The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation [1 ed.] 9783666560330, 9783525560334

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Lily Gardner Feldman / Raisa Barash /  Samuel Goda / André Zempelburg (eds.)

The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation

Research in Peace and Reconciliation Edited by Martin Leiner in co-operation with Beno%t Bourgine (Louvain-la-Neuve), FranÅois Dermange (Genf), Dennis Doyle (Dayton/Ohio), Matthias Gockel (Jena), Makoto Mizutani (Kyoto), Arie Nadler (Tel Aviv), Bertram Schmitz (Jena) and David Tombs (Belfast/Dublin) Volume 4

Lily Gardner Feldman/Raisa Barash/Samuel Goda/ Andr8 Zempelburg (eds.)

The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation With 12 Figures and 10 Tables

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: http://dnb.de.  2019, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Gçttingen All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Cover image: Russian flag,  Getty Images, Martinns Typesetting: 3w+p, Rimpar Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage j www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2197-0947 ISBN 978-3-666-56033-0

Contents

Lily Gardner Feldman Introduction to the Present Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Martin Leiner Setting the Stage: An Introductory Clarification of Concepts of East Central Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Samuel Goda The OSCE and Reconciliation: between Theory and Practice . . . . . .

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Raisa Barash Mythologization of the Soviet Past and Prospects for Historical Reconciliation in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Olga Konkka Russian Internal Narratives about the “Western Enemy” as a Barrier for Reconciliation: The Example of School History Textbooks . . . . .

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Matthew Rojansky Russian-Ukrainian Relations: Conflict and Reconciliation over Shared History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Karina V. Korostelina Reconciliation in Ukraine: within and across the boundary . . . . . . . 105 Katja Wezel Memory Conflicts as Barrier to Reconciliation: Post-Soviet Disputes between the Baltic States and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Annam#ria Kiss The Means and Ends of Russo-Georgian “Normalization”: What is beyond the “Red Lines”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

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Jolanta Jonaszko Disarming Memory : The Katyn Massacre and Reconciliation in Polish-Russian Relations 1990–2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Klaus Bachmann Polish-Ukrainian Reconciliation after World War II . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Mimoza Telaku and Shifra Sagy Perceptions of Collective Narratives and Acculturation Attitudes: The case of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 About the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Lily Gardner Feldman

Introduction to the Present Volume

Most of the essays in this fourth volume of Research in Peace and Reconciliation (RIPAR) originate in the 2014 Summer School at Jena University on “Societies in Transition:the Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation.” The remainder of the essays are provided by outside experts in the field. At the time of the Summer School of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, the former Soviet Union was in the throes of crisis following the March 2014 Russian annexation/ integration of Crimea and the movement of Russian soldiers into Eastern Ukraine to aid Ukrainian separatists. By summer 2016, the violence had taken the lives of 9, 500 people, with many more wounded and displaced, providing a dominant image of conflict in this region rather than reconciliation. However, entrenched conflict is just the time when we should be thinking creatively about how to achieve reconciliation in the medium-term and long-term; we cannot wait passively until the conflict is over. Moreover, elsewhere in the region there have been small steps towards reconciliation. Most of the essays assembled in this volume were written in 2015; even though they do not cover subsequent developments, they do provide a bench mark to measure the subsequent degree of progress. “Reconciliation” is a frequently ill-defined term. As a reality and as an aspiration in this volume it encompasses three senses: an incipient, thin and minimal form amounting to passive, peaceful coexistence after enmity ; a more elaborate, intermediate and engaged form that is captured by the term rapprochement; and a thick or fuller form denoting active friendship, empathy, trust, magnanimity and, ultimately, amity. Beyond the definitional goal, the volume addresses ten themes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Reconciliation as a process and/or as a terminal condition. The requirements for the transition from conflict to a reconciliatory process, and the obstacles to beginning a process of reconciliation. The emotional and symbolic dimensions of reconciliation (“soft” expressions) and/or the pragmatic and political (“hard” expressions). The role of identity formation in either encouraging or inhibiting reconciliation. The stages or sequencing of the steps involved in reconciliation.

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6.

The institutionalization or instruments of reconciliation so that it is an enduring rather than ad hoc phenomenon. 7. The challenges to reconciliation from the domestic and international systems. 8. The actors involved, whether individual leaders, societal groups (civil society), governments, the media, third parties. 9. The role of “history,” “memory” and “remembrance” either as catalysts for or obstacles to reconciliation. 10. The connection among the past, the present and the future in actual or prospective reconciliation. The first two essays (Leiner ; Goda) focus on conceptual issues. The next two (Barash; Konkka) consider internal developments in Russia concerning attitudes toward the West. The next two (Rojansky ; Korostelina) analyze attitudes of Russia and Ukraine toward one another. Two essays (Wezel; Kiss) address Russia’s relations with other parts of the former Soviet Union: the Baltics and Georgia/the Caucusus. The penultimate two essays (Jonaszko; Bachmann) encompass the broader East Central Europe: Polish-Russian relations and Polish-Ukrainian ties. The final chapter takes us further into East Central Europe through its focus on the Balkans. In his chapter on setting the stage, Martin Leiner examines in depth the term “East Central Europe,” using analysts’ categories of race, ethnicity, religion, language, geography and identity. ”History,” particularly World War II and communism, is both cause and consequence of conflict and still presses indelibly in a limited process of reconciliation. The 2015 refugee crisis, itself a product of the absence of reconciliation in the Middle East, is the biggest challenge for reconciliation within the EU as a whole, between member-states and within individual countries. Samuel Goda’s analysis of the OSCE and reconciliation discusses both theory and practice. In addition to looking at reconciliation as a relational, structural and procedural term, he unpacks the attendant Deutschian concepts of “security community” and “pluralistic security community.” In its comprehensive goals, institutions and practices, he finds the OSCE wellsuited to conflict resolution and reconciliation, although the challenges are considerable in frozen conflicts such as over Transnistria between Moldova and Romania and Moldova and Russia. Raisa Barash identifies the officially-stated, internal goal for Russia of historical reconciliation (address divisions over civil war ; accept crimes of communism; reevaluate attitudes toward Stalin; revisit post-war relations with Eastern Europe). She shows, however, with some exceptions for Hungary and the Czech Republic, how reality is quite different, for Russian officialdom is incapable of fulfilling the primary ingredients of reconciliation: selfcriticism and self-reflection regarding the past. Focusing particularly on the Putin-Medvedev period, she demonstrates the Russian capacity for myth-

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making as it glorifies the Soviet past, especially Victory Day in World War II, as a source of collective identity, pride in policy and social achievements, and social solidarity. Rather than using the last decade as an opportunity for reconciliation with the West, Putin has instead conducted a policy of foreign policy isolationism in which the West is perceived as the enemy. In her chapter about Russian internal narratives about the past and present concerning images of the West, Olga Konkka paints essentially the same picture as Barash. She evaluates in detail some seventy school history textbooks and delineates four Russian strategies to depict as the enemy the West as a whole and individual countries, i. e. the opposite of reconciliation. There had been some tentative Russian steps in a more positive direction in the framework of the Council of Europe, but they have been marginalized in renewed ethno-nationalism as the basis for collective identity. Matthew Rojansky’s discussion of Russian and Ukrainian narratives about common history and memory (the Great Famine 1932–33; the Stalinist Great Purge 1936–1938; World War II) traces their concordance or competition depending on the nature of the regimes in both countries. The clearest discrepancy between the two narratives has been evident in the Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas. Drawing lessons for the Russian-Ukrainian situation from other international cases, Rojansky is hopeful that minimal reconciliation might be possible in the future. He specifies the ingredients for this forward movement: a breakout event, truth-telling, accountability, bilateral institutions at the societal and governmental levels, third-party involvement, a common agenda for the future. He assesses potential catalysts for reconciliation in human rights organizations, popular culture figures, the churches, political leaders, and generational change. Karina Korostelina offers an identity-based approach to reconciliation by outlining social identity theories that limit the significance of rigid social identification to improve the chances of individual and inter-group comity and to balance power dynamics between actors. Korostelina utilizes public opinion polls and her own research on narratives regarding Ukrainian approaches toward history, Russia, and the West to disaggregate attitudes and inter-group identification. She demonstrates significant regional differences in the Western, Central, Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine. She characterizes a reconciliation process in the full sense as a transformative process redefining relationships and stereotypes between conflicting parties, and offers recommendations for its realization that are linked to major changes in beliefs, perceptions, norms and values, and power. Memory conflicts are seen as a barrier to active and deep reconciliation by Katja Wezel in her analysis of post-Soviet disputes between the Baltic states and Russia. She documents how the tensions between Russia and the Baltic states since the latter’s independence in 1990 have revolved around three issues: the memory and interpretation of the past; the place and status of large Russian minorities in the Baltic states; and border conflicts of territory

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remaining with Russia after 1991. In addition to detailing the vicissitudes of the various bilateral relationships, she looks at the internal actions and instruments to address history, such as the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian history commissions created in 1998. While deeming high the hurdles to active friendship, Wezel rates positively the possibilities for rapprochement, based on mutual understanding of shared everyday life under communism. The prospects for Russian-Georgian “normalization,” a weak form of reconciliation, are the center of the chapter by Annam#ria Kiss. She examines the ups and downs of Russian-Georgian relations, including the August 2008 war, and their post-war efforts for an improvement via bilateral and multilateral institutions. She uses Zartman’s notion of a pragmatic “mutually hurting stalemate” as an incentive for reconciliation in the first step, to be followed by his long-term “mutually enticing opportunity.” She concludes that the main sore-point between Russia and Georgia – the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – is not likely to alter. Whereas de-occupation of the areas is the priority for Georgia, Russia is content with the influence it extends over these de facto states. The Georgia-Russia relationship still has not experienced either of Zartman’s two forms of incentives for the process of reconciliation, despite some positive signs, such as improved relations after the 2012 change in government in Georgia. Jolanta Jonaszko explores the place of the Katyn massacre in the larger picture of Polish-Russian relations. In addition to offering thinner and thicker conceptions of reconciliation (following David Crocker), she notes how Russia and Poland interpret the term differently. She identifies five periods of Russian-Polish interaction over Katyn in the years 1990–2015: Careful rapprochement, 1990–1995; symbolic reconciliation, 1995–2000; standstill, 2004–2008; warming and breakthrough, 2008–2011; cooling and crisis, 2011–2015. She elaborates on three general lessons of reconciliation from this case study : the first concerning process and structure, the second relating to attitudes, motivations, and the third centering on the subject matter in need of reconciliation. She concludes with observations about the limits of pragmatism, the role of values, and future historical frameworks of cooperation and commonality. Klaus Bachmann seeks greater understanding of the nature of reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine. Using the Nadler-Schnabel framework for inter-group dynamics and a variety of survey results, he classifies the PolishUkrainian interaction as three different “emotional reconciliatory steps.” Based on the socio-emotional model of reconciliation, he finds more talk about reconciliation in Polish-Ukrainian relations than reconciliation in practice in which shifts in attitudes would be evident, as was the case between France and Germany and Poland and Germany. The two sides remain divided, for example, on the key issue of who is the perpetrator and who is the victim. Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is, then, an incipient, rather than welldeveloped, process.

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Mimoza Telaku and Shifra Sagy also employ the Nadler-Schnabel sociopsychological approach to assess reconciliation, this time between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, although their primary theoretical framework is the collective narratives and acculturation literature. Their statistical analysis shows that “integration attitudes of acculturation are found positively related to both empathy towards in-group collective narratives and ‘other’ group’s collective narratives.” In terms of practical implications, empathy could be the first step in limiting hostilities between groups involved in conflict; and psychological and emotional damage may be more enduring than cognitive or behavioral dimensions. The editors hope that the observations about conflict and cooperation offered in this volume will add significantly to the burgeoning literature of reconciliation. These essays demonstrate that we need a variety of disciplinary and theoretical perspectives to grapple with conflict and to promote reconciliation. We are grateful to the Jena Summer School for inspiring these reflections, and extend our thanks to all the authors for their commitment and dedication to this volume.

Martin Leiner

Setting the Stage: An Introductory Clarification of Concepts of East Central Europe

Introduction For the first time in 2014 the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies organized its Summer School “Societies in Transition. The Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe between Conflict and Reconciliation” together with an institution which focusses on history, namely the Herder Institute for Historical Research on East Central Europe (Institut für historische Ostmitteleuropaforschung) in Marburg. Throughout the world, history matters when reconciliation is at stake, but in East Central Europe, it seems that history is even more important. Marci Shore’s A Taste of Ashes starts with an important characterization of Eastern Europe: Eastern Europe is special. It is Europe, only more so. It is a place where people live and die, only more so. In these lands between the West and Russia, the past is palpable, and heavy. The past is also merciless: by history’s caprice, here the Second World War and communism were inseparable historical traumas, one bleeding into the other, as Nazi power gave way to Soviet domination (2013, ix).

During the 2014 Summer School we were confronted with a de facto war in Eastern Ukraine, the annexation/reintegration of Crimea into Russia, the problems of civil dialogue and historical memory inside Russia and increasing tensions between the European Union and Russia. There were concerns about peace and the kind of future almost no one in Europe had experienced in decades. Of course, those conflicts can be understood only if we go back in history and appreciate better how history is influencing the present.1 The following chapter provides an overview of the specific problems and opportunities we encounter in a region some people call East Central Europe. And this specific region is directly touched by actual conflicts. The concept of East Central Europe is itself part of the conflict because it poses a fundamental question about where the borders of Europe are. Concerning the problems of this region one can pose some general questions. How far into the East do Western feelings of belonging reach? Does it make any sense to draw a border 1 Already in the nineteenth century Russia considered itself as a protective power for the Northern Black Sea region and provoked violent reactions of Western countries, for example in the Crimea war.

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somewhere between Germany and Russia or would it be better to see European commonalities from West and East, from Portugal to Siberia and to think in a framework of “our common European home”?2 The other basic question is what are the consequences of the first fundamental question in terms of political borders, solidarity and cooperation in common institutions like the EU and NATO? In the following pages, I will give an overview of interpretations by American and German scholars as well as the perspective of Milan Kundera. Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order draws a narrow border between Western European and Eastern European civilizations. Based mainly on religious criteria, countries like Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia, Serbia and Greece are part of Eastern Europe. According to Huntington, conflicts can easily break out between the different civilizations (Huntington 2002).

Figure 1: Huntington’s View of East Central Europe; Source: https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations.

An even closer border between Eastern and Western Europe can be drawn if one uses the criteria of ethnicity and language. The Slavic languages also include the languages of formerly and actually Catholic countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Poland and Slovenia. Pan-Slavism in the nineteenth century was based on linguistic and ethnic similarities and made a strong argument for emphasizing the solidarity between all Slavic-speaking people.3 The closest border was drawn by the Cold War. Parts of Germany and Hungary clearly became elements of the East European bloc, dominated by the Soviet Union. With the term of East Central Europe, we find ourselves in an ambiguous situation: On one hand, the idea of East Central Europe historically tried to give more importance to the nations, cultures and states in the region between 2 That formula was used by several leading politicians of the Soviet Union. Most famously Gorbachev used it in a speech delivered in Prague in April 1987. See Svec 1988. 3 See Petrovich 1985 and Milojkovic-Djuric 1994.

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Figure 2: A Pan-Slavic Conception of East Central Europe; Source: https://upload. wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/87/European_Union_and_Sla vic_countries.svg/1200px-European_Union_and_Slavic_countries.svg.png (the map does not include Lithuania and Latvia because of the absence of strong pan-Slavic thinking in these countries).

Germany/Austria/Italy on one side and Russia on the other. It was often used to foster either independence in the East or integration in the West (Germany, Austria or Western Europe and the EU). Focussing on East Central Europe means recognizing the importance of cultural achievements in music, art, poetry, and the sciences in countries like Latvia, Poland and Hungary which are impressive but underestimated. On the other hand, talking about East Central Europe also means dealing with the polemical legacy of that concept and it raises significant questions: Which nations belong to Eastern Central Europe and which do not? Are Ukraine and Belarus too close to Russia to be considered part of Eastern Central Europe? Are there enough commonalities between a Latvian and a Hungarian or between a Pole and an Albanian to bind them together as East Central Europeans? These are the questions, I would like to answer in the first part of this chapter by drawing on Milan Kundera’s ideas. The second and third parts of the chapter address the problematic legacies of East Central Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, and the fourth part analyzes the efforts to deal with those legacies. The final section of the chapter relates to the contemporary challenges for reconciliation in the region.

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Figure 3: East Central Europe in the Cold War ; Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Iron_Curtain.

The Central Europe Debate Revisited: Milan Kundera’s Prophetic Article In the early 1980s, Czech writer Milan Kundera published in the French revue D8bat a pioneering article: “The Stolen West or the Tragedy of Central Europe” (Un occident kidnapp8 ou la trag8die de l’Europe centrale) (Kundera 1983). The article was prophetic in so far as it anticipated and inspired the debate about what he calls Central Europe years before the end of the Cold War. As parts of Central Europe, Kundera identifies three nations – the Hungarian, the Czech and the Polish – and then refers to commonalities with Slovaks,

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Lithuanians, Romanians, Croats, Slovenes, Jews and even Austrians and Germans. He mentions Austria explicitly : “Today, all of Central Europe has been subjugated by Russia with the exception of little Austria, which, more by chance than by necessity, has retained its independence, but ripped out of its Central European setting, it has lost most of its individual character and all of its importance” (Kundera 1983, p. 8). According to Kundera, there are some aspects that constitute the commonalities of Central Europe. Like Huntington, Kundera points out the religious division: Europe “was always divided into two halves which evolved separately : one tied to ancient Rome and the Catholic Church, the other anchored in Byzantium and the Orthodox Church” (Kundera 1983, p. 1). With the exception of Romania the two halves are also divided by alphabets: the Latin in the West, the Cyrillic in the East. For thousands of years Central European nations participated in the history of the West. That identity is constructed as pro-Western Europe in contradistinction to Russia. In Central Europe, Russia is seen “not just as one more European power but as a singular civilization, an other civilization” (Kundera 1983, p. 4). The great Hungarian revolt of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Polish revolts of 1956, 1968, 1970, all were supported by almost the entire population in each case and were part of the struggle of Hungarian, Czech and Polish nations to be part of the West again. Even dissidents in those countries were very different from the opposition in Russia. Besides the issue of Western identity, there are three main commonalities of Central Europeans which unite them also in comparison with Germans or Western Europeans. First is the reality of their experience of being small nations. “The small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it” (Kundera 1983, p. 4). That vulnerability also affects the relationship of Central Europeans towards history and their character : “The people of Central Europe are not conquerors […] they represent the wrong side of this history ; they are its victims and outsiders. It’s this disabused view of history that is the source of their culture, of their wisdom, of their ‘nonserious spirit’ that mocks grandeur and glory” (Kundera 1983, p. 8). The second common experience of most Central East European people is the fact of the Habsburg Empire, which, in its best practices, accepted pluralism to a previously unknown extent in Europe (Stourzh 1985). Kundera sees the Habsburg Empire as a missed political opportunity as well as an experience of cultural exchange and flourishing of Central Europe. The most important group to integrate the culture of Central Europe were the Jews. “Indeed, no other part of the world has been so deeply marked by the influence of Jewish genius. Aliens everywhere and everywhere at home, lifted above national quarrels, the Jews in the twentieth century were the principal cosmopolitan, integrating element in Central Europe: they were its intellectual

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cement, a condensed version of its spirit, creators of its spiritual unity” (Kundera 1983, p. 7). Kundera concludes that the fall of the Habsburg Empire, the Holocaust and the Soviet occupation were the three tragedies of Central Europe, but the main tragedy is that Europe forgot what it had lost. In revisiting Kundera’s views today, two considerations seem obvious. The first one concerns the following question: does speaking about East Central Europe as a region mean using the precise description Kundera gave? One could also wonder : do nations he did not explicitly count as part of Central Europe nonetheless belong to it? Contemporary Ukraine would be an interesting case to test his perspective. Kundera wrote in 1983: “One of the great European nations (there are nearly forty million Ukrainians) is slowly disappearing” (Kundera 1983, p. 12), although his point was more to make a distinction between Ukraine and Central European countries than to show similarities. Nonetheless, we could find some resonance of his basic points about Central Europe also in Ukraine: the experience of a small country that can disappear ; the important role of the Jewish population; the Habsburg Empire experience in the Western part in cities like Lwiw/Lwow/Lemberg and the Bukovina; a relatively strong Catholic minority ; and a history of struggle against the Soviet regime – all could be seen as reasons to count Ukraine as part of East Central Europe and to reflect on the political consequences of such an inclusion. A further question to be posed is how would Kundera see Russia today? Kundera wavers: “But am I being too absolute in contrasting Russia and Western civilization? Isn’t Europe though divided into east and west, still a single entity anchored in ancient Greece and Judeo-Christian thought? Of course” (Kundera 1983, p. 3). He also mentions the attraction of Russia toward the West in the nineteenth century, but he believes that “Russian communism vigorously reawakened Russia’s old anti-Western obsessions and turned it brutally against Europe” (Kundera 1983, p. 3). Several critical reflections on Kundera regarding Russia are in order. First, in Russia there is a long tradition of the conflict between more Westernoriented intellectuals, politicians and citizens and those who stress more the differences with the West? Reading Russian authors one could feel mostly the disappointment about the West than traditional opposition. Russians often see themselves as defenders of Europe against Mongols, against Turks, against Napoleon and against Hitler. And we should consider that there has never been much gratitude from European nations for what Russians did. On the contrary, in the Crimea War (1853–56) the alliance between France, Great Britain and the Kingdom of Sardinia with the Ottoman Empire against Russia was considered a kind of betrayal by other “Christian” nations (Figes 2010). The second aspect to be noted is that in the Soviet Union, as in contemporary Russia, there was a struggle between Russian nationalistic approaches and international solidarity with all nations. Even if Russian

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nationalistic approaches became dominant during World War II and in relationship with occupied countries, the international ideology was never completely denied or ineffective. The third reflection is that using Kundera’s elements to describe a Central European identity, some are also valid for Russia, such as the importance of Jewish intellectuals or the suffering under communism and the struggle for identity and culture. Even the experience of being conquered or dominated by stronger nations is not completely unknown by Russia. Between 1240 and about 1350 Russia was dominated by the Golden Horde; in the PolishLithuanian War of 1605–18 Moscow was conquered by the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth; in 1812 Napoleon conquered Moscow ; in 1941–42 Nazi Germany came close to Moscow. The Orthodox Church often adheres to a narrative describing Byzantine, Serbian or Russian Christians as abandoned and sometimes betrayed and attacked by Western Christianity. As is the case for Central European nations, victimhood is often part of Russian identity. When talking about East Central Europe, even if it makes no sense geographically to include Russia, the borders of culture and identity between Central Europe and Russia should nonetheless be more fluid; and there should be more receptivity and understanding and less demarcation and opposition, not only between Europe and countries like Ukraine or Moldova, but also between Europe and Russia. Such an understanding would not only aid reconciliation, but also would mean more appreciation of history, cultural exchanges and different mentalities.

The Problematic Legacy of the Nineteenth Century : Imperial Domination and Aggressive Nationalism Using the term East Central Europe also requires acknowledging problematic legacies. In the nineteenth century the term “Central Europe” (Mitteleuropa) often was used to express German claims to dominate the region between the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic Sea even in regions mainly populated by Polish, Czech or Hungarian speaking populations. Already the liberal economist Friedrich List developed his idea of a “Central Europe (Mitteleuropa) based on a close alliance between Prussia and Austria with Hamburg and Trieste as its two great harbour cities” (Quoted in Wandruszka 1980, p. 114). Besides that fundamentally economic vision of Central Europe, there were also more political versions, be it as an alliance of independent states (Constantin Frantz), or as a single nation-state (Heinrich von Gagern). Referring to Central Europe in nineteenth century Germany was almost always associated with cultural aspects and with an anti-Russian attitude. First crucial discussions took place in the Parliament of Paulskirche in Frankfurt

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during the 1848 revolution. The preparatory parliament (Vorparlament) invited representatives from the non-German speaking populations of the Habsburg Empire to join the parliament in Frankfurt: Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Croats and others. As a response to that, on June 2, 1848 in Prague a Slavic Congress gathered with Croats, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Slovenians, Slovaks and even two Russian delegates. That Slavic Congress was forced to leave Prague by the Austrian army bombarding the city in revolutionary unrest. Speakers in the Parliament of Paulskirche welcomed the end of the Slavic Congress that acted more nationalistically than by democratic solidarity. Several Austrian and other speakers in the Paulskirche articulated the conception of a greater Germany. The mission to bring German culture and civilization to the Slavs, to prevent Russian influence and to foster German immigration into Central Europe was often expressed in the speeches in the Paulskirche. The concept of a German-dominated Central Europe reappeared later in many German attempts to expand eastward. Lacking clear goals for World War I, the German Empire returned to the idea of a Central Europe dominated by Germany (Münkler 2013, p. 216). In the September Program (September 9, 1914), one of the texts describing the aims of the German Reich after winning World War I included plans for Central Europe: “We have to attain a Central European economic alliance (Verband) with free trade including France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, AustroHungary and perhaps Italy, Sweden, Norway. That alliance, probably without a common constitutional leader and respecting on the face of it equal rights of the member but in fact under German dominance, must stabilize the economic predominance of Germany over Central Europe (Mitteleuropa)” (Quoted in Mommsen 1977, p. 233). Other plans during the Great War understood Mitteleuropa as unification of Germany and Austro-Hungary (Friedrich Naumann) or wanted to include the Ottoman Empire into such a federation (Ernst Jäckh). Florian Greiner has demonstrated that American and British newspapers during World War 1 often used the word Mitteleuropa untranslated to describe the imperialistic and dangerous claims of the German Reich (Greiner 2012). The current German notion of Mitteleuropa is more limited than the World War I plan, but nevertheless it more or less includes Germany before 1919 and the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (Beck 2012). The following map shows in blue how the Permanent Commission for Geographical Names (Ständiger Ausschuss für geographische Namen) – made up of several German federal and regional ministries, the national library, geographical institutes and other institutions – defines Central Europe in two ways. The first designation is according to nation-states, including the Baltic states. The second definition embraces cultural aspects with territories like Alsace-Lorraine, Western Ukraine, the Italian province of Alto Adige, Oblast Kaliningrad, Banat and Transylvania.

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Figure 4: The Permanent Commission for Geographical Names’ Designation of Central Europe; Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/ European_sub-regions_%28according_to_EuroVoc%2C_the_thesaurus_of_the_ EU%29.png.

The Problematic Legacy of the Twentieth Century : Wars, Genocide(s), Ethnic Cleansings, Cold War As we have seen, the German notion of Mitteleuropa was sometimes an imperialistic and violent idea. Nevertheless there were more neutral versions linked to federalism of independent states and free trade and open borders and to ideals of the Habsburg monarchy. To talk about Mitteleuropa also implied limitations to expansion.4 Those who wanted a much larger imperialistic extension of the German Reich, like Hitler and the National Socialist party, did not use that term, with the exception of some economists who wanted to 4 Only in one case was the idea of Mitteleuropa clearly used for very far reaching plans of expansion. They did not go, however, in the same direction Hitler had in mind. During World War I, the idea of a greater Central Europe was constructed by the best-seller book of Ernst Jäckh, who thought of a Greater Central Europe as a combination of Germany, Austro-Hungary and the former Ottoman Empire as part of a great empire stretching from the North Sea to Arabia.

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continue the work of the Central European Economic Association (Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstag) founded in 1926. As neither the Soviet Union nor the nation-states formed after the end of World War I were interested in using the term, for much of the twentieth century, only very few people referred to Mitteleuropa. The word was mostly used to describe a time zone, the very large Central European time (CET), without cultural or political claims. The map shows in red the Central European time area covering countries which in any other sense clearly are classified as northern (like Norway), southern (like Italy) or western (like France) European. In the period between 1919 and the 1980s, the countries of East Central Europe shared (as Kundera noted) catastrophic, though contradictory experiences. After the fall of four empires – the Habsburg Empire, the

Figure 5: The Central European Time Zone; Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/ wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/71/Time_zones_of_Europe.svg/1200px-Time_zones_ of_Europe.svg.png.

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Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the German Empire – several countries in East Central Europe enjoyed independence for the first time in centuries: the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, for a short time Ukraine (1917–1919), and for an even shorter time Belarus (1918). Yugoslavia and Romania became relatively large multi-ethnic states. At the same time, the wars and civil wars and the migration of minorities led to millions of persons losing or leaving their homes. By 1922, some 2 million Russians fled from civil war. By 1920, 800,000 Germans had left Poland; 425,000 Hungarian people had left Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia; and in 1919 the policy of “purification” (8puration) forced 150,000 “Germans” to leave Alsace-Lorraine (Ther 2011, pp. 83–88). In 1922, the Lausanne agreement decided on an “exchange of populations” between Turkey and Greece, according to which at least 1,221,849 Greek people had to leave Turkey and 355,635 Turkish people had to leave Greece (Lausanne Conference 1923). Whereas the emigration of Germans from Poland and of Hungarians from the neighbouring countries was not reinforced through pogroms by the population but rather was organized by the stripping of civil rights through the nation-state itself, the forced flight of the Greek minority from Turkey was clearly a case of ethnic cleansing. As that “exchange of populations” was acknowledged and approved by international law, the Lausanne agreement in a tragic way strengthened the (false) belief that states should be ethnically homogeneous. The activities of the Nazis and their allies during World War II, the new order of East Central Europe after World War II, and the wars in exYugoslavia in the 1990s all put pressure on multi-ethnic, friendly coexistence in the entire regions of East Central and South East Europe. Countries such as Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, have become nation-states where one language and one ethnic identity clearly dominate. Many of those countries protect minority rights, but rarely are minorities considered a problem-free benefit. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, only Romania and Bosnia are countries with a strong multi-ethnic population, but in a problematic way. The false belief in ethnically homogenous states, had numerous terrible consequences. One special minority, the Roma, which has no nation-state to receive its refugees, has been a victim in many ethnic cleansings and was also a target of the Nazi Holocaust. As Figure 6 shows, South Eastern European countries from Slovakia to Bulgaria count more than 9 % of Roma in their population. Like Jews, but less systematically, under Nazi rule Sinti and Roma were murdered for racial reasons, with the figure of annihilation reaching, conservatively, at least 100,000. Porajmos (Romani for “devour”) is the name Roma and Sinti gave to that extermination. Paradoxically, the situation of the Roma often worsened after the end of communism. After Roma lost their positions in agricultural areas they migrated into the suburbs of cities like

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Bucharest, Plowdiw, Sofia, Belgrade or Skopje to build settlements (mahala) which are the largest slums in Europe.

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Roma In Europe; Source: https://upload.wikimedia. org/wikipedia/commons/7/7e/Roma_people_in_the_world_ethnic_map.PNG.

Poland in particular has suffered from the displacement of population. Between 1944 and 1948, 2,1 million Poles were forced to leave Eastern Poland, which became part of the Soviet Union, and to resettle in former parts of the German Reich. In addition, up to 12 million Germans left East Central Europe as a result of the genocidal war Germany started, becoming, after the Jews, the second large ethnic group which almost completely left East Central Europe. The transfer of Germans was part of the Allies’ plan to make it impossible for Germany to start another war and a new imperialistic policy. Ian Kershaw has summed up the Nazi strategy : It was no accident that the war in the east led to genocide. The ideological objective of eradicating “Jewish-Bolshevism” was central, not peripheral, to what had been deliberately designed as a “war of annihilation”. It was inseparably bound up with the military campaign. With the murderous onslaught of the Einsatzgruppen, backed by the Wehrmacht, launched in the first days of the invasion, the genocidal character of the conflict was already established. It would rapidly develop into and all-out genocidal programme, the like of which the world had never seen. Hitler spoke a good deal during the summer and autumn of 1941 to his close entourage in the most brutal terms imaginable, about his ideological aims in crushing the Soviet Union. During the same months, he also spoke on numerous occasions in his monologues in the Führer Headquarters –though invariably in barbaric generalizations – about the Jews. These were the months in which, out of the contradictions and lack of clarity of anti-Jewish policy, a programme to kill all the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe began to take concrete shape (Kershaw 2009, 668). Part of that strategy was the German “starvation plan” (Hungerplan), which meant that 30 million civilians and Soviet citizens should starve in the first winter of the attack (Snyder 2010, p. XI). The total plan was never realized, but nonetheless more than 3 million Soviets, mostly prisoners of war, died from

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An Introductory Clarification of Concepts of East Central Europe

hunger during the War. East Central Europe became more and more the place where the most terrible and the largest genocide in modern history took place: the Holocaust against the Jews. Exact estimations of the exterminated population were undertaken by Lucy Dawidowicz in the 1980s (Davidowicz 1986, p. 403): Table 1: Estimated losses as a Result of the Holocaust. Country Poland

Estimated Pre-War Jewish Population

Estimated Killed

Percentage Killed

3,300,000

3,000,000

90

253,000

228,000

90

Bohemia and Moravia

90,000

80,000

89

Slovakia

90,000

75,000

83

Baltic countries

From those who survived, many emigrated to Palestine or to the US. The Jews who emigrated were a great loss for East European societies. Timothy Snyder has described the regions mired in extensive suffering as the “bloodlands.” German expansion involving an extremely brutal occupation regime; racism against Slavic populations, intellectuals, communists; even more brutal policies of genocide against the Jewish population; and Stalinist mass atrocities against millions of people including Ukrainians by starvation and by mass-executions and deportations of Poles, Latvians and other nations – all come together as a bleak picture: In the middle of Europe in the middle of the twentieth century, the Nazi and Soviet regimes murdered some fourteen million people. The place where all of the victims died, the bloodlands, extends from central Poland to western Russia, through Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic States. During the consolidation of National Socialism and Stalinism (1933–1941), the joining German-Soviet occupation of Poland (1939–1941), and then the German-Soviet war (1941–1945), mass violence of a sort never before seen in history was visited upon this region. The victims were chiefly Jews, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians, and Balts, the people native to these lands. […] The Second World War was the most lethal conflict in history, and about half of the soldiers who perished on all of its battle fields all the world over died here, in this same region, in the bloodlands. Yet not a single one of the fourteen million murdered was a soldier on active duty (2010, vii–viii).

Already the three places which are the corners of the triangle between Auschwitz, Leningrad/Saint Petersburg and Stalingrad/Volgograd forming the bloodlands were places where between 1941 and 1945 one million or more people died. Intentionally provoked starvation was the reason for many

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deaths. That was also the case in 1932/33 during the Holodomor in Ukraine. Snyder estimates that 3.3 million people died by starvation caused by Stalinist policies of brutal collectivization of the land.

Figure 7: The Bloodlands; Source: http://www.bradford-delong.com/2015/12/richardj-evans-reviews-bloodlands-by-timothy-snyder-lrb-4-november-2010httpwwwlrb coukv32n21richa.html.

After 1945 the third catastrophe occurred in East Central Europe: an imposed communism and the walls cutting off the West constructed by the Cold War. For most countries, that period began with punishments against hundreds of thousands of people, who were considered “collaborators” with the Nazis or were not fitting into the new communist regime5 : between 1944 and 1946, 182,543 Ukrainians; and by 1948, 81,248 Lithuanians, 42,149 Latvians and 20,173 Estonians were deported into Gulag camps (Snyder 2010, p. 333). Many East Central Europeans considered the communist regimes as Soviet occupation, which forced the countries into social experiments, economic stagnation and, where the right to travel was limited, into isolation.

5 Albania and Yugoslavia were exceptions and freed themselves from German occupation. Romania left its coalition with Nazi Germany in 1944 through a coup against the dictator Antonesco and became an ally of Soviet-Union.

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Attempts to Deal with the Problematic Heritage Following the history described above, what constitutes East Central Europe cannot be easily determined from a German or Austrian perspective. It seems strange to describe Mitteleuropa as a cultural entity in the way the German Permanent Commission for Geographical Names did. The people now living there are more influenced by an orientation to the EU and Europe as an entire political body on the one hand and by the common experience of the bloodlands and the imposition of Soviet-dominated communism on the other. More people in the area between Tallinn and Dubrovnik understand English or Russian than German. As in the seventeenth century, World War II and communism associated the populations of countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany closely to the population of countries like Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, even if, for many people, those relationships are filled with memories of violence. There is also another development since 1989. East Central Europe has become more connected with Western Europe, but also has its own cultural renaissance. Detlev Preuße has accurately described it in this manner : the independence of East Central European countries came not only from the financial problems of some states or from Gorbachev, but also from the population (Preuße 2014). They freed themselves. There is a new validation of the East Central European nations and their cultures. There are also alliances among East Central European countries themselves. Those associations also help to overcome the German or Austro-Hungarian centred concept of Central Europe and create a common East Central European identity. Already in 1989, the Central European Initiative (CEI) was created with Austria, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia as founding members. The goal was to foster cooperation in areas of common interest, especially in economic matters, social issues and the construction of a knowledge-based society. The CEI has a Secretary General and counts 16 countries as members today, including Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, but without Germany and the Baltic States. On February 15, 1991 the Visegrad group was established with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as members. The goals is regular consultation and cooperation in fields like economics, energy policy, education and research, and security. In a certain sense the member-states of the Visegrad group could be seen as the core of a definition of East Central Europe. If we do not take that definition as closing but as opening opportunities with all the neighbouring countries, we could include much of what is in most cases identified as part of East Central Europe. It would include Belarus and Ukraine as well as for other questions Germany and Austria or Romania and Serbia. For some other issues we must be more expansive and talk also about countries like the Baltic States, Russia, Bosnia and Italy.

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Figure 8: Central European Initiative Countries; Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/CEI_members.svg (using this link you find a picture with better resolution).

Figure 9: The Visegrad Countries; Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:Visegrad_group_countries.png.

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The Herder Institute in Marburg for Historical Research on East Central Europe has a slightly different focus. It deals with the following countries and territories: the Baltic States, Poland, Kaliningrad oblast, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. That inclusion of the Baltic States is relatively uncommon, because at least Estonia is considered to be closer to Finland and to Scandinavia than to Central Europe, but it is justifiable given historical connections and cultural exchanges. The exclusion of Hungary relates to the fact that Hungary is a country which develops new links more to South Eastern European countries such as Romania, Serbia and Croatia. Nevertheless, whether we start with the definition of the Herder Institute or with the Visegrad definition, if we keep the definition open to neighbouring countries, in the end we are speaking about the same object. The states to be included in a definition of East Central Europe share several commonalities: Before 1919 the whole area was ethnically, culturally and religiously mixed. It was almost impossible to travel 50 kilometers without entering a village were people spoke another language and adhered to a different religion, be it Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish or Muslim. That diversity was part of the richness of East European culture. Before 1919 three empires dominated East Central Europe: the AustroHungarian Empire, the Russian Empire and the German Reich. Focussing on the South, until some decades earlier, the Ottoman Empire ruled the area. All four empires disappeared after World War I. Some of the populations of East Central Europe sought to create nation states in the area, while others like Jews and Roma built smaller communities. It was typical for East Central Europe that the violence of the nationbuilding process and the violence of the restored imperial aspirations of Germany, Austria and Russia came together, sometimes provoking one another sometimes being models for one another.

Conclusion: Actual Conflicts and Reconciliation The above analysis leads to some logical conclusions about the potential for reconciliation. Reconciliation in a broad sense means the reestablishment of good or at least “normal” relationships mainly between populations and states, but also between individuals and smaller groups, after traumatizing violent conflicts such as wars, civil wars, genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced labour and other human rights violations and atrocities. Reconciliation is a process which is always threatened by the revitalization of enmity. There are four major problems and challenges facing reconciliation in East Central Europe. The reality of extremely brutal behaviour of Nazi German occupation

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during World War II, including the Holocaust and the plan to displace or enslave most of the East Central European population, and Soviet-imposed communist rule over most of the East Central European countries, including deportations and murder and the violent oppression of opposition, are enduring legacies. After World War II Germany undertook major efforts in reconciliation policy especially with Poland and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic (Gardner Feldman 2012, pp. 201–322). After 1989, Russia began small steps of reconciliation, especially with Poland. Forty-five years of communism and Soviet occupation in many countries, with extensive damage to the economy and to social life, means that reconciliation with Russia is needed as much as it is with Germany. Russian politics has made some serious steps towards reconciliation. The most emblematic was the encounter between the Polish and Russian governments, represented by Donald Tusk and Vladimir Putin, in Katyn in April 2010 to acknowledge the Soviet Union’s responsibility for the killing of some 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia during World War II in the area around Katyn. Tragically, the crash of the plane with the Polish president Lech Kaczyn´ski overshadowed that important act of reconciliation. During the last years, however, a possible and helpful orientation towards reconciliation in Russian politics was very much weakened by a policy of national strength. The policy of national strength can be seen as the reaction of a kind of postimperial disease, of difficulties to digest the loss of importance Russia has undergone and to prevent the breaking apart of the CIS. Publicity-seeking activities such as sports events, military violence like in Eastern Ukraine, attempts to destabilize countries like Georgia and the Baltic States, and opposition to the EU by cooperating with anti-EU parties such as the French Front National – all are used to give Russians pride in their nation again. These actions are a risky choice because international isolation and economical decline6 could accelerate as a result. Despite nationalism’s revival reconciliation efforts have not ceased entirely. The Russian Orthodox Church has played a reconciliation role in several conflicts. The Minsk-negotiations and above all the Minsk II agreement (February 2015) negotiated by Angela Merkel, FranÅois Holland, Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin, still seems a good basis for an end to the violent conflict and for steps towards reconciliation, if Minsk can be fully implemented and expanded. Minsk II foresees amnesty for all crimes committed, which is a contested element both in the peace process and from the point of view of reconciliation. Perhaps this element of the agreement was the price to pay for the ceasefire. When peace comes, most important is to find sustainable agreements for Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, to restart a reconciliation policy and to rebuild the destroyed cities in Eastern Ukraine. The Commonwealth of 6 Cf. The previsions of IMF: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/pdf/text.pdf.

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Independent States, EU and US should find ways to come together in closer cooperation again, providing thus the framework for sustainable peace and economic development. German occupation and communism provoked injustices and human rights violations perpetrated not only by foreigners but also by domestic actors. Relatively often memory is divided. Different groups and individuals draw different lines between “good” and “bad” victims, honourable resistance fighters and despicable collaborators, justified violence and brutality. Those lines are often, but not always, identical with differences between Right and Left. Many of those troubled pasts have not yet been deeply worked through, neither by historians, nor by the public, nor by the educational system, nor by the legal system. East Central Europe societies need, then, to confront their own, indigenous pasts and historical narratives. As we know from Kundera’s article, most East Central European nations see themselves as victims. It is difficult for East Central European nations to admit that in some moments of history against some groups they also were perpetrators. The dark side of ethnic nation-states is that some degree of ethnic cleansing was necessary to create relatively homogeneous nations like Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia without German and partly without Hungarian minorities, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. Such a reality leads to several basic questions: How do these societies conceive of the future? Is the lesson to be learned from the twentieth century that ethnic homogeneity is the ideal? What does that mean for countries like Bosnia- Herzegovina? Is it doomed to break apart? Or what is the future of the Baltic States who still have a strong Russian minority? The reaction of East Central European states in the refugee crisis of 2015–2016 seems not only driven by economic concerns, but also by the desire not to interact with foreigners who are very easily portrayed as dangerous and criminal. Do East Central European countries need some decades of ethnonationalistic stabilization before reconciliation can take hold? Looking back across history that seems not to be the case. The variety and diversity of East Central Europe were always a source of inspiration and of cultural achievements, despite periods of political upheaval, societal chaos and deep conflict. Reconciliation may, thus, still have a chance of flourishing in this difficult terrain.

References Beck, U 2012, Das deutsche Europa. Machtlandschaften im Zeichen der Krise, Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp. Figes, O 2011, Crimea: the last crusade, London, Penguin Books. Gardner Feldman, L 2012, Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation: from enmity to amity, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

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Greiner, F 2012, ‘Der “Mitteleuropa”-Plan und das “Neue Europa” der Nationalsozialisten in der englischen und amerikanischen Tagespresse’. Available from: http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/3-2012/id%3D4499?language=en. Huntington, S 2002, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, New York, Simon and Schuster. Jäckh, E 1916, Das größere Mitteleuropa. Ein Werkbund-Vortrag, Weimar, Kiepenheuer. Kershaw, I 2009, Hitler. Edition in one volume, London, Penguin Books. Kundera, M 1983, ‘Un occident kidnapp8 ou la trag8die de l‘Europe centrale’, Le D8bat, no. 5 Paris Gallimard. English version available from: http://www.ises.hu/ webimages/files/Kundera_tragedy_of_Central_Europe.pdf. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922–1923, 1923, Records of proceedings and draft terms of peace, London. Milojkovic-Djuric, J 1994, Panslavism and Nation. Identity in Russia and the Balkans 1830–1880: Images of the Self and Others, New York, East European Monographs. Mommsen, WJ 1984, Imperialismus. Seine geistigen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen, Hamburg, Hoffmann & Campe. Münkler, H 2013, Der große Krieg. Die Welt 1914 bis 1918, Berlin, Rowohlt. Petrovich, MB 1985, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856–1870, (Publications of the Russian Institute of Columbia University), Santa Barbara/CA, Greenwood. Preuße, D 2014, Umbruch von unten. Die Selbstbefreiung Mittel- und Osteuropas und das Ende der Sowjetunion, Wiesbaden, Springer. Shore, M 2013, A taste of ashes. The afterlife of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, New York, Crown. Snyder, T 2011, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin, New York, Vintage. Stourzh, G 1985, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848–1918, Wien, Österreichische Verlagsgesellschaft. Svec, M 1988, ‘The Prague Spring’: 20 years later. Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988. Ther, P 2011, Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. ‘Ethnische Säuberungen‘ im modernen Europa, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Wandruszka, A 1992, ‘Großdeutsche und Kleindeutsche Ideologie 1840–1871’, in: RA Kann & F Prinz (ed.), Deutschland und Österreich. Ein bilaterales Geschichtsbuch, Wien, Jugend & Volk.

Samuel Goda

The OSCE and Reconciliation: between Theory and Practice

Introduction Conflict is a natural feature of human behavior and social interactions. Social scientists have already developed a wide range of research classifications and databases regarding past and contemporary conflicts as well as definitions of the term “conflict”. This chapter is dedicated to conflicts on a “higher level” of the imaginary scale from intra-personal to global conflicts, including international and intra-national conflicts and the role and perspective of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a third party in reconciliation processes in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet space. We will focus on the issue of conflict, conflict resolution and transformation and reconciliation mostly from the perspective of political science scholarship. From the academic point of view, conflict resolution as a new field of study emerged only after World War I, despite the fact that we can find numerous instances of this tradition as far back as classics such as Thucydides (Zartman 1997). Regarding the period after World War II, analysts looked closely at conflicts during and after the Cold War. The general assumption is that the two superpowers fought only outside their territories and never were engaged in a direct armed conflict. John Paul Lederach has pointed correctly to the paradox of two simultaneous phenomena during the Cold War : on the one hand suppression of conflict and on the other hand intensification of conflict, depending on the region (Lederach 1997). The first r e l a t e s to conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Central Asia, which we nowadays consider frozen and/or protracted conflicts. The latter refers to conflicts as ideological struggles between the two blocs, in the regions of Asia, Latin America and Africa. The end of the Cold War has brought a significant qualitative change in international relations, a shift from a bipolar system to a unipolar system. However, there is still a debate about the rise of other poles in the global international political and economic systems. There is also considerable discussion about the role of “cooperation” in the contemporary international system, for example in institutions like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE is an international organization of collective security, whose instruments of quiet diplomacy are well-developed through a practical process of employing various instruments, with both

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success and failure, in every stage of the conflict cycle and conflict management/resolution approach. This reality of conflict resolution experience makes the OSCE a very good example of what Joseph Nye calls “soft power” (Nye 2004). Reconciliation is an intrinsic part of the overall concept of conflict resolution. Reconciliation may be seen as a goal and as a process. Reconciliation may be necessary in both inter and intra- national conflicts. Reconciliation operates at multiple levels, from bottom-up to top-down with other variants in between. In the past, reconciliation has possessed a strong religious context and background. Today, reconciliation also can be manifested in functional areas such as politics, economics, psychology, and society. When dealing with reconciliation after any type of conflict, we need a comprehensive approach and a recognition that reconciliation is not an easy or speedy process. Securing successful reconciliation can take years or even decades. A lot depends on the intensity and duration of the conflict and its aftermath. Both sides involved in a former conflict have to address the past in every generation, a very arduous task, but an essential one. The hardest challenge for the perpetrator and the victim involves developing both the will to achieve reconciliation and the trust that defines it. In certain protracted conflicts across the OSCE area, we can count numerous lost opportunities for successful conflict resolution, although some analysts argue that full reconciliation is not strictly needed in every type of conflict. In the following contribution, we will address the issue of reconciliation from different theoretical perspectives to demonstrate its richness. We will then present the concept of the OSCE from a theoretical point of view, mainly based on the works of Karl Deutsch, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The OSCE is a unique phenomenon of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architecture and of international conflict management and conflict resolution. In the final part of the chapter, we will connect reconciliation and the OSCE by assessing how the OSCE contributes to the practice of reconciliation.

Reconciliation Different Definitions Theories and concepts of reconciliation are far from being homogenous and the term is often ill-defined (Lederach 1997; Kriesberg 2001; Bar-Siman-Tov 2004; Rigby 2001; Meierhenrich 2008). Thinking about reconciliation seems to move on two tracks, either geared towards academia and theorizing or

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oriented towards policy and training (Lederach 1997; Bloomfield et al. 2003; Gardner Feldman 2012). John Paul Lederach understands conflict and reconciliation as relationoriented whereas Johan Galtung emphasizes structural and cultural contexts (Lederach 1997; Galtung 2001). Offering an exact, working definition of “reconciliation” is a very complicated task because there are so many possibilities when authors bother at all to give it content. Galtung has suggested that “reconciliation is a theme with deep psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots – and nobody really knows how to successfully achieve it” (Galtung 2001, p. 4). A number of authors consider reconciliation both a process and the outcome of a process. Lederach considers reconciliation to be “dynamic, adaptive processes aimed at building and healing” (Lederach 1997, p. 18). According to Lily Gardner Feldman, reconciliation is “the process of building long-term peace between former enemies through bilateral institutions across governments and societies. Reconciliation involves the development of friendship, trust, empathy, and magnanimity” (Gardner Feldman 2012, pp. 2–3). Ernesto Vardeja offers a different, less procedural view : “[Reconciliation] refers to a condition of mutual respect among former enemies, which requires the reciprocal recognition of the moral worth and dignity of others. It is achieved when previous, conflict-era identities no longer operate as the primary cleavages in politics, and thus citizens acquire new identities that cut across those earlier fault lines” (Verdeja 2009, p. 3). Bloomfield et al. see reconciliation as both relation-oriented and structural: “[a] need to examine and address their relationship [with former enemies] and their violent past, [a] process that redesigns the relationship between us” (Bloomfield et al. 2003, p. 11). They elaborate further by noting that reconciliation is “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future,” and that the goal of reconciliation is “a future aspiration, something important to aim towards, perhaps even an ideal state to hope for. But the process is very much a present tense way of dealing with how things are – building a reconciliation process is the means to work, effectively and practically, towards that final goal – and is invaluable in itself” (Bloomfield et al. 2003, p. 11). Also bridging the relationship and process-oriented approaches is the perspective of Louis Kriesberg, who understands reconciliation as “the processes by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable” (Kriesberg 2001, p. 48). Regarding the content, as portrayed by Gardner Feldman and Vardeja, the term reconciliation can be differentiated according to its scope, whether minimalist and maximalist. According to Lily Gardner Feldman, political science scholarship understands the minimal approach as the “absence of war, peaceful coexistence and political accommodation”, while the maximal

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approach is based upon the “establishment of political community, trust and friendship and zones of stable peace” (Gardner Feldman 2012, p. 24) The minimal approach is the most visible in relations among states or groups within a state. On the opposite side is the maximalist approach which assumes responsibility and repentance of the perpetrator and forgiveness from the victim (Verdeja 2009). The linkage to stable peace has been emphasized by Charles Kupchan, for example, who maintains that stable peace “breaks out through a four-phase process. Reconciliation begins with an act of unilateral accommodation: a state confronted with multiple threats seeks to remove one of the sources of its insecurity by exercising strategic restraint and making concessions to an adversary. Such concessions constitute a peace offering, an opening gambit intended to signal benign as opposed to hostile intent” (Kupchan 2010, p. 6). He understands reconciliation as very closely related to politics among nations and especially security. To sum up, reconciliation, in our perspective is a long-term socio-political process where parties of a former violent conflict politically accommodate and socially interact through acknowledgement of past sins in order to avoid future violence and establish trust, friendship and thus, lasting peace. Stages and Sequencing Reconciliation can be viewed as one of the many sequences of a particular conflict cycle model. As a dynamic process, reconciliation itself has different stages, involving various steps. The following stages are stated most often: apology, truth-telling, justice, reparation and healing (Bloomfield 2006; Bloomfield et al. 2003; Kupchan 2010; Long and Brecke 2003; Gardner Feldman, 2012). The nature of the stages also depends on the level of reconciliation, whether national or international. In order to start the reconciliation process, violence has to be stopped. Even when the overall conflict may last for several years or decades, small steps towards reconciliation can be undertaken, for example truth-telling or confidence building activities, but the prerequisite for this is still a ceasefire. Religion and Reconciliation: The Role of Forgiveness The research dedicated to reconciliation is tightly connected to religion and thus has a very strong theological, especially Christian, context. Observers of reconciliation can be divided into two main group: those who argue that forgiveness is an absolute condition for reconciliation and those who argue that forgiveness is not a prerequisite for successful reconciliation. There is no doubt that religion plays an important role in various processes of

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reconciliation throughout the world. Many societies, although deeply divided, may share a strong religious heritage, but the roots may be different. The common basis of religion as a foundation for reconciliation is its connection to universal values of justice, honesty, respect, and spirituality. In contemporary research, in many cases religion is considered to be a cause of a conflict, but some researchers highlight the positive effects that religion might have in conflict resolution and transformation processes, for example South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Cochrane et al. 1999; Shore 2009; Appleby 2000). Analysts dealing with reconciliation from the religious perspective often argue that forgiveness is crucial (Gardner Feldman 2012). Forgiveness is not only a religious proposition but also a biological or psychological one, as Worthington suggests: “Forgiveness is a complex of internal experiences. Beyond that, social interactions feedback and affect the internal experiences. Even societal events can affect whether forgiveness does or does not happen” (Worthington 2006, p. 10). Dwyer is more critical of forgiveness’s role in reconciliation: “[A]ny conception of reconciliation—at either the micro- or macro-level—that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that emphasizes interpersonal harmony and positive fellow-feeling, will fail to be a realistic model of reconciliation for most creatures like us” (Dwyer 1999, pp. 97–98). For the purposes of this chapter, we do not consider forgiveness as an indispensable prerequisite for successful reconciliation, especially at the international level, as we think that these two actions – reconciliation and forgiveness – can live separately. Actors in Reconciliation Besides its representation in different intellectual and disciplinary areas, reconciliation also can be classified according to levels: intra-personal, interpersonal (both could be labeled as individual), societal (or national) and international levels. This variety of levels suggests there are numerous actors involved in the process of reconciliation both directly and indirectly (third parties). Individuals, prominent personalities that are well respected from community members to politicians, political activists, public figures or even businessmen, can posses the status of role models. Civil society or churches as organized units have immense potential, as do political parties or political movements. Executive and legislative structures dealing with the education of the next generation, and thereby stimulating truth-telling and memory policies, are indispensable. One of the phenomena that deserves special attention is media and social networks and their impact on post-violence society. International actors in the role of third parties also might have a considerable impact on the institutionalization and internationalization of reconciliation processes. In many instances, these actors and levels are combined (Broun8us 2003; Bloomfield et al. 2003).

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The Benefits of Third Parties in the Process towards Reconciliation Why is there a need to incorporate third parties such as international organizations into the process of reconciliation? According to the pragmatic theory of international relations based on Realpolitik and the more liberal practice of international law, the main actors in international relations are states. However, contemporary debates argue for the relevance of other actors in international relations such as international organizations, which nonetheless derive from state sovereignty. International bodies are not needed in every reconciliation or conflict resolution process. If the states or other conflict parties are able to reconcile without the need of a third party, it m ay b e better for all the parties to the conflict. Many experts in fact share a premise that reconciliation should start from the grassroots of society and that there is nothing worse than imposed reconciliation. But, given the tendency of both sides to a conflict to see themselves as victims, third party intervention can be useful. In religious conflicts, for example, each party prays to its own god(s) because each considers itself right and just. This type of situation, however, is just a step away from falling into the vicious circle of revenge and hatred. (Lederach 1999) The third party is expected to offer solutions for the conflict parties and even to execute these proposals via its own particular instruments (peacekeeping forces, legal or “soft power” instruments, etc.). The OSCE and its forerunner the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were established to counter traditional thinking in the Cold War and to engage non-involved states. These organizations helped to reconcile the East and the West, suggesting that from the beginning they were involved in broad terms (rather than as a specific mission) in reconciliation in the CSCE/OSCE. The very roots of the CSCE/OSCE, thus, may be understood as very modern and future-oriented. At the peak of the Cold War, the discussions about three dimensions (baskets) of international relations – security, economics and environmental issues, human rights – were novel and innovative forty years ago at the time of the Helsinki Final Act that codified CSCE (later OSCE) intentions and instruments. In addition to conceptual advances, the OSCE has influenced conflict resolutions terminology for scholars, think tanks, practitioners and academic institutions. The idea of conflict resolution promoted by the CSCE/OSCE is often called t h e missing gap between the pragmatic practice and liberal theory approaches (Beriker 2009). State-centric classic realism barely has reflected the existence and role of international organizations. The neo-realist approach, still linked firmly to the classical notions of power and state interests, has shifted the realist approach somewhat by accepting the fact of international organizations. The reality of dynamic international relations then gave rise to liberalism, institutionalism and constructivism, which all have proposed a new point

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view regarding conflict resolution and the role of international organizations. The OSCE is a perfect example where both theories of realism and liberalism give us very good explanations of its role and functions. We have chosen the OSCE in particular because it is arguably the primary organization dealing with conflicts in Eastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, the Balkans and other regions of the OSCE area. It is the only organization that encompasses 57 states, in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, on a formally equal basis. Moreover, it falls under the UN regional arrangement status. The original CSCE states declared the organization to be a regional arrangement of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, which has confered international legitimacy on the CSCE/OSCE. In the UN Charter, chapter VIII, article 52 states: “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (United Nations 1945). In this regard, the participating states declared at the CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration in the article 25: “Reaffirming the commitments to the Charter of the United Nations as subscribed to by our States, we declare our understanding that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. As such, it provides an important link between European and global security. The rights and responsibilities of the Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety. The CSCE will work together closely with the United Nations especially in preventing and settling conflicts” (CSCE 1992; Goda 2013). We could characterize the CSCE/OSCE, after the UN, as a pioneer in conflict resolution and conflict prevention in the international organizations’ agenda. The influence of the CSCE/OSCE goes far beyond conflict resolution and conflict prevention to the basic rejection of war as an instrument (unless it has to be used as the last resort). The process itself is understood as a process towards reconciliation.

The Concept of Security Community The OSCE in theory is tightly connected with the “security community” concept, understood as a space in which the inhabitants expect that conflicts will be settled in non-violent ways. Security communities emerge in the moment when the entities stop accepting war as a legitimate means of conflict settlement. Several approaches to security community have evolved, with the two leading positions represented by Karl Deutsch and by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Tusicisny 2007). Karl Deutsch (Deutsch 1957) introduced the concept of the security

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community “as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men someday might abolish war.” He defined a security community as “a group of people” integrated by a “sense of community,” based on, “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’” (Deutsch 1957, p. 5). He continues by defining peaceful change as “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force”: (p. 5). Later he elaborates: “a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior” (p. 36). Deutsch distinguished between two basic types of security community : “An amalgamated security community (such as the USA) emerges when two or more previously independent political units form one larger unit with one common government. A pluralistic security community (such as the USA with Canada) consists of formally independent states” (Tusicisny 2007, p. 16). Moreover, as Deutsch observed, “pluralistic security-communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts” (Deutsch 1957, p. 29). As constructivists, Adler and Barnett developed pluralistic security communities. They define the pluralistic security community, the more prevalent form in the international arena, as “as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it” (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 30). They provide a basic distinction between two ideal types of pluralistic security community – loosely and tightly coupled (Adler and Barnett 1998). Adler and Barnett provide an additional dimension of security communities: the phases of development, which helps to categorize them into nascent, ascendant and mature communities. In the first phase of the security community development, the states have no essential interest in forming a security community but they start to consider the possibilities of how to coordinate relations in order to increase mutual security, decrease costs related to the changes in security and to stimulate further changes and interactions. However, there are no expectations that such cooperation will be permanent and will lead to mutual identification and confidence (Mutzenich and Karadi 2013; Vucetic 2001). Adler and Barnett specify the interactions: “interstate and transnational interactions can produce and are facilitated by international organizations and institutions that: contain norms and provide mechanisms that make states accountable to each other ; institutionalize immediate (if not diffuse) reciprocity ; identify common interests (or even identities) among a selected population; and produce charters and agendas,

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and convene meetings and seminars, that reflect the attempt to create a binding set of interests and a collective future. ‘Third parties’ can become region-builders” (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 52). The second phase of the Adler-Barnett model reveals an intensity and enhancement of mutual interactions through deepening relations among states in the security community. Through the increase of mutual trust among security community members also comes a deepening of trust to deal with common threats and challenges within the community. (Cross and Vukadinovic´ 2013). Adler and Barnett note that “this phase is defined by an intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states that is likely to be produced and be a product of various international institutions and organizations. Although functional organizations might help to encourage mutual trust, we look to changes in the organization and production of security for both the primary mechanisms by which this trust is produced and for its evidence” (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 54). In the third phase, the security community displays maturity. Regional actors share common identity and mutual expectations about peaceful change, which lead to the establishment of a true security community. Security communities in this phase are no longer dependent on international organization in terms of inspiration and providing trust. Trust is assured based on the existing system of mutual recognition and the shared system of norms. Here the analysis leads the authors to “distinguish between the loosely and the tightly coupled variants. In the former, minimalist, version: states identify positively with one another and proclaim a similar ‘way of life’; there are multiple and diverse mechanisms and patterns of interaction that reinforce and reproduce the security community ; there is an informal governance system based on shared meanings and a collective identity ; and while there remains conflicting interests, disagreements, and asymmetric bargaining, there is the expectation that states will practice self-restraint” (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 55).

The OSCE as a Security Community How does the OSCE fit into the theory of security community? Emmanuel Adler has applied the pluralistic security community model in the case of Europe and specifically in the case of the OSCE. As a general proposition, he argues that among other regional organizations, such as the EU and NATO, the OSCE is the best instance of the “security community-building institution” (Adler 1998, p. 119). Adler presents seven specific points on how the OSCE contributes to the idea of a security community : “(1) It promotes political consultation and bilateral and multilateral agreements among its members. (2) It sets liberal

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standards – applicable both within each state and throughout the community – that are used to judge democratic and human rights performance, and monitors compliance with them. (3) It attempts to prevent violent conflict before it occurs. (4) It helps develop the practice of peaceful settlement of disputes within the OSCE space. (5) It builds mutual trust by promoting arms control agreements, military transparency, and cooperation. (6) It supports assistance to newly independent states and supports the building of democratic institutions and market-economic reforms. (7) It provides assistance to post-conflict reestablishment of institutions and the rule of law” (Adler 1998, p. 132). Building on this, Adler specifies six broad themes that enhance the seven contributions above: 1. Cooperative security – within the OSCE there is the hope that its structures – such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Field Missions and other crisis mechanisms as well as regional security and human rights tools – will work together in order to assure conflict prevention and conflict resolution. 2. Socialization and the teaching of norms – the whole OSCE is about norms and standards. According to Adler, “the OSCE has adopted the view that you must first let the largest possible number of people from different states imagine that they are part of a community” (Adler 1998, p. 133). Therefore, the whole idea of incorporating the post Soviet states into the OSCE was based on the imagination that “we are the same.” 3. Expectations of international legitimacy and the “accountability norm” – here, the expectation is that international legitimacy is based on the democratic character of domestic regimes; by accountability Adler means that the OSCE states are accountable to each other in terms of their actions towards their own citizens. 4. System of governance – “the OSCE’s constitutive norms and associated institutions and practices may be conceived as a crude governance system” (Adler 1998, p. 134). This dimension seems to be the most difficult and the weakest when discussing the role of the OSCE because any system of governance cannot be dependent only on legitimacy. 5. Cognitive region and agent States – this aspect relates to creating and promoting collective perceptions and transnational identity about common regional security and well-being among peoples and states. 6. OSCE practices as community-building devices – here Adler explains that “the institutionalization in the OSCE space of cooperative security practices is intended to ground regional security on a collective transnational identity and, therefore, on dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler 1998, p. 136). The institutional processes and attributes of the OSCE are, according to Adler, fully compatible with role of the OSCE as a security communitybuilding organization. He argues that the lack of enforcement mechanisms could be turned into an advantage as the decisions adopted remain only politically binding, which helps to promote confidence among actors. Secondly, the informality of the Helsinki process prevented the bureaucratizatiom of the organization and empowered individuals and civil society to

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fight for their own rights. Furthermore, the consensus principle instead of majority voting helps create a unique political culture within the organization. Institutionalized learning is an additional benefit when the outcome of the OSCE conferences relies on careful review of existing documents and a gradual, calibrated decision-making process. In this atmosphere, the use of common approaches and recognition of mutual positions replaces balance of power techniques. Finally, Adler suggests the strength of the OSCE’s institutionalization of the diplomatic practice of teaching norms and legitimizing professional and expert insights as the basis for agreements. The OSCE has played a crucial and key role in the promotion of a security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok in the last 40 years. The organization is nowadays considered the pioneer and the most creative institution in terms of crisis prevention. It has also shared its own experience with other regional organizations, which have later adopted some measures in order to build a security community. A considerable influence on the development of security communities was foremost the institutionalization of complex, indivisible and cooperative security principles on which the OSCE as a security community building model is based (Mutzenich & Karadi 2013).

The OSCE in Practice The OSCE has shown potential as one of the most important institutional actors in the European security architecture, providing international institutionalization of lessons learned and best practices from processes towards reconciliation. The comprehensive approach to security embodied in its three dimensions – politico-military, economic-environmental and human rights – makes the process as inclusive as possible. Its comparative advantage is represented in specific instruments such as the Conflict Prevention Centre, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and, especially, the Field Missions. The OSCE has a mandate for conflict settlement in several protracted or frozen conflicts across the OSCE area, including Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Ukraine. The OSCE is present in its Field Missions which provide a unique opportunity to reach the local level while at the same time operating on the international level through its Permanent Council, giving it the possibility of serving as a two-way hub. In addition to its experiences in Eastern Europe, the OSCE can draw on experiences with reconciliation in Western Europe, as it did during the 2012 OSCE Security Days. In his report on progress made and possible options for the way forward regarding elements of the conflict cycle, the OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zanier stated that “there are related topics which merit more attention, such as

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reconciliation as a means for conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and security sector reform as an important element of post-conflict rehabilitation” (OSCE 2012, p. 3). As we have mentioned above, the OSCE follows the concept of security community which aims to touch the grassroots, even the level of an individual. In order to give a more specific picture about the role and perspective of the OSCE in reconciliation we have chosen the case study of Transnistria (Pridnestrovye), the breakaway region of Republic of Moldova. Using this instance we will briefly analyze two levels of the OSCE’s engagement – first, OSCE as an actor possessing an international mandate in conflict settlement and, second, OSCE as an actor engaging two parts of the conflict from both banks of the Nistru (Dniester) river. In the first case, the OSCE is present on the ground through the OSCE Mission to Moldova since 4 February 1993 and its main task is to “facilitate the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects…” (CSCE Mission to Moldova 1993, p. 1). The OSCE has a mandate “only” to facilitate the political settlement of the conflict and under any circumstances the OSCE cannot go beyond this task. In other words, the OSCE is not entitled to solve the conflict but to provide constructive ideas and proposals for the conflict parties how to overcome mutual discrepancies. The second level represents areas where the OSCE brings together representatives from both banks of Nistru river and where they interact mutually – this is what we understand as confidence building measures and confidence is a sine qua non of successful reconciliation. The OSCE identified several areas that are of mutual interest for Transnistria and Moldova including gender inequalities, combating domestic violence, educational system, transport, telecommunications, environmental issues. Through organizing workshops, seminars, conferences and other platforms including summer schools for youth on the above mentioned issues, the OSCE contributes to mutual understanding and maintaining a dialogue between the two parties, which is a prerequisite in the process of reconciliation. However, there are deeper roots of the conflict over Transnistria. Besides the geopolitical influence of major actors, historical narratives and memory are also implicated in Moldova. Historical narratives are being misused very often in the Moldovan public sphere, creating and limiting perceptions to at least two very different “worldviews” which cause to some extent permanent polarization of society. In this case, the OSCE could be more active and fulfill this gap through promotion of dialogue and research on historical narratives. The OSCE Representative for Freedom of the Media or other OSCE bodies, including the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, could serve in collecting best practices and lessons learned in similar initiatives from all participating states and afterwards implement new ideas through OSCE Field Missions. In order to assure the identification of the most burning issues dividing the society in this context, the special envoy could be deployed, which

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would collect local needs based on the discussions with local representatives (government officials, parliamentarians, civil society, academia). Basically, the OSCE could follow the example of the “National Dialogue in Ukraine” where the OSCE deployed a team of 15 international experts to Ukraine for a limited time of four weeks to identify areas for further OSCE activities to support confidence-building between different parts of Ukrainian society. In the case of Moldova, reconciliation is needed on two levels – the international and the national. When talking about the international sphere, we have in mind relations between Chisinau and Bucharest, as well as Chisinau and Moscow. In our view, the developments at this level will definitely have further impact on the national level and discussion within domestic society. And the OSCE could be an actor promoting such initiatives as it incorporates all levels. To some extent, this could be applied to most of the existing (and emerging) frozen or protracted conflicts within the OSCE area. The OSCE’s “Strategy towards Reconciliation” included specific recommendations for reconciliation in general: (1) “Encourage comprehensive patterns of interaction,” meaning that reconciliation processes should be as comprehensive as possible. (2) “Identify the core processes,” implying that reconciliation rests on a variety of core processes as part of a reconciliation strategy. (3) “Make use of varied instruments,” suggesting the widest possible application of the various instruments that reconciliation processes have to offer. (4) “Muster support of the OSCE community,” indicating that reconciliation should have the support of international, regional, and or sub-regional actors. (5) “Promote institutionalization,” highlighting that reconciliation must become institutionalized over time and not remain a process that is linked or dependent on particular political elites in office (OSCE, Conflict Prevention Centre 2012, p. 5–7). The OSCE publications on reconciliation build on the work of the Carnegie Endowment’s Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative working group on historical reconciliation and protracted conflicts. The Carnegie authors in turn endorse the work of the OSCE as an institutional platform for reconciliation: “The OSCE might be a useful framework for action and an instrument of choice for some of the activities in the realm of conflict resolution. (For example, the OSCE could serve as a link between Track II dialogues and official contacts.)”. As they correctly continue “[T]he Euro-Atlantic Security Community is not embodied in a single organization, but must find expression in the work of all the region’s institutions. In the case of the OSCE, realistically speaking, there is only so much that can be done to teach a thirty-five-year-old structure to perform new tricks. The goal is to help the organization adapt its potential to achieve the objectives we set ourselves at the outset.” (EASI 2012, p. 9). Track II initiatives of the OSCE include its Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions,1 which has the potential of producing academic as well 1 http://osce-network.net/.

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as policy relevant inputs. During the last year a frequently discussed platform for “senior officials” has become a reality in the creation of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project.2 The main advantages of the OSCE are the political nature of the institution, a long track record in the conflict resolution processes across the OSCE area (in the form of 17 Field Missions and an international mandate under the UN as its regional arrangement), a unique set of its own internally developed instruments and an inclusive and comprehensive approach. However, these advantages can also turn into disadvantages if states show no political commitment and no political will for it to be an efficacious institution for promoting reconciliation.

References Adler, E, Barnett, MN (ed.) 1998, Security communities, Cambridge, UK, New York, Cambridge University Press. Adler, E 1998, ‘Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model’, in Security communities, ed. E Adler & MN Barnett, Cambridge, UK, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 119–161. Appleby, RS 2000, The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Bar-Siman-Tov, Y 2004, From conflict resolution to reconciliation, New York, Oxford University Press. Beriker, N 2009, ‘Conflict resolution: the missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice’, in Handbook of conflict analysis and resolution, ed. DJD Sandole, London, New York, Routledge, pp. 256–272. Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T & Huyse, L (ed.) 2003, Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook, Stockholm, International IDEA. Bloomfield, D 2006, On good terms: Clarifying reconciliation, Berlin, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Broun8us, K 2003, Reconciliation: Theory and practice for development cooperation, Stockholm, SIDA. Cochrane, JR, De Gruchy, JW & Martin, SW (999, Facing the truth: South African faith communities and the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Cape Town, South Africa, Athens, Ohio, David Phyilip Publishers, Ohio University Press. Cross, S & Vukadinovic´, R 2013, ‘Shaping the Twenty-First Century International Security Community in South East Europe and Beyond: An Introduction’, in Shaping the Twenty-First Century International Security Community in South East Europe and Beyond: Trust, partnership, integration, ed. S Cross & R Vukadinovic´, pp. 1–28. CSCE 1992, Helsinki Document – The challenges of change. [Online]. 2 http://www.osce.org/networks/pep.

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Deutsch, K 1957, Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Dwyer, S 1999, ‘Reconciliation for Realists’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 13, pp. 81–98. EASI 2012, Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts [Online], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available from: http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/02/03/historical-reconciliation-and-protracted-conflicts (29 July 2015). Galtung, J 2001, ‘After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution: Coping with visible and invisible effects of war and violece’, in Reconciliation, justice, and coexistence: Theory and practice, ed. M Abu-Nimer, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books. Gardner Feldman, L 2012, Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation: From enmity to amity, Lanham, Md, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Goda, S 2013, ’The role of the OSCE as the regional arrangement of the Charter of the United Nations’ in Economic, political and legal issues of international relations 2013, Bratislava, Ekonjm, pp. 129–135. Kriesberg, L 2001, ‘Changing Forms of Coexistence’, in Reconciliation, justice, and coexistence: Theory and practice, ed. M Abu-Nimer, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, pp. 47–64. Kupchan, C 2010, How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Lederach, JP 1997, Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. Lederach, JP 1999, The journey toward reconciliation, Scottdale, Herald Press. Long, WJ & Brecke, P 2003, War and reconciliation: Reason and emotion in conflict resolution, Cambridge, MIT Press. Meierhenrich, J 2008, ‘Varieties of Reconciliation’, Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 195–231. Mutzenich, R & Karadi, M 2013, ‘The OSCE as a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community : Theoretical Foundations, Preconditions, and Prospects’, in OSCE Yearbook 2012: Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Baden-Baden, Nomos, pp. 43–55. Nye, JS 2004, Soft power : The means to success in world politics, New York, Public Affairs. OSCE 2012, Report by the Secretary General on progress made and possible options on the way forward with regard to Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, related to enhancing the OSCE’s capabilities in early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-conflict rehabilitation [Online], SEC.GAL/137/12. OSCE, Conflict Prevention Centre 2012, Food for Thought Paper : Towards a Strategy for Reconciliation in the OSCE Area [Online]. Rigby, A 2001, Justice and reconciliation: After the violence, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Shore, M 2009, Religion and conflict resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Farnham, England, Burlington, Ashgate. Tusicisny, A 2007, ‘Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously’, International Political Science Review, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 425–449. UN 1945, 1945. Charter of the United Nations, chapter VIII. [Online]. Verdeja, E 2009, Unchopping a tree: Reconciliation in the aftermath of political violence, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. Vucetic, S 2001, ‘The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution’, Southeast European Politics [Online]. Available from: http://www.seep.ceu.hu/issue22/vucetic.pdf (29 July 2015). Worthington, EL 2006, Forgiveness and reconciliation: Theory and application, New York, Routledge. Zartman, W 1997, ‘Toward the Resolution of International Conflicts’, in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques, ed. W Zartman, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Raisa Barash

Mythologization of the Soviet Past and Prospects for Historical Reconciliation in Russia1

In May 2015, the Russian Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskiy announced the need for historical reconciliation in Russia. Talking about the prospects of this long-term process, Medinskiy emphasized the need to overcome the inner divisions caused by the events of 1917 and the Civil War (Modern Russia 2015). Offering a reconciliation agenda Medinskiy however appealed for not waging a war on memory and called for respect for the Soviet era’s massive achievements. If a reconciliation process is recognized in the Hölderlinian tradition articulated by the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS) as the middlepoint of a strife (Leiner, Palme & Stoeckner 2014, p. 9), reconciliation should start from the critical self-reflection of its participants. In this sense the statement by the Russian civil servant reflects the central problem of Russian reconciliation policy – as an infant process it faces a deficit in the realm of critical self-reflection. Appealing to the great Soviet past, to the mass nostalgia for Soviet foreign influence, to the willingness to sacrifice personal well-being for the sake of the state, along with the thematization of the need to beware of traitors – all these dimensions of the Soviet value scale are apparent in contemporary Russia. At the same time, Soviet mythology is being critically revised in some post-Soviet states (the Baltic States, Georgia, and Ukraine). The closer these states come to the European community, the more intensive Russian society is looking for the basis of a new political mythology in re-Sovietization. In turn, Soviet nostalgia in Russia pushes its neighbors toward European modernism. Explaining the anti-Western turn of some post-Soviet states Dmitriy Furman noted that the fall of the post-Soviet, Russian-backed regimes has eventually helped bring to power western-oriented oppositions (Furman 2007, p. 99) who minimize symbolic links with the Soviet past and thus with Russia. The accentuation of contemporary Russian politics in the framework of Soviet mythology was clearly demonstrated during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The deviation of Ukraine from the pro-Russian customs union to the EU-association agreement meant the death of the post-Soviet community. The deep hurt and grievance felt by the Russian authorities 1 The publication has been prepared with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation, Project No. 15–33–01392 “Multicultural societies: communication models and forms of identity”.

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against the Ukrainian escape to Europe forced the Russian government to play the deep strings of the collective conscience. The accusation made by Russian officials and media that the Ukrainian activists were fascists was supported by some Russian citizens, who were certain that it was followers of the ultranationalist Stephan Bandera who had rioted in February 2014 in Kiev. In April 2014, commenting on the Ukrainian laws on historical memory that condemned the communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibited use of their symbols, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov claimed that the Ukrainian authorities are in fact engaged in the glorification of Nazism as a way to de-glorify the real heroes (Lavrov 2015). His statement gave the state media the opportunity to tell a wide audience about the “Nazi revenge” in Ukraine. Whereas Vladimir Putin in 2015, during the “Direct Line” (annual TV and a Q&A show, where the President responded to citizens’ questions), claimed “it is impossible to put Nazism and Stalinism on the same plane because the Nazis directly, openly and publicly proclaimed [as] one of their policy goals: the elimination of entire ethnic groups,” while the Stalin regime never set the goal of destroying entire groups of people. The USSR tried to impose its own development model on many Eastern European countries, and did so by force. Putin insisted that “this is more or less what Americans are doing today” (Putin 2015).So, any criticism of pro-Russian foreign policy can be automatically viewed as the American “export of democracy”. These incidents demonstrated that Soviet mythology and its value system are still deeply rooted in the Russian collective memory, preventing the prospects for reconciliation, especially inside the state. Undoubtedly, the Soviet past is very carefully maintained and protected in Russia as the unequivocal heroic heritage. The heroic Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet past in general are used by the contemporary Russian authorities to parade themselves as the successor to the Soviet Union. This reference point of the Soviet Union is, for the Russian authorities, the only example of social solidarity in a contemporary environment which is most accurately described as fragmented; its use allows the government to ensure Russian society is easily mobilized against external enemies.

The Early Post-Soviet Rollback of the Soviet Myth The contemporary reverential attitude toward the Soviet past is largely the result of the efforts of the Russian government during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Just after the fall of the USSR the attitude towards the Soviet era was more sober than today. By 1991 the Soviet concept of history was largely disregarded. To the collective consciousness it was clear that the Stalinist period and communist ideology were full of terrible moments and

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caused a great number of tragedies, especially in domestic policy. It was also known that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union brought great suffering to neighboring Eastern European states. The changes in the historical consciousness of the 1980s led to most Soviet people losing faith in communism and played a serious role in the moral justification for the transition from communism to a market-based economy and an open society. The focus of the 1990s was not so much the balanced assessment of the Soviet past but more the outright denial and ignoring of the Soviet past. President Boris Yeltsin’s era was mostly oriented not to the serious painstaking work with historical memory and reconciliation but rather worked to build a new Russia, a kind of futuristic, Westernized project, in which no attempt was made to seriously reflect on the Soviet experience. The work with Soviet heritage during the 1990s was principally reduced to banal anti-Stalinism and to symbolic politics. The flag of the Moscow tsar and the imperial hymn by Mikhail Glinka were reintroduced; the names of cities such as Samara, Yekaterinburg, Vladikavkaz, Nijni Novgorod were changed back to the names they bore prior to the Soviet Union. As if to restore pre-communist Russia, Yeltsin attempted to galvanize the symbolism of the pre-Soviet imperial period: during Yeltsin’s presidency the Romanov family was reburied and canonized, and the Russian Orthodox Church was returned the land of which it had been deprived by the Soviets. Yeltsin personally supported the idea of the restoration of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. And his intimacy with the Orthodox Church was the beginning of a trend which continues today : Yeltsin began to meet Patriarch Alexei II regularly and the Patriarch began to play an increasingly large role in important secular state ceremonies (e. g. the president’s inauguration). The way that Yeltsin embodied himself as the new Russia made President Mikhail Gorbachev seem like an unconditional derivation of the communist past. In the 1990s, the days of the Bolsheviks were considered a period of bloody fanatics and murderers while the new Russia, represented by democrats, was a step back to the golden period of Russian history. But in spite of Yeltsin prohibiting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1991 and restoring the mythology and ethics of pre-communist Russia, the Russian Federation wound up becoming the inheritor of the Soviet Union. Despite the absence of a serious politics of memory, the early post-Soviet period gave birth to some very important ideas – that the ruling communist minority was a special social stratum, devoid of any of the common characteristics that the Soviet people shared, and that it worked against the Soviet people instead of for them. It was articulated that the Bolsheviks, not ordinary Soviet citizens, were responsible for the horrible crimes of the Soviet Union. The lack of ethics behind the Bolsheviks’ crimes was a very important notion in post-Soviet Russia: the collective desire to push aside the communist context from the collective past gave birth to the idea that as well as being the main rulers the Russians were the main victims of Soviet politics (Hosking

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2006). In spite of the common knowledge that the fall of empire meant historical memory and the political emancipation of the republics were painted in the colors of ethnic liberation, the post-Soviet denial of the crimes for their being anti-Russian by nature made it impossible to associate Bolshevism with ethnic Russians. The secondary effect of this anti-Russianization of Bolshevism was the displacement of collective responsibility from the collective Russian memory that also downplayed the need for a serious reconciliation policy. During the Yeltsin administration historical memory was mostly utilized to overcome communism without special attention toward Stalinism. Even the celebration of Victory Day and the legend of the Great Patriotic War were not given great attention by the authorities as they were inseparably associated with the figure of Stalin. The first post-Soviet victory parade, which commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of Victory Day, was mostly devoted to the glorification of the people’s heroism. In 1995 the memorial complex Poklonnaya Gora was opened, and the main figures in the parade were veterans marching through Red Square. By the end of the 1990s the Russian authorities had lost their interest in the history of the Bolshevik period. Society itself was left to deal with the problems of historical memory. Discussing this problem Valeria Kasamara and Anna Sorokina noted that the important obstacle to democratic consolidation is the denial of the crimes of the old regime and the lack of the guilt for the mistakes of past generations (2014, p. 108). In the period of the 1990s and 2000s one could find a search for alternative versions and interpretations of history. The educational system had to deal with the rejection of the Soviet version of history they had accepted and studied for so long. In the context of serious regional separatism and nationalism, different alternative regional historical memories appeared, especially in the Caucasian Republics, Tatarstan and Tuva (Giuliano 2011).

Reverting to the Anti-Western Discourse A new conception of historical politics began to form just at the end of the first term of Vladimir Putin. The political and administrative strategy of Putin’s first term was the combination of the Soviet ideas of social solidarity and sovereign democracy. The idea of the social state, which tried to revive the best of the Soviet anti-capitalist social practices, and the concept of sovereign democracy as the specific Russian unrepresentative form of the illiberal political regime were clearly anti-Western. Evgeniy Yasin noted that the strategy of domestic policy during the presidency of Vladimir Putin was seriously changed: declarations of economic liberal reforms were accompanied by the revival of official patriotism (Yasin 2007, p. 15).

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Post-Crimean foreign-policy isolationism of Putin’s Russia stopped any prospects of post-Soviet reconciliation with Western neighbors, although at the beginning of the 2000s the Russian authorities addressed the issue of Soviet foreign policy and strived for reconciliation with those Eastern European states that suffered from forced Sovietization. Also, in 2006 Putin visited Hungary and the Czech Republic and publicly apologized for the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Budapest, Putin laid flowers at the grave of those killed during the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and proclaimed that contemporary Russia is not the Soviet Union, but feels morally responsible for these incidents. Later on Putin visited Prague and claimed that Russia accepted historical responsibility for the Soviet invasion of 1968. In 2009 the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza published an article by Putin (2009) in which he claimed that both the Soviet Union and West European states were responsible for World War II. He wrote that the MolotovRibbentrop Pact was criminal to the same extent as the Munich agreement, signed a year earlier. Putin compared the feeling of the Russian citizens whose fate was ruined by totalitarianism with the pain of the Polish people, who remember the cruel killing in Katyn. Despite such claims of the President and the fact that the Russian Parliament even called Stalinism totalitarianism, the memory of Soviet foreign politics was not critically revised, and it stopped prospects for reconciliation with the Western states. This absence of ripeness for foreign policy reconciliation became obvious by the beginning of the twenty-first century, when the Russian government began to note the difference in Russian and Western values and when the skepticism against the West was formed. The anti-Western vector was noticed even by the US ambassador Alexander Vershbow, who in 2003 drew attention to the “values gap” between the USA and Russia. The authorities’ desire to differentiate Russia from the West was exemplified by the Russian Orthodox Church when Kirill, the head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s department for external church relations (now the Patriarch), publicly declared in 2006 that the secular liberal concept of human rights practiced in Western Europe could not be adopted in Russia without making appropriate adjustments. Kirill’s statement corresponds to the ideas of Iver Neumann, who argued that the roots of the Western “other” were in some ways determined by the fact that “Russia was perceived as and represented itself as an oriental state by its culture and lifestyle for more than two centuries” (1999, p. 25–70). The popular Slavophile’s conception, and even the conception of Alexander Kozhev, expressed a need for Russia’s future to lie in not being grouped with the West, which would inevitably exploit and undermine the country, and rather in being a Eurasian state (Hosking 2006, 75). A dramatic deterioration of the relationship with the West came on the eve of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, when the U.S. President and some European leaders refused to visit Russia in protest at the infringement of the

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rights of sexual minorities. Simultaneously, accusations that the opposition was cooperating with the West reached their highest point following the reunification with / annexation of Crimea. In his annual address to the Federal Assembly on March 18, 2014, just after the attachment of Crimea to Russia, Putin warned against the threat of internal problems, inspired by Western politicians, and mentioned that it was national traitors and a fifth column who were working on behalf of foreign governments with the aim of harming Russia (Putin 2014). Thus, those citizens who did not agree with the annexation of Crimea or criticized the Russian action were called Westernized traitors; it was noted that the potential for civil dialogue was thwarted. The anti-Western discourse of the Russian authorities in the 2000s stemmed powerfully from the Soviet tradition of positioning the USSR, as the center of the Communist world, against the U.S. as the repository of alien values of wealth, exploitation, racial inequalities and so on. As Lev Gudkov noted, the idea of enemies is still one of the key factors in Russian identity (2005a, 43). While defining the historical enemy in anti-Western discourse was not difficult to achieve, defining the Soviet past during the 2000s demanded serious historical and political efforts. Nikolay Koposov rightly noted that the contemporary politics of memory in Russia has related mainly to foreign policy (Koposov 2011, 12). Talking about key elements of the collective identity, based mostly on the Soviet past, one has to deal with the heritage of Soviet foreign relations. But with no serious, critical analyses of the Soviet past, any discussions about the key facts of national history are still suppressed. Factual honesty in discussions about the Soviet past casts doubt on key myths of the collective identity. Trying, from the one side, to prolong the tradition of strong centralized authority, and from the other, to promote the ideas of humanism and human dignity, the Russian authorities faced a problem with the portrayal of the communist past. A decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union the best examples of real collective solidarity in Russian society were mostly in the communist past (especially the victory in the Great War). Putin’s administration was very careful in how it judged the “black spots” of the communist past in order to inherit the myth of Soviet social solidarity and a powerful country. Contemporary Russian bureaucracy uses the mythologized image of the Soviet past as a tool for its moral self-legitimization and bans any critical analysis of the Soviet legacy (Antonovskyi 2015).

Rewriting History Here, the case of the “struggle” with the history textbook and the attempt in the 2010s to establish a single history textbook should be taken into account. In the beginning of the 2000s, Russian bureaucrats implemented a campaign to

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“protect” schools from unpatriotic textbooks. The criticism of the history textbooks by Alexandr Kreder and Igor Doluckyi, because they contained a negative image of Soviet history, were the most vivid examples of state interference. Similarly, in the beginning of the 2010s, Putin, argued in favor of a single concept of the historical past when claiming that Russian youth very often do not feel any connection with the heroes of the past (Putin 2013). The Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests, which was working in 2009–2012, should also be mentioned. The Commission, headed by the chief of the presidential staff, aimed to counteract attempts to re-write or politicize Russian history. The Commission’s main target was to counter the rehabilitation of Nazism, but this initiative was interpreted more widely as the struggle over historical truth in which the Commission fought against any attempt to offer an alternative to the official view of the history of Russia and the Soviet Union. Although there was no real outcome of the commission’s activity, the commission by itself symbolized the conservative and protective attitude of the Russian authorities towards the Soviet past. The uncritical attitude of the Russian authorities toward the Soviet past remained vivid and continued after the Commission’s work ended. In May, 2014, the Criminal Codex of Russia was supplemented by a new article (#354.1) on the Rehabilitation of Nazism. This article imposed criminal punishment, including imprisonment, for dissemination of false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War (Criminal Codex). This addition to the criminal code suppresses dissent and prevents any possibility of critical debates on the war period. The official interpretation of wartime events should be treated as dogma, as a sacred revelation. In such a dogmatic paradigm of history, any black spots of history can be justified, even the crimes of Stalinism. In April, 2015, Putin announced that it is impossible to compare Nazism and Stalinism because Nazism was aimed at the killing of people of a particular ethnic origin, while Stalinism did not (2015). Putin acknowledged the horrors of Stalin’s repressions and deportations, but concluded that the mass killing of people due to their social characteristics and not their ethnic origins (although deportations were implemented along ethnic logics), were “not so bad” as the crimes of Hitler. Defending the uncritical attitude to the Soviet past and its Stalinist period, the Russian President in fact recognized that the lives of different people (the victims of Stalin and Hitler) had different values.

Reflection on Stalinism All these attempts to protect only the official interpretation of state history have a common root. Fear of damaging the foundation of the social consensus,

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based on the mythologization of the Soviet period of history, the Russian nomenclature restricted even itself from unbiased discussion about the past. The clearest example here is the discussion about the murder of the Polish officers at Katyn. Any critical evaluation of Soviet behavior in the Katyn tragedy destroys the myth of the Great Victory, which is the assemblage point of Russian collective identity, and is to be avoided at all costs. Discussing the Katyn tragedy in 2010, Dmitry Medvedev, then President, called the shooting of the Polish officers a crime of Stalin: “The Katyn tragedy is a crime of Stalin and his henchmen. The position of the Russian state regarding this tragedy was formulated and remains unchanged” he said. In an interview, with the newspaper Izvestia, Medvedev noted that “Stalin committed lots of crimes against his people… And despite the fact that he did a lot for the state, despite the fact that under his leadership the country prospered, the things that Stalin did against his own people cannot be forgiven”. According to the position of Medvedev, Stalin’s role in the Soviet victory during the Great Patriotic War was “very serious”, although the war “was won by our people” (Medvedev 2010). Medvedev’s position toward Stalin was a dialectical – on one hand, it attempted to show that Stalin was not the only factor in the victory and, on the other, it was meant to show Stalin’s important role in history. Vladimir Putin was more moderate and mild in his estimation of Stalin. Putin claimed that it was Stalin, not the Russian people, who was personally guilty in the Bolshevik terror and that, although he agreed that Stalin was a great political leader who did much for the Soviet state, the Great Patriotic War was won by the Russian people. For example, during a meeting with Donald Tusk in Smolensk in 2010 Putin announced that there was an obvious change during Stalin’s rule, from an agrarian to an industrial society. And Putin noted that it was the Russian people, who won the Great Patriotic War. Concerning the Katyn tragedy, Putin remarked that Stalin personally commanded the execution of the Polish officers and nobody should blame this crime on ordinary Soviet citizens. Although Putin admitted the guilt of Stalin in the Katyn case, he noted that Stalin desired revenge for the deaths of 32,000 Soviet soldiers that were killed in Polish captivity during the 1920s. The Russian Parliament in 2010 officially recognized that the shooting of Polish officers in Katyn was committed following direct orders from Stalin and other Soviet leaders. In 2010, when Putin visited Katyn, he condemned the execution of Polish officers as a crime of Stalinism. However, Russian authorities did not demonstrate repentance for the killings in Katyn. One might expect that Russia, recognized as a successor of the Soviet Union, would share in the shame as it does the fame of the Soviet past. The recognition of the Katyn crime is the only precedent where Russian authorities recognized the crimes of Stalinism on an international scale; however, this recognition did not lead to serious reflection about using Stalinism as path to state reconciliation policy in regards to historical memory.

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The Lack of Social Solidarity : Fuel for a Soviet Myth Despite the critical attention toward the Soviet past during the early postSoviet period, the wave of mass Soviet nostalgia increased. It was nostalgia not for communism, but for the basic economic stability and social order of the Soviet era. Free market and political liberalization and, of course, the radical transformation of the social and economic order during Yeltsin’s presidency, led to a rise in Soviet nostalgia. Before long the belief and hope vanished that a fair post-Soviet state had emerged. The lack of social justice, the uncontrolled free market, privatization, and especially the Shelling of Parliament in 1993 (initiated by Yeltsin) engendered doubt about Russian democracy. The mass death of thousands of Russian citizens, both civilian and military, during the Chechen wars, the uncertain victory of Yeltsin during the elections of 1996, and the very privileged status of the presidential family – all evoked great positive sentiment for the social order of the Soviet era. The nostalgia for Soviet social solidarity manifested itself in some initiatives aimed at the museumification of the Soviet past. During recent years many museums dedicated to the commemoration of the Soviet past were created: museums of the USSR were founded in Moscow, Novosibirsk, Ulyanovsk; the Museums of the Soviet gambling machines were founded in Moscow and St. Petersburg; the Soviet Naive Art Museum was founded in Perm; the Museum of the Soviet automobile industry was established in Ivanovo; the Museums of the socialist way of life were founded in Moscow and Kazan; the Museum of the lifestyle of Soviet scientists was established in Moscow. Many such museums were created on the initiative of private citizens as a result of the sincere sympathy of many Russians for everyday life in the Soviet Union. In contrast to the anti-communist museums of Eastern Europe (the House of Terror in Budapest, the KGB Museum in Prague, the Museums of Occupations in Tallinn and Riga, the Museums of the Soviet occupation in Kiev and Tbilisi), the “Soviet exhibitions” in Russia are dedicated to the commemoration of the struggle of the local population for their freedom and independence from the Communist dictatorship; the museums of the Soviet lifestyle in the Russian cities are completely devoid of admiration for communist ideology. The “Soviet museums” in Russia are devoted to the commemoration of everyday grassroots solidarity, social practices and the daily Soviet culture. The desire to revive the social solidarity of the Soviet style is one of the main reasons for the longing for the Soviet past in contemporary Russia. Nostalgia for the minimal but broad Soviet social welfare coexists quite harmoniously with the myth about the victory and common views about the Stalinist terror. There are two emotionally strong, albeit differently colored, identity markers: 1) a robust sense of pride; and 2) the memory of a time of

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robust social well-being under the “Soviet” banner. It was 2004, when Boris Dubin explained the popularity of the Soviet myth by the intersection “crossing” of the piety for the memory of war and the memory of the Brezhnev era’s stability (2004). Why has there been such a need for Soviet mythology? The answer lies in psychology – during the Soviet times a so-called Soviet identity was born. It was a value system based on collective memory and pride in historical achievements. Soviet memory was centered on several events: the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and World War II, the Soviet advancements in science and space exploration, and accomplishments in sports and the arts. After the collapse of the USSR, this Soviet identity continued to reproduce itself throughout the 1990s. Lev Gudkov has noted that some characteristics of Soviet identity are still present – acting as the condensed expression of longterm institutionalized practices and ideological transformations (2007, p. 25). Albeit in different forms, the idea of the birth of a special Soviet mentality and its post-Soviet vitality was supported by both academicians and journalists. Professor Andrei Zubov argued that the Great Patriotic War formed a new Soviet patriot, who was more or less passive and left the solutions to important questions to the political leadership (Zubov 2011). In February 2015, judging by the neo-imperial complex attitude of the Russians towards post-Soviet states, mainly Ukraine, the journalist Leonid Parfyonov noted that this crisis was a result of the deep rootedness of Soviet mentality (Parfyonov 2015). In some ways, the gap between the nostalgia for Soviet social stability and the skepticism toward communist ideology led to a special kind of particularism – to the rise of nationalist ideology. The pursuit of a powerful country, based on a particular set of values, a special past and lack of a foreseeable good future fanned the flames of Russian nationalism. The postSoviet sympathy for nationalist views was also very much determined by the unresolved “Russian question,” by the problem of the uncertain status of the Russian majority during the Soviet period as well as in Yeltsin’s time. Having lost the formal but symbolically privileged status of a “big brother” in the postSoviet states and national Russian republics, ethnic Russians looked for any particular ideology. The desire for any particularism in the situation of an absent social solidarity during the 1990s made the ideas of Russian nationalism popular. The earliest examples of post-Soviet nationalism had a broad ideological tone, from the Russian National Unity of Alexandr Barkashov and the Eurasian Movement of Alexandr Dugin to the National Bolshevik party of Eduard Limonov and the Communist Party of Russia (Verkhovsky & Pribylovsky 1996; Verkhovsky 2010, p. 5–7). During the mid-1990s the nationalist movement had no single leader and mostly accumulated the conservative ideas of national protectionism. There were differences among the early postSoviet nationalist movements regarding their communist past. While Russian National Unity was based on the idea that Russians were discriminated against

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in the Soviet Union, Dugin personally eventually came to support the imperial idea of restoring Soviet borders. In spite of their differences, all nationalist movements held the belief that it was ethnic Russians who won the Great Patriotic War, created a powerful Soviet industry, invested their efforts into the development of the Soviet republics and lost more than other Soviet nations because of the fall of the USSR. The mass Russian enthusiasm for the reunification with/annexation of Crimea was largely the result of two factors – the unsolved “Russian question” and the nostalgia for Soviet social stability and solidarity. From one side, during the period 2000–2008 so-called “managed nationalism” was invented: the amalgamation of the political authorities and the church, in which the antiWestern trend in politics was supported by the “system conservators” (Alexandr Prohanov, Alexandr Dugin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky). It was obvious during the BORN-process (the trial over radical nationalist groups) that some nationalist groups were supported by the authorities. For example, in 2006 Dmitry Rogozin, the current Vice-Premier and one of the leaders of the election bloc Motherland (Rodina) actively communicated with the leaders of the rightwing movements, as was the case with his communication with the monarchist Andrei Saveliyev during the attempt to increase the electoral potency of the Great Russia party. In 2007, the authorities organized a right-wing Russian project itself, which was headed by the deputy of the Parliament Ivan Demidov. As Andrey Isaev has claimed, the Russian project was oriented to the protection of the Russian majority’s interests without (at the same time) offending other people. So in the context of the growing problem of illegal migration and crimes that were interpreted in the media as having an ethnic component (Kondopoga, Birulevo, crimes committed by natives of the North Caucasus republics) the public consciousness was activated by the “national theme.” From the other side, during the 1990s the Russian government claimed to be maintaining ties with “Russian compatriots” living abroad. The rights of Russians living abroad was one of the most popular topics in the Russian media for years. The thesis of the “divided Russian people” was even included into the agendas of the political parties (the programs of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia contained the thesis of the divided Russian people), and many politicians talked about the need of the re-unification of the divided Russians. At the same time the post-Soviet Russian authorities continued the Soviet tradition of the broad definition of the category “Russians” (Russkie) when the category turned into a synonym for the category “Soviet”. The reunification with/annexation of Crimea was perceived as reclaiming traditionally Russian land which had been conquered and cultivated by many generations of Russians. Also, the annexation of Crimea was seen by many Russians as a Russian irredenta. Many Russians considered the unification with Crimea as compensation for the “Russian contribution” to the construction of the USSR.

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Victory Day and the Dilemma of Foreign Policy Reconciliation The Russian political mythology, as mentioned above, today is largely based on Soviet culture and values. This is symbolized mainly by the celebration of the victory of the Soviet people in World War II. Victory Day is the most popular holiday in Russia and the only day that truly symbolizes collective identity and the pure pride of the Soviet period. And an inalienable part of the “victory myth” is the idea that the USSR saved Europe. Nikolay Koposov and Dina Khapaeva argue that the myth about World War II is still associated with the idea of a humanistic mission of the Soviet Army in Europe (Koposov & Khapaeva 2007; Khapaeva 2007). The attitude towards Victory Day itself is a serious dividing line between Russian and European views of the communist past. If in some Eastern European states (the Baltic states, Poland) struggle against fascism was accompanied by a civil resistance to Soviet invasion, then any action taken by the Soviets in Europe was justified from a Russian perspective. There is near unanimous agreement in Russia that the Soviets played the greatest role in the victory over fascism, despite the crimes of Stalinism. As the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, claimed in 2009, it is impossible “to equate the Nazi regime and the dictatorship of Stalin” (2009). And in this context critical evaluation of history and politics in Russia is impossible – since Victory Day is the focal point of the myth of Russian identity. Lev Gudkov argued that the memory of the war was used for the legitimation of a centralized and repressive social order ; it embedded into the general order of the post-totalitarian traditional culture in society. Therefore, the Russian government has to constantly go back to those searing circumstances of the traumatic past to reproduce the key moments of national mobilization. Although Gudkov made this claim in 2005, the idea of the Russian authorities’ pragmatic use of the war and the memory of victory for unreflecting social mobilization under the slogan of resisting any enemy, especially a foreign one, is still prevalent. It was no accident that Poland was unwilling to invite Putin in 2015 to take part in the commemoration events for the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp inmates. After all, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Grzegorz Schetyna, insisted that it was ethnic Ukrainians (not Russians or Soviets) who served in the 1st Ukrainian front that liberated the concentration camp. These statements were perceived by Russian officials and many citizens as an insulting attempt of the European states to revise the key role of the USSR during the salvation of Europe from the fascist threat. A similar reaction was caused by the refusal of the world’s leading politicians (the US President, the British Prime Minister, the Presidents of France and the German Chancellor and President, and the President of the European Council) to visit Moscow for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the end of World

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War II. Although the refusal to attend in May 2015 was a predictable act by the leaders of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, the mass rejection of the Victory Day celebration was perceived in Russia not only as a desire of the West to revise the USSR’s contribution to the victory over fascism, but also as a display of disrespect for the memory of the victims and living veterans and to many Russians. The enthusiasm surrounding the Russian victory excludes any critical attitude towards the dark points in Soviet history ; any negative moments of the Soviet and communist past clash with the delight and pride which stem from the great victory. The victory is the most memorable moment in Soviet history and it is powerful enough to overshadow the memory of the repressions, deportations, terror and aggression toward Eastern European states. The anguish for the Soviet past in Russian society is still strong due to collective pride (the Great Victory, success in space exploration, industrialization, success in science and sports) being solely anchored in the communist past, with the New Russia having no such great examples of social solidarity. Two decades after the Soviet Union fell, not only has a new collective identity not formed but there have been no examples of positive collectivism. Only past achievements feed contemporary Russian identity. And the state sacrifices in the Great Victory exclude from the collective identity any undesirable moments of Soviet history. At the same time, the mass conscience, according to the results of the vox populi, judges Stalin with caution. The Russian government’s overly strict and uncritical imposition of Soviet discourse prevents honest discussion of history and, most importantly, it prevents a policy of reconciliation between the conflicting interpretations of history (above all, it would have to involve an assessment of Soviet foreign policy toward post-war Eastern Europe and a critical revision of Stalinism).

Conclusion Despite declaring the need for “inner” reconciliation after the divisions of civil war and for confronting communist crimes from that period, today the Russian government tries to re-invent Soviet history, separating it from alternative or critical views and leaving only its own heroic interpretation, based on the myth of the Great Victory. Maurice Halbwachs (2005) wrote that history is just a collection of facts that occupied the most important place in people’s memories. And very often history starts when tradition ends and social memory disintegrates. That means that the history is often invented in the absence of eyewitnesses and bystanders of historically important events. In contemporary Russia one can find the features of the re-invention of the Soviet myth on the basis of the refined myth of the Soviet victory, which is used

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for the legitimation of foreign policy isolationism and even for the suppression of political diversity within the state. Today, 70 years after the Great Victory, the Soviet legacy of war is used to justify the suppression of internal traitors and the “fifth column” and the renaissance of the Soviet authoritarian tradition. The growing political isolationism of Russia and the tendency to refuse to negotiate and instead opting to persecute neighbors out of desire to overvalue the historical contribution of Russia and the Soviet Union will trigger a critical attitude abroad toward Russian diplomacy and also toward the historical mythology that is used for the legitimation of Russian foreign policy. That in turn will almost certainly cause another wave of restoration and museumification of the Soviet myth by the Russian authorities, and Russian society will most likely face another round of wars over memory and the past. The hardest work with historical memory, and reconciliation, in Russia remains to be done.

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Mythologization of the Soviet Past and Prospects for Historical Reconciliation 63 Kasamara, V & Sorokina, A 2014, “Obraz SSSR i sovremennoy Rossii v predstavleniyah studencheskoy molodezhi” [The image of the USSR and modern Russia in vies of students] // Obschestvennie nauki i sovremennost’ 1, pp. 107–118. Khapaeva, D 2007, “Ocharovannye stalinizmom: massovoe istoricheskoe soznanie v preddverii vyborov” [Charmed by stalinism: Mass historical consciousness on the eve of elections], Neprikosnovennyi zapas 5 (55), pp. 19–74. Available from: http:// magazines.russ.ru/nz/2007/55/ha6.html. Koposov, N & Khapaeva, D 2007, “Pozhaleyte, lyudi, palachey…” [People, have a pity towards the executioners], Polit.ru, November, 21, 2007. Available from: http:// polit.ru/article/2007/11/21/stalinism/. Koposov, N 2011, Pamyat’ strogogo rezhima: Istoriya i politika v Rossii. [Remembering the brutal regime. History and politics in Russia], Moscow, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. Lavrov, S 2009, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview to the Greek Newspaper Kathimerini, Mid.ru December 2, 2009. Available from: http:// www.mid.ru/maps/gr/-/asset_publisher/D4tBbKa1q61C/content/id/ 271058?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_D4tBbKa1q61C&_101_INSTANCE_D4tBb Ka1q61C_languageId=en_GB. Lavrov, S 2015, Kommentariy i otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova po itogam ministerskoy vstrechi v “normandskom formate” [Comment and answers of S. Lavrov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the media’s questions after “Normandy format meeting”] , Berlin, 13 April 2015. Available from : http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/ C64664E191CAD60843257E270026D340. Leiner, M, Palme, M & Stöcker, P 2014, Societies in Transition, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Medvedev, D 2010, “Interv’yu Dmitriya Medvedeva gazete “Izvestiya” [The Interview of Dmitryi Medvedev to newspaper “Izvestiya”], Izvestia, 7 June 2010. Available from: http://www.kremlin.ru/news/7659. Modern Russia: Toward Historical Reconciliation, 2015, Fort Ross, 29 May 2015. Available from: http://www.fort-russ.com/2015/05/modern-russia-toward-histor ical.html. Neumann, I 1999, Uses of the Other.” The East” in European identity formation, Borderlines, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Parfyonov, L 2015, “Govorit’ pro sovetskoe — govorit’ pro sebya.” [To talk about the Soviet means to talk about myself.], The New Times, 16 February 2015. Available from: http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/94723?sphrase_id=719351. Putin, V 2009, The pages of history – an occasion for the mutual complaints or the basis for the reconciliation and partnership?, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 September 2009. Available from: http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/pressconferences/ 4814/. Putin, V 2013, “Prezident: Uchebniki istorii dolzhny imet’ edinuyu kontseptsiyu.” [The President: the history textbooks should have a single concept.], Rossiiskaya

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Gazeta, 25 April 2013. Available from: http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/25/uchebnikanons.html. Putin, V 2014, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu.” [Address by President of the Russian Federation.], 18 March 2014. Available from: http://eng.kremlin.ru/ transcripts/6889. Putin, V 2015, Pryamaya liniya s Vladimirom Putinym [Direct Line with Vladimir Putin], 16 April 2015. Available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/49261. Verkhovsky, A & Pribylovsky, V 1996, Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii. Istoriya, ideologiya, ekstremistskie tendentsii [The national-patriotic organizations in Russia: History, ideology, extremistic trends], Moscow, Institut eksperimental’noy sotsiologii. Verkhovsky, A 2010, Russkoe natsionalisticheskoe dvizhenie: 20 let posle Perestroyki [Russian nationalistic movement: 20 years after Perestroyka], Eurasian Review, 3. Available from: http://evrazia.or.kr/review/01Verkhovskii.pdf. Yasin, E 2007, Fantomnyie boli ushedshey imperii [The phantom pains of a past Empire] // In After the Empire / ed I Klyamkin, =oscow, Liberal mission, pp. 5–49. Zubov, A 2011, “Sovetskiy chelovek perezhil SSSR.” [The soviet man survived USSR]. Vedomosti, 21 November 2011. Available from: http://www.vedomosti.ru/opin ion/articles/2011/11/21/sovetskij_chelovek_perezhil_sssr.

Olga Konkka

Russian Internal Narratives about the “Western Enemy” as a Barrier for Reconciliation: The Example of School History Textbooks Introduction: The Enemy as Object, The Textbook as Instrument Hostility towards another state, the perception of it as an enemy, represents a serious obstacle on the way to constructing balanced international relationships and cooperation between countries. The change in a nation’s attitude toward another nation is an unavoidable element of inter-state reconciliation. Indeed, we would define reconciliation as a complex process starting with political decisions, followed by debates involving civil society, scholars, the media and institutions. This process leads to changes in political discourse and in internal narratives. They certify that another nation is no longer considered as an enemy, that the past conflicts belong to the past and that they should not have any impact on the current policy and relationship. In order for this reconciliation to happen it is essential that not only the government but also many other actors who are involved in the formation of public opinion (media, educational and religious organizations, different institutions) cease to consider the other state as an enemy. It is crucial for this change to happen throughout a society and to transform the collective memory (Halbwachs 1935). Inter-state reconciliation is not an easy process. It becomes even more difficult when this hostility is not the result of an armed conflict (when the reconciliation can be constructed around a reinterpretation of this conflict), but when it results from a common history, tormented and sown with wars and conflicts, and when this history is deeply rooted in the narratives specific to each country. It does not mean that reconciliation is impossible: The relationship between France and Germany, whose hostility dates back much longer than World War II, serves as an example. Because of both parties’ willingness to achieve reconciliation, employing all means possible, this example has become an emblematic success story. The Franco-German reconciliation process has included work on historical memory and on the discourse about “the other.” In the case of Russia and Western countries, the road to reconciliation appears very complex. The idea of hostility toward Western countries, nowadays represented by the United States and the European Union, is very present in the Russian national imagination. Researchers have noted that the idea of an occidental enemy has been an inherent element in the construction

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of Russian identity, and that it has very deep historic roots. Initially, it was a question of opposition between Byzantine Christianity and that of Rome. This opposition had been gradually transformed into an affirmation of Russia’s uniqueness and of a Russian Sonderweg that persisted during the whole period of the autocracy. Finally, after 1917, it was especially in relation to the West that the “first socialist State” measured itself, a practice that was transformed into Soviet Cold War opposition to the West in the second half of the twentieth century. Several researchers believe that Russian identity is constructed “negatively” in relation to the “other” perceived as an enemy (Gudkov 2004; Mendras 2007). Nowadays, the notion of hostility toward the West is present in the deep collective memory of the Russians more than ever (Wertsch 2008). Despite the past reality of a negative image of the west, after a long period of rivalry and Cold War confrontations Mikhail Gorbachev proposed rethinking foreign policy ; his initiative stemmed from an emerging new diplomacy. New Thinking that allowed for a possibility of peaceful coexistence and even cooperation with the so-called capitalist countries radically changed the USSR’s attitude to the latter, as socialist and capitalist regimes previously were seen as irreconcilable (Rey et al. 2005, pp.15, 17). In the years that followed the fall of the USSR the attitude to the countries on the other side of the iron curtain that came down remained benevolent, at least in the official discourse. The Russian population at that time appeared to be so consumed by economic preoccupations, that the issue of Russia’s new place in the world was overshadowed by much more pressing problems. Since the mid-1990s, the disappointment following the passage to a market economy and the unease provoked by the fall of the USSR engendered Russian accusations against the conventional enemy (Amacher 2009, p. 120). Several authors have noted that in the face of the difficulties and the crises of the first post-Soviet decade, many Russians thought that “the change was imposed on them by some reformers or by the West” (Mendras 2007, p. 78), and the latter was accused of “having voluntarily contributed to the weakening of the country” (Dauce´ 2008, p. 55). The idea that Russia “is surrounded by enemies” was supported by 4 % of the population in 1989, 18 % in 2011 and 26 % in 2014 (Tsvetkova 2014). A Russian sociologist Yuri Levada has drawn attention to the constantly growing percentage (65 % in 1999 and 77 % in 2003) of those who believe that Russia arouses other countries’ hostility (Levada 2005, p. 11). Certainly, there are many means of transmitting this idea of a hostile West, including TV, cinema, and the Internet. School textbooks represent a particularly interesting object of study, as they allow an analysis of the message they wish to transmit to young generations and a vision of the world that can be received in school (Ferro 1992, p. 7). Several researchers who looked at school history textbooks in post-Soviet Russia have emphasized the growing importance of the image of the enemy, rather often incarnated by the West, in these texts. (Berelowitch 2002; Zhukovskaya 2003; Shatina 2011; Sokolov 2008a, 2008b; Berelowitch & Amacher 2013).

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Our study, based on more than seventy school history textbooks, allows us to trace the evolution of the image of the West in the narrative of the history of the twentieth century in post-Soviet Russia. This corpus is quite exhaustive as it includes at least one work of every author or every group of authors who published a textbook of Russian history in the twentieth century between 1992 and 2016. It includes also a representative selection of world history in the twentieth century textbooks. All these books are intended for 14–17 years old students i. e. those who study the twentieth century according to the Russian secondary education curricula. Our analysis shows that the USA, Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, France, incarnate the arch-enemies in Post-Soviet history textbooks. They affirm with ever-growing certainty the ambition of Western powers to achieve a dominating position in the world. This vision is central in the presentation of the USA in a large number of textbooks. Several authors argue that the USA “wanted to become the only leader in the post-war world” (Izmozik, Zhuravleva & Rudnik 2013, p. 224) and “were certain to be able to claim global domination as the greatest world power that has created the nuclear weapon” (Dmitrenko, Esakov & Shestakov 1995, p. 393; Levandovsky, Shetinov & Mironenko 2010, p. 225; Zagladin et al. 2008, p. 256). At the same time, Russia or the USSR appear in the textbooks as exclusively pacifist powers, yet strong enough to constitute an obstacle to this domination. This logic naturally leads to the confirmation of the Western countries as enemies and of their will to weaken Russia and the USSR. This idea can be traced through numerous episodes in the history of the twentieth century and, according to textbooks, allows us to distinguish four strategies employed by the West in order to diminish the power of their rival.

Textbook Perceptions of Western Historical Strategies Against Russia The first strategy consists of a direct military attack. If the civil war that followed the revolution of 1917 remains the sole event in the history of the twentieth century that entailed the presence of Western armies on Russia’s territory, the role that this intervention plays in the perception of Western countries cannot be underestimated. Among the operational goals of the countries of the Entente as they are described in the textbooks, we can find the willingness to “secure their geopolitical interests” (Lubchenkov & Mikhailov 2013, p. 69), “to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs” (Danilov et al. 2010, p. 88; Danilov & Kosulina 2001, p. 104), to “take advantage of the civil war in order to weaken, if not to destroy Russia completely” (Shestakov et al. 2010, p. 101), to “prepare its dismembering” (Kiselev & Popov 2013, p. 89;

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Lubchenkov & Mikhailov 2013, p. 69), to “rip from it its peripheries” (Levandovsky, Shetinov & Mironenko 2010, p. 106), to “impede the reestablishment of a strong state in Russia” (Kiselev & Popov 2012, p. 71), to “ruin its status of a great power” (Dolutsky 2001b, p. 161). The fear of a new plot of the Westerners followed by an invasion remains in the presentation of the whole Soviet period. To weaken, if not to make submissive, and to divide a country that chose a different way while pocketing its riches – that would be the goal of such an invasion. The images of a besieged fortress and of the notorious iron curtain being built in the shadow of this menace are ever present. Thus, certain authors refer to the plans of attack against the USSR that Great Britain and France were devising at the time of the Soviet-Finnish war (1936–1940) (Danilov & Filippov 2012, p. 326; Izmozik, Zhuravleva & Rudnik 2013, p. 131; Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, p, 180; Zagladin et al. 2007, p. 175). Several textbooks mention Unthinkable, a British operation against the Red Army deployed in Eastern Europe, (Lubchenkov & Mikhailov 2013, p. 144; Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, p. 232); Dropshot, an American plan of nuclear bombing of one hundred Soviet cities (Kiselev & Popov 2012, pp. 187–189); or other plans devised by the American military “to put an end to the USSR” (Danilov et al. 2009, p. 97; Dmitrenko, Esakov & Shestakov 1995, p. 439; Ostrovsky & Utkin 2002, pp. 328, 338). The second strategy can be found in books that highlight the West trying to provoke a conflict between Russia or the USSR and another country. The first example of the implementation of this strategy is the war of the Russian Empire against Japan (1904–1905). Whereas the West is absent from the narrative in the first post-Soviet textbook published in 1992 (Zharova & Mishina 1992, p. 51), the textbooks of the 2000s and 2010s insist upon Western countries involvement in the conflict. Those texts explain that Great Britain wanted to draw Russia into a war in the Far East in order to reinforce its own position in the world; that the United States provided multifaceted aid to Japan, encouraging it to declare war on Russia; and that even France, which was already allied to Russia, announced that its alliance would concern only European affairs (Danilov & Filippov 2012, pp. 21–22; Pashkov 2002, p. 30; Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, p. 26). One textbook also claims that the Russian Empire was drawn into the First World War in the same manner by a “hostile” Great Britain that feared Russian influence in the Balkans (Danilov & Filippov 2012, p. 20). In the presentation of the period before the signature of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, numerous post-Soviet textbooks mention the goal of Great Britain and France to provoke a war between Nazi Germany and the USSR. This perspective frames the Munich agreement that, in the tradition of Soviet historiography, appears as Munhenskij sgovor [The Munich plot or criminal conspiracy] in half the textbooks. The paragraphs concerning the Munich agreement are very often the most “anti-Western” paragraphs of every

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textbook. Certain textbooks published in the 1990s proposed a new approach to this very complex period (Dolutsky 2001b, p. 275; Levandovsky & Shetinov 1997; Ostrovsky & Utkin 1995, p. 249; Zharova & Mishina 1992, pp. 309, 333). But for the most part, the textbooks from the 2000s and 2010s repeat the affirmation of their Soviet predecessors (Pankratova et al. 1952, p. 356), according to which France and Great Britain sought to direct German aggression against the USSR The Soviet signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is thereby justified by the hostility on the part of the Western powers. In the narrative of more recent periods this second strategy sometimes makes its reappearance in the context of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan: the authors indicate that the USA provided aid to the mujahideen in order to weaken the USSR (Pashkov 2002, p. 353; Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, p. 284). In this way, the narrative scheme that wants to present the West as the instigator of the conflicts with Russia or the USSR, largely inspired by Cold War rhetoric, is gradually introduced into the modern textbooks. Examples related to the third strategy are meant to demonstrate that the Western countries use Russia or the USSR in a conflict in which they are equally involved. The bold and selfless aid given to the allies is at the center of the narrative concerning the events of the First World War, where it serves to create a contrast between Russia and the West. A much cited example is that of the attack in East Prussia in 1914 during which Russia rushed to the aid of its allies, upon their request, even if its own army was not completely ready. That supposedly helped to preserve Paris and save France from an imminent defeat In another Russian operation in 1916, Russia would again come to the rescue of other countries of the Entente. At the same time the authors make it clear that the allies never showed the same solidarity in relation to Russia, preferring to wait for it to exhaust itself in battles and thus, perhaps, take advantage of it in order to seize the straits of the Black Sea. In the context of the Second World War, beginning from June 1941, the authors also insist on the intention of Great Britain and the USA to take advantage of the conflict to achieve a mutual weakening of Germany and the USSR. In most manuals this explains the delay in the creation of the second front which was opened only when the near victory of the Soviet Union became unquestionable. According to some authors, the Allied landings were supposedly directed not against Germany but against the USSR (Danilov & Filippov 2012, p. 425; Kiselev & Popov 2013, p 172). However, the 1990s textbooks sometimes did not contain any criticism towards the other Allies in the narrative of the Second World War (Ostrovsky & Utkin 1995) or did not hesitate to remind readers that between 1939 and 1941 the USSR was indifferent to the fate of its future partners, notably Great Britain (Dolutsky 2001a, p. 13). Finally, the fourth strategy, the only one that has no connection to an armed conflict, contains examples showing that Western countries try to weaken and

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undermine Russia “from the inside.” First and foremost, it comes down to the support that Western countries could bring to the emerging opposition within the Russian or the Soviet state, or within countries considered as its zone of influence. It is probably this strategy that lends itself the most to modern Russia, and that is why it is evoked especially in very recent textbooks. A shadow of Western influence is present in the narrative of the great upheavals that Russia knew since the beginning of the twentieth century, notably the revolution of 1917. One textbook states that “American bank representatives invested considerable amounts into the future Russian revolution. […] All these efforts pursued only one goal: to destroy the traditional political regime in Russia” (Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, p. 77). Then, according to certain authors, the Western powers supposedly participated in the disintegration of the old Russian Empire by supporting the so-called “separatist” movements. After the Bolshevik victory they hoped for the impending overthrow of Soviet rule: in order to achieve this, they encouraged the activity of anti-Soviet forces inside the country and supported Russian emigration abroad (Dmitrenko, Esakov & Shestakov 1995, pp. 165–166, 195; Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, p. 139). After the Second World War, the secret services of Western countries would also encourage nationalist movements in different USSR republics, as well as dissidents, confusing the public with their radio broadcastings, such as The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, BBC Russian Service. Having drawn the USSR into the very expensive arms race, Western powers would also weaken its economic potential. In addition, they would contribute to anti-Soviet movements in socialist bloc countries (Danilov et al. 2009, p. 96; Perevezentsev & Perevezentseva 2012, pp. 181, 183; Sukhov, Morozov & Abdulaev 2012, p. 257). Thus history textbooks show a willingness to take up these ideas, derived largely from the Cold War, and to transmit them to younger generations by associating the decline of the USSR to the activity of the West that was always looking for ways to weaken its adversary.

Textbook Perspectives of the Contemporary West as Threat: Content and Sources of Suspicion It goes without saying that all these representations are very present in the national imagination of modern Russia. The notion of the “fifth column” constantly appears in discourse about the opposition movement or about international NGOs that are now officially called “foreign agents.”1 The idea of 1 Federal Law dated 20. 07. 2012 N 121-FZ “On amending certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation in part of regulating activities of non-governmental organizations which perform the functions of foreign agents.” This law stipulates that non-governmental organizations partici-

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the Allies’ ingratitude for the sacrifice of the Soviet people in the Second World War is equally very present. The image of the West, constantly seeking ways to weaken Russia both politically and economically, seems to be deeply rooted in the national consciousness. Finally, foreign influence is constantly evoked nowadays when speaking about any pro-Western movements in countries that Russia considers to be its zone of influence, such as Ukraine or Georgia. In fact, as with many other ex-Soviet republics, these two states are constantly accused of revising their history and rejecting their Soviet past which, according to the Russian textbooks authors, had largely (and positively) contributed to their political, economic and cultural development. In fact, when some former republics of the USSR are moving away from Russia, Moscow sees in this “a generalized plot directed against Russia” (FavarelGarrigues & Rousselet 2010, p. 193). So, if a direct confrontation with the West remains only a potential threat, this confrontation may be transformed into a real war in a third country, as is the case now in Ukraine. Ukraine’s willingness to orient itself toward the West was perceived with much hostility in Russia. Public opinion considers that this country was manipulated by Western governments and secret services. The discourse of public Russian media became very anti-Western, especially after the international reaction to the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia and the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. This media war brings back many historical references, mostly in connection with the Second World War. But who is at the origin of this representation of the West in Russian school textbooks? Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm in his book Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 states that the image of “the other,” “them,” who are different from “us” can be used by all societies to accuse them of all “misfortunes, difficulties and disappointments.” This enemy can be present, past or even imaginary (Hobsbawm 1992, p. 222). In Russia, the idea of the Western enemy appears to be an integral part of the nationalist discourse. Research works on the Russia of the 2000s (Favarel-Garrigues & Rousselet 2010; Favarel-Garrigues & Rousselet 2004; Le Hue´rou & Sieca-Kozlowski 2008) attest to the willingness of Russian leaders to “turn their backs on the West” and to present their country as a besieged fortress (Favarel-Garrigues & Rousselet 2010, pp. 13, 15). The authors state that “the defiance towards the West and a general sentiment of a collision between enemies constitute, since the beginning of 2000s, the principal references of the political power” (Favarel-Garrigues & Rousselet 2010, p. 346) and note that this type of discourse had a certain effect on society which became more suspicious in regard to the Western countries (FavarelGarrigues & Rousselet 2004, p. 24). Anne le Hu8rou & Elisabeth SiecaKozlowski point out that the official discourse is constructing “a new image of pating in political activities and receiving funding from abroad must undergo a registration process as ”organizations performing the functions of a foreign agent” and assume a special legal regime.

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the enemy, internal and external”, presenting the West is as being “motivated by hostile intentions towards Russia”, and so the anti-Western discourse is becoming an element of patriotic discourse (Le Hue´rou & Sieca-Kozlowski 2008, pp. 15–16). In modern Russia, contrary to the Soviet period, the idea of the hostile environment is not doctrinally supported. However, the concept of “sovereign democracy” should be mentioned here because, first and foremost, it is antiWestern. It is in relation to the “other” that Russia’s special way is affirmed in the articles representing this concept. Dmitry Orlov, one of the authors of the anthology Sovereign Democracy, states that “it is indispensable to answer to real threats directed at national sovereignty and the national democracy model” (Surkov et al. 2007). This approach seems to fit with the attempt by current leadership to affirm a new Russian nationalism (Laruelle 2010) based on the outcomes of the Soviet period, as well as the values of imperial Russia. The state intervenes increasingly in the process of school textbook writing which is submitted to a mandatory evaluation in Russia. It should be noted that in Russia, unlike in many other countries, history teaching in school is perceived much more as an instrument of civic education than as an introduction to historical science. This tradition, inherited from the Soviet period, has never been called into question, which explains the poverty of didactic tools offered by Russian history textbooks. The documents appear in them more to illustrate the chapters than to invite students to work on their capacity for critical analysis. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Vladimir Putin’s invitation “to review the contents of history textbooks” (Putin, May 20102), because they should “inspire a sentiment of pride” (Putin, November 20033) implies that a political project is being planned behind the textbooks. This period was marked by the ban or non-publication of works of several authors (Igor Dolutsky, Alexander Kreder, Leonid Katsva) who present new approaches to certain problems. For example, they do not insist on the role that the West supposedly played in the drawing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the fall of the USSR. During the same period some textbooks have appeared that offer a very uncritical interpretation of the national history. These works win contests, are granted administrative support and are published in greater quantities. This process culminated in 2013 with the creation of a plan for a standardized history textbook that provoked lively debate in society. Certain authors close to the Kremlin openly explain that the school textbook must represent an instrument to exercise power over young generations and advocate deliberalization of 2 On May, 7 2010, responding to the question of a Second World War veteran in Novorossiysk, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that it was “necessary to verify what is written in our textbooks, who writes them, who finance their publication and for what purpose”. 3 On November, 27 2003, at the meeting with the Russian historians in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin said that history textbooks must “give students a sense of pride for their country”.

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school education in Russia (Bagdasaryan et al. 2009, pp. 13–14). They celebrate a textbook that tries to construct the narrative around the Western threat (Bagdasaryan et al. 2009, p. 19). So there is a strong attempt to present the anti-Western discourse of the textbooks as coming from the government, the leadership. However, we should also consider a second actor beyond the state as influential in textbook content: the authors of the books. Many among them received education during the Soviet period and were distraught by the revelations of perestroika. In a work on history textbooks in Russia, Annie Tchernychev cites a letter sent in 1989 by a history teacher to a newspaper : “Can we always tell truth to children? Doesn’t it risk crushing their belief in ideals, destroying their patriotism?” (Tchernychev 2005, p. 68). Thus, with the arrival of Vladimir Putin and the rebirth of nationalism the authors seem to find once more the discourse that they have been missing for a very long time. According to Guennadi Bordyugov, some authors would even like to go in this direction faster than the President himself because as early as the 1990s they had been questioning liberty and searching for intellectual and political absolutism (Bordyugov 1996, pp. 10, 435). In fact, with the exception of several isolated cases, we find a strong capacity of adaptation to the new circumstances among authors of history textbooks. Thus, some of them, having collaborated in the writing of textbooks published in the 1990s and largely inspired by the ideas of glasnost, joined the teams of textbook authors in the 2000s that affirm nationalist ideas and offer a positive interpretation of the Soviet past. The textbook written by Danilov and Kosulina presents an example of the adaptation of discourse. This textbook first appeared in 1995 and is still published today. A comparison of its numerous reissues, separated into two versions, reveals through its modifications a progressive evolution of the approach to the history of the twentieth century. Many critical remarks disappear, giving place to the justification of national history as a whole. But the direction that the development of history textbooks in Russia is taking now seems to be gaining approval of the majority of Russians (Istorija v ˇskole 2014, Sˇkol’nyje uroki istorii 2013), who represent the third actor. The discourse that presents Russian history as worthy of pride and that insists on the hostility of the West allows the state to place the population, greatly marked by Soviet rhetoric, on bearings that are familiar to it. Natalia Zorkaya from the Levada Center (a Russian non-governmental polling and sociological research organization) states in her 2007 article “The nostalgia of the past” (devoted to the opinions of young Russians) that Russian society “achieved consolidation, having chosen a traditional way of passive adaptation and negative mobilization directed against Russia’s enemies” (Zorkaya 2007, p. 37). The author points out that the West is at the head of the list of its enemies. Lev Gudkov draws a parallel between the rate of hatred and aggression and a general optimism connected to the sentiment of security for

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Russian society which is expressed, notably, by a rise in the President’s confidence rating (Gudkov 2004). According to Gudkov, it is wrong to pretend that the image of the enemy can be imposed uniquely by means of propaganda or ideological manipulation: No propaganda can be effective if it’s not based on the expectations and demands of the mass conscience, if it doesn’t correspond to already existing representations, to legends and stereotypes. […]. That’s why the rise of the importance of the image of the enemy is always the result of mutual efforts: those of the elite in power which has an interest in rationalized interpretations, on one hand, and those of opinions, explanations, beliefs, superstitions, symbols, traditional elements of mass identification, on the other hand (Gudkov 2004).

Thus, the idea of the hostility of the West as it appears in school history textbooks results from a consensus among three actors: the state, the textbook authors and the population, represented notably by the students’ parents who seem to approve of such discourse. So it is difficult, as of now, to expect a change in Russia’s attitude to the West. In addition, because of school textbooks and the system of secondary education in general, this attitude is likely to be deeply inscribed in young generations of Russians and thus perpetuated.

The Trajectory of Textbook Characterizations of the West The seeds of new approaches were perceptible in certain textbooks of the 1990s, now out of print or banned. Even if these works were far from perfect, their authors really wanted to break with the Soviet narrative that reappears in most modern textbooks. Notably, they refused to construct their texts around a Manichaean view of the world where Western countries are always the enemy. We can also mention the membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe since 1996. Since the very beginning of this cooperation, the questions of history teaching in school have been part of established priorities (Council of Europe 2006, p. 7). With the integration into this intergovernmental organization Russia was invited to follow recommendations in terms of the teaching of history that warn against politicization of historical narrative and invite openness to other nations: The first Recommendation stresses that history teaching should be free of political and ideological influences; politicians have their own interpretation of history and history should not be used as an instrument for political manipulation. Learning about history is one of several ways of gaining knowledge of one’s roots, as well as being a gateway to the experiences and richness of the past of other cultures. The second Recommendation on history teaching in twenty-first-century Europe further

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highlights the need to understand differences, realise the value of diversity, respect others, develop intercultural dialogue and build relations on the basis of mutual understanding and tolerance (Council of Europe 2006, 8).

In a document published in 2006 that offers up an assessment of the first ten years of this collaboration, the representatives of national Russian education underline its importance and celebrate the first results. Andrey Fursenko, Minister of Education and Science at that time, states that international programs proposed by the EC “help to eliminate deep-rooted problems and stereotypes, develop tolerant and respectful attitudes among children and teenagers towards the traditions and customs of other peoples, and to preserve a common historical and cultural heritage” (Council of Europe 2006, p. 10). Alexander Chubaryan, Director of the Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Science, explains in his foreword that “History education should help to bring together the peoples of the world by creating a basis for their consolidation; however, such consolidation should be conscious and understood in all its complexity and contradictions as regards the historical destinies of peoples living in a common home” (Council of Europe 2006, p. 11). This document also announces the launch in 2007 of a new intergovernmental project “The Image of the Other in History Teaching”. It stipulates that this project envisions the creation of “an approach to teaching and learning history that reflects the increasing cultural and religious diversity of European societies; and contributes to reconciliation, acknowledgement, understanding and mutual trust between different cultures by endorsing the values of tolerance, openness to others, human rights and democracy” (Council of Europe 2006, pp. 18–19). Nevertheless, during the same period, in the first half of the 2000s, the Ministry of Education gave its approval to certain textbooks offering a hostile image of the West. The textbook of Chestakov, Gorinov and. Viazemski first edited in 2000 explains that in the period that followed the fall of the USSR the West decided not to provide Russia with economic or political aid, choosing to create around Russia a ’cordon sanitaire’ and to take advantage of the changes that occurred (Shestakov et al. 2006, p. 363). The authors also mention the USA’s attempts to affirm itself as the one and only superpower. The text indicates that the growth of anti-Western attitudes since 1994 represents a “spontaneous reaction to the actions of the USA and its allies” (Shestakov et al. 2006, pp. 363–364). Finally, the integration of former USSR satellites into NATO received a very negative assessment in the textbook (Shestakov et al. 2006, p. 365). A textbook under the authorship of Zagladin, Minakov, Kozlenko and Petrov explains that since the 1990s Russian politicians “had the impression that Western countries, first and foremost the USA, did not take Russia into consideration and forced Russian government to support their policy”

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(Zagladin et al. 2003, p. 366). The West is equally accused of practicing “double standards” in the struggle against terrorism (Zagladin et al. 2003, p. 367); the authors point out that the Russian Federation “strives that the actions against terrorism be led in respect of international law standards and UN statutes and not by way of unilateral shows of force of the United States at the whim of that country’s president” (Zagladin et al. 2003, p. 371). In these texts, as in many other textbooks, the idea of the hostility of the West toward post-Soviet Russia is very present, as well as its ambition to be considered a great power. The authors regret the disarmament undertaken by Gorbachev and Yeltsin and fear the growth of NATO and the dominant position of the United States.

Conclusion Consequently, we can state a discrepancy between the declarations made before international institutions and real policy in terms of history teaching at school. Obviously, the twentieth century history textbooks’ narratives about the western countries represent an obstacle to reconciliation between Russia and the West. These texts describe several strategies used by the West in order to weaken and destroy the Russian state, intending that the western hostility towards Russia is a permanent phenomenon. What now hinders the return today to the much more tolerant discourse of the first post-Soviet textbooks and the application of the recommendations of the European Council of which Russia is still a member? It seems that, unlike the example of France and Germany mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is the lack of will to construct another vision of the “other” that constitutes the first obstacle to positive change. This willingness should emanate not only from the government but also from two other actors: the textbook authors and public opinion. For these changes to occur it is necessary to shatter the triangle of consensus among these actors, which is not in the cards for now. Hence, reconciliation does not seem possible in the short term, as the discourse of all the actors is becoming ever more hostile. However, the consensus about the past in Russia is more fragile than it appears. Even though the other actors (public opinion, historians) matter, the state leader’s willingness seems to be decisive in this consensus. We should recall that the image of the West in Russia already changed quickly and unexpectedly when a young member of the Politburo, Mikhail Gorbachev, was named General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Therefore, if the political context changes, a reconciliation process could be launched in the long term. It should nevertheless be accompanied by a long, comprehensive and profound work in order to readjust collective memory and collective narratives. Only in this case, are real changes possible.

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Matthew Rojansky

Russian-Ukrainian Relations: Conflict and Reconciliation over Shared History1

Introduction: History, Memory, Identity Politics Thanks to its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Southeastern Ukraine, Russia has suffered a degree of international opprobrium and isolation from Western partners not seen since the worst decades of the Cold War. From the Russian perspective, these costs have been justified as necessary not only to secure Russian interests, but to defend Russian speaking citizens of the region who are described as Russians’ ethnic brothers and inheritors of a shared historical legacy, which has always been threatened and rejected by Westernbacked Ukrainian nationalists. In the Russian telling, current events practically mirror 1941–44, when Ukrainian fighters committed atrocities against Russians, Poles, and Jews in the name of an extreme nationalist ideology, and often in collaboration with the Nazi occupation. The dominant Ukrainian view of this same history, and of current events in Eastern Ukraine, is practically the diametric opposite of that held by most Russians, and in the face of ongoing bloodshed in the Donbas, neither side seems to have the capacity to conduct meaningful dialogue about their shared troubled history. However, history has shown that if left to calcify, memories of personal and collective suffering stemming from armed conflict will practically guarantee repetition of conflict in the future. Since this cannot be in the interests of Ukrainians, Russians or the West, it is not too soon to develop a shared vision for historical reconciliation in the post-conflict period. This discussion will therefore focus on Russian-Ukrainian historical reconciliation as a process integral to the prevention and resolution of international and internal conflict, rather than as a final state of “reconciled” or “normalized” relations between two states or peoples.2 This chapter will seek to shed light on the challenges for historical reconciliation by examining the close connection between divisive historical memory and identity politics in Ukraine and Russia, and the ideologies and 1 This chapter is adapted from a paper prepared for the 2014 Riga Security Conference, titled “Is there a Role for Historical Reconciliation after the Ukraine Conflict?” 2 For a complete discussion of the distinctions between reconciliation as process and outcome, and for comparison of theoretical views of reconciliation as conflict resolution, see, Gardner Feldman 2012, pp. 2–10.

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political arguments both sides have marshaled to justify the current conflict. The important implication is that in a case like the Russia-Ukraine conflict, failure to address sources of historical tension through dialogue in peacetime are likely to exacerbate the difficulty of preventing and resolving armed conflict when it does occur. Second, the chapter will suggest a possible conceptual approach to historical reconciliation with some positive examples from the recent past, which may provide hope and inspiration for Ukraine and Russia. In light of these, finally, the chapter will examine the major obstacles to reconciliation in and around the current conflict, and propose possible paths forward for the short-, middle-, and long-term post-conflict period.

The Politics of Russian and Ukrainian Historical Memory and Conflict Historical memory has been central to Ukrainian politics and Ukraine-Russia relations from the outset of Ukraine’s post-Soviet independence in 1991 and even long before. Ukrainian and Russian politicians have used and abused collective historical memory to shape public sentiment around Ukrainian domestic politics and relations with Russia, and to advance their personal political interests. In all of these respects, Ukraine is hardly unique—the same approach to historical memory is common among politicians throughout Europe, Russia, and worldwide. Peter Verovsˆek, of Harvard’s Center for European Studies, describes the use of history in politics this way : Politicians frequently make references to the events of the past, or rather to myths created within memory, to justify their decisions and standpoints on a variety of issues, both foreign and domestic. They seek to gain political advantage by monumentalizing group-specific understandings of the past in order to legitimize their actions in the present to gain an advantage in the future. Though these debates are usually based on domestic cleavages or on national and sub-national interpretations of history, they frequently spill into international politics, as differing and seemingly irreconcilable collective understandings of events come into contact and clash politically. In this way, politicians activate memory as a weapon both against domestic opponents and in international affairs (Verovsˆek 2008, pp.4–5).

When it comes to Ukraine and Ukraine-Russia relations, the use of history and historical memory by national leaders as a “weapon” against opponents at home and abroad has become an endemic and deeply destructive feature of national life.

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Russian Perspectives on History and Memory In Tsarist and Soviet times, Ukrainian-inhabited territory under the control of St. Petersburg or Moscow was subject to intense campaigns of Russification (Magocsi 2010, pp. 64, 762, 920). Beyond promotion of Russian symbols and the Russian language over Ukrainian ones, a core component of both Tsarist and Soviet Russification was the denial of Ukrainian nationhood per se by embracing Ukrainians as a kind of quaint, agrarian subset of the greater Russian nation—the Tsarist geographic label for Ukraine was in fact Malorossiya or “Little Russia.” Though Russians and Ukrainians had a centuries-long history of both conflict and coexistence, all was subsumed into the greater Russian imperial narrative of the “gathering of Russian lands,” and imperial expansion from the early Romanov period into the 19th Century. From the mid-19th Century onward, however, a significant Ukrainian nationalist movement developed in concert with the awakening of other nationalisms throughout Central Europe. In part as a cudgel against their Russian rivals, Austro-Hungarian authorities facilitated the growth of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment and of nationalist organizations based largely in Galicia, a historic Ukrainian heartland region that bordered AustroHungarian, Polish and Russian domains, and that changed hands as power waxed and waned in the region (Magocsi 2010, pp. 512–517; Marples 2007, p. 32). In the late Tsarist era, Ukrainian nationalism crept across the border into Ukrainian-inhabited areas of the Russian Empire through Ukrainianlanguage publications and secret societies, but it was to a large degree crowded out of the tumultuous political debates of the period by the rising strength of leftist internationalist movements within the Russian Empire, including the Communists, who counted thousands of Ukrainians among their revolutionary vanguard. Although both Lenin and Stalin alternated between encouraging and squashing expressions of national identity among peoples of the Soviet Union, including Ukrainians, Russian-Ukrainian identity and memory politics settled into a relatively stable pattern after Stalin’s death. Viewed by Soviet Russians as their ethnic brothers, Soviet Ukrainians were accepted as co–inheritors with Russians and Belarusians of the East Slavic civilization known from medieval times as Rus’, and were therefore acceptable to Russian elites at the very highest levels of Soviet power in a way that many other Soviet nationalities—Armenians, Kazakhs, or Jews, for example—never were. This later Soviet version of Russian-Ukrainian relations was greatly strengthened by massive relocation of Russians into Ukraine and of Ukrainians to European Russia and the Soviet Union’s Siberian, Far Eastern and Central Asian territories (both as political and wartime prisoners or evacuees and as part of the Soviet command economy). Ukrainians also shared with Russians the near universal Soviet veneration

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for the incalculable suffering and eventual triumph in the Second World War, known in the Soviet Union as the Great Patriotic War (Marples 2007, pp. 34, 42). With very few exceptions, the official Soviet narrative of the war emphasized the shared suffering and victimhood of Soviet citizens—very intentionally painting the experience of Russians, Ukrainians, Jews and others with an identical brush, even if the dynamics of each group’s collective experience differed dramatically. As a frontline region, where every inch of territory changed hands multiple times, Ukraine suffered disproportionately high human and economic losses, including millions of military and civilian casualties, leveling of cities and industrial infrastructure, and the near total destruction of the Ukrainian Jewish community, which had numbered between one and two million before the war. Ukrainian Lenses on History and Memory For many ethnic Ukrainians, especially those in the newly Soviet-occupied territories of Western Ukraine, a distinct and different memory of the entire period persisted into the post-war era. This narrative emphasized not only the Russian imperialist aspect of Soviet occupation, but the persecution and murder of Ukrainians in the pre-war Holodomor (or Great Famine, 1932–33), the Stalinist Great Purge (1936–38), and Ukrainian suffering both during and after the war itself (Marples 2007, pp. 58–66). During the war, Ukrainian nationalist partisans had fought opportunistically both with and against the German and Soviet forces, with some ultra-nationalist Ukrainian groups committing mass murder of civilians, especially Jews and Poles. Though the partisan war in Western Ukraine persisted in the form of an underground antiSoviet movement well into the 1950s, it was alternately suppressed, concealed, and demonized by Soviet media and government officials, in favor of mainstream Soviet Ukrainian identity and memory policies. The late Soviet version of the Ukrainian-Russian brotherhood narrative easily dominated after Ukrainian independence in 1991, not only because of the enduring legacy of Russification and the considerable number of Russians living in Ukraine, including in key industrial, political and intellectual leadership positions, but also because of the compatible political, economic and security interests of the Ukrainian and Russian leadership in the 1990s and early 2000s. Ukraine under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk (1992–94), a former Communist party boss, and Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004), former director of a Soviet missile factory, followed a similar path to that of Russia during the same period. Ukraine remained utterly dependent on Russia for energy supplies, and for most of the first post-Soviet decade continued to participate in the Russian media, transport, telecommunications, banking, education and other basic economic infrastructure (Aslund 2009, pp. 41–55, 93–106).

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While a strong and growing anti-Russian sentiment emanated from the Western part of Ukraine throughout the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods, it was effectively suppressed on the national level by the demographic, economic and political predominance of the most Russified and most industrialized parts of Ukraine in the East and South, especially the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Ukrainian leaders would generally pay lip service to Ukrainian language, history, and culture, but basically continued to conduct business in Russian and with Russia just as they had in Soviet times. Ukraine’s 2004–5 Orange Revolution was the first major break from Soviet and post-Soviet Russian-Ukrainian identity, though it ultimately proved short-lived and incomplete. During and immediately following the Orange Revolution, the new political leadership sought to discredit not only their Soviet and post-Soviet predecessors, but to distance themselves from the legacy of Soviet and Russian history in Ukraine altogether. The key vehicle for doing so became collective memory around tragic chapters in Ukraine’s history, particularly the Holodomor and the Second World War, both of which entailed mass civilian deaths and were catalysts for widespread anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiment. In addition, President Yushchenko (2005–10) and his allies raised up controversial symbolic figures from these and past historical periods as national heroes, in an attempt to solidify a unique Ukrainian historical narrative distinct from that previously shared with Russia and the Soviet Union (Marples 2007, pp. 109–115). Focused on commemoration of Ukrainian victimhood and resistance against “occupiers” who were understood to be Russian (whether Tsarist, Soviet or post-Soviet), the politics of memory in Orange Ukraine also ensured the new political leadership a strong base of electoral support in the country’s western provinces. These Ukrainian-speaking areas, some of which had never had any connection with Russia until the start of Soviet occupation in 1939, were fertile ground for the new leaders’ agenda of forging a dominant Ukrainian national identity. However, official endorsement by Kyiv of an implicitly and explicitly anti-Russian, pro-Western Ukrainian narrative alienated not only citizens of Russia, but millions of Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine itself, particularly in Crimea and the Southeastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. At the other end of the current Ukrainian-Russian historical memory debate is a narrative far friendlier to the Russian and Soviet role in Ukraine’s development, the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church, and other key symbols associated with today’s Russia. While most Ukrainian leaders have paid some lip service to the common experience of Russians and Ukrainians during the past several centuries, especially the shared victory over Nazi Germany and its allies in World War II, the regime of Viktor Yanukovych, which came to power following the collapse of the Orange coalition, fully embraced this approach, largely reviving Soviet era views of Ukrainian and Russian nationality, identity and history.

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For Yanukovych, rollback and delegitimization of the Orange government’s identity-creation narrative also helped justify policies intended to secure his own electoral base, concentrated in precisely the same Russian-speaking southern and southeastern regions that had been alienated by the previous authorities (Aslund 2009, p. 216). Yanukovych followed a well-worn Soviet and post-Soviet path in condemning anti-Russian strains of Ukrainian nationalism while endorsing a common East Slavic historical narrative, including celebrating Ukraine’s achievements in Tsarist and Soviet times and commemorating the common origin of East Slavs and the Orthodox Church in Kyivan Rus’. These efforts won grudging appreciation from Moscow, which facilitated conciliatory foreign policy gestures and cheap Russian energy imports, from which Yanukovych and his allies syphoned huge amounts to line their own pockets. In addition to appeasing some Russian-speaking voters in Southeastern Ukraine and helping secure concrete Russian political and economic concessions, Yanukovych’s treatment of Ukrainian history resonated with a majority of Russians (including, apparently, Vladimir Putin) who conceived of Ukraine and Russia as one nation divided by an essentially artificial and accidental border (LiveLeak 2014; Saigol & Hille 2013). The brotherhood narrative was a convenient overlay for complex and disparate views of Ukrainian-Russian relations both within Ukraine itself and across the border in Russia. Thinking of Ukraine as a brotherly nation helped both sides justify otherwise unimaginable compromises of sovereignty such as the shared naval base at Sevastopol, decades of deeply discounted Russian gas supplies to Ukraine, millions of legal and illegal labor migrants thanks to essentially open borders, and the persistence of inefficient Soviet-built heavy industry throughout Ukraine which was almost entirely dependent on the Russian market.

The Euromaidan Revolution and the War in Donbas: Dramatic Differences in History-Driven Responses The two polarized and contradictory conceptions of Ukraine’s history described above have at times been deployed in direct opposition to one another, championed by government and opposition politicians respectively, while at other times they have coexisted uncomfortably within a single political party platform or even in the professed ideology of a single politician. Still, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians have not jumped on the bandwagon of either extreme approach, but rather preferred a compromise view that gave deference to the central themes of both narratives, while committing state resources and national policy to neither. Unfortunately, this view has proved barely achievable in the winner-take-all context of Ukrainian

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politics and is certainly unsustainable in the immediate aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution and the ensuing war in Donbas. On the Russian side, wide acceptance of the brotherhood narrative of Russian and Ukrainian history yielded shock and outrage in response to the Euromaidan Revolution, especially its message that Ukraine had chosen Europe and rejected Russia. While the conflict in Ukraine has been generally described in geopolitical terms (Russia versus the West) in Western media coverage, Ukrainians more frequently describe it as a fight for European values—or even for the survival of European civilization—against what they consider retrograde Russian authoritarianism. Russians, of course, take a very different view, namely that the conflict in Ukraine is a culture war within European civilization, in which radical Ukrainian nationalists are seeking to eliminate any shred of Russian culture and Russian identity from Ukraine, including through violence against the Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian population (=dbY^ 2014; D[aQY^Q – 46þ?G95 2014). While elements of radical right nationalism, even distinctly neo-fascist strains, have been evident in Ukrainian politics before, during and after the Euromaidan, Russian perceptions of events and ideologies in Ukraine have fed off propagandized accounts in the Russian media and public discourse. During the height of the Euromaidan protests and the Yanukovych government’s violent response, in January 2014, Russian media described the events as a “Banderite Fascist putsch”3 against the legitimately elected President of Ukraine, and reported that neo-Nazis and foreign agents in the Maidan were responsible for the violence (Bylbenko 2014). Following Yanukovych’s ouster, when new presidential elections were held in May 2014, Russian television exaggerated the fascist threat by predicting a victory for far right candidate Dmytro Yarosh, who in fact won less than one percent of the vote (Russian TV 2014). In justifying the occupation and annexation of Crimea, a documentary aired on Russian state television in 2015 describes the plans of Ukrainian nationalist Maidan activists to bring their violent revolution to Crimea. In an extensive interview, Vladimir Putin himself explains how the Ukrainian fascist takeover of the heavily Russian-speaking peninsula was only foiled by the readiness of the pro-Russian Crimean population and their Russian allies (Crimea: The Way Home 2015). Even after Moscow’s endorsement of the Minsk agreements as a framework for ending the conflict, Russian media routinely portrays Ukrainian volunteer self-defense battalions fighting in Donbas as the modern incarnation of Ukrainian nationalist insurgents or SS auxiliaries in the Second World War. This is not a difficult case to make, since 3 The term Banderite is a reference to Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, one of the controversial figures in Ukrainian history awarded a posthumous Hero of Ukraine decoration by President Yushchenko which was later revoked by President Yanukovych. Bandera’s faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was responsible for crimes against the Polish and Jewish civilian population in Western Ukraine during the war, and some units collaborated directly with the German occupiers.

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some of the so-called volunteer battalions, such as the one known as Azov, indeed use symbols and slogans associated with nationalist and fascist movements of that time period (Crimea: The Way Home 2015). The Russian notion that Ukrainians have embraced a neo-fascist ideology, which seeks to destroy or eliminate Russians from Ukraine, runs strangely counter to the brotherhood narrative that has until now predominated Russian views of Ukraine. As a result, much of the popular discourse on Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation revolves around themes of brotherly love, or the rejection of it. The most famous example may be the cri de coeur by Ukrainian poet Anastasia Dmitryuk, “We will never be brothers,” a music video version of which was posted to YouTube last year and has been viewed by over a million people. The poem, in Russian, reads as follows: We will never be brothers; Not by lineage, not by birth. You don’t possess the spirit of freedom; You won’t ever become free like us. You regard yourselves as our superiors; We may be younger, but we are bolder : There are so many of you, but, alas, you are all faceless. You may be huge, but we are great. And you hoard; you’re malcontent with everything. You are suffocating on your jealousy. For you “Freedom” is a foreign concept. You have been in chains since childhood. “Silence is golden” – this is the maxim of your lives. But in our hearts the Molotov cocktails are burning. Indeed, the blood that flows through our veins is hot. What kind of blind collective are you? Our eyes blaze with fearless courage. We don’t need weapons to be dangerous. We have grown in wisdom and courage. We have stood in the scope of the sniper’s deadly aim. The bastards brought us to our knees – But we rose again and put things right. And hiding in vain, like rats they pray – That through shedding blood, they will be cleansed. You are sent your new commands. But here, the fires of revolt are kindled. You have your Tsar; we have our Democracy. Never will we be brothers (A Passion for the Possible 2014).

In reply, Russian (and some Ukrainian) politicians, artists and ordinary people, have posted their own quips, poems and ballads on the theme of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood, evincing wounded pride, reminders of a long shared history, and promises not to abandon Ukraine even when rejected by its people. An especially noteworthy example is the poem by Leonid Kornilov, “Answer to Ukraine,” which has also received over a million views on YouTube: Yes, you are wild and we are disciplined. But I am standing next to you. And I know, my Ukrainian, How you are on the edge.

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To throw yourself on the wild field, Shielded with a swastika… If you want to be – be “great” Just first let me protect you. You’re frightened and confused And do not say those words; With my own chest against bullets Let me shield you first. As I always did in time. But now the times are different. And you are in the claws of Ravens You do not feel their claws. And you forget about our ancestors. And you scream in pain and fear. We are with you – “the blind relations” Because our eyes are filled with tears. But brushing away your sly insult I hold you tighter to my chest, And for your happiness, Ukrainian, I’ll go to your war. You found me guilty. I wish you well. You will never be a brother to me, Because you are my sister (;_a^Y\_S 2014).4

The intensity of feeling around the narrative of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood is palpable on both sides of the debate. The anti-Russian Ukrainian view is straightforward—Ukraine and Russia are not brotherly nations, they have never been, and recent history proves it. For the pro-Russian side, the logic is more strained—Ukraine’s rejection of Russia’s “brotherly love” is explained by further reducing Ukrainians’ sense of agency, telling them they don’t know what they are saying or doing, they are in the clutches of (Western, especially American) puppet masters but don’t know it, and that they are weak, so only a strong Russia can protect them. It is, in many ways, a trope that recalls the official Soviet and Russian narrative of the Second World War, in which the Soviet people made incalculable sacrifices to liberate Central and East European countries from Nazi occupation, including those whose governments had been German allies or whose citizens had collaborated with the Nazi occupation. In these dramatically different perspectives, the deep divide over memory and identity between Ukraine and Russia, and even within Ukraine itself, is evident. In light of the current conflict, such disagreement is far more than a 4 Translation by the author.

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mere abstraction. Ukrainians and Russians have reason to fear that the history, identity and memory policies supported by the governments in Kyiv and Moscow, or by separatist forces in the Donbas, can translate into concrete policies that will promote the interests of one side at the other’s possibly dire expense. Adherents of the pro-Russian historical narrative, and even some Russian speakers in Ukraine more broadly, read into the vision espoused by Ukrainian nationalists, and in Ukraine’s increasingly anti-Russian mainstream views, a promise that the misery of the Second World War and the 1944–54 anti-Soviet insurgency will be repeated, and that they will suffer. At the same time, many Ukrainians fear that any compromise with what they consider Russian-backed terrorists will ensure that Ukrainian identity, including the Ukrainian language and the rights of Ukrainian speakers, will be once again repressed, as in Tsarist and Soviet times.

Reconciliation in Theory and Practice Ukrainian domestic politics and Russia-Ukraine tensions appear mired in a vicious cycle of deepening distrust and insecurity, which makes meaningful dialogue on historical reconciliation increasingly difficult. However, theory and past practice offer some cause to hope that reconciliation may be possible in the future. To approach this challenge in a practical and concrete way, let us dispense with what reconciliation cannot achieve: it will not impose a ceasefire on the current conflict, nor will it bring perfect harmony to Ukraine’s deeply divided domestic politics, nor can it resolve the major geopolitical disputes between Russia and Ukraine.5 At best, reconciliation would be an ongoing process in which Ukrainians among themselves and with Russians undertake jointly to examine the historical roots of their mutual distrust, and agree to move gradually but steadily from a posture of confrontation to one of cooperation and even friendship. The truism that “time heals all wounds” does not apply to festering conflicts with historical drivers because as time passes, individuals who possessed personal knowledge and experience of disputed events to which they might attest, as well as the unique brand of empathy that comes of living through inhuman suffering, disappear. They are gradually displaced by new generations, for which disputed historical events are at best received memories, 5 For insights into the broader principles and context of historical reconciliation, the author would like to thank distinguished members of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) Commission’s working group on historical reconciliation, particularly Rene Nyberg, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, and Istvan Gyarmati. Appreciation is also due for advice and insight from Lily Gardner Feldman at the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies. Her work on the broader topic of reconciliation has been invaluable background for this analysis. See, e. g. Gardner Feldman 2012.

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and at worst highly mythologized narratives of victimhood. Yet these received memories are no less sensitive—rather, they are all the more explosive precisely because younger generations understand them in black and white, essentially abstract terms, often with far less capacity to appreciate complexity and moral ambiguity than among those who personally lived through the past.6 For Russians and Ukrainians, the symbols and collective memories of World War II have already entered this phase of destructive abstraction, since many young activists on both sides look upon the current conflict as their chance to vindicate one side’s version of a titanic struggle in which their grandparents and great grandparents fought, suffered or even perished. In past successful cases, the immediate motivation to begin reconciliation has come from a combination of vital national interest—that is, when political leaders recognize the need to resolve conflicts with neighbors to avert significant economic, political or social damage and secure gains—plus moral imperative, often underscored by courageous spiritual leaders or civic groups who are persuaded that reconciliation is simply the right thing to do, even as a matter of faith. Consider the 1965 example of the letter from Polish bishops to their German counterparts, which is seen as the beginning of the PolishGerman reconciliation process (Rydlinski 2015). There have likewise been various efforts by American and Israeli Jewish religious leaders and Church leaders from Germany and Eastern Europe to spur dialogue and reconciliation over the Holocaust. In either case, bold leadership is indispensable, especially to defend and sustain the reconciliation process against inevitable attacks from all sides. In practice, the “breakout moment” at which national policies supporting reconciliation replace those exacerbating distrust and conflict can be unexpected. It may occur through tragedy, such as in April 2010 when a Polish airliner carrying dozens of senior government officials, including President Lech Kaczynski, crashed near Smolensk, Russia, killing all aboard. In this case the foundations of a historical reconciliation process were already in place, but the tragedy served as a dramatic wake-up call to previously indifferent publics on both sides, who could neither downplay nor deny the traumatic impact on Poles or the symbolism linked to the 1940 Katyn massacre. Although recent Russian-Polish reconciliation efforts were largely derailed by the Ukraine crisis and the broader downturn in Russia-West relations, the Smolensk crash resulted in several high level gestures, including a famous embrace between the Russian and Polish Prime Ministers, the transfer of Soviet archival materials on Katyn from Russia to Poland, and the

6 Various actors adopt symbols of the past for contemporary political reasons, but that does not make them any less powerful or sensitive today. Take for example the mixture of elderly Waffen SS veterans and young neo-Nazis who seem to revel in provoking international ire and damaging Latvia’s foreign relations with their annual march in Riga (RIA Novosti 2010),

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broadcast of Andrzej Wajda’s documentary film about Katyn on Russian state television. Of course, breakout moments have also occurred thanks to determined diplomacy and political leadership. Prominent examples include Willy Brandt’s famous Kniefall at the Warsaw ghetto monument, the visits of other German leaders to memorial sites throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Turkish-Armenian “football diplomacy,” reciprocal high-profile visits by presidents, parliaments, and faith leaders, and other events both commemorative and symbolic (Willy Brandts Kniefall 2013; The Economist 2009). A breakout moment may even stem from anonymous actions, such as the leakage of state secrets or archival records, though their impact depends on the freedom and integrity of the media and public discourse. Consider the impact that Wikileaks has had and continues to have on accountability of governments for actions taken in the name of national security that may violate civil rights, international norms, or the sovereignty of other states. In the context of Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation, potential breakout moments are difficult to imagine at this current, acute stage of conflict. However, when and if the fighting settles into the kind of “frozen conflict” previously seen throughout the post-Soviet space, it is not unreasonable to think that Russian and Ukrainian leaders could take similar steps to those that have been attempted by others—there would certainly be more than adequate moral, political and economic arguments in favor of doing so. While the Russians will likely never contemplate returning Crimea to Ukraine, a major gesture could be to offer to open talks on just compensation to Ukraine. The Ukrainians have already suggested figures in the tens of billions, yet international sanctions have and will cost the Russian economy billions of dollars, so paying compensation to Ukraine to end the dispute could actually be a net economic gain for Russia. Ukraine, in turn, could renew the open travel, trade and people-to-people relations it previously had with Russia, removing restrictions on Russian visas, imports, and flights into Ukraine. Once the urgent need for historical reconciliation is recognized and the cycle of distrust is at least interrupted, societies may adopt a wide variety of tools and mechanisms to advance the process of reconciliation itself. However, successful processes are likely to demonstrate several common characteristics. Each of these should be undertaken on a maximally inclusive, mutual and reciprocal basis. First, the process must be oriented toward uncovering and documenting truth. This means not only establishing facts and figures through forensic historical or archaeological research, but memorializing the testimony of participants in the events, on all sides, including the thoughts and feelings of those affected by the events in subsequent generations. This deep and detailed truth-gathering process must be of a high professional quality, and yet open to public participation, rather than limited to the cloistered world of academic

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historians (Polish-Russian Group 2012).7 Student and professional exchanges, film, art and cultural exhibitions, and even public hearings—with appropriate expert management and oversight—all have a role to play in such a truthgathering process, as these are tools to enhance outreach to societies as a whole, rather than just elites or advocates. Ideally, the process should also bear the blessing and imprimatur of governments on each side, yet without excessive state intervention or politicization.8 Reconciliation can also benefit greatly from institutional engagement of various kinds. Among the parties to the process—whether states or subnational groups—it is helpful to establish expert groups and other institutional support structures, which can, in turn, pursue formal or informal partnerships with foreign counterparts. Groups committed to truth-seeking and accountability through reconciliation, such as the Polish-Russian Centers for Dialogue and Understanding established in Warsaw and Moscow9, if endowed with adequate funding, human capital and independence from fickle government policies, can help sustain the momentum to continue reconciliation processes as time goes on. Such institutions not only give a protected platform to those inclined to pursue reconciliation dialogue, but they also concentrate resources and expertise on the ongoing priority (Polish and Russian Centers 2012; Rokkosovskaya 2012). Second, the process should entail a clear element of accountability, in place of amnesty or forgetting. In practically every case in which it has been tried, especially in Europe, the imperative to “forgive and forget” has proved an unhelpful burden on successful reconciliation.10 At the same time, accountability need not—indeed probably should not—equate to some form of legal liability, particularly for events in the more distant past. It is crucial that the biblical and juridical principle that children shall not be punished for their parents’ sins be respected, and that when responsibility is truly shared by a whole society, it may be understood as collective responsibility, but not collective guilt. In order to ensure productive and satisfying engagement from all sides, the potential consequences for those accepting accountability must be clearly delimited to exclude fears of retroactive criminal prosecution, confiscation of 7 The Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters, co–chaired by Adam Daniel Rotfeld and Anatoly Torkunov offers a valuable example 8 According to the author’s conversations with co–chair Adam Daniel Rotfeld, this was the nature of support received by the Polish-Russian group from both governments. 9 Although worsening political relations between Russia and the West inhibited the successful work of these two centers, Russian-Polish cultural exchange is still taking place thanks to the reconciliation process, even in the midst of reciprocal economic sanctions and deeply divergent official positions on Ukraine (RIA Novosti 2014). 10 Even Spain, which was famous for its post-Franco “pact of forgetting,” has begun to grapple with the need for reconciliation over events stretching back to the 1936–39 Civil War. See, e. g. Govan 2006.

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property, defamation of cherished ancestors, or protracted court battles as a consequence of the truth-seeking process. While individuals must of course remain free to seek their own legal remedies, truth uncovered through a reconciliation process should not carry any special evidentiary weight in court, so that the purpose and practice of historical reconciliation remains squarely focused on the moral dimensions of truth and accountability. Finally, while no process of historical reconciliation will ever reach a single, definitive endpoint, all participants should agree to move with reasonable speed toward the development of a common future agenda, so that enhanced trust from the reconciliation process can be put into practice in the form of concrete cooperation with benefits for all sides. This progress will also help reassure skeptical participants and observers that the ultimate purpose of the reconciliation process is not to determine winners and losers. Relations among individuals, groups, or nations that have been subject to traumatic shared history can never be without sensitivity, yet through deliberate steps toward reconciliation, it should be possible to replace mutual hostility and estrangement with working trust and improved prospects for conflict prevention, if not eventual full friendship and normalization. It is an irony of Russia-Ukraine relations that the two countries and peoples have been so close over the past half-decade that specific state-sponsored or private initiatives on mutual understanding were likely thought unnecessary by most. After all, most Ukrainians spoke Russian, and most Russians had relatives in Ukraine or other connections to their Western neighbor. Now of course, institutionalization of Russian-Ukrainian mutual understanding and reconciliation seems far-fetched. The two countries are busily building institutions committed to deepening their separation. Yet based on the models described above, it may be possible in the near future to establish joint Russian-Ukrainian institutions, groups and processes committed to the key elements of the reconciliation process. Some of the necessary impulses towards the reconciliation process are already evident in both Russian and Ukrainian society. In Ukraine, for example, following Yanukovych’s ouster and his precipitous flight from the country, volunteers committed to discovering and preserving truth fanned out across government agencies and Yanukovych’s private residences to search for documents on the previous government’s crimes and shady business dealings. At Yanukovych’s massive Mezh’hyrye estate, volunteers took to boats to try to fish out documents that had been dumped into the Dnipro River by the fleeing president (Sidorenko 2014). At the same time, Russians committed to ending the war with Ukraine have come out onto the streets by the thousands, organizing marches in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and other Russian cities in March 2014 (Maloveryan 2014). One perhaps surprising consequence of Russia’s annexation of Crimea is that the territory has become a test bed for joint Russian-Ukrainian human rights monitoring and advocacy efforts. The Crimea Field Mission, in

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particular, is a joint Russian-Ukrainian undertaking which has come under scrutiny by the Russian government but thus far persevered (B@H 2015). The group reports on conditions for journalists, activists, lawyers, ethnic minority representatives and others in Crimea, communicates with the local and national governments on both sides and with foreign partners, and provides assistance and mediation services when complaints arise between the local population and governing authorities (Crimea Human Rights). A very small number of individuals have spoken out publically in favor of reconciliation and reengagement between Russia and Ukraine, including famously former political prisoner and oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who in speeches throughout Ukraine calls for renewal of friendship and close relations, and rejection of the enemy framework between Russia and Ukraine (RBC 2015). Khodorkovsky, through his Open Russia foundation and charitable activities, may be in a position to support substantial Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation projects, though thus far he has only proposed convening a “Congress of Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia” (RIA Novosti 2014). Unfortunately, the impact of any such effort is likely to be limited by Khodorkovsky’s ongoing political confrontation with the Russian authorities, who will view any effort initiated by him with suspicion. Russian rockstar Andrey Makarevich has also famously spoken out in favor of reconciliation with Ukrainians, and participated in the March 2015 peace march in Moscow. However, his own outreach to Ukrainians, including a concert for refugees of the Donbas conflict in Ukraine in August 2014 has provoked harsh criticism from political enemies in Russia, who claim he is simply a tool of the fascist Ukrainian regime (BBC-Russia 2014). Despite calls to strip him of all Russian state honors and ban his concerts in Russia, Makarevich continues to oppose Russian intervention in Ukraine and promote reconciliation (Podkovenko 2014). While under the present acute circumstances he has provoked a political firestorm without much tangible progress in relations, Makarevich’s use of performance art and celebrity status to call attention to Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation at least suggests a path for future efforts. Unfortunately, in both Russia and Ukraine, the positions of the dominant religious groups are closely aligned with those of the government, and thus churches are unlikely to give rise to independent movements for reconciliation. Patriarch Kirill of the Orthodox Church has offered conciliatory words in public: “The results of this bloody conflict are terrible. There are not just hundred (as it was in the winter in Kiev), there are hundreds of dead and thousands wounded and homeless people. Only devil can celebrate the victory when fighters are brothers, who destroy each other, wound and weaken the vitality of people” (Lenta.ru 2014). Yet the Russian Orthodox Church has also endorsed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and given credence to Moscow’s claims on Ukrainian territory, citing its own origins in the 10th Century conversion of Prince Vladimir of Kyiv to Orthodox Christianity. Patriarch

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Filaret, head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, has of course taken the opposite stance, and even famously donated money to support the Ukrainian government’s “Anti-Terrorist Operation” against Russian-backed separatists in Donbas (Lenta.ru 2014). It is possible that over time, and at individual parish levels, Church leaders on both sides could begin to support reengagement between Russians and Ukrainians and provide a moral boost to political and civil society leaders who are prepared to move in that direction. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine exacerbates already severe obstacles to beginning a historical reconciliation process either within that country or between Ukraine and Russia. The continuing violence, which could easily escalate into a sustained and bloody regional war, not only makes it difficult for politicians on any side to contemplate dialogue or mutual understanding, but also constantly adds fuel to the fire of mutual resentment and distrust. If Ukrainians and Russians fear that participating in a historical reconciliation dialogue will delegitimize their respective views of their own history, then certainly doing so while under physical threat from “the other” is even more terrifying. Until there is an end to the fighting and a durable armistice, it is hard to imagine how any of the key elements of a reconciliation process described above—truth seeking, accountability, or normalization—could be pursued by either side.

A Path Forward Though the daily reality of violence and looming threat of further escalation inhibits progress, the current tragic circumstances in Ukraine may reveal a silver lining for future reconciliation efforts. The Euromaidan Revolution and the conflict in Southeast Ukraine have concentrated significant international attention on the dysfunction of Ukraine’s domestic politics as well as deeply strained relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Likewise for Ukrainians and Russians themselves, the conflict may provoke insecurities and inflame nationalist passions, but it also draws attention to the underlying sources of tension within and between these societies. This elevated attention to conflict in the region, if sustained, could provide the sense of urgency needed to achieve a breakout for reconciliation in the near future. The current conflict is also producing a new generation of Ukrainians and Russians with both awareness of history and personal experience of recent events that could be a powerful force for reconciliation. In the half century following the horrific events of the Hitler-Stalin era, East and West Ukrainians lived in artificial harmony with one another, and with Russians, based in part on the Soviet Union’s suppression of all non-official history and identity politics. This enforced mutual acceptance permitted unreconciled, mutually hostile historical memories to grow and fester within families and communities, and ultimately within post-Soviet governments on the national level.

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Now that these memories have found expression in the rhetoric and symbols supporting violence within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia, there is a new generation that has much energy and anger, but also unique credibility earned by sacrifice, and with it the capacity to appreciate the complex circumstances and shades of gray that attend every controversial historical event or individual. The result is that the Ukrainians and Russians who emerge from this conflict could be better equipped to undertake meaningful reconciliation than any of their predecessors for over six decades. They must be given opportunities to channel their unique experiences and identities into practical reconciliation processes. The next steps will be critical. In the immediate short term, the obvious priority is to end the fighting in Southeast Ukraine and limit the extent of any further harm to people, property and communities. In addition, whatever the shape of the ceasefire or political settlement, it is important for all sides to commit to limiting the spread of inflammatory propaganda in the postconflict phase. Moreover, the sides must resist the temptation toward polarized treatment of grievances and memories immediately following the fighting—burying and ignoring reminders of others’ suffering while positioning one’s own grievances as insurmountable obstacles to progress and reconstruction. Instead, the government, non-governmental organizations and the international community should assist victims to maintain a careful accounting of the human and economic costs of the conflict, and to preserve all documentary and other evidence so that it can be used in support of truth seeking and accountability in the context of a reconciliation process. In the short term, the priority is not to seek a breakout moment for reconciliation, but simply to ensure that the building blocks and the openness to such a process exist for the future. Once the fighting has ended and an environment conducive to engagement and dialogue can be established, several key steps can facilitate the start of intra-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russian historical reconciliation processes. First, documentary evidence and oral testimony related to the most recent conflict as well as past divisive historical issues should be gathered and archived in a neutral—ideally international—repository. One venue might be the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has played an important role observing and monitoring developments on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine border, and facilitating national roundtable dialogues within Ukraine. The OSCE offers the additional advantage of being inclusive—it is the only security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region that includes both Russia and NATO member countries. Symbolically, the OSCE could be a good choice because it is the successor to the 1973–75 Helsinki process, which dealt explicitly with the legacy of World War II in the politico-military, human, and economic dimensions. The OSCE has also been given primary

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responsibility for monitoring implementation of the troubled Minsk agreements in the Donbas, and its Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has unique access and credibility with both sides. Second, civil society, government and international actors should support the creation of expert working groups on re-engagement and trust-building within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia. With reference to past best practices, such as the Russian-Polish working group on difficult matters and the German-French and German-Polish joint historical projects, Ukrainian and Russian experts should establish a joint commission to examine difficult questions of shared historical experience ranging from Kyivan Rus’ to the modern era. As in past successful projects, the goal should not be to negotiate a single authoritative truth, but to create a safe space in which each side’s unique perception and experience can be heard, and documentary evidence may be carefully and responsibly discussed. It is certainly unrealistic to expect the Ukrainian and Russian governments to co-sponsor such a project in the near future, and in fact under the current circumstances it should be expected that the governments might effectively block any such efforts. However, if the fighting can be fully ended and the acute conflict phase brought to a durable halt, the governments themselves may at least be more permissive toward efforts to explore reconciliation as at least a way of saving face with the international community. Enthusiasm for reconciliation projects must primarily come from civil society and the expert community, as it has already, while financial support would likely be forthcoming from international donors.11 Still, it is critical that efforts be properly sequenced, since almost no one in Russia or Ukraine is now well positioned to take on such projects while situation on the ground in Eastern Ukraine is still so unstable and new fighting remains likely. Lastly, in Ukraine especially, it will be important to undertake the process of national rebuilding and identity formation in a way that is sensitive to the need for national historical reconciliation. In the ongoing aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution and the ouster of the Yanukovych regime, there may be a temptation to associate the former President’s perspective on Ukrainian history and national identity with his corruption, cruel violence, and abuses of power. To paint with such a broad brush would, of course, be a serious mistake, since it would also alienate many Ukrainians who suffered equally under Yanukovych, yet were sympathetic to his position on controversial historical issues. Particular sensitivity should be exercised in 11 It is worth noting that several initial attempts at such projects have already been undertaken, with limited results thus far. Russia’s Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) and the Russian Alexander Gorchakov Foundation have convened several forums of Russian and Ukrainian youth leaders and scholars, however efforts have been so poorly received by authorities on both sides that they have been effectively halted at this point. In 2015, the Kennan Institute held a conference of its scholar alumni, including Russian and Ukrainian scholars, focused on the theme of Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation.

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making any changes to school curricula and history textbooks, because of the danger that still living memories of the latest conflict could become hardened and inflexible in the minds of a new generation, as has happened in the past. In the long term, successful historical reconciliation within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia will demand each of the major elements described above, including political leaders who appreciate both the concrete national interests and moral imperative at stake, and who can deliver the breakout moment necessary to begin reconciliation on the official level as well as between societies. It may be years before such leaders or opportunities emerge in either Ukraine or Russia, however the international community can still play an important role in assuring that politicians at all levels see clear incentives for reconciliation. Foreign governments and private donors should continue to support reconciliation projects in both Russia and Ukraine despite the political difficulties they will invariably face. Engagement with the wider international community in this area is essential to help local leaders gain experience and see best practices at work first hand. Above all, Western politicians must demonstrate their own commitment to historical reconciliation by making serious efforts in this area a precondition for Ukrainian or Russian participation in regional political, security and economic integration projects. For the moment, this may be a bigger incentive for Ukrainians to undertake internal reconciliation dialogue than for them to do so with Russians, but that is precisely why clear conditionality is needed. Merely burying intraUkrainian and Ukrainian-Russian tensions under the unifying mantra of European integration would risk repeating the tragic myopia of the Soviet authorities in the aftermath of the previous war. History is never a closed book. As long as Ukraine stretches from the Carpathian Mountains to the Eurasian steppe, and as long as Ukraine and Russia are close neighbors, new chapters will be written and new memories will be forged—some of these, as in the past two years, will bring new pain and deepen divisions between people. For that reason, historical reconciliation must be a flexible, forgiving process, making progress toward a better future of cooperation and coexistence, but with patience and understanding to handle challenges along the way. The time for Ukrainians and Russians to take the first steps is long overdue.

References A Passion for the Possible, 2014. Available from: https://apassionforthepossible. wordpress.com/2014/05/21/hymn-of-a-free-people-we-will-never-be-brothers/. Aslund, A 2009, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and a Democracy, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.

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BBC-Russia, “Andrey Makarevich Accuses the Russian Media of Lies,” BBC-Russia, 18 August 2014. Available from: http://www.bbc.com/russian/society/2014/08/ 140818_tr_makarevich_media_campaign. Bylbenko, C 2014, “2Q^UVa_Sb[YV eQiYbcl XQfSQclSQoc D[aQY^d Y RVX^QUVW^lZ gdgSQ^T P^d[_SYhQ,” ]Ya Y ]l, 24 January 2014. Crimea Human Rights Organization Website. Available at: http://crimeahr.org/en/ about/. Crimea: The Way Home, 2015 (video file). Available from: http://www.vesti.ru/ videos?vid=642241. Gardner Feldman, L 2012, Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield. Govan, F 2006, ‘70 years on, Spain hopes to heal civil war wounds’, The Telegraph 18 July 2006. Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ spain/1524263/70-years-on-Spain-hopes-to-heal-civil-war-wounds.html. ;_a^Y\_S, ý 2014, þY[_TUQ ]l ^V RdUV] RaQcmp]Y (?cSVc d[aQY^[V). ýV_^YU ;_a^Y\_S, 2014 (video file). Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YcTR ceGMRHI&feature=youtu.be. Lenta.ru 2014, “Filaret Promises to Arrange a ‘Warm Welcome’ for Patriarch Kirill,” Lenta.ru, 18 June 2014. Available from: http://lenta.ru/news/2014/06/18/patri arkh/. Lenta.ru 2014, “ROC Decided to Pray Daily for Peace in Ukraine,” Lenta.ru, 17 June 2014. Available from: http://lenta.ru/news/2014/06/17/rpc/. LiveLeak 2014, ‘Putin says Russians and Ukrainians are one people like brothers and sisters but what Kiev did to Eastern Ukraine is just like what Nazi Germany did to Leningrad in WWII.’ Available from: http://www.liveleak.com/ view?i=690_1409328670. Magocsi, PR 22010, A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its People, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Maloveryan, Y 2014, “March of Peace in Moscow Collected Tens of Thousands of Marchers,” BBC-Russia News Portal, 15 March 2014. Available from: http://www. bbc.com/russian/international/2014/03/140315_ukraine_moscow_rallies. Marples, DR 2007, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine, Budapest, Central European University Press. =dbY^, = 2014, “CaVRdV] _c ;aV]\p ^V]VU\V^^_ _bcQ^_SYcm TV^_gYU adbb[Yf ^Q D[aQY^V,” Anna News, 2 May 2014. Available from: http://anna-news.info/node/ 15649. Podkovenko, A 2014, “Makarevich’s Guest Role in Ukraine Provokes Emotional Outburst from State Duma,” Vesti.ru News Portal, 18 August 2014. Available from: http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1901954. Polish and Russian Centers: http://www.cprdip.pl/. Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters 2012, ‘Statement on the meeting of the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters’, Summary of proceedings of the Group session of 31 May-1 June 2012. Available from: http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/ news/meeting_of_the_polish_russian_group_for_difficult_matters.

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RBC, “Khodorkovskiy Would Permit Normalization of Relations with Ukraine,” RBC-Ukraine News Portal, 23 July 2015. Available from: http://www.rbc.ua/rus/ news/hodorkovskiy-dopuskaet-normalizatsiyu-otnosheniy-1437641562.html. RIA Novosti 2010, ‘Neo-Nazi Tendencies in the Baltic States: Latvian Ruling Party to Appeal Against Ban on Waffen SS March’, RIA Novosti 7 March 2010. Available from: http://www.globalresearch.ca/neo-nazi-tendencies-in-the-baltic-states-lat vian-ruling-party-to-appeal-against-ban-on-waffen-ss-march/17987. RIA Novosti 2014, ‘@_b_\ @_\miY: `_\p[Y Y a_bbYp^V U_\W^l Y]Vcm iQ^b `_^pcm UadT UadTQ’, RIA Novosti 12 August 2014. Available from: http://ria.ru/interview/ 20140812/1019699889.html#ixzz3ABH7xOtY. RIA Novosti 2014, “Head of European Parliament Discusses Ukraine Situation with Khodorkovsky,” RIA Novosti News Portal, 16 April 2014. Available from: http:// ria.ru/world/20140416/1004213580.html#ixzz3lpiypsmS. Rokkosovskaya, A 2012, “Pismo RVX `VaVS_UQ,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 31 October 2012. Avaliable from: http://www.rg.ru/2012/10/31/smuta.html. Russian TV Broadcasts Fake Election Results: Kremlin channel claims nationalist Yarosh won vote, 2014 (video file). Available from: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=a3WD7D2xWVE. Rydlinski, BM 2015, ‘The role of Polish-German reconciliation and cooperation in West-Russia relations’, EASI Hurford Fellowship policy paper from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Saigol, L & Hille, K 2013, ‘Putin likens Ukraine bailout to brotherly love’, Financial Times 19 December 2013. Available from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 3a7c0314-688f-11e3-bb3e-00144feabdc0.html. Sidorenko, S 2014, “Mezh’hirya Papers”, Kommersant –Ukraine News Portal, 23 February 2014. Available from: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2414923. “B@H `_`a_bY\ SlhVa[^dcm “;al]b[do `_\VSdo ]YbbYo” YX “`QcaY_cYhVb[_T_ bc_`-\YbcQ,”” Interfax News Portal, 14 July 2015. Available from: http://www. interfax.ru/russia/453723. The Economist 2009, ‘Turkish-Armenian relations “Football diplomacy”’ The Economist 3 September 2009. Available from: http://www.economist.com/node/ 14380297. “D[aQY^Q – 46þ?G95 : ?RaQjV^YV WVacS eQiYbcb[_Z Fd^cl [ @aVXYUV^cd @_a_jV^[_,” 10 June 2014. =_p `_\YcY[Q : D[aQY^Q. Available from: http:// goldnike-777.blogspot.com/2014/06/blog-post_10.html. Verovsˆek, P 2008, ‘The Politics of Memory : A Conceptual Approach to the Study of Memory in Politics’, Paper given at “The Interdisciplinary Memory Conference”, New York, pp. 4–5. Available from: www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/confpapers/Verovsek.pdf. Willy Brandts Kniefall, 2013 (video file). Available from: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=2rdiUDJYMwM.

Karina V. Korostelina

Reconciliation in Ukraine: within and across the boundary

The war in Ukraine has deepened the divide within Ukraine as well as between Russia and Ukraine. The process of reconciliation is complicated by many factors, including the continued violence, the presence of competing national narratives in Ukraine, and the existence of different interpretations of history. History and identity play a crucial role in the reconciliation process. This chapter emphasizes the ineffectiveness of the development of one common vision of the Ukrainian nation based on ethnic identity. The attempts to create one common history or establish one common set of values and beliefs will only serve to exacerbate existing conflicts and further divides between ethnic or ideological groups. Acceptance of Ukraine as a multiethnic state with different cultural vectors of development can create a foundation for reconciliation efforts.

An Identity-based Approach to Reconciliation Reconciliation is a highly contextual, highly complex process that includes the restoration of relationships in the aftermath of conflict that consists of the development of friendship, trust, empathy, mutual understanding, common and cross-cutting identities, and magnanimity in order to build a stable and peaceful future where respect and security prevail. Reconciliation is also viewed as a process of building long-term peace between former enemies through bilateral initiatives and institutions across governments and societies. (Gardner Feldman, 2014; Korostelina and Lässig, 2013; Lederach, 1997; Tutu, 1999). Depending on the specific case, these components can exhibit varying levels of development; however reconciliation always includes improved intergroup relations and the building or rebuilding of trust. It involves reestablishing cooperation between conflicting parties who have previously harmed each other and implicates management of social identities and a process of reckoning with the past. Reconciliation processes depend on interrelations among conflict, power, social identity, and collective memory/ narratives about history. Reconciliation, therefore, is much more than a cessation of violence and hostilities; it requires the participation of the parties involved in the conflict to

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come together to redefine their relationship and create an environment where cooperation and peaceful coexistence are the operative norms within society (Bloomfield, 2003; Fisher, 2001; Galtung, 2001; Lederach, 1997). As reconciliation in divided societies and between countries must occur on an interpersonal, international, and often interethnic levels, approaches to reconciliation involve complex processes and methods that address justice, reparations, mercy, apology, and forgiveness, which have as their aim the restoration of broken relationships and prevention of continued cycles of violence. The methods implemented encompass secular and religious approaches, individual and community approaches, as well as punitive and holistic approaches to reconciliation. These methods underline the importance of the relationship between two parties and the possibility of transforming this relationship from one of victim/offender to one of mutual understanding, healing, and cooperation. This conception of reconciliation underscores the necessity of a multi-disciplinary approach, comprising judicial, religious, psychological, and sociological elements to address the complex dynamics involved in peace-building processes in post-conflict societies. Reconciliation, therefore, is a transformative process that redefines relationships and stereotypes about conflicting parties; it shifts the dynamics from antagonism and mistrust, to mutual respect and cooperation. Social identity theory, which is premised on the study of the mechanisms behind intergroup relations and conflict, can provide several insights for developing effective reconciliation policy and practices. This chapter first explores the various social identity theories and then applies them to the situation in Ukraine. The analysis here posits that social identity impacts the process of reconciliation through several functions: (1) social identity impacts a person’s beliefs, norms, and values; (2) it impacts perceptions in intergroup relations and justifies social hierarchies; and (3) it legitimizes power structures and mobilizes collective actions in conflict.

Social Identity Theories Categorization Models One of the approaches to reconciliation based on social identity theory suggests the necessity of reducing the salience of social identity and thus improving inter-group relationships. The reduction of the salience of social identities can be achieved through three methods: (a) decategorization, (b) cross-categorization, and (c) recategorization. The decategorization model (Brewer & Miller, 1984) suggests that moving from the level of interaction based on social groups (ethnic, religious, national, etc.) to the level of

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interaction founded on an individual basis would reduce the importance of social categorization. The cross-categorization model proposes that connections between members of separate groups can be made through the introduction of a third social category that unites some members of both groups. Thus, people will still hold competing identities but will share a new common identity, which may have the result of improving group perceptions of each other. The ability to move freely across cultural boundaries that define social identities provides group members with a multicultural experience thus promoting cumulative layers of cultural identities and tolerance to others (Campbell, 2000). The recategorization model (e. g., Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) argues that negative intergroup perceptions can be reduced if several conflictual identities are united into a more inclusive, superordinate ‘‘we’’ category. All these approaches increase the permeability of social boundaries or expand the boundaries of ingroup categories. Through the development of a shared, superordinate identity, people are able to perceive former members of competing groups in a more positive light and share with them aspirations and visions for the future. The dual recategorization that allows for the preservation of existent identities together with the increasing salience of a common shared identity has the effect of reducing the perception of threats to existent identities and, thus, any resistance to the acquisition of new common identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Categorization ideas have been practically employed in different programs organized to promote reconciliation. The decategorization approach was used by Kosic & Tauber (2010), who suggested the necessity of developing a positive personal identity among members of conflicting groups and promoting values of caring about others beyond the boundaries of the ingroup. The story-telling exchange (Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Salomon, 2004) promoted the foundations for cross-categorization through an emphasis on common feelings, beliefs, and experiences, while still preserving the actuality of existing identities. Similarly, cross-community contact as a result of integrated education was found to reduce intergroup anxiety, create common ground for dialogue, and thus promote more positive outgroup attitudes and reconciliation between groups (Cairns & Hewstone, 2002; Coletta & Cullen, 2000; Feuerverger, 2003; McGlynn, Niens, Cairns & Hewstone, 2004). Cross-categorizations also can be established through inter- and intra-communal sport initiatives that help harmonize intergroup relationships and create positive interaction and cooperation across lines of division (Hoglund & Sundberg, 2008). The recategorization approach was successfully employed in the coexistence model that emphasized the commonalities and the similarities between the groups, and created a common national identity through the formation of a common goal (Maoz, 2004). The dual recategorization approach was used as a foundation for the three-phase process in Zanzibar, where inner divisions were subdued and the salience of Zanzibari national

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identity was increased based on fostering the growth of Zanzibar nationalism and improved intergroup relations (Moss & Tronvoll, 2015). Reconciliation also can be promoted by symbols of common national identity that represent multiculturalism and unity in spite of diversity (MacGinty, 2003). In South Africa, sport created opportunities for emphasizing new symbols of national unity and promoted a marked degree of willingness for reconciliation (Hoglund & Sundberg, 2008).

Intergroup Perceptions of Emotions Another approach to reconciliation based on social identity theory emphasizes intergroup perceptions of emotions. Ingroup bias is one of the central factors that can lead not only to attribution of negative characteristics to an outgroup, but also has the result of denying some human features. Thus, people tend to attribute the human essence to their ingroup, while rejecting the presence of some human qualities in the outgroup. Dehumanization of outgroup members comprises two forms: mechanistic and animalistic (Haslam 2006). Mechanistic dehumanization rests on the attribution or denial of human nature attributes such as emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness and agency, resulting in the perception of outgroups members as cold, rigid, and machine-like. Animalistic dehumanization involves the attribution or denial of uniquely human attributes such as civility, refinement, and moral sensibility, leading to the perception of outgroup members as less human and more animal-like. Animalistic dehumanization is also described as a process of infrahumanization that creates an underestimation of the capacity of human emotions to be displayed among outgroup members (Gaunt & Demoulin, 2002; Gaunt & Sindic 2004, Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, et al, 2000). Ingroup members believe that their members are more able to experience complex emotions in comparison to outgroup members. Leyens, 2009; Leyens et al., 2000). Thus, members of the ingroup are perceived to experience human emotions to a greater extent than outgroup members (see Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Viki & Abrams, 2003). Research on reconciliation has shown that an increased perception of the humanity of outgroup members is a necessary precondition for intergroup forgiveness (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Tutu, 1999). The less infrahumanization performed by members of the ingroup, the more they are willing to forgive the other group (Tam et al., 2007). The infrahumanization process impacts the willingness of members of victimized groups and to forgive perpetrators following an official apology (Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett, 2012).

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The Impact of Identity on Beliefs and Perceptions A salient social identity, defined as a central identity that has a strong influence on behavior, increases feelings of collective unity, and the acceptance of collective perceptions and beliefs (Deschamps & Devos, 1998, Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The salience of identity rests on factors such as permeable or impermeable group boundaries, positive or negative intergroup comparisons, identity distinctiveness, and socialization. The groups to which people belong influence individual members’ self-definition, perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. (Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarthy, 1994) The impact of norms, goals, feelings, and motives associated with a particular ingroup identity and the behavior of a person becomes even stronger in the intergroup context when the ingroup is compared to the outgroup, or it is in a situation of conflict with some outgroups (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner 1987). How people view members of other groups and how they behave toward them depends on the norms associated with their membership to their ingroup. (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes & Haslam 2007; Hornsey, Jetten, McAuliffe & Hogg, 2006; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). For example, if ingroup norms support discrimination, people are likely to discriminate in favor of their group (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1996). If violence and harm are perceived as “normal” for that category of humanity, then the violence perpetrated by an ingroup toward outgroup(s) might be perceived as more understandable and less problematic (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Morton & Postmes 2011). The similarity of views and beliefs is stronger in groups with a high level of “entitativity,” for example groups that are perceived as meaningful (Hamilton, Sherman & Lickel, 1998). The entitativity facilitates the interconnections between social norms and social identity in the formation of discriminatory behavior. The perception of entitativity is based on two different properties: (1) similarity among group members and the factors that distinguish the group from other groups; and (2) commonality of goals and plans, a group’s development over time, and the interrelations among group members (Rothbart & Park, 2004). Thus, people in groups not only share their perceptions and beliefs but also their tactics and strategies for achieving common goals. An individual’s acceptance of ingroup norms, beliefs, and values, as his or her own, rests on several mechanisms. First, a person accepts ingroup perceptions because the achievements and social position of a particular social group provide the source of a member’s positive self-esteem. Under certain conditions, an individual can choose to act according to individual or group identity based on the need for positive self-evaluation, self-esteem, and their quest to improve their self-representation (Tajfel, 1978). Alternatively, if an individual cannot achieve high self-esteem in the context of interpersonal

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comparison, he or she will tend to increase self-evaluation by connecting with social groups, estimating ingroup more positively in comparison with other groups. Second, people can acquire an ingroup’s view on the world because they believe in membership in this group and feel a high degree of loyalty and a positive connection to its members. Both the theory of social identity (Tajfel, 1978) and social categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) stress the importance of identification with social categories for the acceptance of ingroup perceptions and norms. Such processes are determined by a common shared membership to the group; individuals identify themselves as members of social categories, perceiving and estimating themselves in terms of these categories. Yet, social categorization theorists also recognize the importance of emotional connections with the group: to accept ingroup beliefs and attitudes, a person should feel positive ties and loyalty to other ingroup members. Third, a person can accept ingroup norms and values through participation in social practices of a particular ingroup. According to the theory of self-formation, the cognitive and emotional roots of identity underpin the ways in which individuals position themselves as agents and subjects operating in culturally constructed worlds (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner & Cain, 1998; Holland & Lave, 2001). The theory stresses that identities are formed by the collective work of evoking, confirming, or declining participation in collective practices. Through the celebration of national holidays, participation in traditional ethnic activities, and the preparation of ethnic cuisine people become involved in everyday practices that constitute their identity. Fourth, a person can internalize social norms and standards by playing different social roles specific for the ingroup. This factor explains that a person’s affiliation or submission to a group is a cognitive mechanism known as self-verification (Stryker, 2000). A person sees the self as embodied in social standards, including norms and meaning associated with the role. Jenkins posits that the categorization and attribution of a specific category to a person lie in the basis of identity (Jenkins, 1996). The more roles that a person associates with a particular identity, the stronger the commitment to that identity will be. Fifth, acceptance of ingroup values and beliefs rests on belonging to particular cultures. Culture plays an important role in the maintenance and development of identities (Gecas, 2000). “Value-identities” arise when “individuals conceive of themselves in terms of the values they hold” (Gecas 2000). A person develops a positive self-image and value-identities by assessing the links between behavior and culturally approved values. And finally, a person acquires ingroup perceptions based on the primacy of the ingroup over other groups (Korostelina, 2007). The higher the level of ingroup primacy for ingroup members, the stronger their willingness to

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disregard their own goals and values and act in accordance with ingroup inspirations and aims, supporting collective actions of ingroup members. An analysis of these mechanisms serves to underscore why individual perceptions became less important and ingroup values, beliefs, and norms impact the behavior of its members and thus have a significant influence on the reconciliation process. Perceptions in Intergroup Relations Many theories of social identity explain intergroup prejudice as resulting from a need for positive self-esteem and a higher social status, which is afforded to members of prestigious groups (Brown, 1990; Huddy &Virtanen 1995; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish & Hodge, 1996; Tajfel, 1978; Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble & Zellerer, 1987; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). Social identity theory suggests that the need for positive social identity is often linked to the construction of outgroup negativities (Brown, 1990; Tajfel, 1978). Intergroup bias rests on the systemic evaluation of the ingroup and its members as more favorable than that of the outgroup and its members. This process involves two forms: favoring the ingroup (ingroup favoritism) and/or disparaging the outgroup (outgroup derogation) (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis 2002). The effect of ingroup favoritism reflects the positive estimation and support of group members; people achieve positive social identity through group comparisons and ingroup overestimation. Another source of negative perception of the outgroup is as a result of a perceived threat posed to intergroup boundaries: if social borders between the ingroup and outgroup are blurred, people are ready to defend the distinctiveness of their group (Michael, Wohl, Nyla, Branscombe & Mcvicar, 2001; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999). In this situation, people are concerned about the future of the ingroup and provide emotional responses in the form of collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2009; Wohl, Branscombe & Klar, 2006). Other studies show that a threat to positive group identity results in discrimination against outgroups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). The social identity threat rests on the recognition that the ingroup is discriminated against and is devalued by the outgroup, thus decreasing the value of ingroup identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999). When group members, and especially those who highly identify with the group, perceive threats to the ingroup, they tend to increase the relative positive aspects of their own group by derogating outgroups (Hornsey, 2008). This negative perception and evaluation of the outgroup can result from a perceived social identity threat, even if the outgroup is nonthreatening and has a low status (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Cadinu & Reggiori, 2002). The assessment of the ingroup in comparison to an outgroup is another factor that leads to the underestimation of the economic and social position of

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the ingroup, as well as the perception of relative deprivation or disadvantage and negative attitudes toward the outgroup. Research has shown that the perception of deprivation or disadvantage is usually based on comparisons rather than on the estimation of the ingroup position. A feeling of dissatisfaction arises from comparisons of the ingroup situation with subjective standards rather than with objective reality (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1968) Relative deprivation definitions range from a feeling of an offense arising from the perception of a position based on comparisons between actual status and expectations (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1968); to actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities, (Gurr, 1970); to a perception that the ingroup has less than what is felt it deserves in comparison to others. For example, people can feel deprived if the social status of their ethnic or racial group is lower than they expected based on the promises of their government. The blame for this feeling of deprivation is directed squarely at other ethnic or racial groups in society for impeding the realization of their expectations. People can also believe that another ethnic group has more access to education, jobs, or social services and develop negative perceptions toward this group.

Legitimization of Power Structures in Intergroup Relations Legitimate power depends on internalized values and a people’s acceptance of a leader’s legitimate rights to influence those who are obligated to accept this influence. Legitimacy is the moral basis of social interaction, resting on certain claims by one group that other groups can accept or reject based on their perceptions of rightfulness or fairness (Kelman, 2001). Thus, legitimacy includes two levels: that of the claim and that of the claimant. Legitimization involves the redefinition of an action, policy, system, or group, in the way that what was previously illegitimate now becomes legitimate, or what was previously optional now becomes obligatory (Kelman, 2001). This process increases the moral acceptance of the claim and claimant, and the acknowledgment of the rights and power of the claimant. Delegitimization likewise diminishes these. Both processes are facilitated by authorities and operate in tandem, decreasing the moral acceptance of one group and the policies associated with it, and increasing the moral acceptance of the other group. The intensity of this normative shift in the perception of groups depends on the congruence of this recategorization with the in-group’s interests and preferences. An in-group’s willingness to accept the legitimacy of specific outgroups or their actions plays an important role in the legitimization process. It is also significantly affected by the historic and structural dispositions of the society. Thus, a conflict between identity groups initiates

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and promotes a recategorization process that legitimizes one side and delegitimizes the other.

The Current Situation in Ukraine Common Identities and Social Boundaries Despite the popular idea concerning the unification of Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression and an overwhelming orientation toward the European Union (EU), the polls conducted in 2018 show the persistence of divisions in political orientations and identity allegiance. According to a poll conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology research in May 2018, nine percent of respondents still want to join a custom union with Russia while forty-six percent of respondents wants to join the E.U. Thirty –two percent of respondents are against joining both a custom union with Russia and the E.U. With regards to accession to NATO, the divide is even stronger : forty-one percent are supportive, while thirty-eight percent would vote against it. These results emphasize the absence of homogeneity among the Ukrainian population in their preference regarding allies and their definition of the meaning of Ukrainian national identity. Around fifty percent of the population has a strong orientation to the EU and see Ukraine in the political and social space of Europe. Despite Russian intervention in the East of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, around ten percent of respondents prefer a union with Russia, and see Ukraine as a part of Eurasia. The survey conducted by the International Republican Institute in December 2017 confirmed the divide. The opinion polls’ results reveal four major regional clusters (see figures 10 and 11). In the West, only three percent of respondents support a union with Russia and seventy-six percent back the union with the EU. Fifty-six percent of the Ukrainian population in the Western part of Ukraine is ready to vote for NATO. In the Central region, a union with Russia is supported by thirteen percent and fifty-five percent favor union with the EU; finally, forty-four percent of respondents back accession to NATO. In the Southern region, nineteen percent favor the union with Russia and forty- three percent support the union with the EU. In the Southern part of the country, thirty-three percent would vote against and twenty-seven percent would vote positively regarding accession to NATO. In the Eastern region, thirty percent favor the union with Russia and twenty-three percent support the union with the EU. In the East of Ukraine –forty-five percent would vote against this idea, and fourteen percent would vote for it. Thus, the regional differences in identity allegiance reveal a significant divide concerning the vision Ukrainians have of Ukraine’s place in the world and their definition of its allies. The divide regarding the preference of a union

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Figure 10: Assessment of the international economic unions

Figure 11: Assessment of the Joining NATO

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with Russia between the West and the East is twenty-seven percent, the divide in favoring a union with EU is fifty-three percent, and the divide in supporting Ukraine’s accession to NATO is forty-two percent. In the West, the absolute majority has a pro-European orientation, in the Centre the support for ProEuropean orientations also dominates, in the South and in the East the majority of the population oppose Ukraine joining the European Union and around quarter of respondents would favor a union with Russia. A similar divide is visible regarding political orientations within Ukraine. Fifty-two percent of respondents stated that prosperity is more important to them than democracy, while only twenty-five percent stated the opposite (Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 2018). In the West, fifty-seven percent believe that democracy is more important and thirty-four percent prefer prosperity, while in the south, sixty-two percent prefer prosperity over democracy and only twenty-eight percent prefer democracy. Similarly, in the East fifty-five percent favor prosperity and only twenty percent opt for democracy. The difference in the preference of democracy in the West and the East is thirty-seven percent. Relative Deprivation The polls’ results also highlight a high level of relative deprivation in relation to the past and perceived expectations. Sixty-six percent of respondents stated that they are very unhappy with the economic situation, and only six percent hold the view that the economic situation is somewhat improved (International Republican Institute, 2018). In April 2014 only forty-eight percent believed that Ukraine was going in the wrong direction. In December 2017 however, seventy-two percent were of this opinion (Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 2017a). Among the most important issues stated by respondents, these include: the military conflict in Donbas (fifty-one percent), rise of prices (thirty-seven percent), low wages (thirty-six percent) and unemployment (twenty-seven percent). Relations with Russia are perceived as a major problem by only two percent of population and the Russian presence in Crimea by one and a half percent. The polls reveal regional differences concerning feelings of relative deprivation. The war in the East of Ukraine is more of a concern for the people of the Western (seventy-five percent) and the Eastern regions (eightytwo percent) than for the inhabitants of Central (sixty-eight and Southern regions (sixty-five percent). The living standards disturb almost equally the inhabitants of the Central and Southern regions (sixty-five percent and sixtynine respectively), somewhat lower – the inhabitants of the Western region (fifty-seven percent), and the least of all living standards disturb the inhabitants of the Eastern region (thirty-five percent). In assessing the efforts of the Ukrainian Government to retake occupied territories in Eastern Ukraine, only seven percent believe that the Government

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is doing everything that can be done, while thirty-six percent perceive that the Government is doing very little, and thirty-three percent state total inactivity. This assessment differs between regions: in the West the assessment is most critical. Four percent believe that the Government is doing everything that can be done, while forty percent perceive that the Government is doing very little, and thirty-three percent state total inactivity. In the East, eighteen percent believe that the Government is doing everything possible, while twenty percent state that the Government is doing too little, and twenty-two percent assess it as total inactivity. The work of the President is disapproved of by seventy-seven percent of the population and the work of Prime Minister and the Parliament is also disapproved of by seventy-seven percent. In addition, sixty-three percent have an unfavorable opinion of the President and eighty-three percent also share this unfavorable opinion of the Prime Minister (International Republican Institute, 2018). Intergroup Perceptions According to Kiev International Institute of Sociology’s research, the perception of Russian citizens has become significantly worse during the last years (KIIS, 2017a). Similarly, the negative perception of ethnic Ukrainians in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions has also increased. Twenty-three percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine believe that they are under threat because of their language. Among ethnic Russians, thirty-one percent see the actions of Russia toward Crimea as a necessary protection of the Russian speaking population and twenty-eight percent see it as an illegal occupation. These numbers significantly differ with the opinions of ethnic Ukrainians. Fifty-nine percent of them view the actions of Russia toward Crimea as an illegal occupation, while only fifteen percent believe it was a necessary measure to protect the Russian speaking population. In Ukraine, the negative assessment of Russia prevails. According to the KIIS research poll, fourty-five percent of respondents have good feelings toward Russia, while thirty-eight percent have cold or very cold feeling toward it. In February 2014, around eighty percent of Ukrainian citizens had a positive assessment of Russia, while in March 2018, these numbers dropped to fortyfive percent in perception. However, the perception of Russia and Russian citizens vary by region. When asked about the responsibility of Russia for the bloodshed and death of people in Eastern Ukraine, only 19.1 percent of Donbass respondents agreed that blame rested with the Russians, while 62.8 percent disagreed. In Western Ukraine, by contrast, 81.6 percent responded ‘yes’ and only 15.8 % responded ‘no’ (Kucheriva Fund, 2014). The Pew Forum research confirmed the differences in perceptions of the causation of violence. In the West, only five percent believe that it was the fault of the Ukrainian

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government and fifty-six percent of respondents viewed Russia as a main instigator of war and sixty-one percent as a major threat. In the East, thirteen percent of respondents blame the government of Ukraine and thirty-three percent blame Russia and thirty percent see Russia as a major threat. The assessment of the military forces also differs significantly between regions. In the Western regions of Ukraine, around half of respondents (51.4 percent) have a positive view of the Ukrainian army’s volunteer combatants. This figure falls to 24.1 percent in the South, 19.1 percent in the East, and 8.2 percent in the Kiev-controlled territory of Donbas. Similar differences are evident in the assessment of the Anti-terrorist operation of the Ukrainian Army in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions respectively. Forty-nine percent of respondents in the West and forty-five percent of respondents in the East support it and believe it should continue, while only eighteen percent of respondents in the East and sixteen percent of respondents in Donbas share a similar assessment (Rosumkov Center). Similarly, the PEW poll shows that only thirteen percent of the respondents in the East support the use of military force to end the conflict and fifty-six percent prefer negotiation, while more than thirty percent of respondents in the West support the use of military force and only forty percent prefer negotiation. Thus, the war increased mistrust and negative perceptions between the West and the East. The population of Western Ukraine attributes total blame for the crisis to the Russians and sees it actions as illegitimate. They support volunteers fighting and the antiterrorist operations of the Ukrainian army. In Eastern Ukraine, respondents ascribed responsibility to both Russia and Ukraine and have a negative assessment of Ukrainian volunteer combatants and the antiterrorist operations of the Ukrainian army. Around a third of them feel the existence of a threat to the Russian speaking population in Ukraine and believe that the aim of Russian annexation of Crimea was in defense of the rights of the Russian speaking population. Legitimization of Power Structures Citizens of Ukraine are divided regarding their countries future relations with Russia. Forty-five percent of Ukrainians want to see the creation of a closed border with Russia, including enforced visa regulations, while forty-six percent would prefer to see Ukraine having a relationship with Russia based on an open border policy and the absence of any visa restrictions and requirements. Thirty-eight percent of Ukrainian citizens believe that Donetsk and Lugansk should have a status similar to other regions; thirty-eight percent state that these regions should have extended rights, ten percent consider them as Autonomous Republics, and three percent view them as independ-

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ent states. This assessment significantly differs between regions. In the West, fifty-six percent of respondents believe that these regions should be equal to others, while only six percent consider them as Autonomous Republics. In the Center of Ukraine, forty percent of respondents see them as equal regions, while forty-five percent of respondents believe that they have to have extended rights, and only six percent consider them as Autonomous Republics. In the South and East, twenty-five percent see them as equal regions, forty-four percent believe they have to have extended list of rights and sixteen percent consider them as Autonomous Republics. Similarly, Pew Forum poll shows a twenty-four point difference between the West and the East in assessing the future of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions respectively : while sixty-one percent of respondents in the West believe that these regions should be equal to others, only thirty-seven percent in the East support this position. Thus, the differences in perceptions regarding the future of Donetsk and Lugansk between the West and the East are significant. In the West, twice as many respondents as in the East see them as equal republics. In the East, almost three times more respondents than in the West consider these regions as autonomous. In Donbas, opinions are very diverse: twelve percent see it as an equal region in Ukraine; twenty percent as a region with extended rights; eighteen percent as autonomous republic; twenty-six percent as independent state, and sixteen percent as a part of Russia (Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 2015). Another poll shows that forty-one percent of respondents in the East and fifty-five percent of respondents in Donbas support the special status for Donbas as a region of Ukraine (Initiative).

Approaches to History My research among history teachers based on 60 interviews in the Eastern, Southern, Central, and Western regions of Ukraine revealed significant differences in approaches concerning the presentation and interpretation of the national past (Korostelina, 2015; Korostelina, 2013). In the Eastern and Southern regions, two approaches to history prevailed: the dual identity type and the pro-Soviet narrative type. The dual identity group uses history to justify the moral predominance of Russians over Ukrainians: Russians industrially developed East Ukraine and supported rural, under-developed Ukrainians in the West who were non-contributors to the economy of the nation. They emphasize that entrepreneurial, industrially developed Russians created the well being of Ukraine and still provide for the rurally backward Ukrainians in the West of the country. They believe that Russian culture is

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deeply rooted in the ancient Kievan Rus’1 and that it has enourmous potential mentally for development, while Ukrainians have a simplistic culture with a young language and very few literary products. They stress that the Ukrainian ethnic group wants to take over the entire Ukrainian nation, thus the ideals of all the Ukrainian people are impeded by the Ukrainian ethnic group: (1) the Ukrainian nation is authentically multicultural and was formed as a conglomerate of different ethnic groups, but Ukrainian nationalists are trying to form a nation on the basis of just one group; and (2) the East and West of Ukraine have different histories and values, but Ukrainian nationalists are trying to transfer Ukraine to the alien civilizational space of Polish culture and the Greco-Catholic Church. In contrast to ethnic Ukrainians , the dual identity group describes Russians as a tolerant group who support a multiplicity of cultures and dual identity (Ukrainian and Russian) for the people; they want to belong to Ukraine but they are treated unfairly by Ukrainian nationalists who attribute Russian imperial ambitions to them and view them as those who wish to impose their own ethno-cultural messianic nationalism. The pro-Soviet group believe that the Ukrainian ethnic group took over the nation and destroyed all that was positive in Ukraine: (1) Soviet Ukraine was a tolerant brotherly nation based on the common identity of the Soviet people (Sovetskii narod), but now nationalists are imposing their vision of history and society on the whole country and are ruining the peaceful nation; (2) Soviet Ukraine was one of the top ten economically developed nations, which brought development to the newly acquired Western regions. Since the Orange Revolution however, representatives of these Western regions – Ukrainian nationalists – have taken over the country and brought about economic stagnation; and (3) Soviet Ukraine provided opportunities for multiple cultures to flourish but now Ukrainian nationalists demand assimilation and enforce the Ukrainization of society, diminishing possibilities for other cultures. This group blames Ukrainian nationalists for the destruction of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine and replacing them with regional and ethnic traditions, in addition to a specific ideology. They delegitimize the power of Ukrainian nationalists and emphasize that the only way to achieve Ukrainian prosperity is to return to the order of Soviet Ukraine. In the West, the pro-Ukrainian narrative prevails. This group justifies the moral predominance of Ukrainians over Russians: (1) Ukrainians have a history and culture of democratic values since the Magdeburg Law and are capable of creating a democratic society while pro-Soviet and totalitarian Russians continue to support a paternalistic society ; (2) Ukrainians have European roots and traditions and can lead Ukraine into Europe, while Russians are Asian and look backward to Russia. The pro-Ukrainian group states that Ukrainians are the authentic native culture of Ukraine while all 1 Kievan Rus’ was a federation of East Slavic tribes in Europe from the late 9th to the mid-13th century, under the reign of the Rurik dynasty with Kiev as a capital.

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other groups are the product of migration and will readily accept an ethnic Ukrainian state. They support the exclusion of Russians from the process of nation-building: the Ukrainian ethnic group has developed in Ukraine and has Ukraine as its own territory while Russians have their own ethnic country – Russia – and came to Ukraine as colonialists who should now either leave or accept the Ukrainian ethnic state. This group states that the Ukrainian ethnic group has a history and culture of democratic values and European traditions that provides ethnic Ukrainians with the capacity to build a European democratic country. The Russian ethnic group however, developed within an Asian culture with its paternalistic and totalitarian values, which are alien to democracy. The pro-Ukrainian group emphasizes the victimization of the Ukrainian ethnic group by the aggressive actions of Russians and Russia: (1) Ukraine is a post-colonial, post-genocidal, post-totalitarian country, which has the memory of the Holodmor2 as the core symbol of its victimization. This victimization is only continuing to grow now because the Ukrainian language and culture are still oppressed as a result of the hegemonic Russian language. (2) Russian suppression of the Ukrainian search for independence occurred through the Holodmor and other repressive actions. Moreover, the Ukrainian people possess an overly feminine identity and are, thus, too peaceful to resist. Russian cruelty completely delegitimizes the perpetrator and delimits its role in nation-building processes, while Ukraine’s victimization heightens the right of the oppressed Ukrainian ethnic group to represent national ideas and define the future of the nation. They believe that the building of a new independent state is impeded by continuing oppression from Russia and the dominance of the Russian language, as well as a liberal ideology that downplays the importance of the ethnic state. This pro-Ukrainian group stresses that Ukrainians have greater rights in their own land than Russians, who either have to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or move to their ethnic land – Russia. In addition, the pro-Ukrainian group celebrates national recovery after a long period of oppression but emphasizes the persistent threat to national independence from different groups, including liberals, Russian nationalists, and Russia: (1) Ukraine survived as a nation and recovered like a Phoenix from the ashes based on cultural nationalism, the idea of the Holodmor, European roots, a national movement, and the Ukrainian language as the genetic code of the nation, and it will prosper despite interference from liberals and Russian nationalists; and (2) the fight for independence that inspired Ukrainians is not finished because of the imperial ambitions of Russia and the government’s policies of Russification. They believe that the Ukrainian ethnic group should define the nation and national identity and proscribe participation of outgroups (liberals, Russian nationalist) in nation2 Holodomor is a brutal artificial famine imposed by Stalin’s regime on Soviet Ukraine in 1932–33.

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building because they are enemies of this renewed nation. This group also emphasizes that the fight for independence that inspired Ukrainians continues because of Russia’s aggressive imperial ambitions. In the Central Ukraine, both pro-Ukrainian and multicultural narratives prevail. The multicultural group emphasizes impediments to their values or ideals by other groups: (1) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists and Stalinistscommunists obstruct the development of a peaceful civic society through conflicting ideologies; (2) they diminish people’s agency through populism and paternalism; (3) they obstruct the establishment of a national dialogue because they promote only nationalistic or pro-Soviet concepts of society and refuse to accept other points of view ; and (4) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists oppose the development of a peaceful multicultural society in Ukraine. This contingent condemns particular groups (nationalists and communists) as obstacles to the achievement of a peaceful, multicultural, liberal nation through the establishment of a civic society, and legitimize the moral right of the ingroup to lead the nation. Ukrainian and Russian nationalists and pro-Soviet groups are perceived as enemies of this civic society who see liberalism as a hindrance to their goals. The group describes Ukraine as a multicultural society challenged by Ukrainian nationalists who forcibly developed an ethno-national state dominated by one ethnic group. Multiculturalists believe that the people of Ukraine long for a liberal society but are thwarted by the overpowering Soviet mentality and Ukrainian nationalism. They want to understand different sides of historic events but are involved in an ongoing conflict of interpretations and possess black-and-white thinking. The nation is portrayed as understanding the ideas of a liberal, shared society but as of yet not ready to pursue them. The group emphasizes the importance of promoting the ideals supported by the group, and justify the moral right of this group to represent the nation and establish its objectives. Thus, the recent polls and my research on the narratives advanced by history teachers show a multiplicity of views about the past and future of Ukraine, as well as about the structure of power in the state. The country is still divided by different loyalties and social boundaries between groups, varying experiences of strong relative deprivation that leads to a worsening of relations between different groups in society, and relations between groups that are affected by negative perceptions. Opposing normative prescriptions regarding the rights of regions and approaches to conflict resolution further divide the country.

Recommendations for reconciliation in Ukraine The war in Ukraine contributed to the development of a divide among the population based on the values and beliefs of particular social groups,

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assessment of the past from new perspectives of threat, and the establishment of clear boundaries between groups. These groups compete for the legitimization of power in intergroup relations and regarding their place in the social hierarchy. They have established patterns of exclusion and inclusion, and they continue to promote a particular political ideology and desired type of regime. These divides are ideological contracts that derive and are inspired by the social need for identity and the political interests of various social groups. Reinforcing solidarity within the ingroup, conflictual narratives emphasize intergroup difference and social boundaries within the nation. They position outgroups as threatening competitors in the nation-building process, as alien outcasts, enemies or as the “fifth columns” that wants to destroy national sovereignty and prosperity. These negative perceptions of the outgroup reinforce the necessity of competition between different groups within the nation. In Ukraine, the absence of a settled vision of a nation and a common national identity is a major source of contestation between social groups. These groups exist in perpetual tension with each other and deny the legitimacy of one another. During periods of political instability and war, the contest between the production of meaning regarding the Ukrainian national identity and power transforms into “zero-sum” competitions in which the existence of one group is perceived as an immediate threat to another. The lack of a nationally-conscious elite, endemic corruption, and a growing ethnocultural and class divides continue to contribute to the crisis. The competition between social groups reinforces “black and white” thinking and results in an absence of inter-community and government dialogue; the search for enemies and zero-sum approaches to Ukraine’s national identity characterize the competition among different groups. The reconciliation process in Ukraine should include several actions: 1) change of beliefs, norms, and values connected to dominant social identities; (2) reduce negative perceptions in intergroup relations; and (3) address processes of legitimization and delegitimization of power. As discussed above, people acquire social norms, beliefs, and values through their membership in particular social groups. The more salient the social identity is, the stronger the impact ingroup perceptions have on the person’s views of society and the world. The acquisition of ingroup norms, beliefs, and values rests on several mechanisms: acceptance of a particular social identity because it provides positive self-esteem, self-categorization based on ascribed social categories of membership, self-formation through the connection with collective myths and social practices, self-verification through an embodiment in social standards, association with social roles, acceptance of values based on belonging to particular cultures, and ingroup primacy that requires the dominance of ingroup values and norms over personal ones. In a particular situation, some of these factors can play a prominent role in the reconciliation process while others can be barely

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present. Thus, a person can support reconciliation through the acquisition of high ingroup self-esteem premised on ingroups values that promote a view of the nation as lenient and forgiving. The Ukrainian nation should promote values of tolerance, acceptance, as well as European traditions of liberal thinking. A person can support reconciliation based on the belief in membership of a tolerant group that promotes loyalty toward all members of this group. The promotion of an inclusive national narrative that emphasizes tolerance and humanity can increase support for different groups within the nation. A person can support reconciliation through their participation in specific collective practices that promote values of forgiveness, for example, truth and reconciliation commissions. A person can support reconciliation by playing roles associated with ingroup contribution, for example, the development of equality and justice in the society by being members of human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social workers, and so on. Another way for a person to support reconciliation is through her/his belonging to a particular culture that promotes values of tolerance and forgiveness and their internalization. And, finally, a person can support reconciliation based on the perception of a humane and lenient ingroup as primary among other social groups he or she belongs to. The promotion of a national identity that emphasizes forgiveness and mercy for all its members can play this role and dominate over more divisive ethnic or regional identities. Similarly, these factors can impede the development of reconciliation process by a person’s acceptance of ingroup biases and prejudices against outgroups as her or his own. Social identity theory also stresses, as a source of negativities, a positive assessment of the ingroup and negative perceptions of the outgroup, threats to group distinctiveness and positive social identity, and relative deprivation. Reducing the perceived threat posed by a particular group; creating equal access to education, jobs, and social services among different groups; celebrating cultural diversity and a multiplicity of values – all are some of the social polices that contribute to the reconciliation process. The reduction of negative perceptions in intergroup relations in Ukraine can also employ recategorization and cross-categorization models. Recategorization should take the form of dual identity : instead of promoting the development of one common vision of the Ukrainian nation, both a common national identity and distinctive ethnic and regional identities should be supported. The attempts to create one common history or establish one common set of values and beliefs will only exacerbate existing conflicts and further divides between ethnic or ideological groups. Acceptance of Ukraine as a multiethnic state with different cultural vectors of development will create the necessary foundation for a shared and peaceful society. The cross-categorization model can be employed through the development of cross-cutting ties among young people, women, and professionals from different regions of Ukraine. It may take the form of

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professional unions, national organizations, annual festivals and conferences, and continued exchange programs. The processes of legitimization and delegitimization of power should be addressed through systemic dialogue aimed at creating common ground and a cohesive national identity. Starting with disagreements as a departing point, agonistic dialogue does not aim to overcome these disagreements through the finding or creation of a consensus. “Acknowledging issues of power and conflict as a central feature of dialogue,” it “highlights the shifting nature of relationships concerned with power, identity, and vulnerability, and continue to privilege conflict as a crucial and potentially productive element of social change” (Ganesh & Zoller, 2012, p. 77). Agonistic dialogue helps expand existing and create new political spaces; it promotes openness to distinct and conflicting views and the development of new understandings of social identity. The practice of agonistic dialogue is based on “the need to acknowledge the dimension of power and antagonism and their ineradicable character” as well as their impact on the development and functioning of social identities (Mouffe, 2000, p. 40). Such dialogue should be sustainable over time; involve a deep level of engagement for all parties; create positive relationships and build trust between participants; build a “safe space” to express profound hopes, fears and interests, and increase understanding of the complex, multidimensional character of the problems. These procedures help create a democratic society where people can “live together productively, even harmoniously, with conflict” (Schoem, Hurtado, Sevig, Chesler & Sumida, 2001, p.15). Reconciliation that aims at the development of a shared society should be based on unifying ideas, including ideas of civic society and a civic concept of national identity, human rights and the equality of every citizen independent of his or her religion, ethnicity, and language. In such a divided society as Ukraine, reconciliation should be created as an essential political practice that contributes to the building of relationships and expands understanding between groups. This type of reconciliation should not illuminate conflict but rather transform the nature of that conflict. Thus, a reconciliation process should not seek to establish the “truth” or some form of consensus about the history of the conflict, but rather create accommodation between conflicting accounts in such a way as to make a conflict more livable. Such an approach to the reconciliation process rests on the idea of agonistic pluralism, which seeks to convert antagonism into agonism, promotes the engagement of adversaries across profound differences, and involves a vibrant clash of democratic political positions.

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Katja Wezel

Memory Conflicts as Barrier to Reconciliation: Post-Soviet Disputes between the Baltic States and Russia On July 20, 2015, the administration of the city of Vilnius started dismantling four Soviet era statues on the Green Bridge that crosses the Neris River in the Lithuanian capital. The statues had been erected in 1952 depicting an idealized Soviet society – soldiers, workers, farmers and students – in heroic display. The newly elected mayor of Vilnius, Remigijus Sˇimasˇius, had ordered their removal because the statues were in need of repair and considered to be dangerous for pedestrians. However, it is unlikely that the statues will ever return. According to the mayor, the statues represent “big lies about the Soviet system.” (The Baltic Times, 20 July 2015). The statues’ removal was criticized as a “political decision” by representatives of Lithuania’s Russian-speaking minority, who consider them part of Vilnius’ cultural heritage from the Soviet period. Since the dissolution of the USSR and the reestablishment of their independence, the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have been struggling to come to terms with their Soviet past and with their neighbor Russia. As the Soviet Union’s successor, the Russian Federation is viewed as the former “colonizer.” In the twenty-five years since the Baltic declarations of independence in 1990, the conflict has been fought mainly over three issues: memory and interpretation of history ; the large Russian minorities in the Baltic states as remnants of the Soviet era; and a border conflict over territories which used to belong to the interwar republics of Latvia and Estonia but became part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) during the Soviet era and stayed with Russia after 1991. While the three issues are interconnected, the border conflict and the question of the integration of the Russian minorities were most central until the mid 2000s; since then the focus shifted to questions of memory and the interpretation of World War II. This chapter provides an overview of how this shift occurred. The aim is furthermore to discuss why the conflict over memory is not only the most crucial conflict, but also the one where reconciliation is most difficult to achieve. In this chapter, I follow Lily Gardner Feldman’s reference to a minimal definition of reconciliation as “political accommodation, rapprochement, or peaceful coexistence” (Gardner Feldman 2012, p. 10). I argue that in the current political climate between the Baltics and Russia, with the existing political leaderships and their diverging viewpoints about the Soviet past, only

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reconciliation on a minimal scale seems likely. I will discuss initiatives and the involvement of bilateral actors, such as the Russian and Baltic governments, and transnational actors, such as the European Union, as well as minority groups as intrastate actors. The principal questions I address are: (1) Is the peaceful coexistence of Balts and Russians in the Baltic region stable? (2) What are the obstacles for a Baltic-Russian rapprochement that would go beyond minimal reconciliation?

The Honeymoon of Russian-Baltic Relations: 1990–1991 When Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia declared their independence in 1990, they shared their struggle for autonomy and sovereignty from the USSR with the Russian Republic (Zı¯le 2001). Boris Yeltsin, then chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, sided with the Baltic states in their conflict with the Soviet center and the General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev. This support by Yeltsin, subsequently elected first President of Russia by popular vote in June 1991, became crucial to the Baltic quest for independence as the Soviet Union fell apart. When special Soviet troops violently attacked public buildings in Vilnius and Riga, Yeltsin called on Russians within the Soviet army not to shoot down civilian protesters. After fourteen protesters died in Vilnius on January 13, 1991, Yeltsin showed his support, signing a mutual agreement recognizing Baltic independence in Tallinn the next day. In the August coup of 1991, when Communist hardliners tried to win back control over the Soviet Union, Yeltsin again supported the Baltic republics in their quest for independence. At this point, Yeltsin and the Baltic governments were allies against the Soviet hardliners and against Gorbachev, who had decelerated his reforms in an attempt to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bunce 1999). So, what happened to this Baltic-Russian alliance once the Soviet Union was gone? Early euphoria about Russia’s “liberation from the Soviet Union” soon faded (Alexandrova 2003, p. 16). Russian nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky gained ground in the 1993 elections. Yeltsin’s government, responding to these nationalist sentiments, increasingly concerned itself with the treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltic states. The temporary exclusion of many Soviet settlers of ethnic Russian origin from Estonian or Latvian citizenship did indeed create cause for concern. However, Russia clearly overcompensated when it classified the treatment of Russian speakers in the Baltics as “ethnic cleansing similar to apartheid” (Simonsen 2001, p. 776). The cry of “severe human rights’ violations” became a standard phrase in the Russian rhetoric when dealing with their Baltic neighbors, and this rhetoric remained even after Estonia and Latvia revised their formerly very

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restrictive citizenship laws (Leijin¸sˇ 2001, p. 516). The Russian-speaking minority in the Baltics thus became a hostage of Russian nationalism. With the invention of the term “Rossiiskaia Diaspora” and its use in Acts of the Russian Parliament, Russian-speaking settler communities in the “near abroad” became publicly perceived as an extension of the Russian nation-state (Melvin 1998, p. 40). In the Baltics, this re-affirmed perceptions of Russian speakers as a “fifth column” and did not contribute to reconciliation.

From Soviet Settlers to Accidental Diaspora: Russian-speaking Minorities in the Baltic States Legal Continuity and the Restoration of the Nation-state The Baltic states followed the “restored state model” when declaring independence from the Soviet Union (Brubaker 1992). Legal continuity was also central for Latvia and Estonia in determining citizenship eligibility, based on their interwar citizenry before the first Soviet occupation in 1940 (Ziemele 2005). This restriction on citizenship was a reaction to the high number of Russian speakers, who had emigrated to the two northern Baltic republics in the Soviet period. While the Lithuanian population remained relatively homogeneous, the share of Estonians and Latvians decreased to sixty-two and fifty-two percent due to the influx of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians. Table 2: Share of Titular Nation as a Percentage of Overall Population; Source: Eglı¯te 2002, Kasekamp 2010, Misiunas and Taagepera 1993. Year

Estonians

Latvians

Lithuanians

1939

88 %

75 %

80 %

1970

68 %

62 %

79 %

1989

62 %

52 %

80 %

As a result, the parliaments of Estonia and Latvia decided in 1991 that “Soviet settlers” – mostly members of the military or workers for the large Soviet industries – should not automatically receive citizenship. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Citizenship Law of November 1989 granted citizenship to all persons born on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania (Budryte˙ 2005, p. 144). Moreover, all permanent residents with more than ten years of residence were immediately eligible to apply for Lithuanian citizenship, when proving their knowledge of Lithuanian and a source of income. By contrast, in

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Estonia and Latvia, Soviet settlers were not able to apply for immediate naturalization (Budryte˙ 2005, p. 67, 105). Only after the adoption of new citizenship laws in Estonia (1992) and Latvia (1994) did Soviet settlers become eligible for citizenship – if they passed a language test, took an oath on the constitution, and an exam about the nation’s history, culture and political system. In the case of Latvia, a so-called “window-system” even then restricted naturalization to certain age groups and essentially slowed down the naturalization process (Dorodnova 2003). Only after the liberalization of the law in 1998 did all Soviet settlers in Latvia become eligible to apply for citizenship. Debates on Citizenship in Estonia and Latvia As Dieter Gosewinkel (2001) has argued, citizenship and naturalization are ways for a nation to demarcate its body and territory. The large numbers of Soviet migrants, who initially often did not speak Estonian or Latvian, were perceived as outsiders and – more importantly – as representatives of the Soviet system, which the re-established Baltic states hoped to overcome. However, scholars such as Roger Brubaker (2000) have stressed that the Soviet migrants affected by this policy were an “accidental diaspora.” They had never chosen to emigrate to a foreign state, but had simply moved within the USSR, and now found themselves in a legally precarious situation: After the dissolution of the USSR on December 25, 1991, they temporarily became stateless. This also applied to second- or third-generation Soviet settlers, including children who had lived in Estonia or Latvia all their lives. Citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia became an important factor in the discourse of reconciliation. In the 1990s Latvia and Estonia were classified as “ethnic democracies” because of the exclusion of large groups of ethnic Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians from citizenship (Linz and Stepan 1996, Smith 1996). The practice that allowed ethnic Latvians and Estonians, who had been citizens of interwar Latvia or Estonia and their descendants, to receive preferential treatment and to restore their citizenship even if they did not permanently reside in these countries, further strengthened the “ethnic democracy” argument. At the same time the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws can deny naturalization to current or former employees of foreign security services or armed forces, including the KGB and the Soviet military. Thus the citizenship laws functioned also as a screening mechanism and a form of lustration (Jaskovka and Moran 2006, Stan 2009, Pettai and Pettai 2015). The Latvian approach to citizenship, the most restrictive in the Baltics, had negative effects for the Russian-Latvian relationship. In the 1990s in particular, the Russian media portrayed Latvia as the Baltic country where all Russians were mistreated (Doron¸enkova 2008). This notion was also picked up by the international media, which tended to present the issue as an “ethnic

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conflict.” However, we should note that not all ethnic Russians (or Ukrainians or Belarussians) were excluded from citizenship: Russian speakers who were descendants of citizens from the interwar republics could obtain citizenship immediately, just as Estonians and Latvians did. Only those who had settled in Estonia and Latvia during the Soviet period were temporarily excluded from citizenship. Treating the citizenship criteria as an “ethnic conflict” did not adequately take the Latvian and Estonian point of view into account. The underlying argument in Estonia and Latvia for restoring its citizenry on the basis of the pre-1940 body of citizens (and their descendants) was that the Baltic states had been forcefully incorporated into the USSR following their occupation by Soviet troops in June 1940. A majority of Russians as well as the Russian government still do not acknowledge that there was a military occupation and subsequent forced annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. Since Russia does not support the “restored state” argument, Russian scholars of International Law have criticized Estonia and Latvia for denying its Soviet era migrants automatic citizenship (Mälksoo 2015, p. 31). From the Estonian and Latvian perspective, however, the question of citizenship is directly linked to the illegality of Soviet rule. Competing historical narratives are therefore at the root of the problems that have impeded Russian-Baltic rapprochement on these issues. The Impact of Non-Citizenship on Baltic-Russian Relations The current existence of approximately 257,000 mostly Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia (twelve percent of the population) and 82,000 noncitizens in Estonia (6.2 percent of the population) still represents a conundrum in Baltic politics that continues to strain Baltic-Russian relations.1 Holders of the non-citizen passports are not stateless, but permanent residents in Estonia or Latvia, who were given this special status as a result of pre-accession pressures by the EU. Non-citizen passport holders are represented by Latvian and Estonian embassies abroad and enjoy various social rights in their countries of residence, such as pension and unemployment benefits, but have restricted political rights. Whereas Estonia allows non-citizens to vote in local elections while excluding them from national elections, Latvia’s non-citizens are politically disenfranchised and have no voting rights (Cianetti 2014). Current numbers of non-citizen passport holders are a clear improvement from the early 1990s, when roughly thirty percent of permanent residents of Estonia and Latvia had an undetermined citizenship status. Under pressure by the EU and the OSCE, both Estonia and Latvia reformed their citizenship laws, making naturalization more accessible. Estonia and Latvia introduced free-of1 Numbers are from July 2015 (Latvia) and November 2015 (Estonia).

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charge or reduced fee language classes. Language tests, which are mandatory for naturalization, have been eased for elderly Russian speakers. The Russian Federation, however, did not acknowledge these changes sufficiently, thus rendering its ongoing accusation of the “severe human rights’ violations in Latvia and Estonia” questionable. Restrictions on citizenship had a very negative influence on Estonia’s and Latvia’s relationship with Russia. In the 1990s both countries ranked regularly on the top of the list as Russia’s “main enemies” in public surveys (Russlandanalysen 11 May 2007; Doron¸enkova 2008, p. 35). At the same time, Lithuanian-Russian relations were not free of tensions, despite the fact that Lithuania had granted its Soviet settler communities the immediate right to receive citizenship. This is largely due to the fact that Lithuania shares Latvia’s and Estonia’s interpretation of the history of World War II. The absence of further Lithuanian-Russian rapprochement indicates that the citizenship issue was not the main point prohibiting reconciliation. While the citizenship issue is important for understanding the tensions between Russia and its Baltic neighbors, it fails to fully explain impediments for a rapprochement in Baltic-Russian relations.

Settling the Border Dispute? Negotiations over Territory and History (Re)Drawing Borders after the Disintegration of the USSR As a result of their incorporation into the USSR, Estonia and Latvia both lost territory that had been part of their interwar republics but was ceded to the RSFSR under Soviet rule (Dauksts and Puga 1995, Jääts 1995). Lithuania actually gained territory during Soviet rule (from Poland), and only shares a border with the Kaliningrad oblast but not with mainland Russia. Lithuania was thus able to sign a border treaty with the Russian Federation in 1997 with little dispute. In the case of Estonia, there were two contested territories: The area east of the Narva River around the city Jaanilinn (Ivangorod in Russian), and the area south of the Lake Peipus next to the city Petseri (Pechory in Russian). The latter is home to the Setus, a Finno-Ugric people related to Estonians. In the Latvian case, the territory in question was Abrene, Pytalovo in Russian, south of the Petseri/Pechory district. It both cases the territories in question were not large, and by the early 1990s were mostly inhabited by ethnic Russians. Only Petseri still had a sizable group of Estonians and Setus. The most contentious issue in the matter was therefore not the territory itself but Estonia’s and Latvia’s insistence on legal continuity with regard to the

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peace treaties of 1920, which had confirmed their statehood by establishing their borders with Russia in the first place. Negotiations over a border treaty started right after Estonia and Latvia had de facto regained their independence on August 20, 1991. Following their thesis of legal continuity to the interwar republics, Estonia and Latvia initially argued in favor of a restoration of their interwar borders. As with the citizenship issue, they based their argument on International Law, more precisely on the illegality of Soviet rule. The two Baltic governments argued that the 1920 Treaty of Tartu and the 1920 Treaty of Riga constituted key legal documents and were still legally binding. Estonia and Latvia were very reluctant to give up the reference to these treaties because they felt it would undermine their argument of legal continuity also with regard to other contested issues, such as citizenship (Mole 2012). The Russian Federation, however, claimed that Estonia’s and Latvia’s insistence on their pre-war borders was a violation of the Tallinn agreement of January 14, 1991, in which Boris Yeltsin had supported the Baltic strive for independence based on the understanding of territorial integrity and the observation of all existing borders. The Russian Federation further argued that the 1920 peace treaties had lost their legal force when Estonia and Latvia became Soviet republics. With these diverging perspectives as a starting point, fruitful conversations were difficult to achieve. Estonia’s and Latvia’s Endless Negotiations about a Border Treaty with Russia The negotiations about the border treaties gained momentum only after Estonia and Latvia had become candidates for the eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU. As unresolved border issues were initially considered to be a reason for impeding NATO and EU membership, western advisors pushed both Estonia and Latvia to give up their insistence on the 1920 peace treaties as the basis of further negotiations with Russia. However, by 1997 it was the Russian Federation that started to delay the process by linking their signature of the border treaties to concessions regarding the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As long as the NATO and EU accession agreements with Estonia and Latvia were not yet concluded, the Russian Federation had an interest to slow down the signing of the border treaties (Mole 2012, p. 137). This explains the stalemate in the negotiations in the late 1990s when the border agreement drafts were essentially ready to be signed but Russia’s attitude blocked further conversations on the matter. After Estonia’s and Latvia’s accession to NATO and the EU in 2004, Russia and the Baltic states continued their negotiations about the border treaties. In 2005, it looked for a moment as if both treaties would be signed. Once again, however, the contested interpretation of Soviet history came in the way. The year 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in

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Europe, which the Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated with a big military parade on the Red Square in Moscow. Russia proposed to sign the Latvian-Russian border treaty in Moscow on May 10. This sparked a heated debate in Latvia, since the preparations for Moscow’s celebration on May 9 were already eyed very carefully. Putin’s renewed emphasis on the Soviet victory over fascism in World War II had been commented on in advance by the President of Latvia, who pointed out that the end of World War II had not been a liberation for the Baltic states since the Soviets merely replaced the Nazis as the occupying forces (Vı¯k¸e-Freiberga 2005). President Vaira Vı¯k¸eFreiberga nevertheless chose to attend the Moscow parade in order to stand up for Latvia’s perspective on the history of World War II. Meanwhile, her Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts refused to accept Putin’s invitation in protest over the Kremlin’s celebratory attitude, which completely glossed over the Soviet occupation of the Baltics and repressions of its populations during and after World War II (Grigas 2013, Onken 2007a). Still, the Latvian government was prepared to go ahead with signing the border treaty “confirming its good will” (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005a). It felt obliged, however, to attach an explanatory declaration, which once again stressed the illegality of Soviet rule and declared that the border treaty “does not deprive the state of Latvia and its citizens of the rights and legal claims provided by the international law, including the Peace Treaty between Latvia and Russia of 11 August 1920” (Ibid). According to Putin, this declaration once again manifested Latvia’s “foolish territorial demands” (Press Statement 2005). Despite the fact that the Latvian Prime Minister Aigars Kalvı¯tis had issued a statement stressing that this declaration did not present any territorial claims against Russia (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005b), the Russian government called off the signing of the treaty. It was not until Latvia dropped the additional declaration that the Latvian-Russian border treaty was finally signed on March 27, 2007, ten years after the draft had first been prepared. With the treaty Latvia renounced all claims on Abrene/ Pytalovo. The treaty was ratified by the Latvian parliament in May and by the Russian Duma in September the same year, entering into force on December 18, 2007. It was also accompanied by Latvian-Russian agreements on energy co-operation and trade. The Estonian-Russian border treaty had come slightly further to conclusion in 2005. It was signed by the foreign ministers of both countries on May 18, 2005. The treaty recognized the de facto existing borderline with slight modifications. The Estonian parliament ratified the treaty on June 20, 2005 but insisted on adding an introductory declaration stressing “the legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia proclaimed on 24 February 1918” (Elsuwege 2008, p. 451). As a result, the Russian Duma refused to ratify the treaty. As EstonianRussian relations took a turn for the worse following the Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007, it took nearly another decade until the Foreign Ministers of Estonia and Russia signed the Estonian-Russian border treaty for a second time on

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February 14, 2014 – without any introductory declarations. In November 2015 the Estonian parliament discussed the treaty in the first reading. Since then the ratification process has been deadlocked. The Russian Duma refuses to discuss the border treaty as long as tensions remain high in connection with NATO troops being stationed in Estonia. These numerous pitfalls hindering the signing or ratification of the BalticRussian border treaties show that the relations between the Russian Federation and its Baltic neighbors in the last twenty-five years were always vulnerable, and in danger of being (mis)used for political reasons. Nationalists on both sides, in the Russian Federation and in the Baltic states, were ready to sacrifice Baltic-Russian relations on the battlefield of nationalist debates. This is particularly true for debates on the interpretation of history, where the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin has taken a turn toward a revival of traditions that go back to a pre-Perestroika understanding of Soviet history. Hence history and memory have now become the main impediment for BalticRussian relations.

Commemorating the Soviet Past: Clashes in Memory Politics between the Baltic States and the Russian Federation Reassessing Nazi and Soviet Crimes The Baltic states’ focus on the illegality of Soviet rule and the atrocities committed under communism is not new. It already invigorated the Baltic independence movements in the late 1980s. Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost policies led to a revival of long suppressed memories of Soviet crimes, most importantly the mass deportations of the 1940s. Central for an understanding of the Baltic debate on memory politics is the MolotovRibbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 and its secret protocol (Wezel 2011). The Balts interpret this pact as the starting point of their loss of independence and view it as prerequisite for the mass deportations and killings that were to follow, leading to a loss of ten–fifteen percent of their pre-war population. The secret protocol, in which Stalin and Hitler divided Eastern Europe among themselves, serves as evidence for the Balts’ argument that Stalin’s policies did not differ much from Hitler’s and were therefore just as despicable. The 1989 pan-Baltic demonstration “The Baltic Way” was one of the biggest peaceful demonstrations during Perestroika: About 1.5 million Balts joined hands to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the pact, in order to remind the Soviet leadership and the world at large of the crimes of Hitler and Stalin. The Perestroika mood of the late 1980s allowed for an historical investigation, carried out by the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet

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Union (the successor to the Supreme Soviet). Its 1989 commission report officially acknowledged – for the first time in Soviet history – the existence of the secret protocol and condemned it as “criminal.” The commission, however, drew the conclusion that this secret protocol was an act of the Stalin government alone, which “did not reflect the will of the Soviet people;” as a result, the Soviet people could not be held responsible for these policies (ed. Bühl 1989, 191). Gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation did not further investigate the matter and rejected Baltic claims of the illegality of the Soviet occupation as a result of the Molotov-RibbentropPact. The Baltic states, for their part, have continued the process of investigating their past begun during Perestroika. It was in the 1990s, that the Russian and Baltic paths for a (re)assessment of history diverged. The Russian Federation, despite opening the archives and beginning the de-classification of formerly unavailable documents under the Yeltsin government, slowly returned to a more Soviet narrative. Since Vladimir Putin’s accession to the Russian presidency in 2000, the Russian Federation has once again embraced the Soviet interpretation of the history of World War II. Meanwhile, the Baltic states have persistently been very active in examining their repressive Soviet past. Moreover, due to international pressure the Baltic governments also started to sponsor research about crimes committed under Nazi rule. The reassessment of the Nazi past and the role of the Baltic population during the German occupation became particularly important after the international media reacted with shock to the Baltic commemoration of resistance movements and “freedom fighters” from the 1940s and 1950s. In the case of Lithuania, this involved honoring individuals such as Jonas Noreika, a post-war anti-Soviet resistance fighter who was posthumously awarded the highest Lithuanian order in 1997, despite the fact that he had also collaborated with the Nazis in murdering Lithuania’s Jewish population. In Latvia, the debate reached a peak with the March 1998 commemoration events for the Latvian SS troops, most of them conscripts who had fought with Nazi forces against the Red Army. This came at a moment of severe Russian-Latvian tensions, engendered by several factors: actions of the Latvian police against elderly Russian-speaking protesters in Riga criticizing the rise of utility costs; a Latvian coalition government under a nationalist prime minister, whose party was preparing a referendum against the liberalization of Latvia’s citizenship law ; Russian-Latvian disagreements connected to Latvia’s refusal to sell the oil transport company Ventspils Nafta to a Russian company (Stranga 1998). The Russian-Latvian crisis in the spring of 1998 put the spotlight on Latvia and on the Baltics as a whole. Following Russian media coverage, Baltic memory politics at large were portrayed negatively in the international press. The Russian media accused Latvia of rehabilitating fascism by allowing elderly SS veterans to march through Riga’s city center. The protests of Russian-

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speaking pensioners against the rise of utility costs in Latvia gave Russia the pretext to combine its criticism of Latvian memory politics with its rhetoric of “human rights violations” against Russian-speakers in the Baltics. These developments were picked up by the international media and added to Latvia’s negative image (Diena 21 March 1998). The Baltic Historical Commissions In order to straighten their record and tackle old and new myths, the Baltic states felt compelled to investigate their recent history. In May 1998 the presidents of all three Baltic nations agreed on the appointment of International Historical Commissions for their respective countries: The Estonian International Commission for Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity2 The Commission of the Historians of Latvia3 The International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania4

Each of these commissions invited native and international scholars and public figures to participate – the Estonian Commission was in fact made up entirely of international public figures. Each Historical Commission included at least one Jewish member and a member from the Russian Federation. Two of these Russian members (for the Estonian and the Lithuanian commissions) were founding members of Memorial, who had pushed for an investigation of Stalin’s crimes in Russia and were therefore interested in further research on human rights violations under Soviet rule. The problem, however, was that organizations like Memorial and their members have become increasingly marginalized in the new Russia, in particular during Putin’s presidency. Since 1999 various conferences with international participation have taken place – including presenters from Russia – and the Historical Commissions of all three countries have published reports or volumes that present results of their work (Onken 2007b, Plakans 2014, Suzˇiede˙lis 2014). The periods researched by the Baltic historical commissions corresponded to popular interests, i. e. the most repressive years of Soviet rule, 1940–1941 and 1944–1959. The commissions’ work in each of the three countries also focused on the German occupation, 1941–1944/45, in order to contribute to the 2 The website of the Estonian Commission is available at: http://www.historycommission.ee [March30, 2018] 3 The website of the Latvian Commission is available at: http://www.president.lv/en/activities/ commissions-and-councils/commission-of-historians [March 30, 2018] 4 Website of the Lithuanian Commission http://www.komisija.lt/en [March 30, 2018]. For an evaluation of the Lithuanian Commission of Historians’ work see Suzˇiede˙lis 2014.

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contemporary debate on the Holocaust in East Central Europe, and to answer imminent questions about Baltic collaboration. The work of the commissions was tied to the Baltic’s bid to EU and NATO accession. This required the approval of Western Europe and the United States. While the commissions’ work “can be considered an honest effort to achieve rapprochement or even reconciliation,” the difficulties with regard to Baltic-Russian reconciliation remained manifold (Pettai 2011, p. 266).

Diverging Historical Narratives and Baltic-Russian Memory Wars Whereas the Baltic states’ history commissions focused on unmasking former Soviet myths, developments in the Russian Federation were taking an opposite course. The discrepancy and diverging narratives became particularly obvious in 2005 in the run-up to the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow, which the Kremlin was determined to celebrate with pomp and glory. By contrast, the Baltic states stood firm by highlighting the human rights violations committed under Soviet rule. From the Baltic perspective it was inconceivable to simply celebrate the Soviet army (and the Russian army as its successor) with a big parade on the Red Square in Moscow, without acknowledging their role as perpetrators, responsible for the occupation of the Baltic (and other) states, and the crimes connected to this. This narrative of crimes against humanity during World War II and the post-war Stalinist era was also the one that Baltic politicians had been very actively promoting following their states’ accession to the European Union in 2004. The aim was to integrate the memory of suffering under Communism into the European master narrative. On May 12, 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, in which it explicitly stressed “that for some nations, the end of World War II meant renewed tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union” (European Parliament 2005, p. 206). In this wording, the influence of Baltic and other MEPs from former Communist states becomes obvious. In their national resolutions, the Baltic states went even further by expressing the hope for an apology from the Russian Federation. A declaration issued by the Latvian Parliament urged Russia to undertake efforts to come to terms with its role in World War II by praising Germany’s example (Saeima 2005). Russia did not comply with these expectations. On May 27, 2005, the Russian Parliament issued a statement, rebuking specifically Baltic and Polish “attempts to falsify history.” It declared: “there is neither historical, nor legal or moral excuse for declaring the Soviet Union – the one to suffer most from the Hitlerite aggression – an accomplice in unleashing the Second World War” (Duma 2005). From a Russian point of view, it is utterly despicable to compare the crimes of the Nazi regime to the atrocities under Soviet rule. Memory politics of the Russian Federation under Putin have further narrowed the

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room for negotiations, making it impossible to acknowledge Soviet soldiers as both victims and perpetrators. Yet, the Baltic approach of investigating Soviet repressions firmly rests on the comparison with Nazi crimes. The underlying notion is that Nazi crimes, and in particular the Holocaust, have already received world-wide recognition while Stalin’s crimes are still less acknowledged. Lithuania has most vehemently embraced the term “genocide” for the description of the mass killings and deportations during the Stalinist era (Budryte˙ 2004). The central Lithuanian museum for the commemoration of crimes committed under Soviet and Nazi rule in Vilnius is called “Genocide Museum,” and focuses on killings, mass deportations and the resistance movement during the Soviet occupation. The Lithuanian thesis of “double genocide” – the Holocaust and the Soviet genocide – further emphasizes the comparison of Nazi and Soviet crimes against humanity. This explains why Lithuania has not been able to establish a more amicable partnership with the Russian Federation, even though Russian-Lithuanian relations were not strained by citizenship or border disputes. The Baltic-Russian “memory war” reached a peak in 2007 with the Bronze Soldier crisis in Tallinn. Following its reestablishment of independence, Estonia tried to re-claim its public space, including the memorial of the Bronze soldier, the main Soviet memorial for the “Great Patriotic War” in the city center of Estonia’s capital. Yet, the de-sovietization of the monument did not prove to be successful. By 2005 the space was again used as a “Soviet monument” and dominated by commemoration events organized by Tallinn’s Russian-speaking minority. The development was fueled by Russian State TV propaganda of the “Great Patriotic War,” also watched by Russian speakers in Estonia. As James Wertsch (2008) has argued, Russians inside and outside of Russia form a “mnemonic community” sharing similar values – which made it possible to expand the revival of commemorating the Soviet Victory Day to the Baltics. Not only did this revived Soviet narrative contradict Estonia’s discourse about World War II; the Estonian government was alarmed that Russian speakers were beginning to take their children to the monument, thereby passing down a counter-narrative of the history of Estonia to Russianspeaking children (Brüggemann & Kasekamp 2008). The relocation of the Bronze Soldier from Tallinn’s city center to the military cemetery did not aid reconciliation. Twelve bodies of unknown Soviet soldiers beneath the memorial were exhumed and reburied. The dismantling of the monument in a cloak-and-dagger operation right before the upcoming May 9 celebrations in 2007 led to violent clashes between ethnic Russian protesters and the Estonian police, and a severe Estonian-Russian diplomatic crisis. The Russian youth group Nashi blockaded the Estonian embassy in Moscow, and websites of the Estonian government were brought down by cyber-attacks. The Russian government answered with economic sanctions and called on Russians to abandon their holiday resorts in Estonia. For a short

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while – until the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 – Estonia became Russia’s enemy number 1, and it took several years for Estonian-Russian relations to defrost. This episode once again illustrated the vulnerability of Baltic-Russian relations. Economic sanctions and a mere diplomatic crisis were the best possible outcome, given the vulnerable bilateral relations between two countries. The Russian bear flexed its muscles. However, the likelihood of a war between Russia and the EU and NATO member Estonia was at no point very high.

Conclusion: Is There a Path to Baltic-Russian Reconciliation? The Estonian political scientists Piret Ehin and Eiki Berg have argued that the “permafrost in Baltic-Russian relations shows no signs of melting” (2009, p. 1). This sounds like a very bleak assessment of the Baltic-Russian reconciliation process. Indeed, in the twenty-five years since the reestablishment of Baltic independence, Baltic-Russian relations experienced several severe crises. At the same time, they always seemed to bounce back to a situation, in which the Russian Federation and the Baltic states at least were able to talk to each other, and even sign and ratify border treaties. If the episodes depicted here offer any clue, then a violent conflict between Russia and its Baltic neighbors does not seem very likely, despite fears of the Baltic states, following the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the obstacles for a more amicable relationship and further reconciliation remain high. This can mostly be attributed to diverging historical narratives in Russia and the Baltic states. While Putin’s memory politics has revived a sense of pride for Soviet achievements among Russians, the Baltic narrative is rooted in a discourse of suffering under Soviet rule. However, this perception of suffering under communism is not the only narrative that exists in the Baltics. Research such as the work by Neringa Klumbyte˙ (2011) on Lithuania’s older generation has pointed out that nostalgia for the late Soviet period also exists in the Baltic states, and not only among Russian speakers. This indicates that there would be a starting point for communication between Russians and Balts: Comparing their everyday life experiences under Communism. In this field mutual understanding, rapprochement and collaborative research would be feasible. Yet, in order to make this possible, the Baltic states and the Russian Federation would both need to take the first step and differentiate between the repressive Stalinist years and the post-Stalinist Soviet period, while Russia would need to acknowledge the crimes of the former. Such recognition of the crimes of the Stalinist period would not necessarily entail an apology. It would however be a sign necessary for the Baltic states that their point of view is

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understood. This could open the door to a more profound reconciliation process. The outlook is not as bleak at it might seem. In a region full of frozen conflicts – Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Eastern Ukraine – the Baltic-Russian relationship can actually count as a success story.

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Annam#ria Kiss

The Means and Ends of Russo-Georgian “Normalization”: What is beyond the “Red Lines”?

Introduction: The Regional Setting In the South Caucasus, for the past twenty-five years Russia has developed its bilateral ties with the three independent states – and also with the de facto ones – in substantially different ways. With Yerevan Moscow has an exclusive relationship that is officially called strategic alliance. By contrast, as a result of its energy export potential and multi-vector dimensional foreign policy, Baku does not let Russia penetrate too deep, neither into its economy, nor into its internal and external affairs (strategic partnership). Significant ties apart from energy deals can be found in military cooperation. Russia earns considerably by heavily arming Azerbaijan, explained by some experts as “a compensation for the elements of a pro-Western orientation in Azeri politics” (Minchenko, Markedonov & Petrov 2015, p. 16). It is worth noting here that Russia sells heavy weapons also to Armenia, justifying it as keeping the balance in a brittle “neither war nor peace” situation over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a longtime disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russo-Georgian relations were hostile for a long period of time before the government change in Georgia in 2012; a highly emotional, political atmosphere was one of its permanent characteristics in which every small issue routinely became highly politicized. From the beginning of the 2000s, Georgia has chosen to develop solid ties with the transatlantic community ; as much as possible, it has become a transit country of goods and energy ; and it was also known to house camps of North Caucasian Islamists on its territory. Georgia is the only country among the three that had an open military conflict with Russia, which resulted in losing its incomplete sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and breaking diplomatic ties with its Northern neighbour. Against the backdrop of a difficult relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi, especially the nadir in their ties in 2008, the change of the government in Georgia in 2012 ushered in a new era in relations. While trying to avoid misunderstanding, neither the Kremlin nor the new government of Georgia had high hopes; nonetheless the tenor of relations was both quite positive and realistic (Abashidze 2013; Margvelashvili 2013). However, three years have passed since then without diplomatic relations being re-established. The “red lines” dividing Russia and Georgia include: the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and the transatlantic foreign policy orientation of Georgia. For Georgia, the Russian recognition of the

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two breakaway regions is unacceptable: Tbilisi sees it as a clear occupation and violation of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a form of leverage for Moscow to put pressure on Georgia. This chapter focuses on Russia-Georgia relations and the role of other stakeholders. It analyses developments since 2012 to improve the relationship on both state and societal levels; and highlights the limitations of this RussoGeorgian engagement. More specifically, the analysis evaluates the steps that were taken toward “normalization” to conclude whether William Zartman’s notion of a “mutually enticing opportunity” can be found for a lasting positive development and the restoration of diplomatic ties. I argue three points. First, based on Zartman’s work, the absence of diplomatic relations is not considered a “mutually hurting stalemate” due to the asymmetry of interdependence and mutually exclusive foreign policy orientations of Georgia and Russia. Second, the lack of ripeness of the reconciliation process can also be understood as preparing the ground for future strategies, not meaning inaction. However, small steps necessarily mean modest results. Third, both Russian and Georgian governmental strategies are uncertain concerning further steps towards reconciliation, and no plan exists for further resolution of divergences on both sides. The rest of the chapter is organized in four sections: first, discussion of deterioration in relations and the prerequisites for “normalization;” second, the institutions of cooperation; third, the “red lines” from the perspective of both sides; and fourth the conclusion.

Deterioration of Relations and Prerequisites for “Normalization” The deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia in 2008 was extensive, reaching a new low for the period after the breakup of the USSR; only improvement was possible. The so called “five-day war” between the two countries created the precedent of Russia engaging in a full-scale military conflict with another post-Soviet state. Moreover, the war was pathbreaking because Russia, for first time since the fall of the Berlin wall, recognized breakaway regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as independent states. Diplomatic relations were severed. For Tbilisi, Moscow became “the number one enemy” and the aggressor ; the lost territories continue to be seen as occupied (National Security Concept of Georgia 2011). Tensions had been building between the two states for several years prior to the conflict in August 2008. In December 2000, Russia unilaterally introduced visas for Georgian citizens,1 and the official rhetoric became harsh from both 1 Russia introduced a visa regime in order to stop or to limit the flight of Islamist insurgents from Georgia to the Russian Northern Caucasus

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sides. After the “Rose revolution” in 2003 and with Georgia’s then-president, Mikheil Saakashvili, in power, Russo-Georgian relations became even more tense. For example, in 2006 Tbilisi arrested four Russian military intelligence officers for espionage; and Russia banned Georgia’s top export products (Borjomi mineral water and wine) and cut rail, road, air and sea links between the two countries (Allison 2008). Saakashvili became a laughing stock of the Russian media, and a war criminal in Kremlin‘s eyes. Saakashvili also took part in mutual accusations by blaming Russia for all Georgian misfortunes. In 2010, Georgia offered ninety-day visa-free travel to the citizens of the North Caucasus (in 2012 it was extended to all citizens of Russia), provoking ambiguous reactions from Moscow. Tbilisi was against Russia’s World Trade Organization accession until 2011, and Georgian officials proposed boycotting the Sochi Winter Olympic games of 2014. Shades of the past appeared in 2011 when the Georgian Parliament recognized the colonial policy of the Russian empire as “genocide against the Circassian people” and Moscow accused Tbilisi of fuelling religious conflict in Russia. During almost nine years of Saakashvili’s “United National Movement” (UNM) in power, the hostile rhetoric and actions from both sides continued unabated. When the UNM and Saakashvili lost the parliamentary elections in fall 2012 to the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition of Russian-made Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the political agenda also underwent change. Although Ivanishvili’s political campaign revolved around domestic issues, the need to restore better relations with Russia was registered frequently in foreign media (De Waal 2011a). In Georgia, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, the power was handed over with peaceful and democratic means. The year 2013, with Saakashvili as president and Ivanishvili as prime minister, saw considerable political mudslinging (Jackson 2013). Saakashvili accused his opponent of being Russia’s stooge and giving up Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, while the prime minister referred to Saakashvili’s responsibility for starting the war in 2008. Whereas the main domestic and foreign policy goal of Georgia @ restoring territorial integrity and deepening relations with the United States and integration in NATO and the EU @ remained unchanged, the prime minister argued that the “normalization” of bilateral relations with Russia was not a question of “either or” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty October 2012). The term “normalization,” rather than “reconciliation,” was used by the prime minister and by the media. Although there is a quite wide range of literature on peace building, conflict resolution, conflict management and reconciliation, Kostic´ states that there is no common agreement on the definition of reconciliation (Kostic´ 2007). Some researchers define it as a goal by itself, some see it as a process. Kostic´ defines reconciliation as a process with the goal of achieving the following: “1) mutual acknowledgement of past suffering by former antagonists as as well as the existence of common understanding of the past; 2) a shared sense that justice has been done; and 3) a belief in common future with the former adversary” (p. 33). Long and Brecke

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(2003) also describe reconciliation as a process and a “mutually conciliatory accommodation between former antagonists @ as one process integral to mitigating future violence and maintaining societal relationships after violent conflict.” (p. 1.) They go even further, and offer two models of reconciliation. The one relevant in our case is the signalling model, which assesses the term reconciliation on an international level and is based on the rational choice model. The authors argue that this model “predicts correctly that when a reconciliation event was part of a costly, novel, voluntary, and irrevocable concession in a negotiated bargain, it contributed meaningfully to a reduction in future conflict. Reconciliation events that lacked these qualities generally failed to lead to a successful signal of a desire for improved future relations, and, in the end, relations were less likely to improve.” (p. 3) The importance of the reconciliation (event) being costly or costly enough is stressed in various works of William Zartman. According to Zartman, resolution of conflict requires a ripe moment “[that] centers on the parties’ perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe … when parties find themselves locked in a conflict and this deadlock is painful to both of them” (Zartman 2001). There also should be a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO) when a settlement is more attractive than hostility ; without a MEO the settlement cannot be durable in the long term. Furthermore, the MHS works as a pull factor that draws the parties into negotiations and MEO as its continuation, promising a more attractive future. Clearly, the resolution is seen as a process where the first stage is to find and have a MHS (the main requirement), which the MEO follows. The following parts of the paper test, through the discussion of “red lines,” whether a “mutually hurting stalemate” can be found and what could possibly work as a “mutually enticing opportunity.” Although this step toward reconciliation was voluntary and somewhat novel, it was neither costly nor an irrevocable concession. Long before arguing in favour of normalization it was clear (for both sides of the conflict) that the foreign policy orientations of Georgia and Russia were incompatible and even “diametrically opposed.” Therefore, “reconciliation” as a term describing the ongoing process between the two countries is hardly fitting (Haindrava 2014). Instead, “normalization” assumes two things. First, it presumes that current bilateral relations are abnormal and require change. Second, improvement has its limits. Zaal Anjaparidze, a Georgian political scientist, argues that without a fundamental change in Georgia’s foreign policy orientation, a breakthrough cannot be expected in Russo-Georgian relations (Voice of America 2012). “Normalization” was more a correction of the two countries’ foreign policies than the evolution of reconciliation.

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Agreeing to Disagree: Multilateral and Bilateral institutions The institutionalization of a normalization process is two-pronged regarding mediation: at the international level the International Geneva Discussions, and at the bilateral level the so-called Karasin-Abashidze talks. The Geneva talks involve negotiators from Russia, Georgia, and the United States and also from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is also co–chaired by representatives of the EU, UN and OSCE. The Geneva talks, launched in October 2008, are held in the format of two working groups but neither of them can boast positive results. Working Group one deals with security issues that include freedom of movement and travel abroad. However, the most important agenda item is the non-use of force; commitment to it was made by Georgia only in 2010 whereas Russia constantly refuses to make such a declaration, not considering itself a party in this conflict (Civil.ge July 2015). The second working group is tackling humanitarian issues, most importantly the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and it also touches upon missing persons, and environmental and cultural heritage. Over the years the discussions proceeded in a difficult atmosphere of disagreements and disappointments, and some parties even left the negotiating room. In July 2015, the thirty-second round was completed in Geneva but results of the whole framework are still contested. In fact, limited concrete results can be identified as the parties have reached only minor agreements. In the end, the whole process faces difficulties concerning both the format and the content, as well as the controversial nature of issues (Mikhelidze 2010). Nonetheless, the format still serves as a conflict management tool; practically it is important to be engaged in negotiation even if only for the sake of being active. On the initiative of then Prime Minister Ivanishvili, the bilateral format was established in December 2012 and Zurab Abashidze was given the role of special representative of the Georgian Prime Minister, with Grigoriy Karasin, deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, as his counterpart. Although the one-onone meetings are limited to economic and cultural issues, some visible goals have been reached, including returning to the Russian market Georgian wine products and mineral water (Borjomi) that had been under a Russian trade embargo since 2006. Furthermore, regular flights between Tbilisi and Moscow were re-established, and the road freight transport connection was also restored. More Georgian citizens were granted Russian visas and cultural relations became more active (Haindrava 2014). In their meeting in July 2015, the format was enlarged to include representatives of the Ministry of Transport of Russia in order to discuss the restoration of the Abkhazia railway (more precisely the Abkhazian part of the “South Caucasian railroad”) with Georgian participants (Jarapashvili 2015). Despite moderate success, bilateral talks were aborted more than once and they met only eight times in four years. There are

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concerns that the format either can become moribund or limited to the already obtained results. The Georgian Dream government has undoubtedly played an important role in reducing tension between the two countries, partly for pragmatic reasons. Georgia was influenced by economic reasoning (lifting the ban on Georgian production and increasing the amount of remittances regularly sent home by Georgians working in Russia) and by the support of the Georgian population (sixty-seven percent) for dialogue with Russia despite the fact that the overwhelming majority (seventy-six percent) still see Russia as the biggest threat for their country (International Republican Institute Poll February 2015). Noteworthy is the reality that the number of those supporting dialogue with Russia is the lowest since March 2010 (when it was seventy-eight percent).

“Red Lines” Remain: de facto States and the Foreign Policy Orientation of Georgia Engagement without recognition – the Georgian approach The conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia have their own complicated and contradictory history and dynamics. After several decades of tensions, the ethno-political conflicts erupted into wars against Georgian control in the early 1990s. The South Ossetian war (1991–92) and the Abkhazian war (1992–93) left many dead, wounded and tens of thousands displaced. Despite the ceasefire agreements, there have been repeated clashes and harsh steps by Tbilisi to establish full control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 2000s. Regarding the wars (secessionist acts from the viewpoint of the Georgian government), the issues for Georgia are primarily internal questions with a foreign policy dimension (as Tbilisi says Moscow is part of the conflicts). Tbilisi continues to claim both territories as integral parts of the country, as codified in Georgian legislation. Article 1 of Georgia’s Constitution declares that “Georgia shall be an independent, unified and indivisible state, as confirmed by the Referendum of 31 March 1991, held throughout the territory of the country, including the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and the Former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia and by the Act of Restoration of the State Independence of Georgia of 9 April 1991” (The Constitution of Georgia, 1995). Georgia clearly does not recognize the prevailing realities of the post-war situation but only the Soviet-era status quo. It has also adapted its national security concept to the new security environment after the August 2008 war by adding a whole section dedicated to the changes brought by the war. The National Security Concept of Georgia (2011) reflects well that sovereignty and

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restoration of territorial integrity are number one priorities, and aims to develop an efficient national security system (National Security Concept of Georgia 2011). In October 2008, after the brief war with Russia the Saakashvili government passed the Law on Occupied Territories leaving unquestioned that these territories are Georgian, that Russia is the aggressor, and that Moscow should pay compensation. Following the EU’s recommendation, the Georgian government also approved in 2010 a much less restrictive document (compared to the Law on Occupied Territories) on conflict regions named “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation.” Leaving military security issues for later, the document has a human-centred approach, focusing on people-to-people contacts in order to improve socio-economic conditions for those living on both sides of the dividing lines, developing infrastructure, improving access to health care, preserving cultural heritage. It rejects the pursuit of a military solution and highlights the peaceful manner of reintegration. Yet, this document can be understood only as a correction; the strategy of the government clearly stays the same: de-occupation: “The Strategy is part of Georgia’s overarching determination to achieve the full deoccupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, reverse the process of annexation of these territories by the Russian Federation, and peacefully reintegrate these territories and their populations into Georgia’s constitutional ambit” (State Strategy on Occupied Territories 2010, p. 1). Following the strategy, an Action Plan was also approved that placed parameters on activities: “[T]he modalities later attached to the strategy put conditionality on international projects there which will make engagement quite difficult in practice.” (de Waal 2011b) Contrary to the Saakashvili government, the Georgian Dream coalition’s rhetoric of “normalization” of relations with Russia has also manifested itself in efforts to soften the law on occupied territories in terms of reducing punishment for illegal border crossing. Steps toward making amendments have been initiated since May 2013 (Echo Kavkaza July 2015). Moreover, the coalition has also renamed the Ministry of Reintegration to the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality mirroring the apparent goodwill of the Georgian government. Engagement and recognition without incorporation – the Russian approach For the Kremlin, revising the post-Soviet status quo and recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as states in 2008 was a solution in itself, as then-President Medvedev indicated in September 2008: “[T]his was the only response available to us. Otherwise, we would have no longer respected ourselves, we would have lost the Caucasus, and, ultimately, would have lost Russia itself. I think I do not need to prove to you this simple truth: Russia can either be big

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and strong, or it will cease to exist” (Medvedev, speech, 30 September 2008). As a consequence, Russia became the ultimate guarantor of the security of the two entities, stationing troops there, opening embassies in Tskhinval(i) and Sukhum(i), and operating guards on the borders. Prior to the 2008 war Russia was also distributing Russian passports to Abkhazians and South Ossetians (this policy is also known as passportizatsiya or “passportization”). By becoming citizens, Abkhazians and South Ossetians receive Russian salaries and pensions (Artman 2014). Moreover, the Russian share in Abkhazia’s national budget has been rising over the years and is around seventy percent, with the share in the South Ossetian budget amounting to more than ninety percent (International Crisis Group report 2010).2 To Tbilisi’s great irritation, in 2013 Russia started to erect a border fence with border signs between South Ossetia and Georgia whereas Tbilisi (and the international community) view the demarcation merely as an administrative boundary line (ABL). Moreover, Georgia does not recognize the existence of South Ossetia as such (neither as a separate unit nor in wording), but as a part of Georgia that is mostly referred to by the authorities as the “Tskhinvali region” or “Samachablo” (Markedonov 2015a). In the summer of 2015, Georgia accused Russia of penetrating two more kilometres into the Georgiancontrolled territory. This action has been referred to as both “creeping occupation” and a violation of international law (Agenda.ge 15 July 2015). Sergey Markedonov indicates that while this is a minor issue for the Kremlin – a correction of borders as consolidation of the old Soviet borders (in line with borders of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region) – Tbilisi does not accept such “new realities” formed by Russia if the process of “borderization” reaches a highly critical point (Markedonov 2011b). Thus, Moscow and Tbilisi have highly divergent views of the status of the partially recognized states and of the extent of Russian control. In order to cement the already solid security guarantees and economic cooperation in strategic documents, Russia formalized these arrangements by signing treaties “on alliance and strategic partnership” with Abkhazia in November 2014, and on “alliance and integration” with South Ossetia in March 2015. For Tbilisi this consolidation was clear evidence of a Russian rejection of the pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Georgia; for Moscow it was a formal step toward creating a legal framework for the ongoing cooperation (Kavkaz-uzel 19 March 2015). Importantly, differences between the initial and final drafts of the treaty show how the Abkhaz government negotiated and was able to distance itself from a too Russia-centric wording in favour of language more favourable to Abkhazia (Kavkaz-uzel 5 November 2015). By contrast, the South Ossetian version goes far beyond the Abkhaz document and reflects the intentions of the South Ossetian political elite for a 2 After they signed the treaties with Russia, according to official declarations the Russian contributions to the national budgets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will double in the coming years.

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deeper integration with Russia (Skakov 2015). Even though both texts represent a strong, one-sided dependency on Russia, they can be also understood as the limits of Russia’s intentions: formulating bilateral relations in accordance with new realities but excluding the Crimean scenario (that these territories can be incorporated into Russia) (Vestnik Kavkaza 28 August 2014). The Russian government’s approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia differs from its policies toward the other partially recognized states in the post-Soviet space. Until the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin had no general approach toward de facto states, and it is still a reactive stance or, as Markedonov suggests, a “selective revisionism” meaning a de jure recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; annexation of Crimea; but non-recognition of Transnistria, and Nagorno Karabakh (Markedonov 2015c). Russian public opinion mirrors to some extent governmental policy. Based on the polls of the Russian Levada Center conducted in July 2014, fifty-five percent of the Russian respondents think that South Ossetia is an independent state and fifty-one percent said it should stay that way, while fifty-eight percent and fifty-two percent answered affirmatively the same questions concerning Abkhazia (Levada Center poll 20149. There is no apparent intention to incorporate the two de facto states into Russia.

Views from Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Russia’s love alone is not enough Given Georgia’s declaration that the main obstacle to normalization (reconciliation) of its relations with both Moscow and with Tskhinval(i) and Sukhum(i) is the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia @ which Russia sees as an expression of free will by the two entities – one should also analyse the intentions and strategies of de facto states. Such an analysis tests whether the political elites and the people of the two de facto states are purely and only “subjects” or players in their own right in this dispute. Many experts on the Caucasus emphasize that it would be a mistake to homogenize de facto states.3 Without denying that Russian military and financial support for these entities is crucial, they are not simply “puppets of Moscow.” Not that long ago, expectations after the fall of the USSR were different, as were the post-Soviet nation-building strategies in both the Abkhazia and South Ossetia cases. At the centre of the Abkhaz national project is the goal of building an independent (from Georgia and Russia) state of the Abkhaz people. In the South Ossetian case, irredentism is present, with the aim of uniting with Russian North Ossetia. Apart from the “Russia factor,” internal dynamics and 3 For instance Thomas de Waal, Sergey Markedonov, John O’ Loughlin, Gerard Toal, Donnacha = Beac#in.

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aspirations of national elites of the two de facto states play a role and should not be neglected. There are both similarities and differences in attitudes of South Ossetians and Abkhazians: majorities in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia share the perception that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a mistake; overwhelming majorities trust the current leadership in Russia in both places (O’Loughlin, Kolossov & Toal 2014). However, in both republics there are political elites in opposition who question the extent and “price” of partial independence without challenging the actual need for cooperation with Russia. In Abkhazia, people “worry about the growing penetration of capital from major Russian firms…[The] corruption and inefficient use of Russian aid destined for the renovation of housing and infrastructure remain a significant issue.” The Treaty on Alliance with Russia has also added one more issue to the domestic debate in Abkhazia. There is evidence that eighty percent of ethnic Abkhazians are for independence, while it is a political preference for only fifty-nine percent of Russians, forty-four percent of Armenians and forty-eight percent of Georgians living in Abkhazia (O’Loughlin, Kolossov & Toal).4 By contrast, eighty-one percent of the respondents in South Ossetia clearly favour integration with Russia and only sixteen percent oppose it. The majority of Abkhazians and South Ossetians approve of Russian military presence and want Russian soldiers to stay permanently. Majorities of the population in both cases believe that all in all their republics are moving in the right direction. Stationing Russian troops obviously make them feel much more secure in physical and economic terms as the bases provide jobs for locals. With regard to forgiving the opposite side of the conflict (albeit measured indirectly), results show low responses in both South Ossetia (thirty-four percent) and Abkhazia (forty-three percent). Ethnic Russians and Armenians (and Georgians) in Abkhazia are more ready to forgive than ethnic Abkhazians. Even with the appreciation for the helping hand of Russia in both de facto states, the strategy is twofold: both maintain positive relations with Moscow, but Sukhum(i) is seeking as much independence as it can achieve in the existing international framework whereas Tskhinval(i) aspires to unification with Russia (despite the fact that Moscow rejected this scenario several times before).

Pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Georgia The other clear obstacle for reconciliation beside the status of the de facto states is the foreign policy orientation of Georgia (as well as the foreign policy orientation of Russia). The pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Georgia 4 In Abkhazia we can witness a gap in perceptions between the Abkhaz, Armenian, Russian population on the one hand, and Georgian/Mingrelian population of the territory on the other.

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has a two-decade long history ; it was not Saakashvili but Eduard Shevarnadze (from 1992 the leader of the country and from 1995 until 2003 the president) who first turned his country toward the West. Saakashvili secured this stance. Moreover, over the course of years Georgia continued its commitment to the West through the goal of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) from NATO. Georgia went above and beyond, for example, contributing the highest number of soldiers (among non-member states of NATO) to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, to date Georgian efforts for “Europeanization at any price” were met with only statements acknowledging the progress Tbilisi has made toward becoming a member of NATO and EU, and not membership itself. When the Georgian Dream came to power, Moscow hoped that Georgia, even if it did not completely give up on its Euro-Atlantic choice, would at least avoid irritating Moscow with NATO military exercises next to its southern borders. However, contrary to Russia’s wish, the Georgian Dream coalition made an unequivocal commitment to an irreversible pro-Western orientation of the country by approving in March 2013 the Resolution on Basic Directions of Georgia’s Foreign Policy. Apart from naming integration into Euro-Atlantic structures its main foreign policy priority, the document emphasized Georgia’s desire for “a consistent foreign policy in order to secure unwavering international respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty” (Resolution on Basic Directions 2013). Georgia’s ruling coalition can record some success in its foreign policy goals: Amid strong Russian opposition Georgia signed an Association Agreement (including the deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement – DCFTA) with the EU in June 2014, and opened a new joint NATO-Georgia training centre near Tbilisi. Signing the Association Agreement is an accomplishment by itself and constitutes a milestone from the perspective of many Georgian experts and officials, but there are still many challenges for ordinary Georgians as well as the Georgian government. Palpable benefits from the agreement with the EU will be felt only in the mid-term and long term (News Georgia 22 June 2015). Regular public opinion polls justify the government’s general direction by showing high levels of support for Euro-Atlantic integration until now. A spring 2014 survey also (just as the previous ones in 2011 and 2013) revealed high levels of support: More than half of the respondents (fifty-eight percent) said that the European Union contributes a lot to Georgia’s development, and the majority (sixty-one percent) said they trust the EU (EU Neighbourhood Info Center September 2014). Nevertheless, scepticism of Georgian society towards the Euro-Atlantic institutions and values is also present (Anjaparidze 2015). However, it is not clear whether the number of supporters of the EU is a real support, or whether it derives from lack of information about the EU and the Association Agreement among Georgian citizens. A survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resources Center (CRRC) clearly shows that Georgians

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do not really know much about the EU, and what benefits the Association Agreement holds. Many Georgians expect positive outcomes, such as reduced unemployment in the country (Larsen 2014). To tackle the problem of low awareness and misinformation, actors from the European Union and Georgian civil society have launched visibility campaigns in several forums (Kapanadze 2014).

Conclusion The status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not expected to change neither in the short term nor in the mid-term. De-occupation of these territories is a number one issue for Georgia. No future government will risk losing face and elections by giving up this issue and accepting the loss of twenty percent of the country’s territory. At the same time, Russia seems to be satisfied with the control it has on the de facto states, as the costs do not outweigh the benefits. In addition, neither strategically nor psychologically do these territories mean as much as Crimea does to Russia and, therefore, there is a little chance that Moscow wants them to be part of Russia; nor do they (especially Abkhazia) seem willing to join. Even though there is the perception in Tbilisi that the perspective of EU membership (or at least expected benefits of the Association Agreement) will work as a magnet and make the country united again, such a scenario is not likely to happen. By contrast, Tskhinval(i) and Sukhum(i) feel their living conditions are better than those in Georgia (O’Loughlin, Kollosov & Toal 2014).5 With the change of government in October 2012 the process of “normalization” between Russia and Georgia has started but not because it was a Zartmanian “mutually hurting” situation. The internal and external policies of the previous Saakashvili government evolved from the euphoric ’Rose revolution’ to authoritarian modernization, corruption, high unemployment and deterioration of relations with Russia that resulted in territorial losses. The negative consequences of the war were numerous for Saakashvili as well: he lost not only the support of the West but also of the Georgian citizens (Boonstra 2008). Though the change of power in Tbilisi provided a “ripe moment” for both Georgia and Russia, the deadlock was not “mutually hurting” as the “catastrophe” had already happened: the actual engagement in a war and the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgian Dream partyled government took some already mentioned steps towards Russia that resulted in positive developments. However, small steps could only bring modest results; the mutually hurting stalemate is not yet there. One should take into account economic considerations as they may serve as 5 Many Abkhazians and South Ossetians, however, prefer to go to Georgia to receive medical treatment at no cost. See Menable, G 2015.

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a (strong) argument for closer cooperation or even a mutually hurting stalemate. The loss of the Russian market for Georgian products was painful but only to a certain extent. Before the 2006 embargo, seventy-four percent of Georgian wine export flowed to Russia such that the ban rocked the wine producers, but with the help of the government they managed to ship some of their exports to other post-Soviet countries and also to Europe (Vardiashvili 2010). Even though Russia has unblocked Georgian exports, the potential suspension of the free trade regime by Moscow between the two remains a form of leverage. “The Russian market does not play as important a role for Georgian exports as it did in the past, if you consider its market share” (quoted in Menable 2014). According to the Georgian State Statistical Service, in the first three quarters of 2015 the Russian share in Georgia’s trade turnover was only 7 percent, while there were years when Russia was not even represented in top five of Georgia’s trade partners (Geostat 2015). In sum, given the asymmetry in the size of their markets, and the reality that trade between the two countries is not brisk, potential economic benefits could not serve as a “mutually enticing opportunity.” Even though cooperation on security issues – such as the fight against insurgency and organized crime and border guarding between Georgia and the Russian Federation – may be logically considered a ”mutually enticing opportunity,” it has been some time since they actually worked as one. From the early 2000s, when Moscow claimed to have serious problems as a result of the heavy flow of insurgents from Georgian territory to the North Caucasus, the Kremlin does not see Tbilisi as a reliable partner in border guarding (Haindrava 2014). Furthermore, Russia does not have the need, nor the will, to make concessions in the context of its vision of foreign policy ; indeed Russia openly competes with the West and their relations are quickly deteriorating. Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian political scientist, has questioned the desirability of improved Georgian-Russian relations and demonstrated well why the “mutually hurting stalemate” is not present from the Kremlin’s side: “And why do we have to try to bring back relations with Georgia to an acceptable level? Practically NATO has become irrelevant. Hostile policy in the North Caucasus is rarely on the agenda of the new government. Tbilisi does not have control over its former autonomies. The prospect of a close alliance cannot be envisaged at the moment. Interests that would justify making extra effort are not there” (Lukyanov 2013). Nonetheless, he did acknowledge the close cultural and historical ties the two countries share (also regularly used as an example by Russian officials). However, the view of cultural and historical closeness is not that widely shared by Georgians, especially bearing in mind the long and hostile, forced relations of the (eastern) Georgian Kingdom, and

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later the Georgian state, with the Russian empire and Soviet Union, respectively, and also the Russian quest for derzhavnost.6

References Abashidze, Z 2013, ‘Zurab Abashidze: We must not create the impression that we have sorted everything out with Russia and it is now time for festivities’, Tabula, 9 April 2013. Available from: http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/70814-zurab-abashidze-wemust-not-create-the-impression-that-we-have-sorted-everything-out. [24 August 2015]. Agenda.ge 15 July 2015, Creeping occupation: Russia advances 2 km into Georgian territory 2015, media release. Available from: http://agenda.ge/news/38872/eng. [4 September 2015]. Allison, R 2008, Russia resurgent? Moscow’s campaign to ’coerce Georgia to peace’, International Affairs, vol. 84, Issue 6, pp. 1145–1171. Anjaparidze, Z 2015, ’Narastayet li v Gruzii “yevroskeptitsizm”, Regnum, 28 June 2015. Available from: http://regnum.ru/news/1937596.html. [10 September 2015]. Artman, V 2014, ‘Annexation by passport’, Al Jazeera America, March 2014. Available from: http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/ukraine-russia-crimeapass portizationcitizenship.html. [3 September 2015]. Boonstra, J 2008, Georgia and Russia: a Short War with Long Aftermath, Comment, FRIDE. Available from: http://fride.org/download/COM_Georgia_Rusia_ENG_a gust08.pdf. Caucasus barometer polls 2009, 2011& 2013, The Caucasus Research Resources Centers, Tbilisi. Available from: http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/eu2009ge/ IMPEU/. Civil.ge, July 2015, ‘At Geneva Talks Russia Says Georgia’s NATO Integration Poses Security Threat to Region’. Available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=28403. Constitution of Georgia 1995. Available from: http://www.parliament.ge/files/ 68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12.06.pdf. De Waal, T 2011a, ‘Georgia1 s Political Shake Up: Enter the Oligarch’, The National Interest, October 2011. Available from: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ georgias-political-shake-enter-the-oligarch-6066. [August 2015]. De Waal, T 2011b, Remember the Caucasus?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 June 2011. Available from: http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/ ?fa=44552. [1 September 2015].

6 Derzhava means ’power’ in the sense of ’great power’ (velikaia derzhava). Therefore derzhavnost can be translated as the acknowledgement of great power status.

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Echo Kavkaza July 2015, media release, Parlament Gruzii vnosti popravki v zakon “ob okkupirovanih territoriyah”. Available from: http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/ar chive/news/20150707/3235/2759.html?id=27114891. [2 September 2015]. EU Neighbourhood Info Center 12 September 2014, ‘Georgians positive about their country’s ties with the EU but deeply pessimistic about the future’. Available from: http://enpi-info.eu/eastportal/news/latest/38355/Georgians-positive-abouttheir-country%E2 %80 %99 s-ties-with-the-EU-but-deeply-pessimistic-aboutthe-future. [9 September 2015]. Geostat 2015, National Statistics Office of Georgia, External Trade. Available from: http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=137&lang=eng. Haindrava, I 2014, ‘Asimmetriya (k voprosu o gruzino-rossiyskih vzaimootnoseniyah)’, in: I Haindrava, A Sushentsov & N Silayev, (ed.), Rossiysko-gruzinskiye otnoseniya: v poiskah novih putey razvitiya, Rossziyskiy Sovet po Mezhdunarodnim Delam and Mezhdunarodniy tsentr po konfliktam i peregovoram, Moscow, pp. 6–29. International Crisis Group 2010, Abkhazia: Uglubleniye zavisimosti. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/georgia/202 %20Ab khazia%20-%20Deepening%20Dependence%20RUSSIAN.pdf. International Republican Institute Poll 2015, Public Opinion Survey Residents of Georgia, 3–28 February 2015. Available from: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/ files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf. Jackson, A 2013, ‘The Resignation of Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Future of Georgian Politics’, The Foreign Policy Centre, FPC briefing, October 2013. Available from: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1578.pdf. [August 2015]. Jarapashvili, N 2015, Abashidze-Karasin Talks to be Held in Prague Next Week, media release, 10 July 2015, Georgia Today. Available from: http://georgiatoday.ge/news/ 613/Abashidze-Karasin-Talks-to-be-Held-in-Prague-Next-Week. [29 August 2015]. Kapanadze, S 2014, ‘Mythologizing EU as a negative actor : case of Georgia’, in: A Chkhikvadze, T Giorgobiani, G Jangiani & D Chkhartishvili (ed.), Myths and Realities on EU in Eastern Partnership Countries, Tbilisi, Georgia’s Reforms Associates – GRASS, pp. 39–45. Kavkaz-uzel 2014, ‘Dogovor o soyuznitsestve mezdu Rossiyey i Abhaziyey. Popravski Abhazskoy storoni’, media release, 5 November 2014. Available from: http://www. kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/251796/. [5 September 2015]. Kavkaz-uzel 2015, ‘Noviy dogovor mezhdu Rossiyey i Yuzhnoy Osetiyey fiksiruyet slazhivseyesa mezhdu nimi otnoseniya’, 19 March 2015. Available from: http:// www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/259116/. [5 September 2015]. Kostic´, R 2007, Ambivalent Peace. External Peacebuilding, Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report78, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Larsen J 2014, ‘Georgians Have High Hopes but Little Information about the Association Agreement with the EU’, 29 September 2014, Caucasus research

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Resources Center : Blog. Available from: http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.hu/2014/09/ georgians-have-high-hopes-but-little.html. [16 September 2015]. Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories 2008. Available from: http://uk.mfa.gov.ge/ files/doc216.pdf. Levada Center opinion poll 2014, Rossiyane o statuse Abhazii i Yuzhnoy Osetii, 21 August 2014. Available from: http://www.levada.ru/21-08-2014/rossiyane-o-sta tuse-abkhazii-i-yuzhnoi-osetii. Long, WJ & Brecke, P 2003, War and Reconciliation. Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, Cambridge/Massachusetts/London, The MIT Press. Lukyanov, F 2013, ‘Zatsem nam Gruziya?’, Rossiya v Globalnoy politike, / February 2013. Available from: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Zachem-nam-Gruziya15847. [19 September 2015]. Margvelashvili, G 2013, Interview by Irada Zeynalova, telesivion broadcast, Voszkresnoye vremya, Moscow, Perviy kanal TV channel, 10 November 2013. Available from: http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/245817. Markedonov, S 2015a, Otgoloski “pyatidnevnoy voyni”: “borderizatsiya”, August 2015, Caucasus Times. Available from: http://www.caucasustimes.com/article. asp?id=%2021430. [3 September 2015]. Markedonov, S 2015b, Why Russia’s ’borderization’ strategy makes Georgia so nervous, Russia Direct, 29 July 2015. Available from: http://www.russia-direct.org/ opinion/why-russias-borderization-strategy-makes-georgia-so-nervous. [4 September 2015]. Markedonov, S 2015c, ‘Rossiya i neprizhnanniye respubliki: defitsit strategii’, Noevkovcheg, September 2015. Available from: http://www.noev-kovcheg.ru/mag/ 2015-16-17/5141.html. [6 September 2015]. Medvedev, D 2008, Speech, Speech at the Ceremony for Officers who have been Newly Appointed to Senior Command Positions and who have Received High (Special) Ranks, Moscow, Kremlin, 30 September 2008. Available from: http://archive. kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/30/1359_type82912type82913_207068.shtml. Menable, G 2014, ‘Is Russia Resuming a Trade War Against Georgia?’, The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 11, Issue 144. Available from: http://www.jamestown.org/single/ ?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42719&no_cache=1#.VgQrL8uqpBd. [18 September 2015]. Menable, G 2015, ‘Why Are Ossetians and Abkhazians Coming to Georgia for Medical Treatment?’, The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 12, Issue 43. Available from: http:// www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43639&tx_ttnews%5B backPid%5D=7&cHash=11940435aa803633976cbab25fc2ba81#.VgQoNcuqpBd. [18 September 2015]. Mikhelidze, N 2010, The Geneva Talks over Georgia’s Territorial Conflicts: Achievements and Challenges, Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali. Available from: http:// www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1025.pdf. Minchenko, Y, Markedonov, S & Petrov, K 2015, Otsenka polititseskih riskov v regione Zakavkazye (Yuzhnovo Kavkaza), Report of Minchenko Consulting, Moscow.

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Available from: http://www.minchenko.ru/netcat_files/File/Political%20risk s%20in%20the%20South%20Caucasus%20region.pdf. [23 August 2015]. National Security Concept of Georgia 2011, Government of Georgia. Available from: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/fi les/12_9052_136720_NationalSecurityConcept.doc. [25 August 2015]. News Georgia, 22 June 2015, ‘We have to receive MAP at Warsaw Summit- Tinatin Khidasheli’. Available from: http://newsday.ge/new/index.php/en/component/k2/ item/3461–we-hace-to-receive-map-at-warsaw-summit-tinatin-khidasheli. [8 September 2015]. O’Loughlin, J, Kolossov, V & Toal, G 2014, ‘Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 423–456. Resolution on Basic Direction of Georgia’s Foreign Policy 2013, unofficial translation, Parliament of Georgia. Available from: http://www.parliament.ge/en/saparlamen to-saqmianoba/komitetebi/sagareo-urtiertobata-komiteti-147/komitetis-gancxa debebi1130/saqartvelos-parlamentis-rezolucia-saqartvelos-sagareo-politikisdziritadi-mimartulebis-shesaxeb.page. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty October 2012, media release, Winning’ Rival Ivanishvili Calls for Georgian President’s Resignation. Available from: http://www. rferl.org/content/ivanishvili-georgia-calls-for-saakashvili-resignation/24727022. html. [28 August 2015]. Skakov, A 2015, V tsom smisl Rossiysko-yugoosetinskovo dogovora o soyuznitsestve i intergratsii?, Kavkazoved, March 2015. Available from: http://www.kavkazoved. info/news/2015/03/18/v-chem-smysl-rossijsko-ugoosetinskogo-dogovora-o-souz nichestve-i-integracii.html. [6 September 2015]. State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation 2010, Government of Georgia. Available from: http://gov.ge/ files/225_31228_370287_SMR-Strategy-en.pdf. Vardiashvili, M 2010, ‘Georgia: Grape Farmers Ailing Despite Subsidies’, Institute for War & Peace, 1 October 2010. Available from: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/ georgia-grape-farmers-ailing-despite-subsidies. [18 September 2015]. Voice of America 2012, ‘Ivanishvili razotserovan reaktsiyey Moskvi’. Available from: http://m.golos-ameriki.ru/a/1544062.html. [28 August 2015]. Zartman, W 2001, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, September 2001, pp. 8–18.

Jolanta Jonaszko

Disarming Memory : The Katyn Massacre and Reconciliation in Polish-Russian Relations 1990–2015 Introduction: Definitions and a Conceptual Framework The Katyn massacre has often been described as a litmus test for changes and fluctuations in Polish-Russian relations. When the debate around the Katyn question, connected since April 2010 with the Smolensk plane crash, is heated and aggravated with arguments on ethical and legal responsibility in the foreground, then Polish-Russian relations are in bad shape. When the arguments are focused on common approaches to difficult historical matters with appeals to reconciliation, then relations are improving. The fact that a crime from over seventy five years ago may be taken to mirror the state of current Polish-Russian relations implies the prominence of history in international politics in Eastern Europe in general and the special place of the discourse in historical reconciliation over Katyn in Polish-Russian relations in particular. David Crocker (2004) differentiates between thinner and thicker definitions of this term: on the thinner side of the spectrum he puts “nonviolent coexistence” and complying with the law, while on the thicker side he places terms such as forgiveness, mercy, healing and harmony. The Polish and Russian words for reconciliation (pojednanie and `aY]YaV^YV), primarily due to their religious connotations, imply a thicker version of reconciliation. The Russian word in particular suggests something unrealistic and even utopian (Cheremushkin 2003, p. 4). The Polish noun derives from a perfective verb (pojednac´ sie˛) and implies a state that will once be achieved as opposed to processes to engage in on a continuous basis. Thus, in Polish and Russian debates, the term “reconciliation” has often been used as a (future) ideal to appeal to rather than concrete present initiatives to launch. This is problematic as invoking ideals without defining them may easily be instrumentalized, misleading or create unclear expectations. In Poland in particular debates around reconciliation with Russia have been politicized, emotional, often devoid of concrete arguments, but carrying latent associations instead. A widespread association is with forgiving a previous oppressor (used almost exclusively in reference to Russia), but the understanding of what forgiveness in this context means in practice varies and is often not spelled out or defined to back up a particular political opinion.1 1 On the more liberal side of the political spectrum, to reconcile and forgive had for a long time (up

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While in Poland the term “reconciliation” has arguably been overused and created unrealistic expectations, in Russia it has not been used so frequently and hardly ever in reference to relations with Poland; when used by Russians, it refers to the internal situation in Russia itself or to other international actors (Cheremushkin 2003, p. 4).2 In contrast to the use of the term in political debates, a comprehensive analysis of the changes in Polish-Russian relations requires either a further differentiation of terms or a processual concept of reconciliation to cover both moments of progress and setbacks in the complex development of those relations: Since April 1990, when Mikhail Gorbachev first officially acknowledged the Soviet responsibility for Katyn, consecutive Russian presidents have done so, too: Boris Yeltsin in 1992, Vladimir Putin in 2002, Dmitri Medvedev in 2008; and in 2010 the Russian Duma recognized the crime. Also, since the beginning of the 1990s numerous important Katyn documents have been made public and in the year 2000 Polish and Russian representatives have together opened cemeteries at the three murder sites. Those developments have not led, however, to any success in the Russian courts, which did not rehabilitate the murdered officers and refused to classify the Katyn crime as “genocide.” Many documents, still present in the Russian archives, have been kept secret and numerous Russian journalists and politicians have continued to publicly deny the Katyn massacre. Those contrary developments have happened partly parallel to each other and partly grouped together, driven by certain events – notably the plane crash in Smolensk, as a result of which there was some progress on different levels of Polish-Russian cooperation. Against the background of these complex and partly disparate moves with regard to Katyn, and for lack of one clear definition of the term reconciliation and its often politicized use, further conceptual differentiation has been made here. The following terms will be used: normalization meaning an introduction of peace after periods of violence; rapprochement meaning a minimal version of reconciliation including taking up contacts after periods of estrangement; breakthrough suggesting a sudden change in relations; reconciliation meaning substantial concentrated progress on different levels until the Ukraine crisis) been equated with a certain level of pragmatism in international relations: it meant giving up historically-anchored grudges, looking forward and building good relations with Russia based on common interests. On the more conservative side, to reconcile had been associated with a more principled approach in historical policy including among others an expectation of apology, acknowledgement of Russia’s guilt toward Poland for Katyn as well as the term “genocide.” Paradoxically, apart from a brief period after the Smolensk plane crash in 2010, inside Poland the term “reconciliation” has most often been a divisive one, used to attack a political opponent and their attitude toward Russia. 2 During fifty years of communism, as a satellite of the Russians, Poland has been perceived by the Russians as a rather unreliable partner (as opposed to the US, for example). Cheremushkin argues that the majority of Russians have not seen the need for reconciliation with the Poles, either because relations have not been deemed so bad, or because Poland has not been considered an equal partner worthy of reconciliation (Cheremushkin, 2003).

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of cooperation, and historical reconciliation meaning an effort to establish consensus on difficult historical issues and establish friendship. This latter sense of the term places reconciliation closer to the thicker side of Crocker’s spectrum as it requires a qualitative change of relations, but remains a dynamic, process-oriented term. Cooperation is used here as a neutral term suggesting any kind of contacts between the parties within different domains. Figure 12 summarizes the development of Polish-Russian relations regarding the Katyn question emphasizing the changing character of this process. It includes a few of the most important initiatives stretching across different levels of cooperation.

Universal Lessons In this chapter I shall argue for three general lessons on reconciliation that can be drawn from the Polish-Russian case: the first lesson relates to the process and structure of reconciliation, the second concerns attitudes, motivations and identities of those involved and the third one refers to the historical topic which requires reconciliation. This analysis focuses mainly on inter-state interaction on the topic of Katyn, with secondary attention to nongovernmental actors. Three general points frame the analysis. First, the words spoken and actions undertaken on different levels of cooperation (political, judicial, institutional and civil society) need to align for reconciliation to succeed. The inconsistencies among various reconciliation policies, including the discrepancies in domestic and international memory politics, decrease the credibility of the partners and the chances of success of the reconciliation process. Second, establishing and maintaining a balance between (national) interests and values increases the chances for long-term reconciliation. In the reconciliation efforts between Poland and Russia since the 1990s, the political interests have outweighed the ethical motivations and the pragmatic approaches have been more often heard than the value and structural change discourse. Importantly, for that balance to hold, the interests and values in question need to be shared by both partners. Third, the concentration of historical reconciliation upon one select memory issue poses a risk of instrumentalization in the reconciliation debate. Katyn has become an important symbol and it is crucial to establish all the facts and justice on this issue. However, future cooperation frameworks need to broaden the historical issue spectrum and the perspectives of those involved. This can be done through institutionalized dialogue and consensusseeking even on the most difficult historical issues.

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Figure 12: Changes in the Development of Polish-Russian Relations 1990–2015 regarding the Katyn Massacre.

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Reconciling Facts and Figures Among all the crimes of the twentieth century, Katyn stands out as one of the first coordinated transnational mass murders of foreign prisoners by a totalitarian regime (Etkind et al 2012, p. 2). In spring 1940, approximately 14,500 Polish officers, taken hostage in September 1939 by the Red Army and held in three camps of the People’s Commisariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk, were secretly murdered and buried in the Katyn forest in the Smolensk region. Additionally, 7,000 prisoners from Ukrainian and Belorussian prisons were executed. Together, we speak of approximately 22,000 victims, “prisoners of an undeclared war” (Cienciala et al, 2007). Those representatives of the Polish elite were murdered in a series of methodically planned executions, prompted by NKVD chief Beria and approved by Stalin himself. It was part of a conscious strategy to eliminate the Polish elite and to weaken the Polish nation (Cienciala et al 2007, 27, p. 118). The atrocious and targeted nature of this crime is one of the reasons for the controversies surrounding this subject. The other reason for controversy is the official position the Soviet authorities took toward the event. From 1943 until 1990 the Soviet government denied responsibility for the Katyn crime and blamed the Nazis for it instead. They asserted that the officers had been executed in 1941 (not 1940) when the Nazis were stationed on those territories. The history of the massacre has not only been denied, but also rewritten; the lie about the perpetrators in Katyn was supported by pseudoscientific results of excavations carried out by the Burdenko Commission from 1944, which blamed the Nazis for the crime, as well as instituting a number of other propaganda moves.3 In communist Poland, the search for truth and the organization of commemoration events were forbidden and individuals involved in this quest were systematically persecuted. Relatives of the victims were imprisoned or expelled to Siberia. The extent of censorship introduced in Poland after 1945 is reflected in the phrase coined by Finnin (2011) to describe a policy on Katyn:

3 For example in July 1969, the Russian authorities inaugurated the opening of a huge monument in a village called ‘Khatyn’ located sixty kilometers from Minsk. It is not clear why this village was chosen out of numerous Belorussian villages destroyed by the Germans except for the phonetic similarity between the words ‘Khatyn’ and ‘Katyn´’. In July 1974, President Nixon visited the Khatyn memorial. Interestingly, “sensing that the Soviets were exploiting the visit for propaganda purposes, The New York Times headlined its coverage of the tour: ‘Nixon Sees Khatyn, a Soviet Memorial, not Katyn´ Forest.’” See Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Katyn´ Controversy : Stalin’s Killing Field,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art6.html.

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“discursive cleansing” meaning disciplining speech though coordinated epistemic and physical violence.4

Careful Rapprochement: A Gradual Half-hearted Acknowledgement of Truth Against the background of such deep and widespread propaganda, the fact that in 1990 President Mikhail Gorbachev officially acknowledged the responsibility of Soviet high officials for the Katyn massacre was understandably taken as the turning point in the Katyn case. On April 13, the Russian president handed over to President Wojciech Jaruzelski several documents on Katyn. The meeting of the two presidents was followed by the communiqu8 of the TASS news agency with the massacre condemned as “the most heinous of crimes.” Polish reactions to these gestures were very positive: “The Polish Government thinks that the position of the authorities of the USSR is an important step in the direction of understanding and reconciliation of the Polish nation with the nations of the Soviet Union” (Przewoznik 2010, p. 254). In 1992, Joseph Stalin himself was identified as the person responsible for ordering the crime. The decision to execute dating from March 1940 was published and delivered by President Boris Yeltsin to the hands of President Lech Walesa, who said: “Thanks to your courage, the truth hidden from the world has seen the light of day (…) You have, Mr. President, opened a new page in relations between our nations. It is directed to the future, based on mutual understanding, cooperation, and agreement,” he wrote. (October 15, 1992). The motives behind disclosing the Katyn documents had been, however, driven primarily by internal Russian politics. Yeltsin ordered their publication in order to discredit and delegalize the Russian Communist Party (Cienciala 2007) and to distance himself from Gorbachev’s halfhearted policies of breaking with the past (Rotfeld 2010). Before, Gorbachev had ordered that archival documents be found proving that the Soviet Union had suffered losses in bilateral relations with Poland, most probably to counter the possible compensation claims from the Polish side (Cienciala 2007, p. 253). Thus, the seeds of the anti-Katyn campaign were sown at the same time as facts from Russian archives were for the first time made public.5 On the part of the Russian representatives, the motives behind the gestures from the early 1990s were clearly circumstantial, personal and political rather 4 This involved, among others, falsifying evidence, fabricating texts and retrospectively erasing references to Katyn in the public sphere (Etkind et al 2012, p. 16). 5 This campaign focused on the introduction of another historical topic – the fate of Soviet soldiers in Polish captivity in 1920 – to the Katyn debate in order to provide a “counterbalance” and to relativize Katyn, despite obvious historical differences between the two events (Materski 2008).

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than based on long-term, ethical grounds. The facts on Katyn had surfaced as a byproduct of Russian internal politics, and only partly due to a bilateral reconciliation policy or respect for the Polish partner and its concerns. The instrumentalization of the massacre for political reasons did not finish in April 1990, but continued throughout the 1990s. In both periods, divided by the supposed breakthrough of 1990, what is prominent is that the truth about Katyn was conditioned by the political situation of the time: before 1990 the policy on Katyn depended primarily on the political situation in communist Poland and after 1990 on the domestic situation in Russia. The selective handling of facts by the Russian side and the targeted spread of anti-Katyn discourses have been a major point of criticism in Poland, which has insisted since the 1990s upon the unconditional uncovering of all available facts on Katyn.6 In Poland, a complete factual truth on Katyn and the declassifying of secret acts from Russian archives have been seen as the only possible antidote to fifty years of denial and a condition for the improvement of Polish-Russian relations.

Symbolic Reconciliation: Official Mourning and Premature Generalizations Through open and official mourning ceremonies and discussions about the reasons for crimes, traumatic historical events may gradually pass over from memory to the historical record. In the Katyn case, we observe the opposite development. During fifty years of denial and propaganda, the Katyn crime and lie, called the “foundational lie of the Polish People’s Republic (Wasilewski 2009, p. 87), gained a prominent place in Polish national consciousness and memory (Materski 2008). The memory of Katyn formed itself in opposition to the official communist discourse, solidified as a later symbol of (Solidarnosc – Solidarity) opposition and turned from a private into a national memory of trauma (Bartmanski, 2011, p. 5). The most evident expression of this transformation are perhaps the words of the then Polish Prime Minister following the Smolensk crash: “We, Poles are in a sense one big Katyn family” (Tusk 2010). The possibility of official mourning and symbolic commemoration presented itself only after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In 1994, a PolishRussian Agreement was signed which became a basis for Polish military cemeteries – in Katyn, Mednoe and Kharkov. During the commemorations in 1995, a Russian politician Sergey Filatov expressed his hope that “memorials in Katyn and Mednoe will be a place not just for our common grief and 6 This applies among others to complete lists of victims and perpetrators and the search for still missing Ukrainian and Belorussian Katyn lists.

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spiritual purification, but also for strengthening relations between the nations of Russia and Poland.”At the same time, the words of Yeltsin that “totalitarian terror affected not only Polish citizens, but in the first place, the citizens of the Soviet Union” led to disappointment in Poland.At the Opening of the Polish War Cemetery at Katyn in 2000, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek said: “In this place I pay homage to all the people murdered and tortured to death at Katyn, as well as the whole territory of the Soviet Union. Our pain is equal to yours,” while the Russian representative stressed the need to honor “victims of totalitarian repression” and of the “inhuman Stalinist” machine, which took the lives of millions of Soviet citizens (quoted in Cienciala 2007). In those speeches, it is clear that the Russian side tended towards more generalist and symbolic expressions (e. g., “Russia is one big Katyn”, Karaganov 2010) while the Polish side emphasized the particular – names, numbers and the nationality of the Polish officers. Behind differences in rhetoric lie fundamental differences in the evaluations of Katyn as an historical event: the Poles stress the qualitatively different character of this crime from others, and the need for a concrete and comprehensive truth and justice. The Russian side has argued that there had been other crimes, more brutal in terms of numbers, in the Second World War ; that many other ethnicities (particularly the Soviet people) had suffered under the totalitarian regime as well; and that it is not correct to separate victims (nationally) after death. Lifting specific historical events to the symbolic level may in certain circumstances be propitious for strengthening feelings of empathy, solidarity and common humanity. Nevertheless, in the case of Katyn a symbolic acknowledgement and honoring of victims preceded full factual insight on the circumstances of their death. This can be explained by the belatedness of the Polish-Russian reconciliation process and the halfhearted search for facts. A premature use of symbols may thus prove an obstacle to long-term reconciliation; commemorative speeches without a basis in historical research, or used as a substitute for economic compensation, may be perceived as cynical. The inconsistencies among the different Katyn policies on the political, symbolic and research levels in the 1990s led to skepticism on the Polish side and weakened the effect of reconciliation measures as a whole.

Legal Proceedings and the Role of Civil Society Actors In the 1990s, court proceedings on Katyn were initiated. The major actor behind this development was the Federation of the Polish Katyn Families. Beyond the legal efforts to exonerate and rehabilitate their relatives, the Federation’s major activities included the preparations of the fifty-fifth anniversary of the Katyn massacre, the organization of pilgrimages to the

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murder sites and other educational and cultural activities. By doing so, the Federation has established itself as a firm pillar of the Katyn memory politics in Poland.7 The Federation’s representatives were also acknowledged by the Russian side and invited by Yeltsin in 1992, and by Medvedev in 2010 when they declared that they would not demand economic reparations but only a “moral compensation” and a “living monument” in the form of a hospital or a school (Etkind 2012, p. 28). Despite the Federation’s high profile, its efforts in Russian courts have been largely unsuccessful. In 2004, Putin discontinued the court case and classified the main materials as secret.8 In March 2005, Alexander Savenkov announced that in the Katyn investigation nobody was to be condemned, and classified the crime as a “common murder” subject to the statute of limitations (Cienciala 2007, p. 258). One year later, the request for the victims’ rehabilitation on political grounds was rejected. Despite hopes that the symbolic gestures of the 1990s would create a basis for a consensus about the Katyn case, this did not happen. Since 2005, it has been the “Memorial” Society, a Russian civil society organization that has led legal efforts for the rehabilitation of the officers, without much success. In 2011, following the Smolensk plane crash, the Russian ambassador to Poland promised the rehabilitation of the officers, but the promise remained unfulfilled and the Memorial lawyers expressed skepticism that this would ever happen (Etkind 2012, p. 107). In 2013, the Federation of the Polish Katyn Families took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and pressed for the acknowledgement of Katyn as genocide and for bringing the perpetrators to justice. The Court criticized the Russian state for failing to comply with its obligations to furnish the necessary facilities for an examination of the case. It also stated that it was not competent to make an investigation into events which had occurred before the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 (Etkind 2012, p. 28). This was a final decision and a discouraging blow to the Polish side. The reasons for not acknowledging Katyn as genocide are symbolic, psychological and economic. In Russia, Katyn is part of a larger problem of coming to terms with the heritage of the Soviet Union. To acknowledge Katyn as genocide would mean to clearly condemn the Soviet regime. Katyn classified as “genocide” does not fit into the Russian historical narrative built around the heroic acts of the Soviet soldiers in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 and the myth of Stalin as generalissimo, in which the first less 7 In a 2003 poll including a question on whether forgiveness for Katyn should come from the Polish Sejm or from the Katyn family federation, the answers were evenly divided (Sanford 2005, 2003: Etkind 2012, p. 27). 8 On this occasion, the common search for justice was again interrupted by the political events of the time. In 2004, Poland voiced its explicit support for the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine (Rotfeld 2010).

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glorious years of alliance with Hitler had been erased from public memory (Snyder 2015). In 2011, Medvedev, in cooperation with the “Memorial” Society developed a “destalinization Program” with the aim to set up memorial sites for the victims of Stalinist terror all around Russia and to thus educate the Russian public – an initiative which has not been realized. In Poland, the court proceedings on Katyn illustrate a search for not only legal but also historical justice in a more general sense. The Katyn massacre is the most prominent expression of the Polish master story of victimhood, which can be traced back to the feeling of an ally betrayed by the Western powers in 1945 when it was given over to its bigger Eastern neighbor at Yalta. The question of truth regarding Katyn is in Poland often perceived against the background of those historical developments. Up until 2010, we can identify two major trends in the Polish-Russian interaction with regard to Katyn: a high dependence on political processes; and a separation of symbolic from legal policy in Russia. This latter discrepancy raises a question about the value of words and gestures unsupported by deeds. From the point of view of policy, symbols are safer than historical facts and legal categories, because they do not require precise explanation or compensation. The disjuncture between the commemorative practices and the legal proceedings in Russia stands in contrast with the conflation of commemorative, political and legal policies on this issue in Poland. This points towards an asymmetry in the significance of Katyn in Poland and Russia, with the former assuming a more active part in securing progress on reconciliation in the Katyn case.

Improvement and Emotional Breakthrough: Developments in the Katyn Case, 2008–2011 In the period 2008–2010, Polish-Russian relations warmed up and Russia took on a more active part and responsibility in the political and historical dialogue on Katyn. On September 1, 2009, Putin participated in celebrations at the Westerplatte in Poland, marking the anniversary of the start of World War II. In February 2010, Putin invited Tusk to jointly celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the Katyn massacre. “I realize that Katyn holds a very important place in the memory of Poles. We should endow the celebrations with a moral-ethical character,” he said. There were critical voices in the Polish press questioning the motives of President Putin9, but the change in the Russian approach was clear to all. “The very sequence of events that have 9 “We should not let the celebration of the Katyn anniversary become for Moscow a way to play on the animosities between the [Polish] president and the [Polish] prime minister” were the first words in an article in Gazeta Prawna written two days before the Katyn celebrations.

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happened in recent weeks shows the opening of the Russian side in respect to Katyn, which could bring a more substantial breakthrough in this case,” said the late Andrzej Przewoznik, a director of the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites. Przewoznik was onboard airplane Tupolev 154 carrying the Polish president, his wife and numerous other Polish politicians and public figures when it crashed while landing in Smolensk airport on April 10, 2010. They were flying to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the Katyn massacre. Despite incipient fears on the effect of this crash on Polish-Russian relations, it produced a wave of spontaneous feelings of empathy and solidarity between the Polish and the Russian people. “I was deeply moved by the deep and sincere empathy of many Russians – ordinary citizens of Russia,” writes Polish historian, Andrzej Smolar (April 2010). Russians living near Smolensk were lighting candles, placing flowers and praying for the victims of the crash. For a week, the Polish Embassy in Moscow was surrounded by Russians and Poles kneeling side by side. There was considerable talk about reconciliation in the days following the tragedy. The tone in many articles verged on the mystical and religious. The categories of commonality and equality in the face of tragic death extend beyond borders and can, for a short time, blur the national differences and change perceptions about other nations. The openness of such post-trauma situations creates space for politicians to act: “Societies and nations are not like individuals, but their leaders can have an enormous impact on the mysterious process by which individuals come to terms with the painfulness of their societies. Leaders give their societies the permission to utter the unutterable, to think the unthinkable and to rise to gestures of reconciliation that people, individually, cannot imagine” (Werner-Mueller, 2002, p. 22). The immediate reactions of the Russian authorities to the crash were exemplary even though their honesty was later questioned. They acted expeditiously, quickly setting up a special governmental committee, to investigate the circumstances of the tragedy ; sending the condolence and announcing the April 12 as a day of national mourning in Russia. Medvedev made a commitment to the Polish nation: “I promise that all the circumstances of this tragedy will be explained in close cooperation with the Polish side” – a promise which has not been fully met but made a big impact at the time. On April 11, the Russian main channel Rossija 1 transmitted the film ‘Katyn’ by the Polish director Andrzej Wajda watched by 3.8 million Russians (Institute TNS Gallop). Three days after the crash, Medvedev announced that it was evident that the Polish officers in the year 1940 were shot on the orders of the USSR leaders, among them Stalin. A month later, he stated that “Katyn is a case of the falsification of history.” On April 28, an electronic copy of the letter from Beria to Stalin concerning the fate of the Polish prisoners-of-war was put up on the website of the Federal Agency of Archives, accessible in both Russian

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and Polish. In November 2010, the Russian Duma officially acknowledged Stalin’s guilt in Katyn and condemned it (TVN24, 26. Nov. 2010). The period after the Smolensk crash was unusual due to a momentary balancing of Polish and Russian perspectives on the Katyn issue. For several weeks following April 2010, the Katyn massacre seemed to have become equally important to the Russians as it had always been to the Poles. The sensitivities of the Polish side were represented in the Russian press with empathy and an attempt to understand. Moreover, there was also institutional progress in historical reconciliation, visible in the reinvigoration of the PolishRussian Group for Difficult Matters, founded in 2002 but largely inactive until 2008. Adam Rotfeld, the director of the Group on the Polish side, describes its work: “We do not explore facts, but remove problems, which block, and at times even paralyze normal relationships between our countries […] We will try to persuade the authorities not to exploit such delicate issues for political purposes” (Rotfeld 2008; Karta 61, 2009). Before 2008, the Group had been an integral part of state official policies which meant that it had been completely dependent upon Polish-Russian political relations. After 2008, a new, independent group was established consisting of Polish and Russian historians and intellectuals working jointly on difficult matters in Polish-Russian history. Since 2008, the Group has identified fifteen blocks of difficult matters in the time frame 1918–2008. The result of the Group’s work is a book “White Spots, Black Spots – The Difficult Moments in Polish Russian Relations” published before Medvedev’s visit to Poland in 2010. Interestingly, the Polish and Russian perspectives presented here next to each other do not differ much and there were no fundamental differences in the evaluations of even the most controversial historical events (Rotfeld, 2010). Despite some commonality, the impact of the Group’s work was limited: “Even though our Group achieved a lot in a relatively short period of time, this did not lead to a significant betterment in Polish-Russian relations. Between September and October the Russian press was flooded with anti-Polish propaganda” (Rotfeld 2010). This suggests that the foundation of bilateral research institutions is not a sufficient condition for reconciliation and implies an alarming disconnect between foreign and domestic historical policies in Russia, and a limited influence of the Russian scholars working within the Group on Russian internal politics and debate. Aiming to spread both knowledge and debate on Polish and Russian histories and to reach more people in both countries, the representatives of the Group came up with an initiative to institutionalize a dialogue on PolishRussian historical issues. In 2010, the decision was taken to establish Centers of Polish Russian Dialogue and Understanding in Warsaw and in Moscow. In 2011, the Polish and Russian governments funded the Centers, which have been officially overseen by the respective Ministers of Culture. Their work has

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been fundamental in upholding contacts between Polish and Russian scholars, youth and civil societies, in particular during the Ukraine crisis when other initiatives have been put on hold.

Ukraine as the Breaking Point in the Polish-Russian Reconciliation Process Analyzing the reconciliation processes in Central Europe after 1989, it is clear that the acknowledgement of territorial sovereignty was the foundation of successful reconciliation. For example, despite a conflict-laden history, relations among Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania in the 1990s were exemplary. The reconciliatory policy implemented then owed a lot to the writings of Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski, who long before 1989 argued that the post-1945 Eastern border of Poland needed to be accepted for the sake of peaceful relations with Poland’s Eastern neighbors. Those Polish intellectuals working in exile produced a forward-looking and peace-oriented version of historical policy. They “sought sovereignty over memory : memory not as individual recollections, not as a collective phenomenon, nor reaction to communism, but as a political problem which could be addressed by future independent Poland by political means” (Snyder 2002, p. 58). Politics is here understood as responsible statesmanship through which the demands of the past are subjugated to the demands of the future. Also the development of the reconciliation process between Germany and Poland has been grounded upon the acceptance of the post-1945 Western border of Poland. While the letter of the Polish to the German bishops in 1965 with the famous phrase “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” was a crucial symbolic gesture often quoted as the cornerstone of the Polish-German reconciliation process, the essence of the normalization process on a political level was the 1970 de facto acknowledgement of the border on the Odra and Nysa (Oder and Neisse) rivers (Rotfeld 2012). Since Ukraine’s civic Revolution on Maidan Square starting in November 2013, Russia has repeatedly undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and crossed its Eastern border. In March 2014, it invaded and annexed Crimea, and then began a war along its border with Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea has been condemned by NATO as illegal and in violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine signed by Russia. Russia has since attempted to rewrite history and publicly questioned the legality of the original transfer of Crimea to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 and even raised questions about the independence of the Baltic States (Jackson 2015). The effect of the conflict in Ukraine on Polish-Russian relations in general

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and historical reconciliation in particular has been substantial. In August 2014, the Polish government decided to cancel the Polish Year of Russia planned for 2015. In 2015, the meetings of the Group for Difficult Matters were postponed to an unspecified date: “In an atmosphere that we have at the moment, speaking about these issues (historical) would be something abstract, not to say absurd. We decided together that we will present our mutual conclusions when the atmosphere is settled” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 30. March 2015). The reconciliation successes from 2009–2011 have been reinterpreted in Poland as tactical, short-term and dishonest on Russia’s part. Words spoken and declarations made have been partly reversed. For example, in 2015 Putin rehabilitated the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (in 2009 he had called it “amoral”) and labeled it “good foreign policy.” Timothy Snyder has argued that this is part of a larger strategy of reinterpreting history for propaganda aims: “Russian propaganda manipulates our understanding of European history, channeling our memories in a way that exports its own responsibility for the Soviet Union’s crimes during World War II. […] it uses contradiction and cacophony to confuse, distract, and generally interfere with processing thoughts.” (Snyder 2015). We see a shift away from dialogue and an attempt to understand toward propaganda and a targeted effort to confuse. Little has been left of officially acknowledged facts and positive emotions from the post-Smolensk period. Despite that, the Center for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding has maintained its activities: in 2014, thirteen debates, nine lectures, three international conferences, six book promotion events, three research conferences and a press conference were organized (Debski 2014, p. 3). At the same time, the conflict in Ukraine had negatively impacted the possibility of the Group to realize numerous research projects. The public opinion poll on Polish-Russian relations conducted by the Group in 2014 has shown a deep regression in Polish-Russian relations and mutual perceptions in comparison to 2012 and 2013 (Mazurkiewicz 2015).

Conclusion From the preceding analysis, three general reconciliation conclusions emerge involving the limitations of pragmatism, the role of values and future prospects. The Limitations of Pragmatism In February 2012, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) released a report in which it praised the developments in the Polish-Russian reconciliation process 2008–2011 and took the activities as a basis for drawing nine lessons

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for historical reconciliation in general. Worth noting is the emphasis placed on the connection between national interests and reconciliation: “Seeking justice for the sake of justice is not enough. A necessary prerequisite for historical reconciliation is the perceived need to work for it in the national interest. The new dialogue between Moscow and Warsaw had everything to do with the necessity of removing obstacles in Russia’s relationship with the European Union as a whole.” (lesson one) and “Reconciliation is primarily a bilateral interstate process driven by the specific needs of the parties and the opportunities open to them.” (lesson three). Moreover, the importance of symbolic and formal gestures (lessons six and seven), of opening the archives and joint history work (lessons five and eight) and the engagement of societies (lesson nine) are underscored (EASI 2012, 10, 11). The authors recommend opportunity-driven reconciliation connected with slow diplomacy which “did much to help states [in Western Europe] overcome historic enmities by focusing on practical cooperation and consensus on major issues. The process began on the basis of accepted democratic rights, such as those inscribed in the Helsinki Final Act, but it did not require specific prior commitments.” Poland traditionally stressed the importance of values and commitments in its relations with Russia, but due to its new positioning in the EU has readjusted its approach to a more pragmatic framework, which might have been one reason for the increased cooperation in 2008–2011. Another reason was the conscious pragmatic repositioning Russia itself initiated in 2008, toward the EU and toward Poland. Analysis of the Polish-Russian historical dialogue, the developments inside Russia and the Ukraine conflict all show limitations of transferring the concept of slow diplomacy into furthering reconciliation with Russia. In this approach, reconciliation is too closely linked to the current geo-political and economic agendas: this close distance renders the reconciliation policy fragile and irrelevant when the political climate and foreign policies of one of the partners change. There is perhaps only one way to secure the priority of reconciliation policy in bilateral relations – building it on the democratic value base of the partners concerned, if such a foundation is present. The Role of Values Poland’s pragmatic approach to relations with Russia was based on two positive assumptions: first, that Russia was on the way to democratization and willing to adopt liberal “Western” values, and second that even if those values were not yet in place, they would become gradually installed through practical cooperation, for example in the domain of economic policy. Nothing like this happened. The values constituting the European communities have been repeatedly refuted in Russia: Europe has in different contexts been named “decadent.” In

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2013, Putin blamed the EU for moving away from its roots, including those of Christian origin (Monagham 2015, p. 5). Also, embracing the MolotovRibbentrop pact is to “discard the basis for common understanding in the Western world for the sake of a momentary tactic that can destroy but cannot create” (Snyder 2015). Finally, launching a war in Eastern Ukraine is a refutation of a European “never again” (to violence). It points toward “a new era of competition between the West and Russia, (…) fundamental differences in how European security is understood, and increasing friction in values. Together, these problems suggest an emergent ‘clash of Europes’ that pits the West’s relatively liberal vision for the region against a more conservative ‘Russian Europe.’” (Monaghan 2015). But what exactly is the connection between reconciliation and democratic values? Here attention is drawn to three values which connect the success of reconciliation policies to democracy : free discussion, pluralism and self-criticism. Lily Gardner Feldman emphasizes the dynamic nature of reconciliation in referring to it as a process of “contention, which is a more realistic goal than perfect peace. Friendship, trust and community – the ultimate expressions of reconciliation – result from grinding efforts,” (Gardner Feldman 2014, p. 17). She stresses the need for “mutual acceptance of persistent differences and disagreements” and for “perpetual quest for mutual accommodation”. Those are principles which cannot be effectuated without securing the freedom of speech, open debate and pluralism of opinion. In the second half of the 2000s, a number of political and legal initiatives in Russia suggest a move away from these democratic values. In May 2009, Medvedev passed a decree to set up a commission to counteract attempts to falsify history to Russia’s detriment. There are other initiatives, e. g. textbooks of the Russian historians Alexander Filippov and Alexander Danilov, which have led to one-sided, ideologically influenced historical “research” and “debate” in Russia (Miller 2010).10 These moves toward unification and solidification of history interpretations, made to strengthen a certain image of Russia and Russian “patriotism,” make the path to reconciliation through “productive contention” (Gardner Feldman) difficult. Such contention has been seen in the Polish-Russian dialogue, but the inconsistency between versions of history represented by select Russian participants of the Group for Difficult Matters and the official versions of history inside Russia puts the sustainability of such efforts into question. Rotfeld also emphasizes the connection between reconciliation and democracy : “The politics of reconciliation and understanding requires the 10 Alexei Miller argues that in current Russia the value of free discussion in historical matters has been substituted by indoctrination and state ideology very similar to that of the Soviet era. He sees the connection between the possibility of free dialogue and the existence of history politics: ”This dialogue is crucial for effective existence of history in a social environment; in Russia, it is being substituted with the dispute between ‘patriots and traitors,’ where the ‘traitors’ must – ideally – be deprived of the freedom of speech.[…]” (Miller 2010).

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harmonization of rules, values and national interests; looking for a common denominator is much easier in democratic countries sharing the same values; democracy is an antidote to the feeling for superiority, strength; against instrumentalization of history ; for certain historical justice and perspective.” On the one hand, he underscores the dynamic character of reconciliation, of “looking for a common denominator”. On the other hand, he points towards the need to refrain from emphasizing power and implies the third value needed for reconciliation: self-criticism. The ability and willingness of the partners to reflect critically and to apologize is a condition for reconciliation. In Western democracies, such a self-critical attitude and the ability to genuflect, say sorry and compensate for past wrongdoings have come to be seen as moral strengths, moral choices; they have created a basis for the post-1945 cooperation mode. As Ivan Krastev from the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia noted: “Being European is about being aware of what we did.” The internal evolution of Russia toward a more critical self-assessment of its own history is thus crucially important for reconciliation with its neighbors to progress (Cheremushkin 2003, p. 30). However, the image currently put forward in Russia is that of a “strong” Russia; strength is here connected to (military) action rather than (historical) reflection and to “hard” rather than “soft” means of diplomacy. While multiple initiatives in the Polish-Russian cooperation process over Katyn have been fruitful in bringing particular actors in both societies closer together, the fact that inside Russia no fundamental democratic change happened in this time weakens the possibility of long-term transformative change in Polish-Russian relations toward thick reconciliation. When values are not shared, short-term interests prevail and actors are primarily motivated by political or economic gains; then reconciliation becomes in the best case a byproduct of other policies (the period 2008–2011) and in the worst case irrelevant, questioned or even reversed (Ukraine conflict). To last, historical truth and reconciliation must become a basis of cooperation frameworks pinned above other policies. Future Historical Frameworks of Cooperation and Commonality Contemplating reconciliation in the current times of a military crisis can seem theoretical. It is clear that Russia would need to turn its current policy by 1208 degrees for us to speak of renewed attempts at normalization. The efforts of the Center for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding reflect the belief that upholding contacts between youth, civil societies and researchers despite the political and military crisis between countries is crucial for reconciliation. It is on these actors’ experience that political and economic actors will be able to draw once the conflict is over. While fundamental changes in its geopolitical and historical policies would

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be required from Russia to be considered a trustworthy partner in renewed cooperation efforts, Poland would also need to change its attitude to certain historical issues for Polish-Russian rapprochement to start again. This goes back to the problematic case of historical reconciliation focused around one memory issue only. For the sake of reconciliation, Poles need to broaden the topic spectrum and the responsibility questions related to them. Poland’s principled approach toward truth has not applied to all historical issues which would deserve it, but focused on the moments in history when Poles were victims. Poles are not alone in this. “So instead of exploring what Poles did to Poles, Czechs and Slovaks to Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians to Hungarians, each nation dwells on wrongs done to it by the Soviet Union (…) the historically defensible but also comfortable conviction that the dictatorship was imposed from outside and, on the other hand, the uneasy knowledge that almost everybody has done something to sustain the dictatorial system” (Garton Ash 2002). A mature nation needs to stand up to the injustices it has inflicted upon others (both other nations and other individuals in its own nation), neither forgetting a larger perspective (e. g. a situation of a country under occupation) nor individual choice and responsibility (e. g. of local Polish populations); only this way can new frameworks of common thinking be established, e. g. a community of victims across national borders as opposed to the dictatorvictim perspective. History does give us tools for such frameworks: “The siege of Leningrad has something in common with starvation in Kharkiv and Kyiv. The destruction of cities in western Russia has something to do with the destruction of Warsaw. There is a way to bring this all together” (Snyder 2015). There are however problems in establishing such cooperative frameworks: a memory formed under dictatorship; a national focus of historical policies in Russia and Poland and in historiography after 1945 in general which has largely been written from national perspectives. Bridging individual stories together along categories other than nationality and based on sources in different languages would feed the reconciliation discourse with facts and frameworks for establishing cross-frontier memory cultures and identities. This, however, requires a change in perceptions, attitudes and national selfimages. Russians need to “rethink the life of several generations (…) rationalize what is happening, purify consciousness.” (Iazhborovskaia 2009, p. 411). Also in Poland the rethinking of history away from the victimization and mythologization needs time. “Polish memory has for two generations been force-fed a counter-intuitive affection for Russian internationalism and it would be surprising indeed were a nation to have turned directly from a “fraternal socialist Europe” to a cosmopolitan Western Europeanism of optimistic dissident imaginings without passing through such some nostalgic engagement with a properly Polish past” (Judt 2002, p. 177). And still, twenty-five years after the fall of communism, Poland is turning this way, despite the challenges posed by a current more nationalistic

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government. With a Pole at the head of the European Council, with strong ties with Germany and with more open academic and social debates on the complex role Poles had played in the Holocaust, large portions of Polish society are starting to represent a less Polish-centric view on history. Russian political elites are at the same time turning in the opposite direction, both in their geopolitical and historical policies. Thus, we can only speak of a possibility of normalization of Polish-Russian relations at some point in the future – this would involve abandoning sanctions, reestablishing contacts in the domain of trade and first efforts at political dialogue and would probably happen within the EU-Russian framework. But bilateral Polish-Russian reconciliation efforts that involve seeking consensus on difficult past issues will in the coming years be at best realized in the activities of cross-border civil society groups and academic initiatives. This limited scope of on-going cooperation offers a valuable reservoir of knowledge and experience. Whether it will ever be a source for setting up or reinvigorating larger reconciliation frameworks and initiatives between both countries remains to be seen.

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Gardner Feldman, L 2014, Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Toronto/Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Iazhborovskaia, I, Iablokovich, A & Parsadonova, V 2009, Katyn´skii sindrom, Moscow, Rosspen. Judt, T 2002, “The past is another country : myth and memory in post-war Europe” in: J Werner-Mueller (ed.), Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Materski, W 2008, Katyn´…nasz bjl powszedni, Warszawa, Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM. Materski, W 2008, Tarcza Europy Stosunki Polsko-Sowieckie 1918–1939, Warszawa, Ksiazka i Wiedza. Mazurkiewicz, L & Fiodorov, W 2015, “Polska-Rosja. Diagnoza społeczna” (PolandRussia. Social diagnosis). Available from: http://www.cprdip.pl/publikacje,rapor ty,69,polska-rosja_diagnoza_spoleczna_2015.html. Monaghan, A, A new Cold War? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia, Chatham House, May 2015. Available from: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150522ColdWarRussiaMonaghan.pdf. Snyder, T 2002, “Memory of sovereignty and sovereignty over memory, Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine 1939–1999” in: J Werner-Mueller (ed.), Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Przewoznik, A & Adamska, J 2010, Katyn´, Zbrodnia, Prawda, Pamiec, (Katyn, Crime, Truth, Memory) Warszawa, Swiat Ksiazki. Rotfeld, AD 2012, Mysli o Rosji…i nie tylko (Thoughts on Russia…and not only), a collection of interviews and essays, Swiat Ksiazki, (Hardcover, Polish edition) including: – Rosja na rozdrozu… (Russia on the crossroads…), p. 19, Interview first published in “Przeglad”, 10 January 2010; – Niemcy, Polska, Rosja (Germany, Poland, Russia), p. 383, first published in ed Witold M. Goralski, Polska-Niemcy 1945–2007; – Dom Wspolnej Historii (The House of Common History), published in “Polityka”, 12 Sept 2009. Wasilewski, W 2009, Pamiec Katynia: działania opozycji (Memory of Katyn: actions of the opposition), Biuletyn Instytutu Pamieci Narodowej, 5–6. Werner-Mueller, J 2002, Introduction to Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, J Werner-Mueller (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Wilson Center, Carnegie Center for International Peace, AISGS, NewHistories for Enduring Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 15 Jan 2015. Available from: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/usa/11521.pdf.

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Articles, conferences “Czy Katyn´ spodobal sie˛ w Rosji”, 15 April 2010. Available from: http://www.fakt.pl/ Czy-quot-Katyn´-quot-spodobal-sie-w-Rosji-,artykuly,69386,1.html. “Facing Uncertainty in Ukraine”, J Jackson, AICSG, July 2015. Available from: http:// www.aicgs.org/issue/facing-uncertainty-in-ukraine/?utm_medium=email&utm_ source=advisor. “History is Always Plural”, T Snyder, Radio Free Europe. Available from: http://www. rferl.org/content/russia-ukraine-interview-bloodlands-timothy-snyder-history/ 27082683.html. “Katastrofa w Smolen´sku, minuta po minucie”, Wpolczesna.pl, 10 April 2010. Available from: http://www.wspolczesna.pl/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 20100410/katastrofa_samolotu_prezydenck/154783865. “Ukraine is but one aspect of a much larger strategy…”, T Snyder, Euromaidanpress, 18 March 2015. Available from: http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/03/18/timo thy-snyder-ukraine-is-but-one-aspect-of-a-much-larger-strategy-that-threatenseuropean-order/. “Medvedev : Katyn´ to przypadek falszowania historii”, Money.pl, May 7, 2010. Available from: http://news.money.pl/artykul/miedwiediew ;Katyn´ ;to;przypa dek;falszowania;historii,18,0,617746.html. “Novaya Katyn´’”, Vedomosti, 12 April 2010. Available from: http://dlib.eastview.com/ browse/doc/21667523. “Pamiati prezydenta Rossii”, A Smolar, Svobodnaia mysl’, April 2010. “Putin zaprosil Donalda Tuska na 70. Rocznice Katynia”, Gazeta Prawna, 2 March 2010. Available from: http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708, 7524545,Putin_zaprosil_Donalda_Tuska_na_70__rocznice_Katyn´ia.html. “Rosyjska Duma pote˛piła Katyn´. 342 razy”, TVN24.pl, 26 November 2010. “Rosja a Katyn´”, A Pamiatnych, in Karta 61, 2009. “Russian-Polish Relations: A Long Way From Stereotypes to Reconciliation”, P Cheremushkin, Moscow State University, Intermarium, vol. 5, no. 3. (2003). Available from: http://ece.columbia.edu/files/ece/images/ruspol.pdf. “Posiedzenie Polsko-Rosyjskie Grupy ds. Trudnych Przelozone”, Gazeta Wyborcza. Available from: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,17679557,Posiedzenie_Polsko_Rosyj skiej_Grupy_ds__Trudnych_przelozone.html. “The Ruinous Consequences of History Politics for the Country and Its Relations with Neighbors”, A Miller, Russia in Global Affairs, July 2010. Available from: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russia:_Politics_and_History-14896. “When Stalin was Hitler’s Ally”, T Snyder, Eurozine, May 2015. Available from: http:// www.eurozine.com/articles/2015-05-08-snyder-en.html.

Klaus Bachmann

Polish-Ukrainian Reconciliation after World War II

Introduction In this chapter, reconciliation is regarded as a process. According to the Nadler-Schnabel model, adapted here to the needs of inter-state relations, for reconciliation to be achieved, emotional and material efforts in a fixed sequence are necessary on both sides. Reconciliation occurs not only between the antagonistic groups, but also within each of them – among social groups, parties and civil society. The process leads to a polarization within these groups and contributes to the politicization of inter-group relations, which – until the first steps toward reconciliation – may not have had much salience for intra-group audiences. In a group setting, according to the Nadler-Schnabel framework, both perpetrator and victim are driven by emotional needs for recognition by other group members. The victim has seen his value as a human being undermined by the acts of the perpetrator and strives to reinstate his agency. The perpetrator has been blamed and strives to reinstate his agency as a moral actor, which he can achieve only with the help of the victim. Both are caught in a situation that requires the two sides to engage in a give-and-take: the perpetrator needs the moral recognition of the victim; the victim needs the instrumental recognition of the perpetrator, who has either to return what he took away or grant compensation. This give-and-take has material and emotional aspects: compensation and apology. Apologies are not credible to the victims (and to their intra-group audience) if they are not accompanied by material compensation; material compensation is not convincing if not accompanied (or preceded) by an apology. Applying this model from an inter-personal situation to an inter-group one makes it even more complex, because it requires the intra-group dynamic of each group be included. Now, perpetrator and victim no longer appear as unitary actors; rather, initiatives of the other side lead to intra-group processes and dynamics, which split each group into supporters and opponents of the other side’s actions. Credibility becomes even more important than in an individual setting. After an interpersonal conflict, the victim may accept, reject or try to negotiate compensation from the perpetrator and the perpetrator may be persuaded to amend his initial apology. After a conflict between antagonistic groups, each group’s repre-

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sentatives not only have to decide whether to offer, endorse or reject a reconciliatory effort, but they also have to organize support for their action within their own group, which opens the door for intra-group conflicts and politicizes the initial moral gesture. The prospect of material compensation triggers conflicts about its redistribution among in-group members. Apologies also may trigger intra-group conflicts about group identity. In the end, the collective identities of both groups undergo an important change, as revealed, for example, by the truth-and-reconciliation process in South Africa, and in other parts of the world. Exclusive and antagonistic group identities, which are based on an “us-them” dichotomy, are replaced by an inclusive and emphatic one that contains shared elements (Kelman 2000). This theoretical approach to reconciliatory efforts requires a prior consensual identification of perpetrator and of victim (Kriesberg 2004). Such an identification can be the result of a social process of “facing the past” (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) by one side only, but it also might be triggered by an important external moral authority (an international tribunal or truth commission or a large part of the international community). It is much more difficult to establish victim and perpetrator categories among states than in intra-state conflicts between antagonistic groups, because in the latter case, it is usually either the judiciary or a moral authority (accepted by both groups) which establishes guilt and victimhood. In international relations, such a categorization may be reached either by an intra-state process of dealing with the past or by external pressure from an important part of the international community. For the purpose of the model, it is necessary to establish guilt first, because such a finding decides which side should first engage in the risky process of reconciliation and make a symbolic offer. Such symbolic measures have to be accompanied or followed by offers of material compensation for two reasons: to assuage those who see themselves as victims on the other side, but most importantly also to make the symbolic gesture credible for the other side. Paradoxically, such an initiative is likely to be rejected in the first place – and it is likely to cause initially the opposite of what is intended. Evidence from inter-group conflict resolution shows that such an initiative renders the whole issue of mutual relations much more politically salient and therefore increases the number of those who are in favor of such a move as well as the number of those who reject it. In opinion polls, this phase often reveals effects of polarization in public opinion and a decline in evasive answers. It is this polarization that creates challenges and obstacles to the whole process. Due to polarization, material compensation appears more and more costly to the side which proposed it, but at the same time grants more credibility to the symbolic offer from the perspective of the victims on the other side. Both societies polarize about the topic and even a decline in support for the process may be observed in opinion polls. If mutual steps by political leaders are undertaken more frequently, the process of reconciliation may lead to stable majorities in

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both groups favoring reconciliation with the other group, despite the perseverance of opponents.

The Historical Background: Polish-Ukrainian Relations in the Twentieth Century Applying the Nadler-Schnabel model to Polish-Ukrainian relations is more difficult than in many other cases (for example, Franco-German or GermanPolish relations), mainly because the boundaries between nation and state shifted frequently for both Poland and Ukraine. In other words – there are no group identities and no clear boundaries between the groups, which could be regarded as stable over time. During the 19th century, there was a Polish nation, but no Polish state, and the same was true for Ukraine until 1991. And even in times, when there was a (Polish or Ukrainian) state, it did not encompass the whole nation. The Polish nation-state also used its power to weaken the Ukrainian national movement, which had started to emerge and gain more and more influence in the Polish countryside in the second part of the nineteenth century, resulting in violent conflicts throughout the inter-war period (Hrycak 2000, p. 188–216). One might well describe Polish-Ukrainian differences as a clash between a Polish state-supported nationalism and an Ukrainian, Piedmont-like, nationalist movement (Magocsi 2002) striving to achieve its own nation state, but not yet as a situation of inter-group conflict with clear boundaries, as most of the Ukrainians were living beyond the borderline of the river Zbruch in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukrainian SSR). Until the outbreak of World War II, then, it was difficult to define two distinct conflicted groups that could be reconciled by symbolic and instrumental steps. But whereas the Polish part of this equation had its own institutions, its own nation state and was able to overcome its collective action dilemmas in an organized way, the Ukrainian part was mostly deprived of such possibilities, lacked a central organization to aggregate different regional, religious, social and ethnic interests and was divided among different other states (Poland, the Soviet Union and, to a smaller extent, Romania and Czechoslovakia). After the military defeat of the Polish Second Republic in 1939, which was first invaded by the German and then by the Soviet armies, officers and soldiers who managed to evade internment by the Soviet and German troops went into hiding and conspired against the occupiers. Various scattered partisan movements finally merged, accepting the central authority of the Polish government-in-exile and the command structure of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa – AK). The Soviet-supported, radical communist partisan

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movement remained weak until the Red Army crossed the pre-war borders of Poland (Borodziej 2010, p. 214–226). The outlook was different in the Ukrainian territories. In the Western part of what is now Ukraine, a strong anti-communist and nationalist partisan movement emerged, which unified under the command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayinska Povstans’ka Armiya – UPA) and was supported by Germany, whereas in the Eastern parts a strong communist partisan movement developed under the control of the Red Army (Torzecki 1993, 234–244; Hrycak 2000, p. 243–250). As the Red Army moved to the West, pushing back the German troops, it also suppressed the UPA and the national, anti-Soviet resistance of AK on the territories of pre-war Poland. For a short period at the end of the war (and in many places even beyond May 1945) Polish and Ukrainian anti-Soviet resistance fighters had a common enemy and concluded short-time alliances against the communist partisans and the Red Army (Motyka 1997). However, more indelible for the population and collective memory in Poland and Western Ukraine until today are the events unfolding between 1942 and 1943 in the former Polish voivodship of Wołyn´ and to a lesser extent in Galicia, and in 1946 in the territories of South Eastern Poland. In autumn 1942, the UPA started to attack Polish settlements in the countryside, in order to drive out the Polish population and include these territories into an independent Ukraine after the war. The Polish governmentin-exile wanted to incorporate Wołyn´ and Galicia again into a post-war Polish state, whereas the UPA intended to include them into a pro-Western, antiSoviet post-war Ukraine. The Ukrainian partisans managed to drive out and kill large parts of the Polish population in Wołyn´ and Galicia. The Polish resistance defended the Polish outposts in Ukrainian-populated territory, but in many cases, the Polish civilians were either forced to escape into larger settlements and towns or were killed. The atrocities committed during the fights left a strong imprint on Polish collective memory, resulting in many myths and stereotypes claiming Ukrainians to be “slaughterers.”1 There are specific notions in Polish to uniquely describe the atrocities committed against Poles by Ukrainians.2 Casualty statistics are still disputed until today. A joint commission of Ukrainian and Polish historians in the 1990s established the figure of approximately 80,000 Polish victims, but victims organizations in Poland usually reject this figure as too low, speaking often about 100,000 or even

1 The respective notion in Polish is ”rezuny” (a noun derived from the Ukrainian verb “rizati” – to slaughter). 2 One example is ”łuny” (flames), a word that is almost exclusively used in order to describe the fights between Poles and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Mountains in 1946.

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hundreds of thousands of Polish victims. The figure is also disputed by some Ukrainian historians (Polska – Ukraina: trudne pytania, 2000).3 After the German surrender in May 1945 and in accordance with an agreement concluded by the Soviet government and the transitional proSoviet government of Poland affirming the 1939 Polish- Soviet border, most of the Ukrainian-inhabited land of Poland’s Second Republic remained under the control of the Red Army and the Ukrainian SSR. With military pressure increasing on the Ukrainian nationalist movement East of the San, many UPA fighters sneaked through the Polish border and hid in the mountainous landscape of the South-West Polish part of the Carpathian Mountains, receiving and confiscating food and weapons from the local population. In 1946, the newly formed Polish People’s Army (Ludowe Wojsko Polskie – LWP) started a military operation called “Operation Vistula,” with the aim to capture and kill the Ukrainian fighters and deprive them of the support of the locals, by carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the civilian population. The aim was to deport the latter west of the Vistula and into the former German lands, from which the German population had been chased away earlier. Nowhere should Ukrainians (or Bojko and Lemko) constitute more than ten percent of the population (Motyka 1999, 2006). Civilians suspected of being insurgents, local leaders and people who were known as nationalist activists were imprisoned in Jaworzno, a former outpost of the Auschwitz concentration camp near Krakjw. Casualty numbers are again disputed, but there is consensus that the overall number of deaths was much below the casualty figures in Wołyn´. Both events – the Wołyn´ massacre and the ethnic cleansing of 1946 – led to the establishment of victim groups. They could not openly function as long as Poland and Ukraine remained under communist rule, but when the political climate became more liberal during the early 1990s they immediately went public, and strove for support and recognition. Both events also became the main focus of the debate about mutual relations and reconciliation, and demands for apologies (and/or compensation) were usually levied specifically with regard to these acts of violence: Polish institutions would urge their Ukrainian counterparts to apologize for “Wołyn´” and Ukrainian institutions would counter with demands to “condemn Operation Vistula.” In both countries, politicians and lawyers were reluctant to acquiesce to such demands, warning that apologies and condemnation might lead to lawsuits from victims, which could quickly become costly (Copsey 2008).

3 Volumes 7 and 8 include a number of chapters written by Polish and Ukrainian historians who were brought together by non-governmental organizations during the 1990s in an attempt to establish a common ground about the difficult parts of both nations’ most recent past.

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Emotional Reconciliatory Steps 1 Ukraine declared independence and held a referendum on independence in summer 1991. Until then, most international treaties that bound the Ukrainian SSR with regard to Poland had been concluded through the Soviet Union. After the 1989 transition in Poland and the emergence of organized opposition movements in the Western republics of the USSR under perestroika, Poland’s diplomacy followed a two-track strategy of keeping contacts with the official governments of the republics and with the grassroots opposition that sought independence from the USSR. After the declaration of independence by Ukraine, Poland immediately recognized Ukraine and then concluded a number of bilateral agreements with the new governments (Burant 1993). During all the years that followed, one overarching dilemma emerged: the anti-Soviet Rukh movement (which had been created by former dissidents and been transformed into a party) seemed to be the most natural ally for a Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement, as it was anti-Soviet, pro-Western and lacked connections with the oligarchic political system that had emerged during perestroika. But due to little access to oligarchic resources, Rukh was weak and strongly relied on nationalist circles in Western Ukraine whose traditions were based on reminiscences of the UPA, making public support in Poland for such a rapprochement unlikely. However, parties and movements from Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine usually had no anti-Polish edge (as their traditions were mostly rooted in Soviet practices), but their ideas about foreign policy usually were incompatible with the overarching antiSoviet and anti-Russian consensus in Poland. In the mid-1970s, Polish anti-communist emigre circles had called for the recognition of the World War II border by a future (independent) Polish government, and for support of independence in Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine. The declaration by the Polish Independence Coalition (Polskie Porozumienie Niepodłegłos´ciowe – PPN), which was linked to the Kultura magazine, rejected any territorial claims toward other states and explicitly accepted the status of Poland’s borders as created by the results of the war. PPN distanced itself from nationalist emigre circles, which rejected the territorial status quo of the postwar era (Friszke 1994, 493; Snyder 2003, p. 219–221). After the fall of communism in 1989 and Ukrainian independence in 1991, there was never any significant opposition against the recognition of the Polish-Ukrainian border in either country, despite the existence of a relatively strong Ukrainian minority in Poland scattered across the country and a strong Polish minority in Western Ukraine concentrated in those regions less affected by the atrocities committed by the UPA. Poland and Ukraine signed in 1992, and later ratified, a treaty on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, which confirmed the existing border and included complex provisions about

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the protection of minorities. It did not contain any references to past acts of violence. On August 3, 1990, the Senate, the upper house of the Polish parliament (dominated by representatives of the former anti-communist opposition), approved a resolution condemning Poland’s “Operation Vistula” as the application of a measure of collective responsibility, “characteristic for totalitarian systems.” But the condemnation did not trigger any further steps. In the aftermath of the resolution, Ukrainian politicians from the Western part of the country started to request that the lower house, the Sejm, issue a similar declaration, which would then open the door for compensation. For their part, Polish opponents of the Senate resolution would ask the Ukrainian parliament to take a similar step by condemning the Wołyn´ massacres. Thereafter, such demands were often supported by the domestic opponents of Rukh, the Communist Party of Ukraine, which emphasized the “red” rather than “red and black” partisan traditions of World War II.4 The stalemate in reconciliation ended in 1997 when Aleksander Kwas´niewski (a former member of the Polish United Workers Party and and co-founder of its successor party, the Social Democracy of Poland – Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej), was elected president. Ukraine was ruled by Leonid Kuchma, a former manager of a huge East Ukrainian armaments corporation under state control. On May 21, 1997, Kuchma and Kwas´niewski signed a solemn “joint statement on mutual agreement and reconciliation” in Kiev, which enumerated most of the controversial events from the Polish-Ukrainian past: the “decades of war in the XVII and XVIII centuries, the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Polish authorities during the 20s and 30s of the XX century, the persecutions of the Polish populations in Soviet Ukraine during the Stalinist repressions.” The declaration then stated that it was “impossible to forget about the blood shed in Wołyn´ during the years 1942–43, the atrocities of the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts during the first post-war years” and “the separate card in the history of our relations, which constituted ‘Operation Vistula.’ Neither president apologized, and neither asked for nor granted forgiveness. Instead, they “condemned the perpetrators of these sufferings,” commemorated the innocent victims and thanked those who had worked for “the rapprochement between our nations.”5 The inconclusive character of the declaration can be explained by the lack of agreement about who was the perpetrator and who was the victim among the two nations, but also, to some extent, by the lack of a coherent approach on 4 The red color stands for the Soviet traditions, whereas black and red are the colors of the UPA flag. 5 The declaration is often quoted in English and Polish articles and book chapters, but the only version, which is currently available online, is the Polish one on a website of Poland’s Lemko minority (which was most affected by “Operation Vistula.”): http://www.lemkounion.republika. pl/oswiadczenie97.html

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the Ukrainian side to the issues of the UPA, Wołyn´ and Operation Vistula. Wołyn´ had become a kind of national myth in Poland, regarded as a collective experience of the nation and for which the entirety of Poles would have been able to accept an Ukrainian apology. But in Ukraine, nothing comparable existed, for which a Polish representative would have been able to issue an apology acceptable to all Ukrainians. The UPA and the 1942–1943 killings of Poles were a matter of regional rather than national collective memory and attitudes of parties and politicians toward them depended on regional and ideological cleavages.6 Ukraine’s East and South would hardly feel addressed by a Polish apology for Operation Vistula; and an Ukrainian apology for Wołyn´ could not count on their support, as most of the local war veterans had fought the UPA in the ranks of the Soviet partisan movement or the Red Army and hated the nationalists just as much as the Polish Home Army members did. Since both sides could not agree on whom to blame and were involved in a Polish-Ukrainian and intra-Ukrainian victims’ competition, a clear cut apology of one side toward the other was out of reach, because it would have been unacceptable for the other side. The only available exit strategy was to list mutual acts of violence and agree on a package deal about the condemnation of all perpetrators and the commemoration of all victims – without weighing guilt, casualty numbers or the level of cruelty. This is what the presidents’ declaration did and why it was slightly asymmetric, assuming guilt on the Polish side for the deportation of the Ukrainian minority within Poland and regret on the Ukrainian side for the atrocities of the Ukrainian national movement against the Polish population in Wołyn´ and Eastern Galicia 1942–1943. It did not cause any major protest in Ukraine, but it contributed to a polarization in public opinion in Poland, which made the issue of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation a political one. Former military and police organizations, whose members had fought and suffered from the Ukrainian underground, issued harsh protests against the declaration; right wing media and politicians opposed it, whereas the liberal part of public opinion welcomed the presidents’ step. The 1997 declaration was the first major element of the Nadler-Schnabel apology-forgiveness circle, and according to the model, it should have polarized public opinion in both countries. The latter actually happened in Poland, where a debate in the media started about the content of the declaration, its allegedly one-sided character and its significance for further Polish-Ukrainian relations. The media echo in Ukraine was much weaker, due to the regional differences in attitudes toward Poland and the ideological 6 Controversy in Poland about the Wołyn´ events existed, too, but did not concern the normative assessment of the events (which were condemned by all), but rather their scope, significance and labeling (for example, as ethnic cleansing and genocide) and their implications for Poland’s foreign policy.

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implications, described above. Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly measure the impact of the declaration on Polish respondents’ readiness to reconcile with Ukrainians, because the first poll including a question about reconciliation was carried out only after the declaration was issued, and not before. No such polls were available in Ukraine. The Polish polls show clearly that no matter how high or low sympathy and readiness to reconcile with Ukrainians might have been before May 1997, they both went down afterwards. A few weeks after the declaration, fifty-eight percent of respondents shared the view, that “reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians is possible.” A year later, this percentage fell to forty-eight percent and rose again in June 1998 to fifty-seven percent. The percentage of those with the opposite opinion (“reconciliation is impossible”) went down from thirtynine percent in 1997 to thirty-seven percent in the following year, rising again to forty percent in 1998. But the most dramatic change took place among those who did not have any opinion about reconciliation. According to the apologyforgiveness model described above, their number should have declined and polarization should have occurred. But the percentage of evasive answers (“difficult to say”) went up from three percent in 1997 to fifteen percent in 1997 and then declined again to the level of three percent (CBOS 1999). There are no comparable data for Ukraine about sympathy or reconciliation, but in Kiev, the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences monitored ethnic distance. Ethnic distance is a widely accepted tool in sociology for measuring (and comparing) respondents’ reluctance (and readiness) to engage with members of an ethnic out-group in various social relations, beginning from cooperation with a colleague of a different ethnic background to the readiness to admit outgroup members into the respondent’s family. This tool is more precise and allows better comparisons, but it also has a serious flaw in the PolishUkrainian context: it does not always distinguish between respondents’ ethnic distance towards Ukrainians from Ukraine and members of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. The same is true the other way round: using ethnic distance as a measurement for assessing Ukrainian respondents’ relations to Poles does not always distinguish between their relation to Ukrainian citizens of Polish descent and their relation to Polish citizens (Konieczna 2003). The Academy of Science’s data do not permit identification of the 1997 declaration as a trigger of reconciliation. Not only did the poll show a decrease in evasive answers (rather than the increase predicted by the model), but distance to Poles also slightly increased in almost every category, except the ones which were the less controversial: in 1998 more Ukrainians were ready to accept a Pole as a neighbor or tourist than they were in 1996.

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Table 3: Ethnic Distance between Ukrainians and Poles 1994–1998 (in percentages); Source: Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences 2005. Are you ready to agree to…

1994

1996

1998

No answer

15.8

4.5

5.1

8.5

9.9

9.4

10.0

9.6

8.7

Poles to become neighbors

9.1

9.4

9.6

Poles to become colleagues at work

3.9

5.1

4.4

Poles to become citizens of Ukraine

19.3

21.8

20.9

Poles to visit Ukraine (as tourists)

27.8

32.6

34.8

5.7

7.0

7.2

1807

1800

1810

100

100

100

3,746

4,313

4,369

Poles becoming members of my family Poles to become close friends

“Poles should not be allowed to come to Ukraine” Overall

Average distance

The table shows clearly that ethnic distance increased slightly (though not dramatically) after 1997, and that Ukrainians were less eager than before to accept Poles in any roles defined by the poll, except the most distant ones: as neighbors and tourists.

Emotional Reconciliatory Steps 2 In the years following the 1997 declaration, nothing happened on the emotional side of the reconciliation equation. Neither government embarked on initiatives that could have furthered instrumental reconciliation. Due to the lack of an Ukrainian apology, the only actor who could have launched an instrumental action was Poland. But there, domestic opposition would have immediately condemned such a step as premature and exaggerated, because there had been an insufficient response from Ukraine to the Senate’s declaration of 1990 and Kwas´niewski’s apology of 1997. Proposing compensation for Ukrainian victims of “Operation Vistula” was likely to backfire against both governments or presidents – against the Polish side, because it would have made Poland appear as the perpetrator, and against the Ukrainian side, because it would have triggered Polish demands for compensation to

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Wołyn´ victims, which in turn would have ripped open another domestic cleavage between protagonists of the “red” and the “black and red” tradition in Ukraine. During the second half of the 1990s, there was a debate in the media and in parliament about re-privatization of real estate, which had been confiscated after World War II. During these discussions, opponents of enacting a law for the restoration of property usually invoked the expropriation of Germans and Ukrainians, arguing, that opening the Pandora’s box of property restitution would entitle Germans and Ukrainians to reclaim their assets, too.7 This discussion was not concerned with compensation for Ukrainian victims, but solely with the issue of whether Ukrainians could eventually take advantage of compensation paid by the state to victims of the post-war nationalization waves in Poland. The next emotion-based reconciliatory step came with the anniversary of the Wołyn´ massacres in 2003. And again, a strong asymmetry could be observed before and during the commemorations. On the one hand, in Ukraine, the events of Wołyn´ did not play a big role and the whole issue of Polish-Ukrainian relations was contemplated as one connected to business, trade and Ukraine’s hesitant rapprochement with Western Europe and the US. On the other hand, in Poland, nongovernmental organizations had prepared well for the commemoration, as did some crucial state agencies like the Institute for National Memory (Instytut Pamie˛ci Narodowej), the Council for the Preservation of the Memory of Combat and Martyrdom (Rada Pamie˛ci Walk i Me˛czen´stwa – RPWiM) and the National Security Office (Biuro Bezpieczen´stwa Narodowego) of the Polish president.8 For years, civil society organizations had gathered victims, relatives of victims and people with an anti-Ukrainian bias; had collected evidence about the atrocities committed against the Polish population in the Eastern parts of pre-war Poland; had erected commemoration sites and monuments; and had held conferences and tried to influence the media. In other words, there was a large asymmetry between how Polish civil society and Ukrainian civil society had dealt with the issue. The bottom-up pressure to address the issue on a bilateral basis was strong enough to incline the ministries of foreign affairs of both countries to take over the agenda-setting before the anniversary of the Wołyn´ massacre (Kasianov 7 This argument is only partly valid, because most of the Germans who were deported after the war never held Polish citizenship and would therefore not be entitled to reclaim their former property. Only a small part (mostly those who had been positively verified as Polish citizens and had been spared expulsion in Upper Silesia and North-Western Poland) held Polish citizenship. The argument was valid for Ukrainians resettled under “Operation Vistula”, because they had never lost Polish citizenship, but had lost their property and been administratively prevented from returning to their farms and houses. 8 IPN was established as a state agency responsible for checking the (confession-based) declarations of politicians and other public office holders concerning their collaboration with the communist secret police before 1990 (or the lack thereof).

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2006, p. 250). The months before the anniversary brought a repetition of the previous quarrel about who should apologize to whom, promising to block the attempt at transforming the anniversary into a reconciliatory event. In light of what happened later, one might conclude that the bilateral momentum for reconciliation was salvaged because of a rare domestic competition between both countries’ legislatures and their executives. Until the last moment before the anniversary, the Sejm and the Verkhovna Rada could not agree on a joint statement. But the presidents, both of whom were strongly committed to make the anniversary a step toward reconciliation rather than let radicals on both sides determine the agenda, had agreed earlier on a joint statement, thus putting pressure on the legislators. A day before the ceremony in Pavlivka (Wołyn´), a Polish settlement that had been raided by the UPA, both parliaments approved a joint compromise, setting aside the concerns of their respective radical minorities. Whereas the Polish radicals had demanded the massacres be labeled “ethnic cleansing” (which some Ukrainian legislators feared would have opened Ukraine to lawsuits before international courts), their Ukrainian counterparts had requested the massacres be explained as the result of the Polish inter-war policy to assimilate and persecute the Ukrainian nationalist movement (Kasianov 2006, p. 251–252). The final parliamentary resolution described the events in Wołyn´ as “a tragedy of both nations,” because both Poles and Ukrainians had suffered. It refrained from weighing the suffering in order to avoid the usual victims’ competition that follows from such comparisons (Bujak 2014, p. 93–94). The presidents’ text condemned the killings of both Poles and Ukrainians and “the perpetrators of crimes against the Polish and Ukrainian peoples,” and urged the younger generation of both countries to reconcile and to “free themselves entirely of the prejudices of the tragic past” (Kasianov 2006, p. 251). Once again, opinion polls are instructive. Contrary to what we would expect from the Nadler-Schnabel model, the percentage of neutral and evasive answers rose after the commemoration, and no sign of stronger polarization was visible (Table 4). However, the emotional reconciliatory steps undertaken by the parliaments and the presidents did increase the percentage of those sympathetic to Ukrainians and it did lower the level of antipathy toward Ukrainians. Table 4: Sympathy and Antipathy of Poles toward Ukrainians 2002–2004; Source: Omyła-Rudzka 2015 (CBOS). 2002

2003

2004

sympathy

22

19

29

antipathy

48

51

29

neutral and evasive answers

30

30

42

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Table 5: The Attitude of Polish Respondents toward Reconciliation with Ukraine 2002–2004; Source: Kowalczuk 2013 (CBOS). IX 2002

VII 2003

V 2004

reconciliation possible

73

63

60

reconciliation impossible

25

37

35

2

0

5

evasive answers

Asking directly about reconciliation gave the same impression. In September 2002, CBOS pollsters inquired whether respondents regarded reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians as possible or impossible. They repeated the question in July 2003 and in May 2004. As Table 5 shows, evasive answers went slightly down during the commemoration year, but then went up again, showing no sign of polarization. The initiatives of the parliaments and the presidents did not result in a stronger readiness to reconcile. A strong majority of Polish respondents prioritized “the historical truth” over good relations with the Ukrainian neighbors. When confronted with the choice of either preferring to “reveal the whole truth about Wołyn´, no matter how this will affect bilateral relations” or “to forget about the past wrongs in the name of Table 6: Ethnic Distance of Ukrainians toward Poles 2002–2004; Source: Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences 2005. Are you ready to agree to…

2002

2004

No answer

2.8

1.6

Poles becoming members of my family

3.4

3.2

Poles to become close friends

6.6

6.4

11.2

11.4

Poles to become colleagues at work

7.1

6.6

Poles to become citizens of Ukraine

15.4

20.2

Poles to visit Ukraine (as tourists)

43.6

43.4

“Poles should not be allowed to come to Ukraine”

10.0

7.3

Overall

1799

1800

100

100

4,872

4,891

Poles to become neighbors

Average distance

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good neighborly relations,” sixty-three percent opted for the first item, with only thirty-three percent being ready to forget in order to further bilateral relations (Kowalczuk 2013, p. 3). On the Ukrainian side, concerning ethnic distance we have data only from 2002 and 2004 (Table 6). The data actually show a slight sign of polarization: the percentage of people who refused to answer went down, but this took place to the detriment of those who were more ready to accept Poles in the roles presented by the poll. There were only a few categories that changed in accordance with our model: more Ukrainians than before were ready to grant citizenship to Poles, a minuscule increase was observed as to Ukrainians’ readiness to accept Poles as neighbors, and the percentage of those rejecting Poles in any of the proposed roles went down. But in all other categories, reluctance toward Poles was bigger in 2004 than it had been in 2002.

Emotional Reconciliatory Steps 3 The situation from the 2003 commemoration replicated itself ten years later, but under worse conditions. In 2003, the presidents had taken the lead. Aleksander Kwas´niewski was a relatively young, liberal left wing politician, who had no constituency connected to the Polish victims organizations. The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – SdRP), did have a connection, which was quite vocal, and had opposed the 1997 declaration. But 2003 was at the end of Kwas´niewski’s second presidential term and he already knew that he would be unable to run again for president. The same was true for Ukrainian president Kuchma, who was busy preparing the ground for his successor, Viktor Yanukovich. Both Kuchma and Kwas´niewski had maintained a cordial personal relationship and were committed to a bilateral rapprochement between the two countries. Their friendship had not suffered from Kuchma’s attempts to sideline the Verkhovna Rada and from his violent re-election campaign in 1999, during which Kwas´niewski had supported him. There was nothing similar in 2013. Poland was governed by a coalition of the liberal-conservative Citizens Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) and the smaller Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL), whose electorate comprised groups with an anti-Ukrainian bias. The president was now Bronisław Komorowski, who was committed to good relations with Ukraine, but lacked a reliable partner in Kiev. After the turmoil of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 and the short-lived pro-Western government of Viktor Yushchenko, Yanukovich’s “Party of Regions” had strengthened its grip on the institutions and imposed a hybrid regime on the country, which started to monopolize political, judicial and economic power in the hands of the Yanukovich family. For Yanukovich, neither good relations

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with Poland nor positive ties with Western governments was a priority. His priority was good relations with Russia, which was the focal point for the businesses belonging to his domestic empire. As a result of the “Orange Revolution,” the non-governmental sector had developed in Ukraine and the media had become more pluralistic, but political debates in Ukraine focused on domestic matters rather than foreign policy. Already in 2012, the attempt to establish a “Day of Polish Martyrdom in the Eastern Borderlands” (Dzien´ Pamie˛ci Me˛czen´stwa Kresowian) had led to controversies between the ruling PO and the opposition, during which PSL had taken the side of the opposition and SLD sided with the government. The controversy came back a year later, when the Sejm prepared a resolution on the seventieth anniversary of the Wołyn´ massacres. Then, the opposition was confronted with a double dilemma: in order to corner the government, the right wing opposition (with a strong constituency among Wołyn´ victims organizations) had to push for a condemnation of the atrocities committed against Poles. But the situation in Ukraine soon made it clear, that such a one-sided approach would support (and be supported by) two important political parties in Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine (Komunistichna Partia Ukrajiny, CPU) and the Party of the Regions, whose foreign policy approach was totally contradictory to what all Polish parties regarded as a vital interest of their country – to bring Ukraine closer to the EU and NATO and to weaken its ties with Russia. The bone of contention was the term “genocide.” The Polish opposition had put forward a resolution which called the Wołyn´ killings outright genocide – and representatives of the Party of the Regions (Partija Regioniv, PoR – Yanukovich’s power base) and the CPU immediately supported it. In Ukrainian domestic politics, such a resolution would weaken the West-Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Russian movements, which at the same time supported EU integration, and it would strengthen the position of those forces, which relied on Soviet rather than nationalist traditions and pursued a Russia-friendly foreign policy (Bujak 2014, pp. 94–96). Before the final vote on a Polish resolution in the Sejm, CPU and PoR representatives sent letters to the Sejm to urge the parliamentarians to condemn the atrocities as genocide, whereas the West-Ukrainian nationalist party Svoboda threatened the Polish parliament with a counter-motion in the Rada, condemning the Polish Home Army. The debate had revealed a deep cleavage among the parties about the “genocide” issue, which was presented by its supporters as an issue of “truth” versus “lying for the sake of good relations.” Members of the government coalition had proposed a compromise, calling the atrocities “ethnic cleansing of a genocidal character,” stopping short from calling them a genuine genocide, but this proposal had been turned down in the respective commission. The plenary vote reversed the proportions and gave the government factions a small victory of ten votes over the opposition. Throughout 2013, no joint declaration was drafted and the commemoration of

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the atrocities in Wołyn´ remained under a national rather than bilateral paradigm. It would also be futile to have expected major shifts in public opinion in 2013. In Poland, no poll including the reconciliation issue had been conducted in 2012, with the most recent one stemming from 2008, when seventy-five percent had regarded reconciliation with Ukraine as “possible” compared to thirteen percent who deemed it impossible. A year later, when CBOS carried out two polls involving reconciliation, the percentage of supporters of reconciliation had fallen to sixty-three and sixty-four percent, and the part of those who regarded reconciliation as impossible had risen to twenty-one and nineteen percent (Kowalczuk 2013, p. 3). Poles’ sympathy toward Ukrainians was hardly affected, as Table 7 below demonstrates. On the Ukrainian side, no comparable data were available. Table 7: Sympathy and Antipathy of Poles toward Ukrainians 2012–2014; Source: Kowalczuk 2015 (CBOS). 2012

2013

2014

Sympathy

32

31

34

antipathy

32

33

33

evasive answers

36

36

33

Conclusion: Reconciliatory Talk instead of Reconciliation Measured by the socio-emotional model of reconciliation, there were some steps toward reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine, but they were mostly unsuccessful and did not trigger the same shifts in public opinion polls, which could be observed between Germany and France after the war and between Germany and Poland after the collapse of communism (Hajnicz 1996). Most reconciliatory initiatives neither triggered domestic polarization, nor increased empathy toward the respective out-group. Without such changes, it would be difficult to expect the final phase of the model to take place: identity transformation and the creation of a common narrative, which replaces the “we-them” dichotomy with a notion of togetherness. Nadler and Schnabel (and Kelman) do not deal with the role of history in inter-group relations, since their model is constructed for the analysis of any possible group conflict. History is not seen as a cause of conflict; it is reduced to events, which led to a collective perception of a wrong that was afflicted on an in-group by an outgroup. Next, the model deals with the steps that are necessary in order to overcome the perceived loss of moral agency in both groups. Here, history is

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important, because it serves as the basis for the symbolic politics: apology. If reconciliation is achieved, history will be used in order to create a common notion of “togetherness” that bridges over the antagonistic group identities of the past. The shortcomings of the Ukrainian-Polish approach to reconciliation are obvious. Lack of consensus about who was the perpetrator and who was the victim left unanswered the crucial questions of who should make the first step and who should apologize to whom. It blocked the issue of compensation, which was never even discussed on a bilateral basis, again due to the competition over victimhood that arose from a lack of consensus about guilt. Without compensation, the apologies (represented by the fragments in the 1990 Senate resolution and by the presidents’ 1997 declaration) lacked credibility. The reconciliatory efforts of political elites had almost no echo in society. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the relatively steady and stable increase in sympathy toward the out-group, which can be observed after 1990, is due to factors other than conciliatory steps undertaken by governments and parliamentarians of both countries. As Table 8 reveals, the biggest increase in Polish public opinion’s readiness to reconcile with Ukrainians occurred as a result of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine during the second half of 2004, when media coverage about the demonstrations in Kiev bolstered interest and awareness for Ukrainian domestic politics and triggered a peak of sympathy among Poles for their protesting neighbors. Table 8: Readiness to Reconcile with Ukrainians 1997–2013; Source: Kowalczyk 2013 (CBOS), 3.

At no point before 2004 nor thereafter, was the readiness of Poles to reconcile as high as in 2004 during the protests against the Yanukovich regime. A similar

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outburst of empathy toward Ukraine took place in winter 2013–2014, when the Maidan uprising started. Despite the poor progress in reconciliation, talk about reconciliation is omnipresent in Poland, in bilateral contacts between Ukrainian and Polish institutions and in the media. This discrepancy happens because those who invoke reconciliation usually do not define or conceptualize it and take its meaning for granted in situations where they undertake efforts whose aim is reconciliation. But there is another reason for this popular and widespread dis-juncture between the rhetoric of reconciliation and the sociological reality in the Polish-Ukrainian case: the unreflected borrowing of practices and terms from other international examples. After 1991, Polish and Ukrainian institutions, non-governmental organizations and even the media have managed to establish a dense network of mutual contacts and common organizations, many of which deal with issues similar to their counterparts in Franco-German and German-Polish relations. Already during the 1990s, a club of Polish and Ukrainian journalists was founded, which handed out a prize for reconciliation to one Polish and one Ukrainian nominee. There is a joint conference of historians to deal with problematic issues of the past (including “Operation Vistula” and “Wołyn´”); a Polish-Ukrainian commission to elaborate recommendations for school textbook reform;9 and a PolishUkrainian brigade for UN missions, whose headquarter is in South-Eastern Poland.10 Since 1999, representatives of the Polish Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox, Greek-Catholic and Roman Catholic Church hand out a reconciliation prize each year. The churches in both countries have done a lot to promote the idea of reconciliation and to moderate radical voices on both sides of the border (Kozyrska 2013). Of course, there is also cross-border cooperation, which tries to replicate the situation on the Franco-German, German-Dutch and German-Polish borders before the enlargement of the Schengen zone. The Euroregion Carpathia (comprising the borderlands of Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary) was the first of its kind in Poland, founded in 1991 with funding from the US before Poland became an EU member. Now, voivodships, districts and municipalities on the Polish side and oblasti and municipalities in Ukraine cooperate in the framework of Euroregion Bug. Investors from both countries have gathered in a joint Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce. A Polish-Ukrainian Center for youth exchange replicates the experiences with the Franco-German and German-Polish Youth Exchange Organizations (Jugendwerke).11 9 More information can be found on the website of the Polish Ministry of Education, which hosts the materials of the commission: https://men.gov.pl/pl/zycie-szkoly/ksztalcenie-ogolne/kom isje-podrecznikowe/polsko-ukrainska-komisja-ekspertow 10 There is also a Polish-Ukrainian-Lithuanian Brigade with headquarter in Lublin, which can be used for NATO, EU and UN purposes. It is not yet fully operational. 11 However, the youth exchange with Ukraine is not institutionalized in the same way. It consists of

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All of the above activities taken together might create the impression of reconciliation as a social process. However, using the Nadler-Shnabel model to actually compare the Polish-Ukrainian reality to the development of FrancoGerman or German-Polish relations, we find reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians is still in its infancy.

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Mimoza Telaku and Shifra Sagy

Perceptions of Collective Narratives and Acculturation Attitudes: The case of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo1 Introduction One of the challenges after reaching a peace agreement and conflict resolution is transforming the relations of the groups in conflict. Both scholars and practitioners realize that although conflict resolution terminates a conflict, it does not necessarily stabilize the peace or prevent the emergence of new conflict in the future, which may even lead to renewed violence (Bar-SimanTov 2004). Reconciliation refers to a process whereby societies learn to live together in the post-conflict environment (Kelman 2010) and transform relations from hostility and resentment to friendly and harmonious relations (Kelman 1999; Gardner Feldman 1999; Bar-Tal 2000; Bar-Siman-Tov 2004). Conflict resolution mainly involves leaders of the conflicting groups, whereas reconciliation expands to include the members of the conflicting groups. Reconciliation requires a fundamental change in psychological identities producing “mutual acceptance by members of formerly hostile groups of each other” that “must include a changed psychological orientation towards the other” (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005, p. 301). The social psychological approach of reconciliation stresses its cognitive and emotional aspects and tries to openly address painful questions of past conflict so as to build a foundation for normal peace relations (e. g., BarSiman-Tov 2004). To be able to cope with the ordeals of interethnic conflict and tensions, society members construct an appropriate psychological repertoire, which includes shared beliefs, attitudes, emotions and capacities (Bar-Tal & Salomon 2006). Therefore, the content of this repertoire originates from virtual experiences of the group members or shared presumed memories and histories, which can be at the root of wars, prejudice, nationalism, and cultural identities (Pennebaker, Paez & Rim8 1997). Such repertoires are conceptualized as collective narratives (Solomon 2004, p. 274). Collective narratives are social constructions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current events; they are accounts of a community’s collective experiences, embodied in its belief system and represent the collective’s symbolically constructed shared identity (Bruner 1990) and sets of beliefs about themselves 1 Data collection for this research project was supported by the Foundation Open Society Institute (FOSI).

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and, in the case of conflict, about the conflict and about their adversary (BarTal 2000). Collective memory narrative is a story that is biased, selective, and distorted, that omits certain facts, adds others that did not take place, changes the sequences of events, and purposely reinterprets events that did take place (Rotberg 2006). The cultural and political context in which an individual develops and conducts his/her life can be a significant factor in the emergence and maintenance of ethnic behavior, including a person’s ethnic identity (Bernal &Knight 1993). In all pluralistic societies, cultural groups and their individual members must deal with the issue of how to acculturate (Berry, Segall & Kagitcibasi 1997). Acculturation does not take place in a “vacuum” but at a specific time and place – a cultural context, which may include the sociopolitical background of the groups in contact as well as the reasons behind the contact (Sam, et al. 2006). Berry (1990) proposed a bi-dimensional model of acculturation: 1) preference for one’s own culture; and 2) preference for the other group’s culture. The interaction of these dimensions yields four modes of acculturation: (1) integration (or biculturalism), defined as the maintenance of one’s native culture while simultaneously joining, participating in, and adopting aspects of the other culture; (2) assimilation, referring to the abandonment of one’s native culture in favor of the other culture, seeking daily interactions with the other cultural group and adopting its cultural values, norms and traditions; (3) separation, in which one’s native culture is maintained while avoiding daily interactions with other culture; and (4) marginalization, which refers to little interest or avoidance of both cultural maintenance and daily interactions with the other culture (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis & Sam 2011). The acceptance of the “other’s” collective narratives is crucial in resolving intergroup conflicts and reconciliation (Salomon 2009) as it is a step in taking the perspective of the “other” (King 2014). Sagy, Adwan and Kaplan (2002) have developed a tool to study cognitive and emotional elements of perceptions related to collective narratives of the “in-group” and the “other” group. They measured legitimacy as related to the cognitive elements, and empathy and anger as related to affective elements. In their study, they used these measures to understand Israeli-Palestinian relations by presenting different narratives of important historical and political events in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. They measured perceptions of collective narratives in relation to acculturation attitudes. The findings of these studies show that acculturation attitudes are related to perceptions of collective narratives; integration and assimilation attitudes of acculturation were related to higher rates of acceptance of the out-group collective narratives. However, the majority of participants in these studies endorsed separation attitudes of acculturation. In this study we conducted a similar examination of intergroup relations in

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a different socio-political context: the relations between Albanians and Serbs during the post-armed conflict period in Kosovo. The perceptions of collective narratives questionnaire was developed from focus groups with Serb and Albanian participants. In this study we ask about the perception of contradictory collective narratives of these ethnic groups and how these narratives are related to acculturation attitudes.

Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo Albanians and Serbs were involved in an interethnic conflict in Kosovo which culminated in armed conflict during 1998–1999. This conflict followed the abolition of Kosovo autonomy in 1989, and the systematic oppression of ethnic Kosovo Albanians and their non-violent resistance. The non-violent resistance transformed into armed conflict between Serbian security forces and the Albanian guerrillas in spring 1998 (Kostovicova 2005). Between 1998 and 1999, the Serbian government’s “ethnic cleansing” policies resulted in the deaths of approximately 12,000 Albanians (Spiegel & Salama 2000). Air strikes were launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and almost one million Kosovo Albanians fled their homes. Between March and June 1999 alone, more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians fled to other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or to neighboring countries, mainly to Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees 1999). While ninety percent of Albanian refugees and internally displaced persons returned after the end of the armed conflict, during that time almost 200,000 Serbs and Roma (internally displaced persons) fled Kosovo to Serbia and Montenegro (Tatham 2009). Since the NATO intervention, the Serb community in Kosovo has been the target of murder, repeated threats, arson, and crop burning (Andrighetto 2012). One of the basic characteristics of Kosovo’s social reality is the complete division of Albanian and Serbian public opinion, resulting in different perceptions of the situational conflict (Bieber & Daskalovski 2003). Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, as other groups in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world, each have their own catalogue of victims, atrocities, destruction and endured injustices, although not the capacity to admit the hurts of others and to grieve for them (Duijzings 2000). Albanians view Serbs as aggressors, occupiers, and war criminals who deliberately sought a greater Serbia, and see independence as the only possible solution to these problems. Serbs, by contrast, usually see Albanians as enemies who want to create a greater Albania at the expense of the Serbs (Romanych 2004). Bieber et al. (2003) describe the Albanian collective consciousness, as well as the Serbian one, as seeing itself as a total victim, antagonized by the opposite side. There is a total

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asymmetry in the interpretation of any social or historical fact. History and memory are selective and colored by the portrait of a ‘victim-image’ (Bieber& Daskalovski 2003). The goal of a multiethnic Kosovo seems distant, as the lack of trust and fear between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo has deepened. The territory is becoming a partitioned land, with Albanians and Serbs each living in their own ethnic enclaves (Williams, 2001). Several studies relating to the interethnic relations between these two ethnic groups have indicated that a social distance widely exists (e. g., Arenliu, Berxulli & Haskuka 2013). However, as far as we know, there are no other studies that show the relationship of perceptions of the interethnic conflict and willingness to interact with the ‘other’ ethnic group.

Hypotheses of the Study 1. Based on previous findings of social distance between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo (Arenliu, Berxulli & Haskuka 2013) we expected that a majority of members of these two ethnic groups would have separation attitudes of acculturation. 2. Significant correlations were hypothesized between cognitive and emotional aspects of perceptions towards in-group collective narratives. Specific correlations were hypothesized as follows: 2.1. Legitimating in-group collective narratives and empathy to in-group collective narratives were hypothesized to be positively correlated. 2.2. Legitimating in-group collective narratives and anger to in-group collective narratives were hypothesized to be negatively correlated. 2.3. Empathy to in-group collective narratives and anger to in-group collective narratives were hypothesized to be negatively correlated. 3. Significant correlations were hypothesized between cognitive and emotional aspects of perceptions towards the “other” group’s collective narratives. Specific correlations were hypothesized as follows: 3.1. Legitimating “other” group’s collective narratives and empathy to “other” group’s collective narratives were hypothesized to be positively correlated. 3.2. Legitimating “other” group’s collective narratives and anger to “other” group’s collective narratives were hypothesized to be negatively correlated. 3.3. Empathy to “other” group’s collective narratives and anger to “other” group’s collective narratives were hypothesized to be negatively correlated. 4. Significant differences were hypothesized between perceptions towards ingroup collective narratives and “other” group’s collective narratives.

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5. Acculturation attitudes were hypothesized to be correlated to perceptions towards collective narratives. The specific correlations were hypothesized as follows: 5.1. Integration attitudes of acculturation were hypothesized to be positively correlated to legitimating both in-group and “other” group collective narratives, and empathy to both in-group and “other” group’s collective narratives. 5.2. Separation attitudes of acculturation were hypothesized to be positively correlated with legitimating in-group collective narratives, empathy to in-group collective narratives and anger to “other” group’s collective narratives; and negatively correlated with legitimating “other” group’s collective narratives, empathy to “other” group’s collective narratives and anger to in-group collective narratives.

Sampling The sample for this research consisted of 202 ethnic Albanians and 122 ethnic Serbs who live in Kosovo. Ages ranged from 18 to 70. The sample was drawn from different localities in Kosovo excluding the four administrative units in the north of Kosovo. The subsample of Albanians included 56.5 % males and 43.5 % females, while the subsample of Serbs included 57.8 % males and 42.2 % females. In our sample 1.5 % of Albanians and 4.2 % of Serbs had only primary school education, 19.9 % of Albanians and 51.7 % of Serbs had high school diplomas, 53.7 % of Albanians and 37.5 % of Serbs had undergraduate degrees, and 24.9 % of Albanians and 6.7 % of Serbs had postgraduate degrees.

Procedure The questionnaires were administered on main streets of different towns. The selection of participants was based on first come: the first persons met were given the questionnaire to fill in. Citizens were presented with the aim of the research. They were then asked to participate and were told that they could refuse. They were also told that if they wanted to participate, their anonymity would be assured. The surveyors were guided to wait until the participant had completed the questionnaire and to help him/her read it when necessary, but if s/he so wished, the participant could ask to fill in the questionnaire without the surveyor’s presence.

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Measures All of these questionnaires were developed in English and were translated into Albanian and Serbian. Translation accuracy was assessed through back translation into English. A pilot study was conducted for 58 participants of both ethnic groups. The reliability of the questionnaires was measured using this pilot study. The Acculturation Questionnaire was constructed to measure both preference for own group’s culture and preference for “other” group’s culture as represented in several domains (friendship, neighborhood, workplace, music, language, customs and ethnic community affairs). Response to each item consisted of a self-rated Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all true”) to 5 (“Very true”). The creation of the indexes of this questionnaire was based on its dimensions: (1) ‘preference for one’s own group’s culture’ and (2) ‘preference for the other group’s culture’. The combination of scores on the indexes enabled classification of respondents according to acculturation attitudes: participants who scored higher than 3 on both indexes were classified as having integration attitudes; participants who scored lower than 3 on both indexes were classified as having marginalization attitudes; participants who scored higher than 3 on ‘preference for one’s own culture’ index and lower than 3 on ‘preference for the other group’s culture’ were classified as having separation attitudes; and participants who scored lower than 3 on ‘preference for one’s own culture’ and higher than 3 on ‘preference for the other culture’ were classified as having assimilation attitudes. There was a total of 16 items on this questionnaire. The first dimension had 9 items and the second had 7 items. The first 9 items applied to the attitude towards one’s own ethnic group and the other 7 items applied to attitudes toward the other ethnic group. For example, the first item which was presented to Serbs was “I want to have more Serb friends.” The tenth item was “I want to have more Albanian friends.” The Perceptions of Collective Narratives Questionnaire was based on the mainstream views of Albanians and Serbs concerning the armed conflict during 1998–1999 and events preceding and directly following this conflict. This questionnaire is based on the model of the collective narratives questionnaire designed by a group of Israeli and Palestinian scholars (Sagy et al. 2002). They developed a tool to study cognitive and emotional elements of perceptions related to collective narratives of both the “in-group” and the “other group”. They measured legitimacy, as related to the cognitive elements of attitude, and empathy and anger as related to affective elements. The contradictory narratives of the ethnic groups in this research were gathered from five focus groups. These focus groups were conducted in different areas in Kosovo. One focus group was conducted with only Albanian participants in an Albanian mono-ethnic locality. Another focus group was

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conducted with only Serb participants in a Serb mono-ethnic locality. Three focus groups were conducted with mixed participants in mixed Albanian and Serb localities. Each of these focus groups had both Albanian and Serb participants. All focus groups were conducted during November and December of 2011. We constructed the perception of collective narratives questionnaire based on the contradictory collective narratives gathered from these focus groups. This questionnaire consists of structured questions that present mainstream views of Albanians and Serbs concerning particular historical events of the interethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement and disagreement with statements about each collective narrative. These statements concern legitimacy, empathy and anger. The degree of agreement and disagreement scaled from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Results Acculturation attitudes First, we conducted factorial analysis of the data gathered by the acculturation questionnaire. The PCA factor analysis using PROMAX (oblique rotation) indicated the presence of two stable factors. The first factor was identified as ‘preference for one’s own group’s culture’ and second was identified as ‘preference for the other group’s culture.’ The significant negative correlation which was found between these two factors (r= -0.29) indicates that the bidimensional model has been preserved and the indexes are reliable. Indexes were created by averaging the items, and acculturation attitudes were classified using the midpoint in each dimension (for example, a respondent who scored higher than 3 on the Likert scale in both indexes was classified as expressing integration, and so on). As in the first hypothesis, the majority of Albanian participants (89.1 %) and Serb participants (87.7 %) have separation attitudes of acculturation. For the rest of the participants, the results indicate that 4.0 % of Albanian participants and 5.7 % of Serb participants have integration attitudes of acculturation; 0.5 % of Albanian participants and 0.8 % of Serb participants have assimilation attitudes of acculturation; and 6.4 % of Albanian participants and 2.5 % of Serb participants have marginalization attitudes of acculturation. A significant difference was found between preference for one’s own group’s culture (Albanian participants: M = 4.42, SD = 0.81; Serb participants: M = 4.71, SD = 0.64) and preference for the other group’s culture (Albanian participants: M = 1.65, SD = 0.67; Serb participants: M =

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Table 9: Factor Analysis of the Acculturation Dimensions. No. Items

Factor 1

Factor 2

1.

I want to have more Albanian/Serb friends.

.823

-.037

2.

I want to have more Albanian/Serb neighbors.

.860

-.050

3.

I would like to work with Albanian/Serb colleagues.

.764

-.165

4.

I like music in Albanian/Serbian.

.787

-.077

5.

I prefer to speak the Albanian/Serbian language.

.842

.003

6.

I like Albanian/Serbian customs.

.753

.072

7.

I see myself as member of Albanian/Serb community.

.825

.082

8.

I am proud of being Albanian/Serb.

.654

.131

9.

I like to participate in activities of the Albanian/Serb community.

.766

.078

.093

.854

11. I want to have more Serb/Albanian neighbors.

-.052

.821

12. I would like to work with Serb/Albanian colleagues.

-.037

.833

13. I like music in Serbian/Albanian.

-.124

.666

14. I prefer to speak Serbian/Albanian language.

-.001

.593

15. I like Serbian/Albanian customs.

.101

.685

16. I like to participate in activities of Serb/Albanian community.

.086

.740

10. I want to have more Serb/Albanian friends.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

1.74, SD = 0.81).The results of paired-samples t-tests were: Albanian participants: t(201) = 33.39, p = 0.00 l; Serb participants: t(121) = 27.32, p = 0.00. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to analyze differences between Albanian participants and Serb participants. Significant differences were found only in the dimension of preference for one’s own group’s culture: t(322) = -3.42, p = 0.00.

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Perceptions of collective narratives The same method of creating indexes as in the acculturation attitudes questionnaire was applied to create indexes of the collective narratives questionnaire. The results of perceptions towards in-group collective narratives indicate that 99.0 % of Albanian participants and 94.3 % of Serb participants legitimate these collective narratives; 94.6 % of Albanian participants and 92.6 % of Serb participants empathize with these collective narratives and 13.4 % of Albanian participants and 13.9 % of Serb participants are angry about these collective narratives. Regarding perceptions of the other group collective narratives, the results indicate that 3.0 % of Albanian participants and 6.6 % of Serb participants legitimate these collective narratives; 5.9 % of Albanian participants and 9.8 % of Serb participants empathize with these collective narratives; and 55.0 % of Albanian participants and 71.3 % of Serb participants are angry about these collective narratives. The zero-order correlations indicate that there are positive correlations between legitimating in-group collective narratives and empathy to in-group collective narratives (r = 0.78; p = 0.00), legitimating in-group collective narratives and anger towards in-group collective narratives (r = -0.25; p = 0.00); empathy to in-group collective narratives and anger towards in-group collective narratives (r = – 0.30, p = 0.00), legitimating “other” group’s collective narratives and empathy towards “other” group’s collective narratives (r = 0.77; p = 0.00), legitimating “other” group’s collective narratives and anger towards the “other” group’s collective narratives (r = – 0.25; p = 0.00), and empathy to “other” group’s collective narratives and anger towards the “other” group’s collective narratives (r = – 0.16; p = 0.00). These findings completely support our second and third hypotheses relating to cognitive (legitimating) and emotional aspects (empathy and anger) of perceptions of in-group and “other” group’s collective narratives. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to analyze the differences in perception of collective narratives between Albanian participants and Serb participants. We found such differences: between legitimating in-group collective narratives (Albanian participants: M = 4.34, SD = 0.44; Serb participants: M = 4.12, SD = 0.59) (t(322) = 3.80, p = 0.00) and “other” group’s collective narratives (Albanian participants: M = 2.00, SD = 0.62; Serb participants: M = 1.77, SD = 0.73) (t(322) = 2.99, p = 0.00), and between anger towards in-group collective narratives (Albanian participants: M = 2.15, SD = 0.88; Serb participants: M = 1.93, SD = 0.89) and “other” group’s collective narratives (Albanian participants: M = 3.19, SD = 0.91; Serb participants: M = 3.60, SD = 1.07) (t(321) = – 3.67, p = 0.00). As predicted in the fourth hypothesis, the results of paired-samples t-test indicate that there are significant differences between perceptions of in-group collective

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narratives and “other” group’s collective narratives in both cognitive aspects and emotional aspects of perceptions. Table 10: T-Test Results for the Mean Differences between Perceptions of In-group Collective Narratives and “Other” Group’s Collective Narratives (scale: 1 strongly disagree–5 strongly agree). Responses towards collective narratives

Mean SD

Legitimating in-group

4.25

0.51

Legitimating “other” group

1.92

0.67

Empathy in-group

4.11

0.65

Empathy “other” group

1.99

0.75

Anger in-group

2.07

0.89

Anger out-group

3.35

0.99

t-value df

p (two-tailed)

44.70

323 0.00

35.12

320 0.00

–15.71 322 0.00

Logistic regression was conducted to test the fifth hypothesis. We tested relations between acculturation attitudes and perceptions towards collective narratives. Acculturation attitudes were entered as dependent variables and perceptions towards collective narratives as covariates. Significant relations were found only between integration attitudes of acculturation and empathy towards own group’s collective narratives (B = 1.87, SE = 0.93, p = 0.04), and between integration attitudes of acculturation and empathy towards “other’ group’s collective narratives (B = 1.01, SE = 0.43, p = 0.02).

Discussion This study aimed at exploring the relationship of perceptions towards collective narratives and acculturation attitudes as indicators of openness towards the “other” group and reconciliation in a post-armed conflict context. This integrative conceptual framework was developed by Sagy and her colleagues and was tested in the Israeli context (e. g., Ayalon et al. 2011; Mana et al. 2012, 2013; Srour et al. 2013). The main findings of the previous studies supported this model, meaning that perceptions towards one’s “own” group

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and the “other” group collective narratives are related to acculturation attitudes. The results indeed showed that strategies of willingness to compete or separate from the “other” group were related to a greater acceptance of the “in-group” collective narratives and lower acceptance of “other” group’s collective narratives (Ayalon et al. 2011; Mana et al. 2012; Sagy et al. 2002). In the present study we examined the perceptions towards contradictory collective narratives related to recent, historical and political events. We employed this model for the first time in a divided society in the case of two ethnic groups involved in the armed conflict in 1998–1999 in Kosovo: Albanians and Serbs. Findings of the present study support this integrative model only in a specific domain: relationship between integration attitudes of acculturation and empathy towards collective narratives. Integration attitudes of acculturation are found positively related to both empathy towards ingroup collective narratives and “other” group’s collective narratives. Unlike other studies which employed this research model, this study did not find any relationships between cognitive aspects of collective narratives and acculturation attitudes. These findings raise questions for further research about the applicability of this integrative model in different contexts and the importance of exploring empathy in intergroup relations in post-armed conflict contexts. The features of the divided society in post-armed context are reflected in the findings of this study. A majority of participants of both ethnic groups expressed separation attitudes of acculturation, legitimating and empathy for the in-group collective narratives and anger at the “other” group’s collective narratives, whereas a small percentage of participants expressed other attitudes of acculturation, legitimating and empathy for the “other” group’s collective narratives and anger towards in-group collective narratives. To understand these findings, we must consider the contextual factors which may potentially be related to these findings: 1) the time distance from when the armed conflict took place to the present and 2) the space in which conflicting groups continue to live. The armed conflict took place fifteen years prior to this study. It is very likely that members of these ethnic groups experienced this conflict directly. Since the end of the armed conflict, a majority of Serbs have settled in enclaves where the opportunities of contact with members of the other ethnic group have been very limited. Endorsement of separation attitudes of acculturation on a large scale shows that there is no solid background of reconciliation. However, the positive relations between empathy towards collective narratives of both groups and integration attitudes of acculturation show that the empathy can be a potential factor to improve interethnic attitudes and therefore foster a reconciliation process. The findings of the relationship between empathy towards collective narratives and integration attitudes of acculturation are consistent with Schnabel-Nadler (2008) conceptual framework which distinguishes between instrumental reconciliation and socio-emotional reconciliation. Socio-emotional reconciliation is a process of mending the lingering emotions and

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threats to identity created during the conflict. The researchers argue that if groups in conflict “coexist separately”, instrumental reconciliation can be a useful option. On the contrary, if the groups in a conflict have to live in the same society, socio-emotional reconciliation can be a viable option. In conclusion, our findings suggest that employing this integrative model (Ayalon & Sagy, 2011) in a post-armed conflict context presents different results and raises questions about the implications of this integrative model in a variety of conflict contexts. The findings of this study show the significance of the emotional aspect in changing intergroup relations in a post-armed conflict context. Among other domains of the applied conceptual framework in this study, empathy towards collective narratives of the “other” group was the only domain, which was found significant in explaining integration attitudes. This suggests that empathy might serve as a starting point in reducing hostilities between groups in conflict. Psychological and emotional injuries may be the most enduring effects of the war, more than other cognitive or behavioral elements. These must be addressed in terms of rebuilding a society, preventing future violence (Olweean 2003) and improving relations between the groups in conflict. Reconciliation and peace necessitate taking the role of the other with compassion to gain an empathetic understanding of the other’s experiences (Peterson-Armour & Umbreit 2005). Based on our findings, it appears that empathy plays a crucial role in openness towards the “other” group and reconciliation in a post-armed conflict context. Further research is needed to shed light on factors which could induce empathy toward the “other” group in such contexts.

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About the Editors

Lily Gardner Feldman is the Harry & Helen Gray Senior Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where she directs the Institute’s Society, Culture & Politics Program. From 1978 until 1991, Dr. Gardner Feldman was an Assistant Professor and subsequently an Associate Professor of political science at Tufts University in Boston. She has held research positions at Harvard University’s Center for European Studies and Center for International Affairs, and at Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Studies. Dr. Gardner Feldman has published widely in the U.S. and Europe on international reconciliation, German foreign policy, German-Jewish relations, non-state entities as foreign policy players, and the EU as an international actor. Her latest book is Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Raisa Barash is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. She received her PhD in Political Science from Moscow State University in 2010. Her recent research focuses on the issues of multicultural communities, identity and self-determination, ethnic and national subjectivity, civic community and the dynamics of mass consciousness in post-Soviet states. Samuel Goda works as Assistant Professor and Vice-Dean for Development at the Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava. His main research areas include OSCE related issues, conflict transformation and reconciliation, EU CFSP/CSDP, as well as a regional scope of Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. Dr Goda also works as researcher and project manager at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, dealing mostly with OSCE-related issues, international security and development aid activities in the Republic of Moldova. He is also a representative at the “OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.” As of 2018, under the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, Samuel became the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Youth and Security. Andr8 Zempelburg is a research assistant at the chair of Religious Studies of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (Germany) and the Jena Center for

226

About the Editors

Reconciliation Studies (JCRS). His current research is on the concept of reconciliation in (Rabbinic) Judaism as a part of the trilateral project “Hearts of Flesh – Not Stone”, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). He is chairman of the association Verein zur Versöhnungsforschung und -praxis (VVV) since its foundation in 2015.

About the Authors

Klaus Bachmann is professor of political science at SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Poland. He specializes in Transitional Justice, dealing with the past and contemporary European history. He has held several research stays at, among others, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Renmin University Bejing, and the universities of Vienna, Bordeaux, and Stellenbosch. He is currently conducting a 5–year-research project on the impact of international criminal tribunals on the societies and the judiciary under their jurisdiction. He is the author (with Aleksandar Fatic´) of the monograph “The UN International Criminal Tribunals. Transition without Justice?” published by Taylor and Francisin 2015. He co-edited The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention (Peter Lang 2014). Raisa Barash is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. She received her PhD in Political Science from Moscow State University in 2010. Her recent research focuses on the issues of multicultural communities, identity and self-determination, ethnic and national subjectivity, civic community and the dynamics of mass consciousness in post-Soviet states. Lily Gardner Feldman is the Harry & Helen Gray Senior Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where she directs the Institute’s Society, Culture & Politics Program. From 1978 until 1991, Dr. Gardner Feldman was an Associate Professor of political science at Tufts University in Boston. She has held research positions at Harvard University’s Center for European Studies and Center for International Affairs, and at Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Studies. Dr. Gardner Feldman has published widely in the U.S. and Europe on international reconciliation, German foreign policy, German-Jewish relations, non-state entities as foreign policy players, and the EU as an international actor. Her latest book is Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Samuel Goda works as Assistant Professor and Vice-Dean for Development at the Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava.

228

About the Authors

His main research areas include OSCE related issues, conflict transformation and reconciliation, EU CFSP/CSDP, as well as a regional scope of Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. Dr Goda also works as researcher and project manager at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, dealing mostly with OSCE-related issues, international security and development aid activities in the Republic of Moldova. He is also a representative at the “OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.” As of 2018, under the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, Samuel became the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Youth and Security. Jolanta Jonaszko holds a Bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages (German and Russian) from Oxford University and a Master’s Degree in European and Russian Studies from Yale University. After graduation, she worked in a communication consultancy IFOK specializing in the design and facilitation of dialogue processes, among others for the German government. Since 2014, Jolanta has worked as a consultant at Lee Hecht Harrison focusing on change and talent management. Through research and active group facilitation, she aims to combine the theory and practice of reconciliation among individuals and groups from private and public institutions. Annam#ria Kiss is a Researcher at the Center for European Neighborhood Studies (CENS) at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Annam#ria received her B.A. degree in International Relations and her M.A. in Russian Studies, both from the Eötvös Ljr#nd University. She worked for the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs before joining CENS. She has also participated in several research projects in cooperation with other Budapestbased institutions. Her primary interest are in Russian foreign and security policy ; her research also covers the Caucasus, radical Islam in Russia and postSoviet politics. Olga Konkka, PhD, is a teaching and research assistant in the Bordeaux Montaigne University, France. She entered the People’s Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, and obtained her master’s degree in Journalism in 2007. Living in France since 2008, she received a master’s degree in Slavic Studies from Bordeaux Montaigne University in 2012. A doctoral scholarship winner, between 2012–2016 she pursued research for her thesis “Looking for a New Vision of 20th century Russian History : Analysis of the Secondary School History Textbooks in Post-Soviet Russia (1991–2016).” Since 2012, she has been teaching Russian civilization, history and language to undergraduate students. Karina V. Korostelina is a Professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, GMU and a Director of the Program on History, Memory and Conflict. She is a leading expert on identity-based conflicts, peace culture,

About the Authors

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conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She has authored more than 80 articles and chapters and is an author or editor of 15 books including authorship of History Education in the Formation of Social Identity : Toward a Culture of Peace (2013) and editorship of History Can Bite – History Education in Divided and Post-War Societies (2016) and History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Reconsidering Joint Textbook Projects (2013). Martin Leiner holds the Chair of Systematic Theology/Ethics in the Faculty of Theology at Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany. Since 2014, he is also Associate Professor in the group of Ecclesiology and Practical Theology at Stellenbosch University in South Africa. He is the Director of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS; www.jcrs.uni-jena.de), which he founded in 2013. He edits the series “Research in Peace and Reconciliation” (RIPAR). From 1998 to 2002 he was Professor of Systematic Theology and Hermeneutics in Neuch.tel, Switzerland. From 2000 to 2002 he also worked as President of the Ethics Center of the University of Geneva. He is the author of many books and articles on reconciliation and other topics (see homepage under : http:// www.theologie.uni-jena.de). Matthew Rojansky is the Director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is an expert on U.S. relations with the states of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. He has advised governments, intergovernmental organizations, and major private actors on conflict resolution and efforts to enhance shared security throughout the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region. From 2010 to 2013, he was Deputy Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. There, he founded Carnegie’s Ukraine Program, led a multi-year project to support U.S.-Russia health cooperation, and created a track-two task force to promote resolution of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict. From 2007 to 2010, Rojansky served as executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America (PSA), which seeks to rebuild bipartisan dialogue and productive debate on U.S. national security and foreign policy challenges. Shifra Sagy is professor emerita of psychology in the Department of Education at Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel. She is the former chair of the department of education and the founder of a new multidisciplinary graduate program on conflict management and resolution. She is currently the director of the Martin-Springer Center for Conflict Studies. Sagy’s major research interests are salutogenesis, coping, and adjustment to stressors, both normative and non-normative. She is also involved in studies in political psychology concerning historical and political consciousness of young Israelis and Palestinians. She has published some 100 empirical and theoretical articles in a variety of professional journals in the USA, Europe, and Israel.

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About the Authors

During the past three decades, Sagy has been involved in peace education in the Palestinian – Israeli context: teaching, lecturing, writing, researching, participating, and initiating dialogue workshops. Mimoza Telaku has a doctorate from the Conflict Management and Resolution Program of the Interdisciplinary Studies Department at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel. Her dissertation was on “Community Sense of Coherence and Openness toward the ‘Other’ in Intergroup Relations: The Case of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.” Her research interests are focused on attitudes of groups in conflict, collective narratives/memory in post-conflict context, group processes, acculturation, and collective identity. Prior to this degree she graduated with a BA and a M.Sc. in Psychology. She has worked for a variety of research and intervention projects in the field of social reconstruction. Katja Wezel was the DAAD Visiting Assistant Professor of History at the University of Pittsburgh. She obtained her PhD at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, in 2011 and is the author of Geschichte als Politikum. Lettland und die Aufarbeitung nach der Diktatur (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2016). Her research interests focus on 19th and 20th century Baltic history and transnational approaches to the study of memory politics, nationalism, and cultural conflicts in Central Eastern Europe.