reig n i n 1981. Table 3.1 0 als o suggest s tha t th e rat e o f expansio n i n socia l spending , relative t o al l publi c expenditure , fluctuated ove r th e fou r decades . An d a s with th e measur e o f socia l spendin g relativ e t o G.D.P. , thos e fluctuations depended, i n part , o n politics . Fo r example , socia l spending' s plac e i n th e budget of French government increased three times faster i n the Fifth Repub lic tha n i n th e Fourt h (0.54 5 vs . 0.189) . An d confirmin g th e earlie r result s that appeared t o contradict a conventional vie w about partisanship and socia l policy, tabl e 3.1 0 suggest s that socia l spending' s shar e o f all publi c expendi tures increase d significantl y durin g th e administratio n o f eac h conservativ e president—0.705 pe r yea r durin g d e Gaulle' s reign , 0.78 6 pe r yea r durin g Pompidou's, an d 0.63 1 pe r yea r durin g Giscard's—an d significantl y mor e under conservativ e rul e tha n unde r rul e b y th e leftis t partie s (0.02 1 fo r Mitterrand). Table 3.1 1 present s severa l multipl e regressio n analyse s o f th e annua l CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 8

1

TABLE 3.1 1

Multiple Regressio n Analyse s o f Expenditure s fo r Socia l Securit y and Socia l Assistanc e a s a Percen t o f Total Publi c Expenditur e in France , 1953-198 7

Constant Change i n G.D. P. Election Yea r

(I)

(2)

(V

(4)

0.159 (0.48) 0.065 (0.87)

-0.254 (0.52) 0.077 (1.01) -0.073 (0.28) 0.477 (1.26)

-0.326 (0.47) 0.087 (0.66)

-0.234 (0.32) 0.076 (0.55) -0.119 (0.42)

0.368 (0.81) 0.638 (1-25) 0.777 (1.42) 0.205 (0.34)

0.396 (0.85) 0.648 (1.25) 0.764 (1.37) 0.154 (0.25)

.03

.05

Fifth Republi c Fifth Republi c President : De Gaulle Pompidou Giscard d'Estain g Mitterrand Coefficient o f Determinatio n

(Adjusted)

.01

.02

change i n socia l spendin g a s a fraction o f total publi c expenditure . Replicat ing th e analysi s presente d i n tabl e 3.9 , th e result s i n tabl e 3.1 1 sugges t tha t the plac e o f socia l polic y i n th e large r budge t varie d directly ', rather tha n inversely, wit h th e rat e o f economic growth . Tha t is , th e shar e o f spendin g allocated t o socia l polic y increase d a bi t mor e rapidl y i n period s o f hig h growth tha n i n period s o f lo w growth—i n spit e o f th e greate r need s tha t typically became evident i n the latter. More importan t tha n wha t the y conve y abou t th e relationshi p betwee n economic growt h an d socia l policy , th e result s i n tabl e 3.1 1 clearl y indicat e that the political effect s identifie d earlie r applied to social policy in particula r rather tha n jus t t o publi c expenditur e i n general . Tabl e 3.1 1 doe s sugges t that th e impac t o f elections o n socia l polic y disappear s onc e on e treat s i t i n

82 DAVI

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terms o f th e shar e o f tota l publi c expenditur e rathe r tha n i n term s o f th e share o f G.D.P. Bu t th e impac t o f the chang e fro m th e Fourt h t o the Fift h Republic remain s significant an d considerable . Thus , socia l policy's share of the budge t increase d almos t one-hal f o f one percentag e poin t faste r i n eac h year o f the Fift h Republi c tha n i t had i n eac h yea r o f the Fourt h (b = 0.477 in equation 2) . The result s i n tabl e 3.1 1 indicate , also , tha t the differential impac t o f the presidents o f the Fift h Republi c o n socia l spendin g remain s discernibl e an d significant whe n on e consider s spendin g relativ e t o th e entir e budge t o f government rathe r tha n relativ e t o th e economi c produc t o f th e nation . Thus, on e observe s tha t th e conservativ e presidents—especiall y Pompido u and Giscard—presided ove r large annual increase s i n social spending's shar e of th e budget—increase s tha t fa r exceede d th e modes t one s tha t occurre d during Mitterrand' s presidency . Th e estimate s fo r th e d e Gaull e presidenc y are somewha t smalle r tha n thos e reporte d i n tabl e 3.9 , indicatin g tha t a considerable portio n o f the apparent increas e i n socia l spendin g effor t i n th e first decad e of the Fifth Republi c should be attributed t o the growth i n public expenditure i n general, rathe r than t o social policy in particular. Conversely , the estimates for the Pompidou presidency are considerably greater than thos e reported i n tabl e 3.9 , indicatin g tha t th e modes t increas e i n socia l spendin g relative t o G.D.P . maske d a substantia l increas e i n th e portio n o f publi c expenditure allocate d t o socia l program s a s othe r nonsocia l spendin g pro grams, and the overall share of the economy absorbed by public expenditure, were cu t bac k b y th e Pompido u governments . Nevertheless , th e overal l message remain s clear : ove r th e pas t fou r decade s i n France , i t ha s bee n during the administrations of the Gaullist and "liberal" presidents of the Fift h Republic that spending for social programs has increased mos t rapidly . CONCLUSION

We began thi s paper with a comparison o f the spending effort, relativ e to the economic product , o f government s i n th e domai n o f socia l securit y an d social assistance . B y th e measure s use d here , Franc e appear s a s on e o f th e leaders among the advanced capitalis t nations, spending a considerably large r share o f it s economi c produc t o n socia l program s tha n suc h nation s a s Britain, Italy , th e Unite d States , Japan , an d Canada . Indeed , Franc e spend s as muc h o n socia l programs , relativ e t o it s economi c resources , a s suc h

C O N T I N U I T Y AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 8

3

highly develope d "welfar e states " a s Sweden , Denmark , th e Netherlands , and Belgium . The cross-nationa l analyse s presente d i n th e first sectio n o f thi s chapte r revealed a quit e parsimonious , multivariat e explanatio n o f th e variatio n across the nation s i n socia l spending relativ e to the economic produc t o f the nation an d t o the total publi c expenditure s o f the nation . Bu t Franc e spend s considerably mor e o n socia l program s tha n thos e cross-nationa l analyse s predict—indeed, s o muc h mor e tha t Franc e appear s a s somethin g o f a n anomaly o r a "devian t case " i n thos e analyses . Tha t bein g th e case , th e chapter turne d t o a detaile d examinatio n o f th e chang e i n socia l spendin g within Franc e ove r th e pas t fort y year s i n orde r t o understan d wh y socia l spending ha d grow n t o consume suc h a large share of the economic produc t of the country . The analysi s o f th e growt h i n socia l spendin g withi n Franc e sinc e 195 0 suggested severa l reason s fo r tha t larg e increase . Fo r on e thing , th e analysi s revealed tha t th e advent o f the Fift h Republic , wit h d e Gaulle's accessio n t o power i n 1958 , apparently put into motion a variety of forces tha t caused th e rate of increase i n socia l spendin g to accelerate. Foremos t amon g these were the accumulatin g perception s o f the nee d t o reform, modernize , an d exten d the benefits o f the socia l securit y syste m inherite d fro m th e Fourt h Republi c —perceptions tha t culminate d i n a serie s o f importan t reform s an d exten sions of coverage in the late 1950 s and earl y 1960s . The analysi s o f socia l spendin g withi n Franc e ove r th e pas t fou r decade s also revealed a complex relationshi p between th e partisanship o f government and th e rat e o f chang e i n socia l spending . Contrar y t o muc h conventiona l wisdom—and t o the earlier results of our cross-national analysis—th e larges t increases i n socia l spendin g di d no t occu r i n period s whe n leftis t partie s (o r Christian Democrati c parties ) controlle d government . Indeed , th e larges t increases occurre d no t durin g th e Mitterran d government , o r eve n durin g the "ne w society " er a whe n Chaban-Delma s serve d a s Pompidou' s prim e minister. Instead , the y occurred i n the first years of the Fifth Republic , whe n de Gaulle was President, an d later , durin g the 1970s , when Giscar d hel d th e Elysee. In short , then , th e diachroni c analysi s o f socia l spendin g i n Franc e suggests that , despit e th e considerabl e degre e o f continuity an d incrementa l change exhibited over the past several decades, politics has had a marked an d significant impact o n th e developmen t an d expansio n o f th e contemporar y French welfar e state . I n particular , th e adven t o f the Fift h Republic , a s well 84 DAVI

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as th e fiscal policie s o f th e d e Gaull e an d Giscar d governments , exerte d a significant upwar d thrust in social spending. Having emphasize d throughou t th e chapte r th e hig h level s an d larg e increases i n spendin g fo r socia l program s i n France , i t i s appropriate , i n concluding, t o inquir e abou t th e consequences o f a highly develope d welfar e state. Fo r example , wha t ar e th e distributiona l consequence s o f the Frenc h welfare state ? T o wha t exten t ha s socia l policy , absorbin g a s i t doe s mor e than one-quarte r o f th e nation' s G.D.P. , alleviate d o r a t leas t provide d a partial remed y fo r th e burden s impose d o n individual s b y sickness , unem ployment, wor k injury , child-rearing , an d ol d age ? And t o what extent , i f at all, ha s th e extensiv e syste m o f social securit y an d socia l assistanc e lessene d the poverty and the distributional inequalitie s present in Frenc h society ? One cannot, o f course, comprehensivel y addres s these, an d similar , ques tions in the concluding paragraphs of a chapter, an d for such a treatment th e reader must turn to such works as Fourastie and Bazil (1980) and the periodic reports o f th e Centr e d'Etud e de s Revenue s e t de s Cout s (1990) . Neverthe less, i t i s possibl e t o marsha l som e evidenc e tha t allow s on e t o hazar d a n educated gues s abou t th e socia l an d economi c consequence s o f the Frenc h welfare state . Tables 3.12-3.1 5 presen t that evidence. One o f the endurin g distributiona l paradoxe s abou t Franc e i s the coinci dence o f a highl y develope d welfar e state , throug h whic h mor e tha n one quarter o f the nation' s G.D.P . i s allocated t o various socia l programs , an d a relatively high degree of distributional inequalit y among incomes. Table 3.1 2 presents tw o measure s o f th e degre e o f distributiona l inequalit y amon g in comes in Franc e and th e other advanced capitalis t nations . Thes e data, fro m Cameron (1988a , 223) , sugges t that , despit e it s unusuall y hig h leve l o f spending o n socia l programs , Franc e rank s amon g th e mos t inegalitaria n o f the advanced capitalis t democracies. Wha t i s that? And does the paradoxica l coincidence o f hig h level s o f socia l spendin g an d a hig h degre e o f distribu tional inequalit y indicat e tha t socia l polic y i n Franc e ha s n o redistributiv e effect? One means of ascertaining whether social policy has a redistributive effec t is to examin e th e allocatio n o f socia l benefit s amon g individual s o r house holds ranke d b y income . Tabl e 3.1 3 present s suc h a n analysi s o f the recipi ents of transfer payment s i n Franc e an d five other nations . A t first glance, i t would appear that social policy in France indeed ha s little or no redistributiv e effect. Th e data i n table 3.13 , based on those reported b y Sawyer (1976, 34 35), indicat e tha t i n mos t o f th e si x nation s th e lowest-rankin g quintile s o f CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 8

5

TABLE 3 . 1 2

Two Measure s o f the Degre e o f Inequalit y i n th e Siz e Distribution o f Incom e amon g Household s i n Sixtee n Nation s

Gini Coefficient

Difference Between Top 20% and Bottom 20% of Households in Shares of Income Received

France

.342

36.7

Australia Belgium Britain Canada Denmark Finland Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden United States

.384 .265 .315 .330 .320 .304 .295 .300 .347 .270 .260 .304 .308 .290 .329

41.7 28.1 32.7 34.7 33.2 31.3 31.6 32.2 37.7 28.8 27.9 32.2 33.1 30.0 34.6

Source: Cameron (1988a , 223) . Note: The lower the Gini coefficient, th e less the inequality among household incomes .

TABLE 3 . 1 3

Distribution o f Transfer Payment s t o Quintile s o f Household s Ranke d b y Income i n Si x Nation s

Top 20 Percent of Households Next 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Bottom %

France (1970)

Britain (1973)

Canada (1972)

Germany (1969)

Norway (1970)

Sweden (1972)

24.3

9.3

14.6

19.1

10.5

10.7

17.7 19.5 20.9 17.8

10.9 12.6 24.9 42.4

13.5 16.0 28.2 27.8

17.0 16.7 23.5 23.7

11.2 14.5 30.6 33.2

12.2 13.8 26.1 37.3

Source: Sawye r (1976, 34-35) .

86 DAVI

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N

households receiv e a disproportionatel y larg e shar e o f benefits . Thus , i n Norway, Sweden , an d Britain , mor e than 6 0 percent of all transfer payment s are distribute d t o th e poores t 4 0 percen t o f households . Conversely , th e households rankin g i n th e to p quintile s receiv e considerabl y les s tha n the y would i f benefits wer e allocate d equall y amon g al l household s regardles s o f income. I n France, however , ther e appears to be no concentration o f benefits among the poorest households; instead, benefit s appea r to be distributed quit e evenly acros s al l o f the quintile s withou t regar d t o thei r positio n i n th e siz e distribution o f income. 9 The pattern observe d i n table 3.13 , o f a proportional distributio n o f social benefits withou t regar d t o income, suggest s that socia l polic y ma y have littl e consequence fo r th e siz e distributio n o f incom e i n France . T o establis h whether that in fact i s the case, i t is necessary to examine the size distribution of income in France . I n particular, i t is necessary to consider the distributio n of incom e befor e an d afte r transfe r payments . Tabl e 3.1 4 present s tha t analysis. Compose d fro m dat a reporte d i n Sawye r (1976 , 14 , 35) , table 3.1 4 compares th e distributio n o f incom e amon g household s ranke d b y incom e before taxe s and transfe r payments , afte r transfe r payment s an d befor e taxes , and afte r bot h transfe r payment s an d taxes . Whil e somewha t dated , th e figures i n th e tabl e allo w on e t o asses s th e exten t t o which—i f a t all — transfer payment s effec t a reductio n i n distributiona l inequalit y amon g in comes in France . The data i n table 3.1 4 on the size distribution o f income i n Franc e befor e and afte r transfe r payment s an d taxe s indicate quit e clearl y tha t socia l polic y does indee d hav e a discernibl e redistributiv e effect . Thi s i s true, w e shoul d note, despit e the essentially proportional allocatio n o f social funds amon g all households regardles s o f income . Considerin g onl y old-ag e pensions—which , although th e larges t componen t o f socia l security , ar e no t necessaril y th e most redistributiv e o f socia l benefits—tabl e 3.1 4 suggest s tha t transfe r pay ments reduced the share of income received by the top quintile of households by abou t thre e an d one-hal f percentag e point s an d increase d th e shar e o f income receive d b y the two lowest quintiles by about four percentag e points. Given tha t those two lowest quintiles, representin g th e poorest 40 percent of French households , receive d onl y slightl y mor e tha n 1 1 percen t o f tota l income befor e taxe s an d transfers , an d give n tha t the y receive d 1 5 percen t after transfers , ther e ca n b e littl e doubt tha t socia l polic y di d i n fac t provid e some remed y fo r thos e wit h th e lowes t income s i n Frenc h society . Ob viously, th e poores t 4 0 percen t stil l receive d a ver y disproportionatel y smal l CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 8

7

2 46. 4 22. 2 15. 5 10. 8 4.

7 -3. 5 47. 0 46. 9 -0. 6 -0. 8 23. 0 22. 7 -0. 8 +0. 6 15. 8 16. 3 +0. 2 +1. 7 9. 9 9. 8 -0. 8 +2. 0 4. 3 4. 3 0.

of Income Qhange Share of Income chang£ Post-Transfer, in Pre-Tax, Pre-Tax Share Post-Transfer

Source: Sawye r (1976, 14 , 35).

Top 20% 50. Next 20% 23. Middle 20% 15. Next 20% 8. Bottom 20% 2.

Households Share Ranked by Pre-Transfer, Income: Pre-Tax

Effect of Transfer Pa yments Effect

1 3 5 1 0

Post-Tax, Post-Transfer

of Direct Taxes in Share

The Impac t of Transfer Payment s an d Direc t Taxes o n th e Distributio n o f Income amon g Household s i n France , 197 0

TABLE 3.1 4

TABLE 3 . 1 5

The Chang e i n Share s o f Income Receive d b y Quintiles o f Households , Ranked b y Income , Attributabl e t o Transfer Payment s i n Si x Nation s

Top 20% of Households Next 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Bottom 20%

France (1970)

Britain (1973)

Canada (1972)

Germany (1969)

Norway (1970)

Sweden (1972)

-3.5

-3.1

-2.3

-4.3

-3.0

-6.7

-0.8 +0.6 + 1. 7 +2.0

-1.4 -0.6 + 1. 4 + 3.6

-0.9 -0.2 + 1. 5 + 1. 0

-1.3 -0.3 +2.3 + 3.5

-1.4 -0.3 + 1. 8 +2.8

-2.7 -0.9 +4.2 + 5.9

Source: Sawye r (1976, 34-35) .

share o f income , eve n afte r th e receip t o f transfe r payments , an d Franc e remained a relativel y inegalitaria n society . Nevertheless , th e shar e o f tota l household incom e receive d b y thos e poores t household s wa s considerabl y larger—by som e 3 6 percent—tha n i t ha d bee n prio r t o th e transfe r pay ments. The dat a i n Tabl e 3.1 4 enabl e one , also , t o compar e th e magnitud e o f the redistributiv e impact o f socia l polic y wit h tha t produce d b y direc t taxe s on income. The y suggest that social policy has a considerably greater redistributive effect o n income s i n Franc e tha n doe s taxation. Indeed , socia l polic y accounts fo r virtuall y all o f th e redistributiv e effec t o f fiscal policy . Direc t taxes appea r t o hav e n o discernibl e redistributiv e effec t a t all—largely , n o doubt, becaus e o f the exceptionall y modes t level s o f taxation o f income s i n France.10 If i t i s tru e tha t Frenc h socia l policy—despit e th e nearl y proportiona l distribution o f pension benefits—ha s a significan t redistributiv e effect , ho w does the magnitud e o f that effec t compar e wit h thos e observe d i n th e socia l policies o f other nations ? Tabl e 3.1 5 present s a summar y o f the change s i n shares of income receive d b y each o f the quintile s o f households, ranke d b y income, i n Franc e and five other nations. The data i n table 3.1 5 suggest that the othe r Europea n nation s fo r whic h comparabl e dat a ar e available — Norway, Sweden , Britain , an d Germany—effec t a somewhat greate r reduc tion of the market-generated inequalit y among incomes via social policy than does France. I t would be wrong to assume or assert that French socia l policy has n o ameliorativ e effec t o n inequalit y i n th e siz e distributio n o f income . But it would be equally wrong to assume that, becaus e it involves a relatively CONTINUITY AN D CHANG E I N FRENC H SOCIA L POLIC Y 8

9

large shar e o f the country' s economi c resources , Frenc h socia l polic y i s mor e redistributive—or eve n as redistributive—a s tha t i n othe r Europea n nations . In fact , Frenc h socia l policy , althoug h mildl y egalitaria n an d redistributive , appears t o b e less egalitaria n an d redistributiv e tha n i s socia l polic y i n an y other Europea n natio n fo r whic h w e hav e comparabl e data . An d therei n ma y lie bot h th e resolutio n o f th e apparen t parado x o f a hig h leve l o f socia l spending an d a relativel y hig h degre e o f distributiona l inequality , an d th e enduring dilemm a facin g contemporar y Frenc h polic y makers : hig h level s o f social spending , i f distribute d i n a proportiona l manne r throughou t th e society rathe r tha n concentrate d amon g th e poores t households , an d i f unac companied b y significantl y highe r level s o f incom e taxation , wil l d o littl e t o mitigate th e inequalitie s endemi c i n an y capitalis t economy .

NOTES

1. Fo r a discussio n o f Christian Democrac y tha t i s congruent wit h thi s argument , see Cameron 1988a , 236-39 . 2. A s I have demonstrated elsewher e (Cameron 1984 , 166) , the measures pertaining to th e organizatio n an d structur e o f th e labo r movemen t ar e highl y correlate d with eac h othe r an d wit h th e measur e o f openness . Fo r tha t reason , table s 3. 5 and 3. 6 includ e onl y on e measur e fro m tha t grou p o f variables, althoug h mos t are highly correlated wit h the spending measures. 3. T o compar e th e degre e o f statistical significanc e o f the independen t variable s i n a multipl e regressio n analysis , on e ca n compar e th e f-statistic s (reporte d i n parentheses unde r th e regressio n coefficient s i n table s 3. 5 an d 3.6) . Thos e statistics are calculated by dividing the coefficient b y its standard error . 4. Th e percen t chang e i n constant-currenc y C D . P . betwee n 196 5 an d 198 5 wa s 49 percen t i n Britai n an d 7 6 percent i n th e U.S . N o othe r countr y amon g th e seventeen considere d her e ha d a lowe r long-ter m rat e o f growt h tha n Britain . And onl y Sweden , Denmark , an d German y (an d Britain ) ha d lowe r long-ter m rates of growth than th e U.S. 5. Th e measur e of social spending effort use d in figure 3.1 was calculated fro m dat a reported b y the Organization fo r Economi c Cooperation an d Developmen t i n it s annual publication , National Accounts ofOECD Countries. Thes e data includ e all public expenditures for social security and social assistance except that portion of public final consumption expenditur e associated with social programs. 6. Thi s analysi s thu s support s Laroque' s contentio n tha t th e reform s o f th e lat e 1950s and earl y 1960s , which attempte d t o bring some order to the various social security regimes and extende d sickness , unemployment , an d othe r benefit s t o workers and employee s outside industry , wer e more consequential tha n the mor e 90 DAVI

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widely publicize d administrativ e reform s o f 1967 . O n th e 196 7 reforms , se e Guillaume(1971). 7. Sinc e th e rat e o f increas e i n socia l spending , independen t o f economi c growt h and elections, wa s 0.182 fo r each yea r of the Fift h Republi c relativ e to each yea r of the Fourth Republic , th e rate of increase for each year of the Fourth Republic , relative to each year of the Fifth, wa s —0.182. 8. Fo r our purposes, a n appropriate definition o f statistical significance—somewha t relaxed bu t stil l quit e restrictive—require s a probability o f 90 percent fo r a onetailed test. 9. I t must be noted her e that the category "transfer payments " includes, fo r France , only pensions. Thi s undoubtedl y accounts , t o some degree, fo r th e near-propor tional distribution o f benefits throughou t th e population regardles s of income. 10. Amon g all the O.E.C.D. nations , onl y two—France an d Greece—received les s than 2 0 percent of all government revenue s from taxe s on personal and corporat e incomes. An d ove r the perio d 1965-1983 , onl y i n Greec e di d taxe s on persona l income represen t a smalle r shar e o f G.D.P . tha n i n France . Se e O.E.C.D . (1985b, 20 , 87).

REFERENCES

Andrews, Willia m G. , an d Stanle y Hoffmann , eds . 1981 . The Fifth Republic at Twenty. Albany : State University of New York Press. Ashford, Dougla s E . 1982 . Policy and Politics in France: Living with Uncertainty. Philadelphia: Temple Universit y Press. . 1986 . The Emergence of the Welfare States. Oxford : Blackwell. Barjot, Alain . 1971 . "L'Evolutio n d e l a Securit e Social e (Jui n 1960-Jui n 1966). " Revue Francaise des Affaires Sociales 25: 61-79. Cameron, Davi d R . 1978 . "Th e Expansio n o f the Publi c Economy : A Comparative Analysis." American Political Science Review 72: 1243-61. . 1984 . "Socia l Democracy , Corporatism , Labou r Quiescence , an d th e Rep resentation o f Economi c Interes t i n Advance d Capitalis t Society. " I n Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, edite d b y Joh n H . Goldthorpe . Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press. . 1985 . "Publi c Expenditur e an d Economi c Performanc e i n Internationa l Perspective." I n The Future of Welfare, edite d b y Rudol f Klei n an d Michae l O'Higgins. Oxford : Blackwell. . 1986 . "The Growt h o f Government Spending : The Canadia n Experienc e i n Comparative Perspective. " In State and Society: Canada in Comparative Perspective, edited by Keith Banting. Toronto : University of Toronto Press. . 1988a . "Politics , Publi c Policy , an d Distributiona l Inequality : A Compara tive Analysis." In Power, Inequality, and Democratic Politics: Essays in Honor of Robert A. Dahl, edite d by Ian Shapiro and Grant Reeher . Boulder : Westview.

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. 1988b . "Th e Color s o f a Rose : O n th e Ambiguou s Recor d o f Frenc h Socialism." Working Paper Series. Cambridge : Cente r fo r Europea n Studies , Harvard University . Centre d'Etud e de s Revenus e t des Couts. 1990 . Constat de IEvolution Recente des Revenus en France (1986-1989). Paris : C.E.R.C. Commissariat Genera l d u Plan . 1983 . L'Avenir de la Protection Sociale. Paris : Documentation Francaise . Doublet, Jacques . 1971 . "La Securit e Social e e t so n Evolutio n (Octobr e 1951—Jui n I960)." Revue Francaise des Affaires Sociales 25: 27-60. Dumont, Jean-Pierre . 1978a . "L a Securit e Social e e t le s Projet s de s Partis. " Le Monde, Februar y 21. . 1978b . "Un e Cathedrale Inachevee. " Le Monde, Ma y 23. . 1981a . "L'Heur e des Comptes." Le Monde, Augus t 30-31 . . 1981b . La Securite Sociale: Toujours en Chantier. Paris : Editions Ouvrieres. Fourastie, Jean , an d Beatric e Bazil . 1980 . Le Jardin du Voisin: Les Inegalites en France. Paris: Librairie Generale Francaise . Freeman, Gary . 1985 . "Socialis m an d Socia l Security. " I n The French Socialist Experiment, edite d b y Joh n S . Ambler . Philadelphia : Institut e fo r th e Stud y o f Human Issues . Galant, Henr y C . 1955 . Histoire Politique de la Securite Sociale Francaise, 19451952. Paris: Armand Colin . Gordon, Margare t S . 1988 . Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries. Cam bridge: Cambridge Universit y Press. Guillaume, Michel . 1971 . "L'Evolution d e l a Securit e Sociale , 1966-1970. " Revue Francaise des Affaires Sociales 25: 81-97. Hatzfeld, Henri . 1971 . Du Pauperisme d la Securite Sociale: Essai sur les Origines de la Securite Sociale en France, 1850-1940. Paris : Colin. International Labou r Organisation . 1985 . The Cost of Social Security: Eleventh International Inquiry, 1978-1980. Geneva : I.L.O. Kuisel, Richar d F . 1981 . Capitalism and the State in Modern France. Cambridge: Cambridge Universit y Press. Laroque, Pierre . 1948 . "Fro m Socia l Insuranc e t o Socia l Security : Evolutio n i n France." International Labor Review 57: 565-90. , ed. 1961 . Succes et Faiblesse de lEffort Social Francais. Paris: Colin. . 1971 . "L a Securit e Social e d e 194 4 a 1951. " Revue Francaise des Affaires Sociales 25: 11-26. — - — . 1980 . Les Institutions Sociales en France. Paris: Documentation Francaise . Organisation fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Development . 1982 . OECD Economic Outlook. 32 . . 1985a . OEC D Economic Studies: The Role of the Public Sector. Paris : O.E.C.D. . 1985b . Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries. Paris: O.E.C.D. . 1988 . OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1966-1986. Paris : O.E.C.D. . 1989 . OECD Economic Outlook. 46. Roson, Henri . 1976 . "Le s Grande s Tendance s d e Involutio n d e l a Securit e Social e 92 DAVI

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en France. " Bulletin International de llnstitut dAdministration Publique 37: 7 20. Rustant, Maurice . 1980 . La Securite Sociale en Crise. Lyon: Chronique Sociale . Sawyer, Malcolm . 1976 . "Incom e Distributio n i n OEC D Countries. " OECD Economic Outlook: Occasional Studies. Paris : Organization fo r Economi c Coopera tion and Development . Shonfield, Andrew . 1965 . Modem Capitalism. Ne w York: Oxford Universit y Press. United State s Departmen t o f Healt h an d Huma n Services . 1980 . Social Security Programs Throughout the Wor/cf , J979 . Washington , D.C. : U.S . Governmen t Printing Office .

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4

THE CONTINUIT Y O F C R I S I S : PATTERN S O F HEALT H CAR E POLICYMAKIN G I N FRANCE, 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 8 DAVID WILSFOR D We're insure d agains t th e bi g healt h risks—everythin g majo r medical , fo r example—but it' s abnormal , aberran t tha t we'r e als o insure d agains t th e little risks—lik e cold s and th e flu. Yo u ca n eve n ge t reimbursed fo r aspirin , as long as you have a prescription fo r it . —French physicia n speakin g in 198 4 We live d i n th e middl e o f Paris , s o we took a tax i t o th e hospita l whe n m y wife went into labor. A t the emergency room , I paid the driver and turned t o follow m y wif e in . Th e drive r stoppe d m e t o as k i f I wante d a receipt . I n reply t o m y "Why? " h e riposted , "Becaus e Socia l Securit y wil l reimburs e you!" —American socia l scientist reflecting o n a stay in France , 1984-198 6

The Frenc h healt h car e system i s characterized b y a strong, centralize d stat e authority. However , healt h professionals, especiall y physicians, are splintered into competin g groups , constitutin g a weak , fragmente d interes t sector . This chapte r i s a revise d versio n o f a pape r originall y presente d a t th e annua l meetin g o f th e American Politica l Scienc e Association/Frenc h Conferenc e Group , 1- 5 Septembe r 1988 , Washington D.C . Translation s fro m Frenc h ar e my own. M y thanks go to John Ambler, Phili p Cerny, Henr y W . Ehrmann , Aren d Lijphart , an d Pascal e Canlorb e Wilsfor d fo r suggestion s and assistance . Al l unattribute d quotation s ar e take n fro m confidentia l interview s wit h th e author.

94

(Wilsford 1988 a lays out the details of these characteristics of state and society in France. ) This chapte r wil l explore ho w these independen t variable s affec t patterns of policymaking i n Frenc h healt h care . I will first describe th e Frenc h healt h car e syste m an d the n tur n t o thre e examples o f stat e refor m o f healt h polic y durin g socialis t rul e fro m 198 1 t o 1986. These cases are the institution o f the budget global for public hospitals, the refor m o f graduate medica l education , an d th e propose d departmentali zation o f hospitals. Finally , I will loo k a t mor e genera l issue s of health car e policymaking durin g socialis t rul e an d contras t the m t o policymakin g i n health car e i n th e 198 6 Chirac government . On e principa l conclusio n t o be derived fro m thi s contrast wil l b e that i n healt h car e i n France , th e politica l party i n powe r make s little difference t o policy outcomes , chiefl y becaus e o f the overridin g salienc e o f the hig h an d incessantl y increasin g cos t o f healt h care. Th e issue s explore d i n thi s chapte r als o poin t u p th e prevalenc e o f polemic i n Frenc h healt h car e politic s an d th e overarchin g importanc e tha t all th e Frenc h attac h t o providin g comprehensiv e healt h car e coverag e t o virtually al l the population throug h nationa l healt h insurance . Thi s las t goal serves t o persistentl y undercu t th e traditiona l prerogative s o f th e medica l profession an d thus reduce the political influenc e o f organized medicine . 1. "L A M E D E C I N E L I BE RALE"

The Frenc h thin k o f thei r medica l syste m a s a treasure d mi x o f socialize d access to health care , which fulfill s th e important goals of national solidarity , combined with the private practice of medicine, whic h preserves the freedo m and independenc e o f th e physicia n an d o f th e patient . Thi s latte r aspec t i s known a s "la medecine liberate" o r liberal medicine . La medecine liberate i s composed o f the fou r sacre d principle s o f Frenc h medicin e first set forth i n the 192 7 manifest o know n a s the Medica l Charter , o r Charte medicaid (1 ) freedom o f physicia n choic e b y th e patient , (2 ) freedo m o f prescriptio n b y the physician , (3 ) fe e fo r servic e payment , an d (4 ) direc t paymen t b y th e patient t o th e physicia n fo r service s rendered . Thes e principle s appl y t o th e organization o f health car e delivered b y private practitioners, bot h generalist s and specialists . Privat e practitioners constitut e roughl y 5 7 percent o f Frenc h physicians. The y are private not because their income s are financed privately —except i n rar e case s the y ar e not—bu t becaus e the y wor k o n th e fee-for service basi s i n thei r ow n office s an d ar e pai d directl y fo r thei r service s b y their patients, who are then reimburse d b y the sickness funds . THE CONTINUIT Y O F CRISI S 9

5

In Franc e a large proportion o f medicine is practiced i n hospitals, a s well. Hospital physician s constitut e roughl y 3 5 percent o f th e practicin g medica l corps. Mos t o f these physician s ar e pai d o n a salaried basis . Th e remainde r of French physicians—abou t 8 percent—work i n various salaried capacities : in publi c healt h centers , a s sickness fund inspectors , a s plant physician s fo r private businesses, fo r schools, an d so on. Eight y percent of French hospital s are public; their administration fall s under the purview of the national healt h ministry. Publi c hospitals range from smal l provincial establishment s i n rura l areas t o th e mos t prestigiou s an d ver y larg e researc h hospital s i n th e larg e university cities , suc h a s Paris . Th e remainder , 2 0 percent , ar e privat e hospitals, o r cliniques. These ar e owne d an d operate d fo r profit . Patient s i n them ar e covere d b y th e nationa l healt h insurance , bu t a t a lesse r rate . Cliniques ma y also charge whatever the y want. I n general , the y ar e reserve d to th e uppe r classes , fo r obviou s economi c reasons , an d ten d t o b e concen trated i n th e larg e citie s o r sp a towns , lik e Vichy, Aix-en-Provence , o r Aixles-Bains. This shor t descriptio n show s clearl y tha t th e characte r o f th e Frenc h health car e system i s heavily public. I n fact, stat e intervention i n health car e has a ver y lon g histor y i n France . Henr i I V issue d a n edic t date d 1 6 Ma y 1604 that establishe d salar y deductions fro m miners ' wages so that a surgeon could be employed an d medicine s bought to care for those injured i n minin g accidents. Accordin g to the edict, "th e injure d poo r could [thereby ] be freel y cared for , an d b y thi s exampl e o f charity, other s shal l b e th e mor e encour aged to work/' I n 1673 , Colbert issue d similar ordinance s concernin g sailor s of the merchant marine . With th e ris e o f industrializatio n i n France—i n th e mines , i n steel , i n ship building, i n heav y construction , i n textiles—couple d wit h advance s i n medicine an d science— a collectiv e protectio n o f th e healt h ris k graduall y supplanted individua l an d familia l protection . Zol a give s compellin g ac counts o f th e dangerou s condition s surroundin g th e industria l workplac e i n France durin g th e latte r nineteent h centur y an d o f ho w worker s ofte n suf fered. Bu t ther e wa s a mor e utilitaria n concer n a s well. Injure d worker s ar e not productive . Th e la w o f 9 Apri l 189 8 institute d workers ' compensatio n and require d industria l employers to subscribe to private insurance for indus trial accidents. In 1930 , genera l socia l protection wa s finally established afte r a decade of opposition b y the medica l corp s to various specific provisions . Thi s nationa l health insuranc e wa s essentiall y a "legislativ e support " fo r th e numerou s 96 DAVI

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previously private sick funds. Employee s covered were required t o enroll i n a fund, an d th e stat e pai d th e premium s ou t o f taxe s levie d o n wage s an d o n employers (Glase r 1970 , 17-18) . Afte r Worl d Wa r II , th e ordinance s o f 4 and 1 0 Octobe r 194 5 furthe r extende d th e principl e o f socia l protection — health care, retirement , an d family allowances—t o th e entire population . The 194 5 ordinances wer e originally designe d b y the Consei l nationa l d e la resistanc e t o exten d healt h care , retiremen t coverage , an d famil y allow ances i n a unitary administrativ e system . Th e interwa r syste m establishe d i n 1928-1930 covere d onl y a small percentag e o f salaried workers , thos e below a relativel y lo w wag e ceiling . I n th e postwa r politic s o f generalizin g socia l security, however , miners , the merchant marine, functionaries , an d employ ees of the nationa l railroad s fough t t o kee p their ow n individua l healt h car e and retiremen t regimes . Initially , then , i n additio n t o thes e specialize d regimes, on e genera l regim e covere d al l othe r wag e laborer s an d anothe r specialized regim e covere d agricultura l workers . I n subsequen t years , socia l security protectio n wa s extended t o students , writers , artisans , an d indepen dent shopkeepers . I n th e 1970s , th e remainin g margin s o f th e populatio n were covered : handicappe d adults , widows , an d divorce d wome n i n 1975 : single parent s i n 1976 ; and al l other s theretofor e uncovere d i n 1978 . Thi s last categor y constitute d littl e ove r 2 percen t o f th e genera l population , including—ironically—physicians. A s of 198 5 only 0.4 percen t o f the Frenc h population (define d t o includ e al l citizen s an d residents ) remaine d uncov ered; these 0.4 percent are normally treated through publi c welfare funds . Throughout it s historical evolution , th e characte r o f the Frenc h nationa l health insuranc e syste m ha s alway s been criticall y influence d b y two forces . The first, th e concep t o f "solidarity, " underpin s th e developmen t o f socia l security sinc e th e nineteent h century . B y "national solidarity/ ' I refer t o th e agreement by all elements o f an otherwise highly divided Frenc h societ y that social assistanc e wa s necessar y t o th e strengt h an d well-bein g o f France — both t o it s interna l cohesivenes s an d t o it s power i n th e internationa l order . This unit y o f purpos e wa s focuse d aroun d th e concept s o f bot h mutua l dependence and national obligation, an d i t was directed toward social welfar e goals concernin g unemployment , famil y allowances , retiremen t pensions , and health care . The theme of national solidarit y dates to at least the Frenc h Revolution an d ha s historicall y attracte d al l shade s o f Frenc h intellectua l thought, rangin g from tha t of the Radica l Socialist s of Blanc's time to that of the Gaullist s an d neo-Gaullist s o f th e Fift h Republic . Thi s sentimen t wa s particularly stron g i n Franc e a t th e clos e o f World Wa r II . I t wa s a crucia l THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 9

7

support i n th e comin g togethe r o f al l ideologica l faction s i n favo r o f a reformed socia l security system. The secon d force , particularl y importan t t o al l tha t ha s t o d o wit h th e financing an d administratio n o f the Frenc h healt h car e system , i s the corp s of civi l servant s imbue d wit h a stron g sens e o f bureaucrati c mission . B y "bureaucratic mission " I mean tha t French hig h functionaries felt—an d stil l feel—that the y ac t wit h th e authorit y t o perfor m a specia l duty . Thi s dut y involves the constant definition an d defense of the general interest in the fac e of all who would assert particular or partisan interest s contrary to the interest s of the whole, o r of France. This sense of mission is not unlike the preaching, teaching, an d proselytizing of a religious order. Th e order in French bureau cratic politic s i s the grand corps. Its training ground s ar e th e grandes ecoles. The missio n give s high functionarie s i n Franc e th e perceptio n tha t th e stat e has a n interes t tha t i s bot h definabl e an d defendable . I t als o shape s thei r understanding o f where interest s lie , whic h o f these ar e compatible wit h th e state's interest , an d wha t type s o f conduc t b y decisio n maker s an d outsid e groups ar e appropriat e t o thi s administrative-politica l universe . Hig h func tionaries in Frenc h healt h car e policymaking defined thei r duty as improving and extendin g socia l security protection , especiall y i n th e postwar period . I n executing thi s mission , the y als o made us e of extensive appeals to the ideol ogy of national solidarity . Currently, th e mai n sicknes s fund , th e Caiss e national e d e Tassuranc e maladie de s travailleurs salarie s (CNAMTS ) cover s th e healt h car e expendi tures o f 8 0 percen t o f th e Frenc h population . Th e remainde r ar e divide d between specialize d regime s an d th e agricultura l regime . A t th e nationa l level, th e CNAMT S govern s a syste m o f sixtee n caisses regionales an d 12 9 caisses locales. Th e regiona l sicknes s funds coordinat e preventio n an d devel opment, i n particula r o f hospital facilities . Th e loca l sicknes s funds, usuall y corresponding t o departments , overse e th e enrollmen t o f thos e covere d b y the system and th e collection o f the employee/employer contributions . The y also are charged wit h the reimbursement o f all claims. The nationa l sicknes s fund fixes al l genera l policy—ofte n a t th e directio n o f th e government — regarding level s of contribution, level s of reimbursement, an d level s of charges and fees . I t als o generall y oversee s th e administratio n o f th e system . Thi s system i s vast. I n 1985 , ther e wer e ove r on e hundre d thousan d administra tors, agents , clerks, and physician-inspectors employe d by the CNAMTS. O f these, seventy-si x thousan d worke d i n th e loca l funds . I n 1984 , 39 3 millio n

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TABLE 4. 1

Average Level s o f Reimbursement Fixe d b y the CNAMTS , 198 5 (in percentages )

Physician fees Other personnel expenditures (e.g., nurses, physical therapists, etc.) Hospitalization Prescription drugs Special medications Eyeglasses, prostheses Laboratory analyses

Reimbursement Level 75 65

Patient Copayment

80 70 100 70 65

20 30 none 30 35

25 35

Source: CNAMTS.

payment operation s were executed. Th e averag e levels of reimbursement ar e displayed i n tabl e 4.1 . I n 1984 , th e CNAMT S administere d 26 7 billio n francs i n payments. l Physicians in private practice i n Franc e mus t adhere to the convention fo r their patient s t o b e reimburse d fo r thei r services . Th e convention i s th e standard fe e schedul e for al l procedures and consultation s tha t i s periodically negotiated betwee n th e sicknes s fund s an d organize d medicine . Physician s are pai d directl y b y thei r patients , exceptin g mos t surgica l procedure s an d consultations associate d wit h hospitalization . I f th e physicia n i s conventionne, th e patien t i s then reimburse d th e specifie d percentag e o f the sched uled fee. 2 All the sickness funds togethe r count only 734 physicians in private practice i n Franc e wh o ar e no t conventionnes. Thei r patient s ar e therefor e not eligible for full reimbursement . The histor y o f th e convention ha s bee n complex . Th e 194 5 ordinance s established a convention at the departmental leve l between funds an d medica l unions. Bu t beginnin g i n 1946 , th e Confederatio n de s syndicat s medicau x francais (CSMF)—a t tha t time, th e sole principal unio n representin g private practitioners—opposed th e fe e negotiatin g syste m altogether . Th e nationa l sickness funds wer e also dissatisfied, fo r many of the departmental agreement s sanctioned fe e level s tha t the y considere d to o high . Thi s syste m le d t o substantial disparitie s i n paymen t percentages . I n theory , th e socia l securit y system wa s supposed t o cover a n individual' s healt h car e expenditures, espe -

THE CONTINUIT Y O F CRISI S 9

9

daily physicia n fees , a t 7 5 percent. Bu t i n fact , reimbursemen t level s varied widely fro m departmen t t o departmen t an d fro m individua l physicia n t o individual physicia n (Wilsford , 1988b) . Against th e backdro p o f widely varyin g level s o f reimbursement , i n 196 0 the French stat e imposed a new system of binding fee negotiations. Wit h th e decree o f 1 2 Ma y 1960 , th e stat e institute d a crucia l change : henceforth , negotiations would stil l take place at the departmental leve l between sicknes s funds an d th e medica l union , bu t physicians would hav e the righ t to adher e to the negotiate d fees—or , i n th e absence o f agreement, t o the fe e schedul e published b y the sickness fund—individually. Thi s reform—imposed b y the state—was aki n t o a n open-sho p rul e an d greatl y damage d th e medica l union's strategi c position, fo r i t meant that the union n o longer spoke for th e entire medica l corps . Further , th e patients o f physicians wh o did no t sign — in th e absenc e o f a unio n agreement—woul d b e reimburse d a t ridiculousl y low levels, fro m 5 to 1 0 percent o f the customary fee s charge d b y physicians in mos t areas . Th e impositio n o f th e decre e o f 1 2 Ma y 196 0 an d th e subsequent fe e syste m le d t o a schism i n Frenc h medica l syndicalis m (Wils ford 1987b) . As o f 1 2 Decembe r 1984 , 69,09 4 physician s ha d signe d th e 198 4 fe e agreement, o r 79.7 percent of private practitioners. Another 7,18 6 physician s (8.3 percent ) benefite d fro m a sanctione d righ t t o excee d th e fe e schedul e without the loss of their patients 7 right to reimbursement (the droit de depassement). Thes e ar e usuall y physician s wh o ar e eithe r ver y celebrate d i n thei r specialty o r practic e a specialt y tha t i s i n exceedingl y grea t demand . Th e droit de depassement i s n o longe r granted . Anothe r 9,74 0 physician s (11. 2 percent) ha d opte d fo r Secto r 2 , a paralle l fe e syste m create d i n 198 0 tha t permits physicians who choose i t to exceed the negotiated fe e schedule "wit h tact an d reasonableness." 3 I n return , the y mus t pa y thei r ow n socia l insur ance premiums . I n practice , Secto r 2 physicians generall y excee d Secto r 1 fees b y abou t 3 5 percent . Naturally , the y ten d t o b e thos e physician s wit h specialties i n demand, o r those who enjoy a stable surplus o f patients, muc h like th e physician s wh o wer e formerl y grante d th e droit de depassement. Sector 2 replace s th e droit de depassement as a safet y valve , o r exi t option , for physician s i n hig h deman d t o ge t around th e restriction s o f the nationa l health insuranc e system . Th e stat e and th e sickness funds assume d tha t wit h a large and growing supply of physicians, fees in Sector 2 would be kept more or less in check . Further , th e financing o f the highe r fee s o f Secto r 2 would fall o n the consumer. H e or she would be reimbursed b y the sickness fund a t 100 DAVI

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TABLE 4. 2

Number o f Privat e Practitioner s Adherin g t o the Convention, 31 December 198 4 Conventioned Without With Sector Total NonDP DP 2 Conventioned conventioned Total

Generalists 43,45

4 1,14 9 5,50 5 50,10

8 54

9 50,65

7

Specialists 25,64

0 6,03 7 4,23 5 35,91

2 18

6 36,09

8

Total physicians 69,09

4 7,18 6 9,74 0 86,02

0 73

5 86,75

5

8 100.

0

Percent 79.

7 8.

3 11.

2 99.

2 0.

Source: CNAMTS (1985a , 16) . Notes: 1. Thes e figures do not include full-time hospita l personnel . 2. "DP " signifies "depassement permanent" an d permits those practitioners so designated to exceed the officia l fee schedule at their discretion. Th e depassement permanent i s no longer granted. 3. Th e Secto r 2 was established b y the 198 1 Convention t o permit physicians to opt out of the negotiated fe e schedules without losing the right of their patients to be reimbursed a t normal levels.

the Secto r 1 rate (Godt 1987) . Finally , th e 73 5 private practitioners wh o ar e not conventionnes compris e onl y 0. 8 percen t o f total privat e practitioner s i n France (CNAMT S 1985a) . Thes e figures d o no t coun t hospita l o r othe r salaried physicians (see table 4.2).

2. EXPLOSIV E D E M O G R A P H I C G R O W T H O F TH E FRENC H MEDICAL C O R P S

There was a terrible shortage of doctors [in the 1950 s and 60s] and then . . . UP! We trained plenty of them . An d now , ther e ar e wa y to o many.—Frenc h physicia n speaking in 1984 The French state has used its tactical advantages to greatest effect i n influenc ing th e demographi c growt h o f th e medica l professio n i n France . Tha t growth ha s helpe d i t an d th e sicknes s fund s t o kee p fe e increase s down , fo r supply o f physicians ha s com e t o excee d demand. 4 Th e explosiv e growt h o f the Frenc h medica l corp s an d it s changin g demographi c characte r hav e increasingly weakened th e strategic position o f organized medicine . Growth o f physician suppl y began i n 196 7 when th e French stat e dramatically increase d medica l schoo l enrollments . On e reaso n i t di d s o wa s be cause a s lat e a s 1965 , fo r example , medica l demographi c studie s predicte d THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F C R I S I S 10

1

FIGURE 4. 1

Medical Graduate s i n France , 1919-198 6

Source: Frenc h Ministr y o f Education, mime o (September 1986) . Note: Figures for 198 3 through 198 6 are provisional.

that Franc e woul d experienc e a growin g shortage of qualifie d physicians . According t o th e mos t optimisti c hypothesis , ther e wer e t o b e mor e tha n seven thousan d fewe r physician s tha n neede d i n 197 0 an d nin e thousan d fewer tha n neede d i n 1975 . Unde r mor e pessimisti c assumptions , shortage s were t o amoun t t o 11,50 0 physician s i n 197 5 (Bui-Dan-Ha-Doa n 1965) . The Frenc h stat e thus increase d th e numbe r o f medical student s by increasing the quota o f students permitted b y competitive examinatio n t o pass fro m the first to the second year of medical studies . This competitive quota syste m is know n a s th e selection in Frenc h an d th e quot a i s fixed annually b y th e Ministry o f Education . Consequently , th e number s o f medica l graduate s dramatically increase d a s well, especiall y beginning i n 1975 . The numbe r of French physician s has tripled i n a quarter-century an d mor e than double d i n the las t decad e (se e figure 4.1) . I n 1983 , ther e wer e 147,40 2 physicians — both privat e practitioners an d hospita l physicians—licensed t o practice med icine b y th e Ordr e de s Medecins . I n Januar y 1987 , ther e wer e 157,52 7 practicing physician s (excludin g retirees) . Medica l densit y i n Franc e ha s grown fro m tw o hundre d practicin g physician s pe r on e hundre d thousan d inhabitants i n 197 9 t o 25 6 pe r on e hundre d thousan d i n 198 4 (se e figure 102 DAVI

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FIGURE 4. 2

Growth i n Numbe r o f Practicing Physician s i n France , 1970-198 4

Source: Calculated fro m CNAMT S (1985a , 8) . Notes: 1. Th e difference betwee n th e numbe r of practicing physicians (the top graph line) and the number of private practitioners (the bottom grap h line) represents the number o f full-time hospita l physicians . 2. Th e figure for each year is that taken o n 3 1 December o f that year.

4.2). Medica l demographers predicted i n 198 4 that the number o f physicians would continu e t o increas e a t a n averag e annua l rat e o f 2 2 percen t i n th e next five years. Al l categorie s o f medica l personne l hav e grown—exceptin g midwives. Nevertheless, recen t statistics show a slowing of the growth of the medica l corps. Th e averag e physician ag e will als o begin t o gradually rise . Th e sam e state tha t increase d enrollment s i n medica l school s s o rapidl y i n th e 1960 s was also able to restrict them whe n i t became apparent tha t having too many physicians cause s it s ow n problem s a s well , namel y a grea t man y unem ployed and underemployed youn g physicians. The quotas for admissions int o second-year medica l schoo l have been cu t by more than hal f in eleven years, from 8,66 1 i n 1976-197 7 t o onl y forty-on e hundre d i n 1987-1988 . O f al l physicians wh o opene d a privat e practic e betwee n 197 5 an d 1979 , 3. 4 percent had cease d practicing medicin e altogethe r b y 3 1 December 1982 . I n March 1985 , 98 0 physician s wer e collectin g unemploymen t benefit s (Le Monde, 8 Ma y 1985) . I n Apri l 1988 , th e stat e als o authorize d th e sicknes s THE CONTINUIT Y O F CRISI S 10

3

FIGURE 4. 3

Number o f Private Practitioner s i n France by Age Group an d by Sex, 1984

age group s Source: CNAMTS (1985a).

fund t o reach a n agreement wit h the medical union s (CSM F and FMF) on an earl y retiremen t program . Physician s between sixt y and sixty-five year s of age woul d b e eligibl e t o retir e o n advantageou s pension s fo r tw o years. Altogether, seventy-fiv e hundre d physician s wer e eligibl e fo r the progra m (Quotidien du Medecin, 7 April 1988) . The curren t plethor a o f physicians in France ha s three notabl e character istics. First , ther e is the "feminization" o f the medical corps. In 1968 women constituted 13. 6 percen t o f all physicians ; the y constitute d 17. 6 percen t in 1979 and 26. 2 percent in 1984. A feminization o f the medical corp s has also occurred i n all countries of the Europea n Community . Second , th e average French physicia n i s far younger now—onl y 42. 5 year s old (see figure 4.3). Over hal f of all physicians hav e graduated afte r 1974 . Third, ther e ar e mor e salaried physicians , a phenomeno n tie d i n par t t o the feminization o f the medical corp s and in part to the surplus o f all physicians . I t is very difficul t now for a young physician—male o r female—to establis h a private practice. Salaried medicine—a t wor k sites, publi c healt h centers , schools , and hospitals—offers a n increasingl y rar e securit y o f employment. Fo r women who are mother s a s well, salarie d medicin e als o offer s mor e convenien t workin g conditions, especiall y insofa r a s scheduling child care is concerned. 104 DAVI

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3. BUDGETIN G R E F O R M S A N D HOSPITA L C O S T C O N T A I N M E N T

During th e socialists ' tim e i n powe r fro m 198 1 t o 1986 , healt h policie s proved t o b e a n are a o f great reform . However , whil e Frangoi s Mitterrand' s platform i n the 198 8 presidential election mentioned ten specific proposition s in th e genera l are a o f health car e (ou t o f 10 1 propositions overall) , non e o f these wa s the foca l poin t o f the campaign . Th e socialist s reforme d s o muc h in healt h car e mainl y becaus e ther e wa s s o muc h tha t neede d reforming . This, i n turn , wa s th e cas e becaus e o f th e complex , sometime s irrational , always ver y expensiv e characte r o f th e healt h car e system . Man y o f th e socialists' reforms—even som e of those that were fought i n bitter ideologica l terms—had thei r origin s i n previou s attempt s b y conservative governments , especially Giscard's, t o reorganiz e th e syste m an d t o contai n costs . Th e first major are a o f socialis t reform—an d perhap s th e on e are a i n whic h the y enjoyed th e mos t unmitigate d success—wa s th e budgetin g refor m essentia l to containing hospital costs. As of November 1986 , the Frenc h publi c hospita l syste m was made up of 1,058 establishments : 2 9 regiona l medica l center s (includin g 2 7 universit y teaching an d researc h hospitals) , 50 5 general hospitals , 9 8 psychiatric hospi tals, 6 9 medium - an d long-ter m convalescen t centers , an d 35 7 loca l an d rural hospitals . Th e numbe r o f beds totalled 512,344 . I n the hospital sector , there wer e 44,000 full-tim e physician s (includin g resident s i n al l specialties ) and 4,500 part-time physicians. There were 620,000 nonmedical employees . The tota l budge t fo r 198 5 was 13 9 billion franc s (se e table 4.3). Ther e wer e also 2,57 2 privat e hospital s i n France : 1,40 7 acut e car e facilities , 81 4 me dium-term convalescen t centers , 2 5 long-ter m car e hospitals , 2 0 cance r treatment centers , 28 3 menta l healt h an d dru g an d alcoho l dependenc y centers, an d 2 3 psychiatric hospitals . Th e numbe r o f beds totalled 209,634 . Physicians practicin g full - o r part-tim e i n privat e hospital s totalle d 40,000 . There wer e 210,00 0 nonmedica l employees . Tota l budget s wer e 5 1 billio n francs i n 198 5 (se e table 4.4) . Th e distributio n o f medical personne l i n th e French hospita l syste m i s show n i n tabl e 4.5 . I n th e Frenc h healt h car e system, hospita l cost s take u p ove r hal f o f all healt h car e expenditures . Th e Paris hospitals alone (4 0 hospitals i n th e H e de Franc e region ) accounted fo r 20 billion franc s o f expenditures i n 1985 . They treate d 640,00 0 be d patient s and employe d 76,00 0 person s (Le Monde, 2 Januar y 1985) . Hospital s ar e thus an obvious target for state reforms . Hospital budgetin g reform s i n pursui t o f cos t containmen t i n thi s vas t THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F C R I S I S 10

5

TABLE 4. 3

Public Hospital s i n France , 198 5 Number of establishments: 29 regiona 505 genera 98 psychiatri 69 medium 357 loca 1,058 tota

l hospital center s (CHRs), including 2 7 university medical centers (CHUs ) l hospital s c hospital center s - and long-ter m convalescen t center s l and rura l hospitals (without full-time physicia n staff ) l public sector hospital s Number of hospital beds (1 January 1985) = 512,34 4 Number of hospital physicians:

44,000 full-tim 4,500 part-tim 18,000 temporar 66,500 tota

e physicians , includin g resident s e physician s y physician s l hospital physician s

Number of nonmedical personnel: = 620,000 Total budget (fiscal 1985) = 13 9 billion franc s (+ 8.0 percen t increase for 1985 ) Source: Frenc h Ministr y of Health, mimeo . (Novembe r 1986) . Notes: "CHR"—Centre hospitalier regional "CHU"—Centre hospitalier universitaire

system sho w som e o f th e characteristic s o f successfu l stat e policymakin g i n French healt h care . A s L'Express pu t i t i n a Jun e 198 5 article , i t turne d ou t to b e "la grande misere des hopitaux." I n 1983 , man y hospita l director s thought i t wa s a jok e whe n a memorandu m wa s sen t ou t fro m Jea n d e Kervasdoue, the n Directo r o f Hospital s i n th e Frenc h Ministr y o f Socia l Affairs. I t ordere d tha t ta p wate r b e substitute d fo r minera l wate r fo r inpa tients (L'Express, 2 8 J u n e -4 Jul y 1985) . Bu t i n tw o years, wit h th e institutio n of a ne w prospectiv e budgetin g system , th e budget global, Frenc h hospita l spending slowe d dramatically . Pencil s wer e har d t o get , vacan t position s wer e no longe r filled, physica l plan t expansio n becam e a thin g o f th e past , an d

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TABLE 4. 4

Private Hospital s i n France , 198 5 Number of establishments: 1,407 814 25 20 283 23

acute care hospitals general hospital s medium- and long-ter m convalescen t center s cancer treatment center s mental healt h an d drug and alcoho l dependency center s private psychiatric hospital center s

2,572

total private sector hospital s Number of hospital beds (1 January 1985)

= 209,634

Number of physicians practicing in private hospitals: = 40,000 (all categories together) Number of nonmedical personnel: = 210,000 Total budget (fiscal 1985) = 51 billio n francs ( + 9.3 percent increase for 1985) Source: Frenc h Ministr y of Health, mimeo . (November 1986) .

reduced maintenanc e crew s coul d barel y kee p up . Th e budget global ha s proven extremel y effectiv e i n slowin g th e growt h o f hospita l expenditures . For mor e tha n a decade, hospita l expenditure s ha d grow n a t annual rate s of between 1 6 an d 2 0 percent . I n 198 5 hospita l expenditure s gre w onl y 3. 1 percent, a pac e fa r inferio r t o th e rat e o f inflation , 6. 7 percen t (Le Monde, 26 February 1986 ; Le Quotidien du Medecin, 1 5 January 1986) . The retrospectiv e pe r day/pe r be d metho d o f financing hospital s ha d it s origins i n Franc e durin g th e eighteent h centur y (Imber t 1981) . Afte r th e French Revolution , hospital s wer e i n a disastrou s financial state , i n par t because—being charit y institutions—the y depende d upo n th e churc h fo r most o f thei r resources . Bu t mos t o f th e church' s holding s i n Franc e ha d been confiscated . Th e Director y assigne d responsibilit y fo r hospital s t o loca l municipalities an d require d the m t o accept patient s from outsid e their com munities. Thes e wer e mos t ofte n soldier s o r inhabitant s o f nearb y village s THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 10

7

TABLE 4 . 5

Distribution o f Frenc h Hospita l Medica l Personnel , 198 6

In regional hospitals and university medical centers: University full professors (Step A), including 2,380 chiefs of service 3,40 Associate professors and laboratory or program heads 1,25 Junior hospital staff and assistant professors 4,13 Full-time senior staff, includin g 2,300 anesthetists 4,00 Part-time staff (all levels) 10 Temporary staff (all levels) 13,00

0 0 0 0 0 0

In general hospitals: Full-time staff, includin g 4,850 chiefs of service 9,40 Part-time staff, includin g 2,500 chiefs of service 4,30 Temporary staff (all levels) 5,00

0 0 0

Residents (all hospitals and medical centers): 21,15 Source: Frenc h Ministry of Health, mimeo . (Novembe r 1986) .

where there was no hospital. Th e easiest way to finance this system was to fix a daily rate. The decre e o f 28 March 195 3 specified tw o categories to Frenc h hospita l budgeting. Th e first categor y provide d fo r investmen t monie s t o fun d th e construction o f hospita l facilitie s an d th e acquisition s o f furnishing s an d medical equipment . Thes e monie s cam e mostl y fro m allocation s b y th e sickness funds—i n clos e consultatio n wit h th e Ministr y o f Health—an d from direc t subsidie s b y th e state , decide d b y th e Ministr y o f Financ e i n negotiations wit h th e Ministr y o f Health . Th e secon d categor y covere d per sonnel salarie s an d regula r operatin g costs , includin g supplies . Thes e wer e funded throug h th e retrospective system of per bed/per da y rates. At first, per bed/per day rates were equal for all services in the hospital, fro m pediatric s to obstetrics t o al l form s o f surgery . A n earl y attemp t t o discriminat e betwee n the different hospita l costs of different illnesse s and service s was the decree of 29 December 1959 . Its effects, however , wer e not significant . Per bed/pe r da y retrospectiv e paymen t i s know n i n th e Frenc h hospita l system a s th e tarif journalier. It s advantage s ar e no t insignificant , i n tha t despite th e typ e of illness o r the characte r o f services involve d i n treatin g it , standard be d rate s avoid th e rea l problem s o f evaluating an d affixin g a pric e to highl y complicate d an d highl y variabl e treatments—eve n fo r th e sam e illness. Onl y th e adven t o f ver y powerfu l computer s ha s recentl y enable d medical technologist s an d economist s t o begin constructin g roug h idea l typ e 108 DAVI

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0

categories o f illnes s tha t ca n usefull y discriminat e amon g differen t patholo gies and th e services required t o treat them. Th e definitio n o f 468 diagnostic related group s (DRGs ) i n th e Unite d States , affixin g a cost t o th e treatmen t of eac h grou p an d usin g pric e a s th e prospectiv e basi s fo r paymen t fo r Medicare, i s on e o f th e first system s o f thi s kind . Th e Frenc h als o bega n work o n a n extensiv e statistica l analysi s o f hospita l treatmen t pattern s an d expect t o combin e th e budget global with a system o f groupes homogenes de maladies (French DRGs ) i n orde r to better adap t prospective paymen t t o th e individual characte r of each hospital . The disadvantages , however , o f a tarif journalier lie foremost i n it s disincentives t o economize . I f th e hospita l budge t i s retrospectivel y fixed fo r a succeeding yea r a s a functio n o f th e numbe r o f patien t be d day s fro m th e preceding year , hospita l physician s an d director s ca n onl y increas e thei r budgets by admitting mor e patient s an d keepin g the m i n th e hospita l longe r (Le Monde, 4 Januar y 1984) . Budge t increase s quickl y becam e quasi-auto matic an d self-perpetuating . Further , ther e i s n o rationa l wa y t o calculat e increased budgets on the basis of more objective factors, lik e treating a greater number o f more expensive cases even if each cas e takes fewer be d days. The socialist s wer e b y n o mean s th e first policymaker s t o perceiv e th e disadvantages o f the tarif journalier and see k a better substitute . Durin g th e preceding Giscar d governments , prospectiv e paymen t systems—mos t o f the m variations o f the budget global—were experimente d wit h i n 197 7 and 197 8 (Le Concours Medical, 2 0 October 1979) . Th e socialist s adopte d th e budget global a s a matte r o f genera l polic y i n th e la w o f 1 9 Januar y 1983 . Th e decrees of 1 1 August 198 3 and th e arretes of 20 and 2 2 September 198 3 laid out it s specifics . I n th e ne w system , a sicknes s fun d wa s create d solel y t o administer hospita l budget s b y collectin g fund s fo r thi s purpos e fro m th e other fund s an d b y assignin g certai n amount s t o eac h hospita l i n France . The individua l hospita l administratio n woul d receiv e twelv e monthl y pay ments an d coul d lobb y durin g th e fiscal yea r fo r extr a monie s fro m th e oversight sicknes s fun d t o cove r specia l project s o r unforesee n expenditures . In fact, th e oversight fund—under stric t orders from th e government t o hold down expenditures—has bee n very stingy in granting these exceptions. During the administrative an d legislativ e process leading to the enactmen t of the budget global, there was some resistance to it, bu t this resistance cam e mostly fro m th e hospita l directors , wh o ar e th e one s wh o dea l mos t closel y with budge t matters . Th e Consei l superieu r de s hopitau x hel d a "consulta tion meeting " o n 4 Jul y 198 3 abou t th e "projet de decret, yy or "tentativ e THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 10

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decree," on th e propose d budgetin g method . I t rejected th e propose d tex t of the decree b y a vot e o f eigh t t o four . It s objection s wer e mostl y thos e criticizing th e lac k o f fund s an d th e fac t tha t to o muc h concer n wa s bein g given t o cost cutting. Th e Syndica t nationa l de s cadres hospitaliers (SNCH) , representing hospita l directors , stake d ou t a position agains t th e "severity " of the proposed decree . T o exer t pressure o n th e ministry , i t organized a letterwriting campaign t o deputies i n orde r to draw their attention t o the financial consequences of the reform o n public hospitals—most o f which were , no t so incidentally, locate d i n assembly districts where powerful loca l political inter ests were present (Panorama du Medecin, 1 1 July 1983) . Clearl y th e SNC H felt tha t it s administrative lobbyin g had failed . Al l that remaine d wa s legislative lobbying . Bu t tha t a parliamentar y debat e ove r method s o f hospita l financing coul d dete r a governmen t holdin g a n absolut e majorit y i n parlia ment an d gravel y concerned abou t social securit y deficit s wa s not clear. Th e final decree wa s publishe d i n th e Journal officiel o n 1 2 Augus t 1983 . I t included al l the mai n provision s of previous proposals. (Panorama du Medecin, 2 2 August 1983) . The hospita l directors sustained a stunning defeat . The budget global wa s pu t int o place , however , gradually . Fo r it s first year, 1984 , i t affected onl y th e twenty-nin e regiona l an d universit y hospita l centers. Th e remainde r o f French publi c hospital s wer e subject t o i t starting in 1985 . Further , initially , som e hospita l expenditure s woul d no t b e regu lated by it at all, suc h a s outside consultations o r abortions. Nevertheless, b y January 198 7 all activities and all hospitals were funded prospectivel y throug h the budget global. Privat e hospitals, know n i n Frenc h a s cliniques, however , were not covered b y the budget global. Hospital directors—an d hospita l physicians—complai n mor e an d mor e about th e "nefariou s effects " o f th e budget global —mainly becaus e th e system translate s int o a "shortage" of funds. "Suc h austerit y i n the financing of hospitals condemns the development and application o f medical progress," the SNC H maintaine d i n a pres s release . I t argue s tha t th e onl y legitimat e criteria fo r hospita l budgetin g ar e thos e o f medica l need , no t medica l eco nomics. Many physician s believ e tha t increasin g hospita l budget s b y rate s fa r les s than inflatio n severel y cut s int o th e hospitals ' abilit y t o kee p u p an d thu s works to the detriment of the quality of medical care—and t o more econom ical car e tha t happen s t o requir e investmen t i n ne w technologies . "W e wanted t o perfor m kidne y transplant s o n som e o f ou r patient s wh o ar e currently o n dialysis, " reporte d on e chie f o f urolog y i n a larg e regiona l 110 DAVI

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hospital center . "Th e directo r o f the hospita l sai d i t was out o f the question given th e hospital' s budget global. Sam e answe r whe n I wante d t o bu y a lithotripeter [tha t can] treat rena l calcium deposit s without surgical interven tion." For th e 198 7 budget, th e Chira c Governmen t chos e t o limi t th e growt h of hospital expenditures—throug h th e instrumen t o f th e budget global —at only 1. 9 percen t (Panorama du Medecin, 2 0 Januar y 1987) . Bot h hospita l physicians an d hospita l director s wer e understandabl y outraged . Th e Syndi cat de la medecine hospitaliere (SMH) argued that "the critical threshold ha s been breached . . . . Mr . Balladu r [ministe r o f finance] has defined wha t th e Chirac Government' s polic y fo r publi c hospital s reall y is : it is strangulation, nothing bu t strangulation. " Th e hospita l directors ' association , th e Syndica t national de s cadre s hospitalier s (SNCH) , maintaine d tha t th e budget wa s "highly unrealistic . . . . I t deliberatel y ignore s previousl y negotiate d salar y agreements an d permit s n o technica l o r physica l progress. " Bu t th e budget passed, an d the hospitals had t o make do with their 1. 9 percent . 4. TH E REFOR M O F UNDERGRADUAT E A N D GRADUAT E MEDICAL EDUCATIO N

The reform s o f medical educatio n enacte d b y the socialis t government fro m 1982 to 198 5 experience d mor e mixe d succes s tha n th e budget global. Th e history of these reforms begins to point toward some of the general condition s of succes s an d failur e fo r refor m i n healt h car e i n France . Befor e thes e reforms, Frenc h medica l student s followe d a seven-yea r curriculu m befor e being grante d th e Docto r o f Medicin e degree . Thi s degre e permitte d a student to practice general medicine immediatel y upo n hi s or her registratio n with th e Ordr e de s Medecin s offic e i n th e localit y o f hi s o r he r choosing . Any student who had passed the baccalaureate examination i n sciences at the conclusion o f secondar y schoo l coul d ente r th e first-year class o f a medica l faculty. During th e first year, th e curriculu m wa s given ove r to the stud y o f basic sciences, suc h a s chemistry o r biology. A t the close of the first year, student s wishing to continue medical school were obliged to sit a competitive comprehensive examination , calle d a concours in French . Th e Ministr y o f Educa tion set the number of places open each year nationally for entry into secondyear studies . Thes e wer e apportione d locall y accordin g t o th e siz e o f eac h medical faculty. Settin g the quotas every year for the medical school concours T H E C O N T I N U I T Y O F C R I S I S 11

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was a powerful too l that the Ministr y of Education use d i n conjunction wit h the health ministr y t o control the numbe r o f medical student s trained b y the system an d consequentl y th e suppl y o f physicians. Fo r thos e who succeede d in th e concours, the secon d yea r o f medica l studie s wa s also devote d t o th e basic sciences , i n thei r mor e advance d versions . Thes e tw o year s togethe r constituted th e "firs t cycl e o f medica l studies, " and a diplom a wa s awarde d to those successfully completin g it . The "secon d cycle " laste d fou r year s an d wa s divide d int o tw o sections . The first sectio n o f th e secon d cycl e laste d fo r on e yea r an d it s curriculu m was solel y devote d t o a progra m o f initiatio n t o hospital , o r clinical , func tions. Thi s wa s th e first poin t a t whic h th e medica l studen t actuall y fel t a s though h e o r sh e wa s studying medicine . Th e secon d sectio n o f the secon d cycle laste d thre e additiona l years . Th e curriculu m emphasize d a mi x o f pathology, therapeutics , an d actua l participatio n i n hospita l activities , how ever brief. At the close of the second section of the second cycle, the medica l student ha d bee n i n medica l schoo l fo r si x years. A seventh yea r spent i n a n internship (stage interne) tha t emphasize d therapeuti c responsibilitie s wa s then required . A t the same time a student embarked upo n hi s or her doctoral thesis, whic h usuall y too k abou t si x month s t o finish, rarel y mor e tha n a year. Upo n completio n o f the internshi p an d th e doctoral thesis , th e Docto r of Medicin e degre e wa s awarded . Thi s degre e coul d lea d directl y t o privat e general practice , t o employmen t b y th e state' s administrativ e agencie s a s a public healt h officer , o r t o a positio n wit h a pharmaceutica l compan y a s a medical representative . During th e las t yea r o f regula r medica l school , student s coul d choos e t o sit the nationa l competitiv e examinatio n (agai n calle d a concours) for admis sion int o a residenc y progra m i n on e o f th e recognize d specialties . A s with any concours, a quot a wa s se t b y th e Ministr y o f Educatio n settin g th e number of students who were permitted int o the residencies. The distributio n of student s permitte d amon g residencies , however , wa s no t regulated . Fur ther, ther e wer e actually tw o separate concours for specialt y residencies . Th e first was for acceptanc e a t th e universit y hospital s (CHUs) . Th e secon d wa s for acceptanc e t o th e regula r publi c hospitals . Th e universit y hospital s wer e considered mor e prestigiou s becaus e onl y the y coul d lea d eventuall y t o a prestigious career on a university medical faculty . The specializatio n residenc y (calle d a n internat i n French ) usuall y laste d from fou r t o five years, dependin g upo n th e specialty . Thus , seve n year s of medical schoo l (afte r completio n o f secondary schoo l studies ) were require d 112 DAVI

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to becom e a genera l practitioner . Eleve n t o twelv e year s o f schoolin g wer e required t o complete both genera l medica l educatio n an d tha t o f a specialty. The residency often le d to employment on a hospital staff—heavily weighte d to specialties—or to private specialist practice. The most prestigious positions in th e Frenc h medica l syste m wer e reserve d fo r thos e wh o di d bes t i n th e university hospital residenc y programs and then worke d their way up through the medica l facult y system . Thi s trac k wa s also the mos t difficult t o succee d in, a s it s concours wer e no t onl y mor e advance d bu t thei r quota s wer e als o the most restricted . While a residency was required of those who wished to enter the university system and—t o a lesse r extent—o f thos e wh o wishe d t o ente r th e hospita l system, residencie s were not the only way that one could becom e certified a s a specialis t fo r privat e practice . A paralle l syste m existed , datin g fro m th e earliest postwar years, called the Certificat d yetudes specialisees (or C.E.S.; in English, a Certificat e o f Specialize d Studies) . A C.E.S. progra m existe d fo r almost ever y specialt y fo r whic h ther e wa s also a residenc y program . Tradi tionally, th e differenc e betwee n th e tw o wa s tha t th e residenc y stresse d clinical experience . It s whole duration wa s passed "hands on" in the hospita l environment. Th e C.E.S. , o n th e othe r hand , wa s classroom an d examina tion oriented, devote d to a complex program o f theoretical studies . A specialist trained o n the C.E.S. trac k spent very little time i n clinical settings. The reform s o f 1982-198 5 change d medica l educatio n i n Franc e i n tw o principal respects . First , a require d residenc y o f two years for genera l practi tioners wa s established . Thi s followe d requirement s o f the Europea n Com munity. Second , th e C.E.S . trac k fo r specializin g wa s abolished . Hence forth, al l specialists would b e trained throug h forma l hospital-base d residencies , while theoretica l studie s i n thes e program s wer e expande d an d reinforced . The program o f medical studies established b y the law of 23 December 198 4 and numerous successive decrees is presented schematicall y i n figure 4.4. The broa d outline s o f thes e reform s i n graduat e medica l educatio n wer e first set ou t i n th e Vei l la w (s o calle d afte r Simon e Veil , the n ministe r o f health an d socia l affairs ) durin g Giscard' s term , i n particula r th e institutio n of a genera l medicin e residenc y require d o f al l futur e medica l practitioner s who di d no t pas s int o a specializatio n residenc y (Le Monde, 7 Februar y 1979). Thi s refor m wa s require d i n par t b y th e term s o f th e Europea n Community protocol s on medical practice. Bu t it was also widely recognize d that th e qualit y o f genera l practitioner s i n Franc e neede d t o b e improved . The mos t obvious way to do this was to require two years of additional study , THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 11

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FIGURE 4. 4

Organization o f Medica l Studie s i n France , 198 6 Baccalaureate (average age: 18-19 ) 1st Cycle—2 Year s 1st year

Basic sciences Competitive examination t o pass into 2nd year (60% + failur e rate ) Basic sciences Diploma 1st cycle medical studies

2nd year

2nd Cycle—4 Years 1st section ( 1 year) 1st year

Semiology Initiation t o hospital function s 2nd section ( 3 years) Pathology Therapeutics Participation i n hospital activities Certificate 2nd cycle medical studies

1st year 2nd year 3rd year

3rd Cycle—2 to 5 Years General medicin e residency , 2 years (internat de medecine generate)

Specialization residency , 4- 5 year s (internat de speciality)

Doctor of Medicine

Doctor of Medicine

Private general practic e State and administrative healt h officers Public health organization s Pharmaceutical companie s

University hospital staf f Public hospital staf f Private specialty practic e State and administrative healt h officer s Public health organization s Pharmaceutical companie s

Source: Adapte d i n part from Anne-Mari e Heuz 6 (1985).

as ha d bee n th e practic e i n man y othe r countries , suc h a s th e Unite d State s or Wes t Germany . Bu t man y part s o f th e Vei l la w wer e indicativ e rathe r than obligatory . The chang e i n residenc y requirement s wa s formally adopte d b y th e social ists i n th e 198 2 la w o f medica l education , i n whic h a residenc y o f genera l

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medicine was created and specialists were obliged to be trained solely through residencies (invalidatin g th e C.E.S . track) . Th e refor m als o conferre d th e title o f residen t o n al l thos e followin g th e obligator y two-yea r progra m i n general medicine . Thi s provoke d hysteri a amon g th e specialt y resident s an d among conservativ e medica l groups . Finally , th e refor m initiall y envisage d an obligator y examinatio n a t th e clos e o f second-cycl e medica l studie s tha t would no t onl y tes t fo r minimu m medica l competenc e i n variou s subfield s but woul d als o ran k al l thos e enterin g th e thir d cycle . Thi s rankin g woul d serve t o classif y student s eligibl e fo r specialt y residencies . An d sinc e th e distribution o f openings int o the various specialtie s was to be controlled, th e second-cycle exi t exa m woul d als o serv e t o giv e priorit y t o higher-rankin g students when to o many student s chose the same specialty studies . Ideally , a great measur e o f additiona l coherenc y woul d thu s eventuall y wor k it s wa y into the demographics of medical specialties . The Nationa l Assembl y vote d th e medica l educatio n refor m int o la w o n 23 Decembe r 1982 . Les s tha n tw o month s later , th e longes t strik e eve r undertaken b y Frenc h medica l student s ha d begun . Th e movemen t bega n more o r les s spontaneousl y amon g th e student s a t th e universit y hospita l center at Saint-Antoine in Paris. They were protesting the required classifyin g examination a t the close of the second cycle . Passin g this examination wa s to be obligator y fo r enterin g th e genera l medicin e residenc y an d fo r qualifyin g to si t th e nationa l residenc y examinatio n fo r th e specialties . Withi n tw o weeks, th e strik e ha d sprea d t o ever y medica l facult y i n France . I t laste d ninety-six day s altogether , unti l 2 0 Ma y 1983 . I n a n unusua l displa y o f cooperation, all medical studen t organization s o f all ideologica l shade s supported th e strike (with the exception o f a communist group) , from th e Unio n nationale de s etudiant s d e Franc e independant e e t democratiqu e t o th e Association national e de s etudiant s e n medecin e d e France . I n Marc h ove r ten thousan d student s marche d i n th e street s o f Paris . I n a questionnair e distributed t o medical students all over France, mor e than eightee n thousan d responded. Ninety-fou r percen t oppose d th e classifyin g examination . I n lat e March, medica l student s occupie d th e entr y hal l o f the Ministr y o f Health . They were "brutally evacuated " and severa l injured . Th e governmen t finally appointed a "mediatin g commission " an d charge d i t wit h negotiatin g th e crisis (Le Quotidien du Medecin, 9 March 1983 , 1 1 March 1983 , 2 4 March 1983, 1 1 Apri l 1983 , 2 7 Apri l 1983 , 3 May 1983 , 1 4 Ma y 1983 , 1 6 Ma y 1984). Th e agreemen t reache d b y the student s an d th e mediator s calle d fo r

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abolishing the classifying examinatio n an d guaranteein g a certain numbe r o f residency post s i n specialtie s an d genera l medicine , a s wel l a s fund s fo r stipends. Resistance t o th e reform s o f medica l educatio n cam e mainl y fro m tw o quarters. First , th e medical students—particularly th e less talented one s who were not likel y to pass into a specialty—objected t o the classifying examina tion a t the close of the second cycle , a s we have seen. Previously , onl y thos e students wh o wante d t o tes t fo r a specialt y residenc y wer e require d t o si t a n examination a t thi s stage . Traditio n wa s a powerfu l all y i n opposin g th e institution o f a new examination . Th e medica l student s i n th e residenc y fo r general medicin e als o wishe d t o b e remunerate d a t th e sam e level s a s thei r specialty peers. Second, th e medica l professor s an d man y specialist s objecte d t o the "de meaning" o f the titl e o f resident b y awarding i t also t o those student s i n th e two-year general medicin e postgraduate program. 5 The "internat pour tous" or th e "residenc y fo r everyon e an d n o one, " becam e th e cente r o f viciou s polemic an d a cal l t o arm s o f the politica l righ t i n th e medica l corps . Th e SNAM, fo r example , claime d i n it s white pape r o f 198 5 that genera l medi cine resident s "ar e no t rea l resident s a t all. The y ofte n refus e t o assume th e constraints an d responsibilitie s o f rea l residents . The y shoul d hav e n o righ t to the title" (La medecine hospitaliere, Octobe r 1985) . Roger Luccioni , nationa l delegat e o f the Syndica t autonom e de s enseig nants de medecine , typifie d th e universit y an d specialis t view : "Why i s their [general medicin e residents' ] leve l o f remuneratio n th e sam e a s th e rea l residents? Wh y pa y thos e wh o d o no t pas s a competitiv e examinatio n th e same as those who do?" (Le Quotidien du Medecin, 2 4 October 1984) . In earl y 1985 , th e specialt y resident s wen t o n strik e unti l Georgin a Du foix, the n ministe r of social affairs an d national solidarity, agreed to pay them more tha n th e general medicin e residents . Man y chief s o f service refuse d t o accept the general medicin e resident s or to assign them an y duties when the y arrived. A grea t man y specialt y resident s refuse d t o trea t genera l medicin e residents a s peers (Panorama du Medecin, 2 8 January 1985) . Som e pointe d to the genera l medicin e residenc y a s proof that th e socialist governmen t wa s intent on levelin g French societ y as a whole. Later, whe n Michel e Barzach , ministe r delegat e fo r healt h i n th e 198 6 Chirac government , propose d t o substitute "resident" and "residanat" i n th e place of "interne" and "internat" fo r the two-year general medicine program ,

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the issu e becam e th e foca l poin t o f unres t amon g th e genera l medicin e residents wh o di d no t wis h t o giv e u p thei r clai m t o a prestig e title . Man y general medicin e resident s had come to speak of themselves as real residents, arguing tha t "general " medicin e wa s jus t a s importan t as—i f no t mor e important than—the specialties . Th e revalorizatio n o f general medicin e was crucial t o makin g a g o o f a caree r a s a generalis t whe n establishin g any private medica l practic e a s a youn g physicia n ha d becom e extraordinaril y hard t o do. I n any case, severa l unions had alread y been forme d t o represen t the interests of the general medicin e resident s (cf. Panorama du Medecin, 2 0 March 1985) . Further demonstratin g th e importanc e o f the cleavage within th e medica l profession betwee n generalist s an d specialists , mos t o f th e medica l union s representing generalist s side d wit h th e genera l medicin e residents . The y planned a serie s o f demonstration s callin g fo r th e retractio n o f th e govern ment's proposa l withdrawin g th e prestig e titl e fro m genera l medicin e stu dents. Sai d on e genera l practitioner , "Befor e th e la w o f 2 3 Decembe r 198 2 [which established th e obligatory genera l medicin e residency] , general medi cine wa s a ghetto. Neithe r th e hospita l no r th e universit y pai d i t an y atten tion. No w the y wan t t o pu t genera l medicin e bac k int o th e sam e ghetto. " Another claime d tha t "th e onl y reaso n th e governmen t want s t o refor m general medica l studie s no w i s to satisf y th e elitis t universit y hospita l lobby " (Panorama du Medecin, 2 8 April 1987 ; also Panorama du Medecin, 2 9 April 1987, 6 May 1987) . For bot h socialist s an d conservatives , th e reform s o f medica l educatio n have enjoyed onl y mixe d success . Th e tool s of control tha t th e stat e enjoys , such as controlling quotas and administering all medical schools (except one) directly fro m Paris , enabl e th e stat e t o sharpl y influenc e demographic s an d to institut e significan t change s rapidl y int o th e medica l educatio n process . But in medica l educatio n reforms , unlik e the budget global, th e state was by no mean s immun e t o th e pressure s o f extensive an d entrenche d interests — medical students , medica l professors , an d physicians . Whe n th e Nationa l Assembly considere d th e reforms , i t eliminate d th e rankin g functio n o f th e exit exa m a s a resul t o f thes e pressures , leavin g distributio n o f specialist s a s uncoordinated an d as poorly distributed a s before. On th e othe r hand , on e importan t sourc e o f fragmentatio n insid e th e medical corps—generalists versu s specialists—enabled th e state to stick to its reforms o f the genera l medicin e residency . Entrenche d interests , whe n united ,

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can effectivel y challeng e a n otherwis e stron g Frenc h state . Bu t insofa r a s entrenched interest s remai n splintere d withi n a sector , th e stat e i s provide d with opportunities to demonstrate it s preeminence an d consolidate it . 5. TH E DEPARTMENTALIZATIO N O F HOSPITAL S

A thir d majo r refor m are a durin g thi s perio d wa s th e reorganizatio n o f hospitals into departments. I n contrast to the success of the budget global and the mixe d succes s of medical education , departmentalizatio n was—ove r th e short term—an almos t unmitigated failure . Traditionally, Frenc h hospital s wer e organize d int o a syste m o f fief-like services tha t exhibite d littl e coherenc e i n th e rang e o f specialties covere d b y an individua l hospital . Ther e wa s also littl e concer n abou t makin g th e bes t use of available funds withou t needless duplication and—thereby—avoidin g waste. Fo r example , i t was no t unusua l t o find tw o pediatri c service s i n th e same hospital . Duplicatio n occurre d i n a numbe r o f hospital s an d i n a number o f specialties . Th e head s o f thes e service s wer e th e chefs de service. They wer e name d b y prefectura l decree a t th e directio n o f th e governmen t and upon nominatio n o f the hospital medica l commission. Th e latter usually followed closel y th e recommendatio n o f th e retirin g chie f o f servic e t o appoint hi s senior assistant . Th e chief s o f service were named fo r a life ter m —until reachin g mandatory retiremen t ag e (sixty-fiv e year s fo r genera l hos pitals, sevent y years for university hospital centers). One o f the majo r reform s o f the socialis t governments betwee n 198 1 and 1986 wa s therefor e th e reorganizatio n o f publi c hospital s int o departments . The organizin g principl e woul d b e the "rational " one o f recognized medica l specialties. Thu s neurology , neurosurgery , an d othe r subspecialtie s o f th e nervous system would be combined, fo r example, int o one department. Tw o urology service s woul d b e merge d int o on e urolog y department , an d s o on . Departments woul d b e oversee n b y electe d head s servin g five-year terms , much a s in th e American academi c system , i n conjunction wit h a n advisor y commission. Thi s commissio n woul d b e composed o f fifteen members: fou r senior staf f physicians , fou r junio r staf f physicians , on e part-time staf f physi cian, fou r paramedica l employees , an d tw o nonmedica l employees . Th e government's overt goal was to do away with "factors o f rigidity" and enhanc e teamwork an d a n efficien t us e o f resources . Man y physician s favore d th e broad goa l o f usin g resource s mor e efficiently , bu t mos t o f the m differe d from th e government's view of how to achieve the goal. I n particular, makin g 118 DAVI

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departments obligatory , placin g the m unde r th e directio n o f electe d heads , and abrogatin g th e right s an d responsibilitie s o f the chief s o f services place d the government i n direct opposition t o the vested interests of a powerful olde r stratum o f hospital mandarins . The mos t importan t lega l text s regarding departmentalization ar e the la w of 3 January 198 4 an d th e decre e o f 2 8 Decembe r 1984 . Th e tim e elapse d between th e two is one indicatio n o f the vociferousness o f the medical corps ' opposition. Edmon d Herve , secretar y o f state fo r health , originall y planne d to hav e a serie s o f "concertation " meeting s wit h intereste d partie s durin g spring 1984 . H e intende d t o submi t th e final tex t t o th e Consei l superieu r des hopitau x i n Jun e 1984 , sen d i t t o th e Counci l o f Stat e fo r a final lega l opinion i n July , an d publis h th e decre e shortl y thereafter . Bu t th e fact s tha t despite vociferous oppositio n a detailed implementatio n decre e was nevertheless promulgated an d tha t the twelve months of 198 4 were full o f administrative negotiation s ove r th e modalitie s o f th e decre e ar e als o sign s o f th e government's an d th e administration' s seriousnes s o f purpos e regardin g th e reform (fo r genera l version s o f the departmentalization reforms , se e Le Quotidien du Medecin, 1 6 January 1986 ; Le Monde, 1 Januar y 1985) . Edmond Herve , the n secretar y o f stat e fo r health , defende d th e depart mentalization reform s a s par t o f a globa l effor t tha t woul d permi t a bette r approach i n ligh t o f new ways of taking car e o f the sick . "[Departmentaliza tion] will provide the conditions for better teamwork between complementar y staffs an d a heightene d sens e o f responsibility . . . . [Furthermore, ] i t wil l achieve a better utilizatio n o f the means , techniques , an d possibilitie s avail able throug h th e participatio n o f al l hospita l personnel . . . . Thi s i s no t a revolution no r i s i t a ne w idea . Wa y bac k i n 1976 , a memorandu m high lighted th e importanc e o f ne w coordinatio n betwee n hospita l services " (Le Monde, 3- 4 Marc h 1985) . The hostilit y o f th e hospita l medica l corp s was—a s th e Quotidien du Medecin headline d i t ( 7 Januar y 1985)—"quasi-general. " Th e first depart mentalization decre e wa s issue d i n Decembe r 198 4 and , b y earl y Januar y 1985, almos t ever y hospita l syndica l group—excep t th e hospita l director s and th e midwives—oppose d it , eithe r i n it s entiret y o r i n mos t o f it s mos t important elements . Th e chief s o f servic e objecte d t o bot h th e power s o f a department hea d ove r them an d t o the fac t tha t thei r term s would n o longe r be for life , bu t subjec t t o reappointment. Onl y full-tim e senio r hospita l staf f would b e eligibl e fo r electio n a s department heads , an d therefor e bot h part time an d junio r staf f objecte d o n ground s o f discrimination . Further , bot h THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F C R I S I S 1 1

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the hea d o f department an d member s o f the advisor y commissio n woul d b e chosen b y electio n i n whic h th e variou s medica l (an d othe r unions ) woul d wage electoral warfare. Almos t everyone denounced th e "politicization" thereby of the hospital . Nin e hospita l union s joine d togethe r i n a n unusua l displa y of cooperation an d forme d th e CLASH—th e Comit e d e liaiso n e t d'actio n des syndicat s hospitaliers—i n oppositio n t o th e reform . Th e oppositio n be lied the government's wish that departmentalization b e "a central element i n the modernizatio n o f hospital organization , conceive d pragmaticall y t o be a flexible framework s o that al l actors i n th e lif e o f the hospital wil l have great liberty t o go about thei r tasks . The ne w organization wil l be largel y th e frui t of their commo n reflectio n an d experienc e an d ma y be reviewed a t the clos e of a two-year period. " Bernard Debre—chie f o f service at Cochin Hospita l (a university medica l center i n Paris) , a Gaullis t part y activist , an d so n o f forme r Prim e Ministe r Michel Debre—arrange d wit h th e conservativ e newspape r Le Figaro to ru n a photograph o f him an d hi s staff—identities o f the latter hidden b y surgical masks—in a n operatin g room . Al l thos e i n th e photograp h wor e ster n expressions. Th e captio n rea d "Sovietizatio n o f Our Hospitals. " On th e wall behind wer e affixe d th e hamme r an d th e sickle . I n th e tex t o f th e articl e Debre lamented tha t "ou r hospital s are being transformed int o popular com munes wher e it' s mediocre doctor s who reign , oversee n b y excited syndical ists." The departmentalizatio n refor m proces s wa s turbulent , t o sa y th e least . The la w authorizing department s wa s voted o n 3 January 1984 . The origina l decree implementin g the m wa s publishe d i n th e Journal officiel on 2 8 De cember 1984 . (I n France , law s hav e n o effec t unti l a decree i s issue d tha t specifies th e modalitie s o f execution. Thi s system forces interest s to attend t o two largel y unconnecte d lobbyin g processes , th e legislativ e an d th e bureau cratic. Sometime s law s resid e o n th e book s fo r decade s withou t havin g an y effect whatsoeve r fo r wan t o f a n implementin g decree. ) Oppositio n wa s s o swift an d vehemen t tha t Dufoi x an d Herv e announce d jointl y tha t th e original implementatio n timetabl e woul d b e "relaxed"—so lon g as the final deadline o f the establishmen t o f a departmental structur e i n hospital s b y 3 1 December 198 7 was respected. O n 2 6 June 1985 , the government withdre w a second proposed decree from th e consideration o f the Conseil superieur des hopitaux, whe n i t became clea r tha t the advisor y counci l wa s going to rejec t it en bloc. By June 1985 , Georgina Dufoi x ha d personally taken over the departmen 120 DAVI

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talization dossie r fro m Edmon d Herv e an d announce d tha t eac h hospita l would b e able to departmentalize a s and whe n i t wished. Th e ne w approac h was called "departmentalizatio n a la carte. 7' By Septembe r sh e ha d decide d to nam e a neutra l party—a n haut fonctionnaire fro m outsid e th e healt h ministry, Jea n Terquem , wh o cam e t o be know n a s "Mr. Departmentaliza tion"—as negotiato r wit h the hospital group s over the ultimat e version o f an implementation decre e (Panorama du Medecin, 1 1 September 1985) . O n 1 October 1985 , the chairmen o f the medica l facult y advisor y commissions — four o f who m sa t o n th e Consei l superieu r de s hopitaux—announce d tha t they woul d brea k of f al l relation s wit h th e secretar y o f stat e fo r health . Consequently, the y woul d boycot t thei r monthl y meeting s a t th e healt h ministry an d woul d resig n fro m th e hospita l advisor y counci l (Le Quotidien du Medecin, 4 October 1985) . I n th e mids t o f the uproar , Dufoi x als o tried inducing suppor t fo r department s b y suggesting tha t whil e opponent s woul d certainly no t b e punished , thos e wh o cooperate d woul d b e rewarde d wit h certain "inducements/ ' suc h a s th e attributio n o f additiona l staf f position s and the authorization fo r new equipment . Many groups and individua l hospita l physician s favore d th e genera l prin ciple o f a mor e rationa l organizatio n o f hospitals . Som e duplicatio n o f services ha d lon g bee n to o flagrant t o ignore . Th e crisi s o f healt h car e expenditures an d th e hospitals ' rol e i n i t wer e als o obvious . Th e principa l organization o f French hospita l physicians , th e Syndica t nationa l de s medecins, chirurgiens , specialiste s e t biologiste s de s hopitau x public s (SNAM , often calle d th e Syndica t Garba y afte r th e nam e o f it s president , Miche l Garbay)—in a representativ e "compromise " view—argue d forcibl y tha t (1 ) the departmen t shoul d unit e onl y thos e service s o r othe r functiona l unit s responsible fo r simila r o r complementar y pathologies , (2 ) eac h physicia n must conserv e tota l clinica l responsibilit y fo r hi s patients , (3 ) department s should b e heade d b y a "coordinatin g physician " electe d b y hi s peer s t o a renewable term , (4 ) the chie f o f a functiona l uni t shoul d b e selecte d b y hi s peers according t o criteria o f professional reputatio n a s a clinical o r researc h physician and experience (to avoid excessive electoral politics among medica l unions), (5 ) th e departmen t advisor y counci l shoul d includ e al l medica l personnel (bu t no nonmedical employees) , (6 ) any departmentalization mus t be strictly voluntary an d decide d internally b y eac h establishment , an d (7 ) the departmen t shoul d neve r b e organized fo r budgetar y reason s but onl y as a functio n o f clinica l o r technica l characteristic s (La medecine hospitaliere, October 1985 , 16-17) . T H E C O N T I N U I T Y O F C R I S I S 12

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Nevertheless, th e fina l socialis t decre e o n departmentalizatio n stil l con tained th e followin g provisions , despit e opposition : (1 ) departmentalizatio n would b e obligator y (althoug h th e timin g o f it would b e highl y flexible), (2) departments woul d b e place d unde r th e authorit y o f a departmen t hea d elected t o a limite d ter m an d governin g i n conjunctio n wit h a n electe d council, (3 ) department s woul d b e divide d int o "functiona l units, " eac h under th e authorit y o f a "chie f o f unit " appointe d b y the departmen t hea d and whos e appointmen t coul d b e revoked , (4 ) incumben t chief s o f servic e (the "mandarins" ) coul d clai m th e righ t t o b e a chie f o f unit , an d (5 ) th e department hea d would define th e medical responsibilitie s and orientatio n o f the department (wit h the advice of the governing council) and woul d partici pate in the preparation o f the department's budget and i n the assigning of the department's nonmedical personne l in conjunction wit h the hospital director. Clearly, th e socialist s cede d som e importan t point s i n th e fac e o f th e opposition o f influentia l element s o f th e hospita l corps . Foremost , whil e departmentalization remaine d obligatory , it s timin g i n individua l establish ments wa s s o flexible tha t th e immediat e effectivenes s o f th e refor m wa s severely compromised. Second , th e development o f the functional unit s as a key aspec t o f the refor m clearl y corresponde d t o th e curren t organizatio n o f services and thu s preserve d man y o f the prominen t prerogative s o f the tradi tional chie f of service. Bu t the spirit of the reform remaine d i n force ove r the long term. Give n th e medica l demographic s o f the hospital corps , th e likelihood o f a n eventua l evolutio n o f hospita l organizatio n alon g th e line s o f departmentalization remai n ver y high . Th e younge r hospita l physician s se e departmentalization a s a wa y o f advancin g i n th e hospita l system . A s th e mandarins retire , th e influenc e o f younger ag e groups will have more effect . Michele Barzach recognize d thi s and knew that the difference wa s not one of political sympathie s o r ideological identificatio n bu t rathe r one of generation and caree r concerns . Th e Chira c Governmen t announce d tha t department s would b e establishe d o n a strictly voluntar y basi s and tha t th e power s o f th e department head s would b e curtailed. Th e governmen t mad e good it s promise in par t with th e la w of 24 July 1987 , which abrogate d th e departmentali zation la w of 3 January 198 4 and reinstated the service as the basis of hospital organization an d the chief of service as its head. No on e doubt s tha t Frenc h hospital s wil l eventuall y b e reorganized . Fiefdoms ar e inconsistent with the imperatives of modern hospita l medicine , particularly i n times of severe economic crisi s in health car e financing. Ove r the short term, th e Frenc h stat e in this case has been rathe r fully defeate d b y 122 DAVI

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united an d entrenche d hospita l interests . Bu t ove r th e lon g term , i t wil l almost certainly prevail, fo r the character o f hospital interest s is changing. 6. HEALT H CAR E POLICYMAKIN G UNDE R MITTERRAN D

In general , muc h o f the socialis t governments ' policymakin g i n healt h car e from 198 1 to 198 6 was initially characterized b y a will to disrupt entrenche d interests an d refor m th e healt h car e syste m t o mak e i t more equitable . Thi s view was epitomized b y the celebrate d remar k o f Nicole Questiaux , Mitter rand's first minister o f health an d socia l security. Sh e said, "J e n e serai pas le ministre de s comptes" (I will no t b e th e ministe r o f accounting). Questiau x lasted littl e mor e tha n a year i n he r pos t befor e resignin g i n eviden t frustra tion. Th e financial proble m wa s too significan t fo r eve n socialist s to ignore . Questiaux was succeeded b y Pierre Beregovoy, a traditional socialist , bu t also a har d administrator . H e said , "J e saura i compter " ( I kno w ho w t o count) . Beregovoy mad e goo d o n hi s pledg e b y ridin g har d o n healt h expenditure s and seekin g out areas of waste. On e o f his most significant accomplishment s in thi s area wa s the prospectiv e paymen t metho d fo r publi c hospital s know n as the budget global. Whe n Beregovo y wa s called b y Mitterrand t o head th e Ministry o f Financ e i n th e 1984-198 6 Fabiu s Government , h e wa s suc ceeded by Georgina Dufoix , anothe r hardnosed "moderate " (read: pragmatic) socialist. Sh e continued th e program o f reform i n austerity. Mitterrand mad e te n specifi c promise s o n healt h car e i n hi s 198 1 plat form: (1) a new emphasis on preventive health care, especially through infan t and childhoo d care ; (2 ) fre e hospita l care ; (3 ) abrogatio n o f th e convention method o f negotiating fees ; (4) promoting th e positio n o f the genera l practitioner i n th e healt h car e system ; (5 ) nationalizin g th e larg e pharmaceutica l corporations an d creatin g a national cente r for drug research an d production ; (6) abolishing th e privat e secto r i n publi c hospitals ; (7) negotiating wit h th e sickness funds an d local communities a substitute for per bed/per day hospital budgets; (8 ) developin g center s o f integrate d healt h car e tha t serv e al l th e medical need s o f a community ; (9 ) abolishing th e Ordr e de s Medecin s an d all othe r simila r corporat e bodies ; (10) rationalizin g th e form s an d level s o f facilities an d institution s i n th e hospita l secto r (Le Monde, 2 6 Februar y 1986). Th e 198 1 campaig n wa s no t fough t ove r thes e pledges . The y mad e up only ten o f 10 1 planks i n Mitterrand' s platform . Man y o f these als o were either continuation s o f Giscard/Barr e policie s o r wer e reform s tha t Giscar d and Barre would have approved. (A n accessible summary—in French—o f a THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 1 2

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wide rang e o f policy issue s i n healt h car e durin g socialis t rul e fro m 198 1 to 1986 i s found i n a serie s ru n i n th e Quotidien du Medecin, 1 4 January, 1 5 January, 1 6 January 1986. ) The eight h plank , callin g fo r th e extensiv e developmen t o f "integrate d health centers, " i s revealin g o f th e shift s betwee n electora l rhetori c an d practical governin g undergon e b y the socialists once i n power . Th e Lef t ha d long envisione d thes e center s a s the ultimat e wa y t o ge t qualit y healt h car e distributed t o th e mos t people . Thes e center s woul d emplo y salarie d physi cians, would administer comprehensive health care, combining both hospital and ambulator y functions , an d woul d b e financed b y globa l budgets—no t through fee-for-servic e no r throug h a kin d o f diagnostic-related grou p whereb y the specific disease s treated durin g a year would determin e level s of funding . Private practitioner s oppose d integrate d healt h center s fo r economi c an d ideological reasons . Economically , the y coul d b e a sourc e o f stif f competi tion. Ideologically , the y coul d introduc e salarie d medicin e fo r ambulator y care o n a widesprea d scale , i n direc t contradictio n t o th e principle s o f la medecine liberate. Th e socialist s vote d a la w i n parliamen t authorizin g a development progra m o f the center s financed b y the sicknes s funds . Bu t i n the period o f general economi c austerit y beginning i n 1983 , more and mor e emphasis wa s place d o n balancin g socia l security' s books . Th e la w quickl y became symbolic. B y 1986 , only one integrate d healt h cente r ha d opened — in Saint-Nazair e o n th e Breto n coas t fifty kilometers nort h o f Nantes. I n th e face o f suc h grea t hostilit y o n th e par t o f mos t o f th e medica l corp s towar d these centers—an d a s the electio n approached—th e governmen t quit e evi dently decided tha t a low profile wa s best. Another long-standin g promise of candidate Mitterran d wa s to abolish th e Ordre de s Medecins . Th e Orde r develope d it s poor reputatio n wit h th e Lef t because o f it s overtl y conservativ e politic s durin g th e 1960 s an d 1970s . It s support of conservative forces during the 196 8 student and labo r crisis and it s virulent oppositio n t o liberalizin g abortio n law s wer e tw o element s o f thi s reputation. Th e Order's popularity with the left wa s not enhanced b y the fac t that i t had bee n establishe d first by Vichy an d tha t i t mandated membershi p of all physician s wh o wis h t o practice medicin e i n France . I t thus projecte d a very corporatist image. Fo r many years the Order also actively opposed th e spread o f integrate d healt h centers , a concept dea r t o th e Lef t (Le Concours Medical, 1 7 June 1967 , 21 October 1978) . But afte r 1981 , Mitterran d showe d littl e interes t i n pursuin g hi s grudg e with th e Ordr e de s Medecins . On e reaso n i s tha t th e Orde r ha d change d 124 DAVI

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significantly beginnin g i n 1975 . I t reforme d it s decision-makin g process , opening i t t o mor e level s an d mor e categories . A t it s nationa l assembl y i n December 1975 , th e Orde r vote d t o institut e regula r meeting s wit h th e presidents an d secretaries-genera l o f it s regiona l an d departmenta l councils . A ne w cod e o f ethic s wa s als o adopte d tha t minimize d it s oppositio n t o abortion an d permitte d physician s t o perfor m the m i n accordanc e wit h th e provisions of the 197 5 abortion law . The leaders of the Order after 197 5 were men wh o played politics much mor e discreetly and with more respect for th e sentiments of the rank and file than ha d their predecessors. Mitterrand's oppositio n t o th e Orde r als o abate d becaus e hi s governmen t had man y othe r an d mor e pressin g issue s on it s health car e agenda . Mitter rand's first secretary o f health, Jac k Ralite, a communist, sai d that reformin g the Orde r "i s no t th e foremos t question o n ou r mind s today . Ther e i s n o reason tha t th e stat e shoul d regulat e al l th e affair s o f doctors . Ther e i s n o reason eithe r tha t doctor s shoul d necessaril y constitut e a corp s completel y apart" (Le Concours Medical, 9 Septembe r 1981) . Opposition t o th e Orde r became mor e an d mor e symbolic . Insider s i n th e healt h ministr y an d i n social securit y ha d neve r care d ver y much—a s lon g a s th e position s o f th e Order o n importan t issue s such a s abortion wer e not obstructionist. Eve n a n organization forme d b y leftist physician s fo r th e expres s purpose o f lobbyin g for th e suppressio n o f the Orde r admitte d defeat . "W e though t tha t th e Lef t in powe r woul d kee p it s promise, " lamente d on e membe r (Le Monde, 2 8 January 1986) , naively. Clearly, i n the face of a moderate Order, Mitterran d an d the socialists had more important battles to fight, not the least being the legislative elections of March 1986 . The healt h car e policies they chos e to push—hospital budget ing, medica l education , hospita l departmentalization , holdin g dow n expen ditures—were perceive d a s mor e significan t ove r bot h th e shor t an d lon g terms. Besides , ther e wa s no overridin g surg e o f support within th e medica l corps for abolishing the Order. On e survey showed that 66 percent of French physicians full y supporte d th e Orde r i n it s licensin g an d disciplining func tions, 4 3 percen t preferre d t o se e som e modification s i n th e wa y Orde r officers wer e elected , an d onl y 28. 4 percen t sough t it s abolition (ImpactMedecin, 1 6 March 1985 , no. 134) . Mitterrand, an d indee d th e whole Left, als o had a long-standing commit ment t o eliminate privat e beds and privat e consultations i n publi c hospitals . Private bed s an d consultation s ha d bee n institute d b y th e sweepin g Debr e reforms o f 1958 , which modernize d th e Frenc h hospita l syste m and pu t int o THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 12

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place the extensive system of university researc h hospitals. To recruit the best practitioners—especially t o th e researc h hospitals—specialist s wer e permit ted t o devote two half-days pe r week to private consultations i n thei r hospita l offices an d t o admi t a certai n numbe r o f their privat e patient s pe r yea r int o the hospita l bed s o f thei r services. 6 Thes e tw o provision s wer e specificall y aimed a t makin g full-time servic e mor e financially and professionall y attrac tive to a large corps of specialists who looked dow n upo n th e publi c hospita l at th e time . Privat e bed s an d privat e consultation s wer e thu s though t o f a s crucial t o the success of the modernizing reforms . With time , however , a certai n amoun t o f corruption se t i n an d th e Lef t used i t t o criticiz e generall y a politicall y conservativ e medica l corps . Som e physicians admitte d fa r mor e tha n th e reasonabl e allowabl e numbe r o f pa tients. Som e devote d mor e offic e tim e t o privat e consultation s tha n t o thei r salaried duties . Som e di d no t pa y th e require d percentage s bac k t o th e sickness funds. Further , fo r th e Left , th e whole notio n o f a private secto r i n public hospitals was offensive. Th e Left' s vie w of medicine tended t o emphasize salarie d an d tota l servic e i n th e publi c sector . Th e privat e secto r repre sented "medicin e fo r th e rich. " Upo n assumin g powe r i n 1981 , on e o f th e first symboli c legislative acts voted by the socialists was the abolition of private sector activities in public hospitals. Curiously, however , th e la w of 1 January 198 3 did no t eliminat e privat e beds and consultation s completel y o r immediately. Physician s could choose . Those wh o abandoned al l private activities immediatel y ha d thei r retiremen t pensions an d healt h car e coverag e increase d b y th e sicknes s funds—a t th e government's direction . Other s could continu e privat e activitie s as late as 31 December 198 6 (Le Monde, 7 May 1986) . The abolitio n o f privat e bed s an d consultation s becam e a rallyin g cr y t o conservative element s o f the medica l corp s leadin g int o th e legislativ e elec tions of March 1986 . They portraye d th e private sector as an essentia l libert y for both physicia n an d patien t that should b e protected b y the public system . One o f th e first acts i n healt h car e o f the Chira c governmen t tha t emerge d from th e Marc h 198 6 election s wa s a restitutio n o f th e privat e secto r i n public hospitals . Michel e Barzac h calle d th e privat e secto r a "spher e o f liberty" (Le Monde, 27-2 8 Apri l 1986 ; Le Quotidien de Paris, 2 9 Apri l 1986). I n another triumph o f symbol over substance, however , th e economi c impact o f this restitutio n wa s expected t o be minimal. Eve n i n 1981 , only a little mor e tha n thre e thousan d hospita l physician s engage d i n an y privat e activities i n th e publi c hospitals . O f these , 97 6 wer e universit y hospita l 126 DAVI

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physicians. Th e remainde r practice d i n genera l hospitals . I n Paris , i n 1984 , 307 practitioners accounted fo r forty-three thousan d be d days out of a total of 10 million be d days (Le Monde, 1 May 1986) . One issu e i n Mitterrand' s 198 1 campaig n tha t bridge d bot h healt h car e and mor e genera l economi c issue s wa s th e nationalizatio n o f th e pharma ceutical industry . Makin g goo d o n thi s promis e wit h th e la w o f 2 6 Octobe r 1981, th e Nationa l Assembl y vote d t o nationaliz e th e tw o larges t pharma ceutical groups , Rhone-Poulen c an d Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann . Th e stat e also bough t a 4 0 percen t interes t i n a thir d larg e pharmaceutica l group , Roussel-Uclaf ( a subsidiary o f the West German group , Roussel-Hoechst) . A fourth group , Sanofi , i s 50. 8 percent hel d b y state-owned Elf-Aquitaine , th e petroleum conglomerate . Socialists wante d t o nationaliz e pharmaceutica l group s a s a mean s o f "defending" consumers ' interest s i n a crucial healt h car e sector . Likewise — as di d thei r conservativ e predecessors—th e socialis t governmenta l exerte d more o r les s constan t an d direc t pressur e o n th e pricin g o f drugs. I n 1981 , the price s o f prescriptio n drug s eligibl e fo r reimbursemen t b y th e sicknes s funds (a t variou s level s fro m 1 5 t o 10 0 percent ) wer e permitte d t o ris e 2. 5 percent, wherea s inflatio n fo r th e sam e yea r ra n a t 1 4 percent . I n 1982 , 1983, an d 1984 , prices of prescription drug s were permitted t o rise 3 percent, 3.3 percent, an d 3 percent, respectively , wherea s inflation fo r those years ran at 9. 7 percent , 9. 3 percent , an d 6. 7 percent , respectively . Moreover , fro m 1982 t o 1986 , th e numbe r o f ne w drug s eligibl e fo r reimbursemen t fel l a n average 35 percent annually. Whil e the pharmaceutical industr y has objected vociferously, ther e ha s bee n littl e i t coul d do , give n stat e dominanc e o f th e sector. Further , th e Chira c Governmen t ha s continue d th e sam e pharma ceutical macropolicies . Althoug h i t sol d of f th e state' s interes t i n Rhone Poulenc an d Pechiney a s part o f it s privatization program , i t stil l controlle d prices. I n th e la w o f 3 0 Jul y 1987 , th e Chira c Governmen t completel y deregulated price s fo r man y traditionall y regulate d consume r good s an d services. Pharmaceuticals , however , wer e a conspicuou s exceptio n t o thi s deregulation. Further , fo r 1988 , th e Chira c governmen t planne d t o permi t the pharmaceutica l industr y onl y a 1 percent increas e i n dru g price s (Panorama du Medecin, 2 1 December 1987) . However , evidenc e suggest s that th e consequences o f thi s ongoin g stat e policy—beside s significantl y cheape r drugs—are a decreas e i n researc h an d developmen t an d a los s o f competi tiveness i n th e internationa l market s fo r prescriptio n drug s t o such countrie s as West Germany, th e Unite d States , an d Japan (Wilsfor d 1989) . THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 12

7

Finally, th e Lef t cam e t o powe r i n 198 1 espousin g freedo m o f acces s t o the medica l educatio n system . Th e principa l too l fo r increasin g acces s wa s the competitiv e examinatio n a t th e clos e of the first year o f medical studies . The quota s fo r th e number s o f students accepte d fro m thi s examinatio n fo r passage int o th e secon d yea r o f medica l studie s ar e se t b y th e Ministr y o f Education, a s we hav e seen . Jac k Ralit e announce d a "pause " i n th e quota system i n 1981 . Bu t th e gallopin g demograph y tha t w e hav e explore d soo n changed hi s mind . Quota s wer e reestablishe d i n 198 2 an d progressivel y tightened. Th e numbe r o f students allowe d t o pas s into th e secon d yea r fel l from 6,48 2 i n 198 2 t o 4,75 0 i n 1986 . Th e socialist s ha d planne d a n addi tional 6 percen t decreas e fo r 1987 , whic h th e Chira c Governmen t imple mented. Michel e Barzach, ministe r delegate for health, an d Alain Devaquet , then ministe r delegat e fo r highe r education , announce d tha t fo r 1987 , th e quotas fo r admissio n int o second-yea r medica l studie s woul d b e reduce d t o 4,460. Nonetheless , th e medica l association s were still no t entirel y satisfied . The CSMF , fo r example , stil l maintaine d tha t littl e progres s i n containin g medical demograph y woul d tak e plac e unti l th e second-yea r quota s wer e reduced t o a t leas t fou r thousan d (Panorama du Medecin, 2 3 Septembe r 1986). 7. HEALT H CAR E POLICYMAKIN G UNDE R CHIRA C

Despite the usua l campaig n rhetori c an d despit e the fact tha t physicians a s a group cam e bac k fro m thei r 198 1 politica l defectio n fro m th e conservativ e political cause, the principal point underlying most health car e policymaking under th e 198 6 Chira c Governmen t remaine d th e contro l o f healt h car e expenditures. I n thi s respect , healt h car e policie s unde r th e conservative s resemble very closely the policies of their socialist predecessors. The emphasi s on containin g health expenditures was evident at the CSMF' s Congres de la medecine liberale in Paris, held 14-1 5 Jun e 1986 . Durin g th e first day o f th e congress , Michel e Barzach , Chirac' s ministe r delegat e fo r health, wa s invited to speak. Barzach , a physician herself— a gynecologis t by training an d a privat e practitione r i n Paris—ha d lon g bee n responsibl e fo r health polic y plannin g fo r Chirac' s Rall y fo r th e Republi c (RPR ) politica l party. Fo r the first time in decades, th e health ministe r wa s a physician, an d seemed t o b e mor e o f a physician tha n a politician. Th e medica l corp s was delighted a t this prospect. Yet the speec h t o the assemble d CSM F delegate s sparked n o enthusiasm . 128 DAVI

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Some measures were announced an d received with polite applause. Coverag e of physician s b y socia l securit y woul d b e mad e mor e comprehensive—n o small matter, a s these physicians are almost solely self-employed. Ta x advantages would be enacted, suc h as increasing the rates of allowable depreciatio n of offic e equipment . Th e Chira c governmen t woul d als o maintai n th e Humerus clausus, or quota of medical students permitted t o pass into the second year (b y competitive examination) , a t forty-fiv e hundre d o r less . Bu t o n th e key question o f fees, Barzac h was silent. On e CSMF activist noted afterward . "This has been a n incredibl e morning. Fo r so long we waited fo r a physician as health minister—someon e wh o kne w our problems , someon e wh o spok e our language , someon e who was one of us. Sh e [Barzach ] jus t gave a speech for ove r forty-five minute s and didrit say anything" Afte r a year and hal f as minister delegat e fo r health , Barzac h appeare d o n th e televise d "L'Heure de Verite" a widel y watche d politica l intervie w program . Indicativ e o f th e medical corps ' reactio n t o he r "performance, " th e Panorama du Medecin headlined it s report, "Doctor s say, Michel e Barzac h has forgotten us " (Panorama du Medecin, 7 September 1987) . Those attending the congress were also invited t o a reception a t the Hote l de Vill e hoste d b y Jacque s Chirac , bot h prim e ministe r o f Franc e an d th e mayor o f Paris . Durin g hi s welcomin g remark s t o th e five hundre d CSM F physicians present, h e made it clear that controlling health car e expenditure s came befor e grantin g an y increas e i n physicia n fees . Specifically , Chira c announced tha t physicians ' fee s woul d no t b e increase d o n th e followin g 1 July a s ha d bee n agree d b y th e previou s socialis t government . I n thi s h e demonstrated tha t h e woul d continu e t o follow th e har d austerit y lin e prac ticed b y hi s predecessors . Further—an d eve n wors e fo r physicians—h e linked an y eventua l increas e o f fee s directl y t o controllin g th e numbe r o f medical service s rendered b y physicians i n the succeeding six months. Orga nized medicin e objecte d strongl y t o thi s linkage . Th e assemble d physician s booed, hissed , an d whistle d th e prim e minister' s remarks , a prim e ministe r they ha d jus t overwhelmingl y supporte d i n th e legislativ e election s thre e months beforehand . Fo r th e medica l associations , puttin g th e onu s for con trol o f expenditure s o n physicians ' treatmen t pattern s ignore d factor s tha t were jus t a s or mor e important , i n particular , patien t demand . I t also questioned th e medica l profession' s traditiona l clai m t o b e th e sol e judge s o f treatment. Subsequently, bot h th e CSM F an d th e FM F agree d t o cooperate a s full y as reasonabl e i n a "moderation " campaign—ye t anothe r one—undertake n THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 12

9

by th e Chira c governmen t t o contro l healt h car e expenditures . Bu t bot h associations mad e i t clear tha t physician s shoul d no t be made the scapegoat s for risin g medical consumption . Th e CSMF physicians at the Hotel de Ville reception i n Jun e 198 6 clearl y fel t lik e scapegoats . Th e evolutio n o f con sumption, the y thought , wa s i n equa l o r greater par t du e t o the othe r socia l partners i n th e sicknes s funds—th e fund s themselves , th e employers , an d the labo r unions—an d wa s du e a s wel l t o th e characte r o f scientifi c an d technical progres s i n medicine . Th e CSM F emphasize d it s oppositio n t o "moderation" i f moderatio n mean t rationin g o f healt h care . Th e FM F ar gued tha t an y "modernation " progra m shoul d i n n o wa y interfer e wit h th e physician's freedom o f diagnosis, prescription, an d treatment . At the urging of the government, th e national sicknes s fund (th e CNAMTS) "invited" the presidents of the local funds (caisses primaries), who are responsible fo r th e admiratio n o f reimbursements , t o undertak e a loca l evaluatio n of healt h car e spending , wit h th e cooperatio n o f loca l physicia n groups . A campaign wa s then t o be mounted t o "sensitize" physicians, employers , an d labor unions to the problems of controlling health car e expenditures. Finally , a public campaign wa s to be mounted fo r the bon usage des soins (wise use of health car e services) . I n retur n fo r thei r cooperation i n thi s program , physi cians would receiv e the suppor t of the sickness funds a t the national leve l fo r an increas e i n fees (Panorama du Medecin, 1 1 July 1986) . In Decembe r 1986 , physician s wer e finally rewarde d b y th e Chira c gov ernment wit h a modes t increas e i n fees . Th e fe e fo r a general practitioner' s consultation wa s raised fro m seventy-fiv e franc s t o eighty francs. I t was again increased o n 1 June 198 7 to eighty-fiv e francs . Th e specialist' s consultatio n remained fo r th e tim e bein g a t 11 0 francs , bu t wa s the n increase d o n 1 7 April 198 7 t o 11 8 franc s an d o n 1 5 Septembe r 198 7 t o 12 5 francs . Th e psychiatrist's consultatio n remaine d initiall y a t 17 5 francs, the n increase d t o 185 franc s an d 19 5 franc s a t th e sam e tim e a s th e specialists ' fees . Th e negotiations ove r thi s revise d schedul e betwee n th e CSMF , th e FMF , an d the CNAMT S proceede d fo r severa l month s an d coul d onl y b e conclude d once th e governmen t ha d give n it s explicit approval . Whil e th e final result s were no t considere d totall y satisfactor y b y th e CSM F an d th e FMF , thei r presidents an d chie f negotiators , Jacque s Beauper e an d Jea n Marchand , claimed tha t "th e rehabilitatio n o f th e [physician's ] intellectua l ac t ha s be gun" (Panorama du Medecin, 1 9 December 1986) . Fo r thei r part , th e sick ness fund s insiste d tha t th e agreemen t includ e languag e committin g th e medical association s to supporting campaigns for the "wise use of health car e 130 DAVI

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services" an d controllin g th e growt h o f healt h car e expenditures . Mauric e Derlin, presiden t o f th e CNAMTS , maintaine d tha t "it' s no t a gif t t o th e physicians." As Barzach ha d als o promised, th e governmen t enacte d severa l fiscal reforms tha t allowe d som e tax advantages t o private practitioners, suc h as faster depreciatio n schedule s fo r offic e equipmen t an d certai n deduction s for business use of personal vehicles. In healt h care , i t i s clea r tha t th e Chira c government' s policie s di d no t diverge significantly fro m it s socialist predecessor's . I n th e matte r o f fees an d of the whol e issu e o f controlling expenditures , th e Chira c Governmen t wa s just as adamant tha t expenditure s wer e ou t o f control an d tha t on e essentia l way of controlling them wa s by controlling how physicians practice medicin e —at leas t b y indirec t watchdog , carro t an d stic k methods . I n th e hospita l sector, th e first Chira c budget accorde d a mer e 1. 9 percen t increas e t o hospital operations . I t continue d th e principl e o f th e budget global. Th e Chirac Governmen t als o continue d th e numerus clausus, decreasin g th e number of medical students admitted int o second-year studies by 6.5 percent , just as the socialists had planned. I t also depenalized Secto r 2, while enhancing the fiscal advantages of practicing in Secto r 1 . These were reforms begu n under the previous, ideologicall y opposin g government . Besides all these measures, perhap s the Chirac Government's mos t impor tant respons e t o th e fiscal imperativ e i n healt h car e wa s th e Pla n Seguin , proposed i n the fall o f 198 6 by Philippe Seguin , ministe r o f social affairs an d tutelary ministe r o f Michel e Barzach , ministe r delegat e fo r health . Segui n assumed offic e i n Marc h 198 6 face d wit h projecte d socia l securit y budge t deficits o f 1 0 billio n franc s i n 198 7 an d ove r 3 3 billio n franc s i n 1988 . Seguin develope d wha t h e terme d a "rationalizatio n plan " fo r curbin g pro jected expenditures. Th e measure s involved were to save 9.3 billio n francs i n 1987 alone. Seguin believe d tha t mos t o f th e measure s h e envisione d wer e simpl y rectifications o f costly abuses and laxisme that had crep t into the system. Fo r example, a certain numbe r of illnesses, such as diabetes, had been designate d by th e sicknes s fund s a s 10 0 percen t reimbursable , "exonerated " fro m th e usual copayment s (ticket moderateur). Seguin , however , planne d t o sav e 2 billion franc s b y havin g physician s distinguis h betwee n treatment s an d pre scriptions fo r th e actua l "exonerated " illnes s an d othe r charge s unrelate d t o the exonerate d illness , suc h a s treatments fo r cold s o r flu. Th e te n principa l measures of the Plan Segui n ar e shown i n table 4. 6 In Decembe r 1986 , th e Commissio n de s compte s d e l a securit e social e T H E C O N T I N U I T Y O F C R I S I S 13

1

TABLE 4 . 6

Ten Measure s o f the Pla n Segui n Savings (in millions of francs) 1. Reimbursin g at 40 percent pain-relieving drugs prescribed to "exonerated" patient s 2. Exoneratio n o f copayment reserve d strictly to treatment associated wit h the exonerated illnes s 3. Refor m o f the list of 25 exonerated illnesse s and elimination o f "catch-air' 26t h exonerated illnes s 4. Eliminatin g franking privileg e for mailing paperwork to the sickness fund s 5. Adjustin g hospita l charge s to the type of hospital servic e 6. "De-reimbursement " o f vitamins 7. Eliminatin g all reimbursement fo r drugs not prescribed by a physician 8. Increasin g hospital copayment to 25 francs pe r day 9. Eliminatin g 10 0 percent reimbursement beyon d thre e months authorized sic k leave 10. Extendin g over three months the base period for calcu lating daily allowances TOTAL

3,300 2,000 1,150 900 500 500 500 240 200 100 9,390

reestimated th e 198 7 healt h car e defici t a t 15. 7 billio n francs . Th e Pla n Seguin wa s put int o plac e b y the Chira c governmen t i n earl y 198 7 and th e actual defici t incurre d fo r 198 7 wa s onl y 2. 3 billion . Th e annua l rat e o f growth fo r healt h car e expenditures fel l t o 5. 1 percen t fo r 198 7 compared t o 8.2 percen t i n 198 6 {Panorama du Medecin, 3 0 March 1988) . Tota l healt h care expenditure s i n 198 7 constitute d 7. 9 percen t o f GD P (Quotidien du Medecin, 2 5 Marc h 1988) . But , o f course , man y o f th e Pla n Seguin' s measures provided for one-time-only savings. Important symbolically , bu t with les s practical an d certainl y les s immediate effects tha n th e Pla n Seguin , wer e the Estates-Genera l o f Social Securit y convened b y Jacque s Chira c i n Februar y 198 7 (Panorama du Medecin, 2 7 February 1987) . In a series of local and regiona l meetings throughout Franc e —not unlik e thos e tha t prepare d th e cahiers de doleances before th e Revolu tion—representatives fro m th e loca l an d regiona l sicknes s fund s an d fro m the departmenta l unit s o f th e principa l medica l unions , alon g wit h loca l political notables , suc h a s members o f the loca l an d regiona l council s (conseils,) me t t o propos e an d discus s way s o f cuttin g healt h car e expenditures 132 DAVI

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over the long term without sacrificing th e traditional quality and comprehen sive coverage of French medicine . The nationa l Estates-Genera l wa s the n convoke d i n Pari s i n Apri l 198 7 by Chira c himself . Thes e deliberations—an d al l th e loca l an d regiona l cahiers—were then synthesize d b y a comite de sages, six impartial, respecte d "statesmen" of France, wh o drew up final recommendations fo r th e govern ment. Thei r final recommendation s range d fro m raisin g th e alcoho l an d tobacco taxe s to deregulating dru g price s t o establishing a new, autonomou s National Counci l fo r Socia l Security . Reaction s t o th e repor t wer e highl y mixed. Eve n Chira c di d no t favor ver y enthusiastically th e proposals to raise alcohol an d tobacc o taxe s fo r tw o reasons : the inflationar y effect s o f highe r taxes o n thes e tw o consumptio n good s an d th e oppositio n o f powerful win e and spirits producers' groups to raising alcohol taxes. While Michele Barzach emphasized tha t the Chirac Government's healt h policy wa s centere d aroun d "th e institutio n an d reinforcemen t o f a [neo- ] liberal society " (Panorama du Medecin, 2 6 January 1987) , i t i s clear tha t i n health care for the conservatives, the most important problems were the same ones that obsessed th e socialists: controlling expenditures , balancin g deficits , ensuring tha t organize d medicin e i s no t to o influential . Th e neolibera l aspects o f the Chira c Government' s healt h policie s centere d mainl y aroun d symbolic change s a t the margins , especiall y th e restitutio n o f private beds i n public hospitals and the contracting to private enterprise of hospital function s such as food, laundry , an d maintenanc e services . These private-public issue s have long been a focal poin t for polemic between the Right and the Left, bu t in th e univers e o f Frenc h healt h car e the y d o no t involv e larg e sum s o f money nor do they affect larg e numbers of individual physician s or patients. 8. C O N C L U S I O N

The demographic explosio n o f physicians that the Frenc h stat e brought ont o the Frenc h medica l professio n beginnin g i n th e latte r 1960 s mean s tha t younger Frenc h physician s toda y hav e a ver y difficul t tim e establishin g private practice . Th e politica l consequence s ar e twofold . First , har d time s have no t incite d youn g Frenc h physician s t o suppor t thei r medica l associa tions an d union s an y mor e no w tha n the y eve r hav e i n th e past . T o th e contrary, muc h a s with labo r union s i n general , difficul t economi c period s mean tha t medica l association s an d unions—th e defenders , ironically , o f physicians' interests—suffe r decrease d support . Second , whil e man y argu e THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 1 3

3

that mor e physician s mea n greate r healt h car e expenditures , especiall y i n a fee-for-service syste m lik e tha t o f la medecine liberale, it i s equally arguabl e that th e plethor a o f physician s ha s i n fac t strengthene d th e state' s han d against the medica l profession insofa r a s fee negotiating and syste m reorgani zation ar e concerned. Further , i t may be speculated wit h some certainty tha t in th e mos t prominen t cas e o f th e Frenc h state' s failur e i n healt h car e policymaking—the departmentalizatio n o f Frenc h hospitals—th e stat e los t against a narrow, entrenched , an d increasingl y age d elite, th e hospital chief s of service. Too many younger physicians fight for extremely limited advance ment opportunities . Eventually , thi s wil l giv e th e stat e leverag e agains t th e entrenched elit e t o enac t th e propose d reorganization . A s th e elit e age s younger cohorts will support the state's move to departmentalize hospitals . 8.1. Genera l Rule s

1. Physicians themselves are sorely divided. There ar e professiona l cleavage s in Frenc h medicine . I n particular , generalist s oppos e specialists . Becaus e they suffe r mos t from th e explosio n o f medical demograph y i n a system tha t assigns them n o formal gatekeepin g rol e over access to specialists, i t is in th e interests of generalists to support any potential increas e in their qualification s and prestige , suc h a s tha t possibl e throug h tw o extr a year s o f postgraduat e medical studie s an d throug h callin g thi s progra m a residenc y i n genera l medicine, instea d o f merel y a n internship . Further , physician s divid e be tween generations . Olde r physicians support the current organization, whic h gives the m a secur e plac e i n th e medica l hierarchy . The y als o believ e sincerely tha t suc h a syste m assure s th e qualit y o f healt h care . Younge r physicians pus h fo r change s i n organizatio n s o tha t thei r caree r paths — currently blocked , excep t i n rar e cases—wil l ope n up . Thes e cleavage s ad d to the splinterin g o f political organization s i n th e Frenc h medica l professio n —divided ideologicall y an d nonideologically—t o severel y weaken organize d medicine's influenc e i n healt h car e policymaking . Th e medica l corp s i s hypersyndicalized. 2. The administration is generally not divided. The politica l an d bureau cratic directio n o f th e Frenc h stat e i s relativel y unite d i n it s goal s fo r th e health car e system . Foremost—an d regardles s o f which politica l part y hold s power—the fiscal imperative drive s policymaking. Second , al l are unite d i n a concer n tha t th e medica l syste m delive r healt h car e equitabl y an d wit h high quality . Fe w policymakers o r citizens ar e concerned wit h promotin g o r 134 DAVI

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conserving th e professiona l prerogative s o r prestige o f the medica l professio n insofar a s suc h suppor t migh t mitigat e th e pursui t o f overridin g goal s fo r health care . A n ideolog y o f nationa l solidarit y i s on e underpinnin g t o th e effective executio n o f th e hig h bureaucrati c missio n i n Frenc h healt h car e and it s reasonably successfu l overridin g o f organized medicine' s resistanc e to change. 3. The government can sometimes be forced to back off from proposed reforms. Whil e th e Frenc h stat e gives certain tactica l advantage s to it s politicians and bureaucrats, thes e policymakers are not thereby immune to outside influences. I n particular, give n a great deal of vociferous opposition , medica l groups ca n sometime s wi n o r at leas t gain time . Thi s i s more easil y accom plished, however , i n a period o f approaching election s when th e governmen t will b e mor e concerne d wit h socia l peac e an d enhancin g it s policymakin g record. Further , som e felt that the socialists simply tried to execute too many reforms a t onc e (Charbonnea u 1983 , 1984)—i n par t becaus e o f it s absenc e from powe r fo r s o long . O f th e reform s tha t w e hav e examine d durin g th e socialists' perio d i n power , th e earlie r one s wer e mor e successful . "Refor m overload" ma y hav e overl y taxe d th e socialists ' resources wit h whic h t o fight those opposed to reform . 4. But the state has many resources at its disposal with which to keep coming back in case of opposition. One o f these resources i s a united bureau cratic corps in health care matters. Another is the clear economic imperative s to restrain health car e spending. 5. The first consequence o f this policymaking univers e i s that the government can threaten and punish groups and entice and cajole their cooperation. The governmen t ofte n thereb y keep s th e medica l corp s fro m eve r unitin g completely. 6. Th e secon d consequenc e i s that most projects and reforms are successfully implemented , but in modified form. 7. Polemic is endemic to French politics. I n healt h car e politics , polemi c characterizes the rhetoric of almost all issues at hand. Bot h the Right and th e Left participat e i n it . Luri d an d extrem e languag e identif y it . Fo r example , regarding th e eliminatio n o r restitutio n o f privat e bed s an d consultation s i n public hospitals , Bernar d Debre—professo r o f medicine , chie f o f service , RPR membe r o f parliament , an d so n o f th e Fift h Republic' s first prim e minister—exclaimed i n an article written fo r Le Monde: Stop the hemorrhage! Protecting the private sector is not merely a symbol, it's an act required t o save our hospitals . . . . Threatening t o eliminate th e privat e sector has THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 13

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incited young physicians to fleethe public hospital. Five hundred posts are vacant. It will be the death of public service [in medicine] (Le Monde, 7 May 1986). During socialis t rule , th e conservativ e dail y Le Figaro characterize d th e reforms o f graduate medical education as the degradation of studies because quotas are despised [by the socialists], the cheapening of medical diplomas , whic h wil l henceforth lea d nowhere , an d th e debasing of future practitioners . I n ever y domain , reform s decree d b y the Lef t wil l en d i n th e destruction of the university (Le Figaro, 2 9 February 1984). Pierre Canlorbe , presiden t o f th e Syndica t autonom e de s enseignant s d e medecine, wrot e abou t ho w th e reform s woul d affec t th e universit y hospita l centers: In truth, they mean the death of university hospital centers (CHUs) as we now know them, create d twenty-five years ago by the Debre reform. Certainly , th e name CHU will not be abolished. Bu t they will be CHUs on paper only, becaus e the decree of 24 September 196 0 that gave life to this system is almost totally abrogated by the new text. Thi s send s u s twenty-fiv e year s backwards , t o th e tim e whe n hospital s an d medical schools ignored each other completely (Le Figaro, 2 9 February 1984). Another articl e i n Le Figaro (19 January 1984 ) was headed i n 24-poin t type. The Whol e Healt h Car e System I s in Peril! " These example s com e fro m th e Right , bu t a s man y o r mor e coul d b e found demonstratin g th e Left' s foray s int o polemic . A leftis t group , fo r example, publishe d a n articl e entitle d "Stop th e Sackin g o f Our Hospitals! " (Quotidien du Medecin, 1 4 Februar y 1986) . Bu t persisten t polemi c keep s sides apar t an d favor s th e impositio n b y th e governmen t o f policie s tha t i t wants. Imposin g reform s high-handedl y the n result s i n mor e frequen t an d more violen t contestatio n an d i n th e exi t tactic s tha t s o ofte n characteriz e protest i n Frenc h politic s (Wilsfor d 1988a) . Suc h tactic s rang e fro m nois y walkouts fro m negotiation s t o stree t demonstration s an d a variet y o f strik e actions. 8.2 Chang e i n Politica l Part y i n Powe r Make s Littl e Differenc e

Apart from symboli c measures—suc h a s the restitutio n w e have observed o f the private sector in public hospitals by the Chirac Government—the politi cal party in power make s relatively littl e difference i n health car e policymak ing. W e hav e seen, fo r example , tha t mos t of the reform s o f medical educa tion wer e first propose d durin g Giscard's term. Unti l th e election o f Mitterrand 136 DAVI

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in 1981 , the medical corps hated n o politician mor e than Giscard' s conservative prime minister , Raymon d Barre . I t was widely believe d a t th e tim e tha t the electio n o f th e socialist s coul d onl y lea d t o improvement . Jea n Belot , then presiden t o f th e FMF , observe d tha t Mitterrand' s platfor m too k th e position tha t the economic crisi s should hav e no negative impact whatsoeve r on healt h car e policy and financing (Panorama du Medecin, 1 2 May 1981) . This chapte r clearl y show s that th e socialist s quickly backe d awa y from thei r full commitmen t t o uncontrolled healt h care spending. Their policies during five year s in power came to be just as hated as the Giscard-Barre policies that preceded them . Socialis t policie s wer e als o remarkabl y simila r t o Giscard Barre policies. The socialis t politicians who ruled ove r health car e also came to be just as reviled by the medical corp s as were Giscard, Barre , and Barrot . The journee d'action o f 3 0 September 198 2 provides a telling exampl e of how littl e ha d change d i n th e transitio n fro m Giscard-Barr e t o Mitterrand Mauroy. I n the words of the Panorama du Medecin in 1982 : The most recent preceding street demonstration o f physicians was in June 1980 . At that time, a conservative government [Giscard-Barre] was seeking to squeeze medicosocial spending. The mechanism thi s government had in mind consisted i n making the level of physicians' incomes depend inversely upon the level of expenditures that their treatments and prescriptions engendered in the social security system. This time [1982], a socialist government [Mitterrand-Mauroy] projects a two-faced posture: they verbally support private practitioners while at the same time asphyxiating them by not providing a minimum decent income. Both governments have been a menace to the public health (Panorama du Medecin, 4 October 1982). A questionnaire administere d fo r thi s study to French medica l associatio n activists during spring 1986—tw o month s after th e legislative elections of 16 March—confirm thi s impression: fully 58. 3 percent of respondents (n = 49 ) believed tha t th e political influenc e o f medical association s doe s not chang e with the political part y i n power ; only 35. 7 percent believed tha t i t did ( n = 30). Asked whether the political influenc e o f medical associations was greater under the socialists than unde r the conservatives, 61. 9 percent thought it was the sam e (n = 52) , 21. 4 percent though t i t was somewhat les s or much les s (n = 18) , and 11. 9 percent thought i t was somewhat mor e or much mor e (n = 10) . Whe n aske d i f relations wit h th e administratio n ha d change d sinc e the socialist s assumed powe r i n 1981 , in compariso n wit h thei r conservativ e predecessors, 53. 6 percen t though t tha t relation s ha d no t change d a t al l ( n = 45) , 28. 6 percen t though t tha t the y ha d change d som e ( n = 24) , an d 10.7 percent thought they had change d a lot (n = 9) . Of those who thought THE C O N T I N U I T Y O F CRISI S 13

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relations ha d change d som e o r a lot , 70. 9 percen t though t the y wer e wors e (n = 22) . Th e questionnair e referre d t o her e ma y b e consulte d i n detai l i n Wilsford (1987a) . I n another poll, 8 3 percent of physicians surveyed believe d that a change o f political part y i n powe r afte r th e 1 6 March 198 6 legislativ e elections would brin g no changes to the relation s between th e medica l corp s and th e stat e or the government (Impact, no . 164 ; the survey was conducte d by th e Cabine t Antoin e Minkowsk i o f a rando m sampl e o f thre e hundre d hospital physician s an d privat e practitioner s betwee n 2 0 an d 2 2 Novembe r 1985). One indicatio n tha t th e politica l part y i n powe r make s little difference — at leas t insofa r a s hospital s ar e concerned—i s th e positio n take n b y th e hospital director s union , th e SNCH , a s the 1 6 March 198 6 legislative elec tions approached . Whil e denyin g an y partisa n politica l coloration , th e SNC H nevertheless disagree d wit h Mitterrand' s socialis t government s o n almos t everything, fro m th e strict enforcement o f policies it disagreed with to the lax implementation o f policies it agreed with. Fo r example, the SNCH originall y favored th e departmentalizatio n o f hospitals , bu t viewe d th e governmen t a s having coppe d ou t o f it s origina l reform . "W e wer e fo r i t [departmentaliza tion] five or si x years ago/' a press releas e noted , "bu t th e final decre e give s great leewa y t o individua l hospitals . W e wil l no t g o int o battl e al l alon e against th e doctors . Instea d w e are going to follow thei r lead " (Le Quotidien du Medecin, 2 8 February 1986) . But the SNC H als o knew that the probabl e change i n governmen t woul d no t mea n th e en d o f austerit y i n th e hospi tal, wit h shortages in everything from supplie s to personnel to investments. I t did not . The Syndica t autonom e de s enseignants d e medecin e demonstrate s eve n more vividl y tha t ofte n th e politica l part y i n powe r make s littl e difference — at least i n a policymaking secto r lik e health car e where th e fiscal imperative rules. Thi s grou p participated full y i n the elaboration o f Chirac's health car e and universit y refor m platfor m prio r to the Marc h 198 6 legislative elections. It ha s bee n closel y identifie d wit h Chirac' s RP R fo r man y years . Bu t si x months into the 198 6 Chirac Government's term, dissatisfactio n wa s evident. The Syndica t autonom e characterize d Chirac' s healt h car e policie s a s incoherent an d unacceptable . Provision s o f th e "reformed " reform s concernin g the privat e secto r i n publi c hospitals , departmentalization , an d advisor y commission wer e criticize d a s eithe r no t differin g enoug h fro m socialis t policies o r no t respondin g t o the nee d fo r mor e freedo m i n decisio n makin g

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by th e medica l corps . Th e onl y issu e o n whic h th e Syndica t autonom e expressed satisfactio n wa s the renamin g o f the general medicin e residenc y as an internshi p (Combat Hospitaller et Universitaire, September 1986) . More generally , th e 198 6 Chira c Governmen t stirre d u p oppositio n i n almost th e sam e quarter s a s the variou s socialis t government s fro m 198 1 to 1986 an d th e Giscard-Barr e government s fro m 197 7 t o 1981 . "Hospital s Once Agai n i n Crisis " headlined th e Panorama du Medecin (14 April 1987 ) little mor e tha n a year after th e 1 6 March 198 6 legislative elections that ha d put Chira c an d th e conservativ e coalitio n i n power . Th e articl e cite d th e government's proposals to reform medica l education, abando n departmental ization, an d revis e the administrative statu s of hospital directors , a s causes of the "agitation tha t reigns in the hospitals." In medica l education , th e Unio n national e autonom e de s nouveau x in ternes e n medecin e (UNANIM) , whic h represent s th e ne w resident s o f general medicine , denounce d th e government' s "wil l t o denigrat e genera l medicine" b y abolishin g th e two-yea r "residency " i n favo r o f a two-yea r "internship." "Thi s refor m i s completel y contrar y t o al l th e promise s tha t have bee n mad e t o th e representative s o f th e residents, " claime d a pres s release. Further , i n additio n t o th e los s o f valuabl e prestig e attache d t o th e resident title , genera l medicin e residents ' salarie s woul d als o b e cut . Resi dents i n genera l medicin e ha d alread y begu n a serie s o f strike s i n variou s university hospita l center s t o protes t th e government' s proposal . Michel e Barzach trie d t o placate th e genera l medicin e resident s b y promising tha t a t least thei r salarie s would remain th e sam e a s resident s i n specialties , eve n i f their title was changed. A s of October 1987 , a year and a half after assumin g office an d i n th e fac e o f UNANIM' s fierce opposition , Barzac h ha d stil l issued n o implementation decree s changing the title of the general medicin e residency. As fo r th e Chira c Government' s plan s t o abando n departmentalization , partisans o f th e ne w organization , suc h a s th e Intersyndical e national e de s medecins hospitaliers , a coalitio n o f hospita l medica l unions , reaffirme d their position supportin g "a departmentalization tha t is flexible and voluntar y [and that ] permits a more collegia l organizatio n o f hospital structure s o n th e basis o f fundamenta l principle s o f participatio n an d responsibilit y fo r al l practitioners." A s Barzach hersel f wa s wel l aware , ther e wa s a grea t dea l o f support amon g younge r hospita l physician s fo r departmentalization , fo r i t loosened th e gri p of the mandarin s o n hospita l decisio n making . Th e younge r

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physicians als o hope d tha t som e ne w caree r avenue s migh t als o thereb y b e opened. Th e coalitio n wa s preparin g t o "demonstrat e it s disagreemen t wit h the proposed texts." The hospita l directors , too , wer e dissatisfie d wit h th e Chira c Govern ment's plan s t o "renege " on prio r commitment s regardin g improvement s i n their administrativ e status . Thei r union , th e SNCH , therefor e brok e of f al l negotiations and planned t o organize a day of street demonstrations i n Paris. Finally, th e presidential campaig n o f 198 8 revealed a remarkable similar ity of views about the reigning problematics of the French health care system. No party , excep t th e Nationa l Fron t (FN) , questione d th e dominan t rol e of the socia l securit y syste m i n providin g healt h car e to Frenc h citizens . Non e questioned th e rol e o f la medecine liberate in thi s system . Al l agree d tha t balancing social security accounts—without sacrificin g qualit y of care—was the foremos t proble m i n healt h car e facin g an y futur e government . Th e modalities fo r respondin g t o thi s fiscal imperativ e differe d marginally , bu t broad consensu s (wit h th e exceptio n o f Jean-Mari e L e Pen/characterize d each candidate' s vie w o f majo r healt h car e syste m principle s an d problems . The fiscal imperative i n Frenc h healt h car e has supplanted prominen t ideo logical refor m movement s an d severel y restricte d th e spac e i n whic h an y politician o r bureaucrat has a marge de manoeuvre.

NOTES

1. Th e best overviews in English of the French healt h care system are Rodwin (1981, 1982), Lacroniqu e (1982) , an d Economi c Model s Ltd . (1976) . Car o (1969 ) ex plores th e philosophica l origin s o f th e system . Hatzfel d (1963 ) examine s th e heyday o f la medecine liberate in th e 1950 s an d th e beginnin g o f th e en d o f organized medicine' s politica l influenc e i n th e battl e ove r th e decre e o f 1 2 Ma y 1960. Rodwi n i n particula r highlight s th e contradiction s inheren t i n th e combi nation o f nationa l healt h insuranc e an d libera l medica l practice . A n earlie r an d equally excellen t treatmen t i n Frenc h o f this them e i s Bing (1971) . God t (1987 ) examines the state's incentives to act against the prerogatives of liberal practitioner s in a deficit-pron e system . Galan t (1955 ) explore s th e politic s an d problem s o f establishing the current national health insurance system beginning with the social security ordinances o f 194 5 (see also Le Monde, 2 9 April, 3 0 April, 2 May 1980) . J. P . Dumon t (1981 ) gives one of the most thorough economi c and socia l analyse s of al l thre e component s o f Frenc h socia l security : healt h care , retirement , an d family allowances .

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2. Othe r paymen t method s beside s fee-for-servic e ar e salary , capitation , an d cas e payment (Glaser , 1970 , 25) . Cas e paymen t i s similar t o tha t base d o n diagnosti c related groups (DRGs). 3. 'Tac t an d reasonableness " (tacte et mesure) long governed ver y loosel y th e uppe r limit of fees for physicians benefiting fro m th e droit de depassement. A Council o f State opinio n (decisio n o f 1 9 Februar y 1977 ) fixed the uppe r limi t o f "tac t an d reasonableness" at no more than doubl e the scheduled conventio n fee . Neverthe less, th e loca l sicknes s funds hav e final jurisdiction ove r what constitutes "reason able." On e o f the m (i n Lille ) suspende d a Secto r 2 physician fo r on e mont h i n 1987 for havin g charge d 8 4 percent highe r tha n th e schedule d conventio n fe e i n 1984 and 75. 3 percen t highe r i n 1985 . Th e loca l administrativ e tribuna l uphel d the suspension (Tribuna l administrati f d e Lille, 1 2 May 1987) . 4. However , ther e i s a n ongoin g controvers y amon g medica l economist s an d stat e policymakers ove r th e "multiplication " o f services . Som e argu e tha t to o man y physicians d o no t kee p overal l expenditure s down . T o th e contrary , physician s simply mak e u p fo r los t incom e b y increasin g services . Thi s tacti c i s particularl y effective i n a fee-for-service system . Increasin g services ranges from recommendin g more follow-u p visit s to prescribin g mor e diagnosti c laborator y o r x-ra y tests . O n the othe r hand , to o man y physician s giv e th e stat e an d th e sicknes s fund s mor e leverage in fee negotiations . 5. Frenc h terminolog y i n graduat e medica l educatio n i s precisely th e revers e o f th e American. Th e Frenc h internat i s an American residency . Th e Frenc h externe of the 1950 s and 1960 s was an American inter n (Le Concours Medical, 1 6 November 1963, 6259-62). I n French, genera l medicine residents are called internes, serving the celebrated u internat pour fous." (Moreover, al l resident s are known i n Frenc h as internes.) 6. Th e fee s charge d t o patient s fo r thes e privat e consultation s wer e no t regulate d b y the sicknes s fund s bu t wer e fixed by a "direc t understanding " betwee n physicia n and patient . "Direc t understanding " wa s a euphemis m tha t permitte d th e physi cian t o charg e whateve r h e wanted . Th e physicia n wa s the n require d t o pa y 3 0 percent of the scheduled fee back to the sickness fund. A s for beds, private patient s could no t occupy more than 8 percent of the bed capacity of the service. A patient admitted privatel y ha d t o pa y a n additiona l 2 5 percen t fo r th e privileg e ove r th e fixed tarif journalier. This supplement was not reimbursed b y the sickness funds .

REFERENCES

Bing, Jacques. 1971 . "Les relations entre le corps medical e t la Securite Sociale—o u la vain e recherch e entr e Tequilibr e d'u n regim e d'assuranc e maladi e e t le s prin cipes du liberalisme. " Questions de Securite Sociale 23 (10). Bui-Dang-Ha-Doan, Jean . 1965 . "Le s besoin s e n medecin s pou r 1970 , 197 5 e t 1980." Cahiers de sociologie et de demographie medicales 1 : 5-14.

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Caro, G . 1969 . La medecine en question. Paris: Maspero. Charbonneau, Pierre . 1983 . "L'inflatio n de s reformes : A propos d e l'agitatio n dan s les facultes d e medecine." Vie sociale, October. . 1984 . "Le s reformes hospitalieres : Leurs actualisations." Revue de la Societe de geographie commerciale (3-4). CNAMTS. 1985a . "L e Secteu r libera l de s profession s d e sant e e n 1984. " Garnets statistiques 18 August. . (1985b) . La CNAMT S en quelques Chiffres. (Paris : Caiss e national e d e l'assurance maladi e des travailleurs salaries). Dumont, Jean . 1979 . Erreurs sur le mal frangais ou le trompe-Xozil de M. Peyrefitte. Paris: Vernoy. Dumont, Jean-Pierre . 1981 . La Securite Sociale: Toujours en chantier. Paris: Editions Ouvrieres. Economic Model s Ltd . 1976 . The French Health Care System. London : Economi c Models Ltd. Fougeres Commission . 1977 . La reforme des etudes medicales: Rapport au ministre de la sante et au secretaire d'Etat aux universites. Paris: Documentatio n Fran gaise. Galant, Henr y C. 1955 . Histoire politique de la securite sociale francaise, 1945-J952. Paris: Colin. Gallois, Pierre . 1984 . "Reformes d u systeme hospitalier." Etudes (March) : 303-14 . Glaser, Willia m A . 1970 . Raying the Doctor: Systems of Remuneration and Their Effects. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Universit y Press. Godt, Paul . 1987 . "Confrontation , Consent , an d Corporatism : Stat e Strategie s an d the Medica l Professio n i n France , Grea t Britai n an d Wes t Germany/ ' Journal of Health ?oliticsy Policy and Law (Summer). Hatzfeld, Henri . 1963 . Le grand tournant de la medecine liberale. Paris : Edition s Ouvrieres. Heuze, Anne-Marie . 1985 . Panorama des etudes medicales, 1985-1986. Paris : Theraplix. Imbert, Jean . 1981 . Les hopitaux en France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lacronique, Jean-Frangois . 1982 . "The Frenc h Healt h Car e System. " In The Public/ Private Mix for Health y edite d b y Gordon McLachla n an d Ala n Maynard . Lon don: Nuffield Provincia l Hospital s Trust. Rodwin, Victo r G . 1981 . "Th e Marriag e o f Nationa l Healt h Insuranc e an d la Medecine liberale." Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society 5 9 (no. 1) : 16-43. . 1982 . "Managemen t withou t Objectives : Th e Frenc h Healt h Polic y Gam ble." I n The Public/Private Mix for Health, edite d b y Gordo n McLachla n an d Alan Maynard . London : Nuffield Provincia l Hospital s Trust. Wilsford, David . 1987a . "Th e Declin e o f Physicians ' Politica l Powe r i n Franc e an d the Unite d States. " Ph.D. diss. , Universit y of California, Sa n Diego . . 1987b . "The Cohesion an d Fragmentation o f Organized Medicin e in Franc e and th e Unite d States. " Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1 2 (Fall) : 481-503. 142 DAVI

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. 1988a . "Tactical Advantages versus Administrative Heterogeneity: The Strengths and the Weaknesses of the French State. " Comparative Political Studies 2 1 (April): 126-68. . 1988b . "Th e Effect s o f a Chang e i n Regim e Typ e o n Strategi c Position . Resources an d Outcomes : The Cas e o f Health Car e Polic y i n th e Frenc h Fourt h and Fift h Republics. " Pape r presente d t o the Souther n Politica l Scienc e Associa tion, November , i n Atlanta. . 1989 . 'Th e Politica l Econom y o f the Pharmaceutica l Industr y i n France. " Paper presented t o the American Politica l Scienc e Association/French Conferenc e Group, September , i n Atlanta.

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5 FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E S I N C E 1 9 3 8 REMI LENOI R

It i s a fact , thoug h somewha t difficul t t o establis h definitively , tha t France , along with Belgium, i s the country that has accorded to the family th e largest place i n th e ensembl e o f wha t societ y consider s a matte r o f politica l lif e (Kamerman an d Kah n 1978) . I n contras t t o man y nation s a t comparabl e levels of economic development , i n Franc e th e famil y i s a relevant categor y of political activity and administrative action . In France , ai d to families ha s been th e object o f a veritable institutionali zation, a s see n i n th e fac t that , particularl y afte r th e Liberation , th e famil y has constituted a specific objec t o f activity i n very different domains . I n fact , the developmen t o f a famil y polic y independen t o f othe r sector s o f socia l policy ha s been accompanie d b y the creatio n o f several institution s tha t give the policy its specificity, it s credibility, an d it s effectiveness (Lenoi r 1989) . First wa s th e creatio n an d officia l recognitio n o f th e Nationa l Unio n o f Family Association s (UNAF) , a body composed o f a variety o f groups repre senting th e interest s o f th e family . Secon d wa s th e establishmen t o f th e National Unio n o f Famil y Allowanc e Fund s (UNCAF ) a s th e autonomou s principal manage r o f famil y benefits , separat e fro m othe r organ s o f Socia l Security. Thir d wa s th e establishmen t o f th e Nationa l Institut e o f Demo graphic Studie s (INED), a research body totally independen t o f other simila r institutions create d a t the sam e time, suc h a s the National Cente r fo r Scien tific Researc h (CNRS ) and th e Nationa l Institut e o f Statistics and Economi c Studies (INSEE). The three organizations—UNAF, UNCAF , an d INED — Translations from the French by John S. Ambler.

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are always consulted b y the governmen t whe n preparin g measure s o f famil y policy; their administrative council s an d thei r director s are part of a veritable lobby, a s shown b y their presentation s t o the numerou s parliamentar y com missions that succeeded on e another during this period. We mus t no t forge t t o mentio n th e formatio n an d developmen t o f th e Movement o f Popular Republican s (MRP) , a political part y whos e Catholi c sympathies wer e publicl y declare d an d that , a s Gordon Wrigh t ha s humor ously written , "preache s an d practice s th e Gospe l o f large families" (Wrigh t 1948, 105) . Mos t o f th e minister s responsibl e fo r famil y matter s (Rober t Prigent, Germain e Poinso-Chapuis , an d Pierr e Schneitter ) cam e ou t o f this party, which , alon g wit h th e Socialis t part y (SFIO) , wa s a t th e forefron t o f political affairs throughou t th e Fourth Republic . Moreover, famil y polic y ha s bee n coordinate d an d implemente d withi n the framework o f a ministry that predates the war and that has varied in nam e and responsibilities , includin g Ministr y o f th e Family , Ministr y o f Popula tion, an d Ministr y o f Healt h an d Population . Polic y wa s also elaborate d i n the Hig h Commissio n o n Populatio n an d th e Family , directl y unde r th e prime ministe r durin g th e Fourt h Republic . Thi s commissio n brough t to gether expert s on th e famil y fro m divers e disciplines—known collectivel y a s "the wise ones"—thereby imbuin g measure s taken i n thi s area wit h a suprapartisan legitimacy . W e find anothe r indicatio n o f the metapolitica l nature , if we can call it that, o f family polic y in the fact that the family i s specifically mentioned i n th e 1 4 Octobe r 194 6 Constitutio n o f th e Fourt h Republic , which reads , "Th e Natio n assure s th e famil y th e condition s necessar y t o it s development." It i s tru e tha t th e defens e o f th e famil y seem s t o hav e los t som e it s importance i n th e politica l aren a ove r th e postwa r period , a s see n i n th e decline o f th e shar e o f famil y benefit s i n th e tota l socia l budget , i n th e changing natur e o f thes e benefits , a s wel l a s i n th e breakdow n o f th e eco nomic an d politica l base s o f familialism . Ye t thi s declin e ma y b e nothin g more tha n a n appearanc e attributabl e t o the misleadin g characte r o f certai n indicators, t o the agin g of some leaders, and , abov e all, t o the displacemen t of the cente r o f gravity of family policy , whic h ha s shifted fro m th e statu s of the married woman t o that of the child. Althoug h changes in social structure have led t o new language fo r discussin g family policy , suc h a s "categories of relationships" an d "type s o f families, " th e basi c socia l issue s remai n th e same.

FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 14

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I. FAMIL Y POLIC Y A N D NATIONA L C O N S E N S U S : TH E POLITICA L ORIGINS O F FAMIL Y POLIC Y

To understand th e political importanc e of family policy in France, i t is useful to recall th e struggle s that gav e birth t o the movemen t fo r th e defense o f the family. A t th e en d o f th e nineteent h century , Franc e recentl y ha d bee n defeated b y Germany , th e proletaria n elite s ha d bee n decimate d afte r th e Paris Commune, an d th e Thir d Republi c ha d bee n establishe d b y a margi n of one vote. While i t is true that the birth rat e had fallen t o such a point tha t at th e en d o f the centur y th e replenishin g o f the generation s wa s n o longe r assured, i t i s less t o thi s wea k demographi c growt h tha n t o a grav e politica l crisis (laten t a t th e en d o f th e centur y an d o f whic h th e Dreyfu s Affai r wa s but on e manifestation ) tha t w e mus t attribut e th e rebirt h o f a populationis t movement, whic h alread y had bee n i n favor durin g the Old Regim e and th e Revolution! By examining th e prehistor y o f famil y polic y i n France , w e ca n se e tha t familialisme initiall y came int o being at the end o f the nineteenth centur y as a diverse grouping of philanthropical movement s connecte d t o social Catholicism, a grouping that, i n favoring large families, explicitl y aimed at restoring a mora l orde r founde d o n respec t fo r th e righ t t o propert y an d "natural " hierarchies, th e respec t fo r th e righ t t o determine freel y ho w one' s propert y will b e distribute d upo n death , an d respec t fo r Christia n value s (Talm y 1967). I n this period when republica n institution s were attempting to consolidate and the workers' movement to reorganize, th e defense o f the family was one o f the unifyin g principle s o f disparate effort s tha t ha d a common objec tive: political conservatism throug h a revival of morality, i n which the famil y was both symbo l an d means . I n short , th e rea l issu e wa s th e wa y i n whic h the family woul d affect socia l structure and the political structure to which i t is bound (Ashfor d 1986 , 252-53) . It i s no t b y chanc e tha t i n time s o f crisi s th e them e tha t crystalize s al l opposing side s i s "fre e choic e o f familie s agains t th e encroachmen t o f th e State," particularl y wit h respec t t o th e secula r school , fo r tha t schoo l i s th e most visibl e competito r t o th e famil y a s a n instrumen t o f redistributio n relatively autonomou s o f position i n th e socia l structure . Th e famil y i n thi s sense encapsulates a whole set of coherent attitude s that provide the basis for positions take n o n education , th e statu s o f women , abortion , an d inheri tance, a s well as on broade r issue s such a s social securit y an d th e exercis e of political authority . 1 4 6 R&M

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But th e mos t conservativ e socia l categorie s wer e no t th e onl y one s t o defend th e family , i.e. , th e socia l orde r tha t permitte d the m t o kee p thei r position i n the social structure. A t about the same time, othe r factions o f the dominant classes , whic h almos t coul d b e considere d antagonist s o f thos e conservative categories , als o becam e intereste d i n th e family , particularl y with respec t t o th e rol e o f th e Stat e i n th e managemen t o f civi l affair s (Becchia 1986 , 201-44) . Th e leaders of this movement, whic h ca n be called "natalist" (th e associatio n t o whic h mos t o f them belonge d wa s first named the National Alliance against Depopulation), were not business owners, army officers, o r leader s o f religiou s organizations , bu t representative s fro m th e elite o f a secula r an d patrioti c republic , th e on e tha t i n Franc e cam e int o power a t th e en d o f th e nineteent h century , includin g doctors , hig h civi l servants, statisticians , demographers , politica l leaders , etc . A s alway s whe n the famil y i s concerned , mora l preoccupation s wer e no t absen t fro m thei r program; bu t i n plac e o f a n ethico-religiou s perceptio n o f th e socia l worl d was substitute d a visio n tha t toda y woul d b e calle d technocratic , on e o f scientistic and rationalis t inspiration : they sought to encourage a higher birt h rate b y economi c an d politica l means , thereb y als o strengthenin g th e eco nomic and militar y power of the nation . The defense o f the family n o longer meant exclusivel y the restoration o f a past social order in decline. Fo r some it meant support for the transformatio n of the mod e o f reproductio n o f the socia l structure , i n whic h familia l patri mony n o longe r wa s to be the sol e principle an d th e onl y objective . Hence forth th e reproductio n o f th e socia l structur e too k plac e mor e an d mor e through system s of resource distribution guarantee d b y the Stat e (educationa l diplomas, socia l benefits, socia l rights, etc.). Durkheim, wh o participate d i n th e movement , remarks , "Th e cente r o f gravity o f moral lif e whic h onc e reside d i n th e famil y tend s mor e an d mor e to displac e itself. " H e adds , 'Th e famil y become s a secondar y orga n o f th e State" (Durkhei m 1963a , 63) . Underlyin g thi s movemen t towar d a for m of socia l reproductio n tha t relie d eve r mor e heavil y o n th e schoo l syste m (Durkheim di d no t believe i n the survival o f inheritance), h e found no t onl y a ne w famil y an d collectiv e moralit y bu t als o ne w principle s tha t ar e th e foundation o f thi s ne w morality . Thi s i s on e o f th e function s fulfille d b y demography a t the end o f the nineteenth century , whe n Bertillo n coine d th e expression "the normal family," or the family whose size permits the national population t o renew itself (Vincent 1950 , 253-56) . We ca n as k ourselves i f new method s o f population managemen t i n thi s FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 14

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period wer e no t relate d bot h t o ne w scientifi c definition s that , a s Durkhei m points out, aime d a t extending scientific rationalis m t o human conduct , an d to th e establishmen t o f a n orde r o f "socia l facts, " a s distinguishe d fro m "individual facts, " as seen no t only in Durkheimian sociolog y but also in th e legal transition fro m th e ide a o f fault i n work-related accident s to the ide a of risk (Durkheim 1963b , ix). These ne w method s o f managin g th e population , whic h includ e th e development o f governmenta l agencies , larg e firms, insuranc e plans , an d mutual societies , ar e founde d o n mora l principle s (suc h a s th e "normal " family o f Bertillon ) wit h scientifi c (o r statistical ) backing , an d o n a socia l technology that relies on methods of statistical processing (indices, rates , etc. ) and bureaucrati c procedure s (standardize d norms , specialize d officials , codi fied procedures, etc.) . In a syste m o f statistica l management , th e issu e i n definin g th e "legiti mate" famil y i s no longe r on e o f differentiating betwee n "natura l children " and "legitimat e children," between "marriage " and "cohabitation"—distinc tions tha t ar e relevan t onl y whe n managemen t o f th e famil y i s a domesti c and patrimonia l affair . Th e ne w moral norm s are less concerned wit h famil y relations themselve s tha n wit h thos e standards , statisticall y establishe d an d sanctioned by law, that govern equitable distribution o f the economic burde n of educating and raisin g children amon g different categorie s of households. In short , wha t ar e w e talkin g abou t i n Franc e whe n w e tal k abou t th e "family" i n politica l terms ? Th e recurrin g debat e ove r immigran t familie s serves to remind u s of the socia l factors a t issue in family policie s i n France . It is obviously th e socia l orde r tha t i s in question : the principle s o f member ship i n thi s order , it s hierarchy, and , o f course, it s method o f perpetuation . This i s sometimes forgotte n whe n famil y polic y expert s discuss the prioritie s to accor d t o thi s o r tha t typ e o f family . Famil y type s ar e alway s define d i n biological term s (numbe r an d ag e o f children, birt h intervals ) o r i n "social " terms (i n th e sens e o f "socia l cases, " i.e., familie s wit h handicappe d mem bers, unmarrie d mothers , etc.) . Thes e categorie s ten d t o mas k th e basi c social issue s o f conflic t betwee n socia l group s tha t ar e pose d b y al l famil y policies. At a time when th e paternalistic and patrimonial mod e of management of social relation s wa s declining bot h i n companie s an d i n families , ther e wa s emerging a system of collective management o f the family, whos e method o f functioning wa s bureaucratic , tha t is , a syste m i n whic h th e relation s be tween individual s ar e institute d accordin g t o totall y formalize d mechanism s 1 4 8 RtiM

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and legall y define d categories—i n short , a syste m wher e th e relation s ar e those of law. As shown b y the typical exampl e of the history o f the establish ment o f famil y allowanc e fund s fro m th e 1930 s onward , suc h a syste m presupposes a n official , legall y guarantee d definitio n o f rights; socially man dated agent s t o recogniz e thei r validity ; explici t an d precis e procedures ; regulations specifyin g rates , contributions , an d allocations ; and, finally, nor malization an d standardizatio n o f eligibilit y requirement s an d schedule s o f payments. II. FAMIL Y POLIC Y BEFOR E TH E IMPLEMENTATIO N OF SOCIA L SECURIT Y

A variety of measures favorabl e t o large families wer e taken afte r Worl d Wa r I, rangin g fro m reduce d railwa y fare s t o publi c housin g t o th e creatio n o f a Central Committe e fo r Famil y Allowances. Two initiatives attempted t o give order an d cohesio n t o thes e measures . Firs t wa s th e la w o f 1 1 March 193 2 on famil y allowances . Face d wit h a persisten t declin e i n th e birt h rate , th e minister o f labor, Adolph e Landry , obtaine d universa l famil y allowance s fo r all wage earners in industr y and business having at least two children. The secon d initiativ e wa s the Famil y Code , whos e goa l wa s above al l t o increase th e birthrate . Governmen t interventio n i n socia l relation s wa s n o longer limite d t o solvin g th e proble m o f salar y compensation , a s ha d bee n the cas e essentiall y unti l th e 1930s . I n fact , a s th e threa t o f wa r increased , the politica l worl d becam e increasingl y consciou s o f th e seriou s proble m posed b y th e fallin g birt h rate . Daladie r create d a Hig h Commissio n o n Population responsibl e to the prime minister. Essentially , i t was composed of three experts , me n wh o wer e bot h politician s an d scientist s i n th e field o f population. The y wer e th e labo r minister , Adolph e Landry ; M . Pernot , senator an d presiden t o f the Federatio n o f Large Families , (an d futur e min ister o f th e famil y i n th e las t governmen t o f th e Thir d Republic) ; an d M. Boverat , presiden t o f the Nationa l Allianc e agains t Depopulation . Thu s we find working togethe r i n th e sam e bod y representative s o f the tw o trend s that at the end of the nineteenth centur y ha d been s o strongly opposed . The adven t o f a famil y polic y i n Franc e suppose d a depoliticizing o f th e family, whic h wa s facilitated b y the development o f a parapublic administra tion i n th e for m o f the famil y allowanc e funds , specializin g i n th e adminis tering of family benefits , an d b y the emergenc e o f the scientific disciplin e of demography, specificall y devote d t o th e politica l managemen t o f families . FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 14

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One mus t also add a political contex t i n which th e thought o f war was never absent and that favored th e strengthening of centrist forces, whethe r Catholi c or secular. This Hig h Commissio n wa s th e primar y sourc e o f th e decree-la w o f 2 9 July 193 9 relatin g t o "th e Famil y an d t o the Frenc h Birt h Rate, " known a s the Famil y Code . Th e latte r favore d familie s havin g a t leas t thre e children , the allowanc e fo r th e first chil d bein g replace d b y a bonu s a t th e tim e o f birth. Moreover , th e tex t anticipate d th e extensio n o f famil y allowanc e distributions to the entire employed populatio n and , withi n the framework o f an assistanc e program , t o families o f the nonworkin g population . Withou t a doubt, thes e measures must be seen as a response to the fall i n the birth rate, which was already apparent i n 192 1 but which became spectacular afte r 193 5 as the number o f deaths surpassed the number of births. The Famil y Cod e wa s resolutel y an d explicitl y natalist . I t wa s als o "fa miliar' i n tha t natalis t measure s wer e place d withi n th e framewor k o f a general polic y concernin g famil y life . First , o n a materia l level , thes e mea sures were accompanied b y provisions for financial ai d to different categorie s of families : developmen t o f publi c assistance , improvemen t o f th e situatio n of taxpayer s wh o hav e children , ai d t o far m familie s t o assis t the m i n financing an d keepin g farms , etc . O n a mora l level , certai n measure s wer e provided t o chec k abortion , contraceptio n publicity , immorality , an d alco holism. O n a legal level, regulations dealing with adoption and the guardianship o f illegitimat e childre n wer e eased . A s ca n b e seen , thi s wa s a ver y diverse pla n that , moreover , wa s supplemented i n Novembe r b y enactmen t of measures pertaining to foreigners, socia l insurance, municipa l an d depart mental taxes , an d especiall y inheritanc e an d housing . A large par t o f thes e measures was drafted b y a leading expert, Alfre d Sauv y (Sauvy 1972 , 75-85). However, th e Family Code did not question th e administrative and financial structure s establishe d b y th e la w o f 1 1 March 193 2 fo r managemen t o f family allowances . Thes e structure s wer e attacke d b y proponent s o f socia l security i n 1945 . Fro m a n administrativ e perspective , th e Famil y Cod e represented nothin g mor e tha n a n effor t t o generalize, t o coordinate, an d t o improve existing plans. Few change s wer e mad e durin g th e Vich y administration , i n spit e o f th e role played b y the famil y i n th e Petai n ideology . "To o fe w children , to o few arms, to o few allies/ ' declared Marshal l Petai n o n 1 7 June 1940 , explainin g to th e countr y th e reason s tha t le d hi m t o as k fo r a n armistice . Th e Vich y government intende d t o make the famil y on e o f the foundations fo r rebuild 1 5 0 RtiM

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ing the country. Althoug h mos t of the measures taken by Vichy to strengthen the famil y fel l withi n th e contour s o f prio r policy , the y wer e inspire d b y a conception o f societ y tha t wa s radicall y differen t fro m tha t o f th e Thir d Republic: "Th e right s o f th e famil y prevai l ove r th e right s o f th e Stat e an d the individual," declared Petai n (Paxto n 1973 , 165). The Vich y progra m o n famil y matter s limite d itsel f to continuing prewa r policy, bu t i n a more energeti c fashion . Fo r example , wit h respec t to retur n to th e land , th e Famil y Cod e o f 193 9 provided fo r loan s t o youn g couples , loans whos e interes t an d repaymen t decline d a s childre n wer e born ; i t als o stipulated tha t th e so n wh o remaine d o n th e far m shoul d inheri t a large r portion tha n hi s urban brother s and sisters . The Cod e also strengthened law s against abortio n an d returne d t o a n earlie r vie w o f adoptio n i n whic h th e adopted chil d belonge d entirel y t o his or her ne w family. Suc h measure s lay within th e scop e o f th e conceptio n o f th e famil y advocate d b y th e ne w regime. It wa s abov e al l th e rol e withi n societ y tha t th e Vich y governmen t in tended t o give the famil y tha t wa s the origina l elemen t o f the polic y o f this period. Th e famil y wa s th e "cel l o f Frenc h life " an d woul d replac e th e individual as the basic unit of social life. Consequentl y divorce was obviously the primar y targe t o f the Vich y regime . Th e la w o f 2 April 194 1 prohibite d divorce during the first three years of marriage. Th e government als o favored heads o f households wit h larg e families an d penalize d thos e tha t ha d fe w o r no children . Father s o f larg e familie s ha d membershi p right s i n numerou s organizations, whil e a single man o r one without childre n coul d no t hope to have a caree r o r t o advance , particularl y i n th e judiciary . Finally , i f th e mother of the family wa s glorified, i t was on the condition tha t she remain a t home: the la w of 1 1 October 194 0 encouraged wome n no t t o work; the la w of 1 5 August 1941 , providing primar y school s fo r girls , manifestl y preferre d to kee p pregnan t wome n a t home . Obviousl y wome n di d no t ye t hav e th e right to vote, a right they would earn i n 1945 . Once judgmen t ha d bee n passe d o n th e Vich y regime , representative s o f Resistance organizations , trad e unions , an d politica l partie s o r tendencies , all grouped withi n th e Nationa l Counci l o f the Resistance , resolve d t o unit e on a platform tha t gave an importan t position t o family policy . Thi s progra m called for the development of "solidarity toward the families o f all the victims of the Hitler and Vichy terror"; "an importan t readjustmen t o f wages and th e guarantee o f a wag e leve l an d remuneratio n whic h woul d assur e t o eac h worker an d hi s family security , dignity , an d th e possibilit y o f a fully huma n FAMILY POLIC Y I N F R A N C E S I N C E 1 9 3 8 15

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life"; an d " a complet e Socia l Securit y plan " (Consei l Nationa l d e l a Resis tance 1944) . III. FAMIL Y POLIC Y A N D TH E INAUGURATIO N O F TH E FOURTH REPUBLI C ( 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 8 )

Political discussio n o f the family an d o f the measure s relatin g to it thereafte r took o n a n ambiguou s character . I n contras t t o familialism , whic h estab lished th e defens e o f th e famil y a s a n explici t issu e an d a wa y o f doin g political battle— a sor t o f familia l corporatis m base d o n th e symboli c an d political instrumen t o f the "familia l vote, " which wa s politically discredite d with th e fal l o f th e Vich y government—"protectio n o f th e family " i n th e postwar politica l aren a wa s no longe r suc h a divisiv e issue . Eve n mor e tha n before, famil y polic y became bureaucratized an d legitimized . Numerous indication s attes t to this neutralization o f the socia l issue s tha t family polic y alway s raises . Debat e o n thes e issue s came t o be characterize d by wha t coul d b e calle d th e "rhetori c o f impartiality, " evidence d i n a ten dency o f al l partie s t o avoi d th e mos t violen t form s o f polemics , t o respec t the positions of adversaries, an d generall y to reject a conception o f debate i n this are a a s ope n politica l conflict . Thi s strateg y o f neutralizatio n foun d it s fulfillment i n th e "rhetori c o f scientificity, " i n whic h opponent s employe d economic, demographic , an d sociologica l argument s wit h increasin g fre quency (Bourdieu 1982 , 155-59) . The fact remain s that this kind of political depoliticization o f family policy was not accomplished withou t political clashes, a s for example and i n particular, th e administrativ e organizatio n o f famil y allocatio n funds . Ye t th e family ai d program s institute d durin g thi s perio d almos t alway s wer e passe d unanimously, despit e th e ver y differen t importanc e an d significanc e the y held fo r the various parties. Political Familie s a n d Famil y Polic y

With th e Liberation , Franc e mad e a n ambitiou s choic e i n favo r o f th e family, becaus e th e standar d o f livin g o f familie s jus t afte r th e wa r wa s particularly lo w and therefor e constitute d a national priority . I n 194 6 spending o n famil y benefit s represente d almos t 4 0 percen t o f total socia l securit y spending. If , i n th e program s o f th e tw o mos t importan t leftis t parties , th e Communist Part y (PCF) and th e Socialis t Part y (SFIO) (parties that togethe r 1 5 2 RtiM

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drew nearl y 5 0 percent o f th e vote) , allusion s t o famil y polic y stricto sensu were rare , the y wer e ver y muc h i n evidenc e i n th e Movemen t o f Popula r Republicans (MRP) . I n th e 1 3 Novembe r 194 5 declaratio n o f th e Frenc h Episcopate o n "th e huma n person , th e family , an d society, " th e Catholi c hierarchy, whic h tightl y controlle d th e politica l orientatio n o f th e MRP , made a distinction betwee n "secularism, " a n atheisti c an d materialisti c doc trine, and "secularity," which could be tolerated to the extent that it concerns only the autonomy of the State in its domain o f temporal order . Th e "duties" of th e Stat e includ e ai d t o families , no t onl y i n respons e t o thei r physica l needs (food, hygiene , lodging ) but als o to their socia l need s (equa l opportu nity) and mora l needs (the fight against "individualism"). It i s perhap s no t i n th e program s o f politica l partie s (particularl y i n thi s period o f economic , political , an d constitutiona l crisis ) tha t position s ar e clearly revealed , fo r ther e i s littl e mentio n o f famil y policy , excep t i n th e program o f th e MRP . Th e principle s an d proposal s o f each partisa n move ment ar e bette r enunciate d i n th e statement s o f member s o f parliament , involved ministers , an d experts more or less affiliated wit h a party, a s well as in journals and i n the deliberations of public bodies, particularly thos e of the General Plannin g Commission . If all politicians an d expert s (physicians, demographers , representative s of family associations ) agreed on natalist objectives (Genera l D e Gaulle i n 194 5 spoke o f th e "1 2 millio n beautifu l babies " Franc e neede d t o onc e agai n become a great nation), th e attention give n t o demographic problem s and t o the method s o f solvin g the m differe d accordin g t o politica l leanings . Thus , for th e Communis t ministe r Frangoi s Billoux , th e Stat e shoul d giv e ai d t o four categorie s of families: the large family, youn g couples without children , households of refugees an d deportees, and young people about to be married. Most o f th e partie s o f th e Lef t an d o f th e Right , a s wel l a s th e experts , shared a concer n wit h natalis t issues . However , rift s clearl y emerged , les s between forma l politica l partie s tha n betwee n movements , regardin g th e preferred typ e o f famil y an d mora l values , an d th e socia l orde r wit h whic h these were associated. Th e share d concer n i s evidenced b y an opinio n give n by the Commission o n Consumptio n an d Socia l Modernizatio n o f the Gen eral Planning Commission, wher e most of the nonparliamentary formulator s of social , health , an d demographi c policie s o f th e Fourt h Republi c wer e grouped unde r th e presidenc y o f Henr i Raynaud , secretar y o f th e Genera l Confederation o f Labor. This opinion stipulated : FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 1 5

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It has come to the attention o f the General Plannin g Commission tha t the various commissions created to study the modernization of each sector of production 1 ) were not well informed a s to the optimum needs of French consumers, 2 ) through lack of sufficient informatio n an d becaus e o f th e principa l objectiv e o f thei r work , riske d neglecting the human and social side of problems posed by the Plan. . . . The Commission determined the optimum population of France and, on the basis of this number, establishe d the essential needs of this population in order to afford i t the best possible living conditions. The optimu m wa s fixed at 50-6 0 millio n an d wa s justified b y the followin g four arguments : 1) The workin g population o f France i s insufficient t o satisfy labo r demands for production and defense. 2) General costs to the French nation are borne by too few individuals. 3) The burde n pose d b y the elderl y populatio n i s becoming to o heav y fo r th e younger generations. 4) The Frenc h populatio n i s too smal l i n compariso n t o neighborin g countrie s (Commissariat General du Plan 1947). There followed a detailed catalogue of methods, simila r to those expressed in th e Famil y Cod e o f 1939 , designe d t o satisf y al l partie s an d intende d t o increase th e birthrat e an d t o improv e th e "quality " o f the population . Apar t from th e obligator y mentio n o f mora l consideration s regardin g alcoholis m and abortion , th e proposa l consiste d o f measure s offerin g direc t incentive s for natalit y (prenata l an d famil y allowances , declinin g rate s fo r taxe s an d public service s accordin g t o th e numbe r o f children, etc.) ; of recommenda tions pertainin g t o nurser y school s an d daycare ; and finally, o f steps to hel p working mother s (extensio n o f maternit y leaves , developmen t o f part-tim e work, an d creation o f a compulsor y nationa l servic e fo r wome n t o provid e mothers7 helpers) . A singl e observatio n attest s t o th e marginalizatio n o f "familialists"; the commission di d no t consider itsel f qualified t o take a stand on th e "familia l vote, " whic h woul d hav e give n eac h hea d o f famil y a number o f votes equivalent to the number o f members of his family. Ye t this measure found numerou s supporter s i n th e rank s of the MRP , whic h wa s in fact poorly represented o n this commission. Finally, withou t attributin g thi s tendenc y t o a particula r politica l move ment, i t i s important t o underlin e th e emergenc e i n thi s perio d o f a kind o f ethical avant-garde, whic h was particularly visible in the literary and journal istic fields (Simon e d e Beauvoir' s emblemati c book , The Second Sex, wa s published i n 194 9 [se e Lenoi r 1985b , 3-47]) . Thi s avant-gard e expresse d itself i n th e politica l aren a onl y i n th e for m o f a defens e o f women' s righ t 1 5 4 RtiM

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(indeed, thei r obligation! ) to work and a call for necessar y reforms , a s shown by this excerpt fro m th e first report o f the Commissio n o n Manpowe r unde r the General Plannin g Commission : —equalization of male and female salaries for equal work; —increased possibilitie s fo r wome n t o obtai n an d t o improv e thei r professiona l qualifications; access to all jobs, even at the highest levels; —replacement o f the single-incom e allowanc e by an equivalen t famil y allowance , added to the normal family allowances, —facilities fo r purchase of supplies (cooperatives, etc. ) accorded t o working women (28). From who m di d thes e recommendation s come ? No t onl y fro m th e unio n members of the General Confederatio n o f Labor (CGT) but also from mem bers o f th e Nationa l Counci l o f Frenc h Employer s (CNPF ) an d fro m hig h civil servants, fo r example Pau l Delouvrier . W e see already a sign of what in the 1950 s wa s t o becom e on e o f th e issue s o f famil y policy , creatin g rift s between partie s and especiall y within eac h o f them: the professional statu s of women. Bu t i n 194 5 th e politica l clas s wa s muc h mor e divide d ove r th e administrative organizatio n o f th e fund s fo r famil y allowance s tha n ove r legislation pertaining to benefits. Administrative Organizatio n o f Fund s fo r Famil y A l l o w a n c e s a n d Legislatio n Pertainin g t o Famil y Benefit s

The ordinance of 4 October 1945 , which established th e new system of social security, brough t radica l modification s bot h t o th e administrativ e structur e and t o the financial organizatio n o f family allowanc e funds . I t include d th e funds i n a unifie d an d centralize d socia l securit y structur e an d brok e th e monopoly o f employer s ove r fun d management . However , th e ne w pla n sought to decentralize th e administration o f social securit y an d t o give beneficiaries a role i n it s management. Th e institution s create d t o manage bene fits differe d fro m th e employer compensatio n fund s o f the previous system i n the following ways . The ne w system ha s regional office s tha t ar e responsibl e for al l benefit s an d tha t impos e a unifor m rat e o f contributio n fixed b y th e State. Above all, thes e offices ar e managed by a council mad e up exclusively of beneficiaries, appointe d i n par t b y employees, i n par t b y employers , an d in part by independent workers. At the outset , th e famil y allowanc e fund s wer e no t intende d t o be auton omous: the primar y Socia l Securit y fund s wer e t o collec t contribution s an d FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 15

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distribute benefits . However , wit h th e first social securit y refor m proposals , representatives o f th e existin g fund s calle d fo r th e preservatio n o f a specia l system fo r famil y allowances . Th e argument s wer e largel y o f a technica l nature: the uniqueness and vulnerability of family interest s compared to other risks covered by Social Security , etc . I n fact, autonom y for the funds an d th e methods o f appointment o f administrators constitute d a major politica l issu e after th e war. On th e sid e o f th e supporter s o f a singl e fun d wer e th e leftis t parties , Socialist an d Communist , a s wel l a s th e Genera l Confederatio n o f Labo r (CGT); o n th e sid e o f the partisan s o f autonomy, wh o di d no t question th e idea o f a vast system o f social protection , wer e the socia l Christians , notabl y the MRP, th e centrists, an d a portion o f the Right. Likewise , stron g political opposition develope d aroun d th e issu e o f beneficiary representation . Begin ning with the First Constiuent Assembly, wher e the Left was largely predominant, th e MRP , wit h a relativel y larg e representation , introduce d severa l bills callin g fo r revisio n o f Socia l Securit y ordinances . Th e MR P hel d tha t the famil y allowanc e fund s shoul d b e independen t an d autonomous , em ployers shoul d hav e a preponderan t rol e i n thei r administration , an d th e representation o f male heads of households on administrative councils should be increased . Al l o f these proposals were rejecte d b y leftist forces . A s for th e selection o f delegate s t o administrativ e councils , th e CG T an d th e leftis t parties wer e agains t direc t electio n b y th e whol e bod y o f wag e earner s an d supported th e principle of selection by appointment. Doubtless on e mus t se e i n thes e conflictin g position s th e desir e o f eac h political organizatio n t o control th e ne w institutions whos e services were no t without effec t o n th e unions . Befor e th e war , th e Lef t ha d lef t th e field o f family matter s ope n fo r th e Right . On e mus t recal l that , a t tha t time , th e workers' movemen t wa s ver y muc h oppose d t o famil y allowances , fo r tw o reasons: the famil y allowanc e wa s considered t o be a salary supplement, an d its managemen t wa s th e exclusiv e responsibilit y o f employers . Henc e fo r employers the family allowanc e was a way to avoid salary increases. On e ha s only t o refe r bac k t o a serie s o f labo r arbitration s i n 193 6 an d 193 7 t o b e convinced o f thi s particula r functio n o f famil y allowances . Fro m 194 5 t o 1946, ther e wa s a marke d turnaroun d i n th e attitud e o f union organization s and leftis t politica l groups , a change linke d bot h t o the dissociation o f family allowances fro m salar y an d t o th e allocatio n o f their managemen t t o repre sentatives o f beneficiaries o f the compensatio n funds . Th e mod e o f electio n

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of member s o f th e administrativ e council s o f Socia l Securit y an d famil y allowance fund s wa s no t fixed unti l th e la w o f 3 0 Octobe r 1946 , whic h established th e principl e o f election o f administrators b y proportional repre sentation. Th e Secon d Nationa l Constiuen t Assembly , meetin g o n 1 1 June 1946, marked a slight move to the right as the MRP became the largest party. After politica l negotiations led by Andre Morice, th e Communist and Social ist parties finally accepted th e principle of election. Family allowanc e fund s wer e definitively grante d autonom y b y the la w of 21 February 1949 , largely as a result of pressure from famil y movement s an d of the administrativ e experienc e o f the funds . Th e importanc e o f separatin g management o f family benefit s fro m tha t o f other socia l risk s was no longe r contested. I n additio n t o th e fac t tha t th e generalizatio n o f Socia l Securit y encountered numerou s difficulties , i t was clearly apparen t t o the majorit y o f administrators themselve s tha t autonom y wa s necessary, eve n mor e s o sinc e in the first two elections o f members of the administrative council s the CG T carried th e electio n fo r th e Socia l Securit y fund s a s wel l a s fo r th e famil y allowance funds . If autonom y o f managemen t o f th e fund s wa s th e subjec t o f a politica l battle, th e syste m o f family benefits , relativel y simpl e i n itself , wa s adopte d unanimously o n 2 2 August 1946 . I t generally continue d existin g policy, bu t focused o n basi c benefit s suc h a s famil y allowances , single-incom e allow ances, an d maternit y allowances . Beside s rat e increases , th e essentia l modi fications were: —extension o f family allowance s to the nonworking population, subjec t to justifica tion of the inability of the concerned party to work. Consequently, the law called for the payment of family benefits no longer to the head of household, but to the person having effective and permanent care of the children; —generalization o f the allowance t o all families wit h a single incom e whether the children are legitimate or natural, recognize d or not, whateve r the nationality of the parents (Ceccaldi 1957). Like the syste m o f family benefits , tha t o f family ta x deductions (quotient familial) wa s also adopte d easil y i n th e la w o f 3 1 Decembe r 1945 , wit h th e only reservatio n expresse d bein g tha t i t did no t giv e a sufficient advantag e t o taxpayers burdened wit h a family. T o be sure, famil y polic y as a fiscal matter does no t dat e fro m 1945 ; but economi c circumstances , legislativ e revisions , and the needs of the State had reduce d famil y ta x deductions to a minimum . Creation o f the famil y "quotient " establishe d a policy resolutel y favorabl e t o

FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 15

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a growing birth rate , no t only be allowing deductions for dependents but also by taxing neither income linked to the family (family allowances) nor indirec t income (Social Security). Professional Need s o f Marrie d Women an d th e Famil y Mode l

If, sinc e th e ev e o f Liberation , famil y polic y ha s bee n abov e al l concerne d with th e changin g statu s o f th e marrie d woman , i t i s because tha t whic h i s fundamentally a t stak e i s th e mod e o f reproductio n o f th e socia l structure . Each mod e o f reproductio n implie s a definitio n o f th e rol e an d o f th e position o f the woman no t only within th e family bu t throughout society . The officia l recognitio n o f a "family interest, " to use the legal expression , was accompanie d b y th e diffusio n o f a "famil y model " tha t justifie d al l possible measure s i n favo r o f thi s "basi c societa l cell, " accordin g t o th e organistic terminolog y stil l i n vogu e a t thi s time . Th e dominan t mode l wa s still th e legitimat e family , o f French nationality , wit h a t least three childre n and i n whic h th e mothe r remain s a t hom e an d th e fathe r i s legall y th e "head." The "mothe r a t home," the original nam e for the allowance paid t o households where the woman doe s not work, was the principal instrumen t of this family doctrine , whic h wa s politically institute d unde r Vich y an d whic h survived more or less until the 1960s . Thus, i n 1943 , the allowance to singleincome familie s represente d mor e tha n 5 2 percen t o f pai d benefits , fo r 7 6 percent o f mothers o f two children, 8 8 percent o f mothers o f three children , and 92-9 8 percent o f mothers o f four childre n receive d thi s allowance . Thi s family mode l an d th e statu s of the woma n tha t i s associated wit h i t were no t really questione d durin g th e Liberatio n o r fo r almos t twent y year s after , except wit h respec t t o politica l rights , wit h wome n earnin g th e righ t t o vote on 5 Octobe r 1944 , an d divorce , wit h th e ordinanc e o f 1 2 Apri l 194 5 eliminating the prohibition o f divorce in the first three years of marriage. The creatio n o f a righ t t o Socia l Securit y an d socia l aid , alon g wit h th e development o f specialize d institution s i n wha t ha s com e t o b e calle d th e "social sector" (cf. Duran d 1953a) , le d to the creation o f a legal definition o f the family differen t fro m tha t of civil law, partly because new objectives wer e being established bu t also because a new set of lawyers and expert s addressed the problem . Tw o example s fro m th e 2 2 Augus t 194 6 la w bea r witness : family benefit s wer e n o longe r pai d t o th e "hea d o f household " bu t t o th e person havin g "effectiv e an d permanen t car e o f the children" ; the notio n o f "child i n care " supplanted th e notio n o f legitimacy an d th e allocation o f the 158 R£M

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single-income famil y allowanc e cam e int o genera l us e fo r al l children , legitimate or not, recognize d o r not, regardles s of the parents' nationality . IV. TH E FOURT H REPUBLIC : TH E SPLENDO R A N D DECADENCE O F FAMILIALIS M

Without a doub t w e mus t attribut e bot h th e rapi d developmen t an d th e orientation o f famil y polic y unde r th e Fourt h Republi c t o th e strategi c position o f the MR P in the political field at this time and als o to the allianc e in which th e MRP was almost always a leading party. The Golde n Ag e o f Familialis m

A series of measures taken i n this period ha d symbolic value as bearers of the familialist banner : the Meda l o f Honor fo r th e Frenc h Famil y was upgrade d in 194 7 and Mother' s Da y wa s created o n 2 9 Ma y 1950 . I t was also durin g this eventful perio d (on e of the Col d War , th e Indochines e War , th e debat e over th e creatio n o f the Europea n Defens e Community , financial stabiliza tion, an d a halt in economic growth) that a proposal to divert 0.75 percent of family allowanc e contribution s t o socia l insuranc e provoke d a ministeria l crisis! The Pinay government was in fact dropped by the MRP on 2 3 December 1952 , apparentl y fo r thi s reason , bu t actuall y becaus e o f th e Europea n Defense Community . I n th e nam e o f an d o n behal f o f th e family , a d ho c groups forme d t o tak e action , fo r exampl e i n th e passag e o f th e la w o f 1 September 194 8 o n decontro l o f rents , i n whic h th e principl e o f decontro l was accepted i n retur n fo r compensatio n i n the form o f a housing allowanc e for th e familie s o f wage earners an d independen t worker s with tw o o r mor e children. I n short , i t ca n b e sai d o f famil y polic y wha t Queuill e reputedl y said abou t politic s i n general : that i t served "no t t o resolv e problems , bu t t o silence those who posed them. " Until th e mid-1950s , th e politica l importanc e o f famil y polic y wa s re flected in a budge t tha t woul d neve r agai n clai m a s large a s a proportion o f social spending : i n 1949 , i t made u p 40 percen t o f Socia l Securit y expendi tures against 28.8 percent in 1960 . Already in the 1950 s other social benefits , notably for health and old age, were growing faster than famil y benefits, eve n as th e rat e o f payrol l taxe s fo r th e famil y allowanc e program s ros e fro m 1 3 percent t o 16.7 5 percen t i n 1959 . Eve n i f financial resource s allocate d t o family benefit s shran k relatively , socia l treatment o f the famil y continue d t o FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 15

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develop in accord wit h barely euphemized familialis t objectives . Thre e mea sures taken durin g thi s time bear witness: creation o f a housing allowanc e (1 September 1948) ; extension o f the single-incom e allowance , originall y enti tled the "mother at home" allowance, t o families whose head was not a wage earner; an d th e scalin g o f famil y allowance s t o th e rea l cos t o f childrearin g through th e establishment o f differing rate s according to the age of the child . It i s true tha t th e inde x o f all famil y benefit s pe r chil d hardl y increase d an d that th e averag e o f tota l benefit s fo r eac h eligibl e child , a s a percentag e o f gross nationa l produc t pe r capita , fel l fro m 21. 8 percen t i n 194 9 t o 14. 6 percent i n 1958 . Th e tw o mos t importan t benefits , financially an d symboli cally (th e "mos t familialist " benefits) , th e single-incom e allowanc e an d th e family allowance , reache d thei r highes t leve l i n 195 5 (1 0 percen t mor e i n constant franc s tha n i n 1949) , bu t decline d thereafter , th e forme r immedi ately and the latter after 195 9 (Nizard 1974) . The Erosio n o f Famil y Polic y

Although a few ne w benefits wer e create d durin g thi s perio d an d th e famil y allowance funds wer e granted definitive autonomy , provin g that the idea of a family polic y wa s no t i n question , i t i s clea r tha t no t onl y th e financial foundations bu t als o th e politica l an d mora l foundation s o f thi s polic y wer e seriously shaken. With respec t to finances, family benefit s foun d themselve s i n competitio n with th e othe r tw o principa l branche s o f Socia l Security , healt h insuranc e and old-ag e insurance , whic h wer e growin g a t a faster rate . Ver y soon , on e of th e grea t principle s o f 194 6 wa s abandoned , tha t o f indexin g famil y benefits agains t averag e salaries . Fo r th e whol e o f th e period , benefit s ros e more o r les s i n accordanc e wit h price s an d no t income , whic h inevitabl y produced a surplus , sinc e th e revenu e fro m contribution s base d o n incom e necessarily increase d faste r tha n benefit s a t a time of rising real income . The proble m o f revising benefits recurre d throughou t thi s period. O n th e eve o f th e legislativ e election s o f 195 1 (th e first since th e Communist s ha d left powe r i n 1947) , a n interparliamentar y commissio n wa s created t o stud y the various family benefi t plans , wit h a view to the eventua l revisio n o f both the financing an d th e conten t o f the system . Withou t goin g int o th e detail s of th e repor t edite d b y Rober t Prigent , forme r ministe r o f populatio n an d family (MRP) , i t appear s tha t al l th e partie s wer e agree d o n changin g th e basis fo r calculatin g famil y benefits ; onl y th e employer s hear d b y th e com 1 6 0 RtiM

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mission wer e agains t thi s measure , whic h woul d lea d t o a ris e i n employe r contributions. I n th e parliamentar y debate s that followed th e presentatio n o f this report, onl y the minister of the budget, Edga r Faure (a radical), oppose d the commission' s proposa l o n th e ground s tha t i t would lea d inevitabl y t o a rise in the overall deficit o f Social Security . If o n th e questio n o f finances on e coul d se e a n oppositio n formin g between, o n th e on e hand , th e Radica l Part y an d certai n member s o f th e Rally of the Frenc h Peopl e (RPF), who gave priority to restoration o f Frenc h financial strengt h ove r a n increas e i n famil y benefits , and , o n th e othe r hand, th e other parties, abov e all the MRP, alon g with th e Communists an d Socialists, thes e temporar y an d ambiguou s alliance s brok e u p ove r othe r issues. Thi s wa s th e cas e i n tw o debate s tha t concerned , respectively , th e housing allowanc e (1948 ) and th e allowanc e t o the mothe r a t hom e (1955) , debates tha t crystallize d opposin g camp s wit h regar d t o wha t constitute d th e essence of "family policy " at the time: defense o f the "traditional" family . With regar d t o housing , th e Communist s an d Socialist s propose d a vas t program fo r th e constructio n o f inexpensive housing . Conversely , th e MRP , which ha d neve r cease d t o submit bills calling for a n allowanc e i n thi s area , and whic h wa s t o mak e housin g polic y on e o f it s majo r theme s i n th e legislative elections of June 1951 , saw the housing allowance as a component of famil y policy . S o w e rea d i n th e preambl e o f a bil l submitte d o n 1 2 December 1946 : Large families are the ones that are most miserably housed. They are clearly disadvantaged compared to households without children an d single persons not only because of a relativ e inferiorit y o f resource s . . . bu t als o wit h regar d t o th e structure s themselves. . . . Jammed together in monstrous barracks, these families of the masses lose their taste for home and family an d develop the bitter feeling tha t they form a class apart. . . . The consequences of such a state of affairs ar e serious: a drop in the birth rate, alcoholism, public immorality, death, etc. These same principles were evidenced i n the debates on the single-incom e allowance, whic h concerne d th e statu s o f women i n th e famil y a s well as in the labo r market . Th e position s taken b y associations ca n b e summarized i n terms of three categories . Famil y organizations , thos e tha t hav e a monopol y on the representatio n o f families i n the UNAF , and , mor e generally, organi zations belongin g t o th e Catholi c movemen t (CFTC , MRP , etc. ) favore d legislation tha t woul d contribut e t o keepin g th e woma n a t home , wit h justifications varyin g accordin g t o th e tradition s appropriat e t o eac h move FAMILY POLIC Y I N F R A N C E S I N C E 1 9 3 8 16

1

ment, bu t all emphasizing the educative and integrational rol e of the mother . Conversely, secula r unio n organization s (CGT , CGT-FO ) an d leftis t partie s defended onl y "equality of the right to family benefits between families wher e the mothe r work s an d thos e wher e sh e doe s not/ ' tha t is , "replacin g th e single-income allowanc e wit h a complementar y allowanc e t o eac h mother " (CGT [Confederatio n general e du travail ] 1953) . Both o f these position s ca n b e contraste d t o a third , modernis t tendenc y politically represente d b y th e radical s an d mendesistes (followers o f Pierr e Mendes-France) the n i n powe r (Jacque s Chaban-Delmas , Jea n Caillavet , Edgar Faure , etc.) . Thi s tendenc y reflecte d th e poin t o f vie w o f economi c planners an d decisio n makers , who , give n th e labo r shortage , ha d bee n favorable t o wome n workin g eve r sinc e th e Liberation . Thus , durin g th e preparation o f th e Thir d Pla n (1958-1961) , th e Manpowe r Commissio n under th e general Plannin g Commission , meetin g i n th e mid-1950s , explic itly favore d a n increas e i n number s o f working wome n an d advocate d part time work, flexible hours, increase d daycare , and , a s a compromise solutio n between th e socia l actor s represente d o n thi s commission , th e allocatio n o f the single-incom e allowanc e neithe r fo r th e nonworkin g mothe r no r fo r al l mothers, bu t in accordance with the amount o f time spent working. The attitud e o f th e Nationa l Counci l o f Frenc h Employer s (CNPF ) i s more ambiguous and i s explained by the desire to meet manpower needs and to lesse n thei r cost s by shifting th e financial burde n o f Socia l Securit y fro m payroll taxe s t o genera l taxation . Th e CNP F preferre d allowance s fo r chil dren rathe r tha n fo r mothers , workin g o r not , a s i f th e "child " personifie d henceforth th e neutral ground o f social confrontations, substitutin g itself in a sense fo r th e "woman. " A t th e sam e momen t th e feminis t movement , finding a cause i n birt h control , wa s transforming th e issu e of the socia l an d economic statu s of "the woman " by placing i t on th e political agenda . Eve n the familialist s wer e reduce d t o economi c arguments : th e languag e use d t o justify suppor t o f th e mothe r a t home , fo r example , wa s based no t onl y o n simple mora l values , a s wa s stil l th e cas e i n th e earl y postwa r familialis t movement, bu t increasingl y o n th e economi c evaluatio n o f domestic work , as suggested i n the notion o f the "maternal salary. " A s s e s s m e n t o f Famil y Polic y unde r t h e Fourt h Republi c

With som e exceptions, legislatio n regardin g the development of major bene fits was no t significantl y modifie d unde r th e Fourt h Republic . Th e excep 1 6 2 R&M

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tions ar e th e creatio n o f th e housin g allowance , althoug h thi s wa s closel y linked to the great reform o f 194 8 that led to the freeing o f rents; the creation of increases relatin g t o th e ag e of the child ; and th e creation o f the mother at-home allowance . We mus t poin t ou t th e importanc e o f th e housin g allowanc e a s a n element o f family polic y durin g thi s period. Thi s allowanc e wa s designed t o give t o th e famil y th e resource s neede d t o mee t th e greate r housin g cost s required b y havin g mor e children . Th e familia l characte r o f th e housin g allowance wa s strengthene d durin g thi s perio d an d th e eligibilit y require ments were relaxed. However , particularl y i n the first few years, the numbe r of beneficiaries wa s very small and i n the cities (rural families di d not occupy housing that would qualif y fo r the allowance), an d the beneficiaries wer e for the mos t par t familie s wit h relativel y hig h incomes . Thi s particula r for m o f aid t o familie s develope d particularl y quickl y i n th e 1970s ; the numbe r o f beneficiaries tripled , fro m mor e than 400,00 0 i n 195 9 to 1,278,00 0 in 1971. The percentag e o f beneficiaries o f basic family allowance s who also receive d a housin g allowanc e increase d steadily , fro m 0. 9 percen t i n 195 0 t o 2. 5 percent i n 1953 , 1 2 percent i n 1958 , 2 3 percent i n 1963 , and 3 4 percent i n 1971 (Nizard 1974 , 302) . In additio n t o th e housin g allowance , th e Stat e an d loca l communitie s expanded th e constructio n o f public Moderat e Ren t Housin g (HLM ) t o th e point tha t i t represented 3 0 percent o f housing unit s complete d i n 195 8 and 27 percen t i n 1971 . T o encourag e investmen t i n construction , th e Stat e subsidized privat e constructio n b y offerin g low-interest , long-ter m loans . Beginning in 1953 , industrial firms were required t o invest 1 percent o f their payroll i n socia l housing , a polic y tha t wa s continue d afte r 1958 . Finally , special home savings plans were created i n 196 5 and expande d i n 1970 . Together thes e investment s o f publi c o r semipubli c origi n playe d a ver y important role ; they represented mor e than 5 0 percent of total investments i n housing unti l th e mid-1950s . An d eve n i f thei r shar e ha s consistentl y de creased since , the y stil l constitute d 3 2 percen t o f investment s mad e fro m 1969 to 197 1 (Magri 1977) . To avoi d a restrictiv e definitio n o f famil y policy , w e mus t no t forge t t o mention th e growt h unde r th e Fourt h Republi c o f regulation s an d service s affecting famil y life , notabl y i n th e area s of health, housing , an d schooling . We know that maternit y insuranc e covere d th e costs of childbirth an d a part of th e los s o f salar y fo r th e workin g mother . Medica l coverag e o f th e chil d and th e mothe r i s ensured primaril y b y a networ k o f medical office s servin g FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 16

3

infants an d toddlers . I n 1960 , ther e wer e 8,56 0 offices , which , i n th e best equipped areas , served almost 60 percent of all mothers. The onl y shado w i n thi s picture , relate d t o th e stil l dominan t thoug h declining familialis t perspectiv e o f th e perio d towar d famil y policy , wa s th e number o f daycare centers . Th e numbe r o f centers buil t o n th e initiativ e of local communitie s an d variou s organization s wit h th e hel p o f th e CNA F grew from 36 0 (12,000 cribs) in 194 7 to still only 697 (31,750 cribs) in 1971! Faced wit h a shortag e o f daycar e (fiv e hundre d thousan d mother s wit h a child younge r tha n thre e wer e working), publi c authoritie s woul d late r loo k at way s t o improv e th e syste m o f private daycar e provider s ( ]ournal Officiel 1971). Before takin g u p th e subjec t o f th e evolutio n o f famil y polic y unde r th e Fifth Republic , which , i n comparison wit h it s predecessor, sa w in the political aren a no t onl y th e declin e o f the familia l movemen t wit h th e fal l o f the Popular Republican s (MRP ) an d th e Frenc h Confederatio n o f Christia n Workers (CFDT ) bu t als o a resurgenc e o f th e natalis t movement , w e mus t point ou t tha t a separat e socia l famil y la w develope d durin g thi s perio d alongside civi l law , whic h theretofor e ha d enjoye d exclusiv e competenc e i n this domain . Thes e tw o bodie s o f la w regulate d tw o differen t form s o f th e economy tha t famil y relationship s no w mad e necessar y an d tha t wer e b y nature relativel y independen t withou t bein g exclusive. I t would b e incorrec t to speak o f the "depatrimonialization " o f family la w or o f the declin e o f the function o f family patrimon y i n determinin g th e career s and socia l position s of individuals . Bu t i t i s true tha t ne w forms o f capital, especiall y economic , could b e passed o n onl y to children wh o had acquire d th e proper culture , o r training. Th e acquisitio n o f the required characteristic s presuppose d trainin g that becam e progressivel y longe r an d costlier . Thes e ne w forms o f socializa tion were , amon g others , a t th e hear t o f th e ide a o f the chil d a s a socia l a s well as an economic charge. Social la w shoul d no t b e viewe d a s th e la w o f proletaria n an d working class families , a s oppose d t o civi l la w a s th e la w o f patrimon y an d th e bourgeoisie. Th e tw o logic s underlyin g th e tw o bodie s o f la w overla p an d function simultaneously . Thi s wa s particularl y tru e durin g th e Fourt h Re public, whe n th e majority o f family benefit s wer e allocated without regar d t o income an d whe n generou s ta x deductions fo r dependents wer e most advan tageous to high-income families (Duran d 1953b) .

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V. B E G I N N I N G S O F TH E FIFT H REPUBLI C ( 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 9 ) : THE D E GAULL E PRESIDENC Y UNDE R PRIM E MINISTE R MICHEL DEBR E ( 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 2 ) A N D PRIM E MINISTE R GEORGES P O M P I D O U ( 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 9 )

In thi s perio d ther e ar e clea r turnin g point s tha t mar k th e beginnin g o f changes i n th e orientatio n o f family policy . The y correspon d t o rea l modifi cations i n th e wa y i n whic h famil y polic y wa s conceived , diffused , an d applied, sinc e i t is true tha t famil y polic y depends , eve n i f in smal l part , o n the balance of power in the political arena . A N e w Politica l a n d E c o n o m i c Contex t

From th e beginnin g o f the Fift h Republic , famil y policy , lik e policy towar d Europe, wa s a n are a o f conflic t betwee n th e Gaullist s o f th e Unio n fo r th e New Republi c (UNR ) an d th e MRP , whic h wa s represente d principall y b y Joseph Fontane t an d Pau l Bacon , wh o heade d th e "social " ministrie s o f Public Healt h an d Labor . Face d wit h a polic y o f economi c austerit y (th e Rueff Plan ) tha t sough t t o reestablis h a balance d Socia l Securit y budge t through limitation s o n spending , an d especiall y o n famil y benefits , th e family association s an d thei r politica l lobb y reacte d b y denouncin g "th e absence o f a famil y policy " i n th e Fift h Republic . I n 196 0 th e governmen t had create d a Study Commission o n th e Problem s o f the Family , heade d by Robert Prigent , a recognize d exper t respecte d b y th e familialis t movement . But in additio n t o discussing traditional technique s fo r increasin g an d differ entiating benefits , th e repor t submitte d a t th e clos e o f 196 1 wa s devote d essentially t o th e single-incom e allowance , tha t is , t o a redefinitio n o f th e social status of the woman. The conflic t betwee n th e familialists, represente d politicall y b y the MRP , and Miche l Debre , prim e ministe r a t th e tim e an d know n fo r hi s natalis t views, focused essentiall y on two points: balancing the Social Security budget and the single-income allowance . O n th e first point the Prigent Commissio n proposed, amon g othe r things , th e separatio n o f family allowance s fro m th e social insuranc e budget , th e transfe r o f benefits o f a natalist characte r t o th e State budget , an d th e linkag e o f allowance s t o increase s i n th e minimu m wage. Th e prim e minister , o n th e contrary , hope d t o increas e existin g sources of social insuranc e revenu e by raising the ceiling on wages subject t o Social Securit y taxes. FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 16

5

As fo r th e secon d poin t o f contention , th e commission , thoug h divide d (which wa s itsel f a sig n o f divisio n i n th e familialis t ranks) , demande d increases in the single-income allowance, a t least for low-income and singleparent families . Th e prim e ministe r considere d abolishin g thi s allowance , which discourage d wome n fro m working , an d i n it s place creating a n allow ance pai d t o youn g couple s fo r th e purpos e o f encouragin g th e birt h o f children i n th e first year s o f marriag e (he Monde, 3- 4 Septembe r 1961) . During thi s period , th e Catholi c newpape r La Croix continue d t o accus e Michel Debr e o f sacrificing famil y polic y i n th e nam e o f a balanced Socia l Security budge t an d i n favo r o f a natalis t polic y tha t di d no t adher e t o th e values implie d i n th e famil y mode l advocate d b y familialists , particularl y keeping mothers at home (La Croix, 2 September 1961) . At th e beginnin g o f th e Fift h Republic , a s ne w politica l personne l re placed th e old and th e political weight of the MRP declined,, it appeared tha t defenders o f the familialis t positio n wer e o n th e defensiv e an d conductin g a rear-guard battle , force d t o adjust , a t leas t part , i n th e fac e o f the victor y o f those who, i n th e nam e o f "modernization" o r "growth"—i n short , o f what was calle d "economi c democratization"—wer e i n contro l o f the Stat e and , little b y little , th e bureaucracy , includin g th e socia l agencies . On e o f th e sources a s well a s one o f the instrument s o f this ne w vie w o f the worl d wa s the plannin g process . Thus , th e Rueff-Arman d Report , resultin g fro m pre paratory wor k fo r th e Fourt h Plan , recommende d th e cancellatio n o f th e single-income allowance , whic h wa s viewed b y the expert s a s a disincentiv e to part-time labor. Thi s plan made no recommendations regardin g the famil y except for the development of child care. This wa s als o th e perio d whe n th e postwa r baby-boomer s entere d th e educational syste m ("the schoo l boom") and, fa r more often tha n i n the past, continued t o highe r education . Finally , thi s wa s also a perio d o f growth i n the numbe r o f working women , including , t o th e alar m o f critics , marrie d women wit h children . Fro m 196 2 to 1968 , the increas e i n the proportion o f women i n th e wor k forc e wa s greates t amon g thos e whos e husband s wer e middle-level an d higher-leve l manager s (se e Table 5.1) . Al l o f these indica tors attest to the transformation o f the economic rol e of the family, especiall y within th e bourgeoisie , whos e wealt h hencefort h wa s base d primaril y o n salary, whic h ha d becom e th e legitimat e metho d o f acquirin g profit s fro m capital (Boltansk i 1982) . W e mus t als o not e th e fal l o f th e MR P i n th e November 196 2 elections , whe n i t wo n n o mor e tha n 5. 3 percen t o f th e vote. Afte r Genera l d e Gaulle's pres s conference o f 1 5 April 1962 , i n whic h 166 R £ M

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TABLE 5. 1

Evolution o f the Percentag e o f Working Marrie d Wome n betwee n th e Ages of 3 0 and 34 , fro m 196 2 t o 198 2 (accordin g t o th e occupationa l category o f husband )

Senior Management and Libera l Professions Middle Level Managemen t White Collar Workers Blue Collar Workers Owners of Business and Industr y Farmers

1962}

I968 2

I982 2

J 968 J962

J 982 1968

25.7 36.5 37.8 24.5 38.7 60.3

34.2 45.5 43.6 28.9 41.6 62.5

63.2 70.8 67.5 57.3 65.3 71.3

1.33 1.23 1.15 1.18 1.07 1.03

1.84 1.55 1.55 1.98 1.57 1.14

Notes: 1. 196 2 census. 2. Lery(1984) .

he denounce d th e "fiction " o f Europea n integration , th e MR P ha d n o deputies serving on the cabinet. Family Policy : Elemen t o f a n E c o n o m i c a n d Socia l Polic y

As the resul t o f changes i n th e politica l an d economi c arenas , famil y polic y was n o longe r pursue d a s a n en d i n itself , bu t a s a mean s towar d broade r economic and social goals. With respec t t o economic policy , althoug h referenc e t o an d reverenc e of the "woman at home" were still obligatory concessions to familialist ideology , it wa s nonetheles s tru e tha t i n variou s area s o f th e law , th e pai d labo r o f mothers hencefort h tende d t o be recognize d an d guaranteed . Th e refor m o f marriage la w o n 1 3 Jul y 1965 , fo r example , di d awa y wit h th e husband' s right to oppose a separate professional activit y by his wife. Th e single-incom e allowance saw its funding an d its share in the family benefit s syste m continu e the decline begun i n 1956 ; this decline accelerated afte r 195 8 and a t the en d of this period, th e allowance had decreased t o half of what it had represente d in constan t franc s a t the beginnin g o f the 1950s . Finally , i n 196 7 i t was the object o f a refor m tha t sough t t o reduc e th e numbe r o f beneficiarie s b y establishing varyin g level s o f benefit s dependin g o n famil y incom e an d th e ages of the children . Another economic dimension o f family polic y was the development of the FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 16

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housing allowance , whic h wa s th e objec t o f a n importan t refor m i n 196 1 aimed a t improvin g th e structur e o f payment s t o benefi t familie s wit h th e most moder n incomes . Th e shar e o f al l benefit s receive d b y low-incom e families double d durin g this period, despit e changes made i n the calculatio n of this benefi t i n 196 6 to slo w dow n th e rat e o f increase i n tota l payments , which wer e doublin g ever y thre e years . Publi c housin g regulation s wer e being reformed i n the same period. From th e star t o f the 1960s , th e sacrosanc t principl e o f familialist polic y began t o b e questioned publicly . Thi s principl e constitute d a s its essence, i f not it s primar y goal , th e grantin g o f identica l benefit s withou t regar d fo r family income , o r th e principl e o f ''horizontal " compensatio n o f famil y expenses. Severa l administrativ e report s demonstrate d th e socia l inequit y o f this principle and the economic reason s for changing it. I t was difficult t o get those who worked i n thi s area t o accept the ne w orientation, a s witnessed b y the fac t that , unlik e earlie r plans , th e preparation s fo r th e Fift h Pla n (1965 ) included th e creation o f a famil y benefit s commission . I n th e Fift h Pla n traditional famil y benefit s wer e retained , bu t a t the pric e o f a concession o n the housin g allowance , whos e growt h ha d t o b e slowed . Bu t chang e wa s inescapable: the Genera l Inspectorat e o f Socia l Affair s (1967) , preside d ove r by Pierr e Laroque , an d eve n th e specialize d plannin g commissions , ende d by accepting variation i n level s of family benefit s accordin g to the incom e of individual familie s (se e particularl y th e 196 9 wor k o f th e specialize d grou p on demographic problem s in preparation fo r the Sixth Plan). At th e sam e time , famil y polic y becam e a les s an d les s autonomou s element o f socia l policy . I n th e nam e o f economi c austerity , th e power s o f certain group s i n th e administrativ e council s o f th e Socia l Securit y syste m were reduced, particularl y thos e of trade union representatives . I n the face of rapid growt h o f 2 0 percent pe r yea r i n payment s o n healt h claims , an d t o a lesser degree as a consequence of increased benefits fo r the elderly, th e famil y benefits branc h was made to cover expenses for which i t had never previously been responsible . I t wa s symptomati c o f th e relativ e los s o f identit y an d o f social priorit y o f famil y polic y i n thi s perio d tha t ta x deduction s fo r depen dents continue d t o gro w i n relatio n t o famil y allowances , a s the latte r gre w more slowly than taxabl e income . As a n elemen t o f "income s policy, " accordin g t o th e expressio n o f th e time, famil y policy , alway s identified principall y with family benefits , tende d to becom e th e instrumen t o f a broade r policy , o f a "globa l social " polic y whose scope was beginning to be transformed (Lenoi r 1991 ) 168 R £ M

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During thes e twelv e year s i t appear s tha t wha t wa s known i n th e Fourt h Republic as family policy , relatin g to the material an d mora l problems of the home (income , housing , patrimony , famil y relationships , education) , wa s beginning t o brea k u p int o severa l sectors , eac h progressivel y acquirin g it s own autonomy . Famil y benefit s continue d t o b e use d a s instrument s o f economic policy (income, consumption , purchasin g power, etc. ) or of housing policy , wher e th e hom e wa s reduce d t o housin g i n it s architectura l definition. An y monopol y o n th e definitio n o f family value s seem s t o hav e been definitivel y broke n durin g thi s period . Th e issu e o f famil y polic y n o longer belonge d t o th e familials , wh o conceive d o f the famil y a s the home . Particularly i n th e presidentia l electio n o f 1965 , th e woma n a s a politica l issue began to replace, o r at least take a place alongside, th e family, i n whose name ne w measures were taken t o reverse the decline i n the birthrate begin ning in 1964 . The ris e i n th e relevanc e o f women' s issues , publicl y expresse d an d manifested b y the feminis t movement , gav e this movemen t th e opportunit y in th e successfu l battl e fo r th e legalizatio n o f contraceptio n (th e la w o f 2 8 December 196 7 was voted almost unanimously) to establish its independence from traditiona l familia l association s an d othe r special-interes t organization s accustomed t o takin g th e lea d o n socia l problem s relate d t o th e family . Similarly, th e refor m o f marriag e la w i n 1965 , a year marke d b y numerou s elections, resulte d i n par t fro m th e pressur e impose d b y thi s ne w lobby , which sough t to increase th e equalit y o f spouses. I n short , th e emergenc e of feminism a s a n ideologica l an d politica l forc e transforme d th e scop e an d process of policymaking regardin g the family, particularl y throug h th e establishment o f a new definitio n o f the civi l an d socia l statu s of women (Lenoi r 1985a). At the sam e time , th e politica l goa l o f family polic y shifted , a s shown b y the evolutio n o f measures take n i n it s name. Despit e it s progressive dilutio n in a changing global social aid policy, whic h resulte d i n part from th e arrival of new actors in the social policy arena, famil y polic y nonetheless was to find in natalis m (th e fal l i n th e birthrat e ha d worsene d i n 1972 ) the mean s of its survival as a distinct policy area.

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VI. 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 4 : PRESIDENC Y O F GEORGE S P O M P I D O U (PRIM E MINISTER, JACQUE S CHABAN-DELMAS , 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 2 )

Under George s Pompido u w e witnes s a ver y stron g intensificatio n o f th e effort t o integrate family benefit s int o the global system of social transfers. Al l new benefits unde r the Chaban-Delmas Government were created essentiall y for the benefit o f the most disadvantaged families . All of this occurred a s if ideas and programs discarded b y officials i n othe r branches o f Socia l Securit y wer e destine d t o emerg e i n th e for m o f famil y benefits, a t a tim e whe n specificall y famil y issue s were losin g thei r separat e identity i n th e politica l arena . A s risks like illnes s an d ol d ag e were covere d in th e 1950s , th e "family " becam e a vehicl e fo r meetin g a variet y o f socia l needs, man y of them no t directly related to family life . The " S o c i a l " Vocatio n o f Famil y Polic y

The arriva l o f Jacques Chaban-Delma s a s prime ministe r wa s the beginnin g of the rise of a new category of social affairs specialists , especiall y administra tors (Jacque s Delors , Ren e Lenoir , etc.) , an d consultant s (Jean-Jacque s Dupeyroux), wh o already were rethinking th e whole syste m o f social protection. Muc h o f the rethinkin g too k place within th e Genera l Plannin g Com mission, wher e new positions were being outlined b y the reformers, man y of whom late r supporte d Socialis t governments . The y sough t t o mak e famil y benefits on e elemen t o f an "activ e famil y policy, " a s it as then called—tha t is to say, a selective policy. The y emphasize d professiona l trainin g fo r women , child care , an d preschoo l instruction , wit h th e famil y componen t o f polic y being diluted i n a sense into the societal. The prioritie s tha t remaine d i n th e socia l secto r the n becam e th e aged , whose number s wer e increasin g an d whos e conditio n wa s becomin g mor e precarious wit h a n increas e i n force d retirements , singl e mothers , an d th e handicapped. I n brief, as Rene Montjoie, genera l commissioner o f planning, wrote, "Wha t w e have lost in ou r capacit y t o guide th e econom y a s a whole we mus t regai n b y concentratin g ou r mean s o n a smal l numbe r o f priorit y programs" (L'Expansion, May , 1971) . I n socia l affairs , thi s wa s th e tim e when Ren e Lenoi r calle d attentio n t o th e "excluded, " Jacque s Delor s spok e of "socia l indicators, " an d th e technocrat s experimente d wit h th e "rational ization o f budget choices" (RCB). I n the area of family policy , whic h hence forth ha d a socia l vocation , thi s mean t specialize d benefit s fo r certai n cate 1 7 0 RtiM

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gories o f children , suc h a s orphan s an d th e handicapped , an d fo r certai n types o f families , particularl y youn g couple s withou t childre n an d familie s with smal l children . I t i s no t surprisin g tha t Presiden t Pompido u an d hi s "progress contracts " fo r th e famil y receive d a col d receptio n a t th e Twenty fifth Congres s o f th e Nationa l Unio n o f Famil y Association s (UNAF ) i n 1970. In short , th e familie s tha t wer e th e beneficiarie s o f ne w socia l measure s were th e mos t impoverished ; th e distinction s i n effec t u p t o thi s point , particularly th e occupationa l statu s o f mothers, gav e way, a t least i n part , t o the criterio n o f income . Al l o f th e benefit s create d b y th e Chaban-Delma s government wer e conditiona l upo n income . Thi s wa s particularl y th e cas e with th e single-incom e allowanc e an d th e allowanc e t o mother s a t home , both o f which guarantee d a payment t o families i n whic h th e wife remaine d at home t o care fo r th e children . Th e la w of 3 January 1972 , i n additio n t o providing a n increas e fo r mother s a t hom e wit h youn g childre n an d larg e families, create d a child-car e allowanc e fo r workin g mother s tha t wa s to b e similar to the single-income allowance . Toward Recognitio n o f t h e Right s o f Mother s

At th e sam e time , a numbe r o f action s wer e taken , usuall y b y unanimou s vote, t o protect pregnant women an d mothers , bot h o n the labor market and in th e workplace . Thes e measure s note d th e "irreversible " increas e o f working wome n an d th e inescapabl e declin e i n th e birthrate . Hencefort h famil y policy recognize d th e righ t o f mother s t o wor k an d tende d t o becom e on e element i n th e polic y o f th e Ministr y o f Labo r an d Employment , an d n o longer o f th e Ministr y o f Healt h an d o f Population , t o whic h i t nominall y belonged. Th e la w o f 3 1 December 1971 , which gav e insure d wome n wh o reared a t leas t tw o childre n a n increas e i n th e perio d o f insuranc e coverag e credit equa l t o on e supplementar y yea r pe r child , wa s a sig n o f th e stil l ambiguous emerging right of mothers to work. This transitio n fro m th e "woma n a t home " t o th e "mothe r o f a family, " whether a t the hous e o r at the plac e o f work, wa s also seen i n th e evolutio n of civi l law . Afte r th e refor m o f marriag e la w i n 1965 , whic h definitivel y established th e right of the mother to work, th e law of 6 June 197 0 abolished "paternal power" and replace d i t with "parental authority," which hencefort h was exercise d b y th e fathe r an d th e mother . Th e la w o f 3 Januar y 1972 , which accorde d th e illegitimat e chil d a status equa l t o that o f the legitimat e F A M I L Y P O L I C Y I N F R A N C E S I N C E 1 9 3 8 17

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child, fo r th e first tim e gav e th e mothe r th e possibilit y o f removin g th e presumption o f paternit y fro m he r spouse , a necessar y an d ultimat e ste p i n the development o f parental egalitarianis m befor e th e law. I t is clear that this progression i n the lega l status of mothers was inseparable from th e evolutio n of the right s of illegitimate childre n an d childre n o f adultery, particularl y i n matters of inheritance, wher e this distinction wa s still in effect . Wha t wa s in question wa s stil l th e lega l redefinitio n o f th e famil y an d it s plac e i n th e system o f social reproduction , a s this changed i n interactio n wit h th e evolu tion of patrimonial structur e and the household economy . Nevertheless a n ol d tension , indee d a contradiction , appeare d betwee n the competence o f the "family " (an d therefore o f the mother) and that of the "woman." W e se e thi s clearl y a t th e en d o f th e Fourt h Legislatur e (1972 1973), whe n th e proble m o f abortio n becam e a n increasingl y acut e issue . Even i f differences o f opinio n o n famil y matter s di d no t completel y follo w party lines , especiall y o n th e Right , an d i f part y position s wer e no t clearl y expressed i n electora l programs , excep t perhap s fo r th e forme r Popula r Re publicans, nonetheles s th e natur e an d intensit y o f sensitivit y o n thi s issu e varied b y part y group . Th e Left , mobilize d b y a n allianc e base d o n a Common Progra m tha t defende d famil y polic y an d supporte d equalit y o f women, wo n th e majorit y o f vote s o n th e first ballot o f th e Marc h 197 3 elections, bu t los t th e majorit y o f seat s t o th e Righ t i n th e runoffs . O n th e eve o f th e election s fo r th e Fift h Legislatur e (1973-1978) , th e Independen t Republicans aroun d Valer y Giscar d d'Estaing attempte d t o chec k th e risin g tide of demands, particularl y fro m feminists , b y adopting them a s their own , at th e ris k o f alienatin g bot h thei r ow n electorat e an d thei r Gaullis t allie s (and rivals) . Th e Independen t Republican s wer e movin g towar d a posture that combined mora l liberalism wit h economic conservatism . To be sure, befor e a meeting of candidates o f the conservative majorit y i n Provins o n 7 Januar y 1973 , th e Gaullis t prim e minister , Pierr e Messmer , developed severa l o f the same themes proposed b y the Independen t Republi cans: refor m o f th e 192 0 la w tha t outlawe d abortion , creation o f two thou sand daycar e centers , ai d fo r hom e chil d care , etc . Al l wer e measure s previously advocate d b y the Left' s Commo n Program . Pierr e Messme r her e joined wit h Miche l Poniatowski , ministe r o f healt h an d a n all y o f Valer y Giscard d'Estaing , wh o hoped , i n vain , fo r a vot e o n abortio n befor e th e elections.

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VII. 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 1 : PRESIDENC Y O F VALLER Y GISCAR D D'ESTAIN G

In the field of family policy , th e seven-year term o f Valery Giscard d'Estain g was characterize d bot h b y a continuatio n o f development s initiate d a t th e beginning of the 1970 s and by the outline o f new policy orientations: experimentation wit h th e ide a o f the negativ e tax; extension o f the righ t to benefit s to th e whol e population ; a searc h fo r a neutra l postur e o n th e questio n o f women i n the work force; and higher priority to large families. Bu t this policy developed i n a very tense political climate in which there were confrontation s not onl y betwee n partie s o f th e Lef t an d o f th e Right , bu t als o betwee n opposing tendencies within thes e movements. 1974—1976: Th e Chira c Governmen t

This was a period o f worsening divisions among leadin g actors in th e field of family policy . A s a consequenc e o f th e differentiation , i f no t o f "famil y institutions" then a t least o f those institution s tha t represen t th e family , on e began to hear of "multiple families," "different famil y models, " and "th e end of the family. " Family Policy and "Social Assistance 7 Policy. There wa s a continuatio n o f the polic y o f using social assistanc e t o the "family " (i n th e double sens e of a group o f relate d person s an d a s a grou p o f agencie s specializin g i n famil y matters) a s a mechanis m fo r genera l publi c assistance . Th e polic y o f socia l assistance to low-income familie s wa s intensified an d diversified, a s exemplified b y th e schoo l allowanc e (la w o f 1 4 Jul y 1974 ) an d th e allowanc e t o handicapped adult s (la w o f 3 0 Jun e 1975) . Ne w measure s wer e take n t o protect workin g mothers , includin g protectio n o f pregnant wome n an d ne w mothers against dismissal an d th e extension o f the insurance coverag e bonu s from on e to two years per child for mothers who cease working. 1975 wa s als o th e yea r o f th e woman , th e yea r o f th e creatio n o f th e Secretariat o f Stat e o n th e Conditio n o f Women , heade d b y Franchis e Giroud—the year , hence , i n whic h a cleare r politica l an d institutiona l distinction wa s draw n betwee n th e real m o f th e famil y an d tha t o f th e condition o f women. The lega l statu s o f th e famil y increasingl y wa s shape d b y th e emergenc e of a policy that regarded "the woman" as an appropriate object of governmental action , bot h wit h regar d t o employment , wit h th e la w o f 1 1 Jul y 197 5 FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E S I N C E 1 9 3 8 17

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prohibiting discrimination i n hiring on the basis of pregnancy, sex , or marital status, an d wit h respec t t o birt h control . A la w passe d i n 197 5 authorize d abortion, althoug h th e majorit y o f deputie s fro m th e governin g majorit y voted agains t it . I t was only thanks to the suppor t o f opposition deputie s tha t this reform wa s adopted. Eve n those majority deputie s who supported the bill did s o o n conditio n tha t th e governmen t establis h a mor e rigorou s famil y policy. I t wa s i n thi s settin g tha t th e first negativ e ta x wa s created , a n ide a that ha d bee n popularize d i n th e work s o f Loui s Stoler u an d Christia n Stoffaes. A minimum guarantee d incom e for single parents was passed unan imously o n 9 Jul y 1976 . Th e ne w divorc e la w o f 1 1 Jul y 197 5 i s furthe r evidence o f a lega l redefinitio n o f th e distinctio n betwee n th e real m o f th e woman an d tha t o f the family . Late r government s furthe r strengthene d thi s distinction. Th e 197 5 divorc e la w wa s passe d wit h a larg e majority , bu t without the support of almost a third o f the deputies of the Right ! 1976—1981: Th e R a y m o n d Barr e Governmen t

This perio d wa s marked b y a deepening o f the economic crisis , a n intensifi cation o f political conflict, an d a high level of social tension. Give n financial constraints, bot h th e mechanism s o f th e socia l benefi t syste m (suc h a s th e various retiremen t plans ) an d it s institution s (suc h a s th e hospita l system ) became almos t immun e t o modification , excep t withi n th e limits buil t int o the system itself. The Irresistible Decline of Family Benefits. Unde r th e governmen t le d b y Raymond Barre , th e financial resource s dedicate d t o family benefit s contin ued t o decline a s a proportion o f all socia l expenditures , bu t a t a slower rat e than i n th e preceding period . Betwee n 197 0 an d 1978 , expenditure s fo r family benefit s gre w at an annua l rat e of only 12. 5 percent, compare d t o 1 8 percent fo r sickness , 18. 9 percen t fo r ol d age , an d 41. 5 percen t fo r unem ployment. Th e monthl y bas e o n whic h allowance s wer e calculate d contin ued t o increas e les s rapidl y tha n pe r capit a salar y (10. 2 percen t compare d with 13. 1 percent) . However , i t mus t b e note d tha t th e relativ e declin e o f financial ai d to families i n this period was partly offset b y a strong increase in social aid to children (18. 5 percent per year) and by an importan t increas e i n tax deduction s fo r childre n (15. 8 percent) . Th e fac t remain s tha t famil y benefits a s a proportion o f all social benefits fel l from 21. 2 percent i n 197 0 to 14.7 percent i n 1980 , partl y as a result of the reductio n o f the rat e of payroll 174 R£M

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taxes earmarke d fo r famil y benefit s fro m 11. 5 percen t t o 9 percent . Famil y policy ha d a seriou s financial effec t onl y o n smal l household s wit h hig h incomes an d larg e familie s wit h modes t incomes . However , fo r thi s secon d category o f families, th e contribution o f family benefit s wa s far fro m negligi ble, eithe r i n absolut e valu e o r a s a percentag e o f tota l income . I n 1978 , family benefit s represente d mor e tha n 5 0 percen t o f the incom e o f familie s with a t leas t fou r childre n unde r th e ag e o f te n an d i n whic h th e husban d was a n industria l worker . I f correspondin g ta x reduction s ar e included , al l family benefit s amounte d t o 6 3 percen t o f th e worker' s salary . A senio r manager wit h th e sam e typ e o f famil y receive d famil y benefit s totalin g 2 2 percent o f hi s salary , o f whic h 14. 1 percen t wa s i n th e for m o f ta x deduc tions, fo r a ne t gai n o f 27,97 0 francs , o r mor e tha n th e ne t gai n o f 22,28 0 for the worker. The Disenchantment of the Ideological World. The Frenc h birthrat e becam e one of the most frequent theme s in political debate in this period, whic h was marked by electoral setbacks for the government parties and by their efforts t o regain a los t constituency, particularl y traditionalis t women . Th e optimisti c and modernis t vision of the social world, o f which on e version was expressed by the languag e o f women's liberation , i n effec t gav e way, i n rulin g circles , to a disenchanted representatio n o f the future , wher e the family appeare d a s a refuge, a place of intimacy an d profoun d value s (in the sense in which thi s term i s used i n "L a Franc e profonde") . Gon e wa s the er a o f great liberatin g struggles; th e ideologica l moo d wa s on e tha t tende d mor e towar d securit y than towar d liberty . Wor k on refor m o f the Famil y Code was halted i n favo r of refor m o f th e pena l code . Th e Vei l La w authorizin g abortio n wa s dis creetly extended b y the law of 3 1 December 1979 , which wa s accepted eve n more reluctantly than th e initial law. In short , th e ideologica l climat e favored th e mothe r mor e than th e woman. Attitudes wer e als o shiftin g wit h respec t t o th e educationa l right s o f youn g working parents , wh o wer e finding tha t thei r wor k prevente d the m fro m receiving the instruction tha t they needed i n order to succeed a t school. Thi s problem ha d bee n foresee n i n th e la w o f 1 2 Jul y 1977 , whic h create d a "parental education leave. " The pligh t o f unskilled workers , whos e limite d educationa l achievement s left the m i n a wea k positio n i n a perio d o f risin g unemployment , togethe r with the market-oriented policie s chosen b y Raymond Barr e to deal with this problem, contribute d t o a reviva l o f familialis t thinking . An d ye t existin g FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 17

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family polic y as a whole tended t o favor two-incom e families . Th e la w of 12 July 197 7 merged th e single-income allowanc e an d th e child-care allowanc e into a ne w "complementar y famil y allowance, " bu t faile d t o achiev e it s objective o f neutralit y wit h respec t t o workin g mothers . Specia l ta x benefit s for single-incom e household s wer e fa r to o smal l t o compensat e fo r th e contribution mad e t o th e tota l househol d revenu e b y a secon d income , which averaged 7 0 percent of the principal income . New policie s establishe d i n thi s perio d sough t t o favo r household s wit h one income over those with two. The criterion tha t seems to have dominated family polic y i n thi s perio d wa s famil y resources . Wit h th e la w o f 4 Jul y 1975, famil y benefit s cease d t o b e salar y supplements , a s the y ha d bee n considered fro m th e beginning, sinc e the requirement tha t at least one of the two parents b e employe d wa s dropped. Similarly , th e expressio n "woma n a t home" was no longe r used , bein g replace d b y "mother o f a family." There after i t was a question o f a "minimum famil y income, " according to the title of the allowance created b y the law of 1 7 July 1980 , a n allowanc e o f varying size tha t brough t th e incom e o f three-chil d familie s u p t o a n establishe d minimum. Althoug h wome n wer e no longer required t o stay out of the work force i n orde r t o establis h eligibilit y fo r mos t famil y benefits , th e ne w crite rion fo r eligibility , househol d income , implie d tha t th e woma n coul d onl y claim maximu m benefit s b y renouncin g th e ide a o f working . Fro m th e perspective o f women' s liberatio n thi s wa s a ste p backward , fo r i t sough t t o check th e "irresistible " increas e i n workin g wome n b y encouragin g the m t o stay at hom e i n a period o f high unemploymen t an d b y reinventing a social demand b y wome n fo r part-tim e work , whic h permitte d th e conciliatio n o f an occupationa l caree r wit h th e "job " of raisin g childre n (law s o f 198 0 an d 1981). The concep t of the "larg e family" continue d t o be use d t o defend famil y interests. I t was , t o b e sure , reduce d i n siz e b y th e realitie s o f th e time s t o three children, th e "golden number" of demographics, a number that assured the biologica l renewa l o f th e generations . Famil y polic y a t thi s tim e wa s marked b y a retur n t o thi s priority , les s natalis t tha n familialist . A n entir e concept of the family was at stake. "Large" was the adjective tha t summarize d all th e characteristic s o f the traditional famil y structure : with thre e children , women di d no t work , di d no t divorce , di d no t spend , etc. ; everythin g wa s done "as a family"—meals, leisur e activities, etc. Family policy during the seven-year term o f Valery Giscard d'Estain g was characterized b y measure s tha t sough t t o favo r familie s wit h thre e o r mor e 1 7 6 RtiM

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children an d tha t found thei r ideologica l justificatio n i n demographi c trend s in th e country . I n fact , afte r 196 3 th e tren d i n fertilit y rate s reverse d itsel f and France experienced another demographic decline. The French fecundit y rate, whil e remainin g highe r tha n i n mos t industrialize d countries , droppe d from 2.9 0 i n 196 4 to less than 2. 0 afte r 1975 . I n 197 6 women wer e havin g on averag e onl y 1. 6 childre n durin g thei r perio d o f fertility , wherea s th e number necessar y fo r th e renewa l o f th e generation s i s 2.1 . Thi s demo graphic declin e canno t b e attribute d t o a refusa l t o hav e children , fo r 9 0 percent of couples had a least one child. Althoug h ther e was some decline in two-child families , 80-9 0 percen t o f the overall reductio n i n fertility wa s the result of a decrease in the number o f women havin g three or more children . The increasin g reticence of families t o have a third chil d can be explained in part by the reduction i n living standard brought on by its arrival. The thir d child wa s costly i n severa l ways : first, i t often force d th e famil y t o seek larger accommodations; second, th e cost of the third chil d wa s added t o the cost of the firs t two ; but mos t o f all, i t almost inevitabl y force d th e mothe r t o leav e her job . Face d wit h mountin g expenses , th e househol d foun d it s availabl e funds considerabl y diminished . Priority to Large Families. I n th e fal l o f 197 9 th e government' s desir e t o prioritize aid to families wit h thre e children wa s clearly affirmed, bu t severa l measures take n beginnin g i n 1977 , a s well a s the Bloi s Progra m o f Januar y 1978, ha d alread y announce d thi s ne w tendency . Th e la w o f 1 2 July 1977 , which create d th e complementar y famil y allowance , establishe d "thre e chil dren" a s on e o f th e alternativ e criteri a fo r eligibility . Th e schedul e fo r personal housin g assistanc e establishe d i n 197 8 favore d familie s wit h thre e children. Th e rat e of family allowance s fo r thre e children increase d fro m 3 7 percent to 41 percent of base salary between 1 Januar y 197 8 and 1 Jul y 1979 , while th e rat e fo r tw o childre n wen t u p onl y a singl e poin t i n th e sam e period. Presented t o the Nationa l Assembl y during the debate on family polic y i n November 1979 , most of the following measure s took effect i n July 1980 . An increase o f 3 percent pe r yea r i n th e purchasin g powe r o f family allowance s was guaranteed t o families wit h thre e o r mor e children , doubl e th e increas e guaranteed t o familie s wit h tw o children. Postnata l allowance s fo r th e thir d child were increased, raisin g the total of all benefits fo r the birth o f this child to ten thousan d francs , o r the famous millio n ol d francs. Maternit y leav e for the thir d chil d wa s extende d t o twenty-si x weeks , instea d o f th e sixtee n FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 17

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allowed fo r th e first two children; th e old-ag e insuranc e benefi t fo r mother s was extende d t o includ e wome n raisin g thre e children ; a famil y incom e supplement wa s create d t o guarante e a minimu m incom e fo r familie s wit h three children ; and , finally, th e 198 1 finance la w grante d a supplementar y deduction t o taxpayers with three dependent children . A new status for "mother s of large families" was developed alon g the lines of these measures . Whethe r sh e "worked " o r not , th e activit y o f the mothe r at home wa s thereafter classe d as work, a s seen i n the fact tha t the mothe r of a larg e family benefite d fro m simila r socia l protection t o that enjoyed b y the working woma n i n th e cas e o f los s o f spouse , illness , ol d age , o r eve n jo b training. In contras t t o the partie s of the Left , whic h attempte d i n th e nex t legisla ture to rebalance the distribution o f aid among different type s of families an d assure a greate r neutralit y regardin g workin g wome n b y creatin g daycar e facilities fo r smal l children , th e partie s o f th e Righ t wer e oppose d t o wha t was then calle d "th e collectivis m o f the cradles. " To b e sure , o n th e ev e of the 197 8 legislative elections, th e delegates for women's actio n o f the partie s of th e Righ t di d no t oppos e th e creatio n o f daycar e centers , especiall y company center s an d minicenters . Stres s wa s lai d abov e al l o n traditiona l methods tha t permitte d mother s t o stay at home wit h thei r children , sinc e i t was a question o f "not penalizing thos e households wit h children." This was the watchword . An d ye t th e polic y followe d unde r th e directio n o f th e conservative partie s continue d t o b e unfavorabl e t o thes e families , particu larly i n th e field o f housing , bu t als o with regar d t o certai n famil y benefits . Thus th e creation o f means-teste d allowance s an d th e transformatio n o f th e single-income allowanc e an d th e mother-at-hom e allowanc e di d no t giv e priority statu s t o larg e families . A s observe d b y th e Hig h Commissio n o n Population, i n th e perio d 1971-197 7 th e proportio n o f familie s benefitin g from th e supplementar y famil y allowance/mother-at-hom e allowanc e (an d from th e late r incremen t i n thi s benefit ) increase d les s among familie s wit h three children tha n among those with one; the child-care allowance benefite d 10 percen t o f familie s wit h on e child , bu t onl y 1.6 8 percen t o f thos e wit h two; and , finally, th e proportio n o f beneficiarie s o f th e housin g allowanc e more tha n double d fo r childles s couple s an d fo r familie s wit h on e child , while i t fell fo r familie s wit h thre e children ! These wer e pervers e an d unin tended consequences o f the policy of the government i n power. Despite th e declare d familialis t orientatio n o f th e leadership , collectiv e facilities directl y servin g workin g mother s continue d t o gro w durin g thi s 1 7 8 RtiM

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period by non-negligible proportions, thoug h still insufficient t o satisfy needs . This wa s particularl y tru e o f thos e wh o provide d materna l an d infan t car e between 197 0 an d 1979 : i n additio n t o th e numbe r o f full-tim e doctors , which tripled , an d th e numbe r o f pediatri c nurses , whic h doubled , th e various form s o f collectiv e infan t chil d car e multiplied , i n particula r th e number o f daycare centers . Th e capacit y o f communit y nurserie s doubled , that of family nurseries increased almost tenfold, an d the number of mother's helpers rose by 77 percent. In conclusion , famil y polic y during th e seven-yea r administratio n o f Giscard d'Estain g wa s marke d b y five principal orientations : th e generalizatio n of family benefit s a s the resul t o f the eliminatio n o f restriction s o n employ ment; an effor t a t simplification throug h th e substitutio n o f the complemen tary famil y allowanc e fo r severa l othe r benefits ; th e creation o f th e single parent allowance ; a rationalizatio n o f housin g assistance ; an d incentive s t o encourage women t o work part-time.

VIM. PRESIDEN T O F TH E REPUBLIC , FRANQOI S MITTERRAN D ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 8 ) : PRIM E MINISTERS , PIERR E MAURO Y ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 4 ) A N D LAUREN T FABIU S ( 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 6 )

The arriva l o f th e Lef t i n powe r i n 198 1 constitute d a typ e o f sociologica l experiment t o determine th e influenc e o f specifically politica l factor s o n th e evolution o f famil y policy . Thi s wa s a particularl y appropriat e occasio n t o examine suc h relationship s sinc e th e Lef t ha d announce d it s preferences , although not without some inconsistencies, wit h respect both to family polic y and t o the model s o f family lif e tha t shoul d b e encouraged . I t was apparen t that th e "family " constitute d a categor y o f politica l action , perhap s mor e than ever , a s Le Monde indicate d i n a n articl e title d "Th e Courtin g o f th e Family" (24 November 1981) . Precise policy guidelines in this field had been defined durin g th e electora l campaign , and , whe n th e ne w government wa s formed, a secretar y o f stat e fo r th e famil y (Georgin a Dufoix ) wa s name d under the minister for social affairs an d nationa l solidarity . The majo r component s o f the Socialis t polic y wer e a massiv e increas e o f approximately 2 5 percent in family benefits; strong rejection o f any "interventionist" polic y aime d a t favorin g on e "famil y model " (e.g. , base d o n th e number o f children) ove r another ; placemen t o f a ceiling o n ta x deduction s for dependents; social assistance to maintain th e child i n his or her milie u of FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 17

9

origin; housing assistance in the form o f "family contracts" ; and developmen t of facilities lik e contract nurseries. As show n b y governmen t statement s an d eve n mor e concretel y b y th e division o f labor among ministries, the categories of government interventio n had no t changed . Everythin g concernin g "ai d t o th e family " wa s under th e jurisdiction o f th e secretar y o f stat e fo r th e family : th e protectio n o f th e condition o f women—momentaril y combine d wit h th e famil y unde r Mo nique Pelletier—wa s assigne d t o th e Ministr y fo r th e Right s o f Wome n (Yvette Roudy). A s for family law , i t remained th e monopoly o f the ministe r of justic e (Rober t Badinter) . I t is clear tha t thes e divisions followe d th e line s of existing institutions, pressur e groups, an d area s of specialization (adminis trative, legal, scientific, etc.) , which survived political changes and weakene d their effects . " T h e C h i l d " a n d Famil y Polic y

Although i n 198 2 th e economi c situatio n force d a revie w o f th e polic y o f increasing famil y benefits , th e objectiv e o f polic y i n thi s are a remaine d th e same: the equalization o f rights, whatever the status of the children. Change s in civil law followed th e same objective . Rebalancing of Aid among Families of Different Size. Thi s objectiv e i s explicitly contrar y t o tha t o f precedin g governments . I t follow s fro m th e government's announce d desir e not to favor an y particular famil y model . Al l measures tha t sough t t o distinguis h clearl y betwee n th e advantage s du e t o families wit h fewe r tha n thre e childre n an d thos e wit h thre e o r mor e wer e called into question, wit h the result that from 198 0 to 198 4 purchasing power increased b y 34. 5 percen t fo r familie s wit h tw o children age d three o r more, as opposed t o a n increas e o f only 7. 5 percen t fo r thos e wit h thre e children . In orde r t o limi t benefit s t o high-incom e familie s wit h larg e families , th e budget o f 198 2 limite d th e allowabl e ta x benefit s pe r chil d t o seventy-fiv e hundred francs . The devaluatio n o f the fran c o n 1 3 June 1982 , accompanie d b y a freez e of price s an d wages , le d t o a serie s o f economy measures , includin g th e reduction o f family benefit s b y approximately 1 3 billion francs . Amon g these economy measure s w e find the reductio n b y half o f the postnata l allowanc e for the third child . Finally , th e law of 4 January 198 5 also contributed t o the rebalancing o f ai d t o th e famil y b y combinin g th e prenata l allowance , th e 1 8 0 RtiM

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postnatal allowance , an d complementar y famil y allowance s int o a singl e allowance to small children, payabl e for each chil d i n the family unde r thre e years o f age , withou t an y tes t fo r famil y incom e unti l th e infant' s thir d month. Thi s allowanc e continue s unti l th e chil d reache s thre e year s o f age for th e grea t majorit y o f familie s (8 0 percent) , whos e incom e i s below th e allowable ceiling, whic h i s the same as for the complementary famil y allow ance. Continuation of the Assimilation of the Different Legal Categories of Children. Anothe r manifestatio n o f th e primac y o f "th e child " a s th e targe t o f political actio n i n favo r o f familie s wa s th e la w o f 2 5 Jun e 1982 , whic h allowed extralega l proof s o f natura l parenthood , thereb y givin g th e chil d additional mean s o f establishin g hi s o r he r filiation . I n th e sam e manne r children wer e th e primar y objec t o f the la w of 6 June 198 4 "relatin g t o th e rights of families i n thei r relation s wit h th e agencie s charge d wit h protectin g the famil y an d th e child , an d t o th e statu s o f ward s o f th e State. " Th e objective o f thi s la w i n effec t wa s t o mak e adoptio n easie r an d mor e rapi d and t o facilitat e th e maintenanc e o f contac t betwee n familie s an d thos e o f their children who m they turn ove r to the State for care. This at least apparent interes t in the child was manifested a s well in man y studies, meetings , reports , an d commentaries , includin g th e "Researc h an d Families" colloquiu m i n 1983 , th e creatio n o f th e Institut e o f Childhoo d and th e Famil y i n 1984 , an d th e colloquiu m o n "Procreation : Genetic s an d the Family " in 1985 . However, a s shown by the parallel evolutio n o f the law relating t o parenta l authority , o r th e managemen t o f join t property , thi s preeminence o f the chil d ca n b e full y understoo d onl y whe n place d i n th e context of the vast transformation o f family la w that began mor e than twent y years ago. Facilities for Children. Despit e th e economi c problem s confronte d b y th e Mauroy an d Fabiu s government s fro m 198 1 t o 1986 , a specia l effor t wa s made t o accommodat e childre n outsid e th e home , thi s bein g a specifi c characteristic o f th e famil y polic y o f th e Frenc h Left . Henc e thirty-fiv e thousand nurserie s wer e created. Alongsid e "collective " nurseries, on e saw a rapid increas e i n th e numbe r o f "famil y nurseries, " "mininurseries, " an d "parental nurseries." Finally, daycar e centers and recreation centers, partially subsidized b y th e famil y allowanc e funds , als o wer e create d i n larg e num bers, althoug h alway s insufficien t i n relatio n t o th e rapidl y increasin g de FAMILY POLIC Y I N F R A N C E S I N C E 1 9 3 8 18

1

mand i n this area, takin g into account th e continuing growth i n the numbe r of working women. Twenty "famil y contract " program s sought , withou t grea t success , t o facilitate housin g constructio n an d improvement , takin g int o accoun t th e welfare o f families . Moreover , ne w ta x measure s wer e approved , suc h a s deductions fo r chil d car e an d fo r hom e remodeling , whic h favore d familie s with children . Transformation o f Marriag e Relationship s an d Parental Responsibilitie s

It appeared tha t littl e b y littl e wha t formerl y ha d bee n combine d wa s bein g disassociated: the conjugal relationshi p and parenthood. I t is well known tha t during thi s perio d th e numbe r o f unmarrie d couple s livin g togethe r greatl y increased an d th e numbe r o f divorce s wa s constantl y growing . Eve n mor e than thes e developments , whic h wer e know n an d recognize d becaus e the y were registere d i n th e la w an d i n statistics , famil y relationship s a s a whol e were being transformed i n all areas of daily life, both in relationships between spouses an d i n thos e betwee n childre n an d parents . I n brief , th e whol e "family" relationshi p wa s modified , a relationshi p tha t th e law , fo r it s part , contributed t o changing, i f only by giving these transformations it s own force : the officializatio n an d legitimizatio n o f establishe d facts . O n th e on e han d one see s a progressio n towar d lega l equalizatio n o f th e spouse s unde r mar riage law , i n th e managemen t o f th e propert y o f minors , an d eve n wit h respect t o famil y name ; o n th e othe r hand , perhap s becaus e i t lacke d th e power t o d o s o by an d throug h marriage , legislatio n continue d t o reinforc e the tie s an d obligation s o f parenthood , particularl y i n case s o f unmarrie d parents and divorce. Legal Equalization of the Spouses. Th e la w o f 1 3 Jul y 196 5 lef t standin g some traces of the old dependence o f the wife on he r husband: the latter was still th e sol e administrato r o f join t propert y (wit h th e exceptio n o f "reserve d property"); common propert y wa s liabl e fo r th e paymen t o f his debts, whil e those of his wife could be claimed only against her own property and reserve d property; and, finally, h e retained majo r lega l responsibility for managing the property of the children. Durin g this period, th e category of reserved propert y was abolished. Hencefort h th e debts of each spouse could b e claimed agains t all communit y property , bu t this could b e used a s collateral fo r a loan o r for 1 8 2 RtiM

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bail only with agreement by both spouses. The majo r rol e of the father i n the legal administratio n o f th e propert y o f childre n wa s abolished , etc . Wit h respect to family names , th e system adopte d b y the deputies onl y authorize d a practice that was increasingly widespread i n the highest social echelons and that consisted o f using the hyphenated name s of both spouse s for themselve s and for their children, fo r example in school enrollment . Reinforcement of Parental Obligations. Tw o measures illustrate the tendenc y of the law to reinforce th e permanence o f the "parental couple. " On th e on e hand parenta l authorit y seeme d t o underg o a radica l evolutio n durin g thi s period i f on e judge s b y th e decision s o f th e Cour t o f Appeals o f 1 1 Marc h 1983 an d 7 Ma y 1984 , givin g divorcin g parent s th e righ t t o joint custody , and by similar legislation that allowed joint custody over illegitimate childre n when bot h parent s recognize d them . (Previousl y th e mothe r ha d bee n give n sole custody. ) O n th e othe r han d th e la w o f 2 Decembe r 1984 , whic h replaced the allowance for orphans with a family suppor t allowance, empow ered famil y allowanc e fund s t o ai d i n th e recover y o f child suppor t whe n a parent fails to pay. The Revival of Natalism. Suc h measures , demonstratin g th e adaptatio n o f the la w t o ne w form s o f conjuga l unio n an d disunio n an d t o thei r effect s upon th e conditio n o f children , fit withi n a famil y polic y tha t onc e agai n became resolutel y natalist , indee d familialist , a s a result of measures adopted following th e report of Evelyne Sullerot to the Economic and Socia l Counci l on filling th e gap s i n ta x la w favorin g unmarrie d ove r marrie d couples . Certainly th e ne w policy emphasi s o n larg e families wa s not as marked a s in the government s precedin g th e arriva l o f th e Lef t i n power . Th e chang e i n policy resulte d fro m th e wishe s o f th e presiden t o f th e republic , wh o wa s aided b y the Hig h Commissio n o n Populatio n an d especiall y by the relevan t specialized committe e o f the Nint h Pla n (1985-1988) , whic h persuade d th e government an d th e parliamen t t o adop t a "priorit y program " "i n orde r t o ensure an environment favorabl e t o the family an d t o the birthrate." In pursuanc e o f these goals, a parental educatio n fun d wa s created b y the law o f 4 Januar y 1985 , providin g fo r payment s t o eac h perso n wh o stop s working o r reduce s hour s o f wor k a s th e resul t o f th e birt h o f an y chil d beyond th e first two , fo r whic h th e parent(s ) i s responsible . Amon g othe r similar measures , th e allowabl e incom e fo r recipient s o f th e youn g chil d FAMILY POLIC Y I N FRANC E SINC E 1 9 3 8 18

3

allowance wa s increase d o n 1 July 198 4 fo r familie s wit h thre e childre n o r more. This ne w allowanc e wa s the objec t o f lively criticis m fro m certai n mem bers o f th e Socialis t Party , wh o sa w i n i t a first ste p towar d th e "materna l salary," th e bet e noir e o f th e feminists , wh o wer e wel l represente d i n th e Socialist Party . Thi s poin t o f view i s exemplified i n a n articl e by Veroniqu e Neiertz o n th e 3 Januar y 198 5 issu e o f Le Monde, wher e sh e writes , " A maternal salary would be an insul t to all those without resources, a n insul t to all workers, a n insul t to all women wh o combine motherhoo d wit h a profession. . . . Ther e ar e tw o way s o f makin g motherhoo d compatibl e wit h a career: creat e mor e flexible workin g hour s fo r everyon e an d expan d chil d care for small children. I f the number o f social benefits i s to be increased, le t us loo k rathe r towar d a guaranteed minimu m incom e fo r everyone. " Thes e are prescien t comment s i n vie w o f th e arriva l i n 198 8 o f th e Minimu m Insertion Incom e (RMI ) fo r jo b seekers , whos e impac t o n famil y polic y n o doubt will be very important . The histor y of family polic y since 198 1 is characterized, a t the very least, by a certai n continuity . Thi s canno t b e attribute d simpl y t o th e searc h fo r ways of halting demographic decline . I t must be seen, rather , a s the resul t of enduring institutions , o f social forces institutionalize d i n the form o f bureaucratic organisms and managemen t mechanisms , o f associations whose representatives an d interest s ar e virtuall y immovable , o f mode s o f representatio n that are virtually immun e t o the effects o f specifically politica l action . With out doubt political life—at leas t its calendar and it s rhythms—is no t without influence o n decisio n making , whic h ofte n i s preceded b y length y prepara tion an d negotiatio n unti l suc h tim e a s th e issu e mobilize s politica l force s and culminates i n official action . To be sure, ther e was evidence of the arrival on the scene of new actors in the field o f famil y policy , particularl y th e feminis t movements , no w con verted int o "responsible " actors i n th e doubl e sens e o f the word , wit h repre sentatives withi n th e politica l partie s (particularl y th e Socialis t Party) , i n th e Ministry o f th e Right s o f Women, i n researc h centers , an d elsewhere . Th e law o f 3 1 Decembe r 1982 , whic h provide d partia l reimbursemen t fo r th e expenses of abortion, produce d a long polemic between leader s of the partie s of th e Right , notabl y Jacque s Chirac , an d spoksperson s i n th e field fo r th e Left, particularl y Yvett e Roudy. Othe r measure s sought to reduce the penal ties o n familie s wit h workin g mothers , a s i n th e la w o f 1 July 1984 , whic h

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substantially increase d th e incom e ceilin g fo r two-incom e familie s receivin g the young child allowance . But beyon d thes e cleavage s tha t divide d politica l parties , unions , an d associations an d tha t g o back t o definitions o f the rol e an d conditio n o f th e woman, th e familialis t consensu s triumphed , paradoxicall y reinforce d b y political competition, ou t of which emerged a unanimity o f opinion i n favor , if not of the "family, " a t least of "the child. " With som e coming an d going , family policy is returning to the essential task of aiding new families and large families, bu t wit h a revise d symboli c focus . "Th e child, " lik e previously th e "family," i s only a word on whic h everyon e can agree , fo r i t is the geometrical poin t a t whic h al l conception s intersect . Th e interes t o f th e chil d ob viously i s no t th e sam e accordin g t o al l socia l classes , no r i s the interes t i n having children. A s shown fo r exampl e i n th e 198 4 demonstrations i n favo r of privat e schools , th e wa y i n whic h childre n ar e treate d i s a n issu e i n political an d socia l conflict ! Ye t the chil d wh o i s the objec t o f family polic y incarnates a visio n o f a natural , nonconflictua l world , a visio n tha t hence forth constitute s th e profoun d unconsciou s o f al l collectiv e actio n i n thi s field. This would no t be the least of the contributions o f family polic y to the forms tha t politica l struggl e take s in France , a t least the struggl e fo r opinio n and elections. An d on this market, th e family i s still a sure value!

REFERENCES

Ashford, Dougla s E. 1986 , The Emergence of the Welfare States. New York: Blackwell. Becchia, Alain . 1986 . "Le s Milieu x parlementaire s e t l a depopulatio n d e 190 0 a 1914." Communications 44: 201-44. Boltanski, Luc. 1982 . Les Cadres: La formation dun groupe social. Paris : Editions de Minuit. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1982 . Ce que parler veut dire. Paris : Fayard. Ceccaldi, Dominique . 1957 . Histoire des prestations familiales en France. Paris : Uncaf. Commissariat General du Plan de Modernisation e t d'Equipement, Commissio n de la Consommation et de la Modernisation Sociale. 1947 . Rapport. Paris . Confederation General e du Travail. 1953 . 29th cong., June. Conseil Nationa l de la Resistance. 1944 . Les Jours heureux. Brochur e published 1 5 March 1944. Durand, Paul. 1953a . La politique contemporaine de securite sociale. Paris : Dalloz.

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. 1953b . "Le s Equivoque s d e l a redistributio n d e reven u pa r l a Securit e Sociale." Droit Social 16 : 292-98. Durkheim, Emile . 1963a . UEducation morale. Paris: PUF. . 1963b . Les Regies de la methode sociologique. Paris : PUF. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets. 1971. November 11 , 11145-46 . Kamerman, Sheil a B. , an d A . J . Kahn , eds . 1978 . Family Policy. Ne w York : Columbia Universit y Press. Laroque, Pierre . 1986 . La Politique familiale en France depuis J945 . Paris : Docu mentation Franchise . Lenoir, Remi . 1985a . "L'Effondremen t de s bases sociales du familialisme. " Acre s de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 57-58 : 69-88. . 1985b . "Tranformation s d u familialism e e t reconversions morales. " Acres de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 59 : 3-47. . 1989 . "Probleme s sociaux , probleme s sociologiques. " I n Initiation a la pratique sociologique y edite d b y Patric k Champagne , R£m i Lenoir , Loui s Pinto , and Dominiqu e Merllie . Paris : Bordas, Dunod . . 1991 . Famille et politique. Paris: Editions de Minuit . Lery, A . 1984 . "Le s Actives de 198 2 n'ont pa s moins d'enfant s qu e celle s de 1968. " Economie et Statistique 171-17 2 (November-December): 29. Magri, Suzanna . 1977 . Logement et reproduction de Vexploitation; Les politiques etatiques du logement en France (1947-1972). Paris : C.S.U. Nizard, Alain . 1974 . "Politique et legislation demographique." Population 2 9 (special number): 285-326. Paxton, RobertO . 1973 . La France de Vichy, 1940-1944. Paris : Seuil. Sauvy, Alfred. 1972 . De P. Reynaud a Charles de Gaulle. Paris : Casterman. Talmy, Robert , 1967 . Histoire du mouvement familial en France (1896-1939). 2 vols. Paris : Uncaf. Vincent, Paul . 1950 . "L a Famill e normale." Population 5 : 253-56. Wright, Gordon . 1948 . The Reshaping of French Democracy. New York: Reynal an d Hitchcock.

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6

F R E N C H H O U S I N G POLICIE S I N TH E EIGHTIES : COMPLEXITY, CONTINUITY , A N D IDEOLOG Y NATHAN H . SCHWART Z

I. INTRODUCTIO N

This pape r examine s th e developmen t o f housin g polic y i n Franc e wit h a particular emphasi s on the period from 1981 , when Frangoi s Mitterrand wa s elected t o hi s firs t ter m a s presiden t o f the Republic , throug h th e perio d o f "cohabitation" (1986-1988) , whe n Prim e Ministe r Jacque s Chira c le d a government o f th e Cente r an d Right , throug h th e announcemen t o f th e second budge t (September 1989 ) of the Socialis t government tha t too k offic e in 198 8 when Mitterran d wo n hi s second ter m a s president.* I t is a particu larly interestin g period , fo r a t it s outset, a socialis t party lon g excluded fro m power cam e t o offic e wit h th e hope s o f bringin g mor e socia l justic e an d equality to France after year s of conservative leadership. The Chirac Government tha t followe d wa s overtl y committe d t o th e marke t idea s espouse d b y Margaret Thatche r an d Ronal d Reagan , i n clea r oppositio n t o th e ideal s o f the previous socialist government, a s well as representing a change in empha sis from earlie r right-win g governments . Th e Socialis t governmen t tha t fol lowed Chirac , tempere d b y it s previou s electora l failure , face d th e conflic t between it s ideological goal s and it s concern t o govern Franc e i n a way tha t would preserv e it s grip on office . Thi s pape r examine s th e way in whic h th e goals of these governments affecte d housin g policy, bu t also the way that th e Support fo r thi s researc h wa s provide d b y th e Alexande r vo n Humbold t Foundatio n an d th e University of Louisville. Translation s from French are my own.

187

TABLE 6. 1

Distribution o f Housing Tenure s i n France : 198 2

Type of Tenure of

Number (in thousands housing units)

Percentage

Owner-occupied 9,92 Rented—HLM 2,64 Rented—Other 5,38 Free Housing 1,62

8 4 9 9

50.7 13.5 27.5 8.3

Source: Directio n de la Construction 1986 , 10 .

structure o f housin g polic y affecte d th e wa y thes e government s wen t abou t seeking their goals. II. TH E CONFIGURATIO N O F F R E N C H H O U S I N G POLIC Y

One usefu l indicato r o f the operatio n o f housing polic y i s the distribution o f housing tenures—typicall y i n term s o f owne r occupation , renta l i n th e private sector, an d renta l i n the public sector. Thes e categories often reflec t a whole set of public policies differentiated b y tenure, and , a s Rex and Moor e (1967) hav e persuasivel y argued , tenur e ofte n predict s th e politica l force s a t work. However , relativ e t o publi c policy , i t i s importan t t o understan d th e ambiguity o f these categorizations. A s in the case with Britis h an d America n housing policy, Frenc h housing policy is extremely complex, an d state action shapes and subsidizes virtually all forms o f tenure. Figures fo r th e basi c Frenc h housin g tenure s ar e show n i n tabl e 6.1 . As in bot h Britai n an d th e Unite d States , i n Franc e thos e peopl e wh o ow n o r are buying their ow n home s are a majority o f the population. HL M housin g (Habitations a loye r modere ) i s subsidized housin g offere d a t moderat e ren t and owne d an d manage d b y HL M associations—thi s i s the Frenc h equiva lent t o America n "publi c housing " an d Britis h "counci l housing. " A t 13. 5 percent o f th e total , HL M housin g represent s a muc h large r proportio n o f French housin g tha n i s th e cas e wit h publi c housin g i n th e Unite d State s (1.6 percent) , bu t represent s a smalle r shar e o f tota l housin g tha n Britis h public housin g (2 7 percent). Accountin g fo r slightl y mor e tha n one-quarte r of Frenc h housing , renta l housin g i n th e privat e secto r i s smaller tha n th e United States' s 3 2 percent, bu t muc h large r tha n Britain' s 1 1 percent (U.S . Department o f Commerce 1982 , 751, 760; Central Statistica l Office 1989) . 188 NATHA

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To describ e Frenc h housin g policy , w e wil l firs t examin e th e histor y o f French housin g polic y fro m th e en d o f Worl d Wa r I I t o th e electio n o f Frangois Mitterran d a s president, the n examin e the direct subsidies provided to build o r obtain housing , th e subsidies provided to housing through th e tax system, th e specia l form s o f finance tha t provid e fundin g t o housing , an d rent regulation . The Developmen t o f Postwa r Frenc h Housin g Polic y

Current Frenc h housin g policy is best understood i n the context of its history since th e en d o f Worl d Wa r II . A t th e en d o f th e war , Franc e face d a n enormous housin g shortage as almost 2 0 percent of the prewar housing stock had bee n destroye d o r severely damaged, whil e at the sam e time an increas ing birthrat e an d a larg e influ x o f refugee s swelle d th e deman d fo r housin g (Pearsall 1984 , 9). While th e Frenc h governmen t lacke d th e financial mean s directl y t o promote massiv e ne w construction, i n th e perio d fro m th e end o f the war to the earl y 1950s , a set of measures wa s adopted tha t regulate d an d promote d housing activity shor t of the direct creation o f housing. Terme d th e "pillars " of French housin g polic y by Duclaud-Williams (1978) , thes e measures con tinue by and large today, ofte n i n highly modified form . Th e first pillar is the 1948 Ren t Act , whic h controlle d th e rent s o f pre-194 8 housin g i n th e attempt t o kee p th e availabl e housin g affordable ; th e issu e o f whether rent s should b e controlle d becam e a n importan t poin t o f differenc e betwee n th e governments o f the Righ t an d th e Lef t durin g th e 1980s . Th e secon d pilla r was what Duclaud-Williams term s the "intermediate" or "semipublic" sector of housing , establishe d i n th e la w o f 2 1 Jul y 1950 , whic h se t u p a privat e bank, th e Credit foncie r d e Franc e (CFF) , t o provide loans and subsidie s fo r house construction . Duclaud-William s (1978 , 18 ) say s o f th e nominall y private Credi t foncie r tha t "it s director s an d governo r ar e appointe d b y th e Minister o f Financ e an d i t serves i n fac t a s the government' s erran d bo y i n the field of housing finance." Furthermore , whil e its funds com e from publi c issues, i t i s u p t o th e ministe r o f finance t o approv e them , givin g th e government powerfu l contro l ove r CF F activit y (Duclaud-William s 1978 , 18). Th e thir d pilla r o f Frenc h housin g polic y i s th e HL M movemen t (Habitations a loyer modere) , organization s tha t provide "social " housing fo r rent and sale ; these organization s wer e reestablishe d i n thei r prewa r for m b y the law of 3 September 194 7 (Duclaud-Williams 1978 , 19) . Funding for th e FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 18

9

HLM organization s activitie s comes from low-interes t loan s and othe r subsi dies. Al l thre e pillar s involv e th e Frenc h stat e i n th e provisio n o f housin g and the regulation o f the housing market, bu t at one remove. From th e earl y 1950 s t o th e mid-1970s , a financially stronge r Frenc h government encourage d massiv e amounts o f new construction. A first phase of this perio d wa s from th e mid-1950 s t o the mid-1960s , whe n th e Frenc h government subsidize d th e buildin g o f mos t ne w housin g throug h subsidie s to th e socia l housin g agencies , th e HL M organizations , t o construc t renta l housing, an d throug h th e provisio n o f subsidie s an d subsidize d loan s t o individuals fo r th e purchas e o f ne w housin g (Pearsal l 1984 , 13 ; Consei l Economique e t Socia l 1989 , 21-22) . I n a secon d phas e lastin g fro m th e mid-1960s t o th e mid-1970s , th e Frenc h stat e coul d n o longe r affor d t o provide s o much direc t subvention . Th e emphasi s no w shifte d t o the us e of private finance t o provide the funds fo r housing construction (Consei l Econ omique e t Socia l 1989 , 22) . On e measur e adopte d i n thi s period , th e so called debudgetisation (debudgetization ) o f 1966 , involve d endin g th e Frenc h treasury's rol e a s lende r t o th e HLMs ; tha t functio n wa s transferre d t o th e Caisse de s depot s e t consignation s (CDC—th e nationa l ban k i n charg e o f financing loca l government ) (Consei l Economiqu e e t Socia l 1989 , 41) . A second measure, adopte d i n 1973 , removed from th e budget the specificatio n of the numbe r o f housing unit s t o be financed b y the nationa l government , so tha t unexpecte d pric e increase s i n housin g woul d no t b e a drai n o n th e budget (Conseil Economiqu e e t Social 1989 , 41). In a litera l sense , Pearsall' s (1984 , 9 ) characterizatio n o f thi s perio d a s "the ris e of the private sector" is accurate, bu t fails to convey the continuin g and expandin g rol e o f government. Th e "conversion " t o privat e secto r source s of finance was accompanied b y new governmental measure s to provide direct incentives t o th e privat e secto r t o inves t i n housing . Th e governmen t als o restructured th e financial system , providin g specialized circuit s of finance i n order t o insur e tha t capita l fo r housin g woul d b e availabl e o n a continuou s basis. Suc h measures, more fully discussed in the next section of this chapter, included ta x break s fo r specia l saving s account s whos e capita l wa s t o b e invested i n housin g (Livre t A) ; specia l housin g saving s account s tha t gav e both ta x break s an d subsidie s t o depositor s usin g thei r saving s t o finance house purchas e (epargne logement); th e creatio n o f specialize d financial institutions to raise and distribute capital for housing (CDC, CFF) ; as well as a ta x o n employer s o f mor e tha n te n employee s whos e proceed s wer e als o devoted t o housing ( 1 percent funds) . Th e privat e secto r did gai n a new rol e 190 NATHA

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in th e provisio n o f housing , bu t thes e development s hardl y represen t a disengagement of the French stat e from housin g policy. Record number s o f house s wer e buil t i n thi s period ; th e Economi c an d Social Counci l (Consei l Economiqu e e t Socia l 1989 , 22 ) has note d tha t i n the perio d fro m 197 0 t o 1975 , th e rat e o f Frenc h housin g construction , relative t o th e numbe r o f inhabitants , se t ne w internationa l records . A t th e same time, a s Pearsall (1984, 10 ) has noted, Crude output was emphasized however, at the expense of quality, and many dwellings were constructed at standards and in locations unacceptable today. With risin g income s durin g th e 1970 s thi s issu e o f qualit y becam e mor e important. Th e Frenc h bega n t o feel crampe d i n comparison t o their neigh bors; in 1973 , the averag e useabl e siz e of a new housin g uni t i n Franc e was 73 square meters (786 square feet) compared t o 85 square meters (915 square feet) in West Germany and 12 4 square meters (1335 square feet) in Denmar k (Conseil Economiqu e e t Social 1989 , 23). In respons e t o the cal l o f government commission s fo r polic y t o improv e the qualit y o f the Frenc h habitat , a majo r ne w housin g ac t wa s adopte d i n 1977. Thi s legislation , whic h structure d muc h o f polic y i n th e 1980s , ha d three majo r aims . Th e firs t wa s t o encourag e hom e ownershi p a s th e pre ferred mean s t o stimulat e th e productio n o f ne w housin g an d th e improve ment o f older housing . Th e secon d ai m wa s to improve the quality o f rental housing, bot h b y encouragin g ne w constructio n an d b y improvin g existin g units. Th e thir d wa s to reduce th e general ai d give n directl y fo r th e produc tion o r renovatio n o f housin g (aide a la pierre) an d t o replac e i t wit h ne w forms o f aid fo r familie s tha t coul d no t affor d th e ne w (an d higher ) rent s o r mortgage payment s (Consei l Economiqu e e t Socia l 1989 , 23) . O n it s face , this thir d goa l wa s t o targe t ai d directl y t o thos e mos t i n need , withou t engaging the state in financing those who could affor d t o pay their own way. Direct Subsidie s t o Housin g

There are basically two forms o f direct government subsidies to housing. Th e first offers subsidie s for th e construction o r acquisition o f housing unit s (aide a la pierre), with th e ai d base d primaril y o n th e cos t o f building a ne w uni t or acquiring an existin g unit of housing. Th e second goes directly to individ uals t o hel p the m pa y ren t o r bu y a hous e [aide a la personne), wit h th e subsidy base d o n a family' s incom e an d th e cos t o f housing . Prio r t o 1977 , F R E N C H H O U S I N G P O L I C I E S I N T H E E I G H T I E S 19

1

TABLE 6. 2

Subsidies t o Housin g Unit s an d Individual s (i n million s o f francs ) J98J 198

Subsidies to housing units 20,63 (includes, but not limited to, PLA and PAP) Subsidies to individuals 2,64 (includes, but not limited to, APL, AL, AFL)

2 J98

3 198

4 J98

5

8 24,61

8 23,61

4 21,54

9 13,14

4

1 4,75

0 7,49

4 10,43

1 13,52

0

Source: Directio n de la Construction 1986 , 18 , 26.

French housin g polic y stresse d aide & la pierre, but wit h th e 197 7 housin g law (La w No . 77- 1 o f 3 January 1977) , th e emphasi s switche d t o aide d la personne, a trend also evident in British and American housing policy (Schwartz 1987a). Th e rational e behin d thi s shif t i s tha t whil e subsidie s fo r th e con struction o f housin g increas e th e suppl y o f housing , i t i s ver y difficul t t o insure tha t th e beneficiarie s ar e those mos t i n need ; more direc t subsidies t o needy individual s ar e seen a s more effective. Th e shif t fro m a n emphasi s o n aid t o constructio n an d acquisitio n o f housin g t o providin g ai d directl y t o individuals can be seen in table 6.2. Fro m that table it can be seen that while the subsidies tied t o particular housin g unit s (and directe d t o developers and / or HL M associations ) fel l 4 6 percen t fro m 198 2 t o 1985 , th e subsidie s t o individuals ros e fivefold from 198 1 to 1985 . Similarly , whil e i n 198 1 subsi dies to individual s accounte d fo r onl y 1 1 percent o f the subsidie s to housin g units, b y 198 5 subsidie s t o individual s ha d outstrippe d th e subsidie s t o housing units (table 6.2). In term s o f the ai d t o housin g units , ther e ar e tw o categorie s o f subsidy . One categor y o f subsidie s i s fo r renta l housing : th e PL A progra m (prets locatifs aides) provides low-interest loan s for th e construction o f rental hous ing available for those under certai n incom e limits. I n theory these loans are available t o publi c an d privat e developers , bu t i n fact , give n th e lo w retur n on investmen t i n thi s typ e o f housin g unde r curren t economi c conditions , very littl e PL A mone y ha s bee n use d b y th e privat e sector . Mos t o f th e construction unde r th e PL A progra m ha s bee n use d b y HL M associations , the semipubli c organization s tha t buil d an d manag e socia l housing . Ther e are ove r a thousand o f these organizations , an d the y ten d t o be ver y closel y 192 NATHA

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tied t o loca l government ; i t i s no t unusua l fo r th e boar d o f director s t o b e headed b y the local mayor, wit h other key positions being filled by important local politicians. The othe r category of subsidies for housin g units i s for owner occupation , in thei r curren t for m als o a legacy of the 197 7 reworking of housing policy . One suc h progra m i s th e PA P progra m (prets aides pour Iaccession d la propriete), which provide s low-interes t loan s fo r th e purchas e o f housing by people falling belo w certain incom e limits . I n additio n t o the PA P program, there i s on e typ e o f housin g loa n (prets conventionnes) tha t i s mad e b y regular banks that get a small government subsidy to lower the interest rate to a leve l betwee n th e marke t rat e an d th e muc h lowe r rat e o f the PA P loans. There i s als o a se t o f direc t subsidie s i n whic h th e governmen t provide s subsidized loan s for the rehabilitation o f housing (PALULOS). The majo r progra m providin g subsidie s directl y t o individual s i s the APL program (I'aide personnalisee au logement), whic h wa s create d i n 1977 . Benefits ar e a housin g allowanc e base d o n famil y situatio n an d availabl e resources, an d the y requir e tha t th e beneficiarie s liv e i n unit s o f housin g meeting certai n standard s (Heugas-Darraspe n 1985 , 55-66) . On e importan t aspect o f th e housin g allowanc e progra m (APL ) i s tha t i t ca n b e use d no t only b y renters but als o by those buyin g their ow n homes . Indeed , i n 1985 , almost 790,000 Frenc h familie s receive d housin g allowances (APL) as owner occupiers, compare d t o 625,00 0 familie s receivin g housin g allowance s a s renters. Thus Frenc h direc t subsidies benefit no t only renters but also homeowners. I n addition , ther e ar e tw o olde r program s o f direc t subsidie s t o individuals, th e allocation logement familiale (AL ) an d th e allocation logement sociale (ALS), whic h provid e subsidie s t o familie s i n specia l circum stances, includin g the retired and handicappe d (Pearsal l 1984 , 12) .

Tax Subsidie s t o Housin g

In addition t o the direct subsidies mentioned above , a major housin g subsidy is provided b y French ta x law that allow s some o f the cost s of housing t o be deducted fro m taxes . Whil e ther e exis t ta x provision s t o encourag e invest ment i n renta l housing , provision s encouragin g hom e ownershi p ar e particularly numerous . Fo r example , a s i n man y othe r countries , includin g th e United State s an d Grea t Britain , Frenc h ta x la w give s specia l treatmen t t o mortgage interest: for the first five years of a home mortgage, incom e tax may FRENCH H O U S I N G P O L I C I E S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 19

3

TABLE 6. 3

Selected Ta x Measure s Favorin g Owner-Occupatio n (Figure s ar e i n millions o f francs an d represen t revenu e no t collecte d becaus e of tax provisions ) J98J 1982 Tax Provision Deductions from taxable income for main 58 residence (including energy-saving expenditure and building upkeep) Deductions from taxable income for 6,24 interest on loans for main residence Exemption of interest and bonus 2,66 payments on home-ownership savings plans and accounts

1983

1984

0 64

5 1,12

5 1,35

0

0 6,56

0 7,01

0 7,27

9

0 3,00

0 3,36

0 3,75

0

Source: Minist&re de l'Equipement, d u Logement , d e l'Am^nagement d u Territoire et des Transports.

be reduced by 25 percent of the interest paid up to a ceiling of nine thousan d francs, plus fifteen hundred franc s pe r dependent. In addition, owner-occupier s living in new housing financed by subsidized loans are exempted fro m propert y ta x for te n year s from th e date of completion o f th e home . Furthermore , ther e ar e housin g saving s plan s subsidize d by the government that provide bonuses to savers meeting certain conditions ; the interest and bonuses are also tax-free. Moreover , ther e are tax deductions for owner-occupier s o n par t o f th e cos t o f makin g a hom e mor e energ y efficient, makin g major repairs , and undertaking restoration work. Lastly , th e capital gain s resultin g fro m th e sal e o f one's primar y residenc e ar e als o taxfree. The cos t o f thes e deduction s i s ver y high . A selectio n o f th e possibl e housing deduction s i s contained i n tabl e 6.3 . Th e cos t run s int o billion s o f francs pe r year . Fo r purpose s o f compariso n t o othe r form s o f housin g aid , the average cost per year of the measure s i n table 6. 3 fo r hom e ownershi p is 10.93 billion francs . Tha t i s more than th e average of the direct subsidies for building renta l housing , whic h ove r th e sam e perio d average d 9. 9 billio n francs pe r yea r (Directio n d e l a Constructio n 1986 , 18) , an d fa r exceed s subsidies aidin g individual s t o ren t housing , whic h average d 2. 5 billio n francs i n the same period (Direction de la Construction 1986 , 26). When th e direct subsidie s fo r buildin g housin g fo r owne r occupatio n an d th e housin g allowance (APL ) fo r individual s buyin g housin g (bot h costin g th e govern 194 NATHA

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ment mor e tha n th e comparabl e subsidie s fo r renters ) ar e adde d t o th e ta x measures that subsidize hom e ownership , i t becomes clear that th e subsidie s for home ownership are enormous. Special Avenue s o f Financ e

In his study of French economi c policy making, John Zysma n suggeste d tha t one of the keys to Frenc h economi c developmen t ma y not hav e been it s use of plannin g s o muc h a s th e contro l ove r finance exercise d b y th e planner s (Zysman 1983 , 99-169). Frenc h housin g policy is also marked by distinctive arrangements i n th e real m o f finance. I n mos t wester n industria l countries , housing i s greatly affecte d b y th e operatio n o f finance markets . I t i s routin e to hea r o f upturn s o r downturn s i n housin g constructio n resultin g fro m changing condition s i n financial market s a s interes t rate s ris e o r fal l an d a s housing compete s wit h othe r form s o f investmen t fo r financial resources . Government subsid y polic y doe s no t alway s ge t aroun d thi s problem . Fo r example, i n th e Unite d State s man y federa l subsidie s fo r th e productio n o f low-income housin g wer e base d o n interest-rat e subsidie s an d loa n guaran tees; these subsidie s wer e no t alway s enough t o overcom e hig h interes t rate s or shortages of available capital (a s was the case in the late 1970s) . One o f the distinctive aspect s of the Frenc h cas e has been th e creation o f special source s o f capita l fo r th e finance o f housin g largel y insulate d fro m competition i n financial markets ; when th e mechanism s use d t o implemen t these policie s functio n a s intended , th e finance o f housing i n Franc e i s less affected b y th e fluctuations i n genera l finance market s tha n i s th e cas e i n other countries . Thes e specia l channel s o f finance includ e specia l tax-fre e savings accounts that, alon g with government subsidies, provided low-interes t loans for th e building o f social renta l housin g and fo r hom e constructio n fo r low-income families ; tax-fre e saving s account s tha t receiv e a n additiona l government bonus when use d t o purchase housing ; and fund s raise d by a tax on large employers that provides funds fo r the construction o f housing. One specia l sourc e o f fund s fo r housin g i s tax-fre e saving s accounts , called " A Accounts" (Livret A). A Accounts pay interest at a rate at or below the inflatio n rate , whic h i s substantiall y belo w th e marke t interes t rate . Despite their lo w return, thes e accounts hav e been popula r becaus e they are exempt from taxation. Thu s th e resource s i n th e A Accounts ar e a source of low-interest money for housing. Th e mone y from thes e accounts, alon g with a subsid y fro m th e governmen t t o lowe r the interes t rat e even more , i s used FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 19

5

to subsidiz e housin g activit y b y th e HL M associations . Befor e 1977 , thes e loans t o HLM s wer e calle d "HL M loans " (pret HLM). I n 1977 , thes e moneys wer e divide d int o thre e differen t loa n programs , al l assistin g th e creation o f housin g throug h th e HL M associations , includin g loan s fo r construction o f social renta l housin g (PLA— pret locatif aide), fo r construc tion o f homes t o be purchase d b y people wit h income s belo w certai n limit s (PAP—pret d'accession d. la propriete), as wel l a s fo r th e rehabilitatio n o f social housin g (PALULOS— prime d. Vamelioration des logements a usage locatif et a occupation sociale) (Conseil Economiqu e e t Social 1989 , 41-44). These loan programs make significant amount s of funds availabl e at below market interes t rates . Fo r example , i n th e spring of 1987 , the rat e of subsidy was 1 2 percen t o f th e overal l valu e o f th e loan s fo r th e buildin g o f socia l rental housing ; th e interes t rat e possibl e unde r thes e arrangement s wa s 4. 9 percent, a great contrast t o market rate s for hom e loan s o f 9.5 percen t t o 1 0 percent. Furthermore , th e government ha s been willin g to give mortgages of up to thirty-nine years , a much longe r perio d tha n i s available i n the privat e market. The raisin g an d administratio n o f thes e loan s funde d b y Accoun t A i s handled b y a governmen t bank , th e Caiss e de s depot s e t consignation s (CDC). Th e recen t role of the CDC i n housing has been a n expansio n o f its role relativ e t o government agencie s an d it s subsidiary banks . Fro m 196 6 to 1986, the actual administration o f CDC housin g loans was the responsibilit y of a n offshoo t o f th e CDC , th e Caiss e de s pret s au x habitation s a loye r modere (CPHLM). I n 198 6 the CPHLM wa s renamed th e Caisse de garantie du logemen t (CGLS) ; at tha t tim e i t cede d th e abilit y t o gran t loans t o th e CDC, bu t The CGLS retained the function o f administering the loans it had made an d als o gained th e abilit y t o guarantee subsidize d loan s t o recipient s when the y coul d no t ge t guarantee s fro m othe r governmen t agencie s ( a guarantee i s normall y necessar y t o b e eligibl e fo r a subsidize d loan) . Whil e overtly th e CGL S ha s a smalle r rol e relativ e t o th e CD C tha n i t di d i n it s earlier incarnatio n a s the CPHLM, it s role is still quite large: the portfolio o f loans under it s administration wa s 266 billion franc s i n 198 6 (CDC 1987) . When i t was given th e responsibilit y fo r providin g HLM s loans for build ing socia l renta l housin g (PLA ) and housin g fo r purchas e b y lower-incom e families (PAP ) in 1986 , the Caisse des depots et consignations (CDC) gained a powe r tha t th e ol d CPHL M di d no t have—th e authorit y t o mak e th e decision whethe r a particular recipien t could receiv e the loan. Th e CPHL M had bee n boun d t o accept th e decisio n o f th e Ministr y o f Housin g abou t 196 NATHA

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whether th e recipien t qualifie d fo r a loan. I n tha t regard , th e movin g o f the loan-approval functio n t o the CD C als o strengthened it s standing a s a bank, albeit on e tha t ha d specia l source s fo r it s operation. I n 1986 , th e CD C wa s able t o dra w upo n 34. 7 billio n franc s i n fund s fro m th e A Accounts (Livre t A) for housin g an d 4 billio n franc s i n subsidie s fro m th e state . I n th e sam e year, i t grante d 26. 9 billio n franc s i n PL A loan s fo r renta l housing , 7. 7 billion i n PA P subsidized loan s for home ownership, an d 4.1 billion i n loans for rehabilitatio n (CD C 1987) . As an aside , i t is important t o note that the A Accounts funds (Livre t A) are no t exactl y fre e t o the government; the cos t of exempting A Account s fro m taxatio n wa s 3 billio n franc s i n 1984 . I t i s important to note that in budget terms this is money not collected, no t direct expenditure; in othe r countries suc h ta x breaks are considerably les s vulnerable to change than direc t expenditures (Schwartz 1987B) . An importan t relate d institutio n i s th e Credi t foncie r d e Franc e (CFF) , nominally a privat e bank , but , a s note d earlier , ver y muc h controlle d i n important aspect s b y th e Frenc h treasury . Unti l 197 7 th e Credi t foncie r made CFF loan s (pret Credit foncier) t o home buyer s who fell belo w certain income limits . Th e fund s fo r thi s Credi t foncie r activit y cam e fro m fund s raised i n th e financial market , wit h governmen t subsidie s t o kee p interes t rates low . I n th e majo r revisio n o f housin g polic y i n 1977 , th e CF F loan s were supersede d b y loan s fo r lower-incom e familie s t o purchas e housin g (PLA—pret locatif aide), bu t unlik e loan s o f th e sam e nam e give n b y th e CDC t o th e HL M association s t o ai d lower-incom e peopl e i n purchasin g housing, thes e CFF loan s go directly t o families fo r home purchas e (Consei l Economique e t Social 1989 , 41-44). For th e purpose s o f this discussion , th e importanc e o f the CF F i s that i t has taken a n increasin g rol e in th e management an d provisio n o f finance for housing, a role insulated fro m th e general financial market. I n 1983 , a single pool o f fund s fo r low-interes t loan s fo r lower-incom e familie s t o purchas e housing (PAP ) wa s create d withi n th e Credi t foncie r (CFF) , mergin g al l funds fo r this end; from thi s point on the CDC brought it s funds fo r this PAP program int o this pool. Bot h banks continued t o make their loans separately, but th e initia l fund s wer e merged . Th e secon d development , i n 1985 , wa s designed t o improv e th e stabilit y o f th e system ; bot h bank s woul d improv e the supply of funds fo r the loans for lower-income hom e ownership (PAP) by bringing int o the pool excess funds fro m thei r retiremen t saving s accounts as well as funds fro m mortgage s that ha d already been pai d off (Conseil Econo mique et Social 1989 , 44). FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 19

7

This developin g relationshi p betwee n th e CF F an d th e CD C signal s several important aspects of French polic y in this area. The first is that policy arrangements ofte n ge t quit e complicated , i n thi s cas e creatin g a join t poo l for fund s whil e preservin g th e separat e role s for th e distributio n o f funds fo r both banks. Th e secon d aspec t is that while the administrative complexit y of the syste m grew , tha t complexit y seem s t o hav e increase d th e flexibility of policy change ; by creatin g a commo n poo l o f funds fo r th e subsidize d loa n programs for home ownership, th e government seems to have given itself the possibility o f making greate r change s i n th e balanc e o f loans grante d b y th e CDC t o HLM s and b y the CFF t o individuals than woul d b e possible when each ban k had onl y it s own pool of funds. A third aspec t i s the commitmen t of policy maker s to preserving potentia l source s of funding b y allowing bot h banks t o dra w o n fund s raise d fro m specia l saving s account s fo r retirement . The bank s wer e allowe d t o pu t fund s fro m thes e retiremen t account s tha t were no t immediatel y neede d t o pa y retiremen t benefit s int o th e poo l fo r housing loans—thu s increasin g th e amoun t o f mone y availabl e t o thes e funds. French polic y ha s create d anothe r for m o f finance insulate d fro m th e general financial market , tha t of special housing savings accounts. Ther e ar e two differen t kind s o f specia l housin g saving s account , th e plan d'epargne logement (PEL) and the compte d'epargne logement (CEL). Both offer govern ment-provided bonuse s (base d o n th e interes t earned) , exemptio n fro m ta x on the interest and bonus, and an additional partial loan at a low interest rate if the specified amount s of money are saved on a regular basis and the savings are used for the purchase of a residence (Pearsall 1984 , 26; Heugas-Darraspen 1985, 91-100) . Th e plans diffe r i n th e amount s t o be deposited , th e mini mum perio d o f deposit, an d th e term s o f the loa n available . Assumin g tha t most people will use this money for housing, th e effect o f the housing savings accounts i s to reserv e a certai n amoun t o f fund s fo r us e i n housing . Tabl e 6.4 show s the numbe r o f such account s an d plans and th e amoun t o f fund s they contain; in 1985 , with almost 1 2 million suc h accounts and 31 3 billion francs o n deposit, they provided a large reserve of personal savings earmarked for housing . Another sourc e o f housing finance insulate d fro m th e finance marke t ar e the fund s contribute d b y employer s fo r housing . Sinc e 1953 , al l employer s with mor e tha n te n employee s mus t contribut e jus t unde r 1 percent o f total wages for housing construction; i n exchange they have the right to nominat e their worker s fo r priorit y i n th e housin g built , whethe r fo r ren t o r fo r sal e 198 NATHA

N H . SCHWART Z

TABLE 6. 4

Housing Saving s Account s an d Plan s 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Number of housing 6,11 savings accounts and plans (in thousands of accounts) Total amount on 130. deposit in the accounts and plans (in billions of francs)

1984

198S

0 6,88 6 7,46 8 7,862 8,459 9,51 3 10,50 3 11,98 5

8 160. 2 170. 1 184. 5 200. 9 222. 8 253.

5 313.

8

Source: Direction d e la Construction 1986 , 33.

(Pearsall 1984 , 19) . Som e larg e firms administe r thes e " 1 percen t funds " themselves, bu t most firms make their contributions t o organizations founde d to administer suc h funds , th e mos t commo n typ e bein g Comite s interprofes sionels du logemen t (CILs) . While, a s Pearsall (1984 , 118-19 ) suggests , th e government doe s no t hav e much contro l ove r the types of housing tha t the CILs inves t in , i t is neverthe less clear that the 1 percent funds represen t another source of housing finance earmarked fo r housing , insulate d fro m pressure s i n th e genera l financial markets. Tabl e 6. 5 show s recen t level s o f the 1 percent funds. I n compariso n to th e subsidie s fo r housin g unit s an d individuals , show n i n tabl e 6.2 , th e 1 percent monie s ca n b e see n t o represen t a substantia l par t o f th e fund s available fo r housing . An d thes e fund s ar e importan t becaus e the y ar e avail able for housing regardles s of the genera l stat e of financial markets .

TABLE 6. 5

Employer Investmen t i n Housin g (i n million s o f francs ) 1981 1982

1983

0 78 1 6,48

3 83 3 7,28

3 1

J984 J98 5 954 1,07 8 7,904 8,27 6

1 7,26

6 8,11

4

8,858 9,35

Direct investments 73 Investments through collecting 5,69 organizations (including CILs) TOTAL employer investments 6,42

4

Source: Directio n de la Construction 1986 , 29.

FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E EIGHTIE S 19

9

Rent Contro l

Rent control s o f on e typ e o r anothe r hav e bee n a n importan t featur e i n modern Frenc h housin g policy, datin g from 191 4 (Pearsall 1984 , 11-12) . I n the perio d sinc e Worl d Wa r II , importan t ren t control s include d th e 194 8 Rent Act , whic h controlle d initiall y ove r 6 millio n unit s o f housin g buil t before 1948 . The numbe r o f units covere d unde r th e provisions o f the 194 8 act declined t o less than seve n hundre d thousan d b y the mid-1980 s becaus e changes in tenants resulted i n decontrol unde r the act, and ministerial decre e removed othe r pre-194 8 dwelling s from contro l (Pearsal l 1984 , 11-12) . Bu t the rent s o f many housin g unit s buil t wit h stat e subsidies fal l unde r govern ment contro l a s well ; for example , th e rent s fo r mos t o f HL M housin g ar e regulated by the government .

Redistributive Effect s o f Housin g

One o f th e importan t way s tha t housin g polic y ca n b e evaluate d i s i n it s distributive effects : wh o get s what . A recen t stud y b y th e Frenc h Nationa l Center for Scientifi c Researc h (CNRS) explored this question, examinin g the impact o f th e housin g allowances , subsidize d loans , ta x provisions , an d subsidized ban k loans on th e Frenc h distributio n o f income (Cornuel 1989) . In term s of the general redistributiv e effec t o f French housin g programs, th e study found tha t government aid s to renter s tended t o be redistributive i n a n absolute sense , tha t is , th e poo r tende d t o benefit mor e tha n th e ric h (Cor nuel 1989 , 11) . The aid s to homeowners affecte d th e genera l distributio n o f wealth b y makin g a smal l contributio n t o "relative " redistribution : tha t is , richer peopl e tende d t o receiv e a smalle r percentag e o f their incom e i n ai d than poore r people , eve n thoug h i t i s possible tha t riche r peopl e receive d a greater absolute amount of aid (Cornuel 1989 , 11) . When lookin g at the impac t o f government aid s to renter s alon e (no t th e whole population) , th e pictur e change s somewhat . Th e CNR S stud y foun d that withi n th e grou p o f renters , riche r renter s tende d t o benefi t mor e fro m housing aide than poore r renters (Cornuel 1989 , 11) . While aid to renters is, in overal l terms , redistributive , man y renter s a t th e botto m o f th e incom e scale d o no t receiv e th e subsidies , a proble m tha t bega n t o b e addresse d seriously in the second half of the 1980 s and is discussed later in this chapter. On the other hand, withi n the group of homeowners, the aid received tended 200 NATHA

N H . SCHWART Z

to favor poorer homeowners (Cornuel 1989 , 11) . It is important to remember that homeowners as a group are richer than renters . With regar d t o more specifi c governmen t aid s for renters , th e mos t redistributive progra m wa s th e housin g allowanc e progra m (APL) , followe d i n order by the programs that provided subsidie s for the construction o f housing units (aide & la pierre) (Cornue l 1989 , 10) . The housin g allowanc e progra m was als o th e mos t redistributiv e progra m fo r homeowners , followe d b y th e subsidized loa n programs funded fro m A Accounts and government subsidie s (PAP), th e variou s ta x deductions , an d loan s fro m th e Credi t foncie r d e France; the tax-free saving s accounts that received a subsidy from th e government whe n th e save r use d th e proceed s t o buy a house ar e the leas t redistri butive aid (Cornuel 1989 , 10) . The findings of the study seem to support th e basic polic y orientatio n emergin g fro m th e 197 7 reform s tha t suggeste d tha t direct ai d t o individuals , tailore d t o thei r income , a s i n th e housin g allow ance program, woul d d o the better jo b of delivering benefits t o poorer peopl e than th e earlie r program s tha t emphasize d subsidie s fo r th e constructio n o f housing units, suc h as the PAP program.

III. MITTERRAN D I : LEF T HOPE S A N D E C O N O M I C CONSTRAIN T

In Ma y 1981 , th e Socialis t Frangoi s Mitterran d wa s electe d presiden t o f France. I n th e subsequen t legislativ e election s (Jun e 1981) , hi s part y wo n 285 ou t o f 49 1 seat s i n th e Nationa l Assembl y an d wen t o n t o for m a government includin g fou r minister s fro m th e Frenc h Communis t Party . The ascensio n o f the Socialis t Party to governmental powe r was grounded i n a histor y o f promise s o f broa d change , a s Doree n Collin s (1987 , 84 ) ha s noted: The polic y statement s fro m th e Common Program [1972 ] t o th e I JO propositions contained a major emphasi s upon the need for change in order that French society might incorporate more fully the themes of social justice, social equality and openness with the aim of establishing a new balance in relationships between public authorities, public authorities and individuals, and between individuals themselves. As Soni a Maze y (1987 , 3-4 ) ha s noted , "Th e keywor d o f th e socialis t programme wa s le changement," an d upo n takin g power "th e newly-electe d government . . . embarke d upo n it s radica l programm e wit h enthusiasm. " Housing, alon g wit h concer n wit h communa l facilities , wa s par t o f thi s program. FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 20

1

The majo r piec e o f housin g legislatio n adopte d b y th e Socialis t govern ment wa s the la w of 22 June 198 2 (No. 82-526) , know n a s the Quilliot La w after th e housin g ministe r wh o introduce d it . Th e la w began wit h "Genera l Principles," which include d th e sweepin g statemen t "L e droi t a Thabita t es t un droi t fondamental"—th e righ t t o habita t i s a fundamenta l right . Afte r this sweepin g assertio n o f a ne w right , th e Quillio t La w actually focuse s o n the relation s o f landlords an d tenants ; one criti c ha s asserte d tha t whil e th e opening stresse s a genera l righ t an d expresse s th e interes t o f the stat e i n th e issue, th e conten t o f th e la w represent s th e grantin g o f privilege s t o on e particular group, renter s (Boubli 1985 , 9-11) . The provision s of the Quilliot La w called fo r a radical restructurin g o f the relation o f tenants an d landlor d i n th e determinatio n o f rents . Th e la w was to apply to all tenants, i n both private housing and i n social (HLM) housing, with th e exceptio n o f tenants i n housin g still unde r th e la w of 1948 . Withi n the ter m o f a lease , th e annua l ren t increas e wa s t o b e determine d b y th e annual increas e i n th e cost-of-buildin g inde x publishe d b y th e Nationa l Institute for Statistic s and Economi c Studie s (INSEE), althoug h th e govern ment coul d limi t increase s t o 8 0 percent o f the index . Th e ren t increas e fo r a leas e renewa l o r a ne w leas e wer e t o b e negotiate d eac h yea r b y th e organizations o f renter s an d landlord s withi n th e framewor k o f a nationa l commission o n rents (Commission national e des rapports locatifs); the incen tive for th e partie s to reac h agreemen t wa s that i n th e even t of deadlock, th e government woul d se t th e rate . A highe r increas e coul d b e sough t whe n renovation wor k had been done on the dwelling. One of the key provisions of the new law specified whe n landlords had th e right t o se t rent s outsid e th e framewor k o f ren t control . Unde r th e Quillio t Law, landlord s ha d th e righ t t o se t an y ren t the y wishe d fo r ne w dwellings , dwellings that were no longer covered by the law of 1948 , dwellings that had been vacan t fo r eightee n month s o r more , an d dwelling s tha t wer e unoccu pied becaus e o f a cour t decisio n (a s in th e cas e where a tenant ha d no t me t his o r he r obligations ) (Cancellier i 1986 , 127-128) . Th e la w als o gav e tenants th e righ t t o rene w thei r leasees , excep t i n situation s wher e th e landlord neede d th e dwellin g fo r persona l us e o r fo r th e us e o f hi s o r he r children. Many argu e tha t the Quillio t La w had th e undesirabl e effec t o f constricting the renta l marke t by encouraging landlords either to hold their propertie s off the market entirely rathe r than fac e ren t regulation an d the tenant's right s to leas e renewal , o r t o hol d a vacan t propert y of f th e marke t fo r eightee n 202 NATHA

N H . SCHWART Z

months i n orde r t o se t th e initia l ren t leve l wher e the y pleased , o r t o avoi d the entire issu e of rent and tenan t regulatio n b y selling their holdings to new owner-occupiers (Boubl i 1985 , 7-8 , 16-17 ; Tuppe n 1988 , 167 , 174) . A s Boubli argues, the basic right of habitat accorded by the Quilliot Law implied greater access , whil e th e provision s o f the la w hav e operate d t o limi t acces s to rental housing (Boubli 1985 , 7-8) . Further expansio n o f government' s rol e i n th e housin g marke t wa s pre cluded by the worsening of the economic situation i n France : 1982 brought a U-turn i n economic strategy and the introduction o f austerity measures which wer e further extende d i n 1983 : benefits wer e cut, taxe s were increased . . . there were problems, delays and trimming (Mazey 1987, 3-4). The Frenc h governmen t suddenl y decide d i t did no t hav e mone y t o spend ; the grea t expens e o f creatin g housin g coul d b e expecte d t o dampe n th e possibilities for major housin g initiatives. But the problem s o f the Frenc h econom y di d no t pos e barriers simpl y t o new programs ; the y als o cause d rea l problem s fo r existin g programs . Th e upswing of inflation i n 198 1 caused rea l problem s fo r peopl e seekin g to buy housing. I n 198 1 the interest rates on unassisted housing mortgages rose from a rat e of 9-10 percen t t o 1 6 percent (maintainin g a rea l interes t rat e o f 6- 7 percent); the interes t rate s for subsidize d loan s for hom e purchas e (PAP ) also rose, reducin g th e affordabilit y o f housing fo r man y peopl e (Consei l Econo mique e t Socia l 1989 , 34) . Bu t th e cessatio n o f inflatio n an d th e deflatio n that starte d i n 198 4 als o create d rea l problems; the incom e o f man y peopl e stagnated o r fell , makin g i t increasingl y difficul t fo r the m t o mee t thei r mortgage payments . On e estimat e i s that i n th e perio d fro m 198 1 t o 1984 , there could hav e been nin e hundre d thousan d familie s i n difficulty (Consei l Economique e t Social 1989 , 35). One facto r accentuatin g th e mortgag e paymen t proble m wa s that, no t so long before , i t ha d bee n quit e eas y t o ge t larg e loan s (relativ e t o income) , based o n th e assumptio n tha t income s woul d continu e t o rise . Figure s provided i n the 198 9 report of the Economic and Socia l Committee (Consei l Economique e t Socia l 1989 , anne x 11 ) sho w tha t th e averag e revenu e o f families obtainin g loan s droppe d i n thi s period , whil e a t th e sam e tim e th e cost of a dwelling was increasing muc h faste r tha n incomes . I n th e sam e set of figures, on e finds tha t th e averag e famil y earnin g tw o time s th e Frenc h minimum wag e (SMIC— salaire minimum interprofessionel de croissance), or less , an d makin g mortgag e payments , wa s spendin g 4 2 percen t o f it s FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 0

3

income o n housing , befor e th e calculatio n o f housin g allowance s (APL) . Even afte r figuring i n th e housin g allowanc e (APL) , th e sam e famil y wa s spending 2 8 percent o f it s incom e o n housing . Anothe r facto r accentuatin g this proble m o f repaymen t wa s that man y o f the subsidize d mortgage s wer e graduated, wit h payment s risin g b y 4 percen t pe r year , base d o n th e earlie r assumption tha t income s woul d ris e over time (Tuppen 1988 , 173) . I n 198 6 and 198 7 the Frenc h governmen t ha d t o reduce the progressivit y and lengthe n the paymen t perio d o f man y subsidize d loan s (PAP ) an d low-interes t ban k loans (prets conventionnes) t o kee p th e mortgag e paymen t proble m fro m becoming a disaster (Conseil Economiqu e e t Social 1989 , 35). These economi c problem s wer e also reflecte d i n th e rapidl y growin g cost of personalize d financial aid s give n t o renter s an d homeowners . Tabl e 6. 2 shows that between 198 1 and 1986 , the cost of personalized housin g aid grew by almost 400 percent! The 197 7 housing reforms ha d emphasized direc t aid to individual s ove r ai d t o unit s o f housing , i n th e doubl e expectatio n tha t direct ai d woul d targe t th e peopl e mos t i n nee d a s well a s sav e th e govern ment mone y i n th e lon g run . Th e assumptio n wa s tha t ove r time , wit h growth i n th e economy , fewe r an d fewe r peopl e woul d qualif y fo r (o r need ) the housin g allowances , resultin g i n a reductio n i n th e cos t o f the progra m (Conseil Economiqu e e t Socia l 1989 , 42) . I n fact , wit h stagnatin g income s and relativel y hig h level s o f unemployment , fe w recipient s los t thei r nee d and eligibilit y for housing allowances (APL), and even mor e people qualifie d for aid . Face d wit h thi s problem, beginnin g i n 198 2 the Mitterran d govern ment stopped tryin g to keep the payment level for housing allowances i n lin e with the cost of living in order to reduce somewhat it s growth. Following th e radica l restructurin g o f landlord-tenan t relation s an d ren t determinations o f the Quilliot Law , succeedin g housing policy of the Social ist government wa s considerably mor e conservativ e i n tone , consisten t wit h the mor e conservativ e economi c policie s characteristi c o f the secon d hal f of its tenur e i n office . Fo r example , t o reduc e som e o f th e disincentive s t o landlords stemmin g fro m th e Quillio t Law , thre e measure s wer e adopte d t o moderate it s effects : first, landlord s coul d rais e rent s whe n a dwellin g wa s improved; second , upo n a chang e o f tenants, landlord s coul d as k for a ren t increase if the old rent was deemed low in comparison t o rents in comparabl e dwellings; and third, th e entire increase in the cost-of-construction inde x was to be used as the basis for yearly rent increases during the term o f a lease, th e government givin g u p th e optio n t o lowe r th e figure t o 8 0 percen t o f th e index. 204 NATHA

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The governmen t als o adopte d measure s tha t mad e clea r it s continuin g support fo r home-ownershi p programs . Whil e thi s suppor t i s often see n a s a non-Left position , on e finds suppor t fo r suc h measure s amon g th e larg e parties o f th e Lef t i n countrie s lik e th e Federa l Republi c o f German y an d Britain. Whil e ideologue s ma y prefe r som e for m o f collective ownership , i t is clear tha t man y individual s se e hom e ownershi p a s an importan t for m o f personal contro l ove r thei r environmen t an d vot e accordingly . I n addition , the government gav e HLM organization s the right to sell units of their renta l stock to tenants (Tuppen 1988 , 167-68) . This may not represent so much a n encouragement fo r hom e ownershi p a s on e wa y o f allowin g financially strapped HL M organization s t o rais e mone y t o pa y debts and t o rehabilitat e existing stock. The government adopte d othe r measure s designed t o aid the home-build ing industry, whic h was in a pronounced downturn , a s is frequently th e case in time s o f economi c difficulty , wit h th e accompanyin g implication s fo r employment. Th e 198 5 measure , "th e Pla n fo r Relaunchin g Buildin g an d Public Works" (le plan du relance du bdtiment et des travaux publics) offered lower interest rates for those borrowing money under the subsidized mortgag e program (PAP) , a s well a s increase d ta x relie f fo r hom e buyer s t o stimulat e the industr y (Tuppe n 1988 , 175) . I n 198 3 an d 1985 , measure s wer e als o adopted t o insure that a larger and mor e certain poo l of money was available for th e PA P progra m (assiste d loan s fo r hous e purchase) , a s note d earlie r (Conseil Economiqu e e t Social 1989 , 44). IV. CHIRAC : IMPLEMENTIN G TH E VISIO N O F "LIBERALISME"

The governmen t o f Jacques Chira c cam e t o powe r i n Marc h 198 6 with th e intention o f reforming Frenc h society , bringin g an ideologica l visio n simila r to tha t o f Margare t Thatche r an d Ronal d Reagan , a visio n i n whic h th e private secto r i s generall y see n a s bein g mor e effectiv e tha n th e stat e i n achieving th e goo d society . Economi c resurgenc e wa s to be provided b y the newly unleashed force s o f individual activit y and energy working through th e market. Th e ne w governmen t portraye d th e futur e i t intende d fo r France , treating televisio n viewer s t o on e commercia l featurin g formul a car s givin g their al l o n th e rac e trac k (o f th e market? ) an d anothe r wit h a powerfu l stallion regainin g the wilderness to roam (in liberty?). For th e governmen t o f Jacque s Chirac , housin g polic y wa s on e o f th e major item s on the agenda. Th e philosophy o f "deregulation" and the use of FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 0

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markets wer e ke y theme s fo r th e majo r piec e o f housin g legislatio n intro duced a t th e en d o f 198 6 b y th e ministe r o f housing , Pierr e Mehaigneri e (Law No . 86-129 0 o f 2 3 Decembe r 1986) . Whil e th e over t conten t o f th e Mehaignerie Law deals with decontrol of rents, the government assumed tha t this deregulatio n woul d stimulat e investmen t i n housing . Thi s increase d investment woul d lea d t o growt h i n th e suppl y o f housing , whic h i n tur n would ac t to keep rents moderate . Henc e thi s la w freeing rent s from regula tion carrie d th e titl e o f "Investmen t i n Renta l Housing " (investissement locatif). The mos t importan t sectio n o f th e legislatio n deal s wit h th e issu e o f liberating control s o n rent s (Titl e 1) . Th e ai m o f th e legislatio n wa s t o decontrol rent s totally , b y phases , callin g fo r complet e "freedo m o f rents " (liberie de loyers) i n agglomeration s o f more tha n a millio n i n 1995 , i n les s populated area s i n 1991 . Vacan t renta l housin g qualifie d fo r immediat e decontrol. Whil e landlords could charge whatever rent they wished o n housing that had bee n vacant , i t is important to note that the law still limited th e ability o f landlord s t o disposses s sittin g tenants , excep t i n case s wher e th e owners wer e sellin g th e propert y (i n whic h cas e th e tenan t ha d th e righ t t o match an y offer ) o r wher e th e owner s coul d sho w tha t the y neede d th e housing for themselves. The arrangements fo r the transition perio d from th e then curren t arrange ments t o complet e decontro l o f rent s fo r sittin g tenant s ar e complex . Fo r most lease renewals, the law stipulates that landlords can lawfully as k for ren t increases tha t ar e consisten t wit h th e rent s fo r comparabl e housin g i n th e neighborhood, a s reporte d i n th e las t thre e years . An y increase s ar e t o b e imposed b y thirds—one-third eac h yea r of the three-year leas e mandated b y law during th e perio d o f transition. I f the landlor d an d tenan t canno t agre e on a rent, th e dispute is to be taken to a departmental committe e o f conciliation (une commission de conciliation)—also se t up by the ne w Mehaigneri e Law (Articl e 24) . I n thes e ren t disputes , th e commissio n o f conciliatio n (including equa l number s o f representative s o f landlor d organization s an d tenant organizations ) ha d th e authorit y t o decid e wha t th e ren t wil l be . Similar transition arrangement s (including an appeals process) will be applied to housin g covere d b y th e 194 8 housin g law—wit h th e exceptio n tha t th e aged, handicapped, an d poor can maintain thei r rent levels and their tenanc y {Le Monde, 1 5 January 1987 , 22). The immediat e reactio n t o the new law was not particularly favorable . Le Monde reporte d tha t tenant s an d thei r association s wer e ver y worrie d abou t 206 NATHA

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the likelihood o f great rent increases, particularly i n the Paris region, an d fel t that th e ne w la w conferred excessiv e powe r o n landlords . Landlor d associa tions expresse d disconten t wit h wha t the y perceive d a s a n overl y length y period o f transition t o th e ne w arrangement s (Le Monde, 1 5 January 1987 , 1,2). Late r sections of this chapter will examine the government's response to problems with their policy and the negative reactions to the new law. The Mehaigneri e La w ha s anothe r sectio n tha t i s o f particula r interes t here: Title 2 of the la w sets out condition s unde r whic h unit s of HLMs ma y be sol d t o tenants . Thi s i s a n interestin g paralle l t o th e polic y o f Margare t Thatcher's governmen t t o encourag e th e sal e o f council (public ) housin g t o tenants. Bu t ther e i s a critica l differenc e betwee n th e two . Th e Britis h legislation require s local governments to sell to tenants who wish to buy their unit o f counci l housing . Loca l government s ma y no t refus e t o sell . I n contrast, th e Frenc h legislatio n doe s no t requir e th e HL M organization s t o sell to interested tenants; furthermore, ther e is no special funding o r financial provision for such sales, so that HL M associations , constraine d b y law not to run deficits , ar e likel y t o conside r suc h sale s onl y whe n th e retur n o n suc h sales outweighs the benefits o f retaining ownership. The othe r majo r elemen t o f th e Chira c Government' s housin g polic y i s contained i n the 198 7 budget. Th e ministe r of housing, Pierr e Mehaignerie , started his housing budget speech with a refrain tha t is quite familiar t o those who have looked at social budgets in Reagan' s America o r Thatcher's Britai n (Mehaignerie 1987 , 2): As you know, the new government i s engaged i n a policy of economic stabilization and stimulatio n o f privat e initiative , whic h assume s fewe r taxes , smalle r budge t deficits, and thus less public spending. The budge t proposal s pu t heav y emphasi s o n increasin g incentive s t o th e private secto r t o increas e housin g supply ; thre e differen t ta x break s wer e introduced fo r th e constructio n o f housing fo r owner-occupier s an d renters . The estimate d annua l cos t o f thes e ta x incentive s wa s betwee n 2 an d 2. 5 billion franc s ($33 0 t o $42 0 million) ; th e governmen t argue d tha t thes e measures woul d increas e th e numbe r o f ne w housin g unit s eac h yea r fo r owner occupatio n b y twent y thousan d an d th e numbe r o f renta l unit s b y fifteen thousan d abov e th e numbe r tha t woul d otherwis e b e constructe d (Mehaignerie 1986 , 3-4) . In 1987 , furthe r t o encourag e privat e secto r activity , Mehaigneri e pro posed ne w ta x benefit s wort h 70 0 millio n franc s t o encourag e th e us e o f FRENCH H O U S I N G P O L I C I E S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 0

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undeveloped lan d fo r housin g (Le Monde, 7 October 1987 , 1) . The govern ment hope d tha t thes e ta x provision s woul d increas e privat e investmen t i n housing, whic h i n 198 5 accounted fo r onl y 32,50 0 ne w units. Th e immedi ate effec t o f thes e measure s t o encourag e privat e secto r buildin g wa s ver y positive: i n hi s budget messag e o f 198 7 the ministe r o f housin g wa s able t o announce tha t i n th e first half o f the yea r there ha d bee n a n increas e o f 7. 5 percent i n th e numbe r o f buildin g permit s an d a n increas e o f 4 percen t o f dwellings whos e constructio n wa s starte d i n thi s perio d (Mehaigneri e 1987 , 4). Fo r th e whol e o f 1987 , th e numbe r o f new dwellings begu n represente d an increas e o f 4.9 percen t ove r 1986 , risin g t o a tota l o f 310,00 0 unit s (Le Monde, 2 3 January 1988 , 24) . I t i s important t o not e tha t thi s increas e wa s heavily biase d agains t constructio n base d o n subsidize d loans ; i n th e first nine month s o f 1987 , th e numbe r o f housing constructio n permit s fo r unit s built wit h unsubsidize d loan s increase d b y 23. 3 percent , whil e permit s fo r units wit h subsidize d loan s fel l b y 1 5 percen t (Le Monde, 2 7 Novembe r 1989, 43) . Thus , i f th e ne w ta x break s wer e responsibl e fo r th e increas e i n building, the y were heavily favoring people with higher income s who did not qualify fo r or need subsidized loans. With regar d t o aid for direc t housing subsidies, th e government expresse d the drea m o f most budgeter s i n har d times : "Thus i t is not th e tim e t o slow down th e effort : i t i s necessary t o have muc h mor e housin g fo r les s money " (Mehaignerie 1986 , 4) . Th e governmen t wen t o n t o detai l it s plans , whic h would, i n general , maintai n th e leve l o f subsidize d housin g construction , but a t a lowe r cost . I n term s o f renta l housing , th e government' s budget authorized sixty-fiv e thousan d unit s unde r th e PL A progra m (prets locatifs aides: subsidized loans for th e constructio n o f rental housing ) and te n thou sand unit s unde r th e PL I progra m (prets locatifs intermediates —subsidized loans fo r th e constructio n o f middle-incom e renta l housin g i n high-densit y areas), whic h represent s a sligh t increas e ove r th e las t budget (Mehaigneri e 1986, fiche no . 9) . I n th e PA P progra m (prets aides pour Iaccession a la propriete), which provide s subsidize d loan s fo r hom e purchase , th e govern ment proposed a budget level of one hundred thousan d units , and a decrease of te n thousan d ove r th e previou s yea r (Mehaigneri e 1986 , fiche no . 9 ; UNFOHLM 1987 , 21). The "budgetar y magic " i s that th e cos t o f maintainin g thes e program s a t 1986 level s droppe d i n th e 198 7 budget : th e authorizatio n requeste d fo r rental subsidie s was 4,788 billio n franc s ($79 8 million) in 1986 , dropping t o 1,796 billio n franc s ($30 0 million) in 1987 , while the bill for the home-loa n 208 NATHA

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subsidy program droppe d fro m 6,83 3 billion franc s ($1.1 4 billion) in 198 6 to 1,044 billio n franc s ($17 4 million ) (Le Moniteur, 2 6 Septembe r 1986 , 43) . The minister explained (Mehaigneri e 1986 , 5): Some people are going to ask how the state's housing program will be maintained at the leve l o f 198 6 when th e authorizatio n inscribe d i n th e la w of finance is 5,673 billion francs, a reduction of 57 percent! The explanation i s simple—economies hav e been realize d i n the programs since 1986 thank s t o th e fal l i n interes t rate s an d w e hav e reutilize d th e mone y thu s available, rather than using new budget authority. Simply put , i n 198 6 th e cos t o f providin g interes t rat e subsidie s droppe d because interes t rate s dropped ; som e o f th e budge t wa s thus availabl e t o b e used i n 1987 . Th e governmen t coul d provid e th e sam e numbe r o f ne w subsidies a t a muc h lowe r cost . Thi s sor t o f budgeting i s nice, allowin g th e government t o hav e it s cak e an d ea t i t too—keepin g progra m level s hig h while reducin g costs . Unde r somewha t differen t circumstance s th e Reaga n administration playe d simila r game s i n it s first years, deferrin g expenditure s and the n usin g th e fund s appropriate d earlie r t o clai m tha t ne w appropria tions were unnecessary (Schwart z 1984 , 158) . With respec t to the loan program fo r the rehabilitatio n o f HLM an d othe r social renta l housing , PALULO S (primes a I 'amelioration de logements a usage locatif et a occupation sociale) 7 the governmen t argue d i n it s 198 7 budget tha t i t wa s maintainin g th e previou s leve l o f rehabilitatio n a t abou t 140,000 unit s (Mehaigneri e 1986 , fische no . 10) . However , on e analysi s of these figures has suggested tha t the overall budge t for this program was being reduced an d tha t maintenanc e o f the volum e o f unit s receivin g thes e loan s was bein g achieve d b y reducin g th e gran t include d i n th e loa n from , o n average, 3 0 percen t t o 2 0 percen t o f th e loa n (Le Moniteur, 2 6 Septembe r 1986, 44) . A t th e sam e time , th e budge t triple d th e allocatio n fo r loan s t o low-income homeowner s t o undertak e rehabilitatio n (PAH— prime a Iamelioration de I'habitat) (Mehaigneri e 1986 , fiche no . 10) . The budge t fo r th e PALULOS progra m wa s se t a t 1.2 9 billio n franc s ($21 5 million ) whil e th e PAH progra m wa s t o receiv e 44 0 millio n franc e ($7 3 million) . Whil e th e budget for rehabilitation o f social rental housing (PALULOS) still was greater than tha t for aiding rehabilitation o f housing owned by low-income families , the tren d wa s clearl y towar d increasin g th e relativ e shar e o f thes e fund s allocated t o homeowners. The 198 7 budget maintaine d th e level s of many housin g program s whil e cutting outlays , thank s t o th e "budget magic " o f carry-ove r surpluse s from FRENCH H O U S I N G P O L I C I E S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 0

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previous year s an d favorabl e interes t rate s tha t kep t th e necessar y leve l o f subsidy fo r a ne w uni t o f housin g stable . Bu t wit h th e surpluse s gone , th e 1988 budget mad e i t clear tha t th e Chira c governmen t wa s more concerne d to reduc e budget deficit s tha n t o increas e budge t authorization s i n orde r t o maintain housin g progra m levels . Th e statemen t o f Pierr e Mehaignerie , minister o f housing , fo r th e 198 8 budge t note d tha t th e increas e fo r th e construction o f socia l housin g (PLA ) an d th e socia l housin g rehabilitatio n program (PALULOS ) togethe r woul d onl y be 2 percent mor e than th e 198 7 budget (Mehaignerie 1987 , 5) . One interestin g step taken i n the 198 8 budget was to make the funds fo r the construction o f social housing and the program for housin g rehabilitatio n "fungible" ; th e department s hav e th e optio n o f deciding wha t proportion s o f th e tota l o f PL A an d PALULO S program s would be spent on ne w social rente d housin g or rehabilitation o f the existin g social housin g stoc k (Mehaigneri e 1987 , 5) . Thi s give s department s mor e flexibility i n dealin g wit h thei r varyin g need s fo r rehabilitatio n an d ne w construction o f social housing . Thi s fungibility, however , mad e i t very diffi cult to predict ho w many ne w units would be built and ho w many would b e rehabilitated; Mehaignerie' s statemen t she d n o ligh t o n hi s budget' s likel y effect o n the social rental housing stock. With regar d t o th e PA P program , whic h provide d subsidize d loan s fo r lower-income people, th e 198 8 budget signaled a 1 0 percent reduction, fro m one hundred thousan d t o ninety thousand loans ; the government argued tha t the declin e wa s justifie d b y a dro p i n deman d an d increasin g us e o f othe r types o f loan s (Mehaigneri e 1987 , 5) . Whil e th e volum e o f ne w PA P loan s was dropping , earl y i n 198 8 th e governmen t announce d measure s t o assis t people havin g problem s payin g bac k thei r loans , includin g a dampenin g o f the progressivity o f the loans , a concomitant lengthenin g o f the loan period , and som e immediat e ai d for borrowers already stretched beyon d thei r mean s (Le Monde, 2 7 January 1988 , 38). Perhaps the biggest money issu e the government faced i n the 198 7 budget was the cost of the housing allowance, th e housing allowance program (AP L —Vaide personnalisee au logement). The governmen t note d tha t the budget ary cost s o f this progra m ha d rise n fro m 198 1 to 198 6 at a n averag e annua l rate of close to 3 0 percent per year, wit h the 198 6 budgetary cos t amountin g to 9. 3 billio n franc s ($1.5 5 billion ) compare d t o th e 198 1 figure o f 2.37 5 billion franc s ($39 6 million ) (Mehaigneri e 1986 , 10-11) . Th e minister' s budget addres s calle d fo r a n increas e i n th e effectiveness o f the progra m an d restraint o f it s cos t increase s (Mehaigneri e 1986 , 10-11) . I n fact , th e 198 7 210 NATHA

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budget only increase d th e funding fo r th e housin g allowance program (APL ) by 1 6 percent , t o 10. 3 billio n francs , b y changin g th e indice s use d t o calculate the level of benefits (Mehaigneri e 1986 , 10-11) . Overall, th e 198 7 housing budget showe d a n increas e of 1. 8 percen t over the 198 6 budget (Mehaigneri e 1986 , 5) , but give n th e 1 6 percent ris e in th e housing allowance program (APL) , i t is clear that majo r cut s had been mad e in funding othe r programs. Eve n the housing allowance program, becaus e of changes in the index for determining benefits, provide d reduced benefit levels for many recipients. In th e 198 8 housin g budget , ther e wa s als o a stron g concer n wit h th e housing allowance program. Th e budget showed a n increas e of 15. 6 percent for th e 198 8 housing allowance progra m an d fo r a new program, th e allocation logement (discussed below) . Pierr e Mehaignerie' s statemen t o n th e bud get note d tha t i t wa s importan t t o se t socia l priorities , bu t tha t a t th e sam e time saving s ha d t o be realize d (Mehaigneri e 1987 , 6-7) . Th e 15. 6 percen t increase reflected savings ; without the adoption of a new scale for the housing allowance progra m tha t reduce d benefits , th e propose d budge t woul d hav e been 1 billion francs , o r abou t 5 percent highe r (Le Monde, 1 9 Septembe r 1987). Earlier i n th e year, th e Chirac Governmen t ha d introduce d it s scheme to replace th e housin g allowanc e progra m wit h a ne w progra m designate d simply "Housin g Allowance " (allocation logement, o r AL). I n principl e th e AL wa s t o eliminat e a majo r flaw i n th e housin g allowanc e program , th e restriction o f benefits t o people living in specified type s of housing, b e it new social renta l housin g (PLA) , ne w housin g purchase d wit h a subsidize d loa n (PAP an d prets conventionnes), o r socia l housin g rehabilitate d wit h subsid y (PALULOS) (Consei l Economiqu e e t Socia l 1989 , 42). This, o f course, lef t out poo r peopl e wh o liv e i n othe r sort s o f housing , suc h a s privat e renta l housing. Th e ne w Housin g Allowanc e wa s t o overcom e thi s exclusio n b y being base d onl y o n famil y income , wit h n o referenc e t o housin g type . T o be graduall y extende d ove r fou r year s t o al l thos e eligible , suc h a benefi t would constitut e le bondage, o r th e closin g o f th e circl e o f ai d t o includ e everyone i n nee d (Le Monde, 1 9 September 1989 ; Mehaignerie 1987 , 6-7) . While th e principl e o f th e Housin g Allowanc e appeale d t o man y o n th e Right an d th e Left , ther e wa s criticis m o f it s ai d level . T o critics , th e ne w policy wa s mor e a n attemp t t o sav e money , throug h lowe r rate s o f support , than a genuin e attemp t t o ai d al l thos e i n need . On e membe r o f th e government's majorit y i n th e Nationa l Assembly , Jea n Tiberi , identifie d b y FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 21

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Le Monde a s th e "gran d patron " o f housin g i n Paris , derisivel y terme d th e new progra m "th e littl e APL, " claimin g tha t i t provide d to o littl e ai d t o recipients an d woul d slo w th e improvemen t o f housin g (Le Monde, 6 No vember 1989 , 7). A set of bureaucrats, interest-grou p representatives , an d researcher s inter viewed i n Franc e durin g the sprin g of 198 7 agreed tha t th e governmen t wa s likely t o tr y t o addres s th e proble m o f fundin g hom e ownershi p i n th e housing allowanc e progra m (APL) . A t thi s point , th e housin g allowanc e could b e obtaine d no t onl y fo r rentin g bu t als o for buyin g housing . I n fact , in 1987 , housin g allowanc e beneficiarie s include d mor e familie s buyin g homes tha n renting ; approximately 940,00 0 familie s buyin g housing receiv e housing allowances , compare d t o 860,00 0 familie s wh o ren t thei r housin g (Direction d e l a Constructio n 1988 , 26) . Som e o f thos e interviewe d per ceived tha t th e governmen t woul d tr y t o preven t ver y poo r peopl e fro m receiving subsidies fo r hom e ownership , feelin g tha t i t was more appropriat e (and cheaper) to provide subsidies for them t o rent than t o buy. The Mornin g After : Makin g Polic y Stic k

The adoptio n o f the 198 7 budget and the Mehaigneri e La w marked onl y th e beginning o f ne w housin g polic y controversie s fo r th e Chira c Government . Some o f th e problem s the y face d i n th e first hal f o f 198 7 wer e th e direc t results of the new measures; others had been developin g for som e time. Thi s section o f thi s chapte r examine s thre e o f thos e problem s an d th e politica l response o f th e government . I n examinin g th e initia l polic y response s t o those problems , i t wil l becom e eviden t tha t th e governmen t di d no t mov e consistently towar d a liberal idea l but rathe r sough t to gain acceptanc e o f its decisions by minimizing their consequences. I n contrast to the actions of the Reagan an d Thatche r Government s i n thei r first days, th e evidenc e i s tha t the Chira c Governmen t wa s unwillin g t o forg e ahea d regardles s o f th e political consequences . The unwillingnes s o f the Chirac Governmen t t o glorify th e "pain " necessary to get back on a truly "liberal" track is not a complete surprise. Margare t Thatcher, a s prime minister , an d Ronal d Reagan , a s president, wer e both a t the to p o f their respectiv e politica l systems ; Jacques Chirac , a s prime minis ter, wa s not . Chira c wante d t o becom e presiden t o f th e Frenc h Republic . But during mos t of the first half o f 1987 , wit h th e presidentia l electio n onl y one yea r away , th e poll s consistentl y ha d hi m runnin g wel l behin d othe r 212 NATHA

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potential candidates , includin g Presiden t Frangoi s Mitterran d an d Miche l Rocard on the Left, a s well as behind Raymon d Barre, former prim e ministe r and a membe r o f Chirac' s parliamentar y majority . Wit h th e economy i n doldrums an d wit h risin g unemployment , Chira c clearl y di d no t wan t t o inflict too much pain i n the name of "liberalism/ ' One o f the first housing controversie s tha t th e Chira c Governmen t face d in th e ne w yea r centere d o n th e ne w rent s bein g aske d a s th e resul t o f th e implementation o f th e Mehaigneri e Law . Report s o f landlord s demandin g rent increase s o f fro m 4 0 percen t t o 15 0 percen t (t o b e sprea d ove r thre e years) caused , a s Le Monde ( 6 Februar y 1987 , 1 ) reported , grea t disquie t among renters . Th e respons e o f th e housin g minister , Pierr e Mehaignerie , was rathe r curiou s fo r a self-professe d believe r i n th e market : h e publicl y called o n landlords to limit rent increases to no more than 5 percent per year and suggested to tenants that they should refus e t o sign any lease that seemed unreasonable an d the n tak e thei r landlord t o a departmenta l committe e o f conciliation t o gain juridica l resolutio n o f the issu e (Le Monde, 1 2 February 1987, 24) . Thi s respons e hardl y calme d thos e wh o feare d tha t rent s woul d rise radicall y afte r th e transitio n perio d ende d i n 199 5 (199 1 outsid e o f th e Paris, Lyon , an d Marseill e regions). The controvers y ove r th e ne w polic y o n ren t contro l flared u p agai n i n early summer . A tenants' organization , th e Confederatio n generat e d u loge ment (CGL) , release d a surve y o f 15 0 ren t demand s mad e b y landlord s i n the Paris region for the renewal o f leases. The survey found that , o n average, the demand s represente d increase s o f 6 8 percen t (Le Monde 2 3 June 1987 , 43). Th e prim e minister , durin g a televisio n interview , attacke d th e report , claiming i t constitute d "misinformation " an d attackin g th e pres s fo r thei r coverage o f th e repor t (Le Monde, 2 5 Jun e 1987) . Hi s respons e clearl y indicated th e sensitivity o f the government t o the issue , a s well as an unwil l ingness t o conside r tha t th e resul t o f freeing rent s migh t b e unpopula r ren t increases. In fact , increase s i n th e initia l day s o f th e Mehaigneri e La w appea r t o have average d fa r les s tha n 6 8 percent . Indeed , th e proble m o f rapidl y increasing rent s seemed , i n general , t o b e a proble m mainl y i n th e larges t cities, especiall y Paris . Th e estimate s fo r Pari s suggeste d tha t renter s wer e paying o n averag e 7 percen t highe r rent s fo r renewe d leases , which , whe n added t o th e increase s i n th e cost-of-constructio n index , mean t tha t actua l increases wer e o n th e orde r o f 1 0 percent , whil e th e rent s o n renovate d dwellings wer e considerabl y highe r (Le Monde, 2 9 January 1988 , 27) . Th e FRENCH H O U S I N G P O L I C I E S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 1

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larger proble m i n Pari s wa s reflecte d i n th e greate r number s o f renter s an d landlords seekin g arbitratio n fro m th e "commission s d e conciliation" ; i n many area s outsid e Pari s fewe r tha n 1 percent o f leases were bein g take n t o the commissions , whil e i n Pari s i t was 4 percen t (he Monde, 1 6 Septembe r 1987, 42) . Addin g t o th e proble m wa s th e complexit y o f th e system ; on e French new s magazine argued tha t no one understood th e situation an d tha t government ad s on th e subject wer e not ameliorating th e proble m (L'Evenement du jeudi, 8-1 4 Octobe r 1987 , 18) . In an y event , thes e development s were hardly likely to placate many tenants, especiall y in the Paris region. Another majo r housin g polic y issu e wa s th e financial situatio n o f th e HLM associations . Fo r man y o f thes e HL M associations , th e rent s the y receive have been inadequat e for them t o pay off their loan s while maintain ing and renovatin g their housing units. One key to their financial situation is the rent s tha t the y ar e allowe d t o charge ; governmen t decision s ha d hel d rents a t level s that wer e inadequat e fo r HLM s t o remai n solvent . Unde r th e Quilliot Law , fro m 198 2 to 1985 , the HL M association s ha d negotiate d ren t rises with representatives of tenants within the national commission o n rents. The ne w Mehaigneri e La w authorize d th e HL M association s t o rais e rent s twice a year (in January an d July) , eac h tim e by up to 1 0 percent, subjec t t o the approva l o f th e prefect . However , wel l befor e th e Jul y 198 7 ren t in creases, Mehaigneri e sen t a circula r t o th e prefects , callin g o n the m t o approve July rent increase s by the HLM s only i n exceptiona l circumstances . His reasoning was that ren t increase s by the HLM s would pos e a real dange r to the government's war against inflation (Le Monde, 2 2 May 1987 , 30). The HL M association s responded t o the prospect of no rent increases with real dismay , fearin g tha t man y associations , alread y i n rea l financial diffi culty, woul d se e thei r positio n worsen . I n thi s context , i t i s importan t t o understand th e very real political power of the HLM associations. I n additio n to their nationa l pea k association, UNFOHL M (Unio n national e des federa tions d'organisme s d'HLM) , the y als o hav e clos e tie s t o th e politica l partie s of both th e Lef t an d th e Right , fo r traditionall y man y o f their tenant s wer e not the poorest of the poor , bu t civil servant s (even thoug h thi s has change d somewhat). Th e politica l powe r o f th e HL M associations , whil e normall y manifested i n government willingness to negotiate with them before promul gating policy , ha s als o been manifes t fro m tim e t o time i n th e abilit y o f th e HLM association s t o bea t dow n governmen t policy ; Duclaud-Williams (1978 , 133-35) ha s documented case s i n th e 1950 s and 1960 s in whic h th e HLM s were abl e t o quas h o r simpl y ignor e announce d governmen t policy , an d 214 NATHA

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Pearsall (1984 , 41 ) ha s foun d a simila r cas e i n th e 1980 s i n whic h th e Mitterrand governmen t ha d t o withdraw policies that would hav e altered th e way HLM associations managed thei r housing stock. But th e desir e o f th e HLM s t o rais e rent s raise d othe r problem s fo r th e government. I f HLM rent s were to increase, thi s was likely to exacerbate th e unhappiness o f HLM tenant s with the government, sinc e many tenants were already facin g th e likelihoo d o f losin g som e portio n o f thei r benefit s unde r the ne w criteri a fo r housin g allowance s (th e AP L program) . Henc e th e government coul d no t easil y bo w t o HL M associatio n pressur e o n rent s without incurrin g th e wrath o f HLM tenants . Th e government' s respons e to this dilemma wa s to propose 30 0 million franc s i n specia l ai d to help HLM s pay of f debt s fro m buildin g i n th e perio d 1978-1984 , whe n interes t rate s were very high. Thi s program wa s explicitly justifie d a s an ai d t o help HL M associations that would be adversely affected b y the freeze i n rents in July (Le Monde, 2 7 Ma y 1987 , 36) . B y the en d o f June 1987 , th e HLM s wer e stil l fighting with th e governmen t t o allo w the m som e kin d o f "moderate " ren t increase. I n thi s instanc e th e government clearl y wanted t o avoid a confron tation wit h either the HL M association s o r their tenants. Eve n i n a period of tight resources , th e governmen t wa s willing t o us e additiona l resource s (th e special subsidie s t o hel p th e HLM s pa y of f debt ) t o avoi d th e conflict , no r was the conflic t use d a s a n opportunit y t o prov e th e "liberal " credential s o f the government by bashing the HLM association s or tenants. The budge t for 198 8 did no t give the HL M organization s relief . Th e ne w provisions allowing for the fungibility o f subsidized loan s potentially gave the organizations mor e flexibility i n thei r decision s ove r whethe r t o buil d ne w units or renovat e ol d ones . However , th e declinin g level s of aid fo r housin g allowance (APL ) recipients , an d th e relativel y lo w level s o f ai d i n th e ne w AL program, wer e see n a s putting mor e pressur e o n HL M organization s t o sell som e o f their housin g stoc k to finance rehabilitatio n an d ne w construc tion, sinc e tenant s woul d no t b e abl e t o affor d th e ren t level s necessar y t o finance suc h wor k (L e Monde, 1 9 Septembe r 1987) . Thi s pressur e o n th e HLM organization s wa s intensifie d whe n th e ministe r o f housin g sen t a circular to prefects asking them to reject all HLM rent increases that averaged more tha n 1 percent (Le Monde, 6 November 1987 , 32) . Hi s reasonin g was that th e HLM s ha d alread y bee n grante d ne w ren t increase s to cover certai n operating expenses , coul d freel y fix the rent s o f vacant apartments , an d ha d seen thei r deb t reduce d b y 5 0 million franc s (Le Monde, 6 November 1987 , 32). Thes e event s surroundin g th e 198 8 budget paralle l th e first year o f th e FRENCH H O U S I N G P O L I C I E S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 1

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Chirac Government , i n whic h housin g polic y was characterized b y a cham pioning o f free rents , a n attemp t t o avoid antagonizin g tenant s i n th e HL M sector, an d a n effor t t o kee p th e HL M organization s a t leas t minimall y solvent. The government faced anothe r housin g policy problem du e to the success of the privatizatio n o f state-owned enterprises . Th e Chira c Governmen t ha d come t o offic e committe d t o th e sal e o f state-owne d enterprise s an d t o encouraging ordinar y citizens to become stockholders in these enterprises. I n Chirac's firs t yea r i n office , man y firms wer e privatized . Th e publi c wa s offered share s a t ver y advantageou s price s i n enterprises , includin g a ban k (Paribas), a nationa l televisio n channe l (TF1) , an d a glas s an d buildin g materials firm (Saint-Gobain). The public responded enthusiastically to these offerings. Bu t a t th e sam e time , i t became eviden t tha t som e o f this invest ment i n now-privat e industr y wa s a t th e expens e o f deposits i n A Account s (Livret A) . I n othe r words , peopl e wer e puttin g mone y int o stock s an d abandoning th e traditiona l "investment " i n th e tax-fre e account s tha t pro vided th e low-interes t fund s wit h whic h th e Caiss e de s depot s e t consigna tions (CDC) financed housing loans. I t was estimated that the funds availabl e to the CDC droppe d fro m 5 8 billion franc s a t the end of 198 5 to 43.7 billion francs a t th e en d o f 1986 , a fal l o f almos t 2 5 percen t (Le Monde, 1 1 Jun e 1987, 37) . While thi s dro p i n th e A Accoun t deposit s (Livre t A ) coul d hav e bee n used t o justif y shrinkin g th e subsidize d housin g progra m (includin g th e subsidized loan s for hom e ownership) , th e government announce d it s intentions t o sto p th e erosio n o f th e A Accounts system . On e ste p take n wa s t o increase th e ceilin g o n th e siz e o f suc h accounts , providin g depositor s wit h the potentia l t o shelter mor e saving s from ta x i n th e A Accounts. Th e othe r measure wa s t o provid e a n incentiv e t o th e saving s bank s t o pus h mor e aggressively th e A Account s b y providin g a bonu s t o thos e bank s whos e A Accounts totaled mor e in 198 7 than i n 1986 . As it turned out , th e A Accounts wer e save d b y the Octobe r 198 7 stock market crash . Whil e th e cras h o f the Pari s Bourse, followin g o n th e heels of the Ne w Yor k stockmarke t plunge , ma y hav e dimme d th e fait h o f smal l investors i n "liberalism, " certainl y i t sent man y o f them scurryin g back to A Accounts i n searc h o f a safe investment . I n fact , i n Octobe r an d Novembe r of 1987 , th e amoun t o f mone y o n deposi t i n A Account s increase d mor e than i n the first eleven month s of the year combined (Le Monde, 1 5 December 1987 , 42) , meanin g tha t ther e wa s a ne t withdrawa l i n th e first nin e 216 NATHA

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months, wit h th e balanc e shiftin g heavil y towar d deposit s i n Octobe r an d November. B y th e en d o f 1987 , th e stat e o f th e A Accoun t wa s agai n satisfactory (Le Monde, 2 3 January 1988 , 26). The perio d betwee n th e appearanc e o f th e proble m wit h th e A Accoun t and th e stockmarke t cras h doe s demonstrat e tha t th e governmen t wa s no t interested i n allowin g thi s specia l for m o f finance t o erode . A s in th e othe r cases discusse d above , th e governmen t wishe d t o implemen t "liberalisme" but wa s hesitant t o disrup t th e basi c institutiona l force s i n housin g i n orde r to gain rapi d radica l change. There stil l remai n tw o other potentia l threat s t o A Accounts presente d b y the openin g o f financial border s i n th e Europea n Economi c Communit y (EEC). On e fea r i s tha t financial integratio n wil l lea d t o Frenc h saving s going elsewher e i n th e EE C i n searc h o f a bette r retur n (Le Monde, 2 4 February 1989 , 36) . Thi s "emigration " o f capita l woul d depriv e th e A Accounts o f deposits , a s di d th e Pari s Bours e befor e it s crash . A secon d fea r about A Accounts concern s change s i n th e structur e o f taxation. A t present, the A Accounts ar e attractiv e t o man y depositer s despit e lo w interes t rates , because they are free o f the high rates of tax on investment. A s France lowers its ta x rate s t o harmoniz e wit h othe r EE C nations , i t i s feare d tha t A Accounts wil l becom e les s attractiv e (Le Monde, Jun e 22 , 1989 ; Consei l Economique e t Social 1989 , 46). Two additional housin g polic y initiative s undertake n b y the Chira c Gov ernment bea r mention . Th e first was a reorganization o f the managemen t of the 1 percent funds , whic h i n 198 7 wer e actuall y collectin g a lev y o f 0.7 7 percent o f the salarie s pai d b y larg e employer s i n orde r t o provid e fund s fo r loans fo r hom e purchas e an d fo r th e constructio n o f renta l housing . Th e government se t up a new central agency , wit h broad representatio n fro m th e unions, member s of the smaller agencies that collected an d administere d th e funds, an d employers . Par t o f the goa l wa s to insur e tha t al l th e fund s wer e actually use d fo r housin g (a s oppose d t o investment s whos e connectio n t o housing was dubious) and t o direct mor e o f the fund s towar d socia l housin g and housin g fo r immigran t worker s (Le Monde, 2 2 Septembe r 1987 , 45 ; 11 November 1987 , 36) . Sweetenin g th e refor m fo r th e employer s wa s th e reduction o f the lev y by another 0.0 5 percen t to 0.72 percen t i n 1988 . Her e the government seeme d t o be hoping again t o have it s cake and ea t it too: to gain mor e efficien t us e o f th e fund s fo r group s i n need , whil e usin g th e increase i n efficienc y t o reduc e th e leve l o f the tax . Thi s initiativ e i s one of the fe w tha t seeme d aime d a t makin g ne w resource s availabl e fo r th e con FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 1

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struction o f housing for groups in need . Th e ai m of the second initiativ e was to make more land available for building. To this end the government offere d new tax breaks and announced th e sale of some government property in Paris (Le Monde, 7 October 1987 , 1 ; 20 October 1987 , 20). V. MITTERRAN D I I — B A C K I N G INT O A H O U S I N G POLICY ?

On 8 May 1988 , Frangois Mitterrand wa s reelected president of France. Thi s election marke d th e end o f the government o f Jacques Chirac, replace d by a Socialist governmen t directe d b y Prim e Ministe r Miche l Rocard . Th e ne w government was confirmed i n office b y legislative elections i n June 1988 . At the outset , thi s new Socialis t government seeme d t o avoid th e housin g issu e and showe d littl e interes t i n immediat e repea l o f initiative s o f th e Chira c government. I n lat e May , afte r th e presidentia l election , economi c figures were publishe d showin g risin g inflatio n i n April , attribute d i n par t t o ren t increases. Othe r figures appeare d showin g a one-yea r ris e o f 1 6 percent i n the cos t o f purchasing a n apartmen t i n Pari s (Le Monde, 2 0 Ma y 1988 , 37 ; 29-30 Ma y 1988 , 15) . Despite calls for abolishing the Mehaignerie La w and controlling rents , th e ne w ministe r o f housing, Mauric e Faure , sai d tha t h e did no t thin k tha t i t wa s a goo d ide a constantl y t o chang e housin g laws , although h e di d thin k tha t somethin g woul d hav e t o b e don e t o preven t excessive rent increases (Le Monde, 2 4 May 1988 , 17). Over the summer o f 1988 , there was debate within the Socialist party (PS) group i n th e Nationa l Assembl y ove r whethe r t o see k a complet e repea l o f the Mehaigneri e La w o r t o suppor t revision s o f th e law . Th e governmen t appeared caugh t i n a bind. I t wanted t o prevent excessiv e rent hike s but was not incline d t o tak e o n th e oppositio n an d th e landlords , wh o wer e alread y unhappy abou t th e slo w timetabl e fo r implementin g th e Mehaigneri e La w (Le Monde, 1 2 November 1988) . Apparently th e specter o f the Quilliot La w still haunte d a governmen t eage r no t t o b e accuse d o f makin g th e sam e mistake twice. The introductio n o f the budget in Septembe r was not the occasion for any grand statement s abou t changin g th e Mehaigneri e La w o r introducin g ne w housing policy. I n his budget statement, Mauric e Faure, the minister respon sible for housing, went to great pains to argue that his new budget represente d a smalle r annua l increas e tha n th e las t budget , ye t provide d a genuin e increase i n fund s fo r housin g (Faure 1988 , 2, 6) . Hi s statement, rathe r mor e chatty and witty than i s normal i n such documents, als o went to great lengths 218 NATHA

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to indicat e wher e th e magi c o f budge t balances lef t ove r fro m th e previou s year woul d b e use d t o maintai n o r increas e progra m level s withou t raisin g costs (without implying that such "magic" was anything more than temporar y good fortune). Th e statement also argues that revisions in the form o f budgeting adopte d b y th e Chira c Governmen t wer e leadin g t o th e appearanc e o f rising expenditures , whil e th e actua l fund s fo r ne w activit y wer e i n fac t decreasing, a s i n th e cas e o f th e progra m o f subsidize d loan s fo r lower income peopl e (PAP) in 1989 . Hi s basic argument wa s that the 198 9 budget was a transition budget , becaus e many of the provisions for housin g aid were being reviewe d wit h a n ey e to large-scal e change . H e note d tha t Mitterran d had give n hi m th e tas k o f elaboratin g a grea t "socia l housin g project " tha t was t o b e oriente d no t onl y t o constructio n bu t t o th e whol e issu e o f urbanism an d th e revitalization o f central citie s and decaying suburbs (Faur e 1988,8-9). The 198 9 housin g budge t include d furthe r step s t o ameliorat e th e situa tion o f thos e peopl e stil l havin g difficult y repayin g subsidize d loan s (PAP ) whose paybac k rat e normall y increase d b y 4 percen t pe r year . Th e govern ment ha d decide d tha t ther e woul d b e n o increas e i n 198 9 an d tha t fro m 1990, th e rat e of payback would b e no mor e than 2.6 5 percen t pe r year (the expected inflatio n rate) . Th e alteratio n woul d cos t th e governmen t 60 0 million franc s (Faur e 1988 , 9). H e also announced tha t the actual contribu tion fo r th e 1 percent fund s wa s fixed a t 0.7 2 percent , wit h 0.6 2 percen t going t o th e 1 percent fun d organizations , th e othe r 0.1 0 percen t goin g t o fund par t of the housing allowance program (APL) that is normally supporte d by th e budget . Tha t us e o f 1 percent mone y fo r th e AP L mean t tha t th e budget showe d a 1 billion fran c declin e i n th e cos t t o th e budge t fo r th e housing allowanc e program ; Faur e pointe d ou t tha t wit h th e 1 percen t money and othe r fund s bein g transferred t o the housin g allowance program , the overal l cos t of the housin g allowanc e progra m ha d gon e u p b y 2 billion francs (Faur e 1988 , 10-13) . Th e proble m o f th e housin g allowanc e pro gram's increasing costs had yet to find an answer . In Novembe r 1988 , th e Socialis t part y grou p i n th e Assembl y presente d the government with a set of proposals for dealing with the housing problem. While these proposals stopped short of abolishing the Mehaignerie Law , they certainly departed fro m it s spirit. Amon g their proposals was the call to make the transitio n feature s o f th e Mehaigneri e La w permanent-—tha t i s to say , most rent s woul d no t b e fre e bu t woul d b e se t b y negotiatio n betwee n landlord an d tenan t an d subjec t t o arbitratio n b y conciliatio n committees , FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 1

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with ren t increase s bein g base d o n comparabl e rent s i n th e area . I n partia l response, a la w dealing wit h rent s wa s adopted; the la w o f 1 3 January 198 9 called fo r spreadin g ou t ren t increase s exceedin g 1 0 percen t ove r si x year s and required that all proposals from landlord s to increase rents had to include proof that there were comparable rent s in the neighborhood . Later i n th e sprin g o f 1989 , th e Socialis t part y grou p i n th e Nationa l Assembly wa s pu t unde r pressur e b y Faur e t o abando n it s direct oppositio n to the Mehaignerie Law . However , a t the same time, report s of rapidly rising rents i n Pari s led the part y group to propose a law dealing with tha t proble m (Le Monde, 3 1 Marc h 1989 , 13) . I n April , th e ne w ministe r o f housing , Louis Besson, announce d tha t measures were being prepared to deal with th e situation (Le Monde, 7 April 1989 , 25). Ultimately, th e Socialis t grou p i n th e Nationa l Assembl y pu t forwar d a bill o n ren t control , wit h th e governmen t franticall y tryin g t o convinc e th e opposition no t t o vot e agains t th e bil l an d t o avoi d creatin g th e wron g "psychological" effect o n landlord s and th e housin g market; the governmen t did no t wan t t o b e see n a s adoptin g anothe r Quillio t La w (Le Monde, 2 0 June 1989 , 43). Perhaps the most controversial part of the bill was a provision allowing th e governmen t t o issu e a decree prohibitin g excessiv e ren t in creases. I n th e hop e o f gainin g oppositio n support , th e governmen t suc ceeded i n amendin g th e legislatio n t o limi t an y singl e decre e t o a specifi c geographic area . I n addition , th e ministe r o f housin g promise d tha t i f th e opposition vote d for the legislation, h e would never make use of the power of decree (Le Monde, 2 0 June 1989 , 43). They didn't, s o he did. On 2 9 June 1989 , the ne w law governing the relation s between landlord s and tenant s wa s adopted. Th e majo r provision s o f the la w mad e th e transi tional arrangemen t o f th e Mehaigneri e La w permanent ; subjec t t o excep tions, ren t increases are not under the control of the landlord. T o gain a rent increase, th e landlor d mus t sho w proo f o f comparabl e rent s i n th e area . I f the tenan t an d landlor d canno t com e t o agreement, th e ren t will be set by a commission o f conciliation . Landlord s ar e fre e fro m thi s syste m whe n the y are rentin g a ne w dwelling , a dwellin g tha t ha s jus t bee n brough t u p t o certain standards , a dwelling being rented fo r the first time, o r a dwelling o n which wor k wit h a cos t o f mor e tha n on e year' s ren t ha s bee n complete d within th e las t six months. Th e la w allows the government t o issu e a decree to limi t ren t increase s i n a particula r are a wher e th e marke t i s considere d "abnormal." Suc h decrees have effect fo r one year. Man y other provisions of the Mehaigneri e La w were left unchanged , includin g those governing form s 220 NATHA

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of contract , notic e t o quit , an d th e us e o f the cost-of-constructio n inde x t o set annual ren t increase s during the term o f a lease (Le Monde, 1 July 1989 , 1, 24). On 2 9 August 1989 , th e government use d it s new power o f decree i n th e Paris region , limitin g ren t increase s t o th e leve l o f increase s i n th e cos t o f construction. Th e decree applie s mainl y t o renewal s o f leases and t o rental s of unrenovate d dwellings . Th e decree ha s man y exceptions , includin g on e that allow s landlord s whos e rent s ar e undervalue d t o see k highe r rent s (Le Monde, 3 0 August 1989 , 1) . With preparation s underwa y fo r th e 199 0 budget, i t was already clea r i n June tha t housin g wa s becoming a ke y government issue . Presiden t Mitter rand, i n a n addres s t o th e annua l congres s o f HLM organizations , sai d tha t housing wa s one o f th e graves t inequalitie s dividin g th e Frenc h peopl e an d that, afte r education , i t should be a priority of government. H e added that he would watc h t o assure that th e evolution o f the budget reflecte d tha t priorit y (Le Monde, 6 June 1989 , 28) . Then , i n lat e July, th e Counci l o f Minister s announced tha t socia l housin g constructio n woul d b e increase d an d tha t more lan d i n cit y center s woul d b e mad e availabl e b y releasing governmen t land fo r buildin g (Le Monde, 2 8 July 1989 , 8) . I n earl y August, th e govern ment announce d i t had pu t housin g o n th e lis t of its priorities (Le Monde, 3 August 1989 , 1 , 16). In a furthe r roun d o f announcement s i n Augus t 1989 , prefigurin g th e 1990 budget, th e government committed itsel f to maintaining the purchasing power o f th e housin g allowanc e (APL) , th e first tim e sinc e 198 2 tha t th e housing allowanc e wa s no t goin g t o b e erode d b y inflatio n (Le Monde, 3 0 August 1989 , 37) . I t was also announced tha t housing aid would increas e by 8 percent ove r 1989 , wit h personalize d ai d bein g extende d t o another grou p of people previously excluded fro m th e housing allowance. Th e governmen t did not e tha t afte r thi s expansio n o f the coverag e o f the housin g allowance , there woul d stil l b e abou t fou r hundre d thousan d people , mainl y singl e people from twenty-fiv e t o sixty-fiv e year s o f ag e an d couple s withou t chil dren livin g i n privat e renta l housing , wh o neede d t o b e include d befor e le bondage wa s complete, befor e everyon e i n nee d qualifie d fo r assistanc e (Le Monde, 3 0 August 1989 , 37) . Th e forma l announcemen t o f the budge t fo r housing adde d t o previou s polic y announcement s tha t th e rehabilitatio n o f rental housin g woul d b e accelerate d t o tw o hundre d thousan d unit s a yea r (requiring a 2 5 percent increas e i n funding) , tha t th e numbe r o f new socia l rental housin g unit s starte d woul d increas e b y te n thousan d t o sixty-fiv e FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 22

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thousand units , an d tha t a ne w PA P subsidize d loa n fo r housin g purchas e (PAP renoves) fo r home buying would cover a larger portion of the total loan, thus lightenin g th e cos t fo r th e recipient s b y lessenin g th e nee d fo r higher priced complementary loan s (Le Monde, 2 September 1989 , 21).

VI. C O N C L U S I O N Continuities a n d C h a n g e i n Frenc h Housin g Polic y

The three governments examined here , th e two Socialist governments unde r the presidenc y o f Frangoi s Mitterran d (1981-198 6 an d 1988-present ) an d the libera l governmen t o f Prim e Ministe r Jacque s Chira c (1986-1988) , al l seem t o represen t break s wit h th e past . Th e Socialis t government s hav e attempted t o chang e th e outloo k an d policie s o f year s o f conservativ e rule ; the Chira c Governmen t wa s committed no t onl y t o undoin g Socialis t mea sures but als o to bringing int o Frenc h politic s a new spiri t of market liberal ism tha t wa s alie n t o man y o f th e reflexe s o f th e Frenc h Right . Ye t th e examination o f it s housing policie s reveal s many continuitie s betwee n thes e governments, a s well as with their predecessors. The continuities reflect ho w entrenched thes e policie s ar e bot h i n Frenc h polic y an d politics . Thei r complexity make s it difficult t o consider far-reaching changes , an d th e polit ical suppor t fo r man y o f thes e policie s make s almos t an y chang e see m far reaching, a t leas t i n term s o f the potentia l politica l pai n i t would engender . This sectio n o f this chapte r wil l loo k no t onl y a t those continuitie s bu t als o at the differences betwee n th e policies of these governments. Th e difference s are important ; ove r tim e they ca n drasticall y chang e th e shap e o f housin g policy and the interests that surround it . One o f th e simples t base s fo r polic y compariso n i s the exten t o f chang e effectuated b y thes e differen t governments . I n term s o f th e provisio n o f housing, th e first perio d o f Socialis t governance , "Mitterran d I, " i s no t marked by strong increases i n government provisio n o f direct aid to housing, which i s partl y attributabl e t o problem s i n th e Frenc h econom y an d t o limited budgets. The government not only felt that it lacked the money to do more; i t wa s als o facin g rapidl y increasin g budget s fo r th e existin g housin g allowance progra m (APL) , a s wel l a s th e increasin g proble m o f th e man y home buyer s wh o coul d n o longe r affor d th e payment s o n thei r subsidize d mortgages. Thes e problem s dominate d th e polic y makin g o f housing provi sion unde r Mitterran d I (ren t contro l wil l b e discusse d below) . I n fact , th e 222 NATHA

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decoupling o f th e housin g allowance s (APL ) fro m th e cos t o f livin g index , which resulte d i n deterioratio n o f th e rea l valu e o f thos e allowances , wa s initiated i n this period as one of the attempts to deal with this crisis. The Chira c Governmen t wa s overtly committe d t o marke t strategies , bu t apart fro m it s hope tha t ove r the lon g term th e liberation o f rents from ren t controls woul d creat e a boo m i n th e creation o f ne w renta l housing , it s overall approac h t o providin g housin g marke t subsidie s doe s no t represen t a great break with previou s policies. I t is true tha t i t did provide mor e encour agement fo r privat e secto r building , whic h unde r existin g economi c condi tions led to great increases in private house building and declines in buildin g for socia l renta l housing . Ove r a n extende d period , tha t differentia l coul d have weakened th e social renta l housin g sector (HLMs) vis a vis other sectors of th e housin g market , bu t th e Chira c Governmen t wa s no t i n powe r lon g enough, no r did it take decisive enough action , t o bring about an immediat e decline in the role or political power of HLM organizations . The secon d perio d o f Socialist government unde r th e presidency o f Frangois Mitterrand, "Mitterran d II, " started with a real hesitancy to take on ne w burdens, a s reflecte d i n th e government' s first budget . However , b y th e second budget , housin g ha d becom e a priority, worth y o f more spending, a s evidenced no t onl y i n increase s i n ai d fo r man y program s bu t als o i n th e commitment to maintain th e purchasing power of benefits unde r the housing allowance progra m (APL) . Wha t account s fo r th e change ? On e repor t wa s that th e presiden t o f the Republi c ha d decide d tha t th e economi c crisi s was over an d tha t i t was time t o consider dividin g som e o f the ne w wealth. Th e prime minister did not wish to be seen as being outflanked o n the Left by the president, s o mor e mone y wa s allocate d t o socia l housing , amon g othe r programs (Le Monde, 2 9 August 1989 , 1) . Increase d expenditure s fo r socia l housing ove r time could strengthe n th e HL M organization s an d allie d polit ical forces i n thi s sector . However , beyon d that , th e secon d budge t does no t propose programs that will fundamentally restructur e th e institution s o f French housing policy . I n tha t sense , i f th e perio d o f prosperit y i s short lived , an d social housin g budget s ar e cu t back , Frenc h housin g polic y an d th e politic s around i t may continue t o look very much th e same as today. An analysi s simpl y o f "ho w much " doe s no t hel p u s understan d th e qualitative change s tha t thes e differen t regime s ma y hav e bee n tryin g t o accomplish. I n retrospect , th e first Mitterrand Government' s majo r attemp t to transfor m Frenc h housin g polic y wa s throug h th e Quillio t Law , whic h represented a n attemp t t o brin g th e governmen t int o th e aren a o f housin g FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 2

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through th e us e o f corporatis t bargainin g t o se t ren t levels . However , th e belief tha t thi s woul d stifl e th e financial retur n o n renta l property , plus generally unfavorabl e marke t condition s fo r investmen t i n renta l propert y (high interes t rates) , le d t o increase d shortage s o f renta l housing . Th e re sponse to this problem i n Mitterrand I and I I was not to change the operation of the marke t o r to effect a fundamental chang e i n th e for m o f housing aid , but i n Mitterran d I t o backpeda l o n th e implementatio n o f th e la w an d i n Mitterrand I I to try to avoid an y impressio n tha t th e Quilliot La w was being revived. Althoug h th e landlord s an d thei r allie s wh o oppose d th e Quillio t Law are hardl y allie s o f the Socialists , th e policie s o f Mitterrand I I (t o date) do no t represen t a challenge t o those forces , bu t a n acceptanc e o f their rol e in the market . The Chira c Governmen t followe d Mitterran d F s Quillio t La w wit h it s own ren t decontro l law , base d o n th e belief tha t housin g problem s coul d b e solved by "going to the market." But the lengthy and very complex transitio n arrangements of the Mehaignerie Law speak to the desire, at least in the short run, t o avoid a possible political backlash. The Chirac Government's willingness to stifle rent increases in the financially ailing HLM sector, i n contradiction t o it s ideologica l bent , speak s t o it s vai n hop e t o remai n i n politica l power. Wha t i s interesting als o is its overt attempt, throug h it s new progra m of personalized housin g aid (allocation logement) to actually exten d housin g aid t o a larger segmen t o f lower-income inhabitants . A s noted earlier , critic s saw this new policy as not simply the extension o f aid to more people, bu t as an attemp t to implement a system of aid that would b e less generous to each individual receivin g ai d an d henc e offe r bette r contro l ove r cost s tha n th e ever mor e expensiv e housin g allowanc e progra m (APL) . Bu t i t also signale d that there was no assumption tha t the market could provid e for everyone and that th e government' s ai m wa s not th e complet e disengagemen t o f the Frenc h state from housin g policy. Mitterrand II , from 198 8 to the present, i s a very interesting study in usin g existing structures tha t ar e overtl y hostil e t o your goals to pursue you r goals. In th e attempt to avoid comparison s t o the Quilliot Law , bu t to contain ren t increases, th e Rocar d Governmen t ha s chosen t o make permanent th e tran sition arrangement s o f the Mehaigneri e Law . Politically , i t i s clear tha t th e government i s hoping that the Frenc h Righ t will hesitate to criticize it s own creation. O n it s own, thi s action doe s no t see m t o previe w a majo r revisio n of the institution s o f Frenc h housin g policy . I t i s clear tha t th e governmen t intends t o spen d mor e mone y o n socia l housin g an d woul d lik e housin g 224 NATHA

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policy to be better integrate d int o the goal structure o f urban policy . Bu t it is unclear whethe r thi s i s simply a "fair weathe r strategy," to be followed whe n the budge t i s growing an d t o b e abandone d i n th e lea n years , o r whethe r i t will resul t i n institutiona l change s tha t ca n sustai n th e improvemen t o f housing condition s i n ba d times . Th e governmen t i s ver y sensitiv e t o th e political powe r o f thos e wh o woul d oppos e ne w policy ; ne w proposal s ma y well attemp t t o "add " ne w feature s o r program s t o existin g policie s rathe r than challeng e the basic structure of current arrangements. French Housin g Polic y i n Comparativ e Perspectiv e

This final section o f this chapter will compare the French cas e to the cases of the United State s and Britain . I n looking at policy in the 1980 s in the Unite d States an d Britain , on e i s lookin g primaril y a t th e Reaga n an d Thatche r administrations. Bot h Reaga n an d Thatche r strongl y advocated widenin g th e role o f th e marke t a t th e expens e o f tha t o f th e state , ver y muc h th e over t position taken by Jacques Chirac, ver y much i n opposition to that of Frangois Mitterrand. Doe s tha t mea n tha t Chirac' s polic y woul d hav e move d Franc e in a directio n simila r t o tha t o f Britai n an d th e Unite d States , o r tha t Mitterrand's policies represent moves in the other direction? Those question s will b e examine d i n term s o f the conten t o f housin g polic y an d th e politic s being constructe d aroun d housing . (Muc h o f th e analysi s o f th e America n and Britis h dat a i s drawn fro m m y earlier comparison s o f British an d Ameri can housin g policy; see Schwartz 1987 a and 1987b. ) One tren d i n housin g policy , eviden t i n bot h Britai n an d th e Unite d States, ha s bee n a movemen t t o provid e housin g b y subsidizin g th e privat e sector rathe r tha n th e publi c sector . I n bot h countries , th e tren d bega n wel l before th e adven t o f Reaga n an d Thatcher , bu t i n bot h o f thes e cases , th e leaders have furthered tha t trend. I n the Unite d States , th e trend bega n wit h the 195 9 Housin g Act , whic h provide d subsidie s t o nonprofi t group s t o provide housin g fo r th e elderl y and th e handicapped ; th e 196 8 Housing an d Urban Developmen t Act, whic h provided mortgage subsidies for low-incom e people to buy housing; and th e 197 4 Housing Act, whic h provide d subsidie s for th e creatio n o f housin g i n th e privat e sector . Th e Reaga n administratio n went one step further i n it s housing voucher plan , whic h provide s recipient s with set amounts of aid to supplement their own resources in finding housing in the private housing sector. The British , havin g built a large amount o f council housin g sinc e Worl d FRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 2

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War II , began movin g away from th e public sector in the 197 4 Housing Act, which provide d ai d t o nongovernmenta l "voluntar y housin g associations " to provide subsidize d housin g t o thos e i n need . Unde r Margare t Thatche r th e move to the privat e sector has been activel y pursued a t the direct expense of the publi c sector ; loca l authoritie s ar e require d t o sel l counci l housin g t o sitting tenant s wh o wis h t o buy—approximatel y eigh t hundre d thousan d units out of a total of 7 million counci l housin g units have been sold . Befor e the 198 7 British nationa l election , th e Thatcher Governmen t propose d tha t all counci l housin g shoul d b e move d fro m th e publi c secto r int o th e hand s of private management; if implemented, thi s would radicall y shift the publicprivate balance i n British housing policy. In th e Frenc h case , i t is harder t o ascertain th e public-private balance . I n principle, privat e secto r firms ca n appl y fo r th e sam e subsidie s tha t HL M associations us e to build low-incom e housing , bu t curren t economi c condi tions hav e mad e suc h investmen t largel y unprofitable . O n th e othe r hand , the subsidize d loan s fo r hom e purchas e b y lower-income peopl e benefit th e private secto r directly . Th e housin g allowanc e program s (APL ) fo r renta l housing can b e used i n certai n part s of the private sector marke t (this shoul d increase furthe r unde r curren t policy) . Th e AP L housin g allowance s ma y also be used for home purchase. I n this sense, the policies of both the Chirac and th e Mitterran d Government s d o not represen t muc h o f a shift i n policy , since the private sector already enjoys a large share of the subsidy programs. Another trend i n both Britain and the United State s has been a movement toward subsidizin g peopl e rathe r tha n unit s o f housing . Again , thi s tren d predates Reaga n an d Thatcher , bu t continue d wit h th e Reaga n housin g voucher program and the Thatcher polic y of "fair rents " (which assumes that council housing is rented at market rates and that eligible families will receive subsidies t o pa y thos e rents) . Thi s tren d i s clearl y eviden t i n France , a s discussed i n the earlier section of this chapter on the configuration o f French housing polic y i n th e shif t fro m aide a la pierre to aide a la personne. However, ther e is a major differenc e betwee n the American progra m and th e French an d Britis h programs . I n th e America n program , onl y a limite d number o f vouchers ar e available regardles s of the number o f eligible, whil e in th e Britis h an d Frenc h programs , al l thos e eligibl e ar e entitle d t o aid . Thus the American progra m creates differences amon g people on the basis of their plac e i n lin e whe n th e voucher s wer e hande d out . I n addition , th e political cost s o f cuttin g program s woul d see m different : i n Britai n an d

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France, a cut in funding affect s equall y a large group of people with potential political clout . I n th e Unite d States , sinc e the numbe r o f people that woul d be affected b y a program cut is much smalle r and certainly does not represent all thos e i n nee d o f aid (eve n b y the program' s standards) , recipients ' objec tions to cut s migh t wel l b e see n a s complaints fro m a n especiall y privilege d group of the poor. Another trend, particularl y evident under Reaga n and Thatcher, ha s been massive cuts in government expenditures for housing. Bu t in neither countr y has ther e bee n a significan t mov e t o cu t th e ta x break s give n t o owner occupiers. I n both countries, th e result has been that the tax breaks for hom e ownership cost their governments mor e than th e "direc t subsidies" for renta l housing (Schwart z 1987a) . Wha t ha s develope d i n bot h th e Unite d State s and Grea t Britai n i s a stark bifurcation betwee n aid s for th e poor (usually fo r rental housing ) an d aid s fo r hom e ownership ; th e forme r ar e funde d wit h direct expenditure s tha t ar e subjec t t o cut s i n ever y budge t crisis , whil e th e latter are funded b y "off-budget" ta x subsidies that are not part of the budge t process an d tha t kee p growing i n cost . A s noted earlier , th e shap e o f futur e housing budgets i n Franc e i s unclear. Muc h o f the aid fo r hom e ownershi p comes from th e sam e programs tha t fun d renta l housing , suc h a s subsidized loans fro m th e Caiss e de s depot s e t consignation s (CDC ) o r th e housin g allowance progra m (APL) . Whil e th e Chira c an d Mitterran d Government s have balance d th e privat e an d socia l housin g sector s somewha t differently , the structur e o f the programs , relativ e t o th e fundin g process , d o no t auto matically favor hom e ownership . Despite all their other similarities, ther e i s a great divergence between th e Reagan and Thatcher Governments i n terms of the institutional changes they have wrought in housing policy. The Reaga n policies have pushed America n housing polic y towar d dependenc e o n th e market ; th e vouche r progra m assumes tha t recipient s see k housin g i n th e privat e renta l marke t fro m ordi nary profit-seekin g landlords . I n th e Britis h case , th e shif t awa y fro m th e public secto r ha s no t bee n simpl y a shift t o th e privat e housin g market , bu t to some exten t ha s also been characterize d b y the us e o f specialized institu tions, such as voluntary housing associations, to provide housing. Thus while the American cas e represents an attempt to deinstitutionalize housin g policy, the Britis h cas e represent s th e us e o f alternativ e housin g institutions , sup ported b y governmen t subsidy , i n additio n t o th e us e o f th e market . I n political terms , th e Britis h cas e keep s mor e institution s involve d i n th e

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politics aroun d th e policy , whil e America n polic y seem s t o b e reducin g th e institutions tha t migh t pla y a politica l rol e i n th e makin g o f polic y (se e Schwartz 1987b) . Certainly th e action s o f th e Frenc h government s examine d her e hav e done littl e t o alte r th e basi c configuratio n o f institution s an d th e politic s around housing . A s describe d earlier , th e response s o f th e thre e Frenc h governments t o variou s polic y problems , certainl y sinc e th e Quillio t Law , seem t o hav e recognize d th e importanc e o f existin g institutions , interes t groups, an d polic y arrangements . I n addition , importan t specia l state sponsored avenue s of finance provide a rich network of institutions o n whic h much o f th e Frenc h housin g marke t depends . An y attemp t b y th e govern ment t o eliminat e thes e arrangement s o r t o integrat e the m int o th e genera l finance marke t coul d wel l leav e th e governmen t facin g th e oppositio n no t only of renters and HL M associations but also of homeowners and businesse s dependent o n them . The complexit y o f French housin g policy could easil y lead to the conclu sion that the system mus t be an impedimen t t o change. Certainl y a complex set o f institution s an d politica l interest s i s involve d i n th e creatio n an d implementation o f housing policy. However , i t is also clear from th e preced ing analysis that different government s with different polic y orientations have been abl e to pursue thei r goal s within thi s complex general framework . Th e changes made have certainly altere d th e balance among different part s of the housing polic y syste m a s wel l a s detail s o f th e administratio n o f housin g policy. A t th e sam e time , th e genera l framewor k an d th e politica l force s involved hav e remaine d muc h th e same . An d certainl y i n compariso n t o British an d America n polic y of the period, Frenc h polic y maker s have had a much riche r se t of options ope n t o the m (a s well a s accompanying politica l constraints). The complexit y o f the Frenc h syste m migh t better b e seen a s providing a wealth o f opportunitie s an d possibilitie s fo r polic y makers , a s wel l a se t o f institutions through whic h policy goals could be implemented. Fo r example, the abilit y o f the Frenc h syste m t o provid e a protecte d channe l o f financial resources fo r housin g i s a grea t advantag e fo r polic y makers , providin g a degree o f certaint y abou t availabl e resources , a t som e remov e fro m th e pressures of general financial market s and, t o a lesser extent, fro m budgetar y exigencies. Th e abilit y o f th e governmen t t o obtai n som e o f th e 1 percent funds fro m employer s to provide resources for more general housing needs as their ow n nee d t o provid e housin g fo r thei r worker s decline s speak s t o th e 228 NATHA

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ability o f polic y maker s t o alte r th e functio n o f existin g polic y form s a s conditions change . Th e abilit y o f polic y maker s t o adjus t th e relatio n be tween majo r financial institutions , a s i n th e cas e o f th e CF F an d CD C mentioned earlier , speak s t o a n abilit y t o "fine-tune " th e syste m t o provid e more flexibility in th e allocatio n o f resource s amon g differen t program s (i n this cas e th e fund s availabl e fo r subsidize d hom e loan s fo r individual s an d through th e HLM associations). Of course , th e Frenc h housin g polic y syste m ha s distinc t limits . Shoul d the "europeanization" of finance as part of the 199 2 reforms i n the Europea n Economic Communit y caus e investor s t o desert A Accounts (Livre t A), i t is not clea r tha t th e res t o f th e syste m wil l b e abl e t o compensate . A radica l restructuring ma y be extremely difficult , a s none o f the institutiona l compo nents o f th e system , wit h thei r associate d politica l interests , ca n b e easil y abandoned. Whethe r thi s complexit y constitute s opportunit y o r constrain t will b e judge d i n term s o f the abilit y o f governments t o pursu e thei r polic y preferences an d th e capability o f the system to produce desirable outputs . I n the decad e o f th e 1980s , th e abilit y o f differen t Frenc h government s t o pursue distinctl y differen t goal s withi n th e sam e se t o f polic y institution s speaks to the potential o f complexity as an asset in policy making.

REFERENCES

Boubli, Bernard. 1985 . Le Logement. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France. Cancellieri, Anne, Jean Foscoso, Jean Lemoine, Maurice Mahaut, and Robert Paoli. 1986. Maitrise d'ouvrage du logement social en France. Paris : Economica. CDC (L a Caiss e de s Depot s e t Consignations) . 1987 . La Caisse des Depots et Consignations: Banque du Logement Social. Paris : CDC. Central Statistica l Office , Governmen t Statistica l Servic e (United Kingdom) . 1989 . Social Trends No. 19: 1989 Edition. London : H.M.S.O. Collins, Doreen. 1987 . A More Equal Society? Social Policy under the Socialists. In Mitterrand's France, edite d b y Soni a Maze y an d Michae l Newman . London : Croom Helm. 81-102. Conseil Economique et Social. 1989 . Le Bilan et perspective dfevolution du logement en France: Seances des 9 et 10 mai J 989. Paris: Direction des Joumaux Officiels. Cornuel, Didier. 1989 . Les Effets redistributifs des aides au logement. Les Cahiers de YHabitat no. 8 (September 1989) : 9-12. Direction d e l a Construction , Minister e d e TEquipement , d u Logement , d e l'Amenagement du Territoire et des Transports. 1986 . Statistiques et etudes genFRENCH HOUSIN G POLICIE S I N TH E E I G H T I E S 2 2

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erales: Donnees economiques et financiires sur le logement: n°132. Paris : Documentation franchise. . 1988 . Statistiques et etudes ginerales: Donnees economiaques et financieres sur le logement: n°J44 . Paris : Documentation frangaise. Duclaud-Williams, Roge r H . 1978 . The Politics of Housing in Britain and France. London: Heineman Euro-Construct. 1986 . L'emploi et la rehabilitation du logement en Europe. Luxembourg: Office de s publications officielles de s communautes europ£ennes. Faure, Maurice . 2 2 Septembe r 1988 . Allocution de Monsieur Maurice Faure a la presse du project du budget J 989. Paris : Ministere d e l'Equipemen t e t du Loge ment. France. 1986 . Loi n°86-1290 du 23 decembre 1986. Investissement locatif; accession a la propriete de logements sociaux; developpement de I'offre fonciere. N°1509-H. Paris: Journal Officiel d e la Republique Frangaise. Heugas-Darraspen, Henri . 1985 . Le Logement en France et son financement (Notes et Etudes documentaires, n°4794) . Paris : Documentation frangaise . Holmes, Peter . 1987 . Broke n Dreams : Economic Polic y i n Mitterrand' s France . I n Mitterrand's France, edite d b y Soni a Maze y an d Michae l Newman . London : Croom Helm. 33-55 . Mazey, Sonia . 1987 . Introduction . I n Mitterrand's France, edited b y Soni a Maze y and Michael Newman . London : Croom Helm. 1-6 . Mehaignerie, Pierre . 2 5 Septembe r 1986 . Discours de M. Pierre Mehaignerie sur le budget. Paris : Ministere d e l'Equipement , d u Logement , d e l'Am£nagemen t d u Territoire et des Transports. . 1 8 September 1987 . Discours de M. Pierre Mehaignerie sur le Budget. Paris: Ministere de l'Equipement, d u Logement, d e l'Amenagement du Territoire et des Transports. Pearsall, Jon . 1984 . France . I n Housing in Europe, edite d b y Marti n Wynn . Ne w York: St. Martin's . 9-54 . Rex, John , an d Rober t Moore . 1967 . Race, Community, and Conflict: A Study of Sparkbrook. London : Oxford University Press. Schwartz, Natha n H. 1984 . Reagan' s Housing Policies. I n The Attack on the Welfare State, edite d b y Anthon y Champagn e an d Edwar d Harpham . Prospec t Height s IL: Waveland Press. . 1987a . Housin g Polic y i n Grea t Britain an d the Unite d States : Converging Trends, Divergen t Futures. I n Contemporary Political Economy: Anglo-American Policy Comparisons, edite d by Jerold L. Waltman and Donley T. Studlar . Jackson MS: University Press of Mississippi. . 1987b . Th e Relatio n o f Politic s t o th e Instrument s o f Housin g Policy . I n Between State and Market: Housing in the Post-Industrial Era, edite d b y L . J . Lundqvist and B. Turner. Stockholm : Almqvist & Wiksell. Tuppen, John. 1988 . France under Recession, 1981-1986. Alban y NY: State University of New York Press. UNFOHLM (Unio n National e de s Federation s d'Organisme s d'HLM) . 1987 . 48e Congres National HLM: aide-memoire statistique. Paris: UNFOHLM. 230 NATHA

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United State s Departmen t o f Commerce . Burea u o f th e Census . 1982 . Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-83. Washington : Governmen t Printin g Office. Zysman, John . 1983 . Governments, Markets, and Growth. Ithac a NY : Cornel l University Press.

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D E M O C R A C Y A N D SOCIA L POLICIES : THE EXAMPL E O F FRANC E BRUNO JOBER T

To reconcil e democrac y an d effectiv e governmen t constitute s on e o f th e great challenges o f our times . Ho w can th e law of the majorit y b e prevente d from leadin g t o a n indefinit e expansio n o f th e Stat e fo r th e purpos e o f establishing actua l equalit y proportiona l t o political equality ? Bot h th e theories an d th e practic e o f democrac y hav e sketche d ou t differen t solution s t o this problem. For th e elitis t democratic theorist s (e.g., Sartor i 1987) , too much democ racy and too much socia l mobilization ris k killing democracy. Thi s excessive participation ca n onl y lea d t o ne w demand s tha t overloa d th e State , whic h becomes bloated an d block s the dynamism o f the society. Henc e democrac y is viable i n th e lon g ter m onl y whe n regulate d b y a n externa l element : th e elites to which th e masse s agree t o defer. Th e depoliticizatio n o f the citize n and hi s relativ e apath y thu s ar e hel d t o b e th e necessar y condition s fo r th e existence of a democracy that is pluralistic and mildly interventionist . In contrast , theorie s o f social democrac y (ofte n presente d unde r th e mis leading term neocorporatism) tend to show that democracy can be compatible with stron g socia l mobilizatio n i f the latte r i s channeled b y socia l organiza tions that are strong and capabl e of imposing discipline on thei r troops (e.g., Lehmbruch 1984) . Som e contemporar y comparativist s hav e attempte d t o classify th e differen t state s according t o thei r approximatio n t o on e o r th e other of these types, on a scale running from corporatis m t o elitist pluralism . One logica l hypothesi s woul d b e t o establis h a correlatio n betwee n th e 232

TABLE 7. 1

Social Expenditure s o f OECD Countries , 198 1 (in % of GDP ) Lembruch Corporatism Scale

Belgium Holland Sweden Denmark Germany France Italy Ireland Austria Norway Finland United Kingdom Canada United States New Zealand Australia Japan Switzerland Greece

37.6 36.1 33.4 33.3 31.5 29.5 29.1 28.4 27.7 27.1 25.0 23.7 21.5 20.8 19.6 18.8 17.5 14.9 13.4

average high high average average off scale or low low average high high average low low low low low off scale average unrated

Sources: OECD 1985 . p. 21 ; and Lehmbruch 1984 .

position of states on this scale and the level of development of social policies. The mor e advance d th e incorporatio n o f the wage-earnin g clas s as a collective actor, th e higher social expenditures should be. However, thi s hypothesis is not supporte d b y th e evidence . A s shown i n tabl e 7.1 , th e leve l o f social expenditure o f countries lik e Franc e an d Ital y i s fully comparabl e t o that o f the social democratic states. How ca n w e explai n thi s paradoxica l situatio n o f a politica l syste m tha t presents both numerou s characteristics of the welfare stat e and a weak overall involvement o f workers ' organization s i n th e definitio n o f socia l an d eco nomic strategies ? Thi s i s what w e woul d lik e t o stud y here , focusin g upo n the experienc e o f th e Fift h Republic . Obviousl y thi s proble m canno t b e treated withou t a brie f historica l perspective , wit h whic h thi s chapte r wil l begin.

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I. TH E WELFAR E STAT E A N D BALANCE D LIBERALIS M

When th e Fourt h Republi c attempte d afte r 194 5 t o provid e Franc e wit h a complete system of social protection, he r modernizing elites had to challenge certain o f th e fundamenta l element s o f th e conception s o f socia l orde r tha t had marke d almos t a half-centur y o f Frenc h histor y (Kuise l 1981) . Thi s social orde r seeme d t o b e founde d o n thre e pillars : th e maintenanc e o f stabilizing socia l categories , differentia l treatmen t o f wag e earners , an d th e public service. The Thir d Republi c lon g wa s haunte d b y th e Commune , b y fea r o f a brutal confrontatio n betwee n th e ownin g classe s and th e workin g classes. I n order to avoid it , th e Republi c contribute d heavil y to organizing the surviva l of buffer socia l categorie s whos e attachmen t t o persona l propert y seeme d t o guarantee prudenc e an d wisdom . Thes e effort s wer e no t withou t results : the proportion o f the workin g populatio n tha t live d i n rura l area s decline d ver y slowly, remainin g a t almos t 4 0 percen t i n 1946 . Th e Frenc h industria l network wa s les s concentrate d tha n tha t o f German y o r o f Britain , whil e French distributio n system s remained archai c (Sellier 1984 , 23). This same concern wit h avoiding a massive confrontation betwee n classe s is seen again i n the differential treatmen t of wage earners. Large-scal e indus trial organization , wit h al l tha t i t implie s i n bureaucrac y an d gigantism , seemed foreig n t o the Frenc h genius . Th e latte r expresse d itsel f better i n th e supposed humanit y o f th e individua l relationshi p betwee n th e owne r o f a small busines s an d hi s worker, bot h wel l integrate d i n smal l citie s that wer e themselves surrounded b y countryside peacefully worke d by small farm own ers. Th e polic y o f social protectio n appear s truly necessar y onl y i n situation s where th e networ k o f loyaltie s an d persona l bond s hav e bee n torn : i n larg e urban area s and i n large firms. In fact, i n the social domain, th e active social policies o f larg e firms (steel , mines , railroads ) contrast sharpl y wit h th e slowness an d reticenc e o f othe r sector s o f Frenc h society . Th e contras t be tween sector s wher e labo r play s a strategi c rol e an d thos e dependen t o n unskilled labor , an d tha t between organize d an d unorganize d sectors , defin e the socia l criteri a o f inclusio n i n o r exclusio n fro m socia l policies . Thes e policies proceede d rathe r b y accretion o f partia l socia l compromises , b y sedimentation, tha n b y general measure s applicabl e t o all worker s (Hatzfel d 1971). Built o n th e notio n o f equality o f opportunity, th e publi c servic e consti tuted th e indispensabl e counterweigh t t o this mode l o f social orde r founde d 234 BRUN

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on differentiatio n an d heterogeneity . Supporte d b y th e prevailin g scientis m of th e beginnin g o f th e century , i t wa s characterize d b y a preferenc e fo r conferring managemen t o f publi c activitie s o n competen t profession s be lieved to command th e scientifi c knowledg e an d th e method s appropriat e t o each of the great social problems (Pisier-Kouchner 1983) . Here w e hav e outline d th e basi c element s o f corporatis m a la franqaise: protectionist corporatism of buffe r profession s tha t expec t th e Stat e t o guar antee th e condition s o f thei r survival ; corporatism of workers o f th e majo r industrial occupations, analyze d i n a masterly fashion b y D. Segresti n (1984); republican corporatism of the major profession s o f the public service, o f which teachers' unions form th e most complete model . Corporatism, whic h has been so maligned by recent essayists, thus appears to be a basic element of the republican state . Durkheim elaborated the theory of such a state at the beginning of the twentieth century : A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals, that a hypertrophied Stat e i s force d t o oppres s an d contain , constitute s a veritabl e sociologica l monstrosity. . . . A nation ca n b e maintaine d onl y if , betwee n th e Stat e an d th e individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongl y in their spher e of action and drag them, i n this way, into the general torren t of social life. . . . [Occupationa l group s are suited to fill thi s role and that is their destiny (Durkheim 1964 , 28). Yet this mode l o f corporatism ha s been onl y partially applied ; the searc h fo r cohesion throug h differentiatio n an d heterogeneit y coul d onl y inhibi t th e formation o f a global socia l compromis e betwee n larg e union s an d employ ers' associations . Th e socia l movement s o f th e Popula r Fron t demonstrate d the extrem e weaknes s o f employers ' association s a t th e cross-sectora l leve l (Ehrmann 1957) . Th e growt h o f th e protectiv e Frenc h stat e proceede d b y sedimentation, b y successive accretion o f "partial socia l compromises " (Delorme and Andre 1983) . II. TH E FOURT H REPUBLIC : TH E DIFFICUL T IMPLEMENTATIO N OF A NE W MODE L O F SOCIA L DEVELOPMEN T

The conversio n o f Frenc h societ y t o growt h an d modernizatio n beginnin g with th e Fourt h Republi c calle d int o questio n som e o f the principle s o f the social orde r o f th e perio d tha t wa s ending ; i t implie d a restructurin g o f th e mediation networ k that supported th e old order . On th e one hand , th e policy of growth an d modernizatio n finally launched DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 3

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was no t easil y reconcile d wit h th e precariou s preservatio n o f buffe r socia l categories. The openin g o f border s i n 195 8 an d th e modernizatio n o f th e economy raise d a ne w problem : that o f managin g th e rapi d declin e o r the restructuring of backward sectors. On th e othe r han d th e differentia l treatmen t o f wage earners , wh o were only partially institutionalized, turne d out in two ways to lead to an impasse. First, th e experienc e o f th e wa r an d o f th e Resistanc e opene d th e wa y fo r new social and political demands: democratic citizenship, onc e reconquered, henceforth include d a social dimension , embodie d i n th e progra m fo r generalizing Socia l Security . Second , th e openin g of borders and the moderni zation that began with the firsteconomic plans called for new social arrangements to accompany economic changes . The emerging economy was hardly compatible wit h th e ver y partial institutiona l representatio n o f wage earners and their leaders in the social and economic life of the country. The perio d o f the Fourt h Republi c wa s marked both by the resistanc e of the old mediation networks and by the beginning of changes that would bear their full frui t i n the Fift h Republic . Thi s dual and seemingly contradictor y movement wa s fostered b y the dissociatio n o f stat e administratio n fro m th e elected bodies of government, a trend that characterized the Fourth Republic (Birnbaum 1977) . On th e one han d members of parliament appeared as the preferred target of interes t groups with th e larges t memberships . Th e vulnerabilit y o f members of Parliamen t wa s reinforce d b y the division s amon g the m an d b y the weak structur e o f thei r parties . O n th e othe r hand , withi n th e executiv e branch an d i n institution s relativel y fre e fro m legislativ e pressure , anothe r system of mediation developed , on e that proved to be more directly focuse d on the implementation o f policies of growth and social modernization. The modernizin g elit e o f hig h civi l servant s tha t too k th e control s o f financial institutions such as the Directorat e of the Treasury, th e Socia l and Economic Developmen t Fund , an d the Plannin g Commissio n ver y quickly understood tha t i t coul d b e a tru e pressur e grou p fo r growt h onl y o n tw o conditions: tha t thi s growt h b e accompanie d b y socia l modernization ; an d that there develop a new mediation networ k between thi s elite, base d i n the state administration , an d society , providin g th e elit e wit h a soli d socia l rooting. The socia l preoccupation s o f th e hig h clerk s o f th e Stat e (suc h a s Frangois Bloch-Lain e o r Pierr e Laroque ) ar e witness t o th e first condition. The polic y o f socia l dialogu e begu n b y th e plan s demonstrate s th e impor tance of the second. The constantly reaffirme d concer n with naming intuitu 236 BRUN

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personnae the member s o f th e plannin g commission s associate d wit h thi s tripartite dialogu e demonstrate s th e desir e o f it s conceiver s t o avoi d bein g trapped i n a dialogue with established organizations and to select in all sectors of societ y thos e individual s bes t suite d t o discussin g an d transmittin g thei r message (Jobert 1981) . The ambiguous recor d o f social policy under the Fourt h Republi c reflect s the contradictor y pressure s o f thes e tw o system s o f decisio n making . Th e Fourth Republi c establishe d th e foundation s o f a ne w socia l order . Th e creation o f Social Securit y gav e a new dimension t o democratic citizenship . All opinion poll s taken i n the past thirty years attest to the importance of this event for Frenc h society . Th e acquisitio n o f social rights , particularl y cover age of social risks , i s perceived b y French citizen s a s an achievemen t whos e importance ca n b e compare d onl y t o the establishmen t o f universal suffrag e (Schnapper, Brody , an d Kastoryan o 1986) . However , th e implementatio n o f these principles encountered grav e difficulties . Plans to expand coverage of Social Securit y became bogged down; hospital reform marke d time ; the question o f social coverag e o f ambulatory medica l care foun d n o satisfactor y solution ; th e spiri t o f renewa l o f th e first years of the Fourt h Republi c wa s broke n b y th e politica l imbroglio s o f th e lat e republic. III. TH E FIFT H REPUBLIC : A POLITICA L A N D SOCIA L N E W DEA L

The political , economic , an d institutiona l ne w dea l o f th e Fift h Republi c demonstrably modifie d th e rule s regulatin g socia l competition . Th e socia l categories threatene d b y modernizatio n sa w thei r margi n o f maneuve r re duced b y a triple mechanism . Th e declin e o f Parliament deprive d powerfu l pressure group s suc h a s th e Genera l Confederatio n o f Smal l an d Mediu m Firms (CGPME ) o f a channe l o f privilege d acces s t o politica l decisio n making. The reinforcemen t o f the executive was less favorable t o groups with large membership s tha n t o organization s whos e leader s relat e mos t easil y t o their partner s i n th e hig h civi l service . Th e existenc e o f a strong nationalis t and conservativ e party surrounding th e president o f the republi c (De Gaulle ) also limite d thei r margi n o f maneuver . I t wa s increasingl y difficul t t o pla y one faction o r one part y against another. Th e mor e politics became bipolar ized an d th e mor e declinin g socia l categorie s foun d themselve s attache d t o one camp, th e less effective th e threat of defection became . Finally , th e great turning poin t represente d b y th e openin g o f border s acte d a s a powerfu l DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 3

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constraint imposin g reaso n o n thes e groups . Moreover , throug h strugglin g mightily to achieve a European agricultura l polic y favorable t o French farm ers, th e governmen t wa s able t o win ove r th e larges t and noisies t fractio n o f these categories. However, th e narrowing of the political spac e open t o these social categories does not impl y their silen t euthanasia. Th e closin g of the political scen e perhaps provoke d th e declin e o f the CGPM E o f M. Gingembre , bu t i t also set off the explosions of anger of the Informatio n an d Defens e Committee — National Unio n o f Independen t Worker s (CID-UNATI ) o f Gerar d Nicou d (Berger 1981) . The secon d elemen t o f this socia l ne w dea l i s found i n th e ne w suppor t offered b y th e mos t divers e sector s o f societ y fo r th e "mystiqu e o f growth " advocated b y a modernizing elite largely from th e high civil service. According t o th e rhetori c o f th e period , economi c growt h ca n avoi d turning socia l struggl e int o a zero-su m game . Wha t i s importan t i s tha t everyone contribut e i n a harmonious fashio n t o the productio n o f as large a cake as possible. Th e socia l struggl e shoul d concer n onl y ho w the surplu s is to b e divided . Th e unstate d premis e o f this ideolog y i s no doub t th e accep tance of a certain leve l of inflation a s a general anesthetic, makin g less visible and henc e les s painful th e reallocatio n o f resources and the new inequalitie s resulting from growt h (Zysman 1983) . The mos t importan t intellectua l debat e seeme d t o pi t th e defender s o f tradition withi n eac h group or social class against what came to be called th e "living forces " (forces vives) of the ne w France . Thi s i s the perio d whe n th e "young farmers" took control o f the Nationa l Federatio n o f Farmers (FNSEA), when th e "youn g employers " (later th e "youn g manager s o f firms") opposed their elder s i n th e Nationa l Counci l o f Frenc h Employer s (CNPF) , an d when th e ne w intellectua l weigh t o f the Frenc h Democrati c Confederatio n of Labo r (CFDT ) wa s being affirme d withi n th e worl d o f wage earner s an d unions. The majo r chang e concerne d th e attitud e o f employers, wh o wer e com pletely marginalized i n the early postwar period. Thei r organization s initiall y were ver y reticen t abou t th e modernizatio n plans issuin g fro m th e stat e administration. Th e Nationa l Counci l o f Frenc h Employer s (CNPF ) wa s a weak and divide d organization . Bu t the demand s o f modernization induce d the leader s o f large modernizin g firms t o reviv e an d consolidat e th e organi zation o f employers to their advantage (Sellier 1984 , 4). The openin g o f borders foreseen b y the Treaty o f Rome (1957 ) induced a 238 BRUN

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change i n th e attitud e o f employers, wh o took th e initiativ e i n engagin g th e unions i n collectiv e negotiation s t o restor e unemploymen t insuranc e wit h equally share d financing. Employer s partiall y abandone d thei r viscera l anti unionism i n orde r t o avoi d th e impositio n b y th e Stat e o f a mor e elaborat e program. This impetu s for modernizatio n woul d no t hav e gained suc h scop e had i t not bee n nourishe d b y intens e intellectua l activit y withi n th e State . O n th e margins o f partie s an d institution s ther e appeare d a multitud e o f club s an d intellectual circle s tha t intende d t o brin g Frenc h publi c lif e int o th e mod ern era . IV. A MODE L O F NEOCORPORATIS T INSPIRATIO N

At the beginnin g o f the Fift h Republic , th e plannin g process , sanctifie d b y General d e Gaull e a s a "burnin g obligation, " becam e th e poin t o f conver gence of these "living forces" that sought to extract France from th e moroseness o f a faile d decolonizatio n an d t o la y ou t ne w plan s fo r th e futur e o f French society . In fact , i n thi s perio d o f triumphan t Gaullism , th e pla n became the preferred instrumen t fo r affirming th e supremacy o f politics over the blin d mechanism s o f the economy . Th e Fourt h Pla n affirme d tha t "th e opportunity mus t b e seized fo r accomplishin g a great, lastin g work to assure that men will live better." The Pla n conceived o f this great work primarily in terms o f a n acceleratio n o f industria l growth , bu t i n th e servic e o f a ne w model o f consumption. I n contras t t o a consumers' societ y o f the America n type, oriente d towar d futil e consumptio n tha t create s it s ow n unrest , th e Fourth Pla n presume d t o offe r anothe r styl e o f life , mad e riche r an d mor e communal throug h emphasi s o n publi c program s an d facilities . I t wa s fel t necessary t o "pu t th e increasin g abundance , whic h i s beginning , a t th e service of a less one-sided view of man." In orde r t o achiev e relativ e contro l ove r socia l development , th e Fourt h Plan, wit h th e suppor t o f th e "livin g forces " o f th e nation , intende d t o achieve a social consensus founded upo n a rational dialogue. The two central objectives o f the Fourt h Plan , industria l growt h an d orientatio n o f lifestyle , each implie d a reasone d agreemen t amon g socia l partners , bot h t o reorien t the benefit s o f growt h towar d a ne w mode l o f consumptio n an d t o contro l the evolution o f nominal income s i n orde r to avoid a dangerous inflatio n i n this period o f opening borders. The mode l o f socia l developmen t tha t th e "livin g forces " o f th e natio n DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 3

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proposed t o th e natio n thu s appear s t o b e th e sociodemocrati c mode l tha t later wa s conceptualize d b y th e neocorporatist s wit h it s thre e centra l ele ments: —dynamic economi c growth —parallel developmen t of the major socia l services —rational dialogu e amon g th e socia l partner s guaranteein g contro l ove r nominal income s an d thereb y maintainin g th e competitivenes s o f th e national economy . This new model o f reference constitute d th e common languag e for political elite s o f th e Fift h Republic . Th e trio o f growth , publi c services , an d participation inspire d th e Gaullist s a s wel l a s th e Socialist s throughou t th e Fifth Republic . Bot h were influence d b y the sam e current , th e sam e "refor mist" ideolog y whos e histor y remain s t o be written . Th e leadin g figures are known: th e intellectua l guid e Pierr e Laroque , Frangoi s Bloch-Laine , Ren e Lenoir, etc . It was a questio n her e les s of an articulate d curren t o f thought tha n o f a network of intellectual influence , strongl y marked by the Christian origin s of its members, whos e position o f strength wa s in certai n sector s of the admin istration suc h a s the General Plannin g Commission, th e social section o f the Council o f State , an d certai n directorate s o f th e Ministr y o f Socia l Affairs . The affinit y o f thi s grou p wa s towar d a unio n o f Christia n origins , th e CFDT, althoug h i t did no t belong quite to the same network. Thu s when i n this perio d Jacque s Delor s wa s praisin g Swedish-styl e dialogu e an d offerin g it a s a n example , th e CFD T wa s stil l resonatin g wit h th e myt h o f self management. I t should b e noted, moreover , tha t a good number o f the hig h civil servant s belongin g t o this movemen t late r rallie d t o the Socialis t party . Jacques Delors , fo r example , becam e th e ministe r o f finance i n th e first Socialist governmen t i n 1981 . I t i s no doub t her e tha t on e mus t loo k fo r a certain continuit y i n politica l practices : i n th e las t analysi s i t i s th e sam e political-administrative personne l (sometime s mor e administrative , some times more political) who have defined th e central lines of social policy. V. PUBLI C SERVICE S A N D BENEFITS : D Y N A M I C G R O W T H MARKE D BY SPECIA L ARRANGEMENT S FO R OCCUPATIONA L G R O U P S

Of al l o f th e element s o f th e ne w mode l o f socia l development , i t i s th e expansion o f service s an d socia l benefit s tha t seem s t o hav e bee n imple 240 BRUN

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merited mos t systematically. Ye t the for m take n b y this expansion highlight s the richness of occupational particularis m i n French society . Benefits: The Formatio n o f a Baroqu e an d Ungovernabl e Syste m

In th e field o f insurance , th e extensio n o f benefit s wa s accompanie d b y a multiplication o f institutions . Th e progressiv e expansio n o f Socia l Securit y coverage too k plac e throug h th e adjunctio n o f specifi c fund s fo r self employed workers. Unemploymen t insurance , supplementar y retiremen t funds , job retraining funds for m a like number o f new sediments in the institutiona l apparatus. Th e 196 7 Socia l Securit y reform s furthe r accentuate d th e com plexity of this system b y establishing a rigorou s separatio n amon g risk s relating to ol d age , health , an d th e family . Complexit y soo n becam e confusio n when loca l government s an d th e Stat e i n tur n develope d mor e activ e socia l action policies . I n the opinion o f the majority o f experts, this baroque system has proven t o be particularly difficult t o regulate because the institutions an d agents i n authorit y ar e s o numerou s an d th e center s o f expertis e capabl e of takin g a n overal l vie w o f th e syste m ar e s o wea k (Revue Frangaise dAdministration Publique 1987). The prim e mover s o f 194 5 sa w i n th e institution s o f Socia l Securit y th e premises of an original form o f social democracy, on e that seemed capable of opening the way to a solid dialogue, a t least in the social domain. I n reality , in th e interes t o f guaranteein g financial responsibility , th e Stat e involve d itself throughout th e management , fosterin g it s bureaucratization, centraliz ing its functioning, an d at least limiting the weight of social representation . The double process of increasing complexity and bureaucratization henc e resulted i n th e formation o f a baroque system , resistan t to any overall polic y of regulation . Throughou t th e Fift h Republic , th e Stat e ha s neve r know n how t o creat e th e condition s fo r a systemati c publi c debat e o n th e majo r directions o f policy i n th e field of social protection . Neithe r parliamen t no r the commission s o f th e pla n hav e reall y know n ho w t o dea l wit h thi s problem. Th e concentratio n o f technica l expertis e o n thi s subjec t i n th e Ministry o f Financ e ha s tende d t o favo r a n accountin g approac h t o th e problem. Th e ver y margina l proposal s fo r actio n tha t emerge d fro m th e States Genera l o f Socia l Securit y i n 198 7 underlin e agai n th e extrem e difficulty o f the problem : a system whos e onl y organize d referenc e cente r i s held b y financial expert s i s better suite d t o installin g bureaucrati c rationin g than t o instigating innovative forms o f redistribution. DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 24

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In th e ver y domai n wher e a n activ e dialogu e betwee n socia l partner s developed, beginnin g wit h th e Fourt h Republic , th e combine d actio n o f sectoral corporatis m an d o f a bureaucratizin g administratio n ha s severel y limited th e reality of social participation . Public Service s an d Corporatis m

The sam e factor s hav e marke d th e developmen t o f the larg e public services. Their growt h wa s realized according to the forms an d prioritie s of the dominant elites in each sector . Henc e th e health polic y of the Fift h Republi c was dominated b y th e overwhelmin g weigh t o f th e universit y hospita l elit e ove r this sector . O f course , th e emergenc e o f thi s elit e di d no t occu r withou t political support . Jamou s ha s demonstrate d ho w i t too k th e join t actio n o f the prime ministe r and o f an elit e of research-oriented physician s to produce the hospita l la w o f 195 8 and it s principal result , full-tim e hospita l employ ment (Jamous 1969) . But once established, thi s elite was to exercise a lasting influence ove r the whole system. By forcing th e medica l elit e t o devot e itsel f ful l tim e t o publi c hospitals , the Stat e succeede d i n disassociatin g a highl y influentia l fractio n o f th e medical corp s from their colleagues . Hencefort h th e universit y hospita l elit e will act on its own in its negotiations with the State. By subsequently favorin g an unprecedente d expansio n o f publi c hospitals , i t pu t it s mar k o n th e French syste m o f care , whic h becam e hospita l centered . B y supporting th e expansion o f th e syste m o f medica l education , whic h i s a t th e bas e o f it s power, i t contributed t o the production o f a large mass of physicians who are now upsettin g th e medica l service s market . Medica l associations , despit e their pretensio n o f representin g th e whol e profession , i n realit y represen t only privat e practitioners , an d thei r leader s mee t wit h som e animosit y a s a result (Steffen 1987) . It i s i n fac t ove r thi s weakes t segmen t o f the medica l professio n tha t th e State ca n mos t easil y impos e th e burde n o f its demands fo r cos t controls. A coherent polic y o f conventiona l rate s was establishe d fo r nonhospita l medi cine i n 1960 ; it was not unti l 198 5 that, throug h a global budget procedure , the Stat e provided itsel f with th e means to contain th e irresistibl e pressure of hospital expenses. Faced wit h th e larg e publi c services , th e Gaullis t stat e presente d itsel f as the hei r o f th e grea t scientisti c consensu s tha t mark s th e Frenc h state . According t o thi s view , a proble m canno t b e bette r treate d tha n b y th e 242 BRUN

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autonomous actio n o f th e grea t profession s endowe d wit h scientifi c knowl edge. Thi s scientisti c consensu s foun d it s primar y applicatio n i n th e grea t industrial, energy , an d technologica l program s tha t marke d th e publi c poli cies o f the Fift h Republic . Bu t thi s Republi c certainl y wa s no t absen t fro m the social domain. Th e almost complete closure of public debate over health policy demonstrate s well , fo r example , th e weigh t o f thi s allianc e betwee n science and the State in this sector. VI. TH E NEOCORPORATIS T MYT H

Of all of the themes advanced b y the reformist s o f the 1960s , i t was that of a contractual socia l polic y tha t ha d th e greates t difficult y i n takin g root . Th e stakes were high: it was a question o f recognizing wage earners as a collective actor in the conduct of economic an d social policy. The Institutionalizatio n o f Socia l Actor s

This contractua l polic y wa s intende d t o find suppor t i n a vigorous polic y o f institutionalization o f socia l actors . I n Frenc h administrativ e languag e tw o terms wit h contrastin g connotation s ar e use d t o designat e th e socia l actor s involved i n policy . On e speak s of "private interests " when i t is a question o f glorifying th e rol e o f th e Stat e a s a guaranto r o f th e genera l interes t i n th e face of the insatiable egotism of the small and the great. One speaks of "social partners" i n referrin g t o dialogu e wit h organization s tha t hav e bee n recog nized as respectable. We hav e elsewher e trace d th e stage s of this initiator y journey , a t the en d of which the miserable special interest is elevated to the rank of social partner (Jobert an d Mulle r 1987) . Recognitio n constitute s th e first stage, permittin g the associatio n t o participat e i n variou s dialogue s an d eventuall y t o receiv e office spac e an d subsidies . Thi s recognitio n ca n tak e a mor e forma l tur n when politica l authoritie s decid e t o accor d th e labe l o f representativeness t o a limite d numbe r o f organizations. Thi s labe l i s not onl y a mark o f prestige; it assure s acces s t o mor e importan t resources , includin g large r subsidies , participation i n election s o f representative s o f occupational groups , seat s o n the Socia l an d Economi c Council , detachmen t o f civil servant s t o work fo r the association , etc . I t open s th e wa y t o a stil l tighte r interactio n wit h th e public spher e whe n th e partne r i s granted comanagemen t o f importan t sec tors of public policy. DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 4

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The mor e the socia l organizatio n i s institutionalized, th e mor e importan t becomes th e contributio n o f th e Stat e a s a proportio n o f it s tota l resources . According t o Fran k Baumgartne r (1985) , i n 198 3 mor e tha n tw o thousan d civil servant s wer e loane d t o th e staff s o f union s an d association s affiliate d with education. Wit h regar d to trade unions, incom e from membershi p dues was generally comparable to subsidies received for the support of training and advancement o f th e grou p (Catal a 1983) . Fo r far m organizations , subsidie s surpassed dues fro m members , particularl y wit h respec t t o th e Nationa l Center of Young Farmers (CNJA) (Keeler 1985) . Hence th e larg e organization s wit h whic h th e Stat e organize s socia l dia logues are very largely dependent on the latter. Whil e these organizations are not thereb y transforme d int o creature s o f the State , institutionalizatio n con tributes strongl y t o channelin g an d slowin g change s i n th e organizatio n o f social mobilization. Publi c resources in fact loosen the dependence of leaders on thei r members . Thes e resource s als o allo w leader s t o expan d services , thereby reinforcing th e loyalty of the membership. A s a result it is a long and difficult proces s fo r a ne w an d riva l organizatio n t o attrac t members , eve n when the y n o longe r trul y feel represente d b y the existing organization. Th e State may attempt to accelerate change by rapidly recognizing the newcomer , but i t the n risk s drawing th e thunde r o f th e ol d organizations , whic h ofte n react violentl y t o thi s typ e o f effort . Th e Nationa l Federatio n o f Farmer s (FNSEA) neve r forgav e Edit h Cresso n fo r attemptin g t o establis h an d t o consolidate riva l far m organization s afte r th e Socialis t victor y o f 1981 . Th e Federation launche d a war of attrition against the Socialist minister, organiz ing numerous demonstration s an d protest s until th e worried Socialis t leader ship replace d Cresso n wit h Miche l Rocard . Rocar d the n devote d himsel f t o calming and reassurin g the Federation (Jober t and Muller 1987) . Institution alization thu s become s a strategi c resourc e fo r a recipien t organization , which then attempt s to assure itself a monopoly position against its rivals. Paradoxically, th e strateg y adopte d b y th e government s o f th e Fift h Re public consisted of inaugurating contractual policies at the most general level —the formatio n o f a globa l socia l compromis e o n income s policy—befor e attacking mor e specifi c problem s suc h a s th e nationa l agreement s o f th e 1970s an d th e definitio n o f the rol e o f union s an d wag e earners withi n th e firm, a proble m finally treate d i n dept h b y th e Aurou x Law s o f 1982 . I t appeared tha t th e strateg y o f participatio n wa s seekin g t o skir t a s lon g a s possible the sensitive problem o f power relationships within th e firm. In attemptin g t o construc t a hous e b y beginning wit h th e roof , on e risk s 244 BRUN

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making grav e miscalculations . Th e mos t paten t failur e concerne d income s policy, whic h appeare d a s th e keyston e o f th e strateg y designe d b y th e reformers. I n orde r t o achiev e simultaneousl y th e objective s o f growt h an d reorientation o f consumption towar d publi c facilities , i t seemed necessar y t o gain control over the movement of nominal incomes . Encouraged b y the succes s of "the wise men" i n endin g the great miners ' strike o f 1963 , the Gaullis t stat e attempted t o launc h a n ambitiou s income s policy. Thi s attemp t rapidl y ende d i n failure . Th e union s denounce d thi s policy a s a simpl e devic e fo r regulatin g wage s i n tha t i t largel y ignore d nonwage incomes , whic h wer e ver y poorl y know n an d difficul t t o control . Moreover, rivalr y between unions, the weakness of their active memberships, and the fragility o f their organizations a t the confederal leve l prevented the m from conductin g negotiation s tha t wer e necessaril y centralized . Ha d the y attempted t o d o so , the y n o doub t woul d hav e bee n incapabl e o f imposin g the slightes t disciplin e o n thei r troops . Th e situatio n wa s littl e differen t o n the sid e o f employers, o f whom w e hav e elsewher e describe d th e organiza tional weaknes s an d th e stron g refusa l o f th e majorit y t o agre e t o eve n a minimum o f openness and disciplin e i n the conduct o f their own businesse s (Jobert and Mulle r 1987) . The myt h o f a grand neocorporatis t agreemen t on income s policy contin ued, however , t o enrich th e language o f planners and politicians . I t inspired the "grea t society " pla n wit h whic h th e governmen t o f Jacque s Chaban Delmas attempte d t o respon d t o the grea t socia l an d cultura l crisi s o f 1968 . It inspired the social strategies of planners who later sought to link income to the distribution o f work. The persistenc e o f the myth was only equaled b y its consistent practica l ineffectiveness . A t n o tim e wa s th e questio n o f incom e distribution th e subjec t o f effectiv e nationa l negotiations . Whil e th e socia l democratic state s have succeeded i n obtainin g collectiv e agreement s t o limi t increases i n nomina l salaries , i n Franc e increase s i n rea l salarie s hav e bee n achieved a t th e pric e o f stron g inflatio n (Camero n 1984) . Th e reductio n o f inflation sinc e 198 3 has no t been th e resul t o f negotiations; it has coincide d with a decline i n th e powe r o f unions weakene d b y the economi c crisi s an d by a loss of members. Thes e fact s confir m th e result s o f comparative studie s that show that only state s endowed wit h a powerful, neocorporatis t structur e for central negotiation s hav e been abl e to carry out sustained policie s for th e regulation o f incomes (Marks 1986) . The ne w impetus given t o contractual politic s unde r th e Chaban-Delma s government woul d n o longe r see k t o achiev e tha t utopi a o f globa l socia l DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 4

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compromise. The proposal established mor e pragmatic and limited objective s for interprofessiona l labo r relations . Afte r 196 8 thi s dialogu e wa s facilitate d by a ne w attitud e o f employer s towar d unions . Thes e wer e n o longe r per ceived necessaril y a s troublemakers; they coul d b e viewed a s mediators wh o prevent little-notice d tension s fro m degeneratin g int o spontaneou s an d un controllable social movements. The Gaullis t government s tha t succeede d eac h othe r afte r th e socia l movements o f 196 8 (an d particularl y th e governmen t o f Jacque s Chaban Delmas, i n whic h Jacque s Delor s wa s th e principa l advisor ) successfull y placed systemati c pressur e o n Frenc h employer s t o negotiate. A n impressiv e amount o f wor k wa s accomplishe d i n a fe w years , particularl y thank s t o agreements that include d mos t of the unions: February 1968 : agreemen t on partial unemploymen t December 1968 : agreemen t on reductio n o f the work week December 1968 : agreemen t on unio n organizatio n withi n the firm March 1969 : agreemen t on jo b security July 1970 : agreemen t on monthl y salaries for workers March 1972 : agreemen t on early retirement and on guaranteed incom e December 1973 : guarantee s i n cases of bankruptcy 1974: agreemen t on full compensatio n fo r unemploymen t March 1975 : framewor k agreemen t on working conditions Several o f thes e agreement s wer e extende d b y furthe r importan t actions , i n particular the law of 1 6 July 197 1 on jo b training, th e law of July 1 3 1971 on collective agreements , an d th e la w o f 1 3 July 1973 . Finally , a smal l begin ning at a contractual income s policy was attempted wit h the establishment of "progress contracts" in the public sector. The dynamis m o f this policy was not linked exclusivel y t o a man an d hi s team. Th e departur e o f Jacque s Chaban-Delma s di d no t pu t a n en d t o innovation i n labo r an d employmen t policy . Contractua l politic s continue d to bea r fruit , bot h wit h respec t t o th e collectiv e an d individua l right s o f workers against dismissal (the law of 1 3 July 197 3 on justificatio n fo r individ ual dismissal; the general agreement of October 197 4 on compensation a t the rate o f 90 percent o f gross salary for layoff s du e t o economic causes ; the la w of Decembe r 197 5 requirin g administrativ e authorizatio n fo r dismissal s fo r economic reasons ) an d wit h respec t t o workin g condition s (creatio n o f th e National Agency for the Improvement o f Working Conditions i n 1973) . However, thi s contractual politics encountered increasin g difficulties. Th e 246 BRUN

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economic crisis, which little by little revealed it s enduring character, increas ingly limite d th e relevanc e o f thes e broa d agreements . Structura l change s affect branche s o f the econom y an d individua l firms i n a n unequa l fashion , making it very difficult t o define unifor m standard s for all. Economi c condi tions, a s well as the issues treated i n collective negotiations, suc h as improvement o f working conditions , sugges t tha t negotiation s shoul d b e a t th e firm level. Ye t i t i s a t thi s leve l tha t employer s ar e mos t reticen t t o engag e i n negotiations tha t migh t encroac h o n thei r power . Moreover , th e incitemen t to negotiat e diminishe d rapidl y i n accordanc e wit h th e eb b o f union mem bership and o f union militanc y during the crisis. This faul t i n th e syste m o f industria l relation s ha d bee n see n b y th e government leader s who commissione d a report fro m Pierr e Sudreau (1975 ) on the reform o f the governance of firms. However, th e hostility of employers prevented an y concrete results from bein g drawn from thi s daring report. In realit y i t too k th e victor y o f th e Lef t i n 198 1 i n orde r fo r Franc e t o adopt, i n th e Aurou x Law s o f 1982 , legislatio n tha t bette r guarantee d th e expression o f th e voice s o f worker s an d union s withi n th e firm. Thi s se t of four law s was initially th e objec t o f extremely violent attacks from employer s and th e conservativ e opposition . Accordin g t o th e latter , th e disturbin g intrusion o f politicized union s int o the firm gravely threatened th e economi c future o f France . I t opene d th e roya l wa y fo r th e implantatio n o f Commu nists throug h th e intermediar y o f the Genera l Confederatio n o f Labor (CGT) . Listening t o certai n leaders , on e woul d hav e though t tha t th e nightmar e o f the communis t sovie t rottin g awa y the whol e o f the countr y wa s not fa r off . In retrospec t on e ca n onl y b e amaze d a t th e excessiv e criticis m tha t thes e laws aroused. Denounced a s a bogeyman at the time of its adoption by many employers, this bod y o f legislation , i n fac t ver y modes t i n it s ambitions, seem s t o hav e been implemente d i n a highl y satisfactor y manner . Agreement s a t th e firm level continue d t o multiply , perhap s thu s announcin g th e adven t i n Franc e of a ne w cultur e o f industria l relations . I t i s moreove r significan t tha t th e rightist majorit y i n th e years 1986-198 8 di d no t find it opportune t o chang e these laws. VII. TH E RESTRUCTURIN G O F TH E WELFAR E STAT E

The notio n o f crisi s ha s neve r bee n a s debased a s in th e cas e o f the welfar e state. T o evok e crisis with respec t t o the Chilea n stat e unde r Allend e seem s DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L P O L I C I E S 2 4

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completely justifie d (Ray o 1987) . What ca n b e observed i n France , a s in th e majority o f Europea n countries , i s bot h th e powerfu l overal l resistanc e o f systems o f socia l interventio n an d som e importan t modification s i n thei r orientation. Th e latte r are seen i n the managemen t o f social modernization , the regulation of public expenditures, an d the administrative decentralizatio n of social policies. The M a n a g e m e n t o f Socia l Modernization : Delayin g Action , Reconversion, a n d Exclusio n

The End of Industrial Policies with Social Objectives. Th e wa y i n whic h industrial relation s hav e bee n buil t i n France , a s described above , ha s pro foundly marke d socia l managemen t an d th e modernizatio n o f France . I n effect al l growt h implie s a sometime s painfu l redistributio n o f economi c activities an d o f people. Th e mor e rapi d th e modernization , th e mor e rapi d the necessar y pac e o f destructio n o f activitie s an d redistributio n o f people . Faced wit h thi s problem , Frenc h socia l polic y seem s t o hav e hesitate d between a delaying action and the management o f exclusion. The hesitation s o f th e "stretcher-beare r State " hav e bee n analyse d b y E. Cohe n (1989) . Th e delayin g action s ar e thos e see n i n th e earl y 1970s , when sectora l pla n afte r sectora l pla n sough t to save occupations an d activi ties tha t modernizatio n seeme d t o condemn . Th e cas e o f th e Frenc h stee l industry offer s a classi c exampl e o f thi s typ e o f situation . Despit e repeate d indications o f crisis, on e finds "the sam e congenital , systematic , institution alized optimism " (Haywar d 1986 , 101) . "Fo r example , wherea s th e Sixt h Plan ha d expecte d a fal l i n stee l employmen t o f four thousan d fro m 1971 — 1975, the number actuall y increase d b y ten thousand" (Hayward 1986 , 93). In reality a large part of what was called industria l polic y was social policy. This situation , moreover , wa s largel y i n accordanc e wit h th e desire s o f French citizen s with respec t to publicly owne d firms. A survey conducted b y SOFRES/Fondation National e de s Science s Politique s a t th e beginnin g o f the 1980 s on th e principa l objective s o f public firms showed clearl y tha t th e majority o f th e respondant s assigne d hig h priorit y t o socia l function s (6 4 percent sai d t o provid e th e maximu m numbe r o f jobs ) or consume r protec tion (5 6 percent). Th e ide a tha t thes e firms should contribut e t o the growt h of th e natio n cam e onl y next , wit h 4 8 percent , and , fa r behin d wit h 1 7 percent, cam e th e ide a tha t the y shoul d promot e ne w techniques . Henc e there was a major ga p between th e industrialist conception o f nationalization 248 BRUN

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held b y the Socialist s and th e value placed o n this view by public opinion. I t is no t surprising , then , tha t th e popularit y o f nationalizatio n droppe d ver y rapidly fro m th e momen t tha t th e governmen t authorize d th e nationalize d firms to tak e of f th e fa t o f thei r surplu s employee s i n orde r t o fac e u p t o international competition . Th e sam e peopl e wh o ha d bee n favorabl e t o nationalization thu s found themselve s approving privatization . This chang e i n publi c firms illustrate s on e o f th e mos t strikin g turnin g points o f socia l policy : th e abandonmen t o f industria l policie s wit h socia l goals. I t wa s wit h respec t t o suc h policie s tha t th e neolibera l rhetori c wa s most heavil y used : i t wa s n o longe r a question o f aidin g i n th e artificia l survival o f lam e ducks , no r o f delayin g necessar y cut s an d restructurin g i n the nam e o f social imperatives . Neoliberalism , wit h it s Darwinia n an d war like connotations, serve d a s the legitimatin g rhetori c fo r th e ne w captains of industry. Between Reconversion and Exclusion. Th e managemen t o f th e peopl e wh o were thu s pushe d asid e ca n b e conceive d eithe r i n term s o f reconversio n o r in terms of exclusion. I n practice the most common resul t was the exclusio n of olde r worker s fro m th e jo b marke t (Guillemar d 1988) . Th e explosiv e development o f system s o f earl y retiremen t profoundl y modifie d th e natur e of discontinuance o f work, whic h becam e les s the exercis e o f a righ t tha n a forced exclusion . At the othe r en d o f the ag e chain, modernizatio n increase d th e difficult y of finding employment fo r poorl y qualifie d youn g people , particularl y sinc e firms tende d t o rais e th e require d level s o f forma l education . Contrar y experiments inspire d b y Bertran d Schwart z nonetheles s showe d tha t youn g people with limite d forma l educatio n coul d hol d skille d job s in ne w technological fields without going back to school (Wuhl 1988) . Yet the efforts o f the present government have concentrated o n formal education , a s if an increas e in the number o f officially approve d degre e holders offers a major wa y out of the difficulties presente d b y current economic changes. Dualism of the Labor Market, Dualism of Systems of Training. Th e stron g development o f vocational trainin g in Franc e might have led one to hope fo r an approach to social modernization base d less on exclusion. Indeed , th e law of Jul y 197 1 o n furthe r educatio n appear s t o hav e bee n th e mos t lastin g consequence o f th e "ne w society " pla n recommende d a t tha t tim e b y th e Chaban-Delmas Governmen t an d b y hi s principa l advisor , Jacque s Delors . DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L P O L I C I E S 2 4

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By imposing on al l firms with mor e than te n employee s a legal obligation t o devote 1. 2 percen t o f thei r payrol l t o training , thi s la w allowe d fo r a rapi d growth o f such activities , whic h i n 198 7 in fac t represente d 2.5 4 percen t o f total payroll . Accordin g t o certai n experts , th e tota l o f fund s devote d t o training place s Franc e amon g th e mos t highl y develope d countrie s i n thi s domain, comparabl e to Sweden (Bruhnes 1989) . In norther n Europe , dismissal s fo r economi c reason s are difficult, neces sarily givin g firms a stron g stimulu s fo r interna l flexibility an d mobility . Elsewhere i n Europe , an d particularl y i n France , externa l flexibility i s fa vored. Wha t rol e ca n th e stron g developmen t o f vocational trainin g pla y i n this second context ? Social modernization implie s a double requirement on the firm. It implies the marginalization , indee d th e elimination o f workers without skills or with obsolete skills . Eac h yea r som e on e hundre d thousan d semiskille d job s disappear. Bu t i t also require s that firms hold an d wi n th e loyalt y o f personne l whose skills are not easily replaceable. I t is a question o f limiting the interna l market o f th e firm an d investin g mos t heavil y i n tha t stabilize d portio n o f employees. The arrangement s fo r furthe r trainin g clearl y favo r manager s an d skille d workers, promisin g sectors of the economy, an d larg e firms (Dubar 1984) . A quarter o f the employee s o f firms subject t o the 1. 2 percen t requiremen t g o through a trainin g perio d ever y year . Thi s figure rise s t o 4 0 percen t fo r training personnel , managers , an d skille d whit e colla r workers , bu t drop s t o 20 percent for employers and skilled blue collar workers (Coulon 1989) . The dualis m o f th e labo r marke t i s thu s extende d b y th e dualis m o f training systems , sinc e the task of providing training fo r th e mos t vulnerabl e segments o f th e populatio n ha s falle n t o publi c authorities . A whole appa ratus ha s bee n fabricate d t o prepar e yout h fo r th e jo b market , a n apparatu s that no w ha s been extende d b y the establishmen t o f local trainin g program s designed fo r recipient s o f the Minimu m Insertio n Incom e (RMI) . Th e link age o f thi s secon d secto r o f trainin g wit h th e employmen t need s o f firms remains ver y problematic. Trainin g program s tha t ar e i n fac t holdin g opera tions do not seem t o be on th e way out. I s it by chance tha t recipient s o f the RMI ar e ofte n th e sam e youn g peopl e wh o hav e alread y know n th e jo y o f training programs? Decentralization of Social Policies. The consequenc e o f thi s polic y orienta tion i s to leave large portions of the poorly qualified populatio n i n a situation 250 BRUN

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of uncertaint y regardin g thei r socia l rights . Th e organizationa l mode l o f Social Securit y buil t i n 194 5 reste d o n th e linkag e betwee n acces s t o socia l rights an d stabl e pai d employment . Thi s lin k i s increasingl y difficul t t o maintain fo r groups that have been marginalize d b y modernization . The extrem e slownes s wit h whic h th e Frenc h stat e rediscovere d povert y and vulnerabilit y an d pu t i n plac e a n apparatu s t o dea l wit h i t i s revealing . Neither th e union s no r th e partie s o f th e Lef t propose d th e ne w policies . These actor s wer e caugh t u p wit h th e administrativ e problem s o f dividin g responsibility (Wha t doe s insuranc e cover ? Wher e doe s th e State' s tas k o f assistance begin?) . I t too k th e activ e pressur e o f ol d an d ne w charitabl e associations i n orde r finally t o brin g t o th e publi c agend a th e ide a o f a minimum income , a n ide a tha t howeve r i s i n practic e i n variou s form s i n most of the countries of Europe. This fac t itsel f raise s a serie s o f questions. Th e managemen t styl e o f th e welfare stat e i n Franc e rest s largel y o n a particula r conceptio n o f socia l democracy accordin g t o whic h organization s representin g worker s an d em ployers shoul d pla y a pivota l rol e i n it s management . I n practice , ca n th e status o f wag e earner s i n genera l b e considere d t o b e sufficientl y homoge neous an d comprehensiv e t o serv e a s a referenc e poin t fo r organization s charged wit h managin g socia l affairs ? Ar e w e no t witnessin g a multifacete d differentiation amon g wage earners that makes any attempt at managing their needs through a single organization increasingl y delicate? One can ask if this problem i s no t reflecte d i n th e increase d developmen t o f territoria l socia l policies: decentralization, jo b training policies associated wit h the Minimu m Income, an d socia l developmen t o f neighborhoods. Whil e th e cor e of regularly employe d wag e earner s continue s t o b e manage d b y the system s based on th e insuranc e principle , th e managemen t o f the poo r and th e vulnerabl e is being buil t o n a mor e territoria l basis , wher e th e Stat e an d loca l govern ments become the principal actors. The searc h fo r a better-coordinated , locall y oriente d socia l polic y ha d been launche d severa l years before b y a modernizing coalitio n tha t criticize d the sectora l an d occupationa l mode l fo r socia l policies . Thi s coalitio n wa s anchored i n a networ k o f hig h civi l servant s a t th e Directorat e o f Socia l Action an d i n th e Plannin g Commission . A grou p o f elit e specialist s o n social question s comin g ou t o f th e Counci l o f State , apparentl y influence d by Pierre Laroque , Jacque s Delors , an d Frangoi s Bloch-Laine , occupie d a n eminent plac e i n thi s network . Thi s grou p produce d a se t o f report s an d decisions tha t lai d ou t a ne w mode l o f socia l polic y aime d a t supportin g o r DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 25

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rapidly reintegratin g fragil e group s b y mean s o f coordinated , preventativ e social activitie s backe d b y loca l governmen t participation . Thi s i s i n effec t the sam e mode l tha t inspire d th e policie s o f keeping elderl y people a t hom e and psychiatri c patient s i n their home districts , bot h begu n i n the 1960s ; the law o f 197 5 o n th e handicapped ; an d th e subsequen t policie s o f redevelop ment o f deteriorate d neighborhood s an d o f socia l integratio n o f young peo ple. Al l of these cases challenged th e corporatist compartmentalization o f the large socia l bureaucracies . The y aime d a t settin g i n motio n loca l socia l policies coordinated aroun d majo r problem s that no single professional coul d resolve alone. The diffus e influenc e o f thes e ne w concept s wa s considerable , bu t a n analysis o f thei r implementatio n show s th e formidabl e obstacle s tha t ar e opposed t o thei r blossomin g (Jober t 1981) . Extrem e scatterin g o f socia l institutions an d rigi d compartmentalization o f occupations continu e t o mark the French socia l countryside. On th e othe r han d th e reinforcemen t o f local government s a s a resul t o f decentralization facilite d th e development of contractual procedure s betwee n the centra l stat e an d loca l government s fo r th e purpos e o f promoting cross cutting policies. The experience of the Commission fo r Socia l Development , renamed th e Interministeria l Delegatio n fo r th e City, demonstrate s th e rela tive effectiveness o f this line of action (Levy 1988) . Neoliberal Ideolog y an d Bureaucrati c Rationin g

The secon d modificatio n i n relation s between profession s an d the state is the result o f increasin g pressur e o n publi c expenditures . Durin g th e perio d o f rapid growth , a consensus easil y coul d b e reache d betwee n profession s an d the stat e o n th e developmen t o f polic y i n eac h sector . I t wa s u p t o th e occupational grou p t o determin e th e need s an d th e method s t o b e used ; i t was up to the state to determine budgets and decide who would pay. This divisio n o f task s becam e difficul t t o maintai n i n a perio d o f crisis . While th e professions continue d t o think abou t problems of adapting to new situations i n term s o f adding o n b y sedimentation, th e financiers demande d redeployment o f resources. Bu t whoever call s for redeploymen t call s also fo r evaluation o f past programs an d establishmen t o f new priorities. Th e persis tent misunderstandin g betwee n physician s and th e Stat e constitutes a particularly clea r exampl e o f th e difficultie s o f thi s exercis e (Jober t an d Steffe n 1988). I n th e nam e o f professiona l autonomy , physician s successfull y op 252 BRUN

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posed an y clos e evaluatio n o f thei r activities , whethe r fro m a technical , economic, o r socia l perspective . Thi s refusa l subsequentl y worke d agains t them, however . Th e mos t powerful center s of expertise and decisio n makin g in matter s o f healt h expenditure s emerge d i n th e Directorat e o f th e Budge t and the Ministry of Finance. Having faile d t o tak e contro l o f th e economi c an d socia l aspect s o f thei r tasks, physician s no w ar e mor e an d mor e subjecte d t o th e procedure s o f bureaucratic rationing , th e onl y kin d tha t financial expert s kno w ho w t o handle. Thes e procedures favor the consolidation o f past gains more than th e search for innovations necessary to adapt the health system to a new socioeconomic context . Th e repeate d failur e o f policies seeking alternatives t o hospitalization ar e evidence of this tendency (Steffen 1987) . It is in the context of rigidification o f professionalized sectora l policies that recent controversie s ove r corporatis m mus t b e seen . I t i s significant tha t th e ideology o f neoliberalism ha s found it s spokesmen amon g th e financial elit e more tha n amon g th e representative s o f Frenc h employers . Th e successfu l essay of Alain Mine , "Th e Egalitaria n Machine, " thu s draw s a good par t of its arguments fro m wor k don e b y the inspectorat e o f Financ e o n th e evolu tion o f public expenditures . Virulen t criticis m o f the organizatio n o f publi c services an d o f th e recognize d profession s attache d t o the m reflect s th e powerlessness o f th e rulin g elit e t o stimulat e chang e an d adaptatio n i n th e large public services . The recommende d recours e to the market, t o competition, thu s appears to be the onl y leve r for overcomin g th e resistanc e o f these recalcitrant professions . The doctrinair e neoliberalis m hel d b y conservative politica l leader s had a passing succes s a s an intellectua l basi s of their oppositio n t o th e triumphan t socialism o f 1981 . However , th e profoun d attachmen t o f the Frenc h t o th e social rights guaranteed b y Social Securit y quickly led the parties of the Right to moderate their ambitions i n this domain (Schnapper , Brody , an d Kastory ano 1986 ; SOFRE S 1982 , 1983) . I n contrast , manageria l neoliberalism , founded o n a critique of the corporatist model o f public management, seem s to hav e gaine d increasin g influence , extendin g fa r beyon d th e intellectua l circles of the Right. Curren t Frenc h publi c opinion i s marked b y a profoun d ambiguity. I t continue s t o vie w socia l right s a s a majo r attribut e o f citizen ship, whil e offerin g a triumphal welcom e t o anticorporatist effort s tha t chal lenge the traditional managemen t principle s of the large public services. There remain s th e tas k o f evaluatin g th e effect s o f thes e increasin g at tempts at rationing on th e evolution o f social policies. The hypothesi s develDEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 5

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oped her e wil l b e tha t rationin g lead s t o th e impoverishmen t o f th e publi c sector an d tha t i n th e lon g ter m thi s ca n hav e tw o type s o f consequences . First, th e impoverishmen t o f th e publi c secto r generate s the blockage of innovation i n th e publi c secto r fo r fea r o f highlightin g costl y need—fo r example, alternative s t o hospitalization—eve n whe n the y ar e necessary . There follow s fro m thi s a tendenc y t o confe r innovation , research , an d th e implementation o f ne w solution s o n th e market , a s i n th e cas e o f manage ment o f dependen t ol d people . Thi s legitimize s th e libera l rhetori c tha t presumes tha t the publi c secto r i s incapable o f innovation an d tha t manage ment of social affairs shoul d be conferred o n ne w entrepreneurs. Second, the impoverishment of the public sector breaks up the social coalition favorable to the public. A s differentiatio n amon g wag e earner s progresses, ther e appear s a ne w category o f prosperous wage earners, willin g to make personal contributions i n order to obtain mor e and better services. A group of OECD experts alludes to the emergence of a new "well-to-do class," no longe r makin g u p 4-1 0 percen t o f th e populatio n bu t 4 0 percent . It s consumerist demand s fo r qualit y service s fi t th e aspiration s o f professiona l groups t o pu t i n plac e th e mos t advance d techniques . I n a perio d o f eco nomic growth , thi s coalitio n serve d a s a fulcru m fo r th e expansio n o f th e public service , particularl y hospita l care . Bu t wer e th e publi c servic e t o b e impoverished, th e sam e preoccupation s coul d generat e a powerful coalitio n in favor o f privatization. Rooted i n democratic citizenship , socia l policies have proven thei r formi dable capacit y fo r resistanc e t o change . Bu t thei r mod e o f organizatio n i s suffering th e backlas h o f structura l change s tha t ar e goin g throug h Frenc h society: th e growin g differentiatio n o f th e worl d o f wag e earner s an d th e increasing vulnerability o f a large number o f them plac e in doubt a model of social democracy tha t seems to have exhausted it s dynamism. I s it by chance that th e mos t promisin g experiment s o f Frenc h socia l polic y hav e bee n carried ou t i n th e contex t o f a mor e territoria l conceptio n o f th e protecto r state? Bu t i n th e lon g ter m on e canno t dismis s th e hypothesi s tha t bureau cratic rationin g o f social policie s will lea d t o increase d privatizatio n o f these services. VIII. C O N C L U S I O N

This journe y throug h Frenc h socia l polic y no w allow s fo r specificatio n o f some o f th e limit s o f neocorporatis t approache s an d suggest s som e comple 254 BRUN

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mentary hypothese s concernin g th e linkage s betwee n publi c policie s an d social mediation . The principa l criterio n use d b y neocorporatis t approache s seem s bot h relevant and limited . Th e existenc e of embracing socia l organizations, tend ing toward monopol y representatio n o f interests and endowe d wit h a centralized styl e o f organization , seem s t o b e a conditio n fo r th e definitio n o f concerted socia l strategies . Onl y powerfu l an d centralize d union s ca n limi t demands fo r salar y increase s when the y ca n reasonabl y expec t that i n retur n they will gain an active social policy as well as a guarantee of limited but real increases in incom e (Cameron 1984) . The Frenc h cas e confirms thi s hypothesis and at the same time shows the limits of political voluntarism i n this field. All governments, al l new political elites inheri t a mod e o f organizatio n o f classe s an d profession s ove r whic h they hav e ver y limited influenc e i n th e shor t term . Th e abundan t resource s given b y politicians t o th e "socia l partners " an d th e institutionalizatio n o f a tripartite dialogu e i n certai n instance s wer e insufficien t t o overcom e th e segmentation and the organizational weaknes s of the major socia l actors. Th e global socia l democrati c compromis e remain s a drea m beyon d reac h eve n when Socialist s ar e leadin g th e country . Th e multiplicatio n o f partial com promises remain s th e rul e an d wit h the m th e maintenanc e o f a dualis t structure o f mediation . Alongsid e th e privilege d sectors , i n whic h a n occu pational grou p ca n obtai n on e o f th e partia l agreements , remai n larg e sec tions o f th e populatio n tha t ar e exclude d fro m socia l citizenship , i f on e understands tha t t o mea n participatio n i n th e definitio n o f socia l policie s through th e medium o f large organizations. Hence the example of France demonstrates well that it would be incorrec t to equat e neocorporatis m wit h th e institutionalizatio n o f relation s betwee n the State and social organizations. I f one attempted t o construct a typology of political system s according to the State's share of resources available to social actors, i t i s no t a t al l clea r tha t th e neocorporatis t state s woul d com e ou t on top. It would als o b e a seriou s erro r t o equat e th e organizationa l weaknes s o f the world o f wage earners with a low level of social mobilization. I f that were the case, i t would b e incomprehensible tha t Franc e develope d a set of social policies comparabl e i n thei r breadt h t o thos e o f neocorporatis t state s o f th e social democrati c type . I n thi s countr y th e detou r throug h politica l mobili zation seem s t o hav e compensate d fo r th e anemi a o f larg e socia l organiza tions. Th e socia l stat e appear s i n Franc e t o b e largel y a dimensio n o f DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L POLICIE S 2 5

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democratic citizenship . Thi s i s what explains that the development o f public services an d benefit s precede d b y severa l decade s th e institutionalizatio n o f labor-management relation s i n th e center s o f economi c power . Thi s i s also what explain s th e rol e o f a n elit e issuin g fro m th e hig h civi l servic e i n th e conduct of social policy. The influenc e o f th e profession s i s the logica l consequenc e o f thi s wea k overall organization o f the major socia l actors and of the scientistic consensus that ha s ha d a lastin g influenc e o n Frenc h publi c activities . Thi s influenc e varies, however , accordin g t o th e politica l an d institutiona l context . Th e strong party organizations o f the Fifth Republi c clearly limit the possibility of playing partie s off against each othe r an d thereb y diminis h th e weight o f the professions. Similarly , th e reinforcemen t o f the executiv e remove s channel s of acces s t o th e uppe r administratio n an d weaken s organization s tha t relie d on the number o f their members to impress Parliament . Finally, i t appear s tha t publi c polic y ca n eve n hav e a certai n impac t o n the evolutio n o f social structure . Th e organizatio n o f the surviva l o f farmer s and th e ol d middl e classe s unde r th e Thir d Republi c i s a n example . Th e management o f thei r accelerate d declin e unde r th e Fift h Republi c i s a further example . Analyse s o f publi c polic y hav e ofte n favore d th e stud y o f innovative policies , suc h a s majo r technologica l program s an d ne w urba n policies. Th e proble m o f the socia l managemen t o f decline, whethe r i t be a case of branches o f the economy , regions , o r social classes, ha s not receive d all o f the attentio n tha t i t deserves (for exception s see Cohen 1989 ; Hayward 1986). I t i s here , n o doubt , tha t som e o f th e mos t significan t difference s between state s would appear .

REFERENCES

Baumgartner, Frank . 1985 . "Frenc h Interes t Group s an d th e Pluralism-Corporatis m Debate." Pape r presente d t o th e America n Politica l Scienc e Association , Ne w Orleans, August-September 1985 . Berger, Suzanne . 1981 . "Regim e an d Interes t Representation : Th e Frenc h Tradi tional Middl e Classes. " I n Organizing Interests in Western Europe, edite d b y S . Berger. Cambridge : Cambridge Universit y Press. Birnbaum, Pierre . 1977 . Les Sommets de Xetat: Essai sur l'elite du pouvoir en France. Paris: Seuil. Brunhes, Bernard . 1989 . Interview in Espace social europeen no. 2 0 (19 May): 10. Cameron, David . 1984 . "Socia l Democracy , Corporatism , Labou r Quiescenc e an d 256 BRUN

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the Representatio n o f Economi c Interests. " In Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, edite d by J. H. Goldthorpe . Oxford : Clarendon Press. Catala, Nicole . 1983 . "Les Moyens du pouvoir syndical." Pouvoir no. 16 . Cohen, Elie . 1989 . L'Etat brancardier. Paris : Caiman Levy. Coulon, M . B . 1989 . "Formation : Place aux professionnels." Espace social europeen (19 May): 12. Delorme, Robert , and Christine Andre. 1983 . Etat et leconomie. Paris: Seuil. Donzelot, Jacques . 1984 . Ulnvention du social. Paris : Fayard. Dubar, Claude. 1984 . La Formation professionnelle continue. Paris: Decouverte. Durkheim, Emile . 1964 . The Division of Labor in Society. London: Macmillan/Free Press. Ehrmann, Henry . 1957 . Organized Business in France. Princeton : Princeton University Press. Guillemard, Ann e Marie. 1988 . Le Declin du social. Paris : PUF. Hatzfeld, Henri . 1971 . Du pauperismed la securite sociale. Paris: Colin. Hayward, Jack . 1986 . The State and the Market Economy. Ne w York : Ne w Yor k University Press. Jamous, Haroun . 1969 . Sociologie de la decision, la reforme des etudes medicales et des structures hospitalieres. Paris : CNRS. Jobert, Bruno. 1981 . Le Social en plan. Paris : Editions ouvrieres. Jobert, Bruno, and P. Muller . 1987 . UEtat en action. Paris : PUF. Jobert, Bruno , an d D. Renard . 1988 . Neoliberalisme doctrinaire et neoliberalisme de gestion: Les deux faces d'un phenomene frangais. Grenoble : CERAT. Mimeo . Jobert, Bruno , an d M . Steffen . 1988 . "Decision s e t non-decision s e n matier e d e politique de sante." Paper delivered to the Congres de la Societe frangaise de sante publique, Lyon , 1 6 and 1 7 May. Keeler, John . 1985 . "Situatin g Franc e o n th e Pluralism-Corporatis m Continuum. " Comparative Politics 17: 229-49. Kuisel, Richard . 1981 . Capitalism and the State in Modern France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lehmbruch, Gerhard . 1984 . "Concertatio n an d th e Structur e o f Corporatis t Net works." I n Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, edite d b y J . H . Goldthorpe. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Levy, F . 1988 . Bilanlperspective des contrats de plan de developpement social des quartiers. 2 vols. Paris : Commissariat General du Plan. Marks, Gary . 1986 . "Neocorporatis m an d Incom e Policie s i n Wester n Europ e and North America." Comparative Politics 18: 253-78. Organization fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Developmen t (OECD) . 1985 . Social Expenditures, 1960-1990. Paris : OECD. Pisier-Kouchner, Evelyne . 1983 . "L e Servic e publi c entr e liberalism e e t collectiv isme." Es£zrzr 12:9-19 . Rayo, Gustavo . 1987 . "L a Politiqu e social e sou s u n regim e autoritaire : l e ca s d u Chili." Doctoral (third cycle) thesis in political science, Universit y of Grenoble. Revue Frangaise dAdministration Publique. 1987. No . 43 . Specia l issu e entitled "La Sante est-elle sous administree?" DEMOCRACY AN D SOCIA L P O L I C I E S 2 5

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Sartori, Giovanni . 1987 . The Theory of Democracy Revisited. 2 vols . Chatham : Chatham House. Schnapper, Dominique , Jeann e Brody, and Riva Kastoryano. 1986 . "Le s Finances et la securite sociale." Vingtieme Siecle 10: 67-82. Segrestin, Denis . 1984 . Le Phenomene corporatiste. Paris : Fayard . Sellier, Frangois . 1984 . La Confrontation sociale en France, 1936-1981, Paris : PUF. SOFRES. 1980 . "L e Servic e publi c industrie l e t commercial." A survey conducte d by Alai n Lancelo t fo r th e Foundatio n National e de s Science s Politiques . Paris : SOFRES. Mimeo . —. 1982 . "Le s Frangai s e t l e progres , 20 0 an s d'er e industrielle. " A surve y published in UExpansion, 1 9 and 24 June. . 1983 . "L a Franc e e n 1983. " A surve y publishe d i n L'Expansion, 16-2 1 March. Steffen, Monica . 1987 . Les Politiques alternatives dans le domaine de la sanU: A report for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Solidarity . Wuhl, Simon . 1988 . "L'Insertio n des jeunes dit de bas niveau." Pour no. 112 . Zysman, John. 1983 . Governments, Markets and Growth. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGIRC Associatio n general e de s institution s d e retrait e de s cadres . Agency forme d b y mutua l agreemen t betwee n employer s an d employees i n 194 7 t o coordinat e divers e supplementar y pen sion funds fo r cadres. AL Allocatio n logemen t familiale . Housin g allowanc e base d o n family income , create d i n this form i n 1987 . ALS Allocatio n logemen t sociale . Housin g subsidie s t o certain cat egories of individuals (handicapped, elderly , etc.) . ANPE Agenc e nationa l pou r Temploi . Agenc y forme d i n 196 7 an d primarily finance d fro m unemploymen t insuranc e fund s fo r retraining workers. APL\ Aid e personnalise e a u logement . Progra m create d i n 197 7 t o provide housing subsidies directly to individuals. ARRCO Associatio n de s regime s d e retraite s complementaires . Agenc y formed b y mutua l agreemen t o f employer s an d employee s i n 1961 to coordinat e remainin g suplementar y pensio n plans fo r lower-level cadres. AVTS Allocatio n au x vieu x travailleur s salaries . Minimu m pensio n established i n 194 1 an d kep t a s basic pensio n fo r al l workers . Paid from th e regime generale, or basic state pension fund . BAPS ABudge t annex e de s prestation s sociale s agricoles . Socia l secu rity budge t o f al l benefit s provide d throug h th e Ministr y o f Agriculture for farmers an d farmworker s sinc e 1967 . CDC Caiss e des depots et consignations. A national ban k tha t man ages the financing of local governments. 259

CEL Compt

e d'epargn e logement . Subsidize d an d tax-exemp t sav ings accounts for the purchase of a residence. CES Certifica t d'etude s specialisees . Degre e awarded for largely theoretical educatio n i n medica l specialities , replace d b y residen cies in 1982-198 5 reforms . CFDT Confederatio n franchis e democratiqu e du travail. The formerl y Catholic trad e union ; generall y sympatheti c t o th e Socialis t Party. CFF Credi t foncie r d e France . A semipublic ban k create d i n 195 0 to provide loans and subsidie s for housing construction . CFTC Confederatio n frangais e de s travailleurs chretiens . Catholi c trad e union tha t changed it s name to the CFDT i n 1964 . CGC Confederatio n general e de s cadres . Considere d a labo r unio n for th e purpos e o f Socia l Securit y an d represent s cadres in al l pension negotiations . CGL Confederatio n general e du logement . Tenants ' association . CGLS Caiss e d e garanti e d u logement . Create d i n 198 6 ou t o f th e old CPHLM t o administer housin g loans. CGPME Confederatio n general e de s petite s e t moyenne s enterprises . Principal associatio n representin g small businessmen . CGT Confederatio n general e d u travail . Th e larges t Frenc h trad e union, wit h clos e link s t o th e Communis t Party . Frequentl y boycotts negotiations on pensions and othe r labor issues. CGT-FO Confederatio n general e du travail-Force ouvriere. A trade union that brok e awa y fro m th e CG T ove r th e latter' s tie s t o th e Communist Party ; the least partisan o f the major unions . CHU Centre s hospitalier s universitaires . Researc h an d teaching hospitals. CIL Comite s interprofessionnel s d u logement . Administrativ e agencies tha t collec t mandator y contribution s fro m employer s for the purpose of housing construction . CNAF Caiss e national e de s allocation s familiales . Fun d providin g family allowances , mothe r an d chil d support ; autonomousl y established sinc e 1947 . CNAMTS Caiss e national e d e Tassuranc e maladi e de s travailleur s sal aries. Principa l fun d fo r th e administratio n o f publi c health insurance , separate d fro m genera l socia l securit y i n 1967. 260 ABBREVIATION

S

CNAV Caiss

e national e d e Tassuranc e vieillesse . Fun d tha t manage s all state pensions and transfers contributions to other insuranc e funds fo r all retired benefits . CNPF Conseil nationa l d u patrona t frangais. Mai n employe r associa tion, whic h conduct s mos t national-leve l negotiation s fo r so cial and unemploymen t insurance . CPHLM Caiss e de s pret s au x habitation s a loye r modere . A branch o f the CD C charge d fro m 196 6 t o 198 6 wit h makin g loan s fo r the construction o f public housing. CSMF Confederatio n de s syndicats medicaux frangais. Unti l 196 0 the sole union representin g physicians in private practice. FO Forc e ouvriere . A trade unio n tha t brok e away from th e CG T over the latter' s ties to the Communist party ; the leas t partisan of the major unions . FMF Federatio n des medecins de France. Sinc e 196 0 the competing union t o CSMF fo r th e representatio n o f physicians i n privat e practice. FNE Fond s nationa l d e Temploi . Fun d financed fro m lev y o n em ployers t o provid e supplementar y benefit s t o unemploymen t insurance benefits o f low-paid workers. FNS Fond s nationa l d e solidarity . Fun d provide d fro m genera l ta x revenues since 195 6 to add supplementary benefit s t o low basic pensions. FNSEA Federation national e de s syndicats d'exploitants agricoles . Th e dominant farmers' association . HLM Habitatio n a loyer modere. Subsidize d publi c housing, usuall y built and manage d b y public and semipubli c corporations . INED Institu t nationa l d'etude s demographiques . Governmen t re search bod y tha t collect s demographi c dat a an d advise s o n social policy. MRP Mouvemen t republicai n populaire . Frenc h Christia n Demo cratic party created afte r Worl d War II. MSA Mutualit e social e agricole . Agenc y withi n th e Ministr y o f Agriculture tha t collect s socia l insuranc e contribution s fro m th e agricultural sector ; no w heavil y dependen t o n transfer s fro m the regime generate and stat e budget. PAH Prim e a Amelioratio n d e Thabitat . Loan s t o low-incom e hom e owners for the rehabilitation o f housing. A B B R E V I A T I O N S 26

1

PALULOS Prime s a Tamdioration d e logements a usage locatif et a occupation sociale . Loa n progra m fo r th e rehabilitatio n o f HL M and other social housing. PAP Pret s d'accessio n a l a propriete . Governmen t progra m provid ing subsidized loan s to low-income peopl e for th e purchase of housing. PEL Pla n d'epargne logement . A subsidized and tax-exempt savings plan for the purchase of a residence. PLA Pre t locatif aide. Loa n program for construction o f housing for low-income groups. PLI Pret s locatifs intermediaries . Subsidize d loans for constructio n of middle-income renta l housing . RMI Revenu e minimu m d'insertion . Grant s t o individual s create d in 198 8 to support certai n categorie s o f disadvantaged, unem ployed persons during job training. RPF Rassemblemen t d u peupl e frangais . Th e Gaullis t part y i n th e Fourth Republic . SMH Syndica t d e l a m£decin e hospitaliere . Hospita l physicians ' association; politically affiliated wit h the Left . SMIC Salair e minimu m interprofessionne l d e croissance. Minimu m wage automatically indexe d t o purchasing power o f minimu m income. SNAM Syndica t nationa l de s medecins , chirurgiens , specialiste s e t biologistes de s hopitau x publics . Principa l associatio n o f Frenc h hospital physicians. SNCH Syndica t nationa l de s cadre s hospitaliers . Hospita l directors ' association. UIMM Unio n de s industrie s metallurgique s e t minieres . Successo r t o prewar socia l researc h grou p of the Comit e de s forges, provid ing statistic s an d report s o n socia l insuranc e t o th e privat e sector. UNAF Unio n national e de s association s familiales . Principa l federa tion of family associations . UNANIM Unio n national e autonom e de s nouveau x interne s e n mede cine. Represent s residents in general medicine . UNCAF Unio n national e de s caisse s d'allocation s familiales . Principa l manager of family benefits .

262 ABBREVIATION

S

UNEDIC Unio n national e pou r Templo i dan s Tindustri e e t l e com merce. Agenc y managin g unemploymen t insuranc e unde r a mutual agreemen t of employers and employee s since 1958 . UNIRS Unio n national e de s institution s d e retraite s des salaries. Agenc y formed b y mutua l agreemen t i n 1961 , whe n supplementar y pensions were generalized t o most of the working population. UNR Unio n pou r la Nouvelle Republique . Th e Gaullis t party, 1958— 1962; subsequently change d it s name several times.

ABBREVIATIONS 26

3

INDEX

Abortion, 146 , 151 , 172 , 17 5 Accident insurance , 7 , 4 0 Adenauer, Konrad , 3 7 Adoption, 18 1 Aide a la pierre. See Housing subsidies : fo r construction Aide personnalisee a u logemen t (APL) , 193 , 194, 201 , 204 , 210-12 , 221-24 , 226-2 7 Alcohol tax , 13 3 Allende, Salvador , 24 7 Allocation au x vieu x travailleur s salarie s (AVTS), 36 , 4 1 Allocation logemen t familial e (AL) , 193 . See also Housing subsidies : to individual s Allocation logemen t social e (ALS) , 19 3 Ashford, Douglas , 6 , 2 1 Association de s regime s d e retraite s comple mentaires (ARRCO) , 3 5 Association general e de s institution s d e re traite de s cadres (AGIRC) , 35 , 4 0 Association national e de s etudiants e n medi cine d e Franc e (ANEMF) , 11 5 Auroux Laws , 244 , 24 7 Australia, 60 , 62 , 6 3 Austria, 6 , 9 , 60-64 , 6 9 Baccalaureat, 1 8 Bacon, Paul , 16 5 Barre, Raymond , 123 , 137 , 174-75 , 21 3 Barzach, Michele , 116 , 121 , 126 , 129 , 131 , 133, 13 9 Baumgartner, Frank , 24 4 Beaupere, Jacques , 13 0

Beauvoir, Simon e de , 15 4 Belgium, 5 , 9 , 60-64 , 69 , 7 0 Belot, Jean , 13 7 Beregovoy, Pierre , 24 , 46 , 50 , 5 4 n 21 , 12 3 Billoux, Francois , 15 3 Birth control , 162 , 16 9 Birthrate, 146 , 149-50 , 158 , 169 , 175 , 177, 18 3 Bismarck, Ott o von , 21 , 3 3 Bloch-Laine, Frangois , 21 , 236 , 240 , 25 1 Blum, Leon , 3 7 Boubli, Bernard , 20 3 Boudon, Raymond , 1 9 Boulin, Robert , 4 5 Boverat, M. , 14 9 Britain: housin g polic y in , 188 , 207 , 225 27; social expenditure s of , 60 , 62 , 63 , 69; social policie s of , 6 , 7 , 24-25 , 37 , 41 , 42 Budget, 22 1 Budget global, 105-11 , 13 1 Buisson Report , 3 9 Bureaux d'assistance , 3 3 Bureaux d e bienfaisance, 3 3 Business an d th e welfar e state , 6- 8 Business associations . See Employers: associations of Caillavet, Jean , 16 2 Caisse d e garanti e d u logemen t (CGLS) , 19 6 Caisse des depots e t consignation s (CDC) , 190, 196-98 , 227 , 22 9 Caisse de s prets au x habitation s a loye r mod ere (CPHLM) , 19 6

265

Caisse national e de l'assuranc e maladi e de s travailleurs salarie s (CNAMTS) , 43 , 9 8 99, 13 0 Caisse national e de l'assuranc e vieilless e (CNAV), 4 3 Caisse national e de s allocation s familiale s (CNAF), 36 , 41 , 43 Cameron, David , 1 Canada, 60 , 62-6 3 Canlorbe, Pierre , 13 6 Catholic Church , 3 , 107 , 15 3 Catholic Left , 3 9 Catholics: and famil y policy , 145-46 , 161 , 166; and th e welfar e state , 9-1 1 Catholic schools , 8 Central Committe e fo r Famil y Allowances , 149 Centre d'etude s de s revenue s e t des cout s (CERC), 2 6 Centres hospitalier s universitaire s (CHU) . See University Hospita l Center s Certificat d'etude s specialisee s (CES) , 11 3 Chaban-Delmas, Jacques , 45 , 84 , 170-72 , 245-46, 24 9 Chefs de service, 118-22 Chevenement, Jean-Pierre , 2 0 Child care : for childre n o f physicians, 104 ; expansion of , 164 , 179 , 181-82 ; partisa n attitudes toward , 178-79 ; Planning Com mission on , 154 , 17 0 Child custody , 18 3 Children: ai d to , 15 ; health car e of , 123 ; legal categorie s of , 181 ; tax exemptions for , 164, 17 5 Christian Democrati c parties , 9 , 65-6 9 Christians: in plannin g an d socia l adminis trations, 24 0 Chile, 24 7 Chirac Government : economi c polic y of , 187; health polic y of , 111 , 122 , 126-33 , 136-40; housing polic y of , 222-2 5 Chirac, Jacques , 25 , 184 . See also Chirac Government Citizenship: and socia l protection , 237 , 254 56 Civil servants : and extensio n o f social ser vices, 98 ; and famil y policy , 155 ; in Fourth Republic , 236-37 ; housing of , 214; pensions of , 22 ; power o f over socia l

266 INDE

X

policy, 256 ; prestige of , 21 ; and republica n corporatism, 235 ; retirement of , 48 ; in social securit y agencies , 43 , 5 3 n 13 ; training of , 1 9 Cohen, Elie , 24 8 College o f Secondar y Educatio n (CES) , 1 8 Collins, Doreen , 20 1 Comite d e liaiso n e t d'actio n de s syndicat s hospitaliers (CLASH) , 12 0 Comites d'entreprise , 3 8 Comites interprofessionel s d u logemen t (CIL), 19 9 Commission de conciliation , 206 , 22 0 Commission de s comptes de l a securit e sociale, 13 1 Commission fo r Socia l Development , 25 2 Commission o n Consumptio n an d Socia l Modernization, 15 3 Commission o n Manpower , 15 5 Common Program , 17 2 Communist Part y (PCF) : and famil y policy , 152-53, 156 ; and housin g policy , 161 ; and mandator y socia l insurance , 9 ; and postwar socia l reforms , 38-39 ; i n Socialis t Government, 125 , 20 1 Communist trad e unions , 3 6 Compte d'epargn e logemen t (CEL) , 19 8 Confederation de s syndicat s medicau x fran cos (CSMF) , 99 , 128-30 . See also Physicians: associations o f Confederation franchis e de s travailleur s Chretiens (CFTC) , 16 1 Confederation general e de s cadres (CGC) , 40 Confederation general e d u logemen t (CGL) , 213 Confederation general e d u travai l (CGT) , 22, 38 , 153 , 155-57 , 162 , 24 7 Conseil nationa l d e l a resistance , 9 7 Conseil nationa l d u patrona t frangai s (CNPF), 35 , 36,40 , 44 , 5 3 n 1 5 Conseil superieu r de s hopitaux , 109 , 119 21 Conservative parties : and socia l expenditures , 65-67 Constitution o f the Fourt h Republic , 14 5 Corporatism, 223-24 , 232-33 , 235 , 239 40, 242-47 , 253-5 6 Council o f State , 11 9

Credit foncie r d e Franc e (CFF) , 189 , 197 98, 20 1 Cresson, Edith , 24 4 Debre, Bernard , 120 , 135-3 6 Debre, Michel : and education , 18 ; health policies of , 125-26 , 136 ; on natalism , 165-66 Delors, Jacques : as advisor t o Chaban-Del mas, 45 , 246 , 249 ; as Ministe r o f Econ omy, 46 ; and neocorporatism , 240 ; as specialist o n socia l policy , 170 , 25 1 Delouvrier, Paul , 15 5 Democratic citizenshi p an d socia l protection , 237, 254-5 6 Democracy: theorie s of , 23 2 Denmark, 60-64 , 69 , 70 , 19 1 Deregulation o f housing, 205-1 8 Derlin, Maurice , 130-3 1 De Swaan , Abram , 7- 8 Devaquet, Alain , 12 8 Directorate o f Socia l Action , 25 1 Directorate o f the Treasury , 23 6 Disability insurance , 7 Divorce, 151 , 158 , 174 , 182-8 3 Droit de depassement, 100-101 Drug an d alcoho l treatmen t centers , 105 , 107 Duclaud-Williams, Roge r H. , 189 , 21 4 Dufoix, Georgina , 116 , 120-21 , 123 , 179 Dupeyroux, Jean-Jacques , 17 0 Durkheim, Emile , 147-48 , 23 5 Economic an d Socia l Council , 183 , 20 3 Economic growt h an d socia l policy , 68-70 , 238 Education: expansio n of , 21 ; higher, 18-19 ; and incom e distribution , 17-18 ; for par ents, 183-84 ; pre-elementary, 24 ; secondary, 18 , 24 ; and socia l equality , 17-19 ; and state-building , 2 1 Election: o f 1951 , 161 ; of 1965 , 169 ; of 1962, 166 ; of 1978 , 178 ; of 1981 , 123 , 127; of 1988 , 140 ; to socia l securit y coun cils, 156-5 7 Employers: associations of , 235 , 237-39 , 245; housing contribution s of , 198-99 , 217; and socia l insurance , 7-8 , 35 , 4 7

Equality, 17-19 , 232 . See also Income dis tribution European Community : economi c effec t of , 236-38; an d Frenc h businessmen , 238 39; and Frenc h farmers , 238; and Frenc h housing, 229 ; and saving s accounts, 21 7 Fabius, Laurent , 178 , 18 1 Familialism, 10 , 145-46 , 159-60 , 16 8 Familial vote , 152 , 15 4 Families: changing conception s of , 173 , 182 ; legal definition s of , 158 ; traditional con ception of , 158 ; types of , 14 8 Family allowances : administration of , 155 57; changing basi s of , 168 ; expenditures for, 159-60 ; and incom e distribution , 16 ; origins of , 10 ; and poverty , 36 ; relative de cline of , 174-75 ; socialist refor m of , 23 , 180-81; an d wag e levels , 156 ; for workin g mohers, 175-7 6 Family Code , 149-51 , 154 , 17 5 Family policy , 144-86 ; and housing , 161 63; origins o f i n France , 144-49 ; fro m 1918-1945, 149-52 ; in th e Fourt h Re public, 152-64 ; i n th e Fift h Republic , 165-85 Farmers: associations of , 238 , 244 ; pension plans of , 23 ; and socia l security , 11 , 46 Farm workers , 3 5 Faure, Maurice , 161-62 , 164 , 218 , 22 0 Federation de s medecin s de Franc e (FMF) , 129, 130 , 13 7 Federation o f Larg e Families , 14 9 Federation national e d e solidarit y (FNS) , 41 Feminism, 154-55 , 162 , 169 , 18 4 Fifth Republic : housin g polic y in , 165-85 ; social expenditur e in , 74-83 ; socia l poli cies of , 1 , 5 , 237-3 8 Finland, 6 , 60 , 62-6 3 Fonds d e solidarit y pou r Temploi , 4 6 Fonds nationa l de solidarit y (FNS) , 3 6 Fontanet, Joseph , 16 5 Fourth Republic : family polic y under , 145 , 152-64; ministeria l stabilit y in , 53 ; social expenditure in , 74-77 , 81 ; social policie s in, 10 , 235-3 7 French Confederatio n o f Christian Worker s (CFTC), 161 , 16 4

INDEX 26

7

Garbay, Michel , 12 1 Gaulle, Charle s de : on birt h rates , 153 ; on Europe, 166-67 ; on planning , 239 ; resignation of , 38-39 ; social expenditure s of , 74-84; social polic y of , 42-4 4 Gaullists: and interes t groups , 237 ; and neo corporatism, 240 ; and right s o f women , 172; and socia l policy , 42 ; and solidarity , 97 General Confederatio n o f Labo r (CGT) , 22 , 38, 153 , 162 , 24 7 General Confederatio n o f Labor-Forc e Ouvriere, 16 2 General Confederatio n o f Smal l an d Me dium Firm s (CGPME) , 237-3 8 General Inspectorat e o f Socia l Affairs , 16 8 General Plannin g Commission . See Planning Germany: developmen t o f social polic y in , 5-7, 9 ; housing in , 191 ; postwar socia l policy in , 33-34 , 37 ; social benefit s in , 44; social expenditure s of , 42 , 60-64 , 7 0 Gingembre, Leon , 23 8 Giroud, Franchise , 17 3 Giscard d'Estaing , Valery : family polic y of , 173-79; healt h polic y of , 105 , 123 , 136 37; on right s o f women, 172 ; social expen ditures of , 23 , 74-84 ; social reform s of , 44-45 Goodin, Rober t E. , 1 2 Grand burea u de s pauvres de Paris , 3 Grandes ecoles, 19 Grands corps, 98 Guesde, Jules , 9

funding of , 98-99 ; and incom e distribu tion, 15 ; reimbursement level s of , 99 . See also Health polic y Health policy , 94-143 ; of Chirac Govern ment, 126-33 ; cost control in , 99-101 , 105-11; growin g consensu s on , 140 ; origin an d characte r of , 95-105 ; of Mitter rand governments , 123-28 ; and politica l parties, 136-4 0 Henri IV , 9 6 Herve, Edmond , 119-2 1 High Commissio n o n Population , 145 , 149 , 150, 178 , 18 3 HLM. See Moderate Ren t Housin g Home ownership , 188 , 193 , 194 , 205 , 222 . See also Prets aides pou r l'accessio n a la propriete (PAP ) Hospitals: administration of , 118-23 ; alternatives to, 254 ; beds in , 105 , 107 ; cost con trols over , 105-11 ; departmentalizatio n of , 118-23, 139-40 ; private bed s in , 125-27 , 133, 135 ; in publi c sector , 96 ; staff of , 108. See also University Hospita l Center s Housing allowances , 193 , 21 1 Housing policy , 187-231 ; i n Britain , 188 ; in Chirac Government , 205-18 ; continuitie s in, 222-25 , 228; and famil y policy , 161 , 163, 177 ; financing of , 195-200 ; flexibility in , 228-29 ; histor y of , 189-91 ; i n Mit terrand governments , 201-5 , 218-22 ; redistributive effect s of , 200-201 ; an d ta x subsidies, 193-95 ; in th e U.S. , 188 . See also Rent control ; Moderat e Ren t Hous ing; Housing subsidie s Housing rehabilitation , 193 , 196 , 209-1 1 Housing subsidies : for construction , 190-93 , 195, 201 , 205 , 207-8 ; to individuals , 191-94, 204 , 210-12 , 216-17 , 221-24 , 226-27; fo r saving s accounts, 190 , 195 99, 20 1

Haby, Rene , 1 8 Hall, Peter , 2 1 Handicapped: ai d to , 15 , 97, 171 , 19 3 Health care : for children , 163-64 ; comple x organization of , 105 ; controlling cost s of , 129-33; financing of , 124 . See also Health polic y Health insurance : development of , 35 , 43;

Illegitimate children , 171-7 2 Immigrants, 26-2 8 Income distribution , 11-20 , 26-27 , 85-9 0 Incomes policy , 246 , 25 5 Independent Republicans , 17 2 Industrialization an d th e welfar e state , 2- 5 Industrial policy , 248-4 9 Industrial workers , 23 4

French Democrati c Confederatio n o f Labo r (CFDT), 23 8 French Revolution , 97 , 10 7 Front National , 2 8 Front Populaire , 1 1

268 INDE

X

INED. See National Institut e o f Demo graphic Studie s Inflation, 2 3 Inspection general e de s affaires sociale s (IGAS), 4 3 Institute o f Childhood an d th e Family , 18 1 Insurance, private , 3 Interest rates , 203 , 209-10 , 21 7 Interministerial Delegatio n fo r th e City , 25 2 Internal, 112-13 , 14 1 n 5 Ireland, 60-6 4 Italy, 60-6 3 Jallade, Jean-Pierre , 12-1 4 Jamous, Haroun , 24 2 Japan, 5 , 60 , 62-6 3 Jaures, Jean , 9 Jeanneney, J.-M. , 43-4 4 Job training, 13 , 27 , 44 , 241 , 246 , 249-5 0 Kervasdoue, Jea n de , 10 6 King, Anthony , 2 Labor, 8-9 . See also Trade union s Labor managemen t relations , 244 , 246-4 7 Labor market , 249-5 0 Labour Party , 6 , 4 3 Landlord associations , 202 , 20 7 Landlords. See Rent contro l Landry, Adolph , 14 9 Laroque, Pierre : as architect o f welfare state , 21, 34 ; on centralizatio n o f social security , 38; as expert o n socia l policy , 168 , 236 , 240, 251 ; on 196 1 and 196 7 reforms , 4 1 42 LeGrand, Julian , 1 2 Lembruch, Gerhard , 23 3 Lenoir, Rene , 170 , 24 0 Le Pen , Jean-Marie , 26 , 28 , 14 0 Le Play, Frederic , 9 , 3 2 Liberalism, 3 , 205-18 , 234-35 , 249 , 252 54 Ligue d e l'enseignement , 3 3 Ligue d e prevoyance , 3 3 Livret A. See Housing subsidies , fo r saving s accounts Marchand, Jean , 13 0 Marriage law , 167 , 171 , 182-8 3

Mauroy, Pierre , 1 , 178 , 18 1 Mazey, Sonia , 20 1 Medical Charter , 9 5 Medical education , 101-3 , 111-18 , 128 29, 131 , 13 9 Medicine. See Healt h insurance ; Healt h pol icy; Hospitals; Physician s Medecine liberate. See Physicians, i n privat e practice Mehaignerie, Pierre , 206-14 , 218-19 , 22 4 Mendes-France, Pierre , 16 2 Merchant marine , 3 5 Messmer, Pierre , 17 2 Millerand, Alexandre, 3 3 Mine, Alain , 25 3 Mine workers : health car e of , 96 ; retiremen t age of, 48 ; social protection of , 7 , 11 , 22, 35, 234 ; strikes of , 24 6 Minimum Insertio n Incom e (RMI) , 13 , 184 , 250 Minimum wage , 5 2 n 8 , 20 3 Ministry o f Agriculture, 35 , 4 4 Ministry o f Education , 12 8 Ministry o f the Family , 14 5 Ministry o f Finance , 108 , 24 1 Ministry o f Health , 108 , 115 , 17 1 Ministry o f Housing , 19 6 Ministry o f Labor , 43 , 149 , 17 1 Ministry o f the Right s o f Women, 180 , 184 ' Mitterrand, Francois , 1 , 74-84 , 105 , 123 28 Moderate Ren t Housin g (HLM) : and equal ity, 221 ; establishment of , 189 ; extent of , 163, 188 , 190 ; funding of , 196-98 , 214 16, 224 , 228-29 ; organization of , 193 ; power of , 223 ; rehabilitation by , 209 ; sale of units by , 205 , 207 ; tenant right s in , 200, 20 2 Montjoie, Rene , 17 0 Moore, Robert , 18 8 Morice, Andre , 15 7 Mothers: day of , 159 ; maternity benefit s of , 157, 163 , 177-78 ; rights of , 171-7 4 Mottin Report , 3 8 Mouvement republicai n populair e (MRP) . See Popular Republica n Movemen t Mutualite. See Mutual Societie s Mutualite social e agricol e (MSA) , 3 5

INDEX 26

9

Mutual Societies , 3 , 21-22 , 32 , 34 , 38 , 5 1 52 n 3 Napoleon, Louis , 9 , 22 , 3 2 Natalism, 147 , 164 , 183 . See also Birth rat e National Agenc y fo r th e Improvemen t o f Working Conditions , 24 6 National Allianc e agains t Depopulation , 147, 14 9 National Assembly , 11 , 17 7 National Cente r fo r Scientifi c Researc h (CNRS), 20 0 National Cente r o f Young Farmer s (CJNA) , 244 National Confederatio n o f Famil y Associa tions (CNAF) , 16 4 National Counci l o f Frenc h Employer s (CNPF), 43 , 155 , 162 , 23 8 National Counci l o f the Resistance , 15 1 National Counci l fo r Socia l Security , 13 3 National Federatio n o f Farmer s (FNSEA) , 238, 24 4 National Front , 14 0 National Institut e fo r Statistic s an d Eco nomic Studie s (INSEE) , 20 2 National Institut e o f Demographi c Studie s (INED), 14 4 Nationalized industries , 248-4 9 National Schoo l o f Administration (ENA) , 19 National Unio n o f Famil y Allowanc e Fund s (UNCAF), 14 4 National Unio n o f Famil y Association s (UNAF), 144 , 161 , 17 1 National Unio n o f Independen t Worker s (CID-UNATI), 23 8 Neiertz, Veronique , 18 4 Neocorporatism. See Corporatis m Netherlands, 5 , 9 , 60-64 , 69 , 7 0 Norway, 60-6 3 Ordre de s Medecins , 123-2 5 Organization fo r Economi c Cooperatio n an d Development (OECD) , 2 , 4 Orphans, 17 1 Parti communist e frangai s (PCF) . See Communist Part y Pelletier, Monique , 18 0

270 INDE

X

Pensions: and incom e distribution , 15-16 ; funding of , 40 , 44 , 47-50 ; increase s in , 42; minimum leve l of , 49-51 ; origin s of , 7; reforms of , 45 ; in th e Vich y regime , 3 6 Pernot, M. , 14 9 Petain, Philippe , 150-5 1 Pharmaceutical industry , 123 , 12 7 Physicians: associations of , 99 , 104 , 110 , 123-25, 128-31 , 133-35 , 137-40 , 242 ; attitudes of , 137-38 ; divisions among , 94 95, 117 , 133-35 ; education of , 111-18 ; fees of , 43 , 99-101 , 129-32 , 14 1 n n 3 , 4, 6 ; general practitioner s among , 116-17 ; increase i n number s of , 101-4 , 133-34 ; in privat e practice , 95-101 , 104 , 124-27 , 135-37, 242 ; resistance o f to evaluation , 252-53; retiremen t of , 104 ; street demon strations of , 137 ; women among , 10 4 Pinay, Antoine , 15 9 Plan d'epargn e logemen t (PEL) , 19 8 Planning: and contro l ove r finance, 195 ; and General Plannin g Commission , 153-55 , 162, 170 , 236-37 ; and Fourt h Plan , 166 , 239; and Fift h Plan , 168 ; and Sixt h Plan , 45, 168 , 248; and Nint h Plan , 18 3 Pleven Law , 4 1 Poinso-Chapuis, Germaine , 14 5 Political parties : and famil y policy , 153 , 184-85; and healt h policy , 136-40 ; an d housing policy , 222-25 ; and socia l expen ditures, 65-6 8 Pompidou, Georges : and famil y policy , 170 — 72; and th e "ne w society, " 45 ; as prim e minister, 43 ; and socia l expenditures , 74 84 Poniatowski, Michel , 17 2 Popular Front , 23 5 Popular Republica n Movemen t (MRP) : and the "familia l vote, " 154 ; and famil y pol icy, 38 , 145 , 153 , 156-57 , 160 , 164-67 , 172; and th e Fourt h Republic , 1 , 10 ; and organization o f social security , 39 ; and party coalitions , 159 , 16 1 Population management , 10 , 147-48 . See also Birth rat e Poverty, 36 , 41 , 25 1 Prets aides pou r Taccessio n a l a propriet e (PAP), 193 , 197 , 201 , 203-5, 208 , 210 11, 221-2 2

Pretlocatifaide(PLA), 192 , 196-97 , 208 , 210 Prets locatifs intermediarie s (PLI) , 20 8 Prigent, Robert , 145 , 160 , 16 5 Primes a Amelioration d e logement s a usage locati f e t a occupation social e (PALULOS), 209-1 1 Priority Educatio n Zone s (ZEP) , 20 , 2 6 Private hospitals , 105 , 107 , 11 0 Private practic e o f medicine. See Physicians: general practitioner s among , i n privat e practice Private sector i n housing , 223 , 225-2 7 Privatization o f industry, 25 , 21 6 Psychiatric hospitals , 105 , 10 7 Psychiatric patients , 25 2 Psychiatrists, 13 0 Public assistance , 13 , 1 5 Public housings . See Moderate Ren t Hous ing Public insurance : institutionalizatio n of , 42 , 46, 50-51 ; origin s of , 6- 7 Public opinion : o n immigrants , 27-28 ; on nationalized industries , 248-49 ; o n socia l programs, 25 ; on socia l security , 237 ; on the welfar e state , 25 3 Questiaux, Nicole , 23 , 46-47, 12 3 Queuille, Henri , 15 9 Quillot Law , 202-4 , 218 , 220 , 223-2 4 Radical Party , 97 , 16 1 Railroad workers : retirement ag e of, 48 ; retirement pla n of , 22 ; social protection of , 7, 11 , 35 , 23 4 Ralite, Jack , 125 , 12 8 Rally for th e Republi c (RPR) , 12 8 Rally o f the Frenc h Peopl e (RPF) , 135 , 161 Rassemblement d u peupl e frangai s (RPF) . See Rally o f the Frenc h Peopl e Raynaud, Henri , 15 3 Reagan, Ronald : housin g policie s of , 225 28; market orientatio n of , 187 , 205 ; political strengt h of , 212 ; and th e welfar e state , 24 Regime general, 34, 41 Regimes complementaires, 34 , 48 , 5 0 Regimes speciaux, 34, 3 9

Rent control , 189 , 200-207 , 213-15 , 218 21, 223-2 4 Research hospitals . See Universit y Hospita l Centers Residency, medical , 112-17 , 139 , 14 1 n 5 Resistance, French , 23 6 Retirement, 16 , 35 , 47, 49-5 0 Retirement insurance . See Pension s Revenue minimu m d'insertio n (RMI) , 5 1 Revolution, French , 3 Rex, John , 18 8 Rocard, Michel , 46 , 213 , 218 , 24 4 Rosanvallon, Pierre , 3 2 Roudy, Yvette , 18 4 Rueff-Armand Report , 16 6 Rueff, Jacques , 42 , 16 5 Sailors, 7 Salaire minimu m interprofessione l de croissance (SMIC) , 20 3 Sauvy, Alfred , 15 0 Schneitter, Pierre , 14 5 Schwartz, Bernard , 24 9 Science an d th e state , 24 3 Seguin, Philippe , 131-3 2 Senate, 2 1 Service nationa l d e logement , 98-100 , 109 , 132 Single-parent families , 4 6 Social aid . See Public assistanc e Social an d Economi c Council , 24 3 Social an d Economi c Developmen t Fund , 236 Social classes : and consumerism , 254 ; in th e Third Republic , 234 , 256 ; and th e welfar e state, 7-9 , 11-2 0 Social democracy : an d corporatism , 255 ; and social expenditures , 65-69 ; and socia l mo bilization, 232 ; and socia l security , 241 ; and th e welfar e state , 25 1 Social expenditure : i n comparativ e perspec tive, 4 , 42 , 60-70 ; i n th e Fourt h Repub lic, 74-77 , 81 ; in th e Fift h Republic , 74 83 Social insurance . See Public insuranc e Socialism, 1 Socialist Governments , French : an d evolu tion o f social policies , 46-51 ; an d educa tion policy , 20 ; and famil y policy , 16-18 ,

I N D E X 27

1

Socialist Governments , Frenc h {Cont.) 179-85; and healt h policy , 123-28 ; and housing policy , 201-5 , 218-29 ; and mini mum pensions , 16 ; and retiremen t policy , 35; social expenditure s of , 5 4 n 21 ; social policy of , 23-24 ; and unemploymen t com pensation, 17 ; and th e welfar e state , 2 0 Socialist Part y (PS) : and educatio n policy , 19-20; and famil y policy , 184 ; and healt h policy, 105 ; and housing , 161 , 219-20 ; and neocorporatis t model , 240 ; and socia l policy, 23 , 25-26 , 39 , 5 4 n 2 0 Socialist Part y (SFIO) , 152-53 , 15 6 Social mobility , 17-1 9 Social policies : decentralization of , 250-52 ; in th e Fourt h Republic , 235-37 ; i n th e Fifth Republic , 237-38 . See also Social Security, Socia l welfare , an d specifi c pol icy areas Social protection . See Public insuranc e Social Security : administration of , 22-23 , 155; budget of , 165-66 ; expenditures for , 159-60; law o f 193 0 on, 10-11 ; taxe s for , 12-13. See also Special welfar e Social structur e an d th e family , 14 7 Social welfare : administratio n of , 43-44 , 52 n 7 ; complexity of , 58-59 ; funding of , 46-50, 5 2 n 6 ; history of , 3 , 32-51 . See also Social expenditur e Solidarity (solidarite) , 10 , 51 , 97 Spain, 60-6 3 States General o f Socia l Security , 132-33 , 241 Steel industry , 24 8 Steel workers , 23 4 Stoffaes, Christian , 17 4 Stoleru, Louis , 17 4 Strikes of medical students , 115-1 6 Students, medical , 115-1 6 Study Commissio n o n th e Problem s o f the Family, 16 5 Sullerot, Evelyne , 18 3 Surleau Report , 4 0 Sweden, 60-64 , 69 , 7 0 Switzerland, 5 Syndicat autonom e de s enseignants d e mede cine (SAEM) , 116 , 136 , 138-3 9 Syndicat nationa l de s cadres hospitalier s "(SNCH), 110-11 , 138 , 14 0

272 INDE

X

Syndicat nationa l de s medecins , chirurgiens , specialistes e t biologiste s de s hopitau x pub lics (SNAM), 116 , 12 1

Tardieu, Andre , 1 1 Tax deduction s fo r children , 16-17 , 157-5 8 Tax subsidie s fo r housing , 193-95 , 207-8 , 227 Teachers' unions , 23 5 Tenants. See Rent contro l Tenant's associations , 202 , 21 3 Terquem, Jean , 12 1 Thatcher, Margaret : housin g polic y of , 207 , 225-27; marke t orientatio n of , 187 , 205 ; political strengt h of , 212 ; and th e welfar e state, 2 4 Third Republic : housing polic y in , 149-50 ; resistance o f to socia l legislation , 21 ; social classes in , 23 4 Tiberi, Jean , 21 1 Trade unions : in administratio n o f social se curity, 44 ; and socia l expenditures , 65-67 ; and socia l insurance , 35-36 , 233 ; on un employment compensation , 43 ; weaknesses of , 245 , 247 ; and th e welfar e state , 233. See also General Confederatio n o f Labor Transfer payments , 87-8 8 Treaty o f Rome , 238-3 9 UNAF. See National Unio n o f Famil y Asso ciations UNCAF. See National Unio n o f Famil y Al lowance Fund s Unemployment, 2 7 Unemployment insurance : development of , 35-36, 43-44 , 5 2 n 5 , 241 ; and incom e distribution, 17 ; in th e 1970 s and 1980s , 249-51; an d pensio n funds , 49-50 ; social ist policy on , 4 6 Union de s industrie s metallurgique s e t min ieres (UIMM), 4 2 Union fo r th e Ne w Republi c (UNR) , 16 5 Union national e autonom e de s nouveau x in ternes e n medecin e (UNANIM) , 13 9 Union national e de s etudiant s d e Franc e (UNEF), 11 5

Union national e de s federations d'organisme s d'HLM (UNFOHLM) , 21 4 Union national e interprofessionnell e pou r l'emploi dan s l'industri e e t l e commerc e (UNEDIC), 35 , 43, 5 2 n 5 United States : housing polic y in , 188 , 225 28; social expenditure s of , 60 , 62-63 , 69 ; social policie s of , 24-25 , 4 1 University Hospita l Center s (CHU) , 105-6 , 112, 126 , 24 2 Veil, Simone , 45 , 113 , 17 5 Vichy regime : family polic y of , 150-52 , 158 ; and healt h policy , 124 ; social polic y of , 36-37, 3 9 Vouchers. See Housing subsidies , t o individ uals

Welfare state : administration of , 36-41 , 236 ; in Britain , 3 , 6 ; causes of , 2-22 ; complex ity of, 241-42 ; crisis of , 23-27 ; institu tionalization of , 243-47 ; restructurin g of , 247- 54. See also Social welfar e Wilensky, Harold , 2 , 3 Women: a s physicians, 104 ; as a political is sue, 169 ; rights o f in marriage , 182-83 ; status of , 145-46 , 151 , 154-55 , 158-62 , 167, 169 , 171-74 , 180 , 184 ; in th e wor k force, 166-6 7 Workers' compensation , 96 . See also Unem ployment insuranc e Workers' rights , 244-4 6 Wright, Gordon , 14 5 Zysman, John , 19 5

INDEX 27

3