The Forgotten Subject: Subject Constitutions in Mediatized Everyday Worlds [1st ed. 2023] 3658428716, 9783658428716

Citation preview

The Forgotten Subject Subject Constitutions in Mediatized Everyday Worlds Edited by Peter Gentzel · Friedrich Krotz Jeffrey Wimmer · Rainer Winter

The Forgotten Subject

Peter Gentzel • Friedrich Krotz • Jeffrey Wimmer • Rainer Winter Editors

The Forgotten Subject Subject Constitutions in Mediatized Everyday Worlds

Editors Peter Gentzel Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Erlangen, Germany

Friedrich Krotz Universität Bremen Bremen, Germany

Jeffrey Wimmer Universität Augsburg Augsburg, Germany

Rainer Winter Universität Klagenfurt Klagenfurt, Austria

ISBN 978-3-658-42871-6 ISBN 978-3-658-42872-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3

(eBook)

This book is a translation of the original German edition „Das vergessene Subjekt“ by Gentzel, Peter, published by Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH in 2019. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com). A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany Paper in this product is recyclable.

Contents

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies . . . . . Peter Gentzel, Friedrich Krotz, Jeffrey Wimmer, and Rainer Winter

1

Part I Subject Conceptions in Communication Studies Research and in the Light of Current Developments in Social and Cultural Studies How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject Concept of Communication Studies in the Age of Digitally Mediatized 17 Lifestyles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Friedrich Krotz The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hubert Knoblauch

37

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization and the Transformations of the Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rainer Winter

55

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication and Media Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peter Gentzel

79

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Jacob Johanssen

v

vi

Contents

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on Communicative Negotiation Processes in Data-Driven Times . . . . . . 123 Jakob Hörtnagl Part II

Empirical Analyses of the Meaning of Subjectivity and Identity in and for Digital Communication in Mediatized Worlds

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and Socio-cultural Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Christina Schachtner From Subject to User: And Back? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Manfred Faßler The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Gerrit Fröhlich Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Holger Herma and Laura Maleyka On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Kerstin Jergus Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Sascha Oswald

Contributors

Editors Peter Gentzel University of Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Friedrich Krotz ZeMKI, Bremen, Germany Jeffrey Wimmer University of Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Rainer Winter Institute for Media and Communication Studies, Alpen-Adria University Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

Authors Hubert Knoblauch Institute of Sociology, Berlin University of Technology, Berlin, Germany Jacob Johanssen St. Mary’s University Twickenham, London, UK Jakob Hörtnagl University of Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Christina Schachtner Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria Manfred Faßler Formerly Institute for Cultural Anthropology and European Ethnology, Frankfurt am Main, Germany Gerrit Fröhlich University of Trier, Trier, Germany Holger Herma Institute for Social Sciences, University of Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany

vii

viii

Contributors

Laura Maleyka Institute of Social Sciences, University of Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany Kerstin Jergus University of Technology Braunschweig, Braunschweig, Germany Sascha Oswald Institute of Social Sciences, University of Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies Peter Gentzel, Friedrich Krotz, Jeffrey Wimmer, and Rainer Winter

Abstract

The volume focuses on the question of the transforming relationship between subject, communication and society, in which – according to our thesis – the currently rapid change of media plays a central role. The mediatization approach is recommended as an entry point into this complex question for several reasons, because it represents an analytically consistent perspective that brings together communicative and medial processes of change with social and cultural ones. From this perspective, subjects emerge on the basis of communicative actions, practices and habits and the processing of the experience associated with them, all of which are in turn closely linked to social contexts and processes.

P. Gentzel (✉) Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] F. Krotz ZeMKI, Bremen, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] J. Wimmer Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Alpen-Adria Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Österreich e-mail: [email protected] R. Winter Universität Augsburg, Augsburg, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_1

1

2

1

P. Gentzel et al.

Introduction

The focus of this volume is the question of the transforming relationship between subject, communication and society, in which – according to our thesis – the currently rapid change of media plays a central role (cf. in detail Krotz, 2017, p. 31). The mediatization approach is recommended as an entry point into this complex question for several reasons, because it represents an analytically consistent perspective that brings together communicative and medial processes of change with social and cultural ones. From this perspective, subjects emerge on the basis of communicative actions, practices and habits and the processing of the experience associated with them, all of which are in turn closely linked to social contexts and processes. This framework of analysis ties in with the Animal Symbolicum’s conception of man (Cassirer, 2007) and cultural studies, and expands the study of communication processes to include their social as well as cultural dimensions (cf. Krotz’s contribution in detail). Phenomena of action coordination, communalization and socialization are taken into account as well as the symbolic forms of explicit and implicit knowledge. From an empirical point of view, personal and situational conditions of communication are increasingly coming into view. Thus, for an adequate understanding of subject-related processes, both concrete communication frames, roles, motives and contents as well as the interrelated, mutually distinguishable aspects of media as techniques, social institutions, staging apparatuses and the spaces of experience thus socially and technically spanned are analytically significant.

2

Deficits in Communication Science, the Necessity of a Subject Concept and the Mediatization Approach as a Possible Starting Point

In the pre-digital journalism studies of the twentieth century, individuals were often considered solely as users of media, prototypically in the uses-and-gratifications approach as a bundle of needs, or conversely as objects of media effects (cf. Pürer, 2003). This abbreviation resulted from the media-centeredness of theory and empiricism at that time, which is most clearly expressed in the well-known Lasswell formula. Especially in German-language communication studies, the disciplinary material and formal objects were for a long time very narrowly bound to mass communication or public communication (cf. critically Hepp, 2016). More complex notions of individuality and subjectivity or of socialization and communization

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies

3

were therefore hardly developed within this discipline, but were primarily derived from concepts of “media use and reception” or “audience”. Similarly, the dictum associated with the development of the uses-and-gratifications approach, “What do people do with the media?” (Rosengren et al., 1985) merely led to the consideration and aggregation of reified motives of single individuals. Accordingly, the “active recipient” in this context is also usually only someone who selects media offerings for reception on the basis of rational and reflected needs (cf. critically Dahlgren, 2013). Activities of understanding and mediating, of appropriation and use of media that go beyond this, in interaction with changing social and cultural framework conditions, have so far been more strongly addressed, above all, only within the framework of cultural studies or in relation to Bourdieu’s habitus approach (cf. the contributions in Hepp et al., 2015). Accordingly, a broad discussion in communication studies of the differentiated ‘activities’ of the subject in confrontation with, for example, sociological or socialpsychological theories has hardly taken place so far. At best, “the subject” has so far been considered in communication studies rather unspecifically and in part not always distinctly in relation to other constructs, such as “actor” and “individual” on the one hand and “identity” and “self-image” on the other. Exemplary, Reichert (2008, p. 47) refers to the rather broad and somewhat fuzzy conceptual field of the study of media-mediated processes of subjectivation: In the discussion about the significance of self-thematization in blogs, wikis, chats, and forums, a kind of semantic conceptual field has recently emerged that attempts to define the practices of subjectification. This semantic web spans between the terms ‘identity work’, ‘biography work’, ‘self-narration’ and ‘self-management’ and is characterised by an emphatic concept of individuality.

Consequently, it is not surprising that, for example, it has not yet been clarified whether the acting subject is constituted in specific direct interaction or mediamediated communication processes. Or even what role the (media-mediated) reference to a sociocultural knowledge plays, and if so, in what mode this reference takes place. What has not been satisfactorily worked out so far is how the relationship between subject and identity must be conceived under the conditions of a digital media society. In the mediatized forms of contemporary social and cultural life, the previous disciplinary approaches are accordingly no longer sufficient, also because the development of the media is currently raising ever new questions. For in the mediatized worlds of the twenty-first century, the individual constitutes himself as an acting subject, especially in relation to the omnipresent and in many respects dominant digital media: in her/his media-related actions, she/he is actively involved

4

P. Gentzel et al.

in the production of social realities, she/he participates in various cultural and social processes, she/he projects himself into the net, she/he continuously develops himself in social relationships through and in relation to it, and at the same time she/he permanently participates in forms of community and socialization in work and leisure. From a critical perspective, however, she/he is also confronted with (media) demands for self-control, self-organisation and/or self-socialisation (cf. e.g. Bröckling, 2007; Thomas, 2007). In addition, however, the basic conditions of communication also change, which is of central importance because the subject ultimately emerges and develops in communicative practices. Thus, social and cultural structures such as hierarchy and power are inscribed in individuals via communicative processes, in order to be reproduced or changed by them in turn. Therefore, current theoretical debates and empirical studies increasingly focus on questions about the agency of actors in relation to techniques and objects (e.g. Lepa et al., 2014) or about the nature and meaning of individual ideas in light of an omnipresent and profound intertwining of reality with these (e.g. Couldry & Hepp, 2016). In this respect, the question of the subject aims beyond communication studies to become a powerful heuristic key concept or analytical strategy (Reckwitz, 2008, p. 10 f.) of research in the humanities, social sciences and cultural studies. In this context, it can be observed that the construct subject does not seem to be in very good shape in other disciplines at present. The marginalization of subject concepts in recent social theoretical discourses can be read as an indication of this thesis. For example, in the debates on a practice turn or practice theories (PT) (Schatzki, 1996; Schatzki et al., 2001), the – urgently needed – revaluation of the materiality of sociality and culture seems to be one-sidedly at the expense of the subject (Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016). At the very least, the emphasis on the routine, repetitive and habitualized character of practices is followed by a description of the social more in terms of order and stability. It is primarily the practices that contribute to a reproduction of the existing social order that are of interest. The disorganization and instability, the cultural change and the constant transformation of the social, which are more characteristic from the participant’s perspective, are, in contrast, mostly relegated to the background. Uprisings and rebellions against the neoliberal order, such as Occupy Wall Street or the Indignados movement in Spain, are spectacular and extra-ordinary in their linking of street protests with digital forms of resistance, but clearly point to the transformative power of digital practices (cf. Winter, 2010, 2016), which needs to be taken more into account in the analysis. Similarly, the Material Turn associated with these discourses (Bennett & Joyce, 2010), as well as the interdisciplinary institutionalizing Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Lengersdorf & Wieser, 2014), while making important contributions

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies

5

to the development of the theoretical and analytical tools of social science research, all too rarely seek to connect with subject theories. Finally, it is Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 2007) that decidedly assumes the subject as the Archimedean point of previous social theory and then polemically argues against it. Nevertheless, it makes sense to take up the impulses and contributions of these three research perspectives – PT, ANT and STS. For the technological “texture”, which represents a digital infrastructure for all symbolic operations of the lifeworld and synthesizes the social and cultural in general (Knorr-Cetina et al., 2017), makes more elaborate concepts necessary in order to be able to analyze precisely this. Furthermore, however, these analyses must then be re-integrated into the social and communicative practices of the everyday lifeworld. Only then can meaningful modulations of technology be truly understood, evaluated and criticized in sociopolitical terms. In this respect, it also helps to consult and further develop the classics of subject and subjectivation analysis. Starting points for such research questions are provided above all by sociology, which, as is well known, has at its disposal a variety of historically developed and current conceptions of the subject that are located in quite different theoretical traditions: In early Marx’s man bound to the truth of practice and in self-realization in work; in the conception, going back to Mead, that man is constituted as an acting subject in his communicative interactions and relations; in the assumption, as in Goffman, that subject formation is characterized above all by the effort to successfully present one’s self; that, as in Habermas, it is normatively about a subject capable of communication; that practice and habitus are of central importance for the formation of subject structures, as in Bourdieu; that it is the socially formed inner structures of the human being, as in Freud, in which the subject expresses itself and appropriates the world; that, as in Foucault, it formats itself within the social conditions of power or, as in Butler, is only produced by these. In this context, the associated social processes must then also be considered more closely. Here, for example, questions arise as to how helpful concepts such as individualization or identity still are today in order to be able to adequately examine the emergence and consequences of digital action in mediatized worlds. And how do we have to further develop our current theoretical concepts of social worlds, communicative figurations, neo-tribes etc. in order to be able to adequately describe today’s community processes? However, it is not only the classics of sociological theory formation that form important starting points for an understanding of a communicative subject that needs to be (re)developed. Rather, numerous other conceptual approaches should also be mentioned that have contributed to the further development of communication studies in the past and that can contribute to the development of a processual

6

P. Gentzel et al.

concept of the subject. In particular, psychoanalysis, Western Marxism and critical theory should be mentioned here: Psychoanalysis, as is well known, foregrounds the relationship between nature and culture condensed into the human being and his structure of action and experience in society. Western Marxism derives its image of man from the analysis of capital and labour and thus from the perspective of structural power, alienated labour relations and therefore asymmetrically constituted society. Critical theory has always been a relevant basis for media and cultural analysis, at least in Germany, and will continue to be so, especially on the basis of its references to psychoanalysis and Marxism, in the conceptualization of a theory of the subject under radical conditions of media change. Far from being able to comprehensively answer all the questions grounded in these considerations, the theoretical arguments and empirical analyses briefly sketched here make it necessary to develop subject concepts that expand and overcome the long-dominant media-centered perspective through research in the sense of mediatization research in a broader socially and culturally centered perspective. As is well known, the mediatization approach1 assumes a fundamental change of everyday life, culture and society in the context of the change of the media. Accordingly, it aims to take a current, historical and critical look at these two transformations – of the media on the one hand, and of human life forms on the other – and their interrelationship, i.e. to examine them empirically and to grasp them theoretically. In this context, mediatization is understood as a so-called metaprocess, i.e. as a development that takes place in a culturally and socially dependent manner, but is also of long-term significance for the development of humanity as a whole; furthermore, as a process that has always accompanied human development. Therefore, mediatization must always be examined in the context of other metaprocesses such as globalization, individualization, and economization (Krotz, 2001, 2011, 2014). According to this, today’s media change, which is often called digitalization in a somewhat undifferentiated and technology-deterministic way, must be traced back in particular to the potentials and uses of computers and the transition of media into hardware-software systems, and thus understood as the emergence of a general, digital, computer-based infrastructure for all symbolic operations of humankind, in which the old media systems are absorbed. On this basis, we call a social or cultural phenomenon, or an area of human action such as one’s family, friendships, or work situation, mediatized when the way in which this phenomenon ‘works’ cannot be understood without taking into account the media and their meaning for it. One area

1

For introductory and further literature, see Krotz (2001, 2007) and Krotz et al. (2014, 2017).

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies

7

of such change that is increasingly being studied in detail is the socialization of future generations. Growing up today, at least in industrial societies, takes place in the context of a constant presence of the Internet, smartphones and the like, and the consequences of these developments are now also widely discussed (cf. the contributions in Hoffmann et al., 2017).2 From these considerations, the question is immediately plausible whether the change of everyday life, culture and society in the context of the change of the media is limited to the environment of individuals, or whether the communicative subject also changes under such conditions, or whether it requires new competencies and skills as well as new integration mechanisms of increasingly complex contexts of experience, and what role changing socialization conditions play for this. This alone raises the question formulated at the beginning about the subject and its relationship to communication and society more fundamentally than ever before, since even in digital times the subject wants to be, or as a rule claims to be, the subject of its communication, however, with whom and for whatever reason.3 Analytical considerations on this can accordingly be linked to the “natural changeability of man as a social constant” (Elias, 1986, p. 110 ff.), which is inherent in man’s ability to actively and communicatively shape culture and society and in his dependence on it. In this respect, the change in the forms of human coexistence is not based on their biology or on the interplay of stimuli and reactions, but precisely on this social and cultural, especially sense-related variability (Linton, 1974, first 1945). For the change of people and their forms of living together, the respective means of communication are then of course also of particular importance (Elias, 1986, p. 118 ff.), which people acquire in their socialization processes and in their social actions throughout their lives (Hoffmann et al., 2017). In terms of the meaning of media and communication, humans can therefore be described in a very general way as Animal Symbolicum (Cassirer, 2007, p. 52). As this expression suggests, both evolutionary emergence and corporeality are significant, as is the unconditional embedding of humans in a symbolic environment. In this respect, communication is a basic human ability and of central importance for socialisation, because it is the basis of social exchange, of learning and of social relationships and individual development, by means of which a person grows into society and

2

See also Röser et al. (2017) and Greschke et al. (2017) on the communication structures that develop in connection with media use and along which families are constituted today. 3 Cf. also the discussion of the concept of subject by Daniel (1981), who relates this concept to integrating identity, reflective and reflected ego, and active self.

8

P. Gentzel et al.

acquires competences and characteristics. And on the other hand, today’s comprehensive media and communicative pressure on social institutions and processes, and on cultural senses and relevant discourses, causes social subjects to adapt to the resulting conditions and their changes. The social subject is thus a primarily communicatively based subject that changes in mediatization processes (Krotz, 2017). In the process, of course, not only people’s modes of expression and representation are transformed, but also their use. From the perspective of the mediatization approach, what is needed today is a more detailed concept of who actually communicates, i.e. how a communicatively understood subject constitutes itself in its communication with itself and with others and also develops in the context of the change in the media. For it is the resulting social relationships, knowledge and emotional experience, the institutional ties associated with them, the participation in culture and society mediated through them, which on the one hand constitute the human being as a subject in society, but on the other hand also produce the symbolic and conceptual categories in which perception and experience, feeling and thinking take place and which, through them, shape the human being.4 Insofar as mediatization processes are concerned, this must also be about the mediatized ego, the mediatized self as well as mediatized identity, so to speak (Krotz, 2017). Of course, such a concept is not limited to the perspective of the mediatization approach, even if the analytical need for it has not always been adequately considered in the traditional approaches of communication studies so far – a deficit that the contributions presented in the following would like to counteract.

3

Theoretical and Empirical Internal and External Perspectives: The Contributions of This Book

The starting point for the anthology is the conference “Mediatization, Digital Practices and the Subject”, which took place from 25 to 27 November 2015 at the Haus der Wissenschaft in Bremen. It was organized by the DFG Priority Programme 1505 “Mediatized Worlds” in cooperation with the “Sociology of Media Communication” section of the German Association for Communication Studies and the “Sociology of Media and Communication” section of the

Of course, the term ‘shaping’ requires further differentiation, especially empirical differentiation. In the social sciences, it expresses the fact that one does not really know what exactly is happening, only that something is happening (cf. problematizing Wimmer, 2019). 4

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies

9

German Sociological Association. The contributions presented briefly below are the result of a twofold selection process. First, they were specifically selected from the pool of conference papers, which all underwent a review process. Secondly, the form and orientation as well as the aim and added value of the intended publication were discussed in detail after the conference and the contributions were selected again on the basis of this concept. Finally, all authors were notified that their abstracts would be processed against the background of a good one-year distance (and the associated development processes). On the basis of the foundations and research perspectives outlined in the previous section, the volume aims to discuss conditions of the constitution and construction of subjects with regard to cultural, social and media conditions and their significance for communication processes and communicative action in both theoretical and empirical terms. This distinction between theoretical-conceptual argumentation and empirical investigations, although closely connected in terms of research practice, is also reflected in the structure of the volume. Thus, in a first part, contributions are gathered that primarily present theoretical and conceptual arguments. These contributions concern both the internal and the external dimension of research in communication studies, understood here as an integrative discipline. That is, subject conceptions of communication studies research as a whole are reconstructed, analyzed, criticized, and further perspectives are opened up (internal perspective). In addition, the relationship between subject, communication, society and media change is discussed in the light of the classics of sociological theory formation or current theory developments – e.g. from cultural studies, critical theory, psychoanalysis, communicative constructivism, STS or PT (external perspective). In his contribution – which introduces the first part of the anthology – Friedrich Krotz makes it clear that the currently urgent question of the subject is to be seen above all in the context of digitalization, which permeates all things social. From the point of view of communication studies, this process requires two analytical approaches: not only an appropriate concept of the subject and a related understanding of subjectivation, but also a fundamental concept of communication and a related understanding of media change. Hubert Knoblauch reinterprets the concept of subject from the perspective of communicative constructivism. Using the example of showing, he clarifies that the subject is to be understood as an attribute of communicative action that can be empirically modelled with subjects, selves and identities. Building on this, the formation of agents, roles, and collective identities in the context of socialization can be understood as an unfinished process of double subjectification: On the one hand, the subject becomes more public in times of mediatization; on the other hand, there is an increased internalization of action.

10

P. Gentzel et al.

Rainer Winter takes up the aspect of the mediatization of social networking analytically. From the perspective of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, he reconstructs how the self is formed in social interactions. The process of mediatization produces a digital self that is increasingly exposed to contexts of control and standardization. The article concludes by raising awareness of the need for civil society to be more intensively supported and encouraged to ensure that the digital transformation of the self does not curtail the freedom of the individual. Peter Gentzel takes up Winter’s critical impetus in terms of content. In his programmatic contribution, he combines aspects of PT, STS and ANT with Martin Heidegger’s analysis of technology in order to more appropriately investigate subjectivity and materiality in times of datafication (Couldry & Hepp, 2016). Jacob Johansson also integrates approaches from other disciplines to enrich the analytical perspective of communication studies. He presents selected psychoanalytic concepts that help to better understand the complexity of subjectification processes and formulate a more detailed subject theory. At the same time, methodological suggestions are also given. Jakob Hörtnagel’s contribution rounds off the strongly theoreticallyconceptually oriented first part. As in Gentzel’s work, the diagnosis of the datafication of the subject is the starting point of his argumentation. However, Hörtnagel focuses on the approaches of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and the associated concepts of governmentality and modulation. With these, it can be analytically traced how algorithmic processing processes become part of communicative acts and practices of self- and other-direction. He grasps these as processes of divisiveness, which context-sensitive mediatization research should take more into account. The second part of the anthology contains more empirically-analytically oriented contributions that use case studies to describe the significance of subjectivity in and for digital(r) communication in mediatized worlds, such as communicative identity constructions in digital media environments. Christina Schachtner interprets from an intersubjective as well as narrative-theoretical perspective the results of an international research project in which several net actors and bloggers were interviewed. She is able to identify six types of narration or narrative practices, which in turn constantly shape the self of the actors in different ways in the various regions of the world. Manfred Faßler outlines the empirical topicality of the digital and irrevocable transformation of the (written world) subject into a computer user like a parforceride. This process goes hand in hand with a de-differentiation of social and technological constitution or of subject and user and the emergence of the so-called prakteur, who constantly adapts to the unavoidable coupling of networked things and programs as well as their participation requirements as a kind of open subject. Like Hörtnagel, Gerrit Fröhlich refers to Foucault’s theoretical framework.

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies

11

However, he focuses on the practices and procedures that decisively determine the process of subjectification and that can be subsumed under the concept of technologies of the self. Using two empirical case studies of media-based technologies of the self, diary-keeping in the eighteenth century and digital life management in the contemporary Quantify Yourself movement, he illustrates the potential of interdisciplinary analysis for more detailed insights. In their analysis of the commentary section of ZEIT Online, Holger Herma and Laura Maleyka empirically investigate the communication practices actors use to design themselves as subjects and the extent to which positioning of discussion participants can be interpreted as indications of subjectification processes. With recourse to Jo Reichertz’s concept of communication power, they conclude that digital communication does not make subjectivity disappear, but rather functions as a generator of subjectivation. Kerstin Jergus illuminates the formation of the subject from the point of view of the mediality of the pedagogical. She is able to show that the media obliviousness of the current discourse on educational policy disregards the constitutive position of the so-called in-between, in which subject and world could enter into a relationship, with problematic consequences. Concluding the second part, Sascha Oswald focuses content-analytically on memes as visual practices of subjectivation. Using the case study of the friendzone discourse within the online community 9gag, he illustrates the extent to which the specific medial properties of this Internet phenomenon as well as its presence in a very specifically structured digital space result in altered perceptual schemata and new techniques of selfthematization. Finally, we would like to express our sincere thanks to the following people: Cathrin Despotović and Merle-Marie Kruse, who prepared and conducted the 2015 conference together with us, the series editors Maren Hartmann, Andreas Hepp, and Waldemar Vogelgesang, who made this volume possible, Julia Augart for proofreading, and Monika Mülhausen and Barbara Emig-Roller from Springer VS for the professional implementation of the anthology.

References Alkemeyer, T., & Buschmann, N. (2016). Praktiken der Subjektivierung – Subjektivierung als Praxis. In H. Schäfet (Ed.), Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm (pp. 115–136). transcript. Bennett, T., & Joyce, P. (2010). Material powers: Cultural studies, history and the material turn. Routledge.

12

P. Gentzel et al.

Bröckling, U. (2007). Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform. Suhrkamp. Cassirer, E. (2007). Versuch über den Menschen. Felix Meiner. Couldry, N., & Hepp, A. (2016). The mediated construction of reality. Polity. Dahlgren, P. (2013). Tracking the civic subject in the media landscape. Versions of the democratic ideal. Television & New Media, 14(1), 71–88. Daniel, C. (1981). Theorien der Subjektivität. Campus Studium. Elias, N. (1986). Was ist Soziologie? (7. Aufl.). Juventus. Greschke, H., Dreßler, D., & Hierasimovicz, K. (2017). Die Mediatisierung von Eltern-KindBeziehungen im Kontext grenzüberschreitender Migration. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess (pp. 59–80). VS Verlag. Hepp, A. (2016). Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft in datengetriebenen Zeiten. Publizistik, 61, 225–246. Hepp, A., Krotz, F., Lingenberg, S., & Wimmer, J. (Hrsg.). (2015). Handbuch Cultural Studies. Springer VS. Hoffmann, D., Krotz, F., & Reissmann, W. (Eds.). (2017). Mediatisierung und Mediensozialisation. Springer VS. Knorr-Cetina, K., Reichmann, W., & Woermann, N. (2017). Dimensionen und Dynamiken synthetisierter Gesellschaften. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Hrsg.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess: Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (S. 35–85). Springer VS. Krotz, F. (2001). Die Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. Wie sich Alltag und soziale Beziehungen, Kultur und Gesellschaft durch die Medien wandeln. Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2007). Mediatisierung. Fallstudien zum Wandel von Kommunikation. VS Verlag. Krotz, F. (2011). Mediatisierung als Metaprozess. In J. Hagenah & H. Meulemann (Eds.), Mediatisierung der Gesellschaft? (pp. 19–41). LIT. Krotz, F. (2014). Media related actions and the meta process mediatization. In A. Hepp & F. Krotz (Eds.), Mediatized worlds (pp. 72–87). Palgrave. Krotz, F. (2017). Mediatisierung: Ein Forschungskonzept. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess: Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (pp. 13–34). Springer. Krotz, F., Despotović, C., & Kruse, M. (Eds.). (2014). Die Mediatisierung sozialer Welten: Synergien empirischer Forschung. Springer. Krotz, F., Despotovic, C., & Kruse, M. (Eds.). (2017). Mediatisierung als Metaprozess: Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem. Springer. Latour, B. (2007). Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue Gesellschaft – Einführung in die Akteur-Netzwerk Theorie. Suhrkamp. Lengersdorf, D., & Wieser, M. (Eds.). (2014). Schlüsselwerke der Science and Technology Studies. Springer VS. Lepa, S., Krotz, F., & Hoklas, A.-K. (2014). Vom ,Medium‘ zum ,Mediendispositiv‘: Metatheoretische Überlegungen zur Integration von Situations- und Diskursperspektive bei der empirischen Analyse mediatisierter sozialer Welten. In F. Krotz, C. Despotović, & M. Kruse (Hrsg.), Die Mediatisierung sozialer Welten: Synergien empirischer Forschung (S. 115–141). Springer VS. Linton, R. (1974). Gesellschaft, Kultur und Individuum. Fischer (Erstveröffentlichung 1945).

Introduction: The Forgotten Subject in Communication Studies

13

Pürer, H. (2003). Publizistik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft. Ein Handbuch. UVK (UTB). Reckwitz, A. (2008). Subjekt. Transcript. Reichert, R. (2008). Amateure im Netz. Selbstmanagement und Wissenstechnik im Web 2.0. Transcript. Rosengren, K., Wenner, L., & Palmgreen, P. (Eds.). (1985). Media gratifications research. Current perspectives. Sage. Röser, J., Müller, K., Niemand, S., & Roth, U. (2017). Häusliches Medienhandeln zwischen Dynamik und Beharrung. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess (pp. 139–162). Springer VS. Schatzki, T. R. (1996). Social practices. A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press. Schatzki, T. R., Knoor-Cetina, K., & von Savigny, E. (2001). The practice turn in contemporary theory. Routledge. Thomas, T. (2007). Showtime für das “unternehmerische Selbst” – Reflektionen über RealityTV als Vergesellschaftungsmodus. In L. Mikos, D. Hoffmann, & R. Winter (Eds.), Mediennutzung, Identität und Identifikationen. Die Sozialisationsrelevanz der Medien im Selbstfindungsprozess von Jugendlichen (pp. 51–66). Juventa. Wimmer, J. (2019). Das Subjekt in Zeiten medialen und gesellschaftlichen Wandels. Das Analysepotential des Mediatisierungsansatzes am Fallbeispiel Retro-Gamer. In A. Geimer, S. Amling, & S. Bosančić (Hrsg.), Subjekt und Subjektivierung – Empirische und theoretische Perspektiven auf Subjektivierungsprozess (S. 259–278). Springer VS. Winter, R. (2010). Widerstand im Netz. Zur Herausbildung einer transnationalen Öffentlichkeit durch netzbasierte Kommunikation. transcript. Winter, R. (2016). The deliberate professional in the digital age: A manifesto in the tradition of critical theory and pedagogy. In F. Trede & C. McEwen (Eds.), Educating the deliberate professional (pp. 207–222). Springer.

Part I Subject Conceptions in Communication Studies Research and in the Light of Current Developments in Social and Cultural Studies

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject Concept of Communication Studies in the Age of Digitally Mediatized Lifestyles Friedrich Krotz Abstract

The question of the subject of the digitally mediatized society is different today from the question of the subject of earlier societies or forms of coexistence that were not comprehensively constituted via computer networks. In order to answer this question, communication studies need an appropriate concept of the subject and a related understanding of subjectivation, a useful concept of human communication as the basis of subject and subjectivation, and an understanding of its change in the context of the change of the media. Current social conditions can be summarized in such a way that people (have to) increasingly understand their being as a being in transition, that they are increasingly bound to different and differently bequeathed discourses or, conversely, subjectively oriented to them, and that they are and have to be increasingly concerned with asserting a wholeness of the subject or at least a formable context of their person against these segmenting pressures.

F. Krotz (✉) ZeMKI, Bremen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_2

17

18

1

F. Krotz

Introduction: Communicating Subjects in Mediatized Worlds

As already explained in the introduction to this volume, the results of research within the framework of the mediatization approach point to the fact that people are currently changing as subjects of society in the context of media change. For media today no longer serve only to inform, entertain and educate, to address once again their functions named in the pre-digital era. Rather, they are increasingly permeating all areas of human and social life; at the same time, media offerings such as Google, Facebook and others aim to organize the actions of their clients: Facebook, for example, social relations of all kinds, WhatsApp people’s everyday communication. And the ever-increasing number of programs present as apps on smartphones increasingly accompany people throughout the day and are responsible for more and more activities, from cooking meals to shopping and driving to streaming services in music. Other devices are being developed that are even closer to the body – Google Glasses, medical-related measuring devices or watches with all kinds of additional functions. In particular, the socialisation conditions of future generations, people’s forms of reflection and also the significance of their communicative instruments such as language are changing (Hoffmann et al., 2017; Krotz, 2017b, c). The connection between media change and the change in communicatively based forms of everyday life, culture and society is primarily due to the change in human communication: this is becoming ubiquitous through the increasing connection to technical media, through smartphones, the Internet and apps, and is taking place at all times in more and more possible forms. In particular, actions that used to be carried out face-toface or instrumentally with instruments and objects created for this purpose, such as waging war, medical operations on the body, or even many work processes, are transformed into activities that are media-mediated or mediatized, i.e. that take place in settings for which media are constitutive. Moreover, people’s forms of communicative action are also increasingly structured by gigantic media conglomerates that control the media and their development and use them to monitor, collect data and influence their customers. This process affects many other areas of life: On knowledge, which is increasingly controlled by Google and only released in personalized versions; on the emergence of filter bubbles; on sexuality, which in turn seems to be transformed from direct interactions into machine-accompanied or controlled operations; on self-images and self-influence, for example through health apps; on constant comparisons and also increasing evaluations by individuals, but

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

19

also by bureaucratic or commercial institutions; all the way to the indices used by the Chinese government to assess the social usefulness of its citizens. In this respect, the question of the subject of the digitally mediatized society, in contrast to the subject of earlier societies or forms of coexistence that were not comprehensively constituted via computer networks, is at issue. This is the subject of the present essay, which provides some framework considerations and reports on existing conceptions and studies of the subject. Section 2 will first deal with considerations on the concept of the subject and its relation to human communication, using the mediatization approach as a basis. Section 3 will then present various empirical and theoretical approaches from different sciences that may be relevant for the development of a communicative concept of the subject in today’s mediatized worlds, with a particular focus on subject structures. Finally, Sect. 4 will deal with processes of subjectivation that come about situationally, but in which important social conditions are realized.

2

Framework Conditions: Communicating, Mediatization, Subject and Subjectification

Whoever wants to deal with subject and subjectification and their change in the transition to computer-controlled and mediatized forms of human coexistence must deal with the relevant basic concepts. First, this requires an appropriate concept of subject and an understanding of subjectivation related to it; second, a useful concept of human communication as the basis of subject and subjectivation; and third, an understanding of its change in the context of the change of the media. With regard to the change of media and its social and cultural meaning, we refer here to the results of the mediatization approach.1 Some framing considerations will now be made here on the other two aspects. The concept of communication has undergone an almost inflationary development in recent decades parallel to the current mediatization processes. If one follows the German spelling dictionary Duden (1989, p. 367), communication in the eighteenth century still meant “notification, conversation” and was thus essentially tied to human action. Today, however, communication is also used in the context of fax machines, computers and robots, for activities of collective social actors such as broadcasters, for controlling rockets to the place of their explosion, for animals up to

1 In brief: Krotz (2017a, b, c), in more detail: Hepp (2012), Hjavard (2013), Krotz (2001, 2007), Krotz and Hepp (2012, 2013), Krotz et al. (2014), Lundby (2009, 2014).

20

F. Krotz

snails and bacteria, even plants and trees are suspected of communication. In an abstract context this undoubtedly makes sense, but at the same time it is also important to focus on differences between the ‘communicating’ of the various possible actors, especially when asking about the transformation of the human subject. Such differences can only be hinted at here with examples: Fax machines ‘communicate’ successfully with each other when both devices involved have exactly the same data after the communication process. In animals, on the other hand, communication means, with few exceptions, stimulus-response mechanisms – communication takes place, for example, when the gazelle runs away in response to a warning call from another animal. And robots cannot understand language, but they can simulate it or respond to it: Human communicating cannot be reduced to any of these models – successful human communicating is not tied to identical bodies of knowledge or immediate responses, nor can it be understood as simulation, but as we know requires processes of understanding and aims at understanding (Habermas, 1987). The development of a communicatively directed concept of the subject, which wants to take a look at the change of the subject in the context of the change of the media, must start with a concept of human communicating that makes sense for this and is not reductionist. Only situational transmission can be observed, but this is preceded by a process of the genesis of a communicate, which arises in the inner reality of a communicator and is bound to the common definition of the situation. Downstream of the transmission, a processing of the transmitted communication and its contexts is required, which takes place within the framework of the inner reality of the others who are involved in the communication situation. Complex processes take place in all participants, which Mead, for example, described in the context of symbolic interactionism as tentative assumption of the role of the other and which are linked to empathy. These basic concepts for symbolically mediated interaction, which are oriented towards situational conversation, can be generalised to media-mediated forms of communication (cf. also Krotz, 2001, 2007 and, of course, fundamentally the works of Mead, 1969, 1973; Helle, 2001 and others). Moreover, one needs a concept of the subject. This, too, is a contested area, as already alluded to in the introduction to the present volume. First of all, it must be taken into account that there are various concepts of the subject in the social sciences, which as a rule start from an empirically useful concept of an individual who is essentially also shaped by his communication through active and lifelong socialization. In its cultural and social dependence, this naturally differs from the absolutely set and autonomously conceived subject of “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes, 1986). In the following, we use the term ‘subject’ in accordance with the definition in the Lexikon zur Soziologie in a sociological sense for “the experiencing and acting

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

21

individual with his needs and aspirations, who confronts, acts upon and is himself shaped by the material, social and cultural objects that make up his environment” (Klima, 1978, p. 664). Compatible with this, Schulze (1990, p. 747) understands ‘subject’ on an empirical basis as the indissoluble coupling of body and consciousness, which is, however, always also situationally bound. Similar concepts are also found in psychoanalysis and psychology. It is significant that such a definition of the term is based on people’s understanding of themselves: thus, more or less every person, at least in Western industrial societies, sees himself or herself as an active subject independent of others, and he or she also assumes that his or her environment is populated by other subjects. Subjectivity thus does not merge into identity and also not into the mechanisms of society, but contains a remainder relevant to action theory, insofar as every individual in principle remains creative and capable of action beyond given norms and in particular also reflects on his or her own actions and experiences (Daniel, 1981). In this context, ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ are not understood, as in philosophy, as absolute concepts that can be analysed overarchingly for themselves, but as historically and culturally dependent: The subject of the Middle Ages differs from that of a slaveholding society and just as arguably from the subject of German industrial society or that of indigenous peoples in, say, Latin America.2 Accordingly, such a conception of the subject aims at a cross-situational, culturally mediated subject structure. It conceives of the human being as an ‘animal symbolicum’ in Cassirer’s (2007) sense, locating the ‘subject’ between materiality and nature on the one hand and the symbolic world in which it lives on the other, but fundamentally incorporating both. Such subject structures are also often referred to as (communicative) social character or (communicative) habitus, as will be elaborated below. It is obvious that such a social character can describe the structures of action and experience of individuals in a real-typical perspective and thereby also take into account differences between social groupings, without, however, being able to describe all individuals in an equally differentiated manner or even to causally derive actions from them. Even from such a comparatively simple and general concept of subject, some assumptions can be worked out that make clear the importance of communicating for the genesis and nature of social and historical subject structures: As an acting

2

Cf. also the conception of man of symbolic interactionism (Goffman, 1973; Helle, 2001; Mead, 1969, 1973) and the thesis of Shibutani: “The socialized person is a society in minature” (Shibutani, 1955, p. 564), which at the same time express this dependence on culture and society and the possible creativity and freedom of communicating.

22

F. Krotz

agent, the subject must, on the one hand, be able to distinguish between itself as an acting person and its environment, consequently between internal and external processes. Accordingly, the subject must have the ability to perceive, i.e. to see and hear, as well as the ability to understand, interpret and process what it sees and hears in some sense and to relate to it in a meaningful way in its actions. These modes of perception, abilities and competences are linked to biological potentials, but in the concrete case they are related to the respective cultural environment in which the person grows up (and acts throughout his or her life) and are thus fundamentally learned. As abilities acquired during socialisation, they are thus dependent on communicating with other people. For the human being comes into the world with a variety of potentials, which then develop into accustomed forms of perception and feeling, of speaking and moving (Linton, 1974). This includes, in particular, the human potential to be able to operate with symbols, by means of which the individual relates to the world, to others, and thus also to himself. By means of this, the individual inserts himself into the culture and society that has always been given to him, thereby reproducing and maintaining it, and thereby developing it further by taking it into account both as a context and as an object of his action. This happens at all possible levels of human action, and always in connection with language and the communicative circumstances into which individuals are born. For only through this can experience be conceptualized and processed. In comparison with animals, this can also be expressed in such a way that the human subject substitutes the lack of genetically determined stimulus-response patterns by, on the one hand, culturally and time-specific habits, and, on the other hand, by corresponding practices or ways of acting and thinking, which are adopted on the one hand, but are also always further developed.3 Social or communicative subjects are thus in principle oriented towards being viable in the respective culture and society. They must therefore possess common historically or culturally dependent competencies and structures, which can be described with the concept of social character or habitus. In this context, social character and habitus develop within the framework of, for example, predetermined structures of speaking, moving, thinking and acting, and thus within the framework of socially and culturally predetermined conditions. Of course, these always refer to power, which must be understood as a universal of human reality, even if the forms of power are culturally and historically changeable. In any case, it should be noted

3 Just as with animals, one can of course find fundamental differences with so-called artificial intelligences.

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

23

that human communication between individuals is constitutive for all these processes.4 It should be added that the conceptions of the subject described in this way and their significance for everyday life, culture and society are also occasionally discussed critically. Foucault, for example, declared a social science oriented towards the subject to be an ideology (Foucault, 1990), and so Althusser developed the concept of a situationally constituted subject enforced by powerful institutions (Althusser, 1977), thus inextricably linking processes of subjectivation to power structures. Accordingly, this so-called concept of invocation makes it possible to focus on processes of subjectivation above all with regard to institutionalized power constellations and thus also to explain the stability of the social classifications of the subjects, which is, after all, produced in this way. However, it also implicitly presupposes a culturally and socially pre-structured socialization of the individual, through which the individual becomes viable in his or her time and can then integrate into society when called upon to do so. In this respect, we will discuss this concept of subjectivation in more detail in Sect. 4 and refer to the possibility of an integrating perspective. Here, in the following Sect. 3, the present considerations on social character and habitus will be outlined.

3

The Communicating Subject as a Mutable Structure: Social Character and Habitus

On the basis of these basic assumptions, it is now possible to outline a series of sociological descriptions of subjects from various social and historical contexts; this is the central project of this third subchapter. These subject descriptions are based partly on common, partly on different basic theoretical assumptions and partly on empirical investigations. In each case, they intend to capture the social subject structures of specific social and historical phases. In this respect, they always also express social change by elaborating different types of subject structures at different points in time as a consequence of different socialization processes and different social conditions. We begin with historical and media conceptions and then outline

4

Once again, we would like to point out that it is primarily the work of Mead that must be taken into account here. For it is only in his work that we find the indication that the conditions of human communicating also influence the human being in its structure – the human forms of communication are not possible without an inner self-image that emerges through them (cf. also Krotz, 2007).

24

F. Krotz

a number of sociological approaches.5 Of course, these conceptions can only be addressed in this essay and not described in more detail or discussed in terms of their applicability for classifications relevant to communication studies.

3.1

Subject Structure in the European High Middle Ages

Formations of the historical concept ‘subject’ are in particular actually also a topic of a social science historical science. Derschka (2014) has compiled the findings on the concept of the subject relevant at that time, which relate to the High Middle Ages, i.e. to the period around 1100 C.E. According to this, the individual6 and personality (understood as “the inner organization of an individual that makes him or her distinguishable from other individuals in terms of his or her essence” (Derschka, 2014, p. 20) began to form in that period, i.e. in a historical phase in which society also developed a willingness to take into account and recognize as justified the claims and potentials of individuals based on a growing freedom of action. Derschka accordingly finds “places of individuality” in many social contexts: in religion and among the monks, in philosophical considerations as well as in law, in interpersonal relationships, the fields of social relations, in the developing material culture and the spread of finance, and not least in literature, for example as the emergence of biographical writing, the writing of personal letters, the change in the fictional literature of the time and also in painting – in other words, in the media of the time. Contemporary to this change was the revival of ancient personality theory and its further development into a “humoral character typology” (Derschka, 2014, p. 192) of the four so-called temperaments tied to bodily fluids, which could accordingly be related to individual people. As a relevant cause for these developments, Derschka highlights in particular the importance of communication, which experienced an increase in significance under the then increasingly complex living conditions. This is because in the previously much more manageable social worlds and spheres of life, in which no use was made of writing, and in the context of an economy that “got by without money and with the simplest of technologies, and which was not integrated into any state structures” (Derschka, 2014, p. 196), perception, thought and experience were much more stringently

5

For lack of other literature, these are exclusively Western concepts in the political sense, which accordingly gives the following text a Eurocentric bias. 6 Derschka points out that the term individual was not used for “single people” until the eighteenth century (Derschka, 2014, p. 19).

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

25

embedded in fixed group-related contexts, so that differences of opinion, for example, were attributed to different social conditions and frameworks rather than to individual differences and biographies (Derschka, 2014, pp. 192–213).7 The growing importance of the city and the division of labor possible there is also emphasized; in this respect, historiography does not locate individualization processes only at the time of the industrial division of labor, as sociology does, but much earlier.

3.2

Media-Related Subject Structures

On the part of communication and media studies, with regard to concepts of the subject, reference should be made to the work of so-called medium theory, i.e. the writings of Harold Innis (1951, 2007) and McLuhan (1964; on this also Krotz, 2001), who still attempted to describe human history mono-causally and in separate phases in the tradition of the late nineteenth century. Innis, as an empirical economist and technology researcher, dealt with the connection between the respective prevailing media and the respective structures of domination; McLuhan also extended this to characterizations of the individual and then, as is well known, described, for example, the human type of print culture as a thematically oriented and thereby theoretically directed expert. This was then further developed by Meyrowitz (1990) on an empirical basis to the human type of the television society by examining the reception of television with Goffman’s instruments. Further relevant empirical evidence or even corrections can be found with regard to the subject concerning different phases of media development, for example, in the framework of Havelock’s (1990) studies on the significance of the invention of writing, in Ong’s (2016) analysis of the emerging print culture, and in the studies of Goody and collaborators on man in oral societies (Goody et al., 1986). In this scholarly tradition, the media-contextualized patterns of action and communication laid out in lifelong socialization in particular have been elaborated, from which a subject structure can be inferred. In addition, we should mention David Riesman and his colleagues, who in 1953 presented a contemporary draft of a social character. By this they understand the “more or less socially and historically conditioned structure of individual drives and satisfactions: The constitution in which man faces the world and his fellow men”

7 Today one would probably speak here of the breaking up of a social structure from ‘bubbles’.

26

F. Krotz

(Riesman et al., 1958, p. 20 f.). ‘Social character’ is then that part of the character of individuals which is common to a social group and which is based on the experiences of its members. On the basis of mainly population-political developments, it is then described how the US social character has changed or is changing from tradition-guidance via an inner-guidance by the ‘gyroscopic compass of conscience’ to an outer-guidance of society. For this externally directed social character, fears and insecurities play a role, which are expressed in an increasing search for orientation in the outside world and which, in the process, encounter the likewise increasing offers of mass communication and the entertainment industry.

3.3

Sociological/Psychoanalytical Subject Structures

On a more social-scientific level, which is generally linked to Marx and Freud,8 a sequence of empirically described social characters can be named, which – among others – have also been described and discussed in more detail by Daniel (1981) and can only be briefly outlined here for reasons of space. • First of all, the well-known study on the ‘authoritarian character’, which Adorno conducted together with other researchers in the USA (Adorno et al., 1968), should be mentioned here. It was directed at fascism and focused on ethnocentrism, but as a qualitative study it also allowed for more profound interpretations and theoretically based further considerations. • Parallel to this and far beyond, Erich Fromm actually spent his life working out the social character of the people living under capitalism (of his time) on the basis of Marxist and psychoanalytical insights as well as empirical research (Fromm, 1942, 1982). However, he always tried to find “ways out of a sick society” (Fromm, 1981) by drawing individually or socially relevant conclusions in order to make his diagnosis of an “anatomy of human destructiveness” (Fromm, 1977) and a structural “fear of freedom” (Fromm, 1983) fruitful. For him, too, the orientation towards consumption and the increasing need for orientation and external supplies, which is also expressed in this, play a central role, insofar as, according to his thesis, capitalist conditions of power generate problematic psychological structures.

8

Cf. also Adorno (1968).

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

27

• Further, as far as differentiated academic theories of the subject are concerned, reference should be made to the so-called new type of socialization, associated above all with the names of Thomas Ziehe (1975) and Christopher Lasch (1979). Their thesis asserts an increasing orientation of people of that time towards inner processes as a reaction to bourgeois expectations of career and consumption, which were seen as meaningless and devious, and to which one’s life was to be tied. In connection with this, conflicts about nature and the environment increasingly developed, as did social movements oriented towards them, such as the citizens’ initiative movement. The narcissism theory of psychoanalysis offered itself as an interpretation of this. • In addition to the subject theories briefly mentioned here, which are based on the concept of social character, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus must be mentioned (Bourdieu, 1987), which ultimately describes the individuals of a certain culture in a certain period of time both in their class-specific diversity and in their historical/cultural commonalities. • Finally, Norbert Elias’ approach to civilization also offers insights into subject structures, insofar as psychogenesis and sociogenesis are described there as intertwined (Elias, 1972, 1994). According to this approach, increasingly complex social conditions lead to increasing demands on individuals and thus to personality structures that can be understood as ever deeper and more elaborate processes of reflection and as the formation of inner instances of control, such as conscience. Elias’ theory is based on a communication theory, because according to his document analyses, the connection between psycho- and sociogenesis also comes about through the observations of people and through their orientation towards the upper classes and thus ultimately on the basis of communication as perception and orientation of action. (Elias, 1986; Krotz, 2001, 2003, 2007). In summary, it can be said that such subject concepts derived from the sociostructural conditions for socialisation and communication make sense, at least for the social sciences, to which communication studies also belongs, insofar as they derive subject structures and the modes of action socially possible for them in a general way from the societal structures and the socialisation conditions and goals arising from them. On the one hand, these are then significant for the life chances of individuals in their respective culture and society, but on the other hand, they also open up a way to analyse how society develops on the level of individual social and communicative action. Also, socially directed basic mechanisms such as Mead’s ideas of communication as “taking the role of the other” and the reflexive consciousness rooted in communication as a general human characteristic (Mead, 1973)

28

F. Krotz

or Schütz’s “general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives” (Gurewitz, 1971; Schütz, 1971) can hardly be meaningfully asserted without such a subject concept. All in all, when it comes to the genesis of social character or ‘habitus’, forms of socialisation in particular, and thus the family as a significant mediator, play a central role, the structures of which can also be found in a more or less binding way in the social conditions for acting and communicating. Of course, such descriptions of culturally and temporally typical social characters must not be understood as causally derivable from them or somehow uniformly effective; rather, social character and habitus are a kind of socially constituted real types. These come about as habits and practices on the basis of symbolically mediated interactions, from which, in addition to social stabilizations, deviations and attitudes of resistance can and have always developed. Of course, this is all the more true today in societies increasingly characterized by diversity; at the same time, these must also be shared by their members in some form, so that the subjects need competencies that match each other and must develop them in the socialization process.

3.4

Presumptions

Overall, all the approaches emphasize that human beings are capable of transformation to a high degree. Against this background, it is of course quite a problem to answer the question that arises here about a social character of today’s societies, which are characterized by the emergence of a new and computerized digital infrastructure for communication and symbolic operations, and which have been and are being shaped in a capitalist economy. It is, of course, easy to suggest that a new type of social character is emerging today, one that needs to be thought of in complex and fluid terms, and one that is transforming in relation to rapidly evolving processes of mediatization. In concrete terms, however, only individual fragments of such a social character can be named at present: For this, the diverse research results of Turkle (1998) can be consulted, as well as considerations from psychoanalysis, such as those compiled by Bainbridge and Yates (2014). The results of mediatization research can also be taken into account here: It is possible that overall patterns of orientation are changing, insofar as the organization of the Internet enforces hierarchized follower structures as the normal form of collective orientations. It is possible that processes of reflection are changing, insofar as they increasingly take place via Internet communication and thus in broader communication associations than in the past. It is possible that self-assessments are changing because they are much more strongly linked to comparisons than in the past, which relate to narcissistic practices, as expressed in the selfie boom and in

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

29

trained methods of self-presentation. It is possible that identity structures are changing because they are becoming tied to the representation of brands. It is possible that social subjects now have many more social relationships and communicatively based social contacts, but these are presumably managed in a more uniform way, leading to less concrete but standardized empathic processes. It is possible that we find increasing communication necessities and communication compulsions, combined with hegemonic and increasingly skillfully operating forms of control and manipulation, some of them algorithmically based, which people follow or which appear as occasions for anxiety. Possibly, the increasing complexity of social occasions as well as a changed physicality combined with increasing control through media has to be taken into account (Krotz, 2017b, c). Many assumptions – but a clear picture does not emerge here; moreover, the conditions of socialization together with families are in an increasingly rapid flux today (Greschke et al., 2017; cf. on this also Röser et al., 2017). This is because the current mediatization push is by no means over, but goes on and on. Perhaps one can summarize a number of social conditions in such a way that people (have to) increasingly understand their being as a being in transition, that they are increasingly tied to or subjectively inversely oriented towards different and differently bequeathed discourses, and that they are and have to be increasingly concerned with asserting a wholeness of the subject or at least a formable context of their person against these segmenting pressures. Accordingly, there can be no stable social character derived from this, but presumably certain lines of development can be pointed out empirically, about whose future, however, one can only make assumptions. In this respect, from the point of view of mediatization research, there is much to be said today in favor of examining the diversity of subjectivation processes more closely. In view of this, the following last paragraph will deal with the approaches already mentioned in Sect. 2, which focus less on subject structures than on power-bound forms of subjectivation, and, on the other hand, with some integrating considerations.

4

Subjectification by Invocation and Some Integrating Remarks

As the contributions in the present volume also show, in recent decades the social sciences have increasingly turned away from sociologically based descriptions of the subject that are tied to socialization processes and aim at the structure of social

30

F. Krotz

subjects, and have instead concerned themselves with constituent processes of subjectivation, while at the same time also narrowing their view of power relations. The works of Foucault and Althusser in particular stand for these developments. As Bröckling puts it in a nutshell, both understand “subjectivation as a process of formation in which social conditioning and self-modelling go hand in hand” (Bröckling, 2007, p. 31). However, while Bourdieu rather studies socialization processes, Althusser (1977) describes subjectivation processes with a “primal scene”, as Bröckling (2007, p. 27) calls it: in this scene, a policeman as a representative of state power calls an individual with “Hey, you there”, whereupon the individual feels that he is being addressed and reacts to this, for example by turning towards the policeman or running away – and through this sequence of communicative events, the individual becomes a specific social subject in the specific situation and thus in principle submits to the current power constellation. Behind these reflections on a process of institutional invocation is Althusser’s strict understanding of an ideological state apparatus by means of which domination over social structures crystallizes within the framework of capitalist relations. The early Foucault, for his part, rejected the subject as an independent social instance in his genealogical writings, viewing theories that start with the acting subject as ideological and instead focusing on powerful social discourses to which the subjects are always already subject (Foucault, 1990) and which they themselves also drive forward. In this perspective, history and social theory cannot then be described, understood or reconstructed from the subject, from consciousness, from a theory of action. Instead, for Foucault, the human being is connected in his wholeness to the discourses that ‘surround’ him, insofar as they decisively determine him. Only in his later writings did Foucault break up his theses in this regard and, for example, take into account the possibility of specific resistant forms of action (on this, see also Dahlmanns, 2008, esp. pp. 45–88). Butler (1991) then develops this view further with regard to a differentiated feminism. An impressive and comprehensive example of a study that uses the theory developed in this way to ask about the subjects of today has been presented by Bröckling (2007) with his description and analysis of the entrepreneurial self. In contrast to the concepts of a subject discussed above, whose structure can be described by a social character that is socially and culturally necessary or by a habitus that is culturally and class-specific, these approaches thus foreground socially conditioned processes of subjectivation, whose relationship to an implicitly presupposed subject structure, however, remains undetermined. The problem here is that the acting subjects appear here more or less only as products of discourses, whereas it is people themselves who make their relations, even if they do not know how they do so, to recall Marx here. Here the fundamental micro-macro problem of

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

31

sociology becomes clear, which either starts from a holistic concept such as society or social system or from an individually situated theory of action. Whether communication science is a suitable reference for finding solutions here can be rather doubted, because communicating is in any case first of all a form of human action, which is in the foreground of this science. However, it should be noted here that the approaches to subjectification have changed the concept of the subject. Here, ‘subject’ means a situational personal presence bound to specific forms of power in its relation to the structure of society, the shape of which, however, is not immediately clearly determined. The constitution of the subject in this context is then, however, first of all interesting for communication studies because it comes about through a communicative act, namely an invocation – subjectification as an invocation process. The obvious question then is whether other institutions besides the police do not also call and thus various power-bound subject structures can emerge, for example through the church, advertising, the ATM machine – Althusser’s argument probably applies to other hegemonic institutions as well. Processes of subjectivation in this sense, therefore, need not be consistent, nor need they lead to uniform subject forms of an individual. The individual then appears in more complex social formations as broken down into subjectivized aspects of itself, in which the various power politics are reflected – the connection to Shibutani’s concept of the subject reported above is then in a sense obvious. However, in the case of a subjectivation through the invocation of social institutions, it remains open whether there are not, as in Beck’s (1986) individualization thesis, integrating influences and movements, which can of course then proceed in a completely different way than before – for example, a hegemonic embedding of the individual overlapping individual invocation processes through a collective invocation through media. In addition, the increasing complexity of social reality generates possibly however dimensioned free spaces for the individual, who is precisely not at the mercy of the police alone, because other processes of subjectivation (can) also take place, which need not be uniform or compatible or coherent with one another. In general, it should be pointed out that the approach of subjectification processes seems at least initially compatible with the concept of a social character or habitus that is historically and culturally mediated through socialization, because such subjectification processes presuppose an already existing and socialized subject, which, as far as can be seen, has not been further considered in the analysis of such subject-constituting invocation processes. Moreover, it should be emphasized that processes of subjectification are also primarily bound to symbolic mediations and, in particular, to communication: The social subject also of the approaches to subjectivation is quite obviously essentially socialized through communication and

32

F. Krotz

is also invoked communicatively. In this respect, the question arises as to the possibilities of integrating the two approaches. Only a few remarks can be made on this in the following. First, one can ask to what extent mediatization processes can contribute to ‘holding together’ the increasingly disparate social subjects. If one follows the results of mediatization research, then the media in particular connect the divergent spheres of action and partial social worlds, in which people also act and experience in a media-mediated way, with the individual in his or her physicality, through which he or she perceives (Krotz, 2017b, 2017c). After all, the media can be used precisely in all these social worlds, and they are also used there. This is related in particular to the fact that media today no longer merely transport or convey content as in the past, but organise human action and in particular social relationships directly (and not via information or entertainment services), in which the various spheres of action and social worlds are constituted. For the acting subject, his inevitably bodily centred self is consequently combined with his media affinity and with the use of media in the various social worlds to form a unity of action. In this way, the subject has internal connections between such spheres of action, which it traces back to its own activities, and which make it possible to address the roles and identities in which it expresses itself in these increasingly differentiating social worlds, so that it can remain capable of acting as a coordinating individual. Secondly, approaches to subjectivation fit in with the processual approach to mediatization, in that they allow for very different processes of invocation by very different social institutions, but also allow us to take a look at changes in processes of invocation, insofar as media play a role here – see the ‘invocation by an ATM’ mentioned above as an example, which always requires a declaration of identity. An understanding of invocation processes and the subjectification segments based on them can be helpful in this respect, in order to take a look at a change of the subject not only by comparing different generations, but also to be able to take into account different institutional integrations. Here, of course, the question arises in particular as to which hegemonic institutions can be effective for subjectification processes in addition to the police, and also whether it always has to be hegemonic approaches whose invocation subjectifies. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that subjects, who have to process different demands, can also call upon themselves and thus process experiences appropriately. On the one hand, this can contribute to a critical reflection of processes of subjectification and orientations of action, and on the other hand, to a critical reflection of processes of mediatization. Thirdly, the question of virtual subjects would have to be pursued, which, as ‘artificial intelligences’, may not have to possess either a spatial location or a continuous existence, which raises entirely new questions for sociality.

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

33

In conclusion, it can be said that the development of a theory of the subject and of processes of subjectivation in mediatized societies, or perhaps more generally, social agglomerations of today, is comparatively open and needs to be worked on more closely, but also that overall the communicative character of processes of subjectivation and the communicative shaping of subject structures are far from being adequately understood. In view of today’s media development and mediatization processes, communication studies would also have a significant contribution to make here. In this perspective, one would have to speak of a social subject in a specific historical-cultural form with specific communicative and also further competences and abilities, but also of specifically historical and communicatively mediated institutional subjectification processes. Approaches to subjectification theory as a whole should anchor individuals in their lifeworld experiences and in the communicatively defined social worlds, and in this respect take communicative practices into account.9 What is special about the current development, which mediatization research observes and allows us to grasp theoretically, is the sustained and comprehensive penetration of social conditions and social action by the media – a process that could enrich people’s lives, but does so only to a very limited extent today. For developments today are controlled and driven by giant corporations that care about social consequences, about human self-realization and democracy only insofar as it is helpful for their interests or for their legitimation. In this way, however, the fundamental characteristic of the human being, his comprehensive ability to form communication and his associated unassailable interest in relationships with others in the context of his self-realization as well as in a democratic coexistence in freedom and responsibility, both of which are bound to free communication, is frighteningly restricted. Communicating is functionalized and bound to the process of commodity exchange, the communicative reproduction of being human is increasingly directed against itself – Marx called this alienation. In this respect, this is a development today whose significance goes far beyond that of earlier bouts of mediatization, insofar as the penetration by media today is not limited to individual forms of action, individual spheres of life or individual groupings or certain social worlds, but is universal. For in this way, all social action will become

9

They should also take note of the fact that the dialectics expressed in the relationship between individual and society as well as in the relationship between subject and power are precisely dialectics and not simply paradoxes or ambivalences that one can only helplessly state.

34

F. Krotz

fundamentally dependent on medial and, via this, also in a new way on capitalist conditions, because the operators of media participate in and can influence all symbolic operations of the subjects. In this respect, the questions discussed here have a special significance today. It is the communicatively communitarized individuals who must collectively take charge of this process and turn the development into a self-determined one by jointly ensuring first transparency and then civic governance. In this context, both the subject theory and the subjectivation approach must be theoretically thought through further and turned anew with regard to resistant action. To this end, however, the importance of communication must not simply be accepted, but must be taken into account as an essential characteristic.

References Adorno, T. W. (1968). Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie. In T. W. Adorno & W. Dierks (Eds.), Soziologica I. Aufsätze Max Horkheimer zum Sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet (pp. 11–45). EVA. Adorno, T. W., Fraenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, H. N. (1968). Der autoritäre Charakter. In T. W. Adorno, B. Bettelheim, E. Fraenkel-Brunswik, N. Gutermann, M. Janowitz, D. J. Levinson, & R. N. Sanford (Eds.), Der Autoritäre Charakter (pp. 88–427). De Munter. Althusser, L. (1977). Ideologie und ideologische Staatsapparate. In L. Althusser (Ed.), Ideologie und ideologische Staatsapparate. Aufsätze zur marxistischen Theorie (pp. 88–153). Argument Verlag. Bainbridge, C., & Yates, C. (2014). Media and the inner world. Palgrave Macmillan. Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Suhrkamp. Bourdieu, P. (1987). Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft. Suhrkamp. Bröckling, U. (2007). Das unternehmerische Selbst. Suhrkamp. Butler, J. (1991). Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter. Gender Studies. Suhrkamp. Cassirer, E. (2007). Versuch über den Menschen. Felix Meiner. Dahlmanns, C. (2008). Die Geschichte des modernen Subjekts. Michael Foucault und Norbert Elias im Vergleich. Waxmann. Daniel, C. (1981). Theorien der Subjektivität. Campus Studium. Derschka, H. (2014). Individuum und Persönlichkeit im Hochmittelalter. Kohlhammber Urban. Descartes, R. (1986). Ausgewählte Schriften. Fischer. Drodowski, G. (1989). Duden – das Herkunftswörterbuch (Bd. 7, 2. völlig neu bearbeitete und erweiterte Aufl). Duden. Elias, N. (1972). Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation (Bd. 2, 2. Aufl.). Suhrkamp. Elias, N. (1986). Was ist Soziologie? Juventus. Elias, N. (1994). Die Gesellschaft der Individuen (2. Aufl.). Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (1990). Archäologie des Wissens. Suhrkamp.

How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject. . .

35

Fromm, E. (1942). Character and social process. An appendix to fear of freedom. https:// www.marxists.org/archive/fromm/works/1942/character.html. Accessed 15 Aug 2015. Fromm, E. (1977). Anatomie der Menschlichen Destruktivität. Rowohlt. Fromm, E. (1981). Wege aus einer kranken Gesellschaft. Eine sozialpsychologische Untersuchung. Ullstein Materialien. Fromm, E. (1982). Das Menschenbild bei Marx. Ullstein. Fromm, E. (1983). Die Furcht vor der Freiheit. Ullstein. Goffman, E. (1973). Asyle. Suhrkamp. Goody, J., Watt, I., & Gough, K. (1986). Entstehung und Folgen der Schriftkultur. Suhrkamp. Greschke, H., Dreßler, D., & Hierasimovicz, K. (2017). Die Mediatisierung von Eltern-KindBeziehungen im Kontext grenzüberschreitender Migration. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess (pp. 59–80). VS Verlag. Gurewitz, A. (1971). Einführung. In A. Schütz (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Aufsätze, Bd. 1., XV– XXXVIII. Martinus Nijhof. Habermas, J. (1987). Theorie kommunikativen Handelns (Bd. 2, 4. Aufl.). Suhrkamp. Havelock, E. A. (1990). Schriftlichkeit. Das griechische Alphabet als kulturelle Revolution. VCH. Helle, H. J. (2001). Theorie der symbolischen Interaktion (3. überarbeitete Aufl.). Westdeutscher Verlag. Hepp, A. (2012). Cultures of mediatization. Polity. Hjavard, S. (2013). The mediatization of culture and society. Routledge. Hoffmann, D., Krotz, F., & Reissmann, W. (2017). Mediatisierung und Mediensozialisation. Springer VS. Innis, H. A. (1951). The bias of communication. University of Toronto Press. Innis, H. A. (2007). Empire and communications. Rowman & Littlefield. Klima, R. (1978). Subjekt. In W. Fuchs et al. (Hrsg.), Lexikon zur Soziologie (2. verbesserte und erweiterte Aufl., S. 664). Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2001). Die Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. Wie sich Alltag und soziale Beziehungen, Kultur und Gesellschaft durch die Medien wandeln. Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2003). Zivilisationsprozess und Mediatisierung: Zum Zusammenhang von Medienund Gesellschaftswandel. In M. Behmer, F. Krotz, R. Stöber, & C. Winter (Eds.), Medienentwicklung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel (pp. 15–38). Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2007). Mediatisierung. Fallstudien zum Wandel von Kommunikation. VS Verlag. Krotz, F. (2017a). Explaining the mediatisation approach. Javnost, 24(2), 103–118. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1298556 Krotz, F. (2017b). Mediatisierung: Ein Forschungskonzept. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess: Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (pp. 13–34). Springer VS. Krotz, F. (2017c). Pfade der Mediatisierung: Bedingungsgeflechte für die Transformationen von Medien, Alltag, Kultur und Gesellschaft. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess: Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (pp. 347–364). Springer. Krotz, F., & Hepp, A. (2012). Mediatisierte Welten: Forschungsfelder und Beschreibungsansätze. Springer VS.

36

F. Krotz

Krotz, F., & Hepp, A. (2013). A concretization of mediatization: How mediatization works and why ‘mediatized worlds’ are a helpful concept for empirical mediatization research. Empedokles The European Journal of Philosophy of Communication, 3(2), 137–152. Krotz, F., Despotović, C., & Kruse, M. (Eds.). (2014). Die Mediatisierung sozialer Welten: Synergien empirischer Forschung. Springer VS. Lasch, C. (1979). The culture of narcissism. American life in an age of diminishing expectations. Norton. Linton, R. (1974). Gesellschaft, Kultur und Individuum. Fischer (Erstveröffentlichung 1945). Lundby, K. (2009). Mediatization. Concept, changes, consequences. Peter Lang. Lundby, K. (2014). Handbook mediatization of communication. De Gruyter. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The extensions of man. McGraw-Hill. Mead, G. H. (1969). Philosophie der Sozialität. Suhrkamp. Mead, G. H. (1973). Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp. Meyrowitz, J. (1990). Die Fernsehgesellschaft (Bd. 2). Beltz. Ong, W. (2016). Oralität und Literalität. Springer VS. Riesman, D., Denny, R., & Glazer, B. (1958). Die einsame Masse. Eine Untersuchung der Wandlungen des amerikansichen Charakters. Rowohlt. Röser, J., Müller, K., Niemand, S., & Roth, U. (2017). Häusliches Medienhandeln zwischen Dynamik und Beharrung. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess (pp. 139–162). VS Verlag. Schulze, G. (1990). Die Erlebnisgesellschaft (2. Aufl.). Campus. Schütz, A. (1971). Gesammelte Aufsätze (Bd. 1). Martinus Nijhof. Shibutani, T. (1955). Reference groups as perspectives. American Journal of Sociology LX, 60, 562–569. Turkle, S. (1998). Leben im Netz. Identität in Zeiten des Internet. Rowohlt. Ziehe, T. (1975). Pubertät und Narzissmus. Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification Hubert Knoblauch

Abstract

In this paper, the concept of the subject will be approached from the perspective of social or communicative constructivism. This is because this theory proposes a systematic division of labour between the philosophical concept of the subject and the sociological one of identity. More recently, social constructivism has been expanded into communicative constructivism, whose basic concept is communicative action. In the following part, it will then be argued that this expansion also has to do with problems of the phenomenological concept of subject that are associated with social constructivism. Building on this sketch, the question of the subject of communicative action will then be addressed. Using the example of showing, I would like to explain that the subject is not to be grasped as a substance in its own right, but is rather an attribute, or more precisely: a property of communicative action. We should therefore speak of subjectivity instead of the subject. However, communicative action cannot be thought without that property. It is subjectivity that makes it explicable that sociality does not merge into systems and that action does not merge into practices, while communication ensures that sociality encompasses everything that can be communicated about. Even if we start from a basic conceptual assumption of only one subjectivity, empirically we are always dealing with subjects, selves and identities in everyday life. These, however, are not prior substances, but are derived from communicative action. This process, once called the socialization of an individual conceived as self-contained, can be H. Knoblauch (✉) Institut für Soziologie, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_3

37

38

H. Knoblauch

described as subjectivation. In the concluding part, this quite unusual use of the term will be briefly outlined, whereby I will address the particular forms of subjectivation under the conditions of contemporary mediatization, which I would like to call double subjectivation.

1

Introduction

The question of the subject is very topical again today. On the one hand, it owes its topicality to an interesting overlapping of debates in the social sciences and social philosophy, which, however, seldom account for their different traditions: Thus, the “subject” plays a different role in Adorno’s critical theory, but also in the understanding and phenomenological sociology from Weber to Schütz, than is thought of in “subject-critical” post-structuralist or post-constructivist theories (which often attack what is called the individual or identity there). The question of the subject, however, is also grounded in the rapid development of technical systems that increasingly seem to act for themselves – be it in the form of giant airplanes, human-like robots, or the finest voice dialogue systems. It thus arises in particular because of the current forms of digitalized mediatization, that “metaprocess” (Krotz, 2001) that not only generates new figurations, but thus also a “new self” (Couldry & Hepp, 2016). However, I do not want to take up the discussion of mediatization in this framework; nor do I want to explain the connection between mediatization and subjectivation in this framework, because I have done so in more detail elsewhere (Knoblauch, 2017). Rather, I want to deal here with the subject and ask how it is involved in the social construction of reality. In doing so, I understand the social construction as a communicative construction, which in turn is anchored in communicative action. Therefore, it must be clarified how the subject of social construction differs from the subject of communicative construction. In both cases, however, it is a matter of action, so that the question of the subject of action arises in each case. This question about the subject is very topical because we encounter more and more “intelligent” objects and technologies that act “autonomously”. Of course, the question of the subject of action also arises when dealing with animals: Whether and to what extent animals (and which animals) can act and have an identity. Finally, it should be remembered that the question of the subject of action has always been a religious question as well. In addition to the intervention of spirits or occult forces in our agency, there has always been the question of whether and in what way we ourselves are subject to other subjects in our innermost being. As is well known, the Calvinist doctrine of predestination offers one of the most radical conceptions of the

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

39

determinacy of our actions by the will of a God so vast as to be beyond the comprehension of man himself. As Max Weber (1988) pointed out, the radical nature of these ideas is at the root of the Protestant ethic that drove the “spirit of capitalism” (Soeffner, 1992). It is this centering of the subject around an individual who initially determines himself alone, who wants, and later also claims uniqueness, that seems to characterize modernity. If individualism is therefore one of the most powerful driving forces of modern society, the arrival of postmodernism more than 40 years ago also heralded the swan song of the individual. If Marxist critique had already stressed that individualism was less a universal than a bourgeois phenomenon, postmodern critique cast doubt on the subject: for instance, the “author” dissolved, the legal “perpetrator” increasingly became the victim of his milieu-forming conditions, and the individual himself was declared an epiphenomenon of neurobiological processes. As radical as the postmodernist critique seemed at first, its diagnosis has since tended to be exacerbated by social developments, especially those of communication technologies: the authorship of an increasing number of cultural products (literature, music, science, etc.) is being dissolved by digital technologies, agency is becoming “post-social” through more and more technologies, and the place of a conscious individual is being taken by counseled actors treated with a wide variety of psychotropic drugs who, together with their non-human environment, form an “actor network” (Bellinger & Krieger, 2006) whose core is hardly identifiable as a “subject” anymore. Against this background, it may be understandable that there is definitely confusion today when talking about subject, individual or identity (cf. Habermas, 1988, p. 192 ff.). But it is not only these perhaps historically unique changes that contribute to this conceptual confusion. Also involved are transdisciplinary shifts in scholarly discourse that accompany the change in communication. For example, the concept of the subject was traditionally at home in (social) philosophy (whereby it is only brought into opposition with the concept of the “object” in theories that transcend disciplines, such as Marxist ones), whereas sociology has been using the concept of identity for several decades in order to avoid the ideological associations of the “individual”. The cultural-scientific dissolution of boundaries between philosophy (and “epistemology”), sociology and other cultural sciences, however, has the consequence that the concept of the subject is now also at home in the social sciences. In the present text, I would like to approach (1) the concept of the subject from the perspective of social constructivism. For in this theory a systematic division of labour between the philosophical concept of the subject and the sociological one of identity is proposed (Knoblauch, 2004). More recently, social constructivism has

40

H. Knoblauch

been expanded into communicative constructivism (cf. Knoblauch, 1995, 2017; Keller et al., 2012), whose basic concept is communicative action. In the following part, it will then be argued (2) that this expansion also has to do with problems of the phenomenological concept of the subject that are associated with social constructivism. Building on this sketch, I would then like to address the question of the subject of communicative action. Using the example of pointing, I would like to explain (3) that the subject is not to be grasped as a substance in its own right, but rather represents an attribute, or more precisely: a property of communicative action. We should therefore speak of subjectivity rather than of the subject. However, communicative action cannot be thought without that property. It is subjectivity that makes it explicable that sociality does not merge into systems and action does not merge into practices, while communication ensures that sociality encompasses everything that can be communicated about. Even if we assume only one subjectivity as a basic concept, in everyday life we are empirically always dealing with subjects, selves and identities. However, these are not prior substances, but are derived from communicative action. This process, once called the socialization of an individual conceived as self-contained, can be described as subjectification. In the concluding part (4), I would like to briefly outline this quite unusual use of terms in order to conclude by addressing the particular forms of subjectivation under the conditions of contemporary mediatization, which I would like to call double subjectivation.

2

The Subject in the Social Construction

If the subject did not play a leading role for early sociology, it entered the stage of basic sociological concepts above all with Weber’s foundation of sociology as a theory of action. Probably also in order to avoid the very specific socio-historical coinage of the concept of the “individual” (not least by Protestantism), Weber famously emphasizes the importance of the subjectivity of action. Action – the fundamental process of which social things consist – cannot simply be observed from the outside; it presupposes that “inside” which, before Weber, the “understanding” tradition from Vico to Dilthey had emphasized. “Inside” is the sense that is “subjectively” meant by the individual agents. As Schütz later complained, however, Weber left it open as to what this subjective is that characterizes action and its meaning. For his clarification, Schütz relied on Husserl’s phenomenology: the subject is the agent of consciousness, which is characterized on the one hand by intentionality and on the other hand by the comparison of intentional objects as typification (which Schütz regarded as the basic trait of meaning).

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

41

The subject, then, is the I, which experiences in time and experiences that it experiences. For Schütz, action is merely a form of experience, but a particular one that is distinguished by its own temporal structure: It is an experience that pre-designs itself (as completed imagined action) in time, so to speak – and realizes this design (as action) in time. If one asks what now constitutes the subjective of action, one could simply say: the fact that I act in each case. Indeed, one should note that phenomenology does not describe action from the observer’s perspective. Phenomenology is not first concerned with understanding the other (as in qualitative social research), but first with understanding the self. That is why phenomenology is not concerned with the question of whether action can be attributed (except when the problem of intersubjectivity is the issue). Phenomenology is a form of introspection, directed at one’s own experiences in each case. Phenomenology is, in a sense, radically subjectivist: the subject is always me. For sociology, however, this gives rise to a “cosmological” problem (Luckmann, 1974). How can we make statements about other subjects? Although this question is also at the center of sociological methodological teachings, it is not even treated by Schütz as a mere methodological question. Rather, Husserl already assumes that this question arises from the perspective of every subject. As a solution, Husserl already offers the concept of “intersubjectivity,” which refers to the relationship between the subject and others. For other theoretical contexts, it should be noted that subject is thus not a counter-term to “object”, but a reference to “others”. For Husserl, intersubjectivity already presents itself on a transcendental level: even if the subject doubts the validity of the external world, it can, so to speak, anticipate the “others” by varying itself. Schütz (1971a) vehemently disagreed with this “transcendental” solution, arguing that it reduced the “others” to the possibilities available in consciousness. Even if consciousness – and thus the subject – is of central importance for intersubjectivity, this can only be understood as an “empirical” phenomenon: The lifeworld of everyday life, which is shaped by action, includes the Others. Husserl sees the Others in the epoché as reducible to (or at least reconstructible from) processes of consciousness, whereas Schütz shifts them to the realm of the social and of action, i.e. the lifeworld, in which Others are included as empirically given. Husserl wants to explain sociality via consciousness, Schütz presupposes it. The others therefore also form one of the pillars of the lifeworld. The empirical givenness of the Other has been treated in various ways: Schütz has tried to describe it from a subjective perspective as part of a “mundane phenomenology” and to generalize it as “structures of the lifeworld”. These structures of the lifeworld, as Luckmann (1973) argues in continuing these analyses, form a kind of “proto-sociological” specification for empirical sociology. In a certain sense, the lifeworld described in this way could be described as structures

42

H. Knoblauch

of the subjective, taking into account that this subjective always already has social sides. These “structures of the lifeworld” (Schütz & Luckmann, 1979, 1984) then also form the basis for the “social construction of reality”, as the concept of a (knowledge) sociological constructivism written by Berger and Luckmann reads. Their starting point is a concept of meaningful action (phenomenologically described from the ego), which is based on Schütz, and from which they then show how it is extended to objectivity in interaction. Berger and Luckmann (1970) first refer to this expansion as “dialectical”, but later note that the concept of dialectics is quite problematic. This is because it assumes a dialectical and, above all, contrastive relationship to the objective, which – in contrast, for example, to Searle’s (2012) very limited concept – encompasses both the social world and the reality it deals with and “knows”. Most importantly, the concept leads to a strange circle in which the subject is also involved (more in detail in Knoblauch, 2005). For the dialectical process turns out to be an analytic-constitutive construction process: an acting consciousness, initially assumed to be pre-social, externalizes its intentions (also mediated by the body) and objectifies them in such a way that coordination with others is possible. This coordination gives rise to sequences of action which, thanks to the consciousness capable of routinisation, can be made permanent. As soon as they are adapted by third parties, they coagulate into “objective” institutions whose meaning must now be separately “legitimized”. The formerly pre-social subjects now find themselves in a socially objectified world into which they are socialized through internalization. In this process, subject and object do not form opposites that cancel each other out, but rather two moments of a cycle that, however, closes in a strange way precisely at the subject: The pre-social subject is, at the end of the construction, a fully socialized “personal identity” or, in the words of Mead (1964), a “self”. As plausibly as this circle serves as a model of reconstruction, however, it makes the presupposition of a subject prior to construction. But since the subject is always already entangled in the circle, since we thus, as Luckmann (1973) calls it, always already live in a “sociohistorical a priori”, the question arises as to how one can assume such a pre-social subject.1

This question arises if one understands the process as dialectical, as Simmel does: “After the synthesis of the subjective produced the objective, the synthesis of the objective now produces a newer and higher subjective – just as the personality surrenders to the social circle and loses itself in it, only to regain its own character through the individual intersection of the social circles within it” (Simmel, 1992, p. 467). 1

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

43

A solution to this problem was formulated by Husserl, who recognized the ultimate ground of consciousness in the transcendental ego. However, the assumption of a transcendental ego raises the question of how this itself can be grounded. Since this question leads into infinite regress, Husserl’s “absolute” program of justification is also considered to have failed. A second solution is proposed by Schütz, who carries out a mundane phenomenological analysis of the acting subject in order to identify general structures of the lifeworld. The subject and its consciousness are here endowed with a set of properties that emerge from ‘mundane phenomenology’, i.e. the method of introspection that Schütz carried out. However, since this phenomenology-performing subject – here now by all means Schütz personally – is situated in each specific socio-historical lifeworld, the problem is raised of how to generalize the time- and society-specific characteristics to which he is exposed. Does Schütz not essentially analyze Alfred Schütz’s lifeworld (especially given the unresolved methodology of Mundane Phenomenology)? Can it really adequately capture the lifeworld of women, non-Europeans, or animals, as the critique from feminism, postcolonialism, and postsocialism goes? As already explained elsewhere (Knoblauch, 2008), these questions by no means have to mean abandoning the program of a lifeworld justification. Rather, the inclusion of the different perspectives can lead to a correction of Schütz’s lifeworld analysis through a kind of triangulating relationalization. It is true that this relationalization requires a subject as a referent (both of the described object and of the description). However, the concept of subject should be kept very “thin”, i.e. low in presuppositions. There are several reasons for this: First, the process of relationing (say, between me, the readers, and, say, Schütz’s texts) is itself communicative, as is that of describing what is being related. While this form of communication is part of the procedure of the science of sociology represented here, one should not exclude the possibility that assumptions about the subject transcend this discipline and the knowledge of the readers, for instance in the direction of psychology, anthropology or philosophy. Second, only a few decades after Schütz’s analyses of the lifeworld, it becomes apparent that some of its structures, which are regarded as “universal,” may be very typical of the time (Knoblauch, 2017, pp. 39 ff.). If one does not want to give up the concept of the lifeworld, the “structures” of the lifeworld must be linked to another concept of subject. This concept is not substantial, but processual, in that it grasps the subject as a moment of communicative action, that is, as subjectivity. Subjects emerge only from communicative action. We will discuss this below. Third, this subjectivity is decentered in that it is part of a relation. We can only hint at this, because in the following section

44

H. Knoblauch

we want to focus thirdly on the fact that this subjectivity is merely formally determined.

3

The Subject of Communicative Construction

In what sense can we speak of subjects at all? There are good reasons for asking this question, since we had already linked the problem of relativity with the subject: The assumption of a ‘universal’, ‘abstract’ or even individual subject necessarily involves culturally specific, ethnocentric, possibly even idiosyncratic elements that distort the sociality derived from it accordingly. But even if I do not want to claim that there is no substance of the subject, there seems to be no firm evidence as to what exactly it consists of. Are there specific and determinable unitary needs, drives to action, character traits of subjects in general? This question is notoriously difficult to answer substantively. For this reason, I also want to make as few substantive assumptions about the subject as possible here and limit the explanations to the subjectivity that we can derive from communicative action. I can illustrate this derivation with an exemplary example of communicative action: pointing. For pointing has to do with a phenomenon that Schütz already called the interchangeability of points of view: “I presuppose,” says Schütz, as a matter of course, “that my fellow human being and I would have the same experience of the common world if we exchanged places, if, that is, my ‘here’ were transformed into his ‘here’ and his ‘here’, for me now still a ‘there’, were transformed into my ‘here’” (Schütz, 1971b, p. 365). The interchangeability of points of view is one of the central “idealizations” in Schütz’s theory of intersubjectivity. It is precisely the analysis of pointing that can therefore make clear the specificity of the subjectivity of communicative action. For Schütz regards the subject as the spatial “zero point of a coordinate system”. He shares this notion with a classical theory of pointing formulated by Bühler (1934). What Schütz calls ‘here’, Bühler conceives of somewhat more abstractly as ‘haecceitas’. Showing, for Bühler, is subjectivistically explained by the fact that it starts from this ‘here’. Schütz’s subjective “zero point of the coordinate system” in showing is the ‘origo’: origo is the identical point to which everything that is shown is related, and this origo is for him the bodily subject from which the deixis proceeds.2

This also applies, figuratively, to linguistic deixis and to what Husserl called indexicality: Words like “I,” “here,” and “now” are part of a conventionalized linguistic system, as are their

2

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

45

Hanks (1996) has made a clear criticism of this subjectivist model and developed a relational conception of pointing. He stresses that pointing cannot be thought of as a solitary act because it is by no means guided solely by the subjective standpoint from which it points. Rather, the ‘art’ of pointing consists precisely in the fact that the pointing person is oriented towards someone else: she aligns her body in such a way that the other person can see the finger point, and she aligns her finger and hand in such a way that the direction is visible from the other person’s perspective. In pointing, therefore, I anticipate the perspective of the Other and I make the pointing visible to Others. While this position is a reference point of pointing, it is not the only one. In its orientation towards a third, showing has two further points of reference.3 In this way I have emphasized the importance of the relationality of pointing; but at the same time the example also makes clear a change in what must be understood by point of view.4 For pointing is not just about what Mead calls “perspectivity”. In acting, pointing does not only take into account the standpoint of others. In the interchangeability of standpoints, it must necessarily also consider its own standpoint in order to be able to show properly: Where it stands itself is relevant to how it shows. This standpoint is called positionality. Here, however, positionality by no means the one-sided relationship between a subject and an object as expressed in “origo”: a single person perceives things.5 In pointing it also becomes clear that this positionality is not to be understood simply in relation to the thing (that is shown), but in relation to others who are shown to or who point. This positionality is not a property of the subject, but a moment of communicative action. More precisely, it is one of those moments that constitute the subjectivity of action. Without this positionality, neither pointing nor seeing pointing makes any sense. So we do not have to assume an antecedent substance of the subject here; rather, the subject is part of the relation of pointing, that is, it is formal; and it is procedural because it is established in the process of pointing; because of the asymmetry of pointing (who

counter-concepts (“you,” “there,” “earlier”), but they can only be understood from their reference to situation, position, and relation. 3 Ricœur (1991, p. 238) therefore also speaks of a “co-positing” of two subjects. 4 It must also be noted that the notion of “perspective” is strongly attached to the visual aspect of sensuality, which is already only a modality for the pointing. On perspective, cf. Mead (1983). 5 The term “positionality” was coined by Plessner and refers to the restricted relationship of higher (in their biology “centrally organized”) animals to the objects of their acting and perceiving attention (Plessner, 1975).

46

H. Knoblauch

points and who is pointed to), however, the subjects are not identical, but are distinguished by their respective (relational, procedural) positionality. The subjectivity lies once in this asymmetry, which is connected with the positionality just described. This positionality is by no means the only moment of subjectivity in communicative action. Already the bodies and their senses exhibit an asymmetry: The mere seeing of pointing is clearly different from the kinestheticvisual movement of arm, hand and eyes. The motives of pointing and being pointed at are also asymmetrical in a way that can be described by Schütz’s distinction between the “because motive” (I look because I am shown) and the around motive (I point so that someone looks). However, I cannot elaborate on this here (Knoblauch, 2017, p. 114 ff.). With this brief illustration of the positionality of pointing, I merely want to indicate what I mean by the subjectivity of communicative action. Subjectivity is a moment that makes communication communicative action. This does not mean, however, that we must empirically abandon the notion of subjects, individuals, and identities in everyday action. However, empirical subjects are themselves results of communicative constructions derived from subjectivity. It forms the condensation core of subjectification, that is, of what is called identity, person, and individual, as recent research on subjectification clearly shows (Bosančić, 2018).

4

Subjectification and Communicative Action

Even if we do not assume particular contents of consciousness, subjectivity undoubtedly requires consciousness. However, this consciousness is not the starting point of communicative action or even of action. Rather, I assume that consciousness is constituted in communicative action. This is already emphasized by Mead when he remarks: “We find no evidence for the prior existence of consciousness as something which brings about behavior on the part of one organism that is of such a sort as to call forth an adjustive response on the part of another organism, without itself being dependent on such behavior” (Mead, 1964, p. 131). It is only through participation in communicative action that consciousness is formed. By virtue of subjectivity, a difference in reciprocal perspective is established so that subjects can be formed. We refer to this as subjectification. Subjectification or becoming a subject is called by Joas equivalent to a kind of “desocialization process” (Joas, 1989, p. 158): Communicative action is disembedded and internalized from its acting, relational and social context. This can be illustrated, with Mead, by the example of thinking: Thinking, for Mead,

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

47

consists in “the importation of outer conversation, conversation of gestures with others, into the self in which the individual takes the role of others as well as his own role” (Mead, 1964, p. 42). Thought, then, is an inwardly displaced conversation that loses or – as the inner “voice of conscience” with which I engage in “inner dialogue” – can lose its dialogic character. What is special about this subjectivization is that now also the reference that is effectually made in communicative action can be internalized and thus appears as intentionality. However, this intentionality is not a precondition of communication, but a consequence of participation in communicative action. The relational aspect of action in thought is preserved by reference to others (things and agents), but is no longer visible (and therefore no longer ‘acting’). In this way, the subject is less a part of communicative action than its result. The communicative acts, and also the social relations of which they consist and which they signify, can, through further mutualization, become ‘conceptions’, ‘imaginations’ and ‘fantasies’ from which one’s own actions can draw their designs. They form an imaginarium of inner thought and space, which is filled by communicative action and also experiences a strong evaluative and emotional occupation through affectivity. One can already see from this that “desocialization” is an inadequate term, since subjectification is not actually about subjects falling out of the relation; rather, subjectification consists in an internalization of the relation. However, since subjectivity already occurs formally as, say, the positionality of communicative action, subjectification is not just about a mutualization of meaning, but rather a kind of mutualization of relation. The self is the relation that can be relocated to the “inside” as soon as such an inside has been formed and solidified in communicative action.6 The mutualization takes place in the context of action sequences, from which action, motives and strategies are derived. We will come back to this in connection with the sequences. With the mutualization of the relation inward – which Mead grasps through the designations “I” and “Me” – an understanding of the self can also form, as soon as the self understands itself as a relation: The self then turns reflexively toward itself. This happens most conspicuously in bodily terms, for instance when the parts of the

Cooley (1902) describes it as follows: “As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another’s mind some thought of their appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it. A self idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination if our appearance to the other person, the imagination of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.” 6

48

H. Knoblauch

body are objectified.7 This elementary subjectification is then followed by more developed forms of self-techniques that ‘cultivate’ the handling of one’s own body. But subjectification also extends to the consciousness that is being formed. Contributing to this are these self-techniques, such as “know thyself”, self-care or ‘aiskesis’ or “working on ourselves”. These are “procedures [...] offered to and imposed on individuals so that they fix, prove, and change their identity as a function of a set of given purposes and within the framework of relations of selfmastery and self-knowledge” (Foucault, 2009, p. 623).8 We can then use the concept of identity to refer to such forms of subjectification that aim to unify the various “voices” or “roles” in communicative action.9 They presuppose the reciprocity of motives and are formed only in the sequences of communicative action, such as those that determine primary socialization. They are strongly shaped by society, such as the particular but also very open form of the modern individual with free will central to it.10 Identities need not be limited to dyadic relations – just as the relation is only ever the simplest example of the social. Thus psychoanalysis has repeatedly emphasized that the mutualization – within the institution of the bourgeois family – can also refer to a constellation of three: The relation of father, mother, and child thus becomes one-sided into the inner roles of “ego,” “id,” and “superego.” However, mutualizations can also refer to collective identities, if these appear or are

Mead (1964, p. 95) calls this “the making of an individual an object to himself.” Here, the “mirror phase” is to be mentioned (Lacan, 1973), but also the actions highlighted by psychoanalysis, in which infants make their body, its parts and ejections into an object. 8 Self-care is an (a) attitude, it is (b) a form of attention, it includes (c) a set of actions directed towards oneself, such as meditation techniques, techniques of memory, techniques of examination of conscience, examination of ideas, and so on. Technologies of subject construction are caring for oneself, self-mastery, self-hermeneutics, dietetics, and the aestheticization of one’s existence (Foucault, 1988). 9 The concept of identity is derived from Freudian psychoanalysis, and in the sociological tradition primarily from Meadian social psychology, which distinguishes between a pre-social “I” and a social “Me”. Conceptually, it assumes that both aspects are integrated into an identity which, while paralleling Freud’s “I” in form, is not a construct of compulsions and repressions in Mead’s view, but rather meets the requirements of a democratic personality that represents one’s own within the framework of the communal. The concept of identity plays a central role in symbolic interactionism, it is regarded as fundamental by Habermas and critical theory, but it also appears in a central place in the theory of the social construction of reality, and it is also treated again and again by Berger as well as by Luckmann, related to language, religion and modern society and developed further. 10 On the historical development of individualistic identity, see Abels (1998). 7

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

49

communicated in a semi-uniform way. This communication can take place physically in the sheer bodily presence of a collective such as at gatherings, demonstrations, or even in the ‘collective effervescence’ (Durkheim, 1981) of shared rituals. Communication can be characterized by a particular sensuality and affectivity, for instance when the bodily voice is so absorbed in the chorus of consonant tones that even subjective perception no longer hears any difference. Collectives can be represented in the form of symbols or also by a more or less common language, for example when it separates the ‘we’ from the ‘you’.

5

Double Subjectification in the Communication Society

If subjectivity is a prerequisite for what we call sociality, i.e. the subject area of the social sciences, then subjectification can explain the formation of agents, roles and collective identities, without which societies cannot empirically exist. The terms are necessarily so general because they must be able to refer to different kinds of societies-be they simple horde societies or modern industrial societies. But because in this volume we are concerned with the contemporary processes of mediatization, I want to conclude by turning to the particular form of subjectivation that is involved. I will briefly outline them as double subjectification, but to do so I must refrain from explaining the processes of mediatization that are associated with them and that are the subject of the other contributions in this volume. Because we have presented our understanding of mediatization in detail elsewhere, it may suffice to say here that I see mediatization as a pervasive social process of changing physical, technical, and material mediations of communicative acts. We see the special features of contemporary mediatization in the digitalization of this mediation, its inter- and intra-activation, and the increasing material productivity of this “communication work” (Knoblauch, 2017, p. 319 ff.). I want to summarize this form of mediatization under the concept of communicativization and limit myself here to its consequences for subjectivation. I want to describe these changes as double subjectification because it has two sides. On the one hand, the subject becomes public through communicativization. On the other hand, there is an increased internalization of action in what I will call Veraktung. The double connection of this subjectivation with communicativization is underlined by Castells, who brings it to the concept of “mass self-communication”. The reference to the “mass” is somewhat misleading, because the subject of this communicativization does not merge into the mass. Rather, it is identified and made identifiable, because the communicative action is highly oriented towards the

50

H. Knoblauch

individual subject. It is a matter of “self-communication”, because this simultaneously emanates from the subject: “the production of messages is self-generated, the potential receiver self-directed, and content retrieval self-selected” (Castells, 2009, p. 55). Castells therefore also speaks almost paradoxically of “communicative subjects” (Castells, 2009, p. 136). This paradox finds its counterpart in the changed relationship between privacy and the public sphere, which is referred to as the “personal public sphere” (Schmidt, 2012):11 Subjectification is carried out in publics that do not know a clear boundary to a private sphere in communicative terms. This results not only in a publication of attention and its own “economy of attention”. It also results in increasing problems with the juridical notion of the “private” and the subject. The publication driven by communicativization and its technologically enabled permanent objectifications includes the publication of problems of face-saving, as Goffman (1967) had described for face-to-face interaction: stigmatization, internet bullying or “personalized shitstorms”, which were common under mass media conditions only for “celebrities”, can now befall any subject. In fact, the publication of the subjective can already be observed in the course of the (neoliberally justified) pluralization of the mass media, such as in the “confession shows” of the 1990s (Imhof & Schulz, 1998). However, while the mass media portrayed individuals as merely representative of all others, any subject can make himself or herself the central subject of communication through communicativization. Starting with self-representation in a wide variety of formats (homepage, Facebook entry, digital photo bulletin board or YouTube’s “Broadcast Yourself”) to lifeblogging, communicativization is also about a representation of the self (Eisewicht & Grenz, 2017). Alongside the “private public sphere”, new forms of public sphere are emerging, such as “networked publics” (Boyd, 2010). Centered on the subject, they often constitute transformations of social relations that were once friendships, acquaintances, or collegial relationships, but are now expanding translocally. These are no longer traditional relationships or formal memberships, but forms of “belonging” that are characterized by their affective occupation. This “sense of belonging” can be linked to social structures and institutions (such as universities) and also extend to collectives in which subjects act or in which they are discursively enmeshed such as migration groups, fan communities, and other “communities” (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2011). Even the “peer groups” of adolescent

11

This leads to the ambiguity of the concept of privacy, which is also referred to as the “privacy paradox”: The protection of privacy is considered a self-evident norm, which is, however, repeatedly broken by (one’s own) practice.

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

51

socialization are now mediatized and can be found in chats, Internet gaming communities, and other communities. These networks derive their subjective character from the fact that they are delegated by the subject – within the framework of accessibility – and can therefore follow subjective relevance criteria. In this way, individual “small life worlds” can emerge in mediatized forms, in which the segregated “network public” forms “echo chambers” or serves as a “tele-cocoon” for special and highly individualized subjectivizations (Ito, 2008, p. 10).12 For example, anorectic women, who for a long time were merely institutionally defined as subjectified attributions of medical therapies, can now conceive of themselves as independent subjects who create their own circles and orient their diet, cosmetics and body design accordingly (Traue & Schünzel, 2014). This activation of the mediatized subjects becomes especially clear in comparison with the mass media: it took a very long time for their reception to be recognized as action, but, as already mentioned, this reception was largely limited to the “appropriation” and decoding of what had already been produced as objectivation in terms of form and content by specialized institutions. The present communicativization leads to a more intense activation of the subjects, which finds its expression in the aforementioned “self-representation”. It is not merely casual and situationally ephemeral, but becomes a media performance. The growing role of performativity, as said, has already appeared in the period of liberalization of mass media.13 Moreover, the communicativization exhibits a subjectivization tendency, as already expressed in the “personal computer”: the subject is bodily connected to the media and has an effect – be it by typing, by uttering words (in systems with interactive speech recognition), or possibly only by automatically recognized eye movement (in the case of the physically severely handicapped), or even a cerebral tense in the case of the motionless. What communicativization adds to the conventional form of theatrical or dramaturgical performance is the effectual aspect of performativity: the interactivity of communication technologies, in particular, gives mediatized actions an efficacy. It produces objectivations, even if these may only consist of (published) photographs, videos and Twitter texts, and it thus triggers lasting sequential follow-up actions, even if these are only carried out as transfers in Internet banking. What is crucial about this performativity is that it does

12

On small life worlds, cf. Honer (2011). Willems (1998) has emphasized this in his diagnosis of the “staged society”; Kershaw (1996) speaks explicitly of a “performative society”: “the mediatisation of developed societies disperses the theatrical by inserting performance into everyday life”. 13

52

H. Knoblauch

not owe itself solely to the communicative power of words and is then “enacted” by tellers or other people being spoken to. By virtue of mediation, it is performed by the subjects themselves, who now produce objectifications whenever they do something. The mediatized communicative acts now become discrete entities that take on act structures. They are not accidentally called “commands” in computer language, because they turn the communicative acts into active acts with unambiguous products that stand as datum in the memory of a potential public. Communicativization thus leads to a lactation: it produces a classification and delimitation of acts, such as has always been analytically associated with “speech acts”. Every “command”, every “item”, every “move” can now be grasped and evaluated as a unit. This act corresponds to a subject that not only has objectified “intentions” (similar to the “speech act”) that are expressed in the technically objectified act. Communicativization thus produces not only a publicly performative outside, but also an objectified inside. Because of its high performativity, this inside exhibits little of what Romanticism or what psychoanalysis eloquently endowed with a merely symbolically describable soul. It consists instead of the objectified acts and choices. It appears to be “responsible” for these decisions in the literal sense, because communicative action, thanks to technical mediation, appears like pre-social unilateral action.14 Responsibility for the acts, however, is not assumed by general “reason” in “rational choice.” Rather, the self only reveals itself in the choices the subject makes, which it must reconcile with its performative side in such a way that it feels “authentic.” This authentic subject nevertheless does not disintegrate into a postmodern “protean” identity that changes arbitrarily with contexts, and whether it is a “singularity” (Reckwitz, 2017) distinct from the individual remains to be seen. Because and insofar as it is continually addressed, is affected, and leaves its own objectified traces, it can gain a constancy as a permanent point of reference of mediatized communicative action, which, like everything subjective, remains related to others and bound to the social (Hitzler, 1991).

References Abels, H. (1998). Einführung in die Soziologie. Westdeutscher Verlag.

14

This is, of course, secured by the legal regulations of responsibility for the mediatized acts through sales contracts, personalized e-mail accounts, and others.

The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification

53

Bellinger, A., & Krieger, D. J. (2006). ANThology: Ein einführendes Handbuch zur AkteurNetzwerk-Theorie. transcript. Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1970). Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Fischer. Bosančić, S. (2018). Die Forschungsperspektive der interpretativen Subjektivierungsforschung. In A. Geimer, S. Amling, & S. Bosančić (Eds.), Subjekt und Subjektivierung. Empirische und theoretische Perspektiven auf Subjektivierungsprozesse (pp. 43–64). Springer VS. Boyd, D. M. (2010). Social network sites as network publics: Affordances, dynamics and implications. In Z. Papacharissi (Ed.), A networked self: Identity, community and culture on social network sites (pp. 39–58). Routledge. Bühler, K. 1982. UTB (Erstveröffentlichung 1934. Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. Oxford University Press. Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. Scibner. Couldry, N., & Hepp, A. (2016). The mediated construction of reality. Polity. Durkheim, E. (1981). Die elementaren Formen des religiösen Lebens. Suhrkamp. Eisewicht, P., & Grenz, T. (2017). App-Fotografie. Zur Veralltäglichung interpretativer Konservierung. In T. Eberle (Ed.), Fotografie und Gesellschaft (pp. 117–132). Transcript. Foucault, M. (1988). Archäologie des Wissens. Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (2009). Hermeneutik des Subjekts: Vorlesungen am Collège de France (1981/ 1982). Suhrkamp. Goffman, E. (1967). Stigma. Über Techniken der Bewältigung beschädigter Identität. Suhrkamp. Habermas, J. (1988). Nachmetaphysisches Denken. Suhrkamp. Hanks, W. (1996). Language and communicative practice. Westview. Hitzler, R. (1991). Der banale Proteus. In H. Kuzmics & I. Mörth (Eds.), Der Unendliche Prozess der Zivilisation: Zur Kultursoziologie der Moderne nach Norbert Elias (pp. 219–228). Campus. Honer, A. (2011). Kleine Leiblichkeiten. Erkundungen in Lebenswelten. VS Verlag. Imhof, K., & Schulz, P. (Eds.). (1998). Die Veröffentlichung des Privaten, die Privatisierung des Öffentlichen. Westdeutscher Verlag. Ito, M. (2008). Introduction. In K. Varnelis (Ed.), Networked publics (pp. 1–14). MIT Press. Joas, H. (1989). Praktische Intersubjektivität: Die Entwicklung des Werkes von George Herbert Mead. Suhrkamp. Keller, R., Hubert, K., & Reichertz, J. (2012). Kommunikativer Konstruktivismus: Theoretische und empirische Arbeiten zu einem neuen wissenssoziologischen Ansatz. Springer VS. Kershaw, B. (1996). The politics of performance in a postmodern age. In P. Campbell (Ed.), Analysing performance (pp. 133–152). Manchester University Press. Knoblauch, H. (1995). Kommunikationskultur. De Gruyter. Knoblauch, H. (2004). Subjekt, Intersubjektivität und persönliche Identität: Zum Subjektverständnis der sozialkonstruktivistischen Wissenssoziologie. In M. Grundmann & R. Beer (Eds.), Subjekttheorien interdisziplinär: Diskussionsbeiträge aus Sozialwissenschaften, Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften (pp. 37–58). Münster. Knoblauch, H. (2005). Wissenssoziologie. UVK.

54

H. Knoblauch

Knoblauch, H. (2008). Sinn und Subjektivität in der qualitativen Forschung. In H. Kalthoff, S. Hirschauer, & G. Lindemann (Eds.), Theoretische Empirie. Zur Relevanz qualitativer Forschung (pp. 210–233). Suhrkamp. Knoblauch, H. (2017). Die kommunikative Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Springer VS. Krotz, F. (2001). Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. VS Verlag. Lacan, J. (1973). Das Spiegelstadium als Bildner der Ichfunktion, wie sie uns in der psychoanalytischen Erfahrung erscheint. Schriften I (S. 61–70). Olten: Freiburg im Breisgau. Luckmann, T. (1973). Philosophie, Sozialwissenschaft und Alltagsleben. Soziale Welt, 24, 138–168. Luckmann, T. (1974). Das kosmologische Fiasko der Soziologie. Soziologie, 2, 16–32. Mead, G. H. (1964). On social psychology – Selected papers. University of Chicago Press. Mead, G. H. (1983). Die objektive Realität der Perspektiven. In H. Joas (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Aufsätze (Bd. 2, S. 211–224). Suhrkamp. Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. (2011). From ‘Identity’ to ‘Belonging’ in social research: Plurality, social boundaries, and the politics of the self. In Albiez, N. Castro, L. Jüssen, & E. Youkhana (Hrsg.), Ethnicity, citizenship and belonging: Practices, theory and spatial dimensions (S. 199–219). Iberoamericana. Plessner, H. (1975). Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. De Gruyter. Reckwitz, A. (2017). Die Gesellschaft der Singularitäten. Suhrkamp. Ricœur, P. (1991). From text to action: Essays in hermeneutics II. Northwestern University Press. Schmidt, J. (2012). Persönliche Öffentlichkeiten und informationelle Selbstbestimmung im Social Web. In J.-H. Schmidt & T. Weichert (Eds.), Datenschutz. Grundlagen, Entwicklungen und Kontroversen (pp. 215–225). Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Schütz, A. (1971a). Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl. Gesammelte Aufsätze (Bd. 3, S. 86–126) Studien zur phänomenologischen Philosophie. Nijhoff. Schütz, A. (1971b). Symbol, Wirklichkeit und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Aufsätze (Bd. 1, S. 331–411) Das Problem der sozialen Wirklichkeit. Nijhoff. Schütz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1979). Strukturen der Lebenswelt (Bd. 1). Suhrkamp. Schütz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1984). Strukturen der Lebenswelt (Bd. 2). Suhrkamp. Searle, J. R. (2012). Wie wir die soziale Welt machen. Suhrkamp. Simmel, G. (1992). Soziologie. Suhrkamp (Erstveröffentlichung 1908). Soeffner, H.-G. (1992). Luther – Der Weg von der Kollektivität des Glaubens zu einem lutherisch-protestantischen Individualitätstypus. Die Ordnung der Rituale (S. 20–75). Suhrkamp. Traue, B., & Schünzel, A. (2014). Visueller Aktivismus und affektive Öffentlichkeiten: Die Inszenierung von Körperwissen in ,Pro Ana‘ und ,Fat Acceptance‘ Blogs. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 39, 121–142. Weber, M. (1988). Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. In Weber, M. (Hrsg.), Religionssoziologie (Bd. 1). Mohr Siebeck (Erstveröffentlichung 1921). Willems, H. (1998). Inszenierungsgesellschaft? Zum Theater als Modell, zur Theatralität von Praxis. In H. Willems & M. Jurga (Eds.), Inszenierungsgesellschaft: Ein Einführendes Handbuch (pp. 23–79). Westdeutscher Verlag.

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization and the Transformations of the Self Rainer Winter Abstract

In the tradition of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, the self is constituted in social interaction. After outlining this connection, the paper examines the consequences of audiovisual mediatization in the last decades of the twentieth century and the implications of digital mediatization in the twenty-first century for the self, which is questioned by these developments. It will be shown that media-induced transformations of the self are occurring. Nevertheless, it continues to have an important significance for the initiation of creative processes and for the possibility of emancipation.

1

Introduction

A central concern of media sociology is to analyse irreversible changes in cultural and social worlds brought about by media. Sociology of media is not a hyphenated sociology that deals only with sociological aspects of media (Waisbord 2014; Hoffmann and Winter 2018). Rather, it aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the present. It aims to explore the dangers and possibilities in a social situation where media are ubiquitous (Featherstone 2009). For example, the study of media history can show how media have contributed to the cultural and social differentiation that characterizes contemporary societies, even if phenomena of de-differentiation cannot be ignored (Winter and Eckert 1990). Very clearly, the R. Winter (✉) Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Alpen-Adria Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_4

55

56

R. Winter

transformations brought about by media are illustrated by the processes of digitalization that have taken place in the last twenty years. It is certainly no exaggeration to state that a radical change in the conditions and relations of communication has taken place, similar to that caused by writing and printing. These go so far that the social itself is changing. More and more, it appears as a dimension of technological worlds (Lash 2002; Faßler 2009, 2014). The digital era is producing new cultural, social and political constellations. For example, the rise of right-wing populism, racism and hatred is sustained and spread by digital media, but social movements advocating equality and democracy also use digital media for their purposes (Winter 2010; Castells 2012; Mason 2012). Our relationships, our communities, and our sense of self have also changed dramatically. It is the important task of the sociology of media to explore these transformations, as yet little understood and grasped, in the context of (late) capitalist society. Above all, it is concerned with determining the share of (digital) media in these processes. Friedrich Krotz (2001, 2007, p. 30) in particular has suggested that the concept of mediatization be used systematically in communication studies to capture the processes of medial change that are to be considered in connection with changes in the relationship between everyday life, identity, culture and society. In his reading, mediatization – like globalization or individualization, for example – is a metaprocess (Krotz 2007, p. 40) that must be conceptually defined and empirically researched. Only in an analytical perspective can it be separated from the other metaprocesses that determine today’s social dynamics. It concerns not only the transformations in culture and society, but also those of institutions and organizations, as well as “the changes in people’s social and communicative actions”(Krotz 2007, p. 38). In this book, the communication studies perspective is expanded by placing the connection between mediatization and the subject at the center of consideration. Hereby, (social) psychological and sociological perspectives become important, which have always had the subject, conceived as self or identity, in view or are even focused on it. Thus, in the pragmatist tradition, the self (‘self’) has been understood as empirically grounded from the very beginning. It develops in social interactions. Whereas philosophers often conceived of a timeless and stable self, in the view of pragmatism the self changes through the social reactions and expectations of others. In this dynamic process, the individual acts actively and creatively. The self reflects and responds to the social demands of the contexts in which it is involved. For Mead (1967, p. 140), it is “essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience.” Even though the self develops in social interactions, it nevertheless remains anchored in the individual. This social psychological insight of interpretatively oriented interactionism, which informs socialization theory and has also become very important in clinical developmental

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

57

psychology (Edelstein and Keller 1982; Selman 1984), will guide the following examination of the relationship between mediatization and the formation of the self.1 First, we will elaborate some important features of the social constitution of the self in the tradition of pragmatism (Sect. 2). Then we will examine how the mediatization thrusts in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, defined by audiovisual (Sect. 3) and digital (Sect. 4) media, have had a decisive impact on the formation of the self. Jean Baudrillard, in particular, has made the formative influence and centrality of postmodern imagery his subject. He believes that not only is the real disappearing, but also that the self is becoming obsolete as a centre of action in the media-constituted hyperreality of the present (Sect. 3.1). We will then confront this pessimistic diagnosis with social psychological findings. To this end, we will take a closer look at the social saturation occurring under these conditions, which is brought about by the ubiquitous availability of communication technologies. It was analysed in detail early on by Kenneth Gergen (Sect. 3.2). Then we will deepen the skeptical perspective towards Baudrillard’s diagnosis by looking more closely at the influence of film in postmodernity, which has been studied in particular by Norman Denzin, one of the most important contemporary representatives of Symbolic Interactionism (Sect. 3.3). Finally, we turn to the implications of digital mediatization for the formation of the self (Sect. 4). The seminal work of psychoanalytically trained psychologist Sherry Turkle, who was a pioneer in this field as early as the 1980s, is important in this regard because she has used many examples to highlight the consequences of digitalization for the formation of the self (Sect. 4.1). A discussion of the concept of the “expository society” developed by Bernard Harcourt, director of the Columbia Center for Contemporary Critical Thought, deepens the results of her studies by analyzing digital power relations and the formation of a transparent digital self (Sect. 4.2). In a final reflection, we plead with the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari for thinking together

1 In the theory of subject cultures developed by Andreas Reckwitz, he locates Mead’s social psychology in the “post-bourgeois subject culture” (Reckwitz 2006, p. 413). It is characterized, he argues, by a “code of the social” that abolishes the difference between the individual and society. “[...] rather, the post-bourgeois subject gains its identity only in belonging to group sociality” (Reckwitz 2006, p. 413). What is fascinating about Mead, however, is precisely that he is able to show that human individuality can only develop in social interactions. When communicative functions and the capacity for reflection are fully developed through diverse social relationships, it can also distance itself from social constraints, act post-conventionally and non-conformistically. This empirical insight of developmental psychology (Noam and Kegan 1982) escapes the theorist Reckwitz, who, like Arnold Gehlen (1957), seems to have no (great) interest in the transformative power and intrinsic value of successful social subjectivation.

58

R. Winter

emancipation and subjectivation in the digital age as well. This requires both theoretical and empirical work (Sect. 5).

2

The Social Constitution of the Self in the Tradition of Pragmatism and Symbolic Interactionism

It was an important concern of pragmatist philosophy not to determine the social self transcendentally, as in the tradition of Descartes,2 but to anchor it mundanely. The self takes shape in the everyday life contexts of ordinary individuals. This becomes pointedly clear in William James’s empiricist-oriented view, which Cooley and Mead also share. “Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind” (James 1961, p. 46). A social self does not have a universal shape, but is first formed in different ways in local contexts of interaction. It does not exist as a stable entity in itself, but it is the social relations that give it form and coherence. Mead (1967) follows up here. The self is a social object that emerges in communicative processes when they become reflexive. This can occur in processes of imagination or reflection, as Charles H. Cooley (1964) has already shown, albeit more subjectivistically oriented through his phenomenological perspective, or in symbolic and reflexive interaction with others whose perspective is adopted to judge one’s actions. “The identity which consciously confronts the identity of others thus becomes an object, an Other to itself, by the very fact of hearing itself speak and respond” (Mead 1980a, p. 245). For Mead (1967, p. 135 ff.), this human ability to coordinate perspectives becomes the basis of “self-consciousness,” the core of the self, which he conceives as an inner representation, emerging from social experience, of external conversation with significant gestures or of others’ reactions to us. At the beginning of adolescence, the individual then develops in “play” an understanding of the organized nature of groups or society, what Mead (1967, p. 154 ff.) calls the perspective of the “generalized other.” In reflexive engagement, it continues the communication of the group or society within itself. Thus, the self develops as a social structure in the process of social coordination, as has been empirically demonstrated in developmental psychology (Selman 1984, p. 34). Like

For Descartes in his philosophical reflections, the “cogito” is a cognitive entity that expresses itself in thought processes. It enables us to observe the (social) world, but remains separate from it and is disembodied.

2

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

59

James, Mead holds that the rule-structured nature of different social contexts also produces different forms of self. We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. There are parts of the self which exist only for the self in relationship to itself. [...] It is the social process itself that is responsible for the appearance of the self; it is not there as a self apart from this type of experience (Mead 1967, p. 142).

The conceptions (‘me’) that the individual makes of the images that important reference persons have of him or her can be synthesised into a homogeneous selfconception, a ‘self’ or ego identity, in confrontation with his or her ‘I’, his or her drive equipment (Joas 1980, p. 117). Mead thus believes that human nature itself is produced in social processes (Joas 1980, p. 112). Herbert Blumer (1969), a student of Mead, developed symbolic interactionism based on Mead’s work, which became a movement within sociology (Keller 2012) and also important in social psychology. He placed at the center of his programmatic thinking how individuals construct meanings when they interact with each other. “Things” such as physical objects, but also people, social roles, or institutions, influence individuals’ actions because they have a specific meaning for them. “Thus, symbolic interactionism sees meanings as social products, as creations that are formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact” (Blumer 1969, p. 5). Embedded in cultural orientations and social organizations, individuals are nonetheless active and creative agents who produce meaningful social worlds that they in turn shape and change. The self is also, according to Blumer (1969, p. 13), who follows Mead, a ‘thing’ that emerges from social interaction. An individual learns to look at himself from the outside by imagining the position of others towards him. Since it has a social self, it also learns to interact with itself. Self-talks in which different positions are taken are an example of this. They too constitute a form of social interaction (Blumer 1969, p. 13). For Blumer (1969, p. 48 f.), symbolic interactionism is an empirical science. The self is to be studied in the social contexts in which it acts and creates meanings. The process of creating meanings is never complete in social interactions. Therefore, empirical research will be used to describe how individuals determine or redefine what is meaningful to them. The self is also not stable or fixed, but a processual event. Erving Goffman, who is in the tradition of Mead but has developed an independent approach within interpretative sociology, has differentiated and deepened

60

R. Winter

Blumer’s views. His studies link naturalistic and ethnographic research with the use of metaphors to compare and systematise observations and descriptions of the social world. In his studies, Goffman (1994) identifies an order of interaction that is his main interest. Rules and norms embodied in cognitive frames by which we perceive and navigate social situations structure and order actions (Goffman 1977). Goffman (1977, p. 55 ff.) emphasizes that these frames can be transformed. He emphasizes the contingencies in social situations, the modulating circumstances that can have an important influence on the constitution of the social self. So when we analyze the self, we are pulled away from its owner, from the person who has the most to gain or lose in the process [...]. There is always a backstage with devices in which the body can form itself, and a frontstage with fixed props. There is always an ensemble of persons [...] (Goffman 1969, p. 231).

In Goffman’s reading, the social self is a dramaturgical self, a self that presents and stages itself on different stages. For its successful self-presentation it is dependent on assistance. It is created in everyday orders of interaction. It is their product and “bears in all its parts the marks of this creation” (Goffman 1969, p. 231). Like James, Goffman (1977) repeatedly emphasizes that different frames also produce different forms of self. The previous remarks have made it clear that in the tradition of pragmatism the self is constituted in social interactions. Temporally, it does not exist before these, but gains shape and form in interpersonal relationships and experiences. Successful self-formation requires social support and recognition by others. Then the conditions are created for individuality to unfold and for the world to be actively changed. But how is this process transformed in the context of increasing mediatization? Media are omnipresent, besiege us, have permeated our lives and colonized them across the board. Already in the discussions about postmodernism since the 1980s, the medial penetration of our everyday life through the flood of images of the media and the growing importance of communication technologies became an important topic that has not lost its relevance until today. The question arises whether and how the self can assert itself in the context of mediatization. As Lyotard (1986, p. 45 ff.) has shown, postmodernism is characterized in particular by a profound skepticism towards the grand narratives of modernity, which assumed a uniformity of society and legitimized the ceaseless production of knowledge as a contribution to the progress of humanity. The social bond of modernity, in Lyotard’s reading, has disintegrated. The self can no longer be understood as an active and creative force in postmodernity.

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

61

The self is little, but it is not isolated, it is caught in a structure of relations that has never been so complex and mobile. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, it is always set at ‘nodes’ of the communication circuit, however insignificant they may be (Lyotard 1986, p. 55).

In the following we will discuss whether this assessment is correct.

3

Audiovisual Mediatization in Postmodernity and Its Implications for the Constitution of the Self

We will first consider Jean Baudrillard’s pessimistic analyses before looking at work by Kenneth J. Gergen and Norman K. Denzin, who already in the 1990s considered the changing constitution of the self under the conditions of the mediatization of the time. Whereas for Baudrillard the real has been submerged and disappeared in the postmodern flood of media images, Gergen and Denzin, who both stand in the tradition of pragmatism and interactionism, hold fast to the self. They search for ways out, forms of resistance and new possibilities of selfdevelopment.

3.1

The Disappearance of the Self in Hyperreality

For Baudrillard (1978, 1982), postmodernity can be described by a process of de-differentiation and the implosion of boundaries and differences. A socially differentiated society oriented towards the conditions of industrial production gives way to a society of simulation dominated by media (Kellner 1989, p. 67). While modern society is dominated by the production of goods and products, postmodernity is characterized by the radical multiplication and acceleration of images and signs. Above all, media such as television contribute to the fact that all areas of society are permeated by simulacra. Images, signs and codes are produced and circulate in society. In the process, these become independent, disconnect themselves from reality and thus increasingly lose their connection to a referent outside the world of simulation. The images become referenceless. The image “refers to no reality. It is its own simulacrum” (Baudrillard 1978, p. 15). Thus a new media reality emerges, which Baudrillard determines as hyperreality. “There is no longer any fiction that life could oppose, victoriously at that – the whole of reality has gone over to the game of reality – the radical disillusionment, the cool and cybernetic stage follows the hot and fantastic stage” (Baudrillard 1982, p. 117).

62

R. Winter

While Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan and Powers 1995) was able to extract positive aspects from the evolution of the communication system and the increasing mediatization, such as the emergence of a global community or a planetary consciousness, for Baudrillard (1983, 1987) the media lead to an “ecstasy of communication” and are responsible for the fact that in the hyperrealism of simulation it is no longer possible to distinguish between the real and the spectacle of images. Thus, media spectacles replace public life. Private lives and intimate stories are depicted in detail and flicker permanently across the screens. On television, on the radio, and today in the digital media, personal problems, tragedies, and successes are incessantly reported in the form of personal stories. Thus we are confronted with a multitude of forms of a media self and the description of interiorities. On talk shows, for example, there are no more personal abysses that are not dragged into the light. The promiscuity of communication and information inevitably leads to transparency and even obscenity. Obscene are relations that no longer have a secret because they have dissolved into information and communication (Baudrillard 1987, p. 19). Phenomenologically, media-mediated things and people move ever closer, no longer leaving room for social interactions in which a self can emerge. Douglas Kellner (1989, p. 72) summarizes: “In this universe we enter a new form of subjectivity, in which we become saturated with information, images, events and ecstasies. Without defense or distance, we become a ‘pure screen, a switching center for all the networks of influence’” (Baudrillard 1983, p. 133). In Baudrillard’s view, there is no longer a social self that engages with the world in a distanced and reflexive way. It is no longer the experience of space and time in the co-presence of significant others or self-centered reflection that decisively determines the position of the individual. “The body as scene, the landscape as scene, time as scene are disappearing more and more. The same is true of public space: the theatre of the social, the theatre of the political are increasingly regressing into a great flaccid body with numerous heads” (Baudrillard 1987, p. 16). The multiplication of self-images through the media, orchestrated by a plethora of (psychological) experts, makes it largely impossible to delineate one’s own self, having taken over self-images (‘me’) from the media in the process of reception. Thus, for Baudrillard, not only the real disappears in hyperreality, but also the self grounded in social interactions. In view of the processes of digitalization, he also uses the term virtual for these transformation processes in his later works. “The completely homogenized, digitalized, ‘operationalized’ virtual reality takes the place of that other reality because it is perfect, controllable, and free of contradictions” (Baudrillard 2002, p. 37). The thinking and acting subject is replaced by technological mediations. “In this sense, it is the virtual that thinks us” (Baudrillard 2002, p. 38).

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

3.2

63

The Oversaturated Self in Postmodernity

Not quite as pessimistic and hopeless as Baudrillard, the US social psychologist Kenneth Gergen (1996) views the mediatization of the self, which he understands as “social saturation”. He observes a fundamental cultural and social change, mainly caused by media changes, which has led to a disappearance of the modern view of the self. The “technologies of social saturation” (Gergen 1996, p. 95) cause a centered individual self oriented towards personal deeper truth and unity to disappear. The technologically enabled confrontation with a multiplicity of personal views, values, and lifestyles leads to a “peopling of the self that reflects the intrusion of partial identities through social saturation” (Gergen 1996, p. 95). In postmodernity, the web of our relationships widens and we take in many voices. Through the technologies of this century, through the quantity and variety of relationships in which we are involved, the possible frequency of contacts, intensity of relationships as well as their permanence are constantly increasing. When this increase goes to the extreme, we reach a stage of social saturation (Gergen 1996, p. 114).

Stored in our memory are (medially mediated) life patterns and identities that can be activated in an appropriate situation. In thinking, the “sublimated conversation” (Mead 1980b, p. 208), there can be an intense engagement with any self we consider important. These can be not only close reference figures from our lives, but also characters from novels or television series. In these inner dialogues, our subjective lives become “more multilayered,” as Gergen (1996, p. 128) notes. At the same time, however, there is the danger of multiphrenia, a confrontation with too many self-images and an uncoordinatable multiplicity of voices. The relatively coherent and unified sense of self inherent in a traditional culture gives way to multiple and competing potentials. A multiphrenic state emerges in which one swims in constantly shifting, chained, and conflicting currents of being (Gergen 1996, p. 140).

Under postmodern conditions, which are closely related to communicationtechnological transformations, the notion of a coherent self living in relatively stable social relations becomes obsolete. “The self as the possessor of true and identifiable characteristics-such as rationality, emotion, inspiration, and will-is dismantled” (Gergen 1996, p. 30). Instead, through the many relationships in which it is involved, it is in a continuous process of self-creation that is never complete. Any lived self can be questioned, ironized, and replaced. But here Gergen

64

R. Winter

also sees an enormous potential for self-development. In postmodernity, the self enters a state of permanent relatedness. “One ceases to believe in a self that is independent of the relationships in which one is embedded” (Gergen 1996, p. 46). Based on this, Gergen (2009) develops an approach that focuses on “relational being”. In relationships, an incessant process of intersubjective coordination takes place. “From this standpoint there is no isolated self or fully private experience. Rather, we exist in a world of co-constitution” (Gergen 2009, p. xv). Gergen considers the development of an understanding of the constitutive character of relational being and of the ethical dimensions associated with it essential if humanity is to survive. He is not, therefore, someone who nostalgically mourns the past, as Baudrillard appears to do. In social saturation he also sees potentials that can be positively developed. For this, perspectives that think from the self must be overcome in favor of a view that understands the generative power of relationships and relational being as opportunity and hope.

3.3

The Imagery of Postmodern Films and Its Influence on the Constitution of the Self

Norman K. Denzin (1991) also finds it necessary to attend to the social transformations of postmodernity in order to understand the situation of the self under these conditions. Like Gergen, Denzin stresses that the self now has more sources at its disposal to shape its identity. In addition to ‘face-to-face’ encounters, there is a plethora of media-mediated interactions. As a sociologist, he nevertheless assumes that the postmodern self experiences itself in the everyday enactments of social identities determined by gender, class and ‘race’. At the same time, however, it inevitably expresses the multiple contradictions of postmodernism (Denzin 1991, p. vii), which are not accounted for in classical social theory. Therefore, he believes it is important to engage with postmodern theory and its representations of the self. This society, Baudrillard argues, only knows itself through the reflections that flow from the camera’s eye. But this knowledge, Baudrillard contends, is unreflexive. [...] I examine the basic thesis (taken from Baudrillard) that members of the contemporary world are voyeurs adrift in a sea of symbols. They know and see themselves through cinema and television (Denzin 1991, p. vii).

According to Denzin, it is problematic that the stagings of forms of the self and of lifestyles in Hollywood films exhibiting visual surfaces usually do not do justice to the complexity and diversity of lived everyday experiences, because they mainly

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

65

serve clichés or create idealizations. They cannot, or can only with difficulty, be meaningfully conveyed with them. For example, the circulation of images of erotic beauty, happy family life, financial success, and of happiness can arouse or intensify resentment in socially disadvantaged groups (Denzin 1991, p. 55). Inevitably, the postmodern self must confront the media images of the self that circulate in and permeate society, even if these often have little to do with concrete experience or blatantly contradict it. In the spirit of Goffman (1969), Denzin understands both these representations and everyday performances of identity as dramaturgical enactments. Goffman’s model of theatre has now become not a metaphor, but an “interactional reality” (Denzin 1991, p. x), given the growing importance of the flood of images in the media and the worlds enacted in them. “The postmodern society is a dramaturgical society” (Denzin 1991, p. x). At the same time, he points out that personal problems and experiences, however, continue to play an important role in these processes. Therefore, theories and methods need to be developed to capture how individuals experience and witness the postmodern moment in history. Above all, the question arises as to how they can act creatively under these conditions. Denzin decisively rejects the position of cultural indifference, which takes no evaluative position on the phenomena described and analysed (Connor 1989). For he is concerned with developing a postmodernist theory of cultural resistance. To do this, it is also necessary to explore and determine one’s own position as a scholar in the creation of meanings (Denzin 1991, p. xi). “Such a theory examines how the basic existential experiences with self, other, gender, race, nationality, family, love, intimacy, violence, death, and freedom are produced and given mythical meaning in everyday life” (Denzin 1991, p. xi). Unlike Baudrillard, Denzin wants to explore how individuals and groups can actively and creatively shape their world in the dramaturgical, postmodern order. Thus, he does not abandon the notion of a social self at all. Even though he follows Baudrillard and the postmodern theory of Lyotard (1986) and Fredric Jameson (1991) in many respects, such as. in the assumption that the boundaries between images and the “real” world are becoming increasingly blurred, he nevertheless clearly criticizes them because they largely fade out the perspective of everyday experience: “More importantly, unexplained in each theory is the way in which human beings, in and through interaction and communication with one another, make sense of and connect themselves to the dominant, residual and emergent features of postmodern life” (Denzin 1991, p. 50). By analyzing important and successful Hollywood films such as Blue Velvet, Wall Street, or Do the Right Thing, Denzin aims to achieve a dense description of postmodern worlds and, in particular, to elaborate the characteristics of the media-

66

R. Winter

staged postmodern self. For him, the films studied represent readings of life in contemporary America. Such texts dramaturgically enact the epiphanal moments of postmodernism. They center their texts on larger-than-life persons. The biographical experiences of such individuals represent attempts to come to grips with the existential dilemmas of postmodernism (Denzin 1991, p. 63). For example, in his analysis of Blue Velvet (1986), he first works out, on the basis of film reviews, which realistic readings were developed in criticism of the film (Denzin 1991, pp. 70 ff.). He is able to show that a plethora of meanings were ascribed to the film. For example, it was seen as pornography, as a comedy, as a small-town film, or as film noir. In a further step, he then shows that Blue Velvet can also be understood as a postmodern text full of contradictions (Denzin 1991, p. 75 f.). Thus the film blurs the boundaries between past and present, between reality and dream, between images and reality. At the same time, it refers to the unrepresentable, to the symbolically unrepresentable. Blue Velvet oscillates in its staging between parody and pastiche. Small-town life, idealized in many Hollywood films of the 1940s and 1950s, is arguably idyllically portrayed by Lynch to some extent, but it is full of abysses, dangers, and backstages where violence, rawness, and perversion reign. Denzin (1991, p. 80) concludes that the film is arguably able to convey an ironically detached attitude. However, as Lynch’s position itself remains ambivalent, the emotional structure of indifference prevalent in postmodernism may also be reinforced. In contrast, Do the Right Thing (1989) is an outstanding film for Denzin that stages the codes and meanings that encompass “race” and the “racial self” in their complexity. “DO THE RIGHT THING is an ethnography of the lived experiences of ordinary, everyday black and white, Italian, Korean, Puerto Rican, and SpanishAmerican men, women, and children in Brooklyn” (Denzin 1991, p. 126). The film succeeds in presenting the different perspectives in a lively and vivid way. It thus provides a profound insight into the symbolic meanings that constitute the “racial self”. In summary, Denzin (1991, p. 149 ff.) states that classical social theory describes a social world that no longer exists or is experienced in this way. In contrast, postmodern theory emphasizes the importance of images and media representation for the enactments of race, class, or gender. The Hollywood films analyzed by Denzin arguably represent the contradictions of the postmodern self, but with the exception of Do the Right Thing, offer only superficial and illusory solutions. While Spike Lees’ film differentiates everyday racism in the US and arouses unease, the other films deny central aspects of social reality such as the role of social class or

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

67

gender discrimination, or perpetuate the myths of romantic love and of social success through hard work. Against this background, Denzin considers it necessary to analyse and examine in a differentiated way the representations of experiences created by the media or other institutions of society that create meaning, in order to find out how they determine everyday experiences. Then, to reflect on the influence of the contradictory elements of postmodern culture on one’s own biography and to shape it obstinately in order to unfold a politics of resistance (Winter 2001). “Begin to write, and live our own pedagogical versions of the postmodern, making our own playful ‘mystories’ of this bewildering, frightening, terrifying, exhilarating historical moment” (Denzin 1991, p. 156). Denzin, then, provides concrete instructions on how to change the self in postmodernity. Undoubtedly, it is decentered and has largely lost its firm anchorage in social interactions. Without nostalgia, however, Denzin points out that it is always being recreated in postmodern stories. “The self which emerges will itself be a tangled web of all that has become before” (Denzin 1991, p. 157). He considers a sociology that realistically depicts the postmodern world impossible because it has become too heterogeneous, complex and diverse. Therefore, he calls for a “cinematic-ethnographic interpretive sociology” (Denzin 1991, p. 157) that breaks new ground in self-education and world exploration.

3.4

Summary

The processes of audiovisual mediatization in the 1980s and 1990s of postmodernism make it clear that we need to rethink fundamental positions, theories and approaches in social theory and sociology. The works of Baudrillard, Denzin and Gergen clearly demonstrate this. The constitution of the self increasingly takes place in the confrontation with the image worlds of audiovisual media. For Baudrillard, the social self even disappears as a social structure in the simulations of hyperreality in which, in his view, it is no longer needed. From Gergen’s and Denzin’s analyses, on the other hand, we can learn that the self continues to matter, even if it has changed decisively. While Gergen understands it as deeply embedded in relationships, Denzin elaborates its anchoring and engagement with cultural representations. Both emphasize the new possibilities and opportunities that mediatization offers when its consequences are critically reflected upon and grasped.

68

R. Winter

4

Digital Mediatization, Virtual Transparency and the Constitution of the Digital Self

Even in the twenty-first century, engagement with audiovisual imagery plays an important role. For example, YouTube or Netflix offer seemingly infinite digital archives of films that can be accessed on any smartphone, anytime, anywhere. Taken as a whole, increasing digitalization since the 1990s has led to a new mediatization push that is decisively transforming the constitution of the self in the twenty-first century. We will discuss some key changes below. To do so, we will first turn to the seminal studies of Sherry Turkle, who is an inspiring and widely read author in the field of Internet studies.

4.1

The Ambivalent Potential of Digital Media

In “The Desiring Machine. Der Computer als Zweites Ich” (1986) and in “Leben im Netz. Identität in Zeiten des Internet” (1999), she paints a predominantly positive picture of the availability and use of digital technologies, which bring about changes in our behaviour and thinking. They transform our perception of space and time, and the computer as a thinking machine challenges our thinking and self-understanding by providing new occasions and perspectives for thinking about ourselves (Turkle 1986, p. 208). The relationship with a computer can influence people’s ideas about themselves, their work, their relationships with other people, and their thinking about social processes. It can form the basis for new aesthetic value systems, for new rituals, new philosophies, and new cultural forms (Turkle 1986, p. 204).

Turkle defines the computer as a “catalyst of cultural structures” (Turkle 1986, p. 204). Not only computer-centered special cultures are formed (Eckert et al. 1991), but also new forms of self-perception, self-reflection and self-expression. In “Life on the Net” (1999), Turkle identifies a postmodern culture of simulation that enables parallel lives in virtual worlds. People use computers to connect. Not only do they develop a different understanding of space. “Computer screens are a new arena for our erotic and intellectual fantasies” (Turkle 1999, p. 38). However, Turkle also notes that living in virtual worlds can shatter and make our experience of the real disappear (Turkle 1999, p. 382 ff.). At the same time, however, in engagement with and use of digital technologies, decentered identities emerge that are less unique than versatile and changeable. “Contributing to the idea of

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

69

multiple identities has also been the Internet. Its users can create a self by vagabonding through many different identities” (Turkle 1999, p. 287). In postmodernity, identities usually consist of multiple roles in professional life and in non-virtual leisure activities, which can mix and also contradict each other (Turkle 1999, p. 289). In this context, as we have shown, Gergen (1996) states an oversaturation of the self, a protean (Lifton 1993) or a flexible (Martin 1994) self are further characterizations of the changes of the self in postmodernity. In postmodernity, personal relationships, in the family and among friends, have fewer and fewer lifelong ties. Thus, taking on different roles and wearing multiple masks becomes a matter of course for many. Turkle uses empirical examples to show that the Internet has become an experimental field for trying on and creating identities. “In its virtual reality, we stylize and create our selves” (Turkle 1999, p. 290). We experience what it means to live in a culture of simulation. In cyberspace, hundreds of thousands, perhaps already millions, of people create online personae; the latter live in an exceedingly multiform world of virtual communities in which the habitual creation of multiple identities undermines the notion of a real, unitary self (Turkle 1999, p. 436).

At the end of her study, Turkle suggests that it will be important that no selfcontained virtual worlds completely replace the real, but that the real and the virtual continually interpenetrate. “Lost among 100 friends” (2012) strikes much more critical notes. Turkle (2012, p. 29 ff.) laments a loss of authenticity in the larger, more differentiated and increasingly important culture of simulation. By authenticity she understands “the ability to put oneself in another person’s shoes, to be able to comprehend something on the basis of shared human experience” (2012, p. 32). Using the idea of the social robot as an example, she makes clear that technologies are associated with the idea that they can serve as a substitute for real interaction with humans. We try to experience closeness with them, but avoid it precisely because we avoid human intimacy (Turkle 2012, p. 38). She also notes that digital technologies of connectivity put us in a state of constant readiness (Turkle 2012, p. 44). We cannot escape connectivity. Many people want to be alone with their personal networks even in public space, the place of bodily copresence (Turkle 2012, p. 46). For young people in particular, permanent connection with networks is central. Turkle (Turkle 2012, p. 50) refers to technologies as “phantom body parts”. “Our new machines create the space for the appearance of a new self-state, the id-self, divided between the screen and the physically real, hoisted into electric existence by technology” (Turkle 2012, p. 50). It is not our ego that controls and dominates technology, but rather we are

70

R. Winter

integrated into technological networks. Smartphones have made cyborgs of us (Turkle 2012, p. 261), permanently online, constantly available, and never wanting to be alone. Turkle (2012, p. 50) notes that online identities are often understood as expressions of the self more than identities in physical reality. The simultaneity of virtual and real activities gives rise to a mix of lives, a “blend of who one is online and offline” (Turkle 2012, p. 275). Turkle (Turkle 2012, p. 281) concludes that the central availability of electronic media increasingly weakens the sense of real interactions with people or causes it to be lost altogether. Moreover, online there is a danger that we treat others as objects, act callously, carelessly or inconsiderately (Turkle 2012, p. 289 ff.). Another insight of Turkle (2012, p. 300 ff.) is that the self online becomes a collaborative effort.3 Particularly among young people, she has observed that they share their feelings online, allowing others to share in them. This often happens as soon as feelings arise. They expect immediate sympathy and validation. In this way, young people try to be clear about their own feelings. In this context, Turkle states a “hyper-externalism” (2012, p. 302) that allows a collaborative self to emerge. She holds that “technology is not the cause of a mode of sentience in which the validation of a feeling becomes part of its establishment and even part of the feeling itself, but merely fosters it” (Turkle 2012, p. 303). Adolescents use the resources of virtual worlds to playfully test their identity, whereby online games (can) take on a serious character. Turkle (2012, p. 307 ff.) shows how avatars are used for identity work. The profile created represents not only what one is, but also what one wants to be, to be recognized as online. “When we breathe life into our avatars, we are expressing our hopes, strengths and vulnerabilities. They are a kind of natural Rorschach test” (Turkle 2012, p. 359). Facebook and MySpace also allow for the creation of virtual characters. Online, the self is experienced as fluid. It can shift between different realities and still experience itself as one self. “With such a diverse identity, people feel ‘complete’ not because their identities are one, but because the relationships between the different aspects of their selves are fluid and unaggressive” (Turkle 2012, p. 331). Turkle (2012, p. 388 ff.) also points to the possibilities and dangers of the new confession culture on the Net. For example, “confessions” are usually given anonymously. It cannot be verified whether the confessions are meant seriously. Reactions

Christina Schachtner also shows in her study “Das narrative Subjekt. Narrating in the Age of the Internet” (2016), Christina Schachtner also shows how net actors and bloggers realize themselves as subjects through practices of narrating on the net. 3

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

71

are also anonymous. Nevertheless, confessors make themselves vulnerable, to which reactions are often insensitive and cruel (Turkle 2012, p. 397 f.). The example of confessional culture illustrates the improbability of communities constituting themselves on Internet portals whose members are physically close to each other, have common interests, feel committed to each other, or are reciprocally organized (Turkle 2012, p. 402). Finally, Turkle (2012, p. 406 ff.) devotes himself to the newly emerged fears in the virtual worlds. First of all, there is the fear of no longer being connected, but of being alone and isolated. Facebook and other portals also enable stalking (Turkle 2012, p. 425). They institutionalize voyeurism. One can invade and rummage through the private lives of others without interference. For some of the users she studied, the fear arises that nothing will remain of their own privacy in the future (Turkle 2012, p. 431 ff.). We leave behind electronic traces on the Net that can be stored, tracked and used commercially or politically. Thus, even in Western democracies, the fear of expressing oneself politically can arise (Turkle 2012, p. 440). In view of these dangers, self-control and dissimulation are needed. In conclusion, Turkle (2012, p. 468) states, “On the Net we quickly find ‘companionship’ but are exhausted by the pressure of self-expression required to do so.” She concludes that the very connectivity we seek does not bring us closer to one another, but separates us from one another and makes us lonely (Turkle 2012, p. 469). “But connectivity also destroys our attachment to things that have always done us good-for example, interpersonal encounters” (Turkle 2012, p. 476). Young people in particular seem to have lost the need for a long-term and “deeper connection” (Turkle 2012, p. 491) with others. Skeptically, Turkle (2012, p. 474) questions whether technology might not be a symptom. Perhaps we do not (yet) want to acknowledge what we have lost through it. Her interpretative explorative studies illustrate how digital mediatization has drastically changed the constitution of the self. Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s Turkle tended to emphasize the positive possibilities – such as the computer as selfexpression or the playful changing of identities online – in the twenty-first century her research increasingly focuses on the dangers and problems for successful identity formation. She points out what is lost when connectivity and being online dominate. The social self is constituted in social interactions based on the real co-presence of people. Research is only beginning to understand what disappears when these conditions experience competition from, or are replaced (in part) by, virtual worlds. One has the impression of witnessing a large-scale social experiment in which the foundations of our personal and social existence are put at risk or destroyed for economic and political interests.

72

4.2

R. Winter

The Virtual Transparency of the Digital Self

Bernard Harcourt elaborates in his book “Exposed. Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age” (2015), that today we should distinguish between a digital and an analogue self, with the digital becoming increasingly important. Our enthusiastic use of social media, fun online shopping or interested use of Google’s search engine constitute a permanent digital self, a virtual identity, as all our activities are stored and archived and can also be tracked and measured. Thus, data about users is collected through tracking. Virtual transparency creates the preconditions for these to be evaluated and analysed for economic or power-oriented purposes. “A new expository power constantly tracks and pieces together our digital selves. It renders us legible to others, open, accessible, subject to everyone’s idiosyncratic projects – whether governmental, commercial, personal, or intimate” (Harcourt 2015, p. 15). In doing so, we voluntarily provide our data. “The technologies that end up facilitating surveillance are the very technologies we crave. We desire those digital spaces, those virtual experiences, all those electronic gadgets – and we have become, slowly but surely, enslaved to them” (Harcourt 2015, p. 52). Harcourt believes that virtual transparency makes possible a new form of social control that is directly embedded in our technological way of life and in whose creation we participate through our activities. “The digital space itself is precisely the machine that we are connected to: it is full of life and energy, of color and movement, of stimulation and production” (Harcourt 2015, p. 50). Today, digital worlds that allow us to distance ourselves from the routines and constraints of institutions such as school or the workplace are available to us at all times. We can follow their promise to do what we want to do, as well as hope for the fulfillment of our (secret) desires. “It is a free space where all the formerly coercive surveillance technology is now woven into the very fabric of our pleasures and fantasies. In short, a new form of expository power embeds punitive transparency into our hedonistic indulgences and inserts the power to punish into our daily pleasures” (Harcourt 2015, p. 21). It is precisely our passionate interests, which we pursue and cultivate in digital space, that make us virtually transparent and thus controllable and manipulable. Harcourt (2015, pp. 80–104), engaging with the panopticon outlined by Jeremy Bentham and Michel Foucault’s Analytics of Power (1976), elaborates that digital control differs from biopower in that it is more comprehensive, profound, and individualizing. Our activities in digital space are seamlessly recorded, and can be tracked and punished at any time. “It is about every little desire, every preference, every want, and all the complexity of the self, social relations, political beliefs and

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

73

ambitions, psychological well-being. It extends into every crevice and every dimension of everyday living of every single one of us in our individuality” (Harcourt 2015, p. 103). Bentham also sought surveillance, control, and security. In the digital age, however, it is also about display, making visible and exposing (Harcourt 2015, p. 116). “Our ambition is to see through brick walls and physical barriers, to turn internal structures inside out, to break down entirely the internal-external differentiation, in order to see into devices and to decipher the invisible” (Harcourt 2015, p. 120). Virtual transparency becomes possible precisely because we allow ourselves to be seduced into voluntarily revealing ourselves. Thus, our digital self gains contour because we tell stories about ourselves on the net to others who are not physically present and construct our ego identities through these representations (Harcourt 2015, p. 128 ff.). However, we not only present ourselves, but also observe and monitor others. Their selfies, their expressions and narratives, their pictures and videos, etc. represent pieces of a mosaic that can be pieced together in detective work, promising deeper insights. Moreover, digital media change the character of confessions. Unlike oral self-disclosures in confession or therapy (Hahn 1982; Hahn et al. 1991), digital confessions are on public display and can reach a large audience. Moreover, they are preserved forever. In addition, self-presentation depends on the respective digital context. While on Facebook a self is usually staged that is desirable and wants to find social recognition, in anonymous environments such as chat rooms or in the comment pages of daily newspapers the presentation of a self that is uncivilized, racist, inconsiderate and hateful is possible. There is no need to consider interpersonal dynamics or fear loss of face. Following Goffman (1972), Harcourt (2015, p. 217 ff.) diagnoses a “humiliation of the self” (“the mortification of the self”) in the digital space. Both Mead and Goffman have assumed that the self is not innate or a transcendental entity. As already described in Chap. 2, it is formed in social interactions with others. Digital mediatization is now leading to a reconfiguration of the self in the twenty-first century. EXPOSED, WATCHED, RECORDED, PREDICTED – for many of us, the new digital technologies have begun to shape our subjectivity. The inability to control our intimate information, the sentiment of being followed or tracked, these reinforce our sense of vulnerability. Our constant attention to rankings and ratings, to the number of ‘likes’, retweets, comments, and shares, start to define our conception of self (Harcourt 2015, p. 217).

It seems as if the backstage area no longer exists. The knowledge about us that is available everywhere, the circulation of which we cannot control, deprives us of a

74

R. Winter

safe place of retreat. This situation is similar to that of inmates in mental institutions. They, too, must constantly reckon with the circulation of destructive information about them that they would prefer to keep secret (Goffman 1972, p. 159). Thus, a documented medical history in which a mental disorder is diagnosed and thus a case history is constructed has very negative effects on self-perception and self-presentation. The inmate can be exposed at any time. Moreover, his/her every activity can be observed and documented in order to gather personal information and draw conclusions. “In the asylum, then, the inmate experiences that his self is not a fortress but rather a small open city; he may soon tire of cheering as soon as it is held by his own troops and of being outraged when the enemy overruns it” (Goffman 1972, p. 163). As a rule, users of digital technologies do not become outraged. At most, in a crisis, they realize that their voluntary activities on the Net lead to surveillance and control. Like inmates in total institutions, some practice “the amoral art of shamelessness” (Goffman 1972, p. 167). They no longer know self-control on the Net and disclose information they would keep to themselves in real-life interactions. Harcourt (2015, p. 229 ff.) concludes that digital display, e.g. in the context of Google, Facebook or NSA, turns us into digital subjects who have experiences similar to those of inmates of psychiatric institutions. We no longer have places of retreat, lose our privacy and anonymity, and cannot influence the digital dissemination of secrets and important moments in our lives. We are experiencing a moral transformation, undergoing a moral career, becoming different moral agents. For many of us, the virtual transparence has begun to mortify our analog selves – they are fading away like the image on an old Polaroid instant photo. Google, Facebook, Amazon, Scorelogix, the NSA – through their rankings, recommendations, scores, and no-fly-lists – are putting in place a new system of privileges and punishments that are restructuring our selves (Harcourt 2015, p. 232).

Vividly, Goffman has shown in “Asyle” (1972, p. 166) that the self is not “the property of the person” but emerges from the “patterns of social control” in which it is bound. Digital mediatization is leading to a reconfiguration of subjectivity, the contours of which are beginning to emerge. At the end of his study, Harcourt (2015, p. 280 ff.) calls for political disobedience and resistance. The effects of the “expository society” must be decisively countered. “Each one of us has a unique ability to intervene in our own way. [...] Resistance must come from within each and every one of us [...]” (Harcourt 2015, p. 281). He appeals to our ethical selves. For him, the “Occupy Wall Street” movement is a powerful example of creating a space for innovative, forwardlooking thinking and political resistance. He also points to Deleuze and Guattari,

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

75

who in “Anti-Oedipus” (1974) note that revolutionary change is borne of desires and wants (Harcourt 2015, p. 283). However, now in the twenty-first century, these have just contributed to enslavement. He concludes his study by pointing out this paradox.

4.3

Summary

Sherry Turkle and Bernard Harcourt’s exploratory studies, which are central to our consideration of the implications of digital mediatization for subject formation, offer a wealth of insights and perspectives for future theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. Unmistakably, they make clear that a radical shift in the constitution of the self is taking place in the digital age to which we should turn our interest. They also ask what can be done to counter this development, which is accompanied by the disappearance of the private sphere and new forms of social control.

5

Conclusion: Emancipation in the Digital Age?

Starting from pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, we have reconstructed how the self is formed in social interactions. We first considered the consequences of audiovisual mediatization for subject formation in the last decades of the twentieth century. The self is besieged, threatened, but does not disappear. Unlike Baudrillard, we have concluded that it remains relevant. In the twenty-first century, digital mediatization has produced a digital self that is monitored, controlled, and humiliated. The analog self analyzed by Mead and others is increasingly relegated to the background. Our remarks suggest that it should be an important task of mediatization research precisely not to lose sight of the self. Moreover, it must be strengthened politically. Forms of resistance against digital display must be developed. Dangerous developments in the field of artificial intelligence, such as image recognition and generation, must be stopped, as leading researchers in this field also demand (Brundage et al. 2018). There is also a need to think about new forms of subjectification in the digital age. Félix Guattari (1994) already called for this in his essay “The Three Ecologies”. An emancipatory practice is only possible in the era of the information revolution and the development of biotechnologies if the self does not allow itself to be

76

R. Winter

overwhelmed by the semiotic flows, the circulating images and signs and the chaos of information. To do so, it must develop its own forms of temporality, unfold an art of self-will (Winter 2001), and individualize itself. For Guattari, a subject is always a tangled assemblage of different components. As a psychoanalyst, he assumes that the preverbal subjective formations that a child develops do not disappear, but remain in adult life. Therefore, a subject is fundamentally polyphonically structured. Thus, even in the digital age, processes of heterogeneous becoming (Guattari 1994, p. 76) brought about by stubborn lines of flight and recurrent existential patterns (refrains) can lead to new articulations of the life-historically acquired components. In this way, a digital fixation of identity can be creatively subverted and prevented in the mediatization process. When these lines of flight are found, the self can become different to itself and singularized in new ways.

References Baudrillard, J. (1978). Agonie des Realen. Merve. Baudrillard, J. (1982). Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod. Matthes & Seitz. Baudrillard, J. (1983). The ecstasy of communication. In l. Foster (Hrsg.), The anti-aesthetic: Essays on post-modern culture (S. 126–134). Bay Press. Baudrillard, J. (1987). Das Andere selbst. Habilitation. Passagen. Baudrillard, J. (2002). Passwörter. Merve. Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism. Perspective and method. University of California Press. Brundage, M. et al. (2018). The malicious use of artificial intelligence. forecasting, prevention, and mitigation. Oxford et al. img1.wsimg.com. Accessed 26 Feb 2018. Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope. Social movements in the Internet age. Polity. Connor, S. (1989). Postmodernist culture. An introduktion to theories of the contemporary. Blackwell. Cooley, C. H. (1964). Human nature and the social order. Scribner’s (Erstveröffentlichung 1902). Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1974). Anti-Ödipus. Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie I. Suhrkamp. Denzin, N. K. (1991). Images of postmodern society. Social theory and contemporary cinema. Sage. Eckert, R., Vogelgesang, W., Wetzstein, T. A., & Winter, R. (1991). Auf digitalen Pfaden. Die Kulturen von Hackern, Programmierern, Cracker und Spielern. Westdeutscher Verlag. Edelstein, W., & Keller, M. (1982). Perspektivität und Interpretation. Beiträge zur Entwicklung des sozialen Verstehens. Suhrkamp. Faßler, M. (2009). Nach der Gesellschaft. Infogene Welten – Anthropologische Zukünfte. Fink.

From Social Interaction to Digital Networking: Processes of Mediatization. . .

77

Faßler, M. (2014). Das Soziale. Entstehung und Zukunft menschlicher Selbstorganisation. Fink. Featherstone, M. (2009). Ubiquitous Media. An Introduction. Theory, Culture & Society, 25(2-3), 1–22. Foucault, M. (1976). Überwachen und Strafen. die Geburt des Gefängnisses. Suhrkamp. Gehlen, A. (1957). Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter. Sozialpsychologische Probleme der industriellen Gesellschaft. Rowohlt Taschenbuch. Gergen, K. J. (1996). Das übersättigte Selbst. Identitätsprobleme im heutigen Leben. Auer. Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being. Beyond self and community. Oxford University Press. Goffman, E. (1969). Wir alle spielen Theater. Die Selbstdarstellung im Alltag. Suhrkamp. Goffman, E. (1972). Asyle. Über die soziale Situation psychiatrischer Insassen und anderer Insassen. Suhrkamp. Goffman, E. (1977). Rahmen-Analyse. Versuch über die Organisation von Alltagserfahrungen. Suhrkamp. Goffman, E. (1994). Die Interaktionsordnung. In In ders., Interaktion und Geschlecht (pp. 50–104). Campus. Guattari, F. (1994). Die drei Ökologien. Passagen. Hahn, A. (1982). Zur Soziologie der Beichte und anderer Formen institutionalisierter Bekenntnisse. Selbstthematisierung und Zivilisationsprozess. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 34, 407–434. Hahn, A., Willems, H., & Winter, R. (1991). Beichte und Therapie als Formen der Sinngebung. In G. Jüttemann, M. Sonntag, & C. Wulf (Eds.), Die Seele. Ihre Geschichte im Abendland (pp. 493–511). Psychologie Verlags Union. Harcourt, B. E. (2015). Exposed. Desire and disobedience in the digital age. Harvard University Press. Hoffmann, D., & Winter, R. (2018). Handbuch Mediensoziologie. Nomos. James, W. (1961). Psychology – The briefer course. New York: Harper & Brothers (Erstveröffentlichung 1892). Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism. Or, the cultural logic of Late Capitalism. Verso. Joas, H. (1980). Praktische Intersubjektivität. Die Entwicklung des Werkes von G.H. Mead. Suhrkamp. Keller, R. (2012). Das interpretative Paradigma. Eine Einführung. Springer VS. Kellner, D. (1989). Jean Baudrillard. From marxism to postmodernism and beyond. Blackwell. Krotz, F. (2001). Die Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. In Der Wandel von Alltag und sozialen Alltagsbeziehungen, Kultur und Gesellschaft durch Medien. Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2007). Mediatisierung. Fallstudien zum Wandel von Kommunikation. VS Verlag. Lash, S. (2002). Critique of information. Sage. Lifton, R. J. (1993). The protean self: Human resilience in an age of fragmentation. Basic Books. Lyotard, J.-F. (1986). Das postmoderne Wissen. Passagen. Martin, E. (1994). Flexible bodies: Tracking immunity in American culture from the days of polio to the age of AIDS. Beacon Press. Mason, P. (2012). Why It’s kicking off everywhere. The new global revolutions. Verso.

78

R. Winter

McLuhan, M., & Powers, B. R. (1995). The Global Village. In Der Weg der Mediengesellschaft in das 21. Jahrhundert. Junfermann Verlag. Mead, G. H. (1967). Mind, self & society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Edited and with an introduction by Charles W. Morris. University of Chicago Press (Erstveröffentlichung 1934). Mead, G. H. (1980a). Die soziale Identität. In ders., Gesammelte Aufsätze Band 1 (S. 241–249). Suhrkamp (Erstveröffentlichung 1913). Mead, G. H. (1980b). Sozialpsychologie als Gegenstück der physiologischen Psychologie. In G. H. Mead (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Aufsätze (Bd. 1, S. 199–209). Suhrkamp (Erstveröffentlichung 1909). Noam, G., & Kegan, R. (1982). Soziale Kognition und Psychodynamik. In W. Edelstein & M. Keller (Hrsg.), Perspektivität und Interpretation. Beiträge zur Entwicklung des sozialen Verstehens (S. 422–460). Suhrkamp. Reckwitz, A. (2006). Das hybride Subjekt. Eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne. Velbrück Wissenschaft. Schachtner, C. (2016). Das narrative Subjekt. Erzählen im Zeitalter des Internets. transcript. Selman, R. L. (1984). Die Entwicklung des sozialen Verstehens. Entwicklungspsychologische und klinische Untersuchungen. Suhrkamp. Turkle, S. (1986). Die Wunschmaschine. Vom Entstehen der Computerkultur. Rowohlt Taschenbuch. Turkle, S. (1999). Leben im Netz. Identität in Zeiten des Internet. Rowohlt Taschenbuch. Turkle, S. (2012). Verloren unter 100 Freunden. Wie wir in der digitalen Welt seelisch verkümmern. Riemann Verlag. Waisbord, S. (Ed.). (2014). Media sociology: A reappraisal. Polity. Winter, R. (2001). Die Kunst des Eigensinns. Cultural Studies als Kritik der Macht. Velbrück Wissenschaft. Winter, R. (2010). Widerstand im Netz. Zur Herausbildung einer transnationalen Öffentlichkeit durch netzbasierte Kommunikation. transcript. Winter, R., & Eckert, R. (1990). Mediengeschichte und kulturelle Differenzierung. Zur Entstehung und Funktion von Wahlnachbarschaften. Leske + Budrich.

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication and Media Analysis Peter Gentzel Abstract

The article shows that the conceptions of subjectivity and materiality mutually refer to each other, but that this is neither adequately taken into account in traditional communication and media research nor in the discussion of practice theories, science and technology studies (STS) and actor-network theories (ANT). First, some basic assumptions of traditional communication analyses are discussed, which are said to be based on a psychologically truncated understanding of subjects and, at best, an undifferentiated treatment of media objects or media materiality. Theories of practice are also criticized for their bias towards reproduction and order, as well as for their deficient concept of the subject. With the help of STS and ANT, analytical models and findings on the meaning of media objects and materiality are also presented. Finally, with the help of Martin Heidegger’s technology analyses, a path for the critical adaptation of practice and material turn for communication and media analyses is outlined.

1

Introduction

The subject matter of the following considerations is the relationship between subjects and material objects, as well as the concepts of action and technology that depend on them, in and for contemporary communication and media analyses. In this context, the adjective ‘present’ aims at a particular pattern of P. Gentzel (✉) Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_5

79

80

P. Gentzel

reconceptualization of subjects and objects in the interdisciplinary and international social sciences. This pattern is characterized by a striking valorization of the meaning of technological artifacts in the context of the ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki et al., 2001) and ‘material turn’ (Bennet and Joyce 2010) or, more concretely related to digital media, of a ‘material phenomenology’ (Couldry & Hepp, 2017). At the same time, this (re)discovery of primarily technological objects is often one-sidedly at the expense of subject conceptions. This flip side of the revaluation of material objects is neither theoretically and conceptually compelling, nor analytically and socio-politically desirable. For example, protagonists of practice theories (PT) develop their arguments for a conceptual privileging of the “temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 1996, p. 89) or the theory-historical “decentering of the subject” (Reckwitz, 2008a, p. 186) often in distinction to the strong subject of (Mundan) phenomenology (Reckwitz, 2008a, b). This is accompanied by a critique of such theories of action that offer mentalistically truncated explanations (Schatzki, 2001b, p. 47; Reckwitz, 2003, pp. 282–283) because they conclude the analysis of social actions by naming and aggregating conscious and rationalized intentions. The plausible conclusions are that (1) explicit knowledge and rational intentions are only a part of human behaviour in a socially, culturally and technologically constructed world and therefore consequently (2) the importance of routines, habitualisations and everyday life must be valorised. This is usually differentiated by means of the (3) concept of materiality, which refers to incorporated routine knowledge as well as to natural and artificial objects. Particularly because of these arguments, PT or even (just) the “idiom of practice” (following Rouse, 2006, cited in Alkemeyer et al., 2015, p. 7) lend themselves to a transition to the more analytically oriented Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Lengersdorf & Wieser, 2014) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Belliger & Krieger, 2006). For these take an “empirical-constructivist” (Knorr-Cetina, 1989) approach, especially in their first phase of laboratory studies, directly to the concretely observable subjects and objects in highly pre-structured working environments of knowledge production, in order to describe the meaning and consequence of that routineness and materiality of practice. Their findings, for example with regard to affordances built into technologies and changing (Lievrouw, 2014) or standardization and classification effects in the course of using material infrastructures (Bowker & Star, 1999), emphatically justify why the relationship between subjective actions and overarching technological processes should be reciprocally analyzed and thought about. Finally, it is primarily Bruno Latour’s approach to ANT that seeks to transfer the working program of those early empirical-constructivist laboratory studies to a social theoretical level (Latour, 2006,

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

81

2007). From the “follow the actor” credo of ethnographic analyses (Latour, 2005, p. 12), he thereby derives a radically symmetrical epistemological position in which the difference between subjects and objects is abolished. However, while ANT is eminently suitable in methodological terms to further develop, for example, social network analysis, a high degree of plausibility is lost in the transition from methodology to “social theory” and epistemology. The basic thesis of this paper is that the conceptions of human subjects and material objects mutually refer to each other and are not antagonistic opposites. If one follows this thesis of reciprocity, certain imbalances arise in the outlined discussion contexts (or ‘turns’). Two observations are leading in this context: First, the conspicuous mixing of the concepts of subject and object from socialphilosophical and epistemological debates with those of the social-theoretical and analytical level. Secondly, the aforementioned one-sided revaluation of artificial, above all technological objects at the expense of subjects. From a disciplinary perspective, an increased sensitivity to these two imbalances makes the difference between instructive adaptation and further development or uncritical import. Consequently, the thesis of the reciprocal construction of subject and object, action and technology functions in the present contribution both as an analytical grid for PT, STS and ANT and as a starting point for their treatment in communication studies. This description of the problem and the project is dealt with in three argumentation steps, which also formally structure the following explanations. In the first step, the understanding of subjectivity and objectivity in communication studies is outlined. Central to this is the observation that communication studies theorizing and analysis is characterized by forgetfulness of technique and object. This forgetfulness can be interpreted as a consequence of a social phenomenological or constructivist concept of the subject that is too strong, i.e. too rational and too individualistic. This rationalistic concept of the subject is necessarily accompanied by a psychologically truncated concept of action and communication, because it is restricted to rationality, intentions and motives. With the help of current contributions from the research field of mediatization, it will be justified why an adaptation of PT and STS is helpful here. In the second step, the aforementioned analysis of the meaning of subjects in their relationship to objects, of action and technology in PT, STS and ANT takes place. A flat ontology as well as a relational and contextual research attitude (Schatzki, 2016) are identified as identity-forming features of PT. Criticized here is the disintegration of subject conceptions (Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016) into, on the one hand, strategic or tactical constructors (Hörning, 2001) of “practices as performance” (Shove et al., 2012; Shove & Pantzar, 2007) and mere executors of “practices as entity” (Shove et al., 2012, Shove & Pantzar, 2007) on the other. The

82

P. Gentzel

foundational practice-theoretical works in particular (Schatzki, 1996; Schatzki et al., 2001) show an overall bias towards routines and always-already-ordered social orders. Another criticism is that the practice-theoretical goal of “overcoming the subject-object dualism” (Schatzki, 2001a, p. 1) by means of an inflated concept of materiality does not result in an analytically viable set of instruments for describing the meaning of material objects. Two models of STS and ANT, in the sense of an instructively further developed social network analysis, are subsequently fitted into this latter void. In the third step, following the basic social philosophical ideas of PT, a case is made for allowing differences and normativity within flat ontology and subjectobject networks. The starting point for this is an argument from the early social philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which is linked to his social philosophical analyses of technology and knowledge from the 1950s. For although the PT make extensive use of Heidegger (and Ludwig Wittgenstein) (as do the “praxeologies” of P. Bourdieu or M. Foucault; Dreyfus, 1995, pp. 7–8; Dreyfus, 2001a), they disregard all those moments of self-determination, crisis, creativity and poiesis that are constitutive of his work. Looking ahead, it is argued that such a rehabilitation of the concept of the subject can pave the way for a historical, normative and thus also critical foundation of the analysis of mediatized communication practices.

2

Mass Communication and Media Culture: On the Change of Subjects and Objects of Communication Science Research

The history of institutionalization of journalism and communication studies after the “social science turn” (Löblich, 2010) is accompanied by a focus of material and formal object on phenomena of mass communication. It is also borne of the adoption of the epistemological position of positivism. The broader, more cultural-scientific orientation of theory and methodology in newspaper studies from the time of the Weimar Republic, on the other hand, has been marginalized (Gentzel & Koenen, 2012). In the introduction to this volume, the subject and object conceptions of some core concepts of mass communication, information dissemination and media choice have already been discussed. It was shown that subjects in these are addressed as functionaries for mass communication (sender & receiver, producer & recipient, opinion leader & influencer) and are conceptualized by means of aggregate social

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

83

and psychological properties dependent on these functions. The conceptualization of media objects solely as material channels of communication (Saxer, 1999) was also found to be insufficient. In preparation for the practice-theoretical discussion, the analysis of the epistemological significance of those subject-object relations now promises added value. Epistemologically and methodologically, the subjects that are functional or dysfunctional for communication processes, information dissemination and media choice have the status of a quantifier – to use a term from classical logic. That is, they are conceived as existing, completed quantities that have a positive or negative value in the sense of this existence and have (or are caused to have) a correspondingly constant effect in the respective defined manner. All in all, this model of knowledge consisting of quantifiers and these external relations of effect is close to epistemology in the natural sciences – specifically, to physical rather than, say, chemical epistemology (Krotz, 2008). It thus corresponds to Cartesian dualism. The attribute goes back to the French mathematician and philosopher Rene Descartes, who in the first half of the seventeenth century, with the Discourse de la méthode and the Meditationes de prima philosophia, formulated the foundations of the correspondence-theoretical epistemology that still dominates the sciences today. Other core elements of this model are (1) methodological individualism (tracing social and cultural phenomena back to the intentional actions of individuals), (2) distanced observer perspective (correct explanations are made from an objective, theoretical position decoupled from everyday practices), (3) univocity and theoretical holism (individual actions and social processes can be traced back to explicit intentions and rules) (Dreyfus, 1995, pp. 4–9). For contemporary communication studies, the explanatory potential of this epistemological model has been exhausted, which is evident due to the break-up of these quantifiers, i.e. the fragility of closedness and delimitability – think, for example, of the delimitations of mass communication and interpersonal communication, one-to-many and many-to-many communication, mass media and social media, or production and reception. Since the turn of the millennium – one should recall works oriented towards social psychology (e.g. Weiß, 2001), the incipient reception of cultural studies (e.g. Hepp, 1999) as well as the (re-)formulation of the mediatization approach (Krotz, 2001) – the reference system of culture has therefore again received considerably more disciplinary attention. As a result, critical voices on the concept of effect, which is shortened from a media-cultural perspective (e.g. Wimmer, 2013), or the physical concepts of communication and media (e.g. Krotz, 2008) are also increasing. Nevertheless, it remains to be noted that the exchange across the boundaries of empirical-social science and culturalist research stances, quite analogous to international Communication and Media Studies

84

P. Gentzel

(Couldry, 2004, pp. 115–118; Reardon & Rogers, 1988; Wiemann et al., 1988, among others), needs to be improved (Hachmeister, 2008; Wehmeier, 2011; Wissenschaftsrat, 2007, among others). The collective development of adequate theoretical and analytical tools, especially in international and interdisciplinary exchange, is therefore crucial for the future of the discipline. Such a collectively led discussion, interested in the conceptual and conceptual foundations of the discipline, is just getting underway (inter alia, Hepp, 2016). However, it is pressing not only for reasons intrinsic to the discipline, such as the definition of subject identity (through continuity), but especially for questions of social relevance. A brief look at some empirical diagnoses from the recent past of digital communication processes, especially the consequences of a monopolizing transformation of media markets and products committed to the data economy, is sufficient to demand, for example, socio-political relevance and critique even beyond topics such as information dissemination, public sphere and media choice. For example, synchronic empirical analyses diagnose a “digital, computer-controlled infrastructure for all symbolic operations” (Krotz, 2017) or a “deep mediatization” under the sign of “datafication” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), thus pointing to a fundamental transformation of the social and cultural world – and thus necessarily also of the subjects located in this world. This culminates in a present in which “[t]he operating conditions of digital-infrastructures become part of the functioning conditions of the self” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 161). The starting point of this development is the assumption of an increasing mediatization of communicative practices – hence the mediation of everything (Livingstone, 2009) – and thus a thesis that is also confirmed outside of communication and media analytical studies in the narrower sense (e.g. Rosa, 2005; Illouz, 2007). Although the development of social science disciplines, depending on the respective material objects, must admittedly converge on different key concepts (public sphere, society, culture, market, politics, etc.), it is above all the omnipresence and ubiquity of media technologies in everyday life that are increasingly moving into the centre of social and cultural analyses as a whole. Communication and media analyses are thus both analytically “decentered” (Morley, 2009) and disciplinarily delimited. In relation to the conceptual discussion conducted here, this means first of all overcoming the polar distinctions between (intentional) action and (routine) behaviour and thus also the one-sided functionalist relationship between communicating subject and technological media object (unilateral constructivism or determinism; Lievrouw, 2014). With PT, STS and ANT, the currently most prominent approaches dedicated to critiquing and transgressing those borderlines will be discussed in the following.

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

3

85

Flat Ontology and Relational Research: Subjects, Objects and Materiality in Theories of Practice and Science and Technology Studies

With the cultural turn (Alexander, 1988) in social theories in the 1960s, the epistemological position of Cartesian dualism in the social sciences was permanently undermined. In addition to the large-scale institutionalization of cultural studies and the profiling of cultural sociology, this primarily addressed the theoretical and analytical development. The reference system of culture, i.e. the “meaningful organization of reality, in the context of which behavior and social structures become possible in the first place” (Reckwitz, 2008a, p. 16), now takes center stage. In the recent history of theory, this development culminates in a “practice turn” (Schatzki et al., 2001; Reckwitz, 2008a), and if one follows other authors, even a “material turn” (Bennett & Joyce, 2010). It is not a question of the normative scope and empirical legitimation of these proclaimed “turns”, but rather of their substantial contributions to the further development of the thematic, reciprocal relationship between subject and object.

3.1

Theories of Practice

The practice-theoretical perspective has had a lasting influence on the entire discourse of social theory. In particular, the preoccupation with practices – at least as a conceptual tool – has had a lasting impact on social science research far beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries (Alkemeyer et al., 2015, p. 7; Schäfer, 2016, p. 14). Practice-theoretical approaches also seem to be gradually adapted in German-language communication studies (Foellmer et al., 2018; Gentzel, 2015, 2017; Pentzold, 2015; Raabe, 2009). Now it is impossible to filter out one practice-theoretical position. The discourse as a whole is neither complete nor homogeneous down to each theorem, and the types of argumentation also vary – e.g. Andreas Reckwitz discusses rather theoryhistorically (Reckwitz, 2008a, b), whereas the international discussion began more genealogically on the basis of the social philosophy of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (Schatzki, 1996; Schatzki et al., 2001). For these reasons, it makes sense to first sketch out the basic commonalities of theories of practice and then to decline these for the relationship between subjects and objects. Primarily, there are two convictions that can be identified as a practicetheoretical consensus: First, the theoretical starting point of a “flat ontology”

86

P. Gentzel

(Schatzki, 2016, p. 30 f.) and second, a “contextual and relational research stance” (Schäfer, 2016, p. 13). That “flat ontology” refers to the epistemological dimension. This has traditionally been anchored either in a strong subject, characterized in more detail above, or in a universal and singular, hegemonic and rigid structure. In contrast, practice-theoretical analysis occupies this point with a spatially and temporally varying “interplay of practices and material arrangements” (Schatzki, 2016, pp. 32–34) that lies between the levels of action and structure (Reckwitz, 2008a, pp. 544–550; Raabe, 2009, p. 364). Practices are thus not assigned to a level of reality (e.g., micro or macro) or a distinct place of origin (e.g., subject or objectified society, action or structure) outside of everyday sociocultural life. Rather, the conviction is shared that all social phenomena “lie on one level”, i.e. the “[v]ertent superordinate[s] or global[s] [...] [have] the same structure [as, P.G.] as micro or local phenomena” (Schatzki, 2016, p. 34). In this interplay, practices denote the concrete actualization of a “temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 1996, p. 89) that is characterized as a culturally handed-down, socially shared “pool of understandings, a set of rules” (Schatzki, 2001b, p. 53). Practices are therefore neither describable as an aggregation of individual motives nor as a necessary consequence of a universal structure (cf. Gentzel, 2015, pp. 67–73). The power of the subject is thus decisively curtailed in theoretical terms, but analytically strengthened at the same time. Thus, theories of practice draw theoretical capital from the rejection of transcendental phenomenologies, i.e. the approach to the isolated, rational subject (Reckwitz, 2003). However, the analysis starts, as it were, from the incorporated “knowledge repertoires and competences” (Hörning, 2001, p. 185) that “people use – often implicitly – to [...] act” (Hörning, 2001, p. 11). Thus, it is increasingly about the description of customs and routines or the way one behaves in everyday life. Practices are thus carried out by socially and culturally contained subjects who also react emotionally and affectively. The analysis of subjective actions is thus no longer adequately secured by the explication of intentions, but must find ways of describing embodied action routines and cultural techniques, non-reflective and non-rationalized constraints on action in their interconnectedness with ubiquitous and ubiquitous media technologies. The second part of the interplay introduced above refers to objects, in the sense of material arrangements – and is therefore also not identical with the objective reference points of phenomenology, which are external to the subject. Material arrangements are constellations of “people, organisms, artifacts, and natural things” (Schatzki, 2016, p. 33) that stand in distinguishable interrelationships with practices. These interrelationships can be distinguished insofar as “(1) practices produce, use, alter, are directed toward, or are inseparable from material

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

87

arrangements, and (2) arrangements align, prefigure, and enable practices” (Schatzki, 2016). Interplay as a sociological category of analysis therefore does not aim at additive linkages (subject and object), but can be differentiated both in terms of types (e.g. use, prefiguration, restriction, intentionality) and in terms of complexity and homogeneity (Schatzki, 2016). The subject of PT is thus simultaneously affected by a loss of autonomy and an upgrading of meaning. On the one hand, autonomy of action is snatched away from it – it is “decentralized” (Reckwitz, 2008a, b) and its “level of activity is lowered” (Hirschauer, 2016, p. 45). On the other hand, it becomes an analytical fixed point, because in each case it is its practices that are analysed and which can then only be classified as traditions and routines or deviant “strategies and tactics” as a consequence (Hörning, 2001, 2004). This breaking of the rational subject’s sole power of disposal over the explanation of action can also be observed in international communication and media research – for instance in the sense of a “material phenomenology” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), “distributed explanations of action” (Henion, 2013) or “shared intentionality” (Tomasello, 2008). This certainly points the way to a further development of the social science theory of the subject; however, this path is not consistently and systematically followed in the discourse of practice theory (Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016; Alkemeyer et al., 2015). Overall, two forms of subject conceptualization crystallize, neither of which in itself adds value. On the one hand, subjects are described as constructors and, above all, change-makers of practices who use certain tactics and strategies to perform and model practices (e.g. “practice as performance”, Shove & Pantzar, 2007). However, in which specific practices and fields of practice these tacticians and strategists are involved and socialized, or under which conditions these exceptions to the rule are made by the subjects – because the assumption of an existence of subjects outside of social practices would be aporetic – remains unclear. On the other hand, there are conceptions of subjects that are close to the original structuralist conception of mere organs of execution. These subjects are to a certain extent “recruited” by a practice that is always already conceived as ordered and moves in reproduction loops (e.g. “practice as entity”, Shove & Pantzar, 2007). An instructive starting point for further development here is the plea of Thomas Alkemeyer and colleagues, who promote a “thin subject conception” in the sense of a systematic interweaving of participant and structural perspectives (Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016; Alkemeyer et al., 2015). Despite these deficits, however, one added value of PT compared to the strong subjects of traditional communication analysis is obvious: it is the sensitization to inanimate artifacts, technologies, nature, or materiality in general as “handrails” and “crooks” (Hirschauer, 2016, p. 50 ff.) of actions – and it is precisely at this point that

88

P. Gentzel

references to ANT and STS suggest themselves (Gentzel, 2017). For the objects and things do not stand outside of the negotiation of meaning and social interaction, but open up new and expand existing potentials – or reinforce the compulsion to behave “passively” at best in the face of “communication powers” (Reichertz, 2009). The analysis of social practices thus calls for a more precise description of materiality or of the objects linked to practices – and this in a double sense. Thus, the materiality of social practices “refers to bodies and to artifacts; they [social practices, P. G.] are ultimately an arrangement of meaningfully regulated bodily movements and artifact activities, both of which are coupled with each other in the practices” (Reckwitz, 2008a, p. 698, emphasis P. G.). While the importance of the incorporation of knowledge and its impact on the notion of subject and action has already been hinted at, the interplay with technical artefacts such as media infrastructures will now be addressed. Unfortunately, the discourse of practice theory does not (yet) contain any elaborated analytical concepts for dealing with objects. A number of works from the environment of STS are suitable for this, particularly concise – but also particularly critical – in the form of ANT.

3.2

Science and Technology Studies and Actor-Network Theory

STS or “empirical constructivism” (Knorr-Cetina, 1989) is an interdisciplinary and international field of research that brings together empirical and conceptual work on the producedness of knowledge and technology, has developed systematically and has meanwhile become institutionalized (Lengersdorf & Wieser, 2014, pp. 3–7; Lievrouw, 2014). By further development, we mean in particular the expansion of the subject matter from the fabrication of scientific knowledge in the context of early laboratory studies to a society-wide level. Technologies and knowledge production thus become interesting for social and cultural analysis in two ways. On the one hand, with regard to the question of which sociality and which cultural knowledge is built into technologies, and on the other hand, with regard to the effects that the socio-culturally different ways of appropriating these technologies produce. For communication and media analysis, this opens up an extremely promising path for analyzing objects beyond the poles of purely technical and purely social determinacy, which can also be understood as a consequence of physical epistemology. Large parts of these studies of “knowledge and technology in action” (Lengersdorf & Wieser, 2014, p. 5) share the “practice-theoretical” principles of contextuality and relativity and at the same time possess an extraordinary degree of reflexivity (Knorr-Cetina, 1989, p. 91). In the following, two of these analytical concepts will be briefly introduced as examples: “affordances” (Bloomfield et al.,

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

89

2010; Zillien, 2008) and “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Bowker & Star, 1999). Thus, the concept of “affordances”, which has been further developed in media sociology, among other fields, directs the focus to the requirements and prompting structures of artefacts in everyday social and communicative practices (Lievrouw, 2014). This brings processes of change, transformation and stabilization of media into view. Communication technologies are thus not only questioned in terms of how they enable or limit understanding, but their capacities themselves become the object of processes of negotiation and design. The disciplinary adaptation of this analytical perspective can analyse the forms and structures of the meaningful construction, change and transmission of mediality and formulate requirements for corresponding production and design processes (Höflich, 2016; Zillien, 2008). The approach of “boundary objects” appears equally instructive. The analysis of boundary objects focuses on the often inconspicuous standardization and classification effects of media infrastructures on the one hand and on the varying use of these media technologies by different social actors (e.g. with regard to age, socioeconomy, gender) on the other. Boundary objects are thus on the one hand flexible, because heterogeneous interests can be addressed, and on the other hand robust enough to create a common identity and to ensure cooperation (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Similar to affordance research, the ambiguity or functionality and the communicative institutionalization of media materiality thus comes into view. While this makes the technological objects analytically accessible in the first place and correspondingly sensitive communication and media analyses are thus no longer limited to the reception of content, but also aim at the production or meaningful negotiation of materiality and technology, questions about the change of subjectivity are not yet systematically laid out here. This moment becomes precarious in ANT. It can be understood as the most radical theoretical draft of the STS, because its representatives around M. Callon, B. Latour and J. Law consistently spell out the idea of a “flat ontology”. Methodologically, the ANT is oriented – and in this it still largely agrees with the STS – on ethnology, the terminology is semiotically inspired – for example, the “translations” and “actants” go back to the work of Michel Serres (Passoth, 2010, p. 312) and the epistemological position is radically symmetrical or ontologically flat – derived from the sociological programmatic of David Bloor (Gentzel, 2015, pp. 114–134). Representatives of ANT plead for an analysis of reality in the form of networks in which the social, the ideal and ideological, the natural and technology participate on an equal footing. These networks are not only to be applied to relations (as classical network analysis does), but form the basic ontological category par excellence. This means that they are to be applied equally to the substances or nodes, i.e. to all elements of the network itself – and thus not least to subjects and

90

P. Gentzel

objects. This is instructive first of all because it means that networks are thought of in a more dynamic, open and comprehensive way than social network research is able to do, and thus productive as well as destructive, ordering as well as disorganizing potentials are revealed (Höhne & Umlauf, 2016). Actor-networks, after all, are first to be identified in ethnographic analysis and from an actor’s perspective, and not, as it may often seem from a distanced observer’s perspective, already given. They are furthermore full of resistances and sometimes chaotic, which is why processes of “translation”, “mixing” and “purification” play a prominent role. Thus, ANT does not only refer to the relation between subjects and objects, nor does this automatically follow the categories of organization, order or stability, but also to these themselves. The proclaimed heterogeneity therefore means not only the network participants in their entirety (nature, artefacts, ideas, people), but also their respective own constitution as “hybrids” or “monsters” (Latour, 2007). As a consequence, the distinct categories of nature, technology, sociality or culture necessarily become brittle – and B. Latour clearly enjoys polemically reproaching traditional social theory for the relations and associations that characterize a technicized and mediatized late modernity (Latour, 2006). That the ANT makes a whole series of important criticisms of traditional theory and, moreover, is analytically successful because, for example, it links together disparate source material and the most diverse data or texts, is beyond question. Most certainly, the form of evidence thus generated has catalyzed its interdisciplinary adaptation and also significantly stimulated the productivity, and in any case the creativity, of social analysis. For all its empirical persuasiveness and theoretical polemics, however, questions remain unanswered that social science should not avoid. These are in particular normative questions about critique, self-determination, ethics, responsibility, good and bad options for action, all of which are closely linked to the concept of the subject. Here ANT is generally mute, and the assumption is that this circumstance is not due to a mere lack of interest, but simply cannot be dealt with well by thinking in terms of relations and associations alone.

4

Subject, Object and Critique – On the Technicization of Knowledge, Action and Communication

What might a systematic interweaving of subject and object conceptions look like? How can the diagnosed one-sidedness be overcome? And what guidelines for the adaptation of the practice-theoretical position and the analytical models from STS and ANT result from this?

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

91

Answers to these questions can only be sketchy, which is why we will limit ourselves here to retracing one step of the argumentation from the sociophilosophical foundations of PT. The aim is to recall a differentiation anchored in the concept of the subject. A differentiation that is not present in the discussions of the practice turn and the material turn, but which seems promising for the development of a critical theory and analysis perspective. The central epistemological references of practice theories are to Wittgenstein’s late work, the Philosophical Investigations, published posthumously in 1953, and to Heidegger’s reflections on the subject’s “being-in-the-world” as published in Being and Time in 1927 (Couldry, 2004, p. 123; Reckwitz, 2003, p. 283; Schatzki, 1996, pp. 18, 25–54, among others). Both sets of arguments are invoked to formulate the basic praxis-theoretic epistemology in terms of a flat ontology (Bloor, 2001; Dreyfus, 2001b; Schatzki, 1996, p. 115). In particular, the rejection of idealisticmetaphysical and psychological-materialistic strategies for the foundation of subject and structure – i.e. the assumption that these can be described outside of practical contexts – is already extensively present here. Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s reflections are complementary in this critical thrust, because they conceive the object of their reflections “language” (Wittgenstein) and “Dasein” (Heidegger) in the sense of a “medium of understanding” (Stegmüller, 1968, p. 148) – and thus develop it explicitly against the physically effective quantifiers of Cartesian dualism (Dreyfus, 1995, pp. 7, 35 ff., 146–156; Rentsch, 1985). Both thus aim to develop alternatives to the positivist worldview, i.e. methodological individualism, distanced observer perspective and univocity, and theoretical holism (Gentzel, 2015, pp. 30–48). This is already apparent with regard to the subject of the mediations (Descartes) and that in Being and Time (Heidegger). The protagonist of Descartes’ reflections is a withdrawn, isolated consciousness sitting by the fireside (Descartes, 1994, pp. 11–12), whose thinking begins with a reflection on the kneadability of wax (as pars-per-toto for physical objects and materiality) (Descartes, 1994, p. 23) and subsequently formulates the scientifically correct, truth-guaranteeing rules of cognition. In contrast, the protagonist in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Heidegger, 2001) is “Dasein” as “being-in-the-world.” This Dasein is always culturally, socially, and materially integrated-it is never singular, and as a thinking subject (res cogitans) it is juxtaposed with the material external world (res extensa). The subject in Being and Time is characterized by “being-in-the-world” and thus, among other things, by “thrownness” (living in a concrete world), “being-with” (sociality), dealing with “available stuff” (objects and things interwoven with practices), and the mode of “inauthenticity” (routine everyday life). It is mostly absorbed in these everyday routines – and this has consequences for the quality of experiences, for

92

P. Gentzel

self-determination and self-awareness, and also for the way we deal with things. For in routine everyday life, subjects live in the mode of “non-authenticity” and act as “one” should and regularly does. Accordingly, “one” also uses the technical (work) “stuff” – namely according to its affordances, functions and modes of use. While PT are frequently and sustainably inspired by these considerations, they ignore the second side – constitutive for Being and Time – of the references to the self and the environment in each case. All these fundamental descriptions of subject, object and world, action, behavior and technology, Heidegger calls them “existentials”, namely do not merge there into the categories of order, stability and reproduction, but have a mode of crisis. When Dasein becomes aware of its own finiteness, when technical objects do not fulfil their functions and routines are disturbed, the quality of perception, of the relation to the self and the world also changes: the “inauthentic man” becomes self-determined “actuality”, the “availability” of “stuff” is broken and artefacts appear as “presence”, i.e. their otherwise all too concealed “existence”. i.e. their otherwise all too concealed technical properties, functions and affordances are perceived – not least, the way we deal with our fellow human beings is also different, namely more “caring”. Just as Wittgenstein shows that language can only be understood and analysed through its speaking, Heidegger shows that subjectivity only exists in the midst of practical processes and is irreducibly entangled in material, social and cultural relations. His justification of the primacy of praxis (Heidegger, 2001, pp. 89–101), which is decidedly directed against the Cartesian model of knowledge, is thus based on an analysis of everyday life and crisis, routine and change. Heidegger thus extends the analytical oscillation of social practices between routine reproduction and tactical or strategic change to include moments of crisis. Crucially, these are not merely descriptive exceptions to the rule, but change the quality of self- and world-relations, according to Heidegger the ontology of self and things. Even if the first mode, which has been extensively received and adapted in practice theory, clearly predominates in Being and Time as well, systematic distinctions and problematizations are thus built in, which start at the ruptures of everyday life without referring to a pre-practical level. For this reason, Heidegger’s normative appeal to a self-determined and self-conscious “actual Dasein” also gets by without recourse to metaphysical conception of isolated and rational subjects. Heidegger’s subject emerges solely from relations to the environment, to fellow human beings and things. In this sense, “Dasein” is an actor-network. However, this subject can transcend the already ordered relations and references and formulate alternatives. This opens up the possibility of systematically developing that approach of the “thin subject conception” (Alkemeyer et al., 2015, p. 25). For on the one hand, fundamental similarities – for example, with regard to the analytical

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

93

approach to the participant perspective in the sense of a “more complex interior position” (following Boltanski, 2010; Alkemeyer et al., 2015) or to “practice as performance” (Shove et al., 2012; Shove & Pantzar, 2007) – are already obvious. On the other hand, Heidegger decisively extends that mutual constitutional relationship of subject and object beyond the subjective inner perspective and questions of the production of order to the quality of practical self-, thing- and social-relations. Now, normativity is not exactly the focus of argumentation in the context of the practice and material turn, but Heidegger shows in his late work (Heidegger, 1977, 2000, 2003) what analytical power can be associated with it. At the center of these works, namely, are the consequences of mechanization and economic-rational thinking for the world- and self-relations of “Dasein”. For Heidegger, it is not the artificial, material objects that have an effect per se. It is the technical thinking and acting that goes hand in hand with them and penetrates ever further spheres of life. His famous dictum that the essence of technology is “nothing at all technical” (Heidegger, 2000, p. 9) has its scientific counterpart in the “theorem of reason”, i.e. the attitude that all phenomena can be traced back to concrete reasons, can be calculated and computed (Heidegger, 1965). The increasing mechanization of the living world in modernity is thus not primarily characterized by an increase in the number of technical things, but rather by the expansion of technical action, i.e., calculating, calculating and efficient action, and of technical thinking, i.e., the perception and description of processes and things in purpose-means relations, in categories of producing, managing and securing existence. For him, the spread of technology as those forms of action, knowledge and perception is accompanied by a restructuring of world relations, in a sense an alienation of the self and world relations of “Dasein” – Heidegger calls this “Gestell” – or a “sealing of the lifeworld” (Luckner, 2008, p. 11). There is no question that Heidegger’s analyses are not easily transferable to empirical social science research. On the one hand, because his theoretical instruments, emphatic choice of words and idiosyncratic conceptual constructions are fundamentally difficult to access – and have already been sufficiently criticized in this respect (Adorno, 1970). On the other hand, because he alone determines finitude, the “fear of death”, as a moment of crisis out of which self-determined subjects, whose thinking, acting and reference to the world is not solely technicallyinstrumentally “sealed”, can develop (Luckner, 2008, pp. 82–91). Nevertheless, he at least offers an analytical program that focuses on a reciprocal constitutional relationship between subject and object, action and technology. From this analytical program, questions are derived that also seem interesting for communication and media analyses in times of digitalization, deep mediatization, and datafication. For example, in the face of a hydroelectric power plant, he describes

94

P. Gentzel

how the perception and classification of the Rhine as a natural object is transformed into a “stock”, i.e. the transformation of a river into a calculable and exploitable resource (Heidegger, 2000). In this sense, the metric contour of Facebook profiles, the counting of followers, likes and re-tweets, or the increase in algorithmically constructed journalistic contributions, for example, could be critically related back to references to the self and the world. A condition for this kind of questioning is the admission and demand of distinctions and thus normativity, which relates to the practical self and world references and is bound to an ideal of self-determination, quality of perception and experience, ability of reflection and criticism of the subject. This must of course be further developed by analyzing and differentiating those distinctions of world and self-references beyond the moment of crisis of recognizing one’s own finitude, of “being-to-death”. Approaches to such a differentiation can be found, for example, in Hanna Arendt, who shares Heidegger’s diagnosis of the mechanization of thought and action – for her, it is the dominant form of action in modernity of “making” on the part of the “homo faber” – with the “zoon politicon” that thinks in alternatives, that communicates and interacts with fellow human beings in public, but presents a counter-design (Arendt, 2005). Herbert Marcuse, who attended Heidegger’s lectures in the 1920s, also attempted to develop the analyses of Dasein and technology further by bringing them together with the critique of historical materialism in the analysis of one-dimensional man (Marcuse, 2004; Luckner, 2008, p. 56). Furthermore, the philosopher of language Ernst Tugendhat has shown that self-determination and self-consciousness (Tugendhat, 1979) require a differentiation of self- and world-relations (of “sich zu sich Verhaltes”; Tugendhat, 1979). To this end, he brings together Heidegger’s distinction with the inner dialogue between “I” and “ME” (Tugendhat, 1979, pp. 245–262) and the assumption of perspective in the stages of “play”, “game” and “generalized other” in Georg Herbert Mead (Tugendhat, 1979, pp. 263–282). Finally, the sociology of world relations, in its emphasis on experiences of resonance (Rosa, 2016) and thus (normative) distinctions between world and self-relations, also recently shows structural similarities with Heidegger’s analyses. It is not difficult to see that these analytical and conceptual instruments merely listed here have far-reaching similarities with a classic thesis of critical social research, alienation. In this context, alienation refers to intentions and practices that subjects “have not been forced upon them by other actors or external factors [...] but which they [...nevertheless, d. A.] do not ‘really’ want or support” (Rosa, 2013, p. 234). The tradition-rich alienation thesis could thus be extended into the present and readjusted, for the “alienation from work becomes [today, P. G.] alienation from one’s own actions; alienation from products becomes alienation from the world of

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

95

things, alienation from nature becomes alienation from space and time” (Rosa, 2013, p. 109). Alienation is thereby only a specific concept of scientific critique, but it is simply not to be had without a concept of the subject, and thus exemplarily underlines its relevance. In this respect, an elaborated discussion of the concept of the subject promises to more clearly contour the socio-political function of communication studies – even beyond normative concepts of the public sphere – or to perceive it at all. Less programmatic in character, but more pragmatic-analytical in relevance, are the observable different social and temporal frames of these analyses of world, social, and self-relations. The subject in these analyses is not a specific actor in a specific context of action or a predefined situation of media use. Thus, the subject is not a bearer of aggregated properties and the question of how these properties correlate with an exclusive type of rational action choices, but rather a transformation of practices themselves, i.e. of world and self references, of knowledge and cognition in a historical dimension. Accordingly, these analyses understand the subject in a fundamentally processual (relational) way. Thus, for contemporary media and communication analyses, socialization, incorporation and enculturation processes – enriched, for example, by sensitivity to classification, selection and standardization effects of boundary objects and material infrastructures – once again take center stage. Media and communication studies is actually well positioned for this, because these theories and models are ubiquitous, at least in cultural studies and media culture research. In this context, theory can then not only be imported, but adapted and developed. Indeed, it is striking that both practice theorists and Latour avoid engagement at this point. A systematic reconstruction of Mead’s work and of symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and the sociology of knowledge according to Berger and Luckmann cannot be found in their works.

5

Conclusion: Potentials and Limits of Flat Ontologies and Relational Analyses

The chronology of argumentation on PT, STS and ANT unfolded here is not an arbitrary one, but marks a path that should facilitate their critical adaptation for communication and media research. This requires a review of the basic theoretical and analytical concepts of our discipline – namely communication and media. Based on the interplay of practices and material arrangements, an understanding of communicative practices can be developed that can grasp the manifold changes in times of a computer-controlled infrastructure for all symbolic

96

P. Gentzel

operations or deep mediatization. This concerns in particular the double meaning of materiality. Thus, firstly, communication processes must also be analysed beyond the explicit intentions of the centred media use of individual actors, especially if the analytical finding of a deep mediatisation of everyday worlds is correct. With the help of a lowering and differentiation of activity levels of practices, everyday communication routines could be more sharply included in the analysis. Max Weber’s construction of ideal types, which incidentally primarily fulfilled methodological-analytical functions (Gerhardt, 2001), already included, for example, traditional action alongside rational action. The connection to Weber’s considerations to institutionalize conscious and rational intention as a hard criterion of difference between behavior and action and to connect communicative action to it is thus neither theoretically compelling nor particularly helpful for the empirical analysis of the digital data economy of the present. This is because the communication processes based on data traces, e.g. in interpersonal communication via social media applications, are neither limited to the individuals involved and their temporally, spatially, socially and modally distinct acts of use, nor is individually addressed advertising, as communicates translated from data into promotional offers, intentionally created by a communicator. The analysis of the public sphere through professional, journalistic news production also faces these problems, because phenomena of algorithmic news aggregation, information selection and processing in data journalism or bot communication do not represent rational and distinct acts of action. Accordingly, media and communication analysis informed by practice theory focuses on everyday life, i.e. on the mediatisation of routines, the formation and maintenance of social relationships, the changes in norms and the incorporation of orientation knowledge. The relevance of such a perspective is also underlined, for example, by studies on mediatised lifestyles – permanently online, permanently connected (Vorderer et al., 2015), because they show that it is not particularly useful to construct distinct practices of media use and to analyse these, for example, via conscious gratification expectations. It is precisely the lifeworlds of young people – the way they establish and maintain social relationships, how they acquire and use information and knowledge, which norms and values apply to privacy and publicity or online and offline friendships – that are fundamentally and irreversibly interwoven with media objects and ubiquitously operating infrastructures. These lifeworlds cannot (or can no longer) be described without the interplay of practices and media arrangements, which is already involved in the formation of motives and intentions as well as their rationalization. Only through the contextual and relational analysis of digital and mobile communication practices can late-modern transformation

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

97

patterns of social acceleration (Rosa, 2013), processes of the reconfiguration of spaces (Lefebvre, 1991) or phenomena of the network society (Castells, 2001), which all aim at the changes of culturally traditional knowledge stocks and competences as well as social (co-)orientation, communitization and socialization, be dealt with from the perspective of communication and media studies beyond these questions. Thus, secondly, the material artefacts and technologies themselves must be opened up for analysis and theoretically integrated. Especially from an empirical point of view, the means and arguments of PT alone are not sufficient for this. Therefore, the studies and instruments from the field of STS and ANT are correspondingly instructive. For example, research on affordances shows that technologies are not only functionally defined, technical entities in a socio-cultural world and that one learns or does not learn to deal with them. Rather, certain demands and forms of operation are embedded in materiality and these are also further negotiated and modelled in appropriation practices. With the help of this perspective, communication and media analyses can, on the one hand, critically question to which ideas and interests the construction and design of media objects is bound. On the other hand, with this analytical perspective it is possible to take the historical development of media technologies beyond the stories of technical innovations and functional increases in performance. For example, the changes in everyday appropriation practices, design changes, media content production, and programming changes could thus be brought together (Weber, 2008). Susan Leigh Star’s studies, particularly on “boundary objects” and the meaningful materiality of infrastructures, open up a different perspective. Star was a student of Anselm Strauss and felt indebted to the work of Mead and Blumer. The starting point of her analyses is therefore the question of how materiality is related to processes of negotiating meaning (Gießmann & Taha, 2017). In these, she impressively succeeds in showing that objects are, on the one hand, very flexible in their handling and are also appropriated differently by different actors. On the other hand, these boundary objects are also stable enough to enable cooperation and create identity through standardizations and classifications. In particular, their conceptualization of infrastructures, which oscillates between social and technical properties and flexibly links local and global contexts of appropriation, seems virtually predestined for media and communication analyses (Bowker & Star, 1999). Here, too, a critical perspective emerges that is not yet available to communication research in this form – for example, when Star and colleagues show the classification, standardization, and selection services to which (media) infrastructures almost inconspicuously commit communication and action processes (Schubert, 2017).

98

P. Gentzel

Finally, ANT attempts to raise this producedness and constructedness of technology and knowledge to a level of social theory. Instructive in this context is especially the focus on translation lines, contingencies, resistances, all of which precede the stabilization of social and material network connections. Social scientific analysis is thus committed to the critical analysis of supposedly certain facts, pre-defined actors and field-specific logics. Mediatization research in particular, which programmatically seeks to link social and cultural change with medial and communicative processes of change, is addressed here. If one assumes a reciprocal constitutional relationship between subject and object, action and technology, then a number of points of contact arise for the development of a corresponding research perspective in communication and media research. For all the approaches and models discussed here are characterised by a certain one-sidedness in the development of theory. PT, for example, tends to overemphasize reproduction and social order as a result of its focus on routines and customs. While there are also those authors who emphasize the tactics and strategies of actors (Hörning, 2001), the complex interior positions (Boltanski, 2010) of participants in practice as performances (Shove & Pantzar, 2007), and call for a systematic interweaving of participant perspectives and theatrical perspectives (Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016), these approaches are (still) in the minority. From this perspective, practice theory provides a useful critique of the monadic concept of the subject in Cartesian epistemology, but fails to develop it further, especially analytically (Alkemeyer et al., 2015). This becomes particularly evident when one searches for the practice-theoretical equivalent of creativity, spontaneity and resistance – i.e. those phenomena that are foregrounded in strong conceptions of the subject. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that practicetheoretical concepts of critique, reflection, self-determination or freedom are rare (Alkemeyer et al., 2015, pp. 13–16, 26–27). This is potentiated in the ANT, which argues particularly vehemently and particularly loudly against the concept of subject. This too may be justified in many respects with regard to the transcendental, metaphysical subject, but it does not succeed in showing better alternatives for the performance characteristics of strong subject theories outlined above. And so it may certainly be true that sociality, culture, technology, science, and nature also contribute to the network map of the late modern subject, only it requires one more step to productively overcome. In this case, it can even be asked whether the lack of sensitivity to power relations and inequalities, as well as the missing time and development dimension (Couldry, 2006, among others), do not represent too high a price to pay (Gentzel, 2017 in more detail).

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

99

In this context, a renewed consultation of the social-philosophical classics, which have only been received one-sidedly in terms of practice theory, could be helpful. In particular, the conceptualization of the subject from the practical selfand world-relations in Heidegger’s Being and Time takes into account not only the reproduction side but also the crisis mode of social practices. Indeed, from the analysis of broken routines and disturbed functionalities, he derives a two-sided ontology of subject and object. This distinction and its inherent normative positing of ideal, self-determined self-references recur in his philosophical analyses of technology and knowledge published more than two decades later and unfold considerable critical potential. For example, the diagnosis of the expansion of technical action and thought and a sealing of the lifeworld (Luckner, 2008, p. 11) could be followed up and posed again in the face of the metrics of digital profiles of individuals, algorithmic selection of knowledge and data-based measurement of subjectivity and sociality.

References Adorno, T. W. (1970). Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Zur deutschen Ideologie. In T. W. Adorno (Ed.), Gesammelte Schriften: Bd. 6. Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Suhrkamp. Alexander, J. C. (1988). The new theoretical movement. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.), Handbook of sociology (pp. 77–101). Sage. Alkemeyer, T., & Buschmann, N. (2016). Praktiken der Subjektivierung – Subjektivierung als Praxis. In H. Schäfer (Ed.), Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm (pp. 115–136). transcript. Alkemeyer, T., Schürrmann, V., & Volbers, J. (2015). Einleitung: Anliegen des Bandes. In dies., (Hrsg.), Praxis denken. Konzepte und Kritik. (S. 7–24). Springer. Arendt, H. (2005). Vita Activa oder Vom tätigem Leben. Piper. Belliger, A., & Krieger, D. (Eds.). (2006). ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie. transcript. Bennett, T., & Joyce, P. (2010). Material powers: Cultural studies, history and the material turn. Routledge. Bloomfield, B. P., Latham, Y., & Vudurbakis, T. (2010). Bodies, technologies and action possibilities. Sociology, 44(3), 415–433. Bloor, D. (2001). Wittgenstein and the priority of practice. In T. Schatzki (Ed.), The practice turn in contemporary theory. Routledge. Boltanski, L. (2010). Soziologie und Sozialkritik. Suhrkamp. Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (1999). Sorting things out. Classification and its consequences. MIT Press. Castells, M. (2001). Der Aufstieg der Netzwerkgesellschaft. Teil 1 der Triologie »Das Informationszeitalter«. Leske + Budrich.

100

P. Gentzel

Couldry, N. (2004). Theorising media as practice. Social Semiotics, 14(2), 115–132. Couldry, N. (2006). Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie und Medien: Über Bedingungen und Grenzen von Konnektivitäten und Verbindungen. In A. Hepp, F. Krotz, S. Moores, & C. Winter (Eds.), Konnektivität, Netzwerk und Fluss. Konzepte gegenwärtiger Medien-, Kommunikations- und Kulturtheorie (pp. 107–117). VS Verlag. Couldry, N., & Hepp, A. (2017). The mediated construction of reality. Polity. Descartes, R. (1994). Meditationen über die Grundlagen der Philosophie mit den sämtlichen Einwänden und Erwiderungen. Felix Meiner (Erstveröffentlichung 1641). Dreyfus, H. L. (1995). Being-in-the-world. A commentary on Heideggers “being and time” division I. MIT Press. Dreyfus, H. L. (2001a). In-der-Welt-sein und Weltlichkeit: Heideggers Kritik des Cartesianismus. In T. Rentsch (Ed.), Martin Heidegger. Sein und Zeit (pp. 69–88). Akademie. Dreyfus, H. L. (2001b). How Heidegger defends the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth with respect to entities of natural science. In T. Schatzki (Ed.), The practice turn in contemporary theory (pp. 151–162). Routledge. Foellmer, S., Lünenborg, M., & Raetzsch, C. (2018). Media practices, social movements, and performativity. Transdisciplinary approaches. Routledge. Gentzel, P. (2015). Praxistheorie und Mediatisierung. In Grundlagen, Perspektiven und eine Kulturgeschichte der Mobilkommunikation. VS Verlag. Gentzel, P. (2017). Praktisches Wissen und Materialität. Herausforderungen für kritischkonstruktivistische Kommunikationsund Medienforschung. Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, 65(2), 275–293. Gentzel, P., & Koenen, E. (2012). Moderne Kommunikationswelten: von den „papiernen Fluten“ zur „Mediation of Everything“. Ein Beitrag zur disziplinär-kognitiven Identität des kommunikations-wissenschaftlichen Forschungsfelds „mediatisierte Kommunikation“. Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, Nr. 2 (2012), 197–217. Gerhardt, U. (2001). Idealtypus. Zur methodischen Begründung der modernen Soziologie. Suhrkamp. Gießmann, S., & Taha, N. (2017). Susan Leigh Star. Grenzobjekte und Medienforschung. transcript. Hachmeister, L. (2008). Konkrete Kommunikationsforschung. Publizistik, 53(4), 477–487. Heidegger, M. (1965). Der Satz vom Grund. Neske (Erstveröffentlichung 1957). Heidegger, M. (1977). Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. In M. Heidegger (Hrsg.), Holzwege (S. 1–74) (= HGA 5). Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2000). Die Frage nach der Technik. In von F. W. Herrmann, (Hrsg.), Gesamtausgabe: Bd. 7. Vorträge und Aufsätze (S. 5–36). Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2001). Sein und Zeit. Niemeyer (Erstveröffentlichung 1927). Heidegger, M. (2003). Die Zeit des Weltbildes. In M. Heidegger (Hrsg.), Holzwege (S. 75–113.) Klostermann. Henion, A. (2013). Von einer Soziologie der Mediation zu einer Pragmatik des Attachements. Rückblick auf einen soziologischen Parcours innerhalb des CSI. Zeitschrift für Medienund Kulturforschung, 4(2), 11–35. Hepp, A. (1999). Cultural Studies und Medienanalyse. Eine Einführung. Westdeutscher Verlag.

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

101

Hepp, A. (2016). Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft in datengetriebenen Zeiten. Publizistik, 61(3), 225–246. Hirschauer, S. (2016). Verhalten, Handeln, Interagieren. Zu den mikrosoziologischen Grundlagen der Praxistheorie. In H. Schäfer (Ed.), Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm (pp. 45–67). transcript. Höflich, J. R. (2016). Der Mensch und seine Medien. Mediatisierte interpersonale Kommunikation. Eine Einführung. VS. Höhne, S., & Umlauf, R. (2016). Die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie – Zur Vernetzung und Entgrenzung des Sozialen. In J. Oßenbrügge & A. Vogelpohl (Eds.), Theorien in Raum und Stadtforschung – Eine Einführung (pp. 203–222). Westfälisches Dampfboot. Hörning, K. H. (2001). Experten des Alltags. Die Wiederentdeckung des praktischen Wissens. Velbrück. Hörning, K. H. (2004). Soziale Praxis zwischen Beharrung und Neuschöpfung. Ein Erkenntnis- und Theorieproblem. In K. H. Hörning & J. Reuter (Eds.), Doing Culture. Neue Positionen zum Verhältnis von Kultur und sozialer Praxis (pp. 19–39). transcript. Illouz, E. (2007). Der Konsum der Romantik. Liebe und kulturelle Widersprüche des Kapitalismus. Suhrkamp. Knorr-Cetina, K. (1989). Spielarten des Konstruktivismus. Einige Notizen und Anmerkungen. Soziale Welt, 40(1/2), 86–96. Krotz, F. (2001). Die Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. Der Wandel von Alltag und sozialen Beziehungen, Kultur und Gesellschaft durch die Medien. Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2008). Sind Medien Kanäle? Ist Kommunikation Informationstransport? Das mathematisch/technische Kommunikationsmodell und die sozialwissenschaftliche Kommunikationsforschung. In K.-S. Rehberg (Hrsg.), Die Natur der Gesellschaft: Verhandlungen des 33. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Kassel 2006 (Kongressband), (Bd. 2, S. 1044–1059). Campus. Krotz, F. (2017). Mediatisierung ein Forschungskonzept. In F. Krotz, K. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess. Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (pp. 13–32). VS Verlag. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory. Oxford University Press. Latour, B. (2006). Die Macht der Assoziation. In A. Belliger & D. Krieger (Eds.), ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur-Nerzwerk-Theorie. transcript. Latour, B. (2007). Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue Gesellschaft. Einführung in die AkteurNetzwerk-Theorie. Suhrkamp. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Basil Blackwell. Lengersdorf, D., & Wieser, M. (Eds.). (2014). Schlüsselwerke der Science and Technology Studies. Springer VS. Lievrouw, L. (2014). Materiality and media in communication and technology studies. In T. Gillespie, P. Boczkowski, & K. Foot (Eds.), Media Technologies (pp. 21–52). MIT Press. Livingstone, S. (2009). On the mediation of everything. Journal of Communication, 59(1), 1–18. Löblich, M. (2010). Die empirisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Wende. Ein Beitrag zur historischen und kognitiven Identität der Kommunikationswissenschaft. Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, 58(4), 544–562.

102

P. Gentzel

Luckner, A. (2008). Heidegger und das Denken der Technik. transcript. Marcuse, H. (2004). Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft. dtv (Erstveröffentlichung 1967). Morley, D. (2009). For a materialist, non–media-centric media studies. Television and New Media, 10(1), 114–116. Passoth, J.-H. (2010). Aktanten, Assoziationen, Mediatoren. Wie die ANT das Soziale neu zusammensetzt. In G. Albert, R. Greshoff, & R. Schützeichel (Eds.), Dimensionen und Konzeptionen von Sozialität (pp. 309–317). VS Verlag. Pentzold, C. (2015). Praxistheoretische Prinzipien, Traditionen und Perspektiven kulturalistischer Kommunikationsund Medienforschung. Medien und Kommunikationswissenschaft, 63(2), 229–245. Raabe, J. (2009). Kulturund praxistheoretische Konzepte in der Kommunikationswisseschaft. Ein Beitrag zur jüngeren Theorieentwicklung der Disziplin. In P. J. Schulz, U. Hartung, & S. Keller (Eds.), Identität und Vielfalt der Kommunikationswissenschaft (pp. 89–104). UVK. Reardon, T. K., & Rogers, E. M. (1988). Interpersonal versus mass media communication. A false dichotomy. Human Communication Research, 15(2), 284–303. Reckwitz, A. (2003). Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Eine sozialtheoretische Perspektive. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 32 (2003), Nr. 4, 282–301. Reckwitz, A. (2008a). Die Transformation der Kulturtheorien. Zur Entwicklung eines Theorieprogramms. Velbrück. Reckwitz, A. (2008b). Subjekt. transcript. Reichertz, J. (2009). Kommunikationsmacht. Was ist Kommunikation und was vermag sie? Und weshalb vermag sie das? VS-Verlag. Rentsch, T. (1985). Wittgenstein und Heidegger – Existential- und Sprachanalysen zu den Grundlagen Philosophischer Anthropologie. Klett-Cotta. Rosa, H. (2005). Beschleunigung. Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne. Suhrkamp. Rosa, H. (2013). Beschleunigung und Entfremdung. Suhrkamp. Rosa, H. (2016). Resonanz: Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung. Suhrkamp. Rouse, J. (2006). Practice Theory. In St. Turner & M. Risjord (Hrsg.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Bd. 15. Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology (S. 639–681). Saxer, U. (1999). Der Forschungsgegenstand der Medienwissenschaft. In J. F. Leonhard, H. W. Ludwig, D. Schwarze, & E. Straßner (Eds.), Medienwissenschaft. Ein Handbuch zur Entwicklung der Medien und Kommunikationsformen (pp. 1–14). de Gruyter. Schäfer, H. (2016). Einleitung: Grundlagen, Rezeption und Forschungsprogramm der Praxistheorie. In H. Schäfer (Ed.), Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm (pp. 9–25). transcript. Schatzki, T. R. (1996). Social practices. A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press. Schatzki, T. R. (2001a). Introduction. Practice theory. In T. R. Schatzki (Hrsg.), The practice turn in contemporary theory (S. 1–14). Routledge. Schatzki, T. R. (2001b). Practice minded-orders. In T. R. Schatzki (Ed.), The practice turn in contemporary theory (pp. 42–55). Routledge. Schatzki, T. R. (2016). Praxistheorie als flache Ontologie. In H. Schäfer (Ed.), Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm (pp. 29–44). transcript.

Materiality, Technology and the Subject: Elements of Critical Communication. . .

103

Schatzki, T. R., Knoor-Cetina, K., & von Savigny, E. (2001). The practice turn in contemporary theory. Routledge. Schubert, S. (2017). Das Ordnen der Dinge. Von den Unbestimmtheiten und Unsichtbarkeiten des Klassifizierens. In S. Gießmann & N. Taha (Eds.), Susan Leigh Star. Grenzobjekte und Medienforschung (pp. 205–212). transcript. Shove, E., & Pantzar, M. (2007). Recruitment and reproduction: The careers and carriers of digital photography and floorball. Human Affairs, 17(2), 154–167. Shove, E., Pantzar, M., & Wattson, M. (2012). The dynamics of social practice: Everyday life and how it changes. Sage. Star, S. L., & Griesemer, J. R. (1989). Institutional ecology, ‚translations‘ and boundary objects: Amateurs and professionals in berkeley’s museum of vertebrate zoology, 1907–39. Social Studies of Science, 19 (4), 387–420. Stegmüller, W. (1968). Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Eine kritische Einführung (4. Aufl.). Kröner. Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of Human Communication. MIT Press. Tugendhat, E. (1979). Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung. Suhrkamp. Vorderer, P., Klimmt, C., Rieger, D., Baumann, E., Hefner, D., Knop, K., et al. (2015). Der mediatisierte Lebenswandel – Permanently online, permanently connected. Publizistik, 60(3), 259–276. Weber, H. (2008). Das Versprechen mobiler Freiheit: Zur Kultur- und Technikgeschichte von Kofferradio, Walkman und Handy. transcript. Wehmeier, S. (2011). What makes communication science matter? Zur Relevanz der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft. Aviso, 53, 3–4. Weiß, R. (2001). Fern-Sehen im Alltag. Zur Sozialpsychologie der Medienrezeption. Wiesbaden. Wiemann, J. M., Hawkins, R. P., & Pingree, S. (1988). Fragmentation in the field – And the movement towards integration in communication science. Human Communication Research, 15(2), 304–310. Wimmer, J. (2013). Kontextualisierung vs. Komplexitätsreduktion. Medienwirkung aus kulturtheoretischer Perspektive. In A. Fahr & W. Schweiger (Eds.), Handbuch Medienwirkungsforschung (pp. 113–128). VS Verlag. Wissenschaftsrat. (2007). Empfehlungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaften in Deutschland, Oldenburg. http://www.wissenschafts-rat.de/ texte/7901-07.pdf. Accessed 25 Juni 2009. Zillien, N. (2008). Das Affordanzkonzept in der Mediensoziologie. Sociologica Internationalis, 46(2), 161–181.

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives Jacob Johanssen

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show to what extent psychoanalysis, especially after Sigmund Freud, can enrich communication studies and specifically media use research. Starting from the argument that communication studies has inadequate subject theories, I argue that psychoanalytic concepts and ideas can be valuable for both theoretical and empirical questions. Three psychoanalytic concepts – the unconscious, free association, and affect – are then defined in more detail and illustrated with an empirical example of a study of the reception of reality TV. An outlook on the future of psychoanalytic communication studies concludes the chapter. The aim of this paper is to discuss to what extent psychoanalysis can enrich communication studies. I argue that the concept of subject in communication studies is often determined by a rationally and logically acting individual (Dahlgren, 2013). Here, psychoanalysis as subject theory may provide valuable impulses that may shed light on both theoretical and empirical issues. Specifically, I refer to Sigmund Freud’s works, noting that he sees human beings per se, and human agency in particular, as processual and constituted by fantasies, affects, the unconscious, and conscious choices. It is primarily a perspective on inner processes, and their dynamics in social situations, that characterizes his work. Such an understanding can be particularly helpful when it comes to questions of media use. For the choice and selection of media content, according to the premise of the contribution, is not solely subject to active-rational processes, but often also to unconscious J. Johanssen (✉) St. Mary’s University Twickenham, London, Great Britain e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_6

105

106

J. Johanssen

fantasies and thoughts that are to be seen in terms of the subject’s biography. Similar ideas are certainly present in communication studies, for example in theories of reception research, but these often ignore the social and conceptualise human action as microscopically related to media use or reception. This chapter begins with an overview of research on psychoanalysis and media. I then selectively highlight some concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis – the unconscious, affects, and free association – to discuss them in terms of theoretical and methodological perspectives on media.

1

The (Missing) Subject in Communication Studies

Peter Dahlgren has argued for “reactivating” questions with regard to the subject in communication studies (2013, p. 73, my translation). He argues that communication studies has many implicit models that seek to explain how the subject or subjects function. Explicit conceptions of the subject, indeed the premise of this anthology, are often missing, Dahlgren argues. Of course, within communication studies, much is concerned with the human subject. This is done in different sub-disciplines within our science and by means of a plethora of theories, paradigms and approaches that analyse the subject and media in the field of tension between social and cultural viewpoints. However, a complex image of the subject is often left out or anticipated as a fact sui generis without further addressing it. Today, the media play a major role in the symbolic construction, distribution and appropriation of certain ideologies, images and values. Furthermore, media have gained influence in the last decades by becoming more differentiated on the one hand and by structurally changing societies through internet technology on the other hand. Furthermore, it can be observed that especially networked media and media content (smartphones, apps, social media) are strongly oriented towards the individual subject, categorizing, marketing, targeting and involving him or her. Given this centering on the individual as media user, who is of course supposed to communicate with many other individuals, a psychoanalytic theory of the subject is helpful to scrutinize the processes outlined here. This is because psychoanalysis conceptually starts from the individual and how this is interwoven with other individuals and structures (Krüger & Johanssen, 2016). Peter Dahlgren (2013) explicitly argues in his essay that communication studies should also start beyond the rational when it comes to questions of media use but also to structural and content-related aspects of digital media. I think that psychoanalysis (in its various currents and schools) can provide impulses here. When it comes to questions of (supposed) irrationality,

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

107

psychoanalysis provides the perspective on just that. Generally speaking, psychoanalysis understands the human being and subjectivity as processual, conflictual, ambivalent, divided, desiring and complex. Such an understanding of the subject – which I will concretize in the following – changes our perspective on media use in particular. A psychoanalytic view of media (use) includes contradictions, ambiguity, incoherence, resistance and destruction, but also pleasure, creativity and joy, for example, in relation to media use. Psychoanalysis is able to provide methodological as well as theoretical impulses for empirical media use research. “A psychoanalytic approach places an emphasis on the irrational self, subjective rather than objective experience, and contradictory responses, all of which are part of usage practices” (Hill, 2007, p. 85, my translation), as media usage researcher Annette Hill writes in reference to psychoanalysis. She argues that such a view is often missing in empirical media use research. Thus, in fact, empirical media use research that relates to psychoanalytic concepts is largely non-existent. In the next section I will present a brief, incomplete, introduction to psychoanalytic media research in general. The remaining sections will focus specifically on an empirical example from media use and audience research in order to show to what extent psychoanalysis has relevance for communication science.

2

Psychoanalysis and Media

Psychoanalysis is primarily a clinical discipline that deals with issues of psychological suffering and how to reduce it, or how to transform it into general unhappiness (Freud, 1950). However, since its inception, psychoanalysis has also been a way of looking at cultural and social issues. Freud’s metapsychological writings, such as The Discomfort of Culture (1974) have related subjective processes to structural processes (such as the concept of repression). This perspective was most notably taken up by the Frankfurt School and attempted to be linked to Marx’s works (Fromm, 1993; Marcuse, 1995). These writings of course had their influence on communication studies but with the emergence and spread of British cultural studies, psychoanalysis tended to be displaced and has since found itself more represented in film and media studies (Angerer, 2001; Bitsch, 2008; Braidt, 2006). However, a kind of psychoanalytic communication studies has also been emerging for some time, combining ideas from communication studies and psychoanalytic perspectives to investigate contemporary phenomena (see Johanssen & Krüger, 2016 for a more detailed overview). Here, authors such as Vera King (2013, 2014), Elfriede Löchel (1997, 2006), Brigitte Hipfl (2009, 2015), Christina

108

J. Johanssen

Schachtner (1993, 2016, see also her contribution in this volume) in the Germanspeaking world can be mentioned in particular. The works of Alfred Lorenzer (1986), who applied sociological and psychoanalytical concepts to questions of culture and society, are still present and being developed in German-speaking countries (Prokop & Jansen, 2006; Krüger, 2014). In the English-speaking world, psychoanalysis was first seen primarily as a filmanalytical instrument for discussing the (ideological) relationship between film content, portrayed gender role images and the audience (Copjec, 1989; Cowie, 1990; De Lauretis, 1984; Mulvey, 1975; Silverman, 1992). Sherry Turkle (1984, 1985, 2009, 2011) is perhaps one of the best known researchers who has explored psychoanalysis and virtuality. Her work, which draws on Jacques Lacan (2002) and also Erik Erikson (1963), has explored the relationship of the subject to virtual avatars and identities on the Internet, but also in other objects that have media elements (e.g. robots). In this, her view has changed over the years from a positive one to a more critical one. She argues that social media in particular, and their ubiquity through smartphones, make human subjects less relational and more narcissistic (cf. also Dean, 2010). It remains to be said, however, that the scientific research field of ‘psychoanalysis and media’ is in the process of emerging. It can claim a certain history for itself, but has become more differentiated in recent years and has also taken contemporary phenomena into account (Johanssen, 2019). But how can empirical communication research concretely benefit from psychoanalysis? In the following, I will introduce three psychoanalytic concepts and explain with the help of an example how they could be helpful for a conceptualization and research of media use. These are particularly relevant to communication studies in relation to a theory of subjects and subjectification processes, as connections between biographical elements and media use practices of subjects can be explored or theorised. As mentioned above, psychoanalysis is a clinical discipline and terms and concepts cannot simply be adopted or should never be used as a form of truth discourse that ‘psychoanalyzes’ research subjects or gives the impression of bringing to light an ultimate, unconscious truth. Psychoanalysis as a clinical discipline would not do this either. Rather, the combination of psychoanalytic concepts can stimulate communication science with its proven theories and ideas on media change, culture and society and show other perspectives.

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

2.1

109

The Unconscious and the Media

Arguably the most central idea within psychoanalysis is that of the unconscious. It was Sigmund Freud who designed a complex theory of the human subject based primarily on the unconscious. Freud changed or revised many of his ideas and designs throughout his life and so here I will discuss his later work on the unconscious. The unconscious is first to be understood as a process, which both leads to the unconscious itself and keeps it in motion as something processual and dynamic. According to Freud (1989), the unconscious arises because of repressed ideas, experiences or fantasies in early childhood. Certain impressions are too traumatic, embarrassing, incomprehensible or unthinkable so they are repressed. The unconscious is created and thus generated by repression. These processes of repression accompany us throughout our lives and certain things are repressed throughout our lives. The goal of repression is a state in which the repressed becomes unconscious. This also happens as a reaction to traumatic experiences. However, the unconscious is a dynamic force and so repressed contents always push towards consciousness and can become conscious to the individual. According to Freud, repression processes also serve economic goals. We simply cannot retain everything we have ever been confronted with and certain contents therefore become unconscious – but are retrievable, for example when we are reminded of them (Freud, 1989). The unconscious is an important part of human life and psychoanalysis argues that individuals are not always able to rationally justify why they have done certain things. The deeper reasons are unconscious. What does this mean for communication and media research? If we assume that media affect us in a certain way, be it strongly or less strongly, and at the same time are effected by us, i.e. used, changed and created, we have to state that this kind of media use does not always take place rationally and consciously. It is true that communication scholars are always looking for motives, reasons and explanations for the dominance of media, e.g. for the emergence of new digital media, modes of use and so on and so forth. However, these reasons are often purpose-driven, rational and discursively situated. By implicitly and explicitly addressing the subject in communication studies (and in other sciences), both theoretically and empirically, as an active-rational acting subject, the subject is also only able to respond rationally. In our, almost pathological, eagerness to explain and interpret everything, we as communication scholars place too much emphasis on conscious knowledge based on rationality. But what about ambiguities, contradictions, non-knowledge or ignorance in, for example, qualitative surveys on media use (Johanssen, 2016a)? According to psychoanalysis, media use is strongly influenced

110

J. Johanssen

by unconscious elements. When it comes to questions about media use, for example, and these are collected in empirical studies, respondents may discuss many motives and patterns of use, but according to psychoanalysis there is often an underlying level that contains unconscious elements or elements that cannot be explained flawlessly. This explicit conception of the subject, which sees the subject as constituted between conscious and unconscious processes, reveals a complexity that is not always present in media use research. But how can we as researchers gain insights when it comes to unconscious relationships and ties to media? One possible answer can be provided by the technique of free association.

2.2

Free Association as an Empirical Method

Sigmund Freud has always emphasized that psychoanalysis is both theory and method (1950). As discussed earlier, unconscious or repressed contents within the subject attempt to break through and penetrate consciousness. Freud took advantage of these elements in clinical psychoanalysis by encouraging his patients to narrate freely associatively. Subjects should say exactly what they were thinking about at that moment and do so without any subsequent internal ‘censorship’ i.e. without thinking about whether what they thought about is relevant to the psychoanalytic session. Through this associative narrative, unconscious, forgotten or repressed contents can penetrate into consciousness and thus provide valuable insights into a patient’s particular symptomatology. The psychoanalyst is in an active-receptive position: the discussed stream of thoughts is taken up and accepted without being strongly interpreted or questioned. If, for example, long pauses or moments of silence occur, these should be tolerated by the analyst and, if necessary, an attempt made to transform them into further narratives. Moments of silence often indicate that the patient is reflecting on whether a particular thought is important. According to psychoanalysis, there is no distinction between unimportant and important in that sense. Everything is potentially important or relevant and should be expressed (Freud, 1989). How can this now be transferred into a method that makes sense for communication science? Of course, empirical communication research is about exploring specific sets of issues that underlie specific questions. However, free association in combination with narrative-generating questions can enable more complex answers. Especially when it comes to questions about the connection between biographies, identities and media, free association can be advantageous. In contrast to ethnographic methods, or open-ended qualitative interviews, it is the combination of

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

111

methodology and subject conceptualization that is an asset to communication studies here. Collected data can be analysed using psychoanalytic concepts, both in terms of their interpersonal emergence (e.g. through interview dynamics) and their deeper meaning. This combination allows for a sharpened perspective, particularly on moments in qualitative interviews that are characterized by unconscious processes. Such moments “are often characterized by pauses, ambiguities, unusual or incoherent language, or changes of topic” (Bereswill et al., 2010, p. 239, my translation). Freudian psychoanalysis continues to place some conceptual value on affects (Green, 1999). These lend themselves to discussion here in that they relate to language, the unconscious and their nesting. They are also particularly relevant to media use when it comes to responding to certain content.

2.3

Affect Theories and Reality TV

It is mainly work in cultural studies that has discussed affect as a concept in the last 15-20 years, mostly referring to Deleuze (1996) or Massumi (2002) and setting a clear boundary between affect as an experience, as a moment, as a relationship and, on the other hand, as language and discourses. In communication studies, affect is mostly used to look at media in terms of content analysis. In empirical media use research, ‘affect’ has hardly been operationalized so far. Generally speaking, ‘affect’ can be described as something excessive, physical, that goes beyond the individual subject. Affect denotes a movement between bodies or bodies and objects. The term, according to Deleuze (1981), denotes the possibility of being moved by something or someone and moving them at the same time. In essence, the growing interest in theories of affect marks something of a departure from the great interest in discourse and language within the humanities and social sciences in recent decades (Skeggs & Wood, 2012). In the last 15–20 years, there has been a general focus within work in communication studies on emotions and especially affects (e.g. Bente & Fromm, 1997; Wegener, 1994; Bonner, 2005; Kavka, 2009; Bratich, 2011; Skeggs & Wood, 2012; Stach, 2013; Lünenborg, 2015). These works shed light, as it were, on the trend of reality TV and shows that are primarily about bodies and corporeality. Misha Kavka has argued that viewers of reality TV feel an affective connection to the content they see because they have been in similar situations to the contestants. This similarity can be established mainly because it is about (so-called) ‘real’ people and situations. Viewers thus recognise their own affective reactions in the people on television. According to Kavka, the real dimension of reality TV consists in this recognition value. Reality TV thus forms

112

J. Johanssen

an “affective basis” (Kavka, 2009, p. 29, my translation) that connects viewers and participants. I will go into this point in more detail later on. One of the first German-language books devoted to the topic is Bente and Fromm’s “Affektfernsehen” (1997). They elaborated four characteristics of affect television (e.g. daily talk or reality TV): personalisation, authenticity, intimisation and emotionalisation (Bente & Fromm, 1997, p. 20). In general, affect television is “emotionally charged” (Bente & Fromm, 1997, p. 42) and the focus is on individual fates, which are often portrayed in a very “extreme” way (Bente & Fromm, 1997, p. 66). In the German-speaking world, Ulrike Prokop, among others, has also described reality TV shows as “affect shows” (2006). In her content-analytical work on Big Brother (RTL2), which is based on the psychoanalytical works of Alfred Lorenzer (1986), she points out that it is about the staging of different affects. That’s why the director has to create scenes that are emotional and characterized by real feelings. According to Prokop, it is above all sequences that are determined by physicality and not by factual discussions that have a particularly real effect. This is established, for example, through the games and through physical interactions between participants (such as touching, looking at, commenting on each other’s bodies) (Prokop, 2006, p. 273). In many works, as here by Prokop, “affect” is used synonymously with “emotion” or “emotional”. A psychoanalytic conceptualization of affect may provide further impetus to flesh out the concept with reference to reality TV and publics. In works on reality TV and affect, affect is often defined implicitly rather than explicitly. Works that follow Deleuze or Massumi often position themselves in opposition to the individual subject or empirical studies. Nevertheless, affect can be helpful to better understand certain processes of media use. Freud’s ideas and how they have been taken up, especially by the French psychoanalyst André Green (1999), lend themselves here, as affective experiences are seen as processes. These processes are to be located in a tension between consciousness, the unconscious, bodily reactions and language. According to Freud, the term “affect” is to be understood as a subjective and bodily experience and also reaction to something (Freud, 1989). This can be, for example, a sequence within a television programme, something someone says but also, of course, a thought, or a fantasy that an individual has. Freud has continually developed his theory of affect and it can only be outlined in this paper. His early theory of affect, first defined in his work with Breuer on hysteria (Freud & Breuer, 1991) and in the “Outline of a Psychology” (1987), conceptualizes the affective process primarily as a movement, as something in the body that is, as Freud calls it, “discharged.” This is the end of movement and affective experience. This movement can have its origin in

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

113

the internal, or in the external. According to Freud, affective reactions can relate to memory, that is, when something is remembered, it is accompanied by an affective reaction. However, there can also be affective reactions that happen without an act of remembering. According to Freud, it is only this final sequence of the dissipation of affect that is consciously perceived by us. All other processes that led to the affective reaction are unconscious (Freud, 1987). Affective reactions can happen without context, without identifiable reasons, and this is central to the project on Embarrassing Bodies and the narratives of the interviewees. When affects are experienced without context or reasons, they are unconscious, according to Freud. The unconscious reasons for a particular reaction lie in the subject himself and in his biography. Unlike, for example, Massumi (2002), for Freud affective reactions do not just occur. They can be caused by a memory (conscious or unconscious) or by an external phenomenon, such as a television programme. André Green (1999) has argued that affect and discourse are in tension. In thinking about an affective reaction, subjects can say whether it was pleasant or unpleasant, but it is difficult to talk about its nature or “content”. An “affect appears only when the other parts of language have exhausted their possibilities, hence my difficulty in talking about it” (Green, 1999, p. 251, my translation). So there is a difficulty but not an impossibility of talking about affects. The psychoanalyst Ruth Stein has expressed this similarly: “In this sense affect is reflexive and even reactive. It reflects what has been experienced in a delayed way. [...] Therefore, the experiential moment and the moment of meaning or signification are never coterminous, the latter is always retrospective” (Stein, 1999, p. 132, my translation). This view is helpful in that it allows us to see media use processes and their discussion in interviews as situated between the discursive and the non-discursive. Freudian affect theory allows us to view media use theoretically and empirically with complexity. It opens up a complex view of media use and reflection on it e.g. in qualitative interviews. Media use is a bodily process that cannot be fully articulated. The following example is intended to illustrate the concepts presented here in more detail.

2.4

The Unconscious, Affects and the Limits of the Discursive: An Empirical Example

I will now discuss the concepts presented in more detail using an empirical example. The starting point was the British reality TV programme Embarrassing Bodies (Channel 4, 2007–2015). In the programme, patients are examined by doctors and

114

J. Johanssen

often operated on in front of the camera. The show is heavily designed, like many reality formats, to expose the participants: They strip naked, have to report shameful illnesses that often deal with taboo subjects, and end up being treated or referred to experts. It is also important that the show always ends with a healing narrative. In classic “before and after” logic, all patients are successfully cured (Johanssen, 2017). It is very clear that both the show and its appropriation are about affects and affectivity, but in the appropriation process also about corporeality, about affective reactions, but of course also about discursive processes and about reflection. Why do people see such a format? What are the relationships between their biographies and what they see? How do they think about their own bodies? These questions structured the research project. As part of the project, I conducted qualitative interviews with ten subjects. The first question I asked them aimed to generate as long a chain of associations as possible about their own identity. On the one hand, this was intended as a good introduction to the interview, and on the other hand, it should allow for possible conclusions in combination with further data from the interviews about the reception of the programme. Drawing on psychoanalysis, many of the things we do (such as the reception of a particular television programme) are in some way related to our biography and certain key experiences within it. The reception of Embarrassing Bodies, for example, is therefore no coincidence, but may be related to certain aspects of subjective identity. Whether media users are always aware of these aspects will be discussed later on. The question I posed at the beginning was: I would like to hear about your life story, experiences and events that you feel are important to you personally, from your childhood up to now. Please take as long as you would like. You have all the time you need. You may begin wherever you like. I will listen.

I will now discuss one respondent in more detail to demonstrate how psychoanalytic concepts can be of use in this case. Ellen (name changed) was in her mid-50s at the time of the interview and worked in the administrative department of a weekly newspaper in London. In response to my first question, she almost immediately began to talk about growing up with a father who had a chronic illness. She said that recently his health had deteriorated badly and one night she had to go to hospital where her father had been admitted in severe pain. For a long time the doctors could not determine what exactly the problem was. As it turned out, a tumor had affected her father. The specialist to whom he went regularly had not recognized this tumor. Ellen was very angry and bitter about this, as she said. Shortly after telling this story, she suddenly said:

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

115

Having said that, it’s just made me realise that I, one thing I did forget about my life and I suppose I tend to gloss over, is that I had a mini, sort of, I don’t even know what, it wasn’t a breakdown, it was like a sort of depressive period myself (144–146).

She elaborated as follows: I remember, I remember feeling fine, feeling, it was a French exam and I remember going into the classroom, I remember that and I wasn’t worried about this exam in the slightest and, erm, and I sat down and I remember, I remember looking at the piece of paper that the questions were written on and I remember it is quite a sunny day and I remember looking, I remember sitting there just keep looking at it, looking at it and I suddenly thought “I can’t read it, I don’t know what it says!” and it wasn’t, it wasn’t in French, it was in English and I couldn’t make the words sort of sink into my head. It was really bizarre and I’ve never experienced it since and it was just, I was sort of reading the words but the meaning, I couldn’t understand the meaning and nothing would sort of go into my head. I remember sitting, I remember, I remember sort of looking out the window thinking “OK, calm down. Just take a minute and then look back again.”, everybody was busily writing away and I thought “Don’t panic”, just you know and I looked back again and I still couldn’t do it and I remember just packing up my pencils in my pencil case and putting it in my bag and getting up and saying to the teacher “I’m sorry, I can’t do this.” and I just walked out of the classroom (146–160).

This quote demonstrates impressively what an associative narrative can generate in terms of material. Material that is detailed and not (only) guided by rationality and causality. In the passage above it becomes clear how Ellen has remembered something forgotten or repressed at the moment of the interview and then traces the memory associatively. This is particularly evident in the phrases “I remember” or “I remember”. The above narrative is not one that can simply be recalled, but the memory of that very narrative has only emerged within the conversation situation. Ellen told and remembered at the same time, so to speak. If I had not asked a question about the biography, this memory would never have come up. However, it is of extraordinary importance when it comes to understanding the reception of and attachment to Embarrassing Bodies. I interpret this quote once as a free association that arose during the interview situation and also as a discursive attempt to explain a bodily experience after the fact and to provide it with symbolic meaning. However, Ellen could not explain why she had this experience. One could now ask: Why is this passage relevant, since it is about questions of communication studies with regard to a certain programme? A look at the aspects of biography in connection with questions of reception reveals a new perspective. Apparently, for Ellen, in aspects of her biography, the body and aspects of control over the body, a loss of

116

J. Johanssen

control over the body, an affective experience is always a kind of dispossession of the body and rationality, seemed to play a role. The above passage therefore not only illustrates the potential of free association as a method, it also shows how Ellen subsequently tried to put an affective-bodily experience into words. She succeeded only to a limited extent, since what she experienced must be located at the limits of what can be described discursively. Ellen and many of the other interviewees also spoke very positively about Embarrassing Bodies. Above all, she appreciated the doctors and that they always had an answer to patients’ questions and could explain things so well. She said the doctors were particularly professional, caring, respectful, caring and good with people. Ellen said that the show “demystified” aspects of illness (250). These statements can be seen in the context of Ellen’s life story and particularly her experience of having a chronically ill father and her own experience on the occasion of the French test at school as a teenager. No one could really tell her what exactly had happened. She stressed how upset she was that the doctors had diagnosed her father’s tumour so late. She therefore idealized the Embarrassing Bodies doctors and felt a kind of security and stability when she watched the show. On the show, the doctors do exactly what Ellen had missed in her real life: they diagnose affective conditions, name them as specific illnesses, and then help the patients. Episodes like Ellen had experienced in her life do not exist in the show. The show thus has a high status in Ellen’s life, as she herself said. The show is a place where sick bodies are healed, but the bodies of the viewers are not healed. In a sense, they are left sitting on their desires. However, the fact that affective and physical states are named as something in the show is of great importance. This allows viewers to develop the fantasy that there is an answer to everything and that they too might one day be healed. This desire for healing could, in Ellen’s case, be explained by aspects of her biography and the experiences she has had with bodies and doctors. Another interviewee expressed a similar view: I like the idea of medicine, of treating something because all the things, healing and I think, I think with the Embarrassing Bodies programme it’s not only they heal the surface of the skin, okay, we do some injections and the glands stop to swell or whatever, it heals the emotional part because these problems that cause a bit of trouble when I see actually that, I don’t know if all of them find treatment, like every, but I have watched many of them, erm, I even feel emotional because I feel like Wow, I bet it feels like such a relief of actually dealing with things (562–532).

There was this desire for healing and understanding among all respondents that the doctors symbolize and that is why recipients tune in week after week.

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

117

Finally, I would like to go into more detail about the relationship between affect and the unconscious and how this affects the reception of the broadcast. Ellen said the following about the show and the very detailed operations and interventions: I can watch most other things, she says gruesomely. I don’t know, I don’t like seeing pain, is the other one that gets me. I’m quite happy to watch operations but if it’s a sort of emergency medical thing that we’re watching and the person is obviously in a lot of pain and screaming and that really “eeeuuh” gets to me. Watching pain is horrible! I can’t watch that (514–517). Erm, not very good at watching needles go in, don’t know why, I have to look away at that point. Don’t like, can’t watch things with eyes that freaks me out and can’t watch anything that involves boobs being pulled around. Breast augmentation just makes me feel ill and liposuction because I don’t know why (491–496).

These quotes show that Ellen attempted to describe and signify affective reactions after the fact. However, she could not explain why she had certain affective reactions to certain sequences. Based on psychoanalysis, an attempt was made here to translate something affective into something discursive. However, the reasons for the reactions are unconscious. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that many, not all, interviewees said they did not believe there was a relationship between their biographies and Embarrassing Bodies or explicitly denied this. Only two of the ten total interviewees became aware of this connection within the interview, as they had never actually spoken to others about the programme. However, in response to my first question, all interviewees talked about aspects of their biography that were almost exclusively about illness, medicine, their bodies or other bodies. Here it could be critically noted that I had in principle asked them about this, since the research project was about Embarrassing Bodies. However, this objection applies to all qualitative research. The fact that the interviewees explicitly, consciously denied a relationship between their biography and the programme, but that it emerged implicitly in all conversations, suggests that there was an unconscious relationship between the two. This unconscious relationship between biography and media use was brought up by the interviewees. However, they were not aware of this relationship. In this sense, the choice of weekly reception of the programme is not only conscious in nature. It represents, in part, an unconscious choice so that affects could be discharged, acted upon, and the recipients could gain a sense of control over their bodies. I, as a researcher, cannot say why exactly the respondents have these affective reactions, only that they do. Exactly what the link between biography and broadcast reception is I am not able to say but I argue that it exists. Here we see that as researchers we cannot

118

J. Johanssen

always explain or analyse everything beyond doubt. Psychoanalytic knowledge does not claim to be final or universal, but is based on intersubjective impressions. These impressions must undoubtedly be presented in an intersubjectively comprehensible way.

3

Conclusion and Outlook

In this paper, I have described psychoanalytic communication studies as a field still in its nascent stages. I have introduced various psychoanalytic concepts and shown how they can be applied to empirical and theoretical questions. It can be stated with certainty that psychoanalysis is the most complex subject theory of the human being. As mediatization research and also other paradigms within communication studies point out, societies around the world are permeated to varying degrees by processes that drive media change. Based on the specific example discussed, it can be seen that, starting from a psychoanalytic approach, subjectification within and through media reception processes has a certain complexity. Ellen and the other interviewees in the study used Embarrassing Bodies unconsciously to ‘work through’ certain bodily experiences of their own (Freud, 1989) and, in particular, in relation to affective reactions, to vent them. Media content can thus be of great conscious and unconscious significance to recipients. There is often a connection between biographical experiences and media use. To what extent the programme was really helpful for the interviewees I am not able to judge. Psychoanalysis not only allows a special view of subjectification processes in relation to a border space between the discursive and the non-discursive, it is also able to remind us as scientists that we are not omniscient. Psychoanalytic communication studies is still in its infancy. In the past, psychoanalytic work on media has often shied away from points of contact with communication studies, preferring to operate in its own circle. This should change, so that on the one hand psychoanalytic ideas become better known outside elite circles, and on the other hand so that a critical debate between communication studies and psychoanalysis can be initiated. Often communication scientists who have an interest in psychoanalytic issues are viewed critically or eyed with suspicion. A true exchange of ideas can only take place if both sides approach each other openly. This could also be pushed forward more if psychoanalytic communication studies were more oriented towards concrete, empirical phenomena. Often psychoanalytic works on media and communication, for example when they refer to Jacques Lacan, are too overloaded and overwhelming for an interested readership outside

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

119

psychoanalysis. A concrete application of theories (Krüger, 2014; Johanssen, 2016a, b) can facilitate the entry here and show the relevance of psychoanalysis as a subject theory for both theoretical and empirical questions on media.

References Angerer, M. L. (2001). Der andere Schauplatz. Psychoanalyse – Kultur – Medien. Turia + Kant. Bente, G., & Fromm, B. (1997). Affektfernsehen. Motive, Angebotsweise und Wirkungen. Westdeutscher Verlag. Bereswill, M., Morgenroth, C., & Redman, P. (2010). Alfred Lorenzer and the depth hermeneutic method. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 15(3), 221–250. Bitsch, A. (2008). Diskrete Gespenster. Die Genealogie des Unbewussten aus der Medientheorie und Philosophie der Zeit. transcript. Bonner, F. (2005). Looking inside. Showing medical operations on ordinary television. In G. King (Ed.), The spectacle of the real. From hollywood to reality TV and beyond (pp. 105–116). University of Chicago Press. Braidt, A. (2006). Mit Freud. Zur Psychoanalyse in Theater-, Film- und Medienwissenschaft. Böhlau. Bratich, J. (2011). Affective convergence in reality television: A case study in divergence culture. In M. Kackman, M. Binfield, M. T. Payne, A. Perlman, & B. Sebok (Eds.), Flow TV: Television in the age of media convergence (pp. 55–74). Routledge. Copjec, J. (1989). The orthopsychic subject: Film theory and the reception of Lacan. October, 49, 53–72. Cowie, E. (1990). Fantasia. In P. Adams & E. Cowie (Eds.), The woman in question: m/f (pp. 149–196). Verso. Dahlgren, P. (2013). Tracking the civic subject in the media landscape. Versions of the democratic ideal. Television & New Media, 14(1), 71–88. De Lauretis, T. (1984). Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, semiotics, cinema. Indiana University Press. Dean, J. (2010). Blog theory: Feedback and capture in the circuits of drive. Polity. Deleuze, G. (1981). Cours Vincennes: Spinoza. https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/43. abgerufen 12 Feb 2019. Deleuze, G. (1996). Das Bewegungs-Bild: Kino 1. Suhrkamp. Erikson, E. (1963). Childhood and society. Norton. Freud, S. (1950). Aus den Anfangen der Psychoanalyse. Fischer. Freud, S. (1974). Das Unbehagen in der Kultur. Fischer. Freud, S. (1987). Entwurf einer Psychologie [1895]. In Gesammelte Werke: Texte aus den Jahren 1885 bis 1938 (pp. 375–386). Fischer. Freud, S. (1989). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. Fischer. Freud, S., & Breuer, J. (1991). Studien über Hysterie. Fischer. Fromm, E. (1993). Die Furcht vor der Freiheit. dtv. Green, A. (1999). The fabric of affect in the psychoanalytic discourse. Routledge. Hill, A. (2007). Restyling factual TV: Audiences and news, documentary and reality genres. Routledge.

120

J. Johanssen

Hipfl, B. (2009). Jacques Lacan: Subjekt, Sprache, Bilder, Begehren und Fantasien. In A. Hepp, F. Krotz, & T. Thomas (Eds.), Schlüsselwerke der Cultural Studies (pp. 83–93). VS Verlag. Hipfl, B. (2015). Subjekt und Begierde. In A. Hepp, F. Krotz, S. Lingenberg, & J. Wimmer (Eds.), Handbuch Cultural Studies und Medienanalyse (pp. 275–283). Springer. Johanssen, J. (2016a). Did we fail? (Counter-)transference in a qualitative media research interview. Interactions: Studies in Communication & Culture, 7(1), 99–111. Johanssen, J. (2016b). Media research and psychoanalysis: A suggestion. International Communication Gazette, 78(7), 688–693. Johanssen, J. (2017). Immaterial labour and reality TV: The affective surplus of excess. In M. Briziarelli & E. Armano (Eds.), The spectacle of ‘free’ labor: Reading debord in the context of digital capitalism (pp. 197–208). University of Westminster Press. Johanssen, J. (2019). Psychoanalysis and digital culture. Audiences, social media, and big data. Routledge. Johanssen, J., & Krüger, S. (2016). Digital media, psychoanalysis and the subject. CM: Communication and Media Journal, 38(11) http://aseestant.ceon.rs/index.php/comman/ issue/view/467/showToc Kavka, M. (2009). Reality television, affect and intimacy: Reality matters. Palgrave Macmillan. King, V. (2013). Die Macht der Dringlichkeit. Kultureller Wandel von Zeitgestaltungen und psychischen Verarbeitungsmustern. Swiss. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 164(7), 223–231. King, V. (2014). “. . .nur mal eben Mails gecheckt”. Veränderte Zeithorizonte, mediale Praxis und Beziehungsgestaltungen im Familien und Alltagsleben von Heranwachsenden. merzmedien + erziehung, 2(58), 28–36. Krüger, S. (2014). Tiefenhermeneutische Zugänge zur digitalen Moderne. Theoretischmethodische Reflektionen am Beispiel der Internetplattform Min 22. Juli. In E. Rohr (Hrsg.), Inszenierungen des Unbewussten in der Moderne. Alfred Lorenzer heute (S. 73–100). Tectum. Krüger, S., & Johanssen, J. (2016). Thinking (with) the unconscious in media and communication studies. Introduction to the special issue. CM: Communication and Media Journal, 38(11), 5–40. http://aseestant.ceon.rs/index.php/comman/issue/view/467/showToc Lacan, J. (2002). Écrits: A selection. Norton. Löchel, E. (1997). Inszenierungen einer Technik: Psychodynamik und Geschlechterdifferenz in der Beziehung zum Computer. Campus. Löchel, E. (2006). Versuch über das Lesen und Schreiben. Zur Psychodynamik alter und neuer Medien. Psychosozial, 29(104), 113–124. Lorenzer, A. (1986). Kultur Analysen: Psychoanalytische Studien zur Kultur. Fischer. Lünenborg, M. (2015). Reality TV als globales Fernsehformat. Entwicklung – Nutzungsmotive – Affektregulation. merz- medien + erziehung, 25(4), 29–37. Marcuse, H. (1995). Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft. Ein philosophischer Beitrag zu Freud. Suhrkamp. Massumi, B. (2002). Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation. Duke University Press. Mulvey, L. (1975). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema. Screen, 16(3), 6–18.

Media Use and Psychoanalysis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

121

Prokop, U. (2006). Spiel-Strategien in der zweiten Staffel der Sendung “Big Brother”. In U. Prokop & M. Jansen (Eds.), Doku-Soap, Reality-TV, Affekt-Talkshow, FantasyRollenspiele. Neue Sozialisationsagenturen im Jugendalter (pp. 243–274). Tectum. Prokop, U., & Jansen, M. (2006). Doku-Soap, Reality-TV, Affekt-Talkshow, FantasyRollenspiele – Neue Sozialisationsagenturen im Jugendalter. Tectum. Schachtner, C. (1993). Geistmaschine. Faszination und Provokation am Computer. Suhrkamp. Schachtner, C. (2016). Das narrative Subjekt. Erzählen im Zeitalter des Internets. transcript. Silverman, K. (1992). Male subjectivity at the margins. Routledge. Skeggs, B., & Wood, H. (2012). Reacting to reality television. Performance, audience and value. Routledge. Stach, A. (2013). Einübung eines kritischen Blicks auf den weiblichen Körper. Die Sendung Germany’s Next Topmodel und ihre Bedeutung für die Körpersozialisation junger Frauen und Männer. In B. Bütow, R. Kahl, & A. Stach (Eds.), Körper – Geschlecht – Affekt. Selbstinszenierungen und Bildungsprozesse in jugendlichen Sozialräumen (pp. 117–136). Springer VS. Stein, R. (1999). Psychoanalytic theories of affect. Karnac Books. Turkle, S. (1984). The second self: Computers and the human spirit. MIT Press. Turkle, S. (1985). Life on the screen. Simon & Schuster. Turkle, S. (2009). Simulation and its discontents. MIT Press. Turkle, S. (2011). Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from each other. Basic Books. Wegener, C. (1994). Reality-TV: Fernsehen zwischen Emotion und Information? Springer VS.

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on Communicative Negotiation Processes in Data-Driven Times Jakob Hörtnagl Abstract

In this article, we will explore the question of what consequences the datafication of society has for processes of subjectification. Subjects can be understood as the result of communicative classification performances, which change in times of ‘deep’ mediatization. Aspects of interactive communication with an overarching digital infrastructure and its distinct computational and processing logic, become a central mode of subjectification. At the same time, governmental rationalities seep into everyday communicative actions, influencing our horizon of what can be thought and done. Against the background of current subject theories and the concept of governmentality, modulation as a form of classification in datafied societies will describe how algorithmic processing processes become part of communicative acts and practices of self- and other-governance. In doing so, the explanations refer to a process of divisiveness in which digital imprints of individuals increasingly become communicative building blocks of the digital as well as analogue negotiation of subjects. Their negotiation must be critically considered within the framework of context-sensitive mediatization research.

J. Hörtnagl (✉) Institut für Medien, Wissen und Kommunikation, Universität Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_7

123

124

1

J. Hörtnagl

Introduction

This article explores the question of what consequences the datafication of society has for processes of subjectification. Within the framework of cultural and social science theories of the subject, subjects can be understood as “socially inhabitable zones” (Villa, 2013), which are made possible within the framework of subject cultures (Reckwitz, 2006) by the discourses present in each case (Foucault, 1983) and realized within the framework of performative practices (Butler, 2001). In this context, the necessity of considering subjectification in the field of tension between valid power relations and the processes of classification that play a normative role in them becomes apparent. Under conditions of modern governmentality (Foucault, 1983), it is especially practices of self-direction that have a subjectivizing effect. Through the emergence and ubiquity of new media technologies, these practices are increasingly carried out in a media-mediated way. Aspects of interactive communication with a superordinate, digital infrastructure and its distinct computing and processing logic, thus become a central mode of subjectification. At the same time, governmental rationalities seep into everyday communicative actions and thus influence our horizon of what can be thought and done. The background and consequences of this interaction will be critically discussed. For this purpose, mediatization research lends itself as a theoretical approach that deals with sociocultural processes of change resulting from the mutual interpenetration of media and communication on the one hand and society and culture on the other (Krotz, 2001, 2007). New media technologies are changing the way we communicate and thus also the conditions under which culture is negotiated. From a historical perspective, it is possible to identify spurts of mediatization in which technological developments are accompanied by upheavals in social coexistence. According to Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp, we are now living through a new thrust characterized by ‘deep’ mediatization (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 7). Driven by increasingly dense digitization and the resulting technical and content convergence of media offerings, we are now entering a phase of datafication, characterized by the fact that more and more states of our everyday world are translated into a digital format and thus made accessible to an automated computational logic. As a result, the symbolic building blocks of the social world are no longer merely mediated by media, but are also co-constructed by them in key areas. This happens through the increasing interweaving of our everyday life with the technical infrastructure of the Internet, its offerings and its processing logics. Or as Roger Burrows puts it:

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

125

(...) the ‘stuff’ that makes up the social and urban fabric has changed – it is no longer just about emergent properties that derive from a complex of social associations and interactions. These associations and interactions are now not only mediated by software and code they are becoming constituted by it (Burrows, 2009, p. 451).

So this is not just about the new variety of possibilities for interaction and participation made possible by the so-called Web 2.0. It is about the penetration of our everyday life world and its construction by data and their algorithmic processing. For Couldry and Hepp, these considerations form the basis of their “materialist phenomenology” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 5), which aims to sensitize classical phenomenological approaches to the role of technology in communicative negotiation processes. Following these approaches, it is ultimately human actors who produce meaning through their communicative actions (Berger & Luckmann, 2007; Knoblauch, 2013). This article follows on from this and aims to provide food for thought on how knowledge, and thus also subjects, are negotiated in datafied practices. With a view to this communicative negotiation, a further change can be attested synchronously to the datafication of society: The establishment of interactive communication as a new basic type of communication. Friedrich Krotz (2008) exemplifies, on the basis of a semiotic understanding of communication, the characteristic of computer games as a type of communication that results from the ability of computers to independently enter into dialogue with humans. The essential point here is that in the context of interpersonal communication between two players via a game, the computer remains relevant as an interactive frame of reference that productively interacts with the players. While Krotz restricts his remarks to communication with, or about, computer games and robots, this perspective will be broadened here: At a time when interpersonal, media-mediated communication takes place almost exclusively via designed user interfaces within the framework of digital infrastructures and their inherent rules, almost every form of interpersonal communication via social media, much like the communication of two fellow players, is simultaneously interactive communication. The game is replaced by a much more abstract, diffuse entity, which will be discussed here, along with its capacities to affect the ‘player’. Today, it is primarily practices of selfdirection in which sensations and states are also communicated and negotiated interactively. The central argument of the contribution is that through this interactive component, everyday actions are linked to higher-level logics of calculation and government, which always also have a subjectivizing effect. In order to critically illuminate the character and consequences of this change, a look is taken at old and new processes of classification. In classical discourse-

126

J. Hörtnagl

theoretical considerations, it is assumed that a normative framework is created communicatively, against which actors can orient their actions (Chapter “How Does Communicating Constitute the Human Being? On the Subject Concept of Communication Studies in the Age of Digitally Mediatized Lifestyles”). This assumption must be questioned when algorithmic processing plays an increasingly important role in processes of selecting, evaluating, and sorting knowledge, thus helping to shape our horizons of thought and action. Against the background of current theories of the subject and the concept of governmentality, modulation (Deleuze, 1992) is discussed as a mode of classification in datafied societies in order to describe how algorithmic processing processes seep into communicative actions and practices of guiding oneself and others (Chapter “The Subject of Communicative Action, Subjectivity and Subjectification”). To this end, a transformation is outlined in which linguistic-normative ways of classification are complemented by algorithmic-factual ones that arise directly from the technical potentials of a digital infrastructure. This development is discussed at three levels: The level of the category itself (Sect. 3.1), which is modulated in an attentionefficient way by machine learning processes. The meso-level of ‘smart’ infrastructures within which modulation operates as a normative force of subjectification (Sect. 3.2). And the micro-level of individual appropriation practices, on which the diversity in dealing with digital images and their (resistant) potentials become visible (Sect. 3.3). Finally, we will touch on the challenges that accompany this change (Sect. 4). These include the normative function of modulation, which must be understood in the broader context of social theory and is closely related to the values of a neoliberal meritocracy. In this context, the remarks refer to a process of divisiveness in which digital imprints of individuals increasingly become communicative building blocks of the digital as well as analogue negotiation of subjects. Their negotiation and effect must be critically considered within the framework of context-sensitive mediatization research.

2

The Subject as Ideal in Discourse

In his works, Foucault aims at a comprehensive historical consideration of processes of subjectification and the resulting subject forms (Foucault, 1983, p. 208). To this end, he discusses the relationship between power and subject in different historical periods. Foucault understands the concept of power, which is central to him, as a relational aspect between (human) actors and their capacities to influence the actions of others in their own sense through their own actions (Revel, 2014). As a

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

127

productive aspect of power, classification in this context is referred to as the capacity to establish certain knowledge as normal or desirable for others through selection, sorting and categorisation. Accordingly, it is also important not to establish a universally valid definition of power, but rather, as Foucault himself did in his sociohistorical studies, to tap into the techniques of power by means of which subjects are produced in different social contexts. He develops the concept of governmentality as a recent form of such entanglements. With this, Foucault describes an ensemble of power techniques that, from the nineteenth century onwards, have condensed into what we understand as the state (Foucault, 1983). The forms of government include techniques of biopower that have the entire population as their object – for example, through techniques of statistical measurement of a population to map its characteristics as a mass to guide action. Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power can be used to illustrate the productive qualities of such techniques of power: Through discourses, traditional knowledge is transmitted, offering itself to people as a framework against which they can orient their thoughts and actions. This happens through the internalization of power relations: ‘closed systems’ such as schools, prisons, factories or hospitals are used to illustrate how the scrutinizing gaze and its normative function is cultivated as a surveillance technique. Through the mere act of surveillance – and not only through the sanction in the case of deviation from the desired norm – subjects are created who perpetually turn their gaze inwards and discipline themselves according to valid expectations. The subject of closed systems thus produces itself according to the model of a communicatively constructed ideal. The distinctive feature of governmentality as a form of governance is that it resorts to forms of autonomous self-direction, so-called technologies of the self, which enable individuals to.... (...) to perform, by his own efforts or with the help of others, a series of operations on his body or soul, his thinking, his behaviour and his mode of existence, with the aim of changing himself in such a way as to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality (Foucault, 1993, p. 26).

Self-technologies are thus practices of self-leadership that are available to independently formulate goals and develop strategies to achieve them. They present themselves to the individual as instructions on how to live properly and thus form an essential feature of contemporary governmental rationality: as “leadership for selfleadership” (“conduire des conduites”), governmentality describes a style of governing modern states that is concerned with viewing the subject as the result of a situation of regulated freedom (Foucault, 1994, p. 237). Underlying Foucault’s

128

J. Hörtnagl

concept of the subject is thus an ambiguity because, on the one hand, it can be conceived of as a ruled subject that must bow to a sovereign power. On the other hand, it opens up a scope of possibilities that focuses on the ability and potential of subjects to act. The introduction of Web 2.0 technologies has also greatly changed the practices of self-care, so that they must be understood as constellations and the relationships between people and technologies that they contain (Bakardjieva & Gaden, 2012). Disciplining is part of power-theoretical considerations with which Foucault clarifies the close connection between knowledge and power and the significance of acts of classification in the context of subjectification. He is concerned with the subjectivizing power of knowledge in social (sub-) systems, including the closed systems he discusses. Only when clear notions of what is to be considered normal exist does this enable the thematization and sanctioning of deviation. The subject of closed systems is a subject of discursively mediated norms that have validity as a symbolic order: Desirable subject forms are created via categories of the ‘good student’, ‘hard worker’ or ‘compliant inmate’, which have an action-guiding function. Through discourses, statements are made possible about what can be assumed as desirable, moral or right, what expectations are associated with certain social roles, or how a person can express himself in conformity with society. Closed systems become imprints of such norms, subjectifying their ‘occupants’ (Foucault, 2013). The entanglement of knowledge and power manifests as a system of classification that simultaneously suppresses and enables, with language as the central organ for producing such institutionalised order. Foucault’s achievement is that he places aspects of subjectification in a power-theoretical context that meaningfully brings together repressive and productive capacities as well as the ambiguity of subjectification. The subject is thus that self-reflexive being who, as a member of a society, is endowed with practices for autonomous living, while at the same time remaining embedded in higher-level, biopolitically intervening, governmental rationalities. Investigating subjectification thus means thinking along with this rationality in order to find out what values, practices and options for action are associated with it. The question now is which mechanisms help to shape the relationship between subject and society in times of datafication, in which mediamediated practices of self-direction become prominent, which are also communicated interactively.

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

3

129

The Divisiveness of the Subject

When we turn to the question of which normative categories are valid in a datafied society, we must first ask about current subject forms. In the governmentality of the present (Bröckling et al., 2000), it is above all the rationality of the market that is developing into the central organizing principle of society, and in which freedom of choice and the resulting self-responsibility for the subject are increasingly becoming the guiding ideas of a successful way of life. In the course of their theory of reflexive modernisation, the sociologists Ulrich Beck (1986) and Anthony Giddens (1991) explore processes of the detachment of the individual from traditional contexts of meaning under the catchword of individualisation. The individual must, in the sense of governmental self-direction, be able to reflexively explore and weigh his or her own needs, define goals and work out solutions. Against this background, Ulrich Bröckling describes the “entrepreneurial self” as the dominant subject form of the present (Bröckling, 2007). In doing so, Bröckling emphasizes the challenges that the subject has to face in the competition of a neoliberal labor market. As an ego corporation, it follows the imperative of constant self-optimization and must exist as a manager of its own success – or take responsibility for its failure. The social theoretical basis of such considerations is that at present it is above all the constraints of neoliberal capitalism and the accompanying pressure to maximize utility and self-optimization that have a subjectivizing effect. The subject of postmodernity can no longer be cast in a fixed form (Reckwitz, 2006); rather, the pluralization of lifestyles results in a variety of hybrid forms that are largely realized through individual choices and that often find themselves in the field of tension between hegemonic and marginal subject forms. In the recent past, datafication has turned out to be the engine of a further development: Steffen Mau sees economization and digitalization as the drives of a “Verdatung der Gesellschaft” (Mau, 2017, p. 40), in which the conditions of this competition are further intensified by the fact that the subject is becoming ever more tightly integrated into ubiquitous logics of calculation and comparison through the comprehensive quantification of a wide variety of states. Building on Foucault, Gilles Deleuze in “Postscript of the Societies of Control” (1992) describes the transition from a disciplinary society to a society of control as a slow death of closed systems and their institutionalized techniques of power. Discursively mediated ideals are replaced by the dynamics of a constant flux in which states are subject to constant change. From a power-theoretical perspective, it is thus no longer a matter of discipline, but of control in this constant flux in a process that Deleuze calls modulation. Modulation can be described as “self-

130

J. Hörtnagl

deforming imprints that continually readjust themselves every moment, or as a sieve whose meshes change from point to point” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4; own translation). As an example of this, he mentions the modern company, which differs from the comparatively rigid constructs of closed systems with its flexible remuneration, flat hierarchies, dynamic working hours, its distinct competitive logic or the comprehensive principle of lifelong learning. This blurs the boundaries within which subjectification takes place according to a discursive ideal. For Deleuze, the power techniques of the society of control do not only apply to the individual, as the single, self-reflexively acting human being, but also to the individual (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5). By this he understands fragments of the individual that are continuously formed and changed in the constant flow of modulation. They represent individual characteristics that are representative of the person in the respective context and to which certain operations can be applied. The mass as a statistical image of individuals is replaced by the control of dividends by code (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5): In databases, in monetary accounts, in geodata or market data, values are stored that serve as starting points for this control, and which are continually readjusted in the flow of modulation. Thus, the position of each element of the open system is captured, measured, and processed anew from point to point (Deleuze, 1992, p. 7), or as Jennifer Whitson puts it in relation to governmental techniques, “Instead of individuals – irreducible and with an autonomous sense of agency – the new subject of governance is instead the divisive, an artifact of data mining searches and computer profiles.” (Whitson, 2015, p. 343). In data-driven times, subjects are always also part of digital infrastructures in which individual actions and practices are made connectable to processes of automated data processing and interactive communication. This raises the question of what consequences a ‘deep’ mediatization, i.e. the ever closer merging of human and technical actors, has on the way knowledge is negotiated under these circumstances. The notion of the dividend lends itself as a heuristic construct to describe the ambiguity of the notion of the subject when dealing with digital data. It serves to describe the mechanisms that have a subjectivizing effect in the context of datafied governmental rationalities. At the same time, the concept of the dividend from the perspective of the individual lends itself to the digital images and traces that are increasingly relevant in everyday processes of appropriation, also with regard to interactive communication. To this end, modulation is discussed in the next chapter as a mode that describes how tasks of selecting, sorting, and evaluating states are increasingly performed by algorithmic processing, in order to subsequently explore what consequences this can have in the meso- and micro-context of everyday experiences.

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

131

For Foucault, it is the nation state that creates subjectifying conditions. In the course of the control society, it is sometimes also the digital infrastructure of the Internet that makes certain power and domination relationships possible. Here we will explore the question of which new challenges in dealing with knowledge can be associated with this. The collection and processing of digital data is carried out according to methods that can be described in terms of Big Data. This term ostensibly refers to the immense volume of data being worked with today, but also refers to potentials arising from increasingly powerful media and surveillance technologies (Kitchin, 2014, p. 1). In particular, the possibilities of continuous, high-resolution capture in real time and relating the captured data through aggregation and scaling of datasets by algorithms. Underlying this is the realization that in Western societies only a fraction of information and data flows take the route of human perception (Hayles, 2006, p. 161). The majority, according to Hayles, flows electronically through the global infrastructure of networked devices and their software, which together also, but not only, constitute the Internet. Thomas Whalen (Whalen, 2000, cited in Hayles, 2006) points out that it is more than networked artefacts, namely a comprehensive cognitive system in which humans are embedded and in which decisions affecting interpersonal interaction are also made by machines. As an example, cities can be taken here as performative infrastructures (Thrift, 2005, p. 224), in which flows of people and information are controlled and directed by means of automated procedures. It is not only at the spatio-temporal level of geographical questions that the need arises to consider this “software sorting” (Graham, 2005). Thinking itself and our capacities to generate and use knowledge are not unaffected by Big Data. In the context of governmentality, modulation can be understood as a mode through which governmental rationalities create the conditions within which subjects can act self-effectively today. Knowledge is thus increasingly negotiated in dealing with such systems, and thus in the mode of interactive communication. In order to explain this, we will focus on three essential aspects that can be used to describe the seepage of processes of automated categorization into everyday life: The modulation of category within the framework of digital profiles, datafied institutions as ‘smart’ infrastructures, and the level of individual appropriation and communicative negotiation and to what extent these are affected by these technological conditions.

132

3.1

J. Hörtnagl

Modulation of the Category

The question of how machines subjectify at the level of category is addressed by John Cheney-Lippold (2011, 2017). Category is not meant here as a term of empirical research, but rather it is about the role of algorithms in the classification of everyday actions. Cheney-Lippold asks about processes of classification under technological conditions of datafication, noting that computer code is now used significantly to collect data about populations and their behaviors and to deploy them according to criteria of profit maximization. Algorithms are not to be understood as neutral actors, but as agents of a neoliberal capitalism. The power of code lies in its facticity: it does not present itself as a value judgment or as knowledge of the world that is negotiated in interpersonal interaction and can solidify into normative categories. The power of code acts directly on the level of the category itself by modulating it, primarily in accordance with economic interests. The basis for this is the continuous collection of transactional data on the basis of everyday actions as well as the arithmetic operations that can be applied to it. Using marketing as an example, Cheney-Lippold discusses how the variable gender is generated from transactional user data using tools from statistical probability and machine learning (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 167). The goal in this example is to divide people into target audiences more precisely than traditional marketing tools in order to place content more effectively for advertising. Correlations between the category of gender and browsing behavior are derived from databases. Every single action of a user, i.e. which pages on the internet are visited, which articles are bought or which messages are ‘liked’, are assigned to the categories male or female. In sum, however, these attributions are not condensed into binary assignments of a subject of a concrete gender, but are differentiated by degrees. The result is not clearly male or female, but somewhere in between, is classified as more ‘male’ the more his behaviour corresponds to the typical behaviour of past users classified as ‘male’ and the less ‘female’ behaviour was recorded. It is thus no longer about man as a biological gender or cultural construct, but about ‘masculinity’ as an algorithmically produced category derived from the measurable behaviour of an existing mass of users. Thus, ‘man’ becomes a “measurable type” (Cheney-Lippold, 2017, p. 39): A data-based model of male gender, but one that is no longer based on social norms or a biological endowment, but one that is derived from the measurability of the traits associated with it. The basis of these types of measurement are collected data points, which can be described with Deleuze as dividends and which can be modulated as digital fragments of the individual in the constant stream of automated data

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

133

processing. Characteristically, the attributions made are not fixed quantities, but heuristics that are continuously adjusted. By continuously feeding the databases with user input, the conditions under which subsequent decisions are made change. Thus, not only do user assignments and their relationship to the measurement type change over time, but the measurement type itself is constantly modulated. Without having to take any actions of their own, data profiles change because users’ inputs change the settings on which categorization is based. While in the closed systems Foucault’s (proto-) typical notions of masculinity remain relatively rigid, or change, albeit slowly, negotiated in interpersonal processes of negotiation, algorithmically produced ‘masculinity’ depends little on the actual biological makeup of its signifiers or the normative power of traditional instances, but rather on users’ data traces and the statistical operations that can be applied to them: (...) (A)lgorithms allow a shift to a more flexible and functional definition of the category, one that de-essentializes gender from its corporeal and societal forms and determinations while it also re-essentializes gender as a statistically-related, largely market research-driven category (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 170).

The adaptable measurement type serves as a temporary imprint whose form, however, changes at any time. In the context of algorithmic processing, dividends and their continuous modulation become vehicles for the production of subjects. This kind of sorting is understandable as long as we turn to individual and less abstract categories such as gender. In a datafied society, however, we are not concerned here with singular categories and their relationship to the ‘real’ world, but with Big Data and its capacities to store and process huge amounts of data in order to form seemingly infinitely many different types of measurement. In sum, an “algorithmic identity” of each user can be derived from dividends (Cheney-Lippold, 2011), which is characterized by the fact that the users no longer speak for the data, but the data speak for them: Because processes of aggregation of dividends take place in an automated way and outside our perception, the consequences often remain hidden. The assignment to certain target audiences and the associated personalization of advertising in daily Internet consumption is a comparatively harmless example. Taken together, these transactionally collected data form a system of surveillance in which connections are made between demographic information, surfing behaviour, personal preferences, geotracking data, socio-economic status or health data by linking databases. The associated mechanisms of selection can have a lasting impact on people’s everyday lives. Opportunities, risks or biopolitical measures then sometimes depend on which digital profile allows a person to be assigned to certain groups. This can have

134

J. Hörtnagl

far-reaching consequences when it comes to applying for a loan (Just & Latzer, 2017, p. 240), claiming insurance benefits (Crawford & Schultz, 2014), or finding out who poses a threat to national security (Cheney-Lippold, 2017, p. 39). This modulation results in a moralizing system that produces memberships that are sometimes perceived as normal or just (Fourcade & Healy, 2017, p. 24) because they are based on past actions and their automated processing: Digital traces of individual behaviors (where classifying instruments define what ‘behavior’ is, and how it should be measured) are increasingly aggregated, stored and analyzed. As new techniques allow for the matching and merging of data from different sources, the results crystallize-for the individuals classified-into what looks like a super-charged form of capital (Fourcade & Healy, 2017, p. 10).

Transactional data are thus condensed into a system with a distinct processing logic, with which users communicate interactively and which reflects back actions taken in an evaluative manner. With regard to the digital construction of subjectrelevant categories, Cheney-Lippold describes the often intransparent regulative effects that accompany this as “soft biopolitcs” (2011, p. 173). The ‘soft’ refers not to the efficacy of a measure, but to its capacity to influence directly at the category level, thereby sorting out otherwise often divergent possibilities of what can be thought and done. In constant modulation, options are developed and offered that increasingly seep into people’s everyday routines. We often encounter these options as suggestions that, based on automatically generated profiles, are made to users of offers. Algorithms as a control factor act as part of search, filtering, rating or recommender systems and are sometimes used efficiently to influence the attention and behaviour of users (Just & Latzer, 2017).

3.2

The Biopolitics of Body Measurement

The impact from a subjective perspective will now be discussed on the basis of two areas. First, we will look at institutions in order to illustrate the subjectifying role that modulation can play at the meso level. The way in which modulation influences the horizon of what can be thought and done will be discussed using the example of concrete institutions, but – provided there is sufficient coverage of transactional data – it can equally be applied to society as a whole and our role as ‘good’ citizens or consumers. The ubiquity of surveying technologies and their intertwining with practices means that the collection and analysis of data is playing an increasingly important role in more and more environments in our everyday lives (Lupton,

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

135

2015a): The ‘smart city’ as a regulator of its inhabitants, or the ‘smart home’ that uses sensors and automation to continuously adapt to the needs of its inhabitants. Deborah Lupton (2015b) refers to ‘sentient schools’ as those attempts to use data tracking to continuously collect information about different areas of a school in order to derive biopedagogical measures. The collection and analysis of bodily data enables the modulation of sensitivities described above, which, as “soft biopolitics”, affect the way in which subject-relevant categories are (re)produced. To this end, Ben Williamson describes how ‘smart schools’ need to be understood as a web of public health programmes, commercial corporate interests and automated data processing in order to understand the ways in which young people learn about their bodies and health (Williamson, 2015). By collecting data from all areas of the school, a dense network of information is developed. Similar to marketing, this can be used to calculate statistical trends from which to derive normative targets, define goals or make predictions about future actions. This digital imprint of the school, which can be modulated from the sum of all measurements taken in real time, can be used as a starting point for health policy decisions. The measurability enables the comparison and weighting of different parameters that emerge as desirable in the context of certain targets. The school is thus embedded in a data network that enables the operationalisation of these targets against the background of public and commercial interests. The ‘smart school’ thus becomes a machine whose individual components can be optimised according to aspects of neoliberal usability (Williamson, 2015, p. 134). As a student in such a system, one is encouraged to reflect on oneself against the background of assessments made and the ideal constructed with them, for example to achieve health goals or to meet certain performance requirements. Similar to the example of the disciplinary society, the gaze is trained and directed inwards, with the image of the ‘good student’ as a point of orientation. Unlike in closed systems, however, such an ideal is no longer communicated exclusively discursively, but interactively, as collected data is reflexively reflected back to the population of this ‘calculable public’ (Williamson, 2015), providing occasions for intervention. As the results of machine learning processes, data are continuously analysed to reconfigure the biopolitically effective type of measurement. On the ways in which the body is thematised in such a school, Lupton writes: The body in this discourse becomes positioned as a ‘smart machine’ linked with other ‘smart machines’. Bodily sensations become phenomena that are mediated and augmented through machines, transformed into data and then communicated back to the user. This vision of the body as augmented via self-tracking devices presents a digital cyborg, in which such devices not only become prosthetics of the body but extend the body into a network with other bodies and with objects (Lupton, 2013, p. 27).

136

J. Hörtnagl

Data is superimposed on the student’s bodily experiences like an “algorithmic skin” (Williamson, 2015). In doing so, they do not displace them, of course, but provoke a translation of bodily sensitivities into a form that can be captured and processed by computers (Neyland, 2015), and thus also an objectification of the body along operational computational logics. The adaptation thus performed enables the quantification, evaluation and comparison of bodily characteristics through which the individual learns ways to shape the body according to his or her own desires, but always in negotiation with its digital or divisionalized images.

3.3

Dividends as Part of Communicative Negotiation

This consideration, which alludes to individual possibilities of action within the framework of digital infrastructures, but still focuses on the meso level of a datafied institution, can be further illustrated by the example of dealing with the body in the context of self-measurement. In today’s societies, the body is increasingly understood as something malleable that can be effectively modeled and staged as a resource, but whose health maintenance is at the same time increasingly the responsibility of the individual. As a testament to one’s own lifestyle, the shaping of one’s own body promises social added value beyond health benefits (Hitzler, 2002; Villa, 2007). Recent practices of self-monitoring, such as those made possible through the use of self-measurement offerings and associated ‘wearables’, offer themselves as a current avenue of bodily self-care (Duttweiler & Passoth, 2016; Neff & Nafus, 2016; Lupton, 2016). These allow users to collect and analyse data about their own bodies. To this end, they are equipped with functions that invite application in different areas of life. The smartphone, in particular, lends itself to the areas of health and fitness to craft a personalized self-measurement regime from the numerous offerings and their functionalities to help one achieve personal lifestyle goals. Practices of self-measurement are thus those practices of self-direction that are offered within the framework of current governmentality in order to live one’s life self-effectively and successfully, but which at the same time refer to inherent rationalities of power that must be critically questioned. Minna Ruckenstein (2014) calls “data doubles” the digital images that are created in the context of practices with self-measurement offerings and that offer themselves to users for reflecting on their own states of mind. Depending on the goal and occasion, these digital images can be disassembled and reassembled in the flow of modulation, offering ways of self-direction that invite interaction. Practices of self-measurement can be understood as communicative phenomena that allow for multiple communicative acts of connection (Lomborg & Frandsen, 2015). Through

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

137

interactive communication with the devices themselves, normative messages are communicated that have been inscribed in the software, for example, certain value and goal concepts that express how athletic performance is evaluated. This also includes visual, textual or acoustic feedback mechanisms through which offerings can respond to user inputs. In this way, they open up goals and strategies for selfreflexive actions that serve to lead a successful life. In addition, they offer functions for sharing information with peers and in social networks, thereby creating horizons of communalization and physical performance utilization through positive selfthematization in a broader social context. What is characteristic of these images is their “livelyness” (Lupton, 2017), i.e. that their meaning, contrary to what data enthusiasts sometimes claim, is not fixed and they can be understood and used differently in different contexts by different actors. On the one hand, this serves the potential of commercial exploitation and data-driven control in Deleuze’s sense: power relations seep much more densely into our lives when every step taken, every meter walked, and every calorie burned can be understood as a communicative act to a regulatory body. On the other hand, this liveliness also points to the many possible modes of appropriation that are conceivable when dealing with data traces: They represent resources in dealing with one’s own corporeality and offer themselves as building blocks for connecting communication in the wider social circle. Their weighting and the valence attributed to them is not a fixed quantity, but the subject of negotiation across different groups of people and professional fields (Fiore-Gartland & Neff, 2015). Possibilities of influence can therefore not be subordinated to a blind determinism of technology. Practices of self-measurement turn out to be multifaceted in their concrete appropriation and cannot be monocausally subordinated to corporate intentions. Particularly among the most diligent self-measurers, such as the Quantified Self movement, it is evident that creative uses occur where non-intended functions are tried out, where ‘false’ data is also deliberately produced, for example by cheating, or data sets remain incomplete because people do not want surveying technologies in many areas of their lives (Nafus & Sherman, 2014). The ‘ideal’ self-surveyor, who provides complete information about his habits and processes through his data and thus serves the interests of companies or governments (Till, 2014) thus remains only a (nightmare) dream for the time being. However, the question remains open as to whether resistive practices are not also profitably captured for their part. Moreover, current studies regularly point out that it is usually not a matter of rationalising everyday practices along efficiency criteria, in which the ideals and norms conveyed in the offer are adopted without reflection. What Pharabod et al. call “force de la chaine”, i.e. the “power of the chain” to provoke a good feeling in users (Pharabod et al., 2013), Duttweiler (2016) describes as the core function of

138

J. Hörtnagl

self-measurement technologies. This is not about the data and its information content, but about the potential of visualizations or feedback options to provoke a positive feeling of self-assurance in users. It is not instrumental use alone that motivates use, but an overarching identity goal or biographical project that is crucial to how consistently self-measurement is pursued (Duttweiler, 2016). This can be understood as a call for such media practices to be examined and understood in a social context.

4

Outlook

With a view to the subject, a new dimension opens up in times of datafication: through the permanent recording of transactional data, people, voluntarily or involuntarily, become part of a superordinate logic of calculation and the power relations inscribed therein. Interactive communication with media technologies is becoming an integral part of the negotiation of culture in today’s media cultures. This always has a reflexive component, because the subject is inevitably negotiated in interaction with itself and its digital footprints. In this context, the concept of dividends points to the fact that interactive communication not only creates opportunities for introspection and connection communication, but is also always part of an overarching digital infrastructure that collects and processes transactional data for the purpose of profiling and exploitation. In this context, it is primarily commercial interests whose consequences need to be critically considered in contemporary neoliberal societies (Mau, 2017). The power relationship between commercial companies and users is largely asymmetrical, whereby it is companies that have access to technology and data and users whose behaviour becomes part of an extensive commodification of everyday practices. This embedding in a neoliberal logic of exploitation is exemplified by the fact that the objectification of the body along numerically measurable parameters can also be seen as a translation of leisure activities into work performance (Till, 2014). Collected data can be used profitably by companies, but they also make everyday actions accessible to a logic of comparison and competition that is primarily oriented towards criteria of efficiency and optimization. Appropriation, however, also reveals creativity in dealing with new technologies and the resistant potential of incomplete data, which is oriented more towards the needs of users and less towards the interests of companies. Recent scandals in the handling of personal data by companies underline the relevance of such a debate.

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

139

Logics of efficiency and optimization are, as was shown in the look at current subject forms, not only the result of datafication, but only through the ubiquitous transactional recording of actions and interactive communication do they become an inseparable part of the everyday world. Instead of being merely a structural given or a discursive ideal, desirable subject forms seep into everyday practices of selfdirection and modulate our state of being from within. Dividends, their automated processing and interpersonal interpretation, thus have an inherently subjectivizing quality that arises from the ways in which knowledge, communication, and technology intertwine within them. As discussed in the example of self-measurement, the reflexive moment of reflexive modernization becomes more and more a moment of interactive communication, when looking inward at one’s sensitivities becomes looking at the smartphone. The potential diversity and hybridity of subject forms in the recent past does not testify to the fact that there are no longer any liabilities. Rather, the commonalities of subject forms are no longer to be found only in the concrete shape of the subject form, but in the logic of its genesis – and thus in communication and the digital infrastructure in which certain forms are made possible or prevented. Within the framework of governmental self-direction, media technologies thus become instances of reflection that significantly influence our coexistence, insofar as questions of socialization, identity, or bodily sensation are increasingly negotiated via profiles and measurements. The analytical challenge is that modulation must be examined differently at each of the levels discussed, but that at the same time it is important for context-sensitive media and communication research to consider the potentially action-guiding function of such man-machine constellations. In the question of how categories are modulated, this means that production relations and modes of action of code must be reflected. In order to penetrate the often postulated opacity of proprietary systems (Pasquale, 2015), it seems useful to make the production relations of code and its modes of operation the object of study (Kitchin, 2017). The epistemological quality of code should be critically reflected upon as “computational ethnography” (Elish & Boyd, 2017), without falling into a naïve dataism (van Dijck, 2014). This includes critical reflection on the actual effectiveness of Big Data. Furthermore, on an institutional level, it must be asked which normative factors are used in a subjectivizing way, or which practices can be linked to them in order to achieve normative goals. The answer to this question could be reflected within the framework of theory-generating procedures (Krotz, 2005) on socio-theoretical considerations, which locate current subject forms in the field of tension of an individualized achievement society. In this context, context-sensitive, non-mediacentered communication research (Hepp, 2010) should show at the micro level how dividers become part of communicative negotiation processes and what parts the

140

J. Hörtnagl

discussed human-machine interconnections have in the construction and circulation of digital images, or where these become relevant for connection communication. In conclusion, the article is also a plea for media research with a practice-theoretical orientation that takes a holistic view of such constellations and the actions that are made possible by them.

References Bakardjieva, M., & Gaden, G. (2012). Web 2.0 technologies of the self. Philosophy & Technology, 3, 399–413. Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Suhrkamp. Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (2007). Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Fischer. Bröckling, U. (2007). Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform. Suhrkamp. Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S., & Lemke, T. (2000). Gouvernementalität, Neoliberalismus und Selbsttechnologien. Eine Einleitung. In U. Bröckling, S. Krasmann, & T. Lemke (Eds.), Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart. Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen (pp. 7–40). Suhrkamp. Burrows, R. (2009). Afterword: Urban informatics and social ontology. In M. Foth (Ed.), Handbook of research in urban informatics (pp. 450–454). Information Science Reference. Butler, J. (2001). Psyche der Macht. Das Subjekt der Unterwerfung. . Cheney-Lippold, J. (2011). A new algorithmic identity. Soft biopolitics and the modulation of control. Theory, Culture & Society, 28(6), 164–181. Cheney-Lippold, J. (2017). We are Data. Algorithms and the making of our digital selves. New York University Press. Couldry, N., & Hepp, A. (2017). The mediated construction of reality. Polity. Crawford, K., & Schultz, J. (2014). Big data and due process: Toward a framework to redress predictive privacy harms. Boston College Law Review, 55, 93–128. Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the societies of control. October, 59, 3–7. Duttweiler, S. (2016). Körperbilder und Zahlenkörper. Zur Verschränkung von Medien- und Selbsttechnologien in Fitness-Apps. In S. Duttweiler, R. Gugutzer, J. H. Passoth, & J. Strübing (Eds.), Leben nach Zahlen. Self-Tracking als Optimierungsprojekt (pp. 221–251). transcript. Duttweiler, S., & Passoth, J. H. (2016). Self-Tracking als Optimierungsprojekt? In S. Duttweiler, R. Gugutzer, J. H. Passoth, & J. Strübing (Eds.), Leben nach Zahlen. Self-Tracking als Optimierungsprojekt (pp. 9–42). transcript. Elish, M. C., & Boyd, D. (2017). Situating methods in the magic of big data and AI. Communication Monographs. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2017.1375130 Fiore-Gartland, B., & Neff, G. (2015). Communication, mediation, and the expectations of data: Data valences across health and wellness communities. International Journal of Communication, 9, 1466–1484.

Subjectification in Datafied Societies: Dividualization as a Perspective on. . .

141

Foucault, M. (1983). Afterword. The subject and power. In H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.), Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (pp. 208–226). Chicago University Press. Foucault, M. (1993). Technologien des Selbst. In L. Martin, H. Gutmann, & P. Hutton (Eds.), Technologien des Selbst (pp. 24–62). Fischer. Foucault, M. (1994). Dits et écrits IV. Gallimard. Foucault, M. 2013; Orig. 1975). Überwachen und Strafen. Suhrkamp. Fourcade, M., & Healy, K. (2017). Seeing like a market. Socio-Economic Review, 15(1), 9–29. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-Identity. Self and society in the late modern age. Polity. Graham, S. (2005). Software-sorted geographies. Progress in Human Geography, 29(5), 562–580. https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132505ph568oa Hayles, K. (2006). Unfinished work: From cyborg to cognisphere. Theory, Culture & Society, 23(7–8), 159–166. Hepp, A. (2010). Researching ‚mediatised worlds‘: Non-mediacentric media and communication research as a challenge. In N. Carpentier, T. Tomanic, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, E. Sundin, T. Olsson, R. Kilborn, H. Nieminen, & B. Cammaerts (Hrsg.), Media and communication studies: Intersections and interventions. Researching and Teaching Communication (S. 37–48). Tartu University Press. Hitzler, R. (2002). Der Körper als Gegenstand der Gestaltung. Über physische Konsequenzen der Bastelexistenz. In K. Hahn & M. Meuser (Eds.), Körperrepräsentationen. Die Ordnung des Sozialen und der Körper (pp. 71–85). UVK. Just, N., & Latzer, M. (2017). Governance by algorithms: Reality construction by algorithmic selection on the internet. Media, Culture and Society, 39(2), 238–258. Kitchin, R. (2014). The data revolution. Big data, open data, data infrastructures & their consequences. Sage. Kitchin, R. (2017). Thinking critically about and researching algorithms. Information, Communication & Society, 20(1), 14–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1154087 Knoblauch, H. (2013). Communicative constructivism and mediatization. Communication Theory, 23(3), 297–315. Krotz, F. (2001). Die Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. Der Wandel von Alltag und sozialen Beziehungen, Kultur und Gesellschaft durch die Medien. VS Verlag. Krotz, F. (2005). Neue Theorien entwickeln. Eine Einführung in die Grounded Theory, die Heuristische Sozialforschung und die Ethnographie anhand von Beispielen aus der Kommunikationsforschung. Halem. Krotz, F. (2007). Mediatisierung. Fallstudien zum Wandel von Kommunikation. Springer. Krotz, F. (2008). Computerspiele als neuer Kommunikationstypus. Interaktive Kommunikation als Zugang zu komplexen Welten. In T. Quandt, J. Wimmer, & J. Wolling (Eds.), Die Comuterspieler. Studien zur Nutzung von Computergames. VS Verlag. Lomborg, S., & Frandsen, K. (2015). Self-tracking as communication. Information, Communication & Society, 19, 1015–1027. Lupton, D. (2013). Understanding the human machine. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 32(4), 25–30. https://doi.org/10.1109/mts.2013.2286431t

142

J. Hörtnagl

Lupton, D. (2015a). Personal data practices in the age of lively data. Digital sociologies.. https://ssrn.com/abstract = 2636709 Lupton, D. (2015b). Data assemblages, sentient schools and digitised health and physical education. Sport, Education and Society, 20(1), 122–132. Lupton, D. (2016). The quantified self. A sociology of self tracking. Polity. Lupton, D. (2017). Lively data, social fitness and biovalue: The intersections of health selftracking and social media. In J. Burgess, A. Marwick, & T. Poell (Eds.), The sage handbook of social media (pp. 562–578). Sage. Mau, S. (2017). Das metrische Wir. Über die Quantifizierung des Sozialen. Suhrkamp. Nafus, D., & Sherman, J. (2014). This one does not go up to 11: The quantified self movement as an alternative big data practice. International Journal of Communication, 8, 1–11. Neff, G., & Nafus, D. (2016). Self-tracking. MIT Press. Neyland, D. (2015). On organizing algorithms. Theory, Culture & Society, 32(1), 119–132. Pasquale, F. (2015). The black box society. Harvard University Press. Pharabod, A. S., Nikolski, V., & Granjon, F. (2013). La mise en chiffres de soi. Reseaux, 197, 97–129. Reckwitz, A. (2006). Das hybride Subjekt. Eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne. Velbrück. Revel, J. (2014). Power. In L. Lawlor & J. Nale (Eds.), The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon (pp. 377–385). Cambridge University Press. Ruckenstein, M. (2014). Visualized and interacted life: Personal analytics and engagements with data doubles. Societies, 4(1), 68–84. Thrift, N. (2005). Knowing capitalism. Sage. Till, C. (2014). Exercise as labour: Quantified self and the transformation of exercise into labour. Societies, 4, 446–462. van Dijck, J. (2014). Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big data between scientific paradigm and ideology. Surveillance & Society, 12(2), 197–208. Villa, P. I. (2007). Der Körper als kulturelle Inszenierung und Statussymbol. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. http://www.bpb.de/apuz/30508/der-koerper-als-kulturelle-inszenierungund-statussymbol. Villa, P. I. (2013). Subjekte und ihre Körper. Kultursoziologische Überlegungen. In J. Graf, K. Ideler, & S. Klinger (Eds.), Geschlecht zwischen Struktur und Subjekt. Theorie, Praxis, Perspektiven (pp. 59–78). Burdrich. Whalen, T. (2000, 23 September). Data navigation, architectures of knowledge. Paper presented at the Banff Summit on Living Architectures: Designing for Immersion and Interaction, Banff New Media Institute. Whitson, J. (2015). Foucault’s fitbit: Governance and gamification. In S. Walz & S. Deterding (Eds.), The gameful world. Approaches, issues, applications (pp. 339–358). MIT Press. Williamson, B. (2015). Algorithmic skin: Health-tracking technologies, personal analytics and the biopedagogies of digitized health and physical education. Sport, Education and Society, 20(1), 133–151.

Part II Empirical Analyses of the Meaning of Subjectivity and Identity in and for Digital Communication in Mediatized Worlds

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and Socio-cultural Change Christina Schachtner Abstract

What narratives are told by people who use digital media as instruments and stages of storytelling or make them the subject of storytelling? This question is the focus of this paper, which is based on a secondary analysis of the study ‘Communicative Public Spheres in Cyberspace’, which included net actors and bloggers from different parts of the world. Six narrative types were identified: Networking, Self-staging, Trader and Seller, Boundary Management, Transformation, Emergence and Breakout narratives. These narrative types are analyzed from the perspective of intersubjective and narrative theory approaches. They represent responses to biographical and socio-cultural provocations and provide insights into the longings of the net generation, their search for orientation as well as their subject constructions. In the narratives, the digital media not only reveal themselves as instruments of storytelling, they also help shape the what and how of storytelling. When I relate media, subject, and socio-cultural change to each other in this article, as the title suggests, I pursue a perspective of interactions that sets itself apart from a media determinist perspective. This is important to me because deterministic assumptions regarding digital media are not uncommon in public, sometimes academically supported, discussions. Such views, being linear, are tempting, since they help us to make quick judgments and act quickly, but not to gain insight into complex interrelationships.

C. Schachtner (✉) Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_8

145

146

C. Schachtner

The aim of this contribution is to determine the interactions addressed more precisely by examining the narrative entanglements of the subject in medial and socio-cultural developments. The consideration of media developments is limited to the digital media world. My claim is to describe subject constructions in the age of digital media empirically and theoretically. This will be done in four steps. First, I will present two theoretical approaches that will provide an explanatory foil for the narratives of net actors and bloggers from different parts of the world identified in the study ‘Communicative Public Spheres in Cyberspace’.1 The presentation of the identified narrative types will be done in a second step. In a third and fourth step, the digital media and the current socio-cultural upheavals will be problematized as conditions that help shape narratives and thus also the self as narrative. Against this background, the question of the possibilities of contemporary conceptions of the subject is finally discussed.

1

Intersubjectivity and Narration: Theoretical Approaches

The question of the subject in the age of digital media cannot be clarified by a single theory, as Meyer-Drawe argues (1990), because it is only through the interplay of different theoretical approaches that different dimensions and facets of subject formation can be illuminated. In this paper, I limit myself to intersubjective approaches and narrative theoretical perspectives. Intersubjective theoretical approaches explain the individual’s dependence on a You, which characterizes narrative as a fundamental need. In other words, they justify the why of narrative. The achievement of narrative theoretical perspectives is that they bring the how of narrative into focus. In the theoretical approaches cited, the terms subject and self are used without these terms being explicitly defined. However, the respective meaning of the terms is implicitly revealed. The subject is understood as a thinking,

(The study is a sub-project of the overall project ‘Subject Constructions and Digital Culture’, which was funded by the FWF (Fund for the Promotion of Scientific Research, Project I 237-617) and the Volkswagen Foundation and was carried out from 2011 to 2014. Cooperation partners of the Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt were the University of Bremen, the TU Hamburg-Harburg and the University of Münster. The results of the overall project can be found in Carstensen et al. (2014). A detailed account of the results addressed in this paper can be found in Schachtner (2016). The present article takes up results from this book that shed light on the connection between narratives, media, subject and socio-cultural change and adds new theoretical considerations to these results). 1

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

147

feeling and acting being that is constituted in the field of tension between autonomy and heteronomy. Subjects are the actors who encounter each other as partners in interaction. The term self describes the sum of attitudes, orientations, values, communication patterns, in short the ego-design from which the subject acts and which is not to be thought statically, but as a process. It must be conceded that the two terms are not used in a clear-cut way. There is also something vague about them. This probably has to do with the denormalisation, relativisation and attempts at redefinition in contemporary discussions of the subject, which are also conducted beyond the theoretical approaches included here (Bilden, 2011, p. 193). This vagueness is not necessarily a disadvantage; it also opens up scope for the discovery and establishment of new accentuations, which accommodates a methodology to which the research project ‘Communicative Publics in Cyberspace’ is oriented and which will be discussed later in this paper. In the following, I outline central assumptions of intersubjective and narrative theoretical approaches that offer explanations for the empirics at hand. I will not refer to this explanatory potential only at the end of this paper, but will return to it again and again in the course of my explanations.

1.1

Intersubjective Theoretical Perspectives

Under the heading of “intersubjectivity” I draw on several theoretical sources that consider the human being as a social being whose becoming a subject is indispensably bound to the existence of others. I draw on the intersubjective turn in psychoanalysis, on the social psychological concept of George H. Mead, and on the phenomenological reflections of Meyer-Drawe. The arguments from these theoretical sources form the basis on which narrative-theoretical perspectives can be built. Mead recognized the importance of relating to the social environment as early as the 1970s. He distinguished between the I and the ME (1973, p. 218). According to Mead, the I is the organized group of social norms and rules that one adopts. The I responds to the ME in a more or less indeterminate way; it embodies the creative in man. Mead situates the encounter with the generalized Other within the subject; he makes this Other the internal structure that tends to dominate the I as the following quote conveys: “Usually the structure of the I determines the expression of the I” (Mead, 1973, p. 254). In the intersubjective approaches of psychoanalytic coinage, on the other hand, the encounter with the concrete other is emphasized more strongly. According to Altmeyer and Thomä, human beings are born into social relationships and acquire a relationship to themselves through social relationships (2006, p. 8). It is not norms

148

C. Schachtner

that are internalised, but the fate of relationships, which at the same time emphasises the emotional quality of relatedness as opposed to the rational quality of Mead. According to Altmeyer and Thomä, intersubjectivity is a mental movement directed against the separation experienced at birth, the overcoming of which represents the child’s main developmental task (2006, p. 7). According to their main thesis, the inner world of the human being is related to the outer world from the very beginning; the psyche of the human being is constituted in this relatedness (Altmeyer & Thomä, 2006, p. 26). The need for an encounter with the concrete other is also seen by Meyer-Drawe, who argues phenomenologically, but sees the cause of this need not in the experience of separation at birth, but in the fact that we belong to the realm of the visible, but see ourselves only fragmentarily (1990, p. 115). This causes a stain on autonomy and at the same time an opening to the Thou (Meyer-Drawe, 1990, p. 115). The gaze of the Other reaches what I cannot see myself (Meyer-Drawe, 1990, p. 117). At this point Benjamin, who again deals with the gaze of the Other from a psychoanalytic perspective, provides a differentiating supplement. The gaze of the Other directed at the individual means recognition, through which one experiences the Other as a psychically constituted being with whom one can empathize (Benjamin, 2010, p. 66). Benjamin, too, emphasizes both the encounter with a concrete Other and the emotional dimension as a component of this encounter. Recognition, for Benjamin, is the crucial accompaniment to self-assertion (Benjamin, 1990, p. 24). Recognition in Benjamin’s sense does not only mean approval; it can also take the form of criticism. What is essential is being perceived; the reflection of one’s own in the other. Common to the intersubjective theory perspectives of different stripes is the assumption that the human being does not have the choice between autonomy and heteronomy for his or her becoming-self, both rather assert themselves in a movement against each other (Meyer-Drawe, 1990, p. 152), in other words: the subject is autonomous and heteronomous, is sovereign and addressee. What sounds so plausible is not self-evident for the conception of the subject across different disciplines. Rather, with the Enlightenment, an ego ideal has been established with lasting effect that develops not in relationships, but through disengagement from relationships. For Meyer-Drawe, this ideal means imposing on people “an uninterrupted, energysapping self-deception” (Meyer-Drawe, 2015, p. 27). With regard to the topic discussed here, it should be noted: It is the dependence on others that makes narrative an existential requirement. With the help of narrative practices, I show myself to others, elicit reactions from them that I can experience as recognition. In turn, I can become the addressee for the narratives of others. Narrative is the mode in which reciprocity unfolds.

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

1.2

149

Narration Theoretical Perspectives

If the why of narration can be explained with intersubjective theoretical approaches, considerations on the how of narration arise from the perspective of narrative theory. From the perspective of narrative theory, narratives2 form a fundamental mode of how people relate to the world. According to Hardy, all life processes are narrative: “We dream narratively, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, hate, and love narratively” (Hardy, 1968, p. 14). The function of narratives is that they help us to explain the world, to make understandable why something is like this and not different (Meuter, 2007, p. 48). They are a way of seeing the world anew, indeed of seeing a new world (Meuter, 2007, p. 47). Their performance is to reduce complexity, to order reality in order to be able to orientate oneself in it and to act in it (Straub, 2013, p. 105). They serve to construct a meaningful world and a meaningful existence in this world. Narrative world- and self-designs go hand in hand, but they do not emerge in separation from, but quite the opposite in communicative engagement with the representational and social environment. Communication forms the indispensable medium for the transmission of narratives, which we make use of in the hope that our narratives will trigger resonances to which we in turn react narratively. At this point, a connection to intersubjectivity-theoretical assumptions becomes apparent. Narration is always embedded in an intersubjective event in which there is an encounter with concrete or imagined assumptions and thus also a possible clash of different self-concepts. In this encounter we experience the gazes of others; gazes that signify recognition in many different shades. Cavarero has expressed the intersubjective involvement of narrative self-designs thus: ‘It is rather the necessary aspect of an identity which, from beginning to end, is intertwined with other lives – which reciprocally exposes and innumerable gazes – and needs the other’s tale’ (Cavarero, 1997, p. 88). The intersubjective entanglement of narratives as well as the world- and self-designs expressed therein holds the possibility for change. According to Wolfgang Kraus, narration is “work in progress” (Kraus, 2000, p. 5). The subject cannot escape this work. The price for renouncing continuous narrative self-work would be the self-dissolution of the subject (Kraus, 2000, p. 15). Representatives of approaches to narrative theory are currently observing general tendencies towards change in narratives and forms of storytelling. Straub notes that narratives in “late and postmodern times have become more fragile and fluid,

2

I distinguish between narrative and narration. Narration is a form of representation, i.e. a medium. The result of the narrative is the story or narration (Müller-Funk, 2002, p. 171 f.).

150

C. Schachtner

more disparate, more dispersed and paradoxical, more fragmented and rhapsodic” (Straub, 2013, p. 100). Kraus states that it has become more difficult to narrate oneself “from a single mold,” that is, to develop a stable and comprehensive selfnarrative (Kraus, 2000, p. 15). According to Kraus, today’s narratives exhibit contingencies, i.e. it is emphasized that something could be one way, but also another. If this assumption is true, it weakens the function of narratives to provide certainties as claimed by Meuter. Kraus has further observed a narrative struggle for coherence in the face of the erosion of traditional social contexts. And finally, the open endings of contemporary everyday narratives are striking, which Kraus explains with the narrators’ lack of hope that everything will be all right and that they will keep things under control. This corresponds to the renunciation of making the narratives round (Kraus, 2000, p. 16). The change tendencies described are related to the current socio-cultural reality, which, partly mediated by intersubjective relationships, does not leave everyday narratives untouched. Contemporary society is characterized by upheavals that are accompanied by unpredictability, inconsistency and uncertainty, which once again stimulate narrative. As Bhabha puts it, “The experience of ambivalence involves the incentive to speak, the urge to express oneself, a way of working through the unresolved and contradictory in order to preserve the right to narrate” (Bhabha, 2012, p. 51). Against the background of the outlined narrative-relevant theoretical assumptions, I would like to pose the following epistemological questions, which I will pursue in this paper on the basis of results from the study ‘Communicative Publics in Cyberspace’: • • • •

What, why and how do net actors and bloggers tell their stories? What role do media play in their narrative practices? How do narrative practices relate to current socio-cultural changes? How must the concept of the subject be conceived in the age of digital media?

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

2

151

Narrative as Self-Construction: A Typology of Media-Related Narratives

On the basis of the aforementioned research project,3 a typology of narratives was developed, which is presented in this section. Participants in the study were 33 net actors and bloggers4 (half women and half men, half girls and boys) from six European countries (Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine), from four Arab countries (Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) and from the USA. The empirical material consists of 33 interviews and 51 visualizations in which the interview partners tell us in words and pictures what and how they communicate in social networks. For the secondary analysis of the empirical data from the perspective of narrative theory, which is pursued in this article, 21 interviews were used; the visualizations have only illustrative status in this article.

2.1

Methodology and Research Methods5

In the study ‘Communicative Publics in Cyberspace’, an understandinginterpretative research approach was chosen, which allows for an explorative approach and is therefore appropriate for a relatively new research field with many unknowns. In the tradition of this research approach is the Grounded Theory developed by Strauss and Glaser in the early 1960s. Both the collection and analysis of data in this study followed their principles. In deviation from a nomothetic research methodology, these principles provide for theoretical assumptions not to be applied to the empiricism, but to be developed from the empiricism, in other words: not to test theory, but to discover it (Strauss, 1995, p. 71). The thematically structured interview and the method of visualization were chosen as data collection methods. The thematically structured interview was based on a questionnaire that primarily served to orient the researchers. After explaining an initial question, the interview partners were free to talk about their net practices and net experiences. Using the question guide, the researchers

Members of the research group ‘Communicative Publics in Cyberspace’ were: Nicole Duller, Katja Langeland, Katja Ošljak, Christina Schachtner, Heidrun Stückler. 4 Network actors are people who were developing many different activities on the Internet at the time of the interview. Bloggers are people whose main activity is blogging. 5 For more on methodology and methods, see Schachtner (2016, pp. 17 ff. and 111 ff.). 3

152

C. Schachtner

followed the extent to which certain topics relevant to the research interest were addressed by the interviewees. The visualization is a contrasting method to the interview. The interview partners were asked to answer the following two questions with a drawing: (1) Who am I? and (2) I switch between platforms. What does this look like? The method of visualization has the advantage that it opens access to the preconscious and the imagined, that it facilitates the representation of contradictions because the image does not push for logical explanations, and that it appeals more strongly than words to the emotionality of the drawer. As mentioned, the visualizations in this article are only used to illustrate the types of narration. At the centre of understanding and interpreting the empirical data was the search for a key category,6 which provides clues to a possible narrative type. This search began with the selection of all text passages per interview with narrative content, which were then bundled according to thematic criteria such as motives, feelings, actions. On the basis of these criteria, epistemological questions were derived, on the basis of which the statements in an interview were ordered (Schachtner, 2016, p. 113): • • • • • • •

What characteristic features does the narrative contain? (feature level) What actions are emerging? (Action level) What motives/goals are discernible? (motivational level) Which feelings correspond to the motives/goals and actions? (emotional level) What reflections are revealed? (reflexive level) What role do digital media play in the narrative? (media level) What external consequences/reactions are revealed in the narrative? (Consequence level) • In which socio-cultural context is the narration embedded? (contextual level) After the individual analysis had been carried out, a cross-comparison of the interviews was carried out in order to identify overarching characteristics that point to a narrative type. The following six types could be identified: Networking narratives, self-staging narratives, salesperson and trader narratives, boundary management narratives, transformation narratives, emergence and breakout narratives.

6 A key category must occur explicitly or implicitly frequently in the material and be the starting point of various subpatterns of a phenomenon (Strauss, 1995, p. 64).

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

2.2

153

“Master Narratives”: A Typology of Media-Related Narratives

The individual types of narration are each characterised by a dominant narration, which can, however, appear in different versions. Like a ‘subterranean web’, it underlies the narrated episodes, reflections, memories and wishes for the future and gives them meaning. It is sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly narrated, but the narrators are usually not aware of it as narration. Nünning refers to these kinds of narratives as “master narratives” (Nünning, 2013, p. 163), to which individual narrative puzzle pieces can be assigned. “Master narratives” are not static, they are told differently at different points in time, new episodes emerge, others are omitted. They may even be replaced by a new narrative. On the other hand, a certain continuity is inherent in them, because they arise from the confrontation with lifehistorical experiences and social-cultural conditions that do not change from day to day. The types of narration presented here are narrative signatures of time in that they are not only shaped by socio-cultural development, but also by the process of mediatization in the sense that media play a self-evident role in them (Krotz & Hepp, 2012). In the following, I will select one case study for the presentation of each of the six types of narration.

2.2.1

Networking Narratives

In the networking narratives, the focus is on being communicatively connected with others. One version of this type follows the central idea of ‘showing and exchanging’. The exclusively Arab network actors tell that they cross local and regional borders in the network in order to make the peculiarities of their own culture visible to other network actors in other countries and continents, but also to discuss events in other parts of the world. “I use it (the net, d. A.)”, says an Arab narrator, “as a way to show kind of the Middle East and Saudi Arabia specifically from the ground, from a perspective that’s not really represented in the news”. The distribution potential of digital media is emphasized, but also the solidarity potential of online communities in the face of experienced sanctions from the control authorities in their own country. (Fig. 1). In their network narratives, the network actors tell themselves as “citizens of the world” or as “multinational and multigeographical”. Another version of a network narrative is told by a 21-year-old American student who is not interested in being connected to the world, but to his friends and family. ‘Sharing’ is the key category in his story; via the internet he shares everyday observations, music and, above all,

154

C. Schachtner

Fig. 1 Ready to receive and transmit. (Network actor 26, Saudi Arabia)

pictures. The multimedia nature of the medium allows him to use the image as a document of his life and as a bridge of contact. In his narration, the 21-year-old constructs himself as part of communities to which he wants to remain emotionally connected despite spatial separation.

2.2.2

Self-Staging Narratives

Self-staging narratives are about the construction and presentation of the self for an audience (Seel, 2001, p. 49). This ego is deliberately staged; questions of showing and not showing are central. The others are of interest as spectators and commentators. I have titled one version of this type of narration “the admired star”. A 29-year-old net actor from a major European city narrates this version with his visualization answering the question: “Who am I online?” (Fig. 2). The 29-year-old positions himself on top of a mountain made of status symbols; the audience looks up at him. He directs his gaze into a mirror, just as Narcissus once looked into a pond in order to fall in love with his reflection. In this narration we encounter an ego who wants to be admired, who successfully masters his life, pretends to be independent, plays with an imagined audience in his fantasy and at the same time hopes for recognition from concrete others. A second version of selfdramatization is represented by narratives entitled ‘counter-model’. In these narratives, a subject of the future is portrayed that springs from the longings and dreams of its creators. A 24-year-old blogger narrates her narrative with a picture of

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

155

Fig. 2 A self that wants to be admired. (Network actor 29, Austria)

herself borrowing from the manga character Asuka. She stages her online appearances with a great deal of time and desires compliments above all, which she feels are a “balm for the soul”. Behind this image is a young woman, a migrant, who says of herself: “I am nothing and I can do nothing”. She fights against this with narrative means. In the narratives entitled ‘counter-model’, a subject appears who sets herself a goal and desires confirmation. In both versions of self-dramatization narratives, approving recognition by others is of great importance (Fig. 3).

2.2.3

Dealer and Vendor Narratives

In the trader and salesman narratives, too, stagings are described that do not, however, concern the author’s own person, but rather products. The authors of these stories tell us that they test products such as flashlights, smartphones, and tooth whiteners and then present them online. They can, as they report, expect a profit, be it in the form of a fee or the presented product or also in the form of recognition for a successful media presentation of their test results. One of the protagonists, a 24-year-old blogger from the German-speaking world, draws himself as a seller of sweets on a highway, which probably symbolizes the flow of his followers and potential buyers. Although the trader and seller narratives focus on

156

C. Schachtner

Fig. 3 The ego as a design for the future. (Blogger 24, Germany)

products, they also say something about self-designs. They point to a competent self that is practicing the logic of capitalist market economy, which includes the ability to anticipate or stimulate the needs of others. This, too, represents a variant of intersubjectivity (Fig. 4).

2.2.4

Border Management Narratives

The narratives of the border managers focus on borders, traditional borders that are swept away by the technology of digital media and new borders that come from outside or inside. Above all, the borders between the public and the private are thematized. For the narrators of one version of border management narratives, the offer of a borderless digital communication space collides with newly emerging undesirable boundaries, for example, of boundaries of free expression. A 27-yearold Arab blogger, as she recounts, experiences such boundaries in the form of threatening emails she receives when she ventures online to publicly discuss social taboos such as religion, politics, sex. In response to this threat, she now runs three blogs, which she fills with different content and addresses to different people. By means of her own selection and differentiation strategies, she is trying to escape the given boundaries. The narrative of a 19-year-old net player from a European country is not about unwanted borders, but about a lack of them. She first tells how much she enjoys creating a beautiful image of herself in the net public, but then she draws this image (Fig. 5).

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

157

Fig. 4 The blogger as a seller of sweets. (Blogger 24, Switzerland)

Fig. 5 Retreat into privacy in the midst of an anonymous public. (Network actor 19, Austria)

She describes herself as the little doll with its Mac, which many poor people access. I interpret the image as an attempt to retreat into privacy in the midst of an anonymous public sphere. Boundary management in this narrative is not about overcoming boundaries, but about setting boundaries, self-determined boundaries.

158

C. Schachtner

Both this narrator and other narrators of border management narratives design themselves as actors who make decisions and transform them into corresponding strategies of action. We encounter a reflexive subject who experiments with different forms of the public sphere or who states transgressions of boundaries and resists them. There is a connection to the theory of intersubjectivity in that this type of narration refers both to the self-evident reality of intersubjectivity and to the risks that this can take on from the perspective of network actors and bloggers.

2.2.5

Transformation Narratives

The protagonists of the transformation narratives are children and young people who feel that they should and want to manage the transition into a new phase of life. There is a 13-year-old who tells how he wants to make his way into the adult world with the help of media technology. One of his goals is to expand his access rights online, the other is to accumulate media technology devices as materialized evidence of his coming of age. “I don’t have a child lock anymore either,” is the central sentence in his narration. Another version of transformation is told by a 12-year-old girl. In this version, the focus is not on concrete goals, but on struggling, experimenting, questioning, doubting. The 12-year-old reports that she experiments with different personality facets in seven online role-playing games. The questioning and doubting expresses itself in a question that runs like a thread through her story; it is the question of what is right and important, which she uses her experiences in virtual space to clarify. Again and again she raises the question of whether she can find real friends there, whether she can learn something real there. I interpret this as ultimately being about the question of real life. By constantly considering that her experiences in virtual space could be evaluated in one way or another, the 12-year-old gives her narration a contingent character. In both narratives of transformation, we encounter a subject who sees himself in a transitional phase and wants to use digital media to shape this phase of life, albeit in different ways. The 13-year-old boy sees the most unhindered access possible to digital technology as well as the possession of technical devices as evidence of his coming of age. The 12-year-old girl uses the comparison between reality on the Net and outside it to explore the possibilities of the two fields of reality for the development of her personality. The boy presents himself implicitly, the girl explicitly as a seeker (Fig. 6).

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

159

Fig. 6 In search of the right one. (Network actor 12, Germany)

2.2.6

Narratives of Emergence and Departure

The narratives of departure and escape refer to biographical and political projects, each of which is closely interwoven with digital media. The narratives are about physical or virtual border crossings into other socio-cultural territories. A biographical departure is reported by a 24-year-old American woman who has set off for Europe, travelling from country to country and gathering a wide variety of experiences. With the help of photos, which she puts online in a picture gallery, she puts her everyday experiences into context: “I take pictures of my food that I eat in different countries (. . .). It’s an easier way to put things together,” she explains. With these words, she names the online picture gallery as a method for creating coherence that should become visible to the family left behind in the USA. Arab net actors and bloggers describe awakenings in a political sense. They consist in the criticism of the political status quo contained on online platforms and in the questioning of social taboos: “How can we learn about other religions if we are not meant to talk about them? How can we believe (. . .) about the value of life and the value of human rights if you have no rights?”, the 23-year-old founder of the platform Mideast Youth explains the necessity of a critical online dialogue. The political narratives of rising and breaking out reveal a rebellious subject who wants to throw off shackles, who accepts risks, but who does not only fight for its own

160

C. Schachtner

sake, but defines itself as part of a we for which the circumstances of life should change. Whether biographically or politically motivated, both versions of this type of narration focus on intersubjectivity. The first version aims at maintaining intersubjective relationships through images; the second documents the struggle for better opportunities for social interaction. In addition, the narratives of emergence and outbreak refer to future-oriented thinking and action, to which feelings of hope, but also of uncertainty and fear correspond, since the outcome of these narratives is highly uncertain.

2.3

Summary

Young net actors and bloggers tell of their desires for connection on a familial, regional and global level, of the efforts of their self-dramatization, of their attempts to transgress and draw boundaries, of their experiments in transformation and change, of their criticism of prevailing conditions and of their individual and social visions of the future. They tell – this should be emphasized – about their narratives on the net, which are in words and increasingly in pictures or in picture-word combinations. They narrate in virtual space, their narratives convey, because they want to make themselves, and sometimes their culture, visible beyond national borders, because they long for recognition, because they want to create counterimages of themselves or their country. Narrative is always connected to imagined or concrete social relations, whether such relations are to be established or maintained, redefined or critically reflected upon, thus confirming the assumptions of intersubjective theory approaches. Accompanying this narrative is an emotional oscillation between optimism and doubt, between hope and worry.7

7

Critical reflections of the narrators with regard to the risks of digital media were only included to the extent that they become components of the respective narratives. They concern, as described, new surveillance possibilities, the destruction of privacy, and the non-committal nature of digitally established social relationships.

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

3

161

The Role of the Media

There is no narrative in which media do not play a central role. This is not surprising, since the narratives come from net actors and bloggers. They belong to the so-called Generation Y,8 those born between 1985 and 2000 (Hurrelmann & Albrecht, 2014, p. 15), who are among the most intensive net users worldwide. The majority of Generation Y has made digital media their preferred means of communication. It can be assumed that narrative practices in this generation typically develop in connection with media. Digital media are described as sites or instruments for the production, presentation and distribution of narratives. Depending on the focus of a narrative, the digital media are transformed under the direction of narrative practices, as emerges from the narratives, into networking instruments, comparison foils, experimental spaces, exhibition spaces, training sites, stages of self-representation or instruments of struggle, as illustrated by the words of an Arab network actor: “We use new media in order to fight against oppression – oppression against ourselves, oppression against minorities”. The functional versatility of digital media is fed by the multifunctional technical structure of these media, the most important features of which include their cross-border networking potential, their multimedia nature and their interactivity. The networking potential makes it possible to get the narratives going; it is thanks to this potential that relationships can be established and that there are opportunities for distribution and solidarity. Multimedia opens up new opportunities for vocal storytelling in the form of music and podcasts, and visual storytelling in the form of images and videos. According to the narratives of the interview partners, it serves to document one’s own life, to bring together different and even contradictory worlds of experience, and as a contact bridge to those whom one had to leave behind somewhere. In the narratives of self-dramatization, the body translated into media forms, the carefully processed, the disguised body that presents itself, gains “a new attraction in its use as an image” (Ries, 2013, p. 41). The realization of such possibilities, however, results from the interactive quality of digital media, and – indispensably – from the existence of an active subject who takes up the offer of interaction with both the technical and the social counterpart. In their narrative media-related practices, the narrators do not generate themselves as 8

Hurrelmann and Albrecht (2014) use the term Generation Y to describe an age cohort who are confronted with the same developments in their youth, such as technical innovations, social and cultural mood shifts. According to the two socialisation theorists, the whole of society is affected by these developments, but they have a particularly strong impact on those who have just come to terms with them.

162

C. Schachtner

spectators or as mere users; rather, they design themselves as designers who co-produce the media content and thus also the media themselves (Jenkins, 2011; Krotz, 2008, 48 f.; Schachtner, 2016, p. 217 ff.). If the narrative practices of net actors and bloggers have so far been described in this article in the context of digital media, this does not mean that audiovisual or print media do not also play a role: On the contrary. It seems almost typical that experiences from other media are called up and transferred into the narrative online. A 21-year-old says that his writing style in blogging is inspired by the television series Gossip Girl; comic characters are portrayed as models for self-dramatizations, nicknames are created as homage to heroines from novels or to fashion brands, to name just a few examples. The narratives of the net actors and bloggers often represent transmedial narrative projects in which earlier and current experiences from different media are mixed, worked through anew and given new facets of meaning, whereby the narrators once again prove themselves to be designers.

4

Narrative as a Response/Signal (to) Socio-cultural Upheaval(s)

Narratives arise because we are given the world to interpret in order to become capable of acting in it (Schütz & Luckmann, 1975, p. 25). The narratives presented by the net actors and bloggers are situated in a world characterized by social-cultural upheavals. To what extent does social change find its echo in the narratives? I try to find my answers along central phenomena of upheaval such as de-traditionalization, pluralization, dissolution of boundaries, individualization, without claiming to depict the entire scenario of upheaval. The process of de-traditionalisation started in Western countries in the modern age and involves, on the one hand, the liberation of the economy from the local fetters of family and household and, on the other hand, the erosion of traditional values, norms, models of life. De-traditionalization is often primarily associated with loss, dismantling, disintegration (Baumann, 2003, p. 12 ff.). The narratives of the Arab storytellers teach us that the overcoming of traditions can also be a goal consciously striven for by the subjects, if the tradition contradicts the future visions of the rising generation. However originated: In the course of de-traditionalisation, forms of life lose their structural interconnectedness and the predictable measure towards which subjects can align their life plans (Keupp, 2015). Life courses that have become open are the most important characteristic of Generation Y, as Hurrelmann and Albrecht found in their study (Hurrelmann & Albrecht, 2014,

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

163

p. 35). The erosion of traditional structures corresponds to the searching ego, which makes its appearance in the narratives of self-dramatization, emergence and escape, as well as in the narratives of transformation, in which the biographical upheaval becomes social. The narratives of the seeking ego announce that this ego experiments with self-designs, that it waits for comments but prefers to receive approval, which are described as “balm for the soul”. The Arab narrators differ from the Western version of the searching I, who do not react to the erosion of a traditional canon of values, but want to bring it about. Their search consists of how they can critically question traditional values and bring alternatives into play without endangering themselves and their families. In the virtual space, they say, this is more possible for them than in the world beyond the screen. Following Welsch (1988, p. 13), pluralisation can be described as the heart word of modernity, which refers to the multiplication of living spaces, which goes hand in hand with a multiplication of demands and offers to the subject. The media have played a decisive role in the intensification and acceleration of pluralization trends. Books and newspapers already took us beyond the physical near-world, and radio and television reinforced this trend by considerably expanding the spectrum of experiential worlds (Meyrowitz, 1990, p. 20). With digital media, duplication was taken to extremes. According to Mitchell, the Internet is “a giant computer operating simultaneously, offering us a world of interconnected spaces in which we can communicate, work, learn, play in overlapping relationships” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 13 f.), which is also told in this visualization of a 22-year-old Net player from a European country (Fig. 7). The picture shows his daily routine in the physical world and – symbolized by the speech bubbles – the simultaneous presence of the virtual world as a parallel world. Pluralization is a contradictory process that means both an expansion of options and an increase in the risk of fragmented experiences. The risk that ‘life in the plural’ breaks down into pieces that are isolated from one another is answered by narrative practices that aim to create coherence. I am reminded of the American globetrotter who, on her travels through various countries, photographs everyday things and places what she has captured in a picture gallery. In this way, she assembles her everyday life into a colourful mosaic that, for her, forms a whole. The pluralization of living spaces means not only expansion, but also superimposition, from which delimitations arise, e.g. between cultures, between work and leisure, between public and private spheres. At this point, I will limit myself to the media-enforced dissolution of boundaries between the public and private spheres. Questions of private life such as the choice of a partner, death, sexuality have become a popular topic of media productions on television in recent

164

C. Schachtner

Fig. 7 A life in the plural. (Network actor 22, Austria)

years (Jurczyk and Oechsle 2008, p. 8). Digital media have expanded the possibilities of publishing the private, offering spaces to which the whole world has access. With the structural dissolution of the boundaries between the public and private spheres, a familiar order is shaken up. Subjects are challenged to develop new classifications, i.e. acts of exclusion and inclusion (Baumann, 1992, p. 15). This challenge finds a clear echo in the narratives of border management, in which, for example, selection and differentiation of contents and addressees are described as strategies that establish new borders between the public and the private. The need to draw clear boundaries and not to abandon oneself to an unresolved situation is clearly evident. Individualization as a further phenomenon of social-cultural upheaval signals the disembedding of the individual from traditional social contexts, which also makes collectively shared models of life obsolete (Beck & Sopp, 1997, p. 10). In the stories of the Arab net actors, individualization in the sense of self-determination is also a theme, but not a theme that is given to them, but a theme of their rebellious efforts. Regardless of the triggers of individualization tendencies, attempts at reorientation and reconstitution of the subject are found in all narratives on an arc of tension

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

165

between egocentric and you-oriented designs of individualization. In one of the selfdramatization narratives, we encounter an egocentric version of this reorientation in the form of the admired star who wants to master his life entirely by his own efforts and yet craves the envious glances of an audience. As a counterpoint, other narratives feature self-designs aimed at dialogue, which is meant to serve as a source of inspiration. The social orientation is particularly pronounced in the narratives of the Arab narrators. They describe their desire for self-determination in close connection with the desire for social-cultural change. According to their narratives, they strive for the reconstitution of the subject and society as a collective enterprise. They characterize the digital networks as relatively protected places that should support them in finding allies and comrades-in-arms. I summarize: The narrators deal narratively with the social-cultural upheavals with which they are confronted or which they themselves want to bring about. In the narratives identified, traces of the change that has occurred or that they are striving for can be found in the form of described experiences, actions and hopes. Once again, in view of the erosion of traditional structures, the narrators are called upon as designers of their future. They generate themselves as such when they experiment as role-players in the transformation narratives, when they set themselves “glittering” goals, when they accept risks for their visions of a different society in the departure and breakout narratives, when they attempt to enter into conversation with one another worldwide in the networking narratives by means of digital communication media. In this respect, the narratives of the net generation presented here can be seen not only as a confrontation with fundamental challenges of being human, as named by the theory of intersubjectivity, but also as answers to social-cultural provocations of contemporary societies.

5

On the Conception of the Subject in the Age of Digital Media

How can the human individual be theoretically grasped in the age of digital media? I come to the last question of the list of questions formulated at the end of the first section. Attempting to find an answer to this question provides me with an opportunity to refer back to central findings presented in the course of this paper, in order to sketch the contours of a contemporary conception of the subject on this basis. I do not plan to summarize, but rather to bring together key arguments in order to interrogate them again in light of a theme that leads beyond this empirical study.

166

C. Schachtner

This project requires an argumentative movement from the empirically concrete to the conceptual. The concepts of subject and self already run through the entire article. The empirical results confirm the meaning as assumed in the intersubjective and narrative theoretical approaches and presented in the first section. They emphasize the processuality of narratives, which requires people as actors, a claim that the term subject takes into account. The self can be seen as the result of narrative practices that never congeal into a final form. These practices apply, among other things, to the communicative production of narratives. Krotz explains that communication does not take place in a vacuum, but under structurally predetermined historical and cultural conditions (Krotz, 1998, p. 77). It enables the construction of narratives which, as a kind of subterranean web, underlie the reported episodes, scenes, memories, giving them coherence and meaning. The communicatively produced narratives are usually not conscious to their creators as a whole and yet they can be read as answers to biographical and socio-cultural developments that contain provocations for the subject. The term provocation is meant to argue against deterministic assumptions. Provocations – it can be said, following Butler – set the stage for the construction and presentation of narratives and narrative puzzle pieces with which people position themselves vis-à-vis socio-cultural structures and thereby produce themselves as subjects (Butler, 2003, p. 28). Provocations do not mean foreign determination, but a call to reflect and act. (Digital) media gain influence on this process in several ways. They are products of socio-cultural change and continue to drive it forward; they force the provocations and they are used as places and instruments for dealing with these provocations. The social-cultural provocations can take on different meanings in different places in the world. The research presented here indicates that the narratives of network actors from Western industrialized countries respond to socio-cultural transformation phenomena such as de-traditionalization and individualization, i.e. that these phenomena are taken for granted, while from the perspective of actors from Middle Eastern countries they are absent and therefore sought by them. Whether the net actors and bloggers see themselves confronted with sociocultural change or strive for it, a searching, active, formative subject appears in the narrative discussion. Admittedly, the narratives turn out differently due to the different positioning. What they have in common, however, is their orientation towards a responding You in the sense of intersubjective theoretical assumptions, from which new impulses for the further development of narratives emanate (Gergen & Gergen, 1988, p. 39). What has not yet been included by the theories cited is the paradoxical situation in which narrators find themselves nowadays: On

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

167

the one hand, they are dependent on others for the construction of their narrative world and self-designs; on the other hand, due to eroding social networks, these others are no longer available to them as a matter of course, or they do not know which others they can count on. The digital networks, which signal the promise of networking, are all the more helpful to the narrators. The narrators do not necessarily have to be aware of the socio-cultural provocations in order to process them narratively, but they must feel the consequences of these provocations. There are indications of this. The net actors and bloggers seem to partly suspect, partly know, that they cannot stop narrating and constructing themselves in the face of social dynamics, that they have to take care of being noticed in the face of social complexity and confusion, that the “you” is not a matter of course for them in the face of eroding social networks, but that they have to struggle for it or that their chances for development lie beyond the social status quo and that global dialogue can be helpful to reach them. In addition to the rational dimension of their narratives, these point to a strong emotional engagement. It is characterized by being torn between confidence and doubt, between hope and disappointment, between determination and fear. The ambivalent feelings that characterize contemporary narrators once again reflect the uncertainty and unpredictability of social-cultural change. The ambivalence felt is coherent and beneficial. Its value is revealed to the narrators if, as Bhabha assumes (Bhabha, 2012, p. 51), the ambivalence spurs on further narration, which serves to refine, specify, correct, expand and renew narrative interpretations of the world and self-construction.

References Altmeyer, M., & Thomä, H. (2006). Einführung: Psychoanalyse und Intersubjektivität. In M. Altmeyer & H. Thomä (Eds.), Die vernetzte Seele. Die intersubjektive Wende in der Psychoanalyse (S. 7–34). Klett-Cotta. Baumann, Z. (1992). Moderne und Ambivalenz. Das Ende der Eindeutigkeit. Junius Verlag. Baumann, Z. (2003). Flüchtige Moderne. Suhrkamp. Beck, U., & Sopp, P. (1997). Individualisierung und Integration. Neue Konfliktlinien und neuer Integrationsmodus? Leske + Budrich. Benjamin, J. (1990). Die Fesseln der Liebe. Stroemfeld & Roter Stern. Benjamin, J. (2010). Tue ich oder wird mir angetan? Ein intersubjektives Triangulationskonzept. In M. Altmeyer & H. Thomä (Hrsg.), Die vernetzte Seele. Die intersubjektive Wende in der Psychoanalyse (2. Aufl., S. 65–107). Klett-Cotta. Bhabha, H. K. (2012). Über kulturelle Hybridität. Tradition und Übersetzung, A. Babka und G. Posselt (Eds.). Turia + Kant. Bilden, H. (2011). Das vielstimmige, heterogene Selbst – Ein prekäres Unterfangen. Subjektivität nach der Kritik am klassischen Subjekt. In A. Drews (Ed.), Vernetztes

168

C. Schachtner

Leben. Kommunizieren, Arbeiten und Lernen in der digitalen Kultur (Bd. 65/11). Reihe Loccumer Protokolle. Butler, J. (2003). Kritik der ethischen Gewalt. Suhrkamp. Carstensen, T., et al. (Eds.). (2014). Digitale Subjekte. Praktiken der Subjektivierung im Medienumbruch der Gegenwart. transcript. Cavarero, A. (1997). Relating narratives. Storytelling and selfhood. Taylor & Francis Group. Gergen, K. J., & Gergen, M. M. (1988). Narrative and the self as relationship. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 17–56). Academic. Hardy, B. (1968). Towards a poetics of fiction. Novel Forum of Fiction, 2(1), 5–14. Hurrelmann, K., & Albrecht, E. (2014). Die heimlichen Revolutionäre. Wie die Generation Y unsere Welt verändert. Beltz. Jenkins, H. (2011). Transmedia 202. Further Reflections. http://henryjenkins.org/2011/08/ defining_transmedia_further_re.html. Accessed 17 Juli 2015. Jurczek, K., & Oechsle, M. (2008). Das Private neu denken, Erosionen, Ambivalenzen, Leistungen. Westfälisches Dampfboot. Keupp, H. (2015). Reflexive Sozialpsychologie. Unpublished Manuskript. Kraus, W. (2000). Identität als Narration. Die narrative Konstruktion von Identitätsprojekten. http://web.fu-berlin.de/postmoderne-psych/berichte3/Kraus.htm. Accessed 17 Juli 2015. Krotz, F. (1998). Kultur, Kommunikation und die Medien. In U. Saxer (Ed.), Medien – Kulturkommunikation (pp. 67–88). Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F. (2008). Kultureller und gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Kontext des Wandels von Medien und Kommunikation. In T. Thomas (Ed.), Medienkultur und soziales Handeln (pp. 43–62). VS Verlag. Krotz, F., & Hepp, A. (2012). Mediatisierte Welten. Forschungsfelder und Beschreibungsansätze – Zur Einleitung. In F. Krotz & A. Hepp (Eds.), Mediatisierte Welten (pp. 7–23). Springer VS. Mead, G. H. (1973). Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp. Meuter, N. (2007). Identität und Empathie. Über den Zusammenhang von Narrativität und Moralität. In K. Joisten (Ed.), Narrative Ethik. Das Gute und Böse erzählen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 17, 45–60. Meyer-Drawe, K. (1990). Illusionen von Autonomie. P. Kirchheim Verlag. Meyer-Drawe, K. (2015). Illusionen von Autonomie. In K. Brücher (Ed.), Selbstbestimmung. Zur Analyse eines modernen Projekts (pp. 25–40). Pavodos. Meyrowitz, J. (1990). Überall und nirgends dabei (= Die Fernsehgesellschaft, Bd. 1). Weinheim. Mitchell, W. J. T. (2003). ME ++ The cyborg self and the networked city. MIT Press. Müller-Funk, W. (2002). Die Kultur und ihre Narrative, eine Einführung. Springer. Nünning, V. (2013). Erzählen und Identität: Die Bedeutung des Erzählens im Schnittfeld zwischen kulturwissenschaftlicher Narratologie und Psychologie. In A. Strohmaier (Ed.), Kultur – Wissen – Narration Perspektiven transdisziplinärer Erzählforschung für die Kulturwissenschaften (pp. 145–169). transcript. Ries, M. (2013). Erzählen im Netz. In B. Kracke & M. Ries (Eds.), Expanded Narration. Das neue Erzählen (pp. 29–44). transcript. Schachtner, C. (2016). Das narrative Subjekt. Erzählen im Zeitalter des Internets. transcript. Schütz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1975). Strukturen der Lebenswelt. Luchterhand.

The Narrated Self: Narrative Subject Constructions in the Sign of Medial and. . .

169

Seel, M. (2001). Inszenieren als Erscheinen lassen. Thesen über die Reichweite eines Begriffs. In J. Früchtl & J. Zimmermann (Eds.), Ästhetik der Inszenierung (pp. 48–62). Suhrkamp. Straub, J. (2013). Kann ich mich selbst erzählen – Und dabei erkennen? Prinzipien und Perspektiven einer Psychologie des Homo narrata. In A. Strohmaier (Ed.), Kultur – Wissen – Narration. Perspektiven transdisziplinärer Erzählforschung für die Kulturwissenschaften (pp. 75–144). transcript. Strauss, A. (1995). Im Gespräch mit Heiner Legewie und Barbara Schervier-Legewie. Journal für Psychologie, 1, 64–75. Welsch, W. (1988). Wege aus der Moderne. Schlüsseltexte der Postmoderne-Diskussion. VCH Acta Humaniora.

From Subject to User: And Back? Manfred Faßler

Abstract

The current focus of digital networking is the data-based globalization of the social. This includes the enforcement of a latent, adaptation-sensitive concept of user. Chatty digital programs and interactively imagining people produce new socio-technical formats of dependence, trust, truth, reliability and predictability. Things, representational and non-representational, visual, virtual, with enormous ranges and speeds seek partner humans. Subject is transformed into practitioner.

1

A Proposal

Programs, things, actors, subjects, users come very close to each other in the universe of networked algorithms, become virtually identical. It is associated with a new politics of comprehensive contingency control. At present, a digitally configured subject hardly plays a conceptual role in this. A pity, really. A brief look at the landscape of digital, sociotechnical dynamization yields the following results: V. Flusser spoke of subject to project, S. J. Schmidt of actants, K. Barad writes about agentialism, B. Latour and M. Callon about actor-networks, in which humans, structures, machines are equally active, R. Kurzweil sees the fusion of machine-human-intelligence approaching us, called singularity, for 30 years computer-scientists have been concerned with the vividness of digital spheres, G. Russegger speaks of smartjects. Others are looking for ways, ways

Author Manfred Faßler has died before the publication of this book. # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_9

171

172

M. Faßler

out, within a cybernetic course of development misunderstood as technoautonomous, to defiantly reserve a still due place for the individual human being. The subject in the reserve of technogenic practice? This protective attitude is too defensive. Media-technological modes of organization produce their specific complexity, but always in relation to the human being, who applies them to himself, his life, his social life. Whether man will continue to be necessary in the status of subject is debatable. But a model of the socio-technical bonds of man (subject) is what we need. Especially if we acknowledge that inventor, addressee, market, producer, consumer, controller of digital media technologies is man. This therefore presupposes a (developmental) unity of differences. This rejects an either/or status, a thesis of opposition, hostility, alienation. This includes critically examining the observation of digital-technical constitutions. In them a change takes place (a) towards the inherent complexity of thing-user relationships and (b) towards the inherent logic of process-actor relationships. After the decades of joyfully pursued expectation delimitation, of free, endless cyberspaces, we are at the beginning of a post-social phase of expectation delimitation. The search for the global social is underway. It is possible that the subject is experiencing a renaissance. The individual human being, whether anthropologically or sociologically considered, remains important even in complex information technology networks. Equally important remain the social conditions (practices) under which people act. But how? The aspects mentioned at the beginning lead towards a relationship between (inescapable) practices and (imposed and demanded, self-organized) actors. I propose, with a bit of a smirk, the term practor, – or will use it here for now. Practor stands for the non-reversible coupling of networked things and programs (representational and non-representational) as well as the non-reversible participation requirements. It is a figure of the current socio-technical, cognitive, design, participatory social constraint. Among the looming functional, ethical, creativitypolitical (Bröckling, 2007; Reckwitz, 2012; Ullrich, 2016), and economicspecialized constraints of expectation, the practitioner stands for latent personal solutions of adaptation. In the ideal of psychological subject theory put forward by, for example, W. Prinz, this would be the “open subject” (Prinz, 2013). I will not go into the psychological aspects here. I already have enough to do with the sociological ones. How do subject and practors relate to each other?

From Subject to User: And Back?

173

Subject only becomes/remains sociologically interesting if it contributes to a pragmatic understanding of emergence. For this, it must be a ‘possibility’, not a probability. Since, understood in this way, subject and digital worlds operate primarily in a state of possibility, this would be the starting point for further research. This is where I start with praktor. What is meant is the structural unity of possible and probable, biotic and abiotic, non-representational and representational. This unity is available to us today as the pragmatics of the virtual. The practor realizes possible by bringing forth ‘probable’, translating it into a sociotechnical space of change. Expectedly, this is the unity of difference of automated processes, physiology, technology, actualization not resolvable. Actuality of the subject is the practor; it consists in the temporary transgression of individual, virtual, technological, structural, ecological possibilities, continuing in real time. With this proposal outlined, I will observe a few aspects.

2

Second Subject, Without Contract?

Let us be realists: subject is a systemic attribution, not a release. It promises selfresponsible dealing with things, circumstances and with oneself, – according to the rules of socio-technical circumstances. The historical framework for this was typographically, industrially, institutionally, didactically standardized and codified, thus limited. Currently, it is about personalizing data-technical codings in large thing-people networks, about (thing-data-technical) constraints, (communicative, economic) reasons, (network-structural) behavioral requirements and (creativeinnovative) interaction opportunities. After the loss of sovereignty of national societies vis-à-vis global data networks and the loss of sovereignty of subject vis-à-vis representational (machine) and non-representational (data-technical) things, new coding, regulating attributions are sought. Discourses of practice and practices, theories of networks and technology shape this conceptually and empirically difficult search. But not only these. All face the insight that subject is deeply embedded in European social modernity. Its previous frameworks belong to the brief design and social history of the bourgeois idiosyncrasy of the human being, which was sometimes associated with individual, sometimes romantically with genius, sometimes dictatorially with command and obedience, sometimes economically with the entrepreneurial personality, sometimes with citizen. Contradictions, irrevocable economic opposites accompanied this modern history. Often discussed and surprising is: The construction of subject is closely interwoven with industrialization of the social, factory techniques of all kinds,

174

M. Faßler

mechanization of cities and households, telecommunications, etc., and yet remains conceptually distant from things and machines in the history of ideas (end of sentence unclear). Up to the present day, subject remains a written cultural construct, heavyweight in the humanities. The well-read subject, certain and aware of itself, follows the cognitive spaces of exquisite thinking, the teaching and contexts, the standards and regulations of society. Technology, machine, apparatus appear alien, even adversarial, to the subject. Some sociological attempts have been made to fill the gaps between subject and machine empirically and theoretically. This goes back to E. Durkheim’s faits sociaux, to M. Weber’s steel casing of bondage, to H. Schelsky’s factual constraints and H. Linde’s factual dominance. It is only in recent years that attempts have been made to overcome the dualistic concepts of man and machine through models of use, networking, development or information contexts. Reasons include: At the end of the twentieth century, modern subject enactments experience a global reference shock. The typographical construction of the individual and subject, its scriptural constitution and its scriptural obligations, are weakened by data-technological changes in the conditions of communication, action and interaction, left behind in large parts, historicized. • In the dynamics of earth-wide data-technological developments, not only a demography of the digital is formed (user populations of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.), not only net populations. • This is accompanied by a change in the positioning of the individual in onlineoffline networks, i.e. (functional, communicative, collaborative) change of the subject. Rules and instructions for the use of virtual states and things are inscribed in people’s abilities to perceive and act. As unobtrusive companions, they are transforming the cognitive and communicative linking and association fields for more than 3.6 billion people through hours of professional, public, individual, intimate use every day as of early 2017. Through the self-application of computer technology to life and production relations, a data-morphic subject is brought forth, – alias user. Data and information technologies introduce a momentary subjectivity, an ad hoc ego, which at the same time enables an earth-wide formalization: the requirement to use digital interfaces not only leads to the globalization of the social and thus to the weakening of subject dimensions exclusively related to a single society. It initiates the global standardization of self-perception of humans as ‘users’. User is potentially in data friendship with everyone and at the same time has no normatively regulated access to ‘his society’. Crouch assessed this as a ‘post-democratic condition’ in which the

From Subject to User: And Back?

175

individual is composed of revocable positions: Citizen, Customer, Object (Crouch, 2015, p. 199).

3

Calculations Instead of Role

The user is not only a functional carrier of programmed sub-areas. User replaces the inheritance of social attribution in the subject concept. The user-self maintains the claim to individualization, person, interaction, but decouples these social forms from society. Subject becomes microagent, and for the advertising and data market, microtarget. The (classic modern) educating and granting contractual partner of the individual is no longer society. It is network companies. Their general terms and conditions refer to communities and collectives, to user contracts and notice periods. Open, change-sensitive society and a correspondingly demanded subjectivity are not explicitly provided for therein. Subject, in European modernity, was a partner in a social contract that the individual ‘made’, unintentionally, with and in society through his or her biography. I will continue to follow this trace of the relations of things here, knowing that the connections of subject, subjectivity, ‘dispositives’ (Foucault), disciplining, domestication have been elaborated through numerous researches and authors. These are works about a psyche that did not have to leave the space of society. I will not take this up further here. In individual aspects, I will devote myself to the questions of what theoretical and empirical demands have arisen for the concept of subject. The constellations of social modernity made it possible to use the subject as socially bound and contractually capable within society. The high understanding of subjectivity stems from this order: it is understood as an independent recognition of social codes and modes of rule. These included the construction of credible continuity and reproducibility. These enduring frames (Goffman) and role profiles are dissected by data streams and device networks. With the assertion of computertechnological networks and nets, it is not only commercial and economic world references that expand. Data and information technologies leave the normative boundaries of society. In the course of the globalization of the social, not only a post-social sociality is emerging (Faßler, 2014). Individuals experience a global, networked, multipolar, nonlinear mapping through their actions in and with data and information networks. In every second of media use, it confirms the participation and regulation principle of the user, of monitoring and self-control, of lifelogging, of the quantified

176

M. Faßler

self, its countable profile, countable network contacts, sports activities, work intensity, etc. The user’s self-consciousness is embedded in the unquestionable, because apparently only ‘use-bound’ self-control and self-monitoring. In the self-perception, the unquestioning, because apparently only ‘use-bound’ self-control and selfmonitoring is stored. This does not appear as a ‘foreign-determined’ power gesture, not as domination, – something I am always surprised about in interviews. Immersion, intimacy and interactivity create the illusion of user/subject not attribution. But in contrast to the symbolic embedding of subject in the production typography and communication society, the embedding of the user takes place by means of its interactive calculability. In use, in the various problem solvings, the principle of selective, confirming adaptation applies. The role has played out. Calculations, algorithms, massive data, big data, various analytics are replacing role concepts. This has not yet been researched sociologically. Not assigned to things and objects, institutions and procedures, but added to data streams in a calculable, retrievable, modelable way and extracted from them, the user emerges as a new constitution of the individual in high-tech environments. Not that subject disappears completely. There will continue to be a need for useful formats of individual human actionism, as the debates about creativity, innovation, productive curiosity show. But the user will have to adjust to the predominance of quantification and calculation. Which brings us to a changed ‘sub’: The ‘sub’ of global, privately run information, knowledge, innovation networks touted as post-social ‘social’ networks. It is the non-committal, role-free, instantaneously activatable collaborative skills that are demanded. They are aligned with highly variable states. User-subject faces no soul-searching, but a permanent consistency check. Future of the subject is the latency of the user, or, as I suggested at the beginning: the format of the practitioner.

4

Consistent Types

Dormehl wrote (Dormehl, 2014) in “The Formula”: “If concepts like ‘creativity’ and ‘perceptiveness’ are successfully quantified and linked to consistent types of behavior, these might take on as much importance as gender or race.” (Dormehl, 2014, p. 59) He thus answers the question to what extent the “human relationship with algorithms” are “real” or “real enough” (Dormehl, 2014, p. 258): One has to deal with the programs of quantifying data in order to understand what in the near future, i.e. tomorrow, under “consistent types of behaviour”, here: Subject, will be gathered. I will discuss some aspects of possible “consistent types” below, always

From Subject to User: And Back?

177

linked to the question: Are there ways back from the user into a data-civilization recasting of subjectivity? In order to be able to do this, a distinction must be made between the invention of data technologies, their application, automation and global spread, their economisation and ultimately their social constitution. This will not be possible here empirically and inferentially. However, one theoretical position is of weight: the notion of being able to grasp complex, automated data worlds with the help of interpersonal observation categories such as action, intention, interaction was and is an illusion. N. Luhmann had offered to distinguish social systems from mental systems. He held them at a seemingly insurmountable distance in his theory of observation. I will try to shorten this distance. Whether this will make possible an (honorary) rescue of the observational category subject (in the format: practor) in global data streams, in expanding device networks and briefly active communitywork-organization networks, remains to be seen.

5

No Time for Connections

It may be that there are now more algorithms available than recognized or acknowledged problems. There is no way to count them. The message in “The Formula” is: Digital storage and communication technologies are being developed in such a way that they can generate and demand consistent types of the online-offline social within themselves. Consistency primarily means “the catchall phrase Big Data”, which refers to “large amounts of data” that can be used “to understand, analyze, and forecast trends in real time”. This is associated with data analytics, analytics, or deep analytics (Ross, 2016, p. 154). Measures of socio-technical connectedness (here: consistency) have long been under the time pressure of organizational decisions ‘in real time’, the time bridge between human perception and slowing down data processing, and High Frequency Communication. A time-sovereign interpretation of distinctions and decisions is nowhere to be read or observed. Thus one of the most important determinants of the subject in industrial modernity is weakened: the time of reflection, of after-thinking, of self-responsible selfobservation. The contractualist basis (and thus the social continuity basis) of subject loses its meaning. It has been replaced – also in sociology – by interaction (of machinemedium-human), the silent contract of interactive practices. This, however, is not structured in terms of time theory. It is increasingly caught in the maelstrom of circuit-activated ‘real time’, billions of times per second. Real time is a brake to

178

M. Faßler

keep the user on the display, because this is the only way for data corporations to get hold of the non-intentional data. The basic technological speeds elude the perceptive ability of humans. The price of this braked acceleration is the renunciation of ‘time-consuming’ correlations and their explanation. Digital data and information technologies aim at the sociobiology of cognitive, communicative, creative constitution of the individual human being and at the organizational, operative, connective constitution of the social. The question of the conditions of emergence and (self-) maintenance of subjectivity makes it clear that it was no longer (and never) just about inanimate things, but about the datatechnological networking of organic and inorganic states – as living contexts. For their ‘order’, net-social norms are missing. A prominent example illustrates this: the development of self-driving cars. How can a theory of the “subject in an autonomous system” be formulated? This would be helpful for “users in global digital networks”. How can subject in and for an autonomous automotive system be described? In addition to the as yet unresolved ethical questions of whom an autonomous system should avoid in road traffic (young people to the detriment of older people, a shopping trolley rolling onto the road to the detriment of a person, a child to the detriment of the accompanying parents?), there are bundles of questions about what the professional, neighbourly, familial, communal, individual etc. ‘roles’ and attributions can or should look like? Should it still be about roles, frames at all? And if so, with what references?

6

Programs, Not Intentions

The modernly designed subject aimed at the literate person, who first had to be alphabetized in school. Written language and psyche entered into a structurally powerful connection. It led to a medially constructed (literate, knowing, contracting) subject. The associated institutional, organizational logics and rules of the typographic universe lose meaning in digital media. The mass media pales in comparison to the billions of real-time machines and their displays. The mediatechnical back channel, the real-time networked communication in the same medium, closely couple the individual user-human to the data and information streams. After the successes of global Turing tests, in games, virtual realities, Second Life, online economy, blended learning, etc., subject seems very lonely, socially abandoned. A social redefinition of the position of the individual human being must be aware of these latent, dizzying conditions.

From Subject to User: And Back?

179

There is no simple answer to the question: What is/Where is subject? Individualized promises of sovereignty that invoke conscious, well-founded, selfdecided action will have to be set aside. Equally outside remain society-based models of sovereignty. Accordingly, what does the term subject address? Subject was a personalizing category of adaptation. It emerged as an assignment, a promise, a call to ‘behave’ in contexts that made the conditions of life ‘available’. Subject was about a ‘determined life’. This is committed to social framings. Being ‘determined’ always also meant being ‘determined’ prior to the situation of a behavioral decision. This temporally and structurally ‘prior’ determination contradicts the individual human feeling and expectation of being able to act ‘self-determined’ in situ. ‘External determination’ and ‘self-determination’ stand in open relation to each other, in a sometimes productive conflict that is at the same time unavoidable. Subjectivity is, thus delimited, the ability to deal with rules, norms, things, technologies in a varying, life-serving, creative, designing, consuming, egoistic way. It is thus assumed that the tools of the subject are used by the subject in a self-responsible manner. Self-determination and self-responsibility, however, presuppose that I have time to consider them or can use them without interference. Precisely this has become questionable through digital networking. The conditions for subject have moved into the infrastructure of digital networks. Man is in permanent visual and social contact with interfaces, in global Turing spaces, has become a practor. Thus I place subject in the data-technological development and networking options. I now translate user into sociotechnical subject. The social context is that of the practor in heterogeneous networking dynamics. Uncertain remains: Is User an art form of the subject? Does it fit in with artificial intelligence? Is User the current data-technical working body of the human being, and this worldwide? Probably. But what then are the social demands on the format of the subject?

7

Look Back, Briefly

Test runs of digitization have been completed; so have the tests of the possible networking of human and machine communication. The Turing world is established. Current promises are aimed at smartness, Industry 4.0, Cyber Physical Systems and – oh yes: care, service, thinking robots and their home, the global

180

M. Faßler

device networks. Individuals are addressed in their potential network-market functions: As User, Consumer, Producer, or as Microtarget, data-economic smalltarget, permanently encircled. More of a subagent than a subject, the conditional activity of the individual human being is demanded and accompanied by data technology. Not the (old) social resource subject, but the net resource ‘user as interagent’ is spread. The social concept of the individual human being is adapted to the conditions of digital media states. Consequently, the individual human being is fitted into the standard use, which means in every second: “You, user, are applying a technology to yourself, which you not only cannot control. It will change your entire sociobiological bodily events, as a post-genetic development.” I will not go into the post-genetic dimensions here. I already did that elsewhere (Faßler, 2012). I will devote a few working steps to the term ‘user’, since with it a different kind of positioning of the human being in a socio-technical formation takes place. It is above all discontinuous, change-sensitive and -intensive, as well as normatively non-constant. I also suggest that ‘user’ is a bridging term in the process of change of the concept of ‘subject’. It is closely linked to the attempts to impose either communities or collectives as a substitute for society. But of that later. Net-technological, mediamorphous developments will further change our living conditions, will generate professional, neighbourly, friendly and political waves of adaptation, will entail new commercial loyalties through general terms and conditions (self-application). People will adjust to the often ornate requirements of media-technically conditioned worlds of work, production, entertainment, play, learning, conflict (self-observation), will use them and prove themselves as users (self-control). With which social and self-understandings this happens is undecided; out of the race for empirically proven observation are class, stratum and domination concepts. Global media networks are established as communication techniques without an explicit reference to people and their life contexts. But there is, this reference and the embodiment of social rules as subjectivity. Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth (2013) write: “Big-data is not an ice-cold world of algorithms and automatons. There is an essential role for people, with all our foibles, misperceptions and mistakes, since these traits walk hand in hand with human creativity, instinct, and genius”. What the social operating systems that follow these changes consist of is thus debated. What status, what role ‘subject’ has, has been put on hold. One can almost speak of a constitutional absence of consensus (or conflict) about subject/subjectivity. Yet, in my view, such a social format of the individual is by no means out of the running for the constancy, continuity and reliability of social contexts.

From Subject to User: And Back?

8

181

Short Visits in Difficult Terrain: Subject, HCI, User, Actant, Agent

Let’s stay with the example of Human-Computer-Interaction/HCI. It was one of those large-scale terminological attempts to give universal network technology developments a new, general term. Interaction was wisely chosen. It promised that human and technological ‘actors’ would come together in a formal, regulatory field. Earth-wide, they were to enable new modes of human-machine relations. Far from the terrain, from society, from institutional modernity, a new territory shimmered: virtual reality and cyberspace(s). The fact that humans had to relinquish some of their (automatable) sovereignty of action in this, and that these areas nevertheless remained in their field of action as digital programs, formed a kind of silent consensus. It was precisely this, to relieve people of previous standard burdens, repetitive, machine-like processes, to free them from the industrial machine bondage, that provided the momentum of the promises. Initially, there was no powerful information and data industry, but there was a vision of newly emerging contexts. The site of these interactive happenings was no longer society, no longer industry, but the multiplicity of interfaces. They populated the earth at an enormous speed. In the debates about the specific nature of this artificial network of places, it was not only references to society that fell silent. Subject, subjectivity as a social (altruistically meant) call and promise did not follow these dynamics. They seemed to tire, to turn almost uncomplainingly into psychologizing loops. Reasons for this were manifold – and have remained so. Thus, the close, above all structurally controlled and non-hypothetical binding (structural coupling) of subject and technology has not been debated in detail until today. Embedded in every thing, every object, every medium are variable requirements for perception, way of thinking, usability, repetition, correct operation, i.e. complex physicality. They become subjective peculiarities, characteristics, if one formulates them as professional qualification, as consumer behaviour, buyer interests, habits of handling, knowledge conventions or also as curiosity, creativity. The fact that the dynamics of these adaptations have been little debated in subject theory also has to do with the fact that the subject is often either associated with normative expectations or, within sociological discussions, is still far too much related to the need for regulation of industrial and institutional modernity. The gain on the human side was seen in the increase in general knowledge (knowledge society), in intelligence (global intelligence development), in

182

M. Faßler

communication speed. Initially, HCI was not seen as a commercial rationalization reserve, but as a new cognitive and communicative gate/window to new terrains. HCI was seen as a “figuration of diversity” (Falb, 2015), and yet it was the beginning of a period of transformation of the social concept of the subject, called the user. It is interesting that in the years 1980–2000 little research was done on the way in which the subject was changed. At the same time, digital mediality no longer provided a continuing single channel, linear communication, mass media alone. With the liberalization of media licensing, the abolition of the state’s broadcasting monopoly in the 1980s, the WWW in the early 1990s, an increasingly differentiated broadcasting and interaction market emerged. This radically reconstructed the structures of attention, message, knowledge appropriation, time discipline, loyalty to the medium, to the broadcaster or to the state (sovereign) broadcasting monopoly. In a remarkable way, the subject was released from the structural, propagandistic constraint of the ‘people’s receiver’ and ‘freed’ for complex communication. Interaction was followed by networking, the platform, the cloud, smartness and augmented reality. Interaction, the term so prominent in sociology, with which a symbolic, regulating, binding intermediate world was described and made empirically possible, could hardly maintain its prominence in the face of networking, artificial intelligence, wisdom of crowd (Surowiecki, 2004). Very close to the cybernetic understanding of the 1950s–1970s that the ‘communication and understanding channels’ between human-machine-medium-molecule-market can be ensured by data and information flows, the expression Human-Computer-Interaction/HCI renounced a subjectifying gesture. In an almost anthropological language, ‘human’ is assigned as an (interactive) actor of digital universal and cross-cutting technology. Physiology and technology in a constant stream of data. Human and machine now seemed to enter the world ‘hand-in-hand’. Man and machine formed a social figure, they belonged together. It could be thought, following Norbert Elias and Dean K. Simonton (1984), as a configuration. It remained unclear whether this was a connection that maintained difference, or led to that “singularity” of the fusion of human and computational intelligence (Kurzweil) in which the human-machine difference no longer has meaning. Subject, the linguistically and materially regulated individual human classification in a social, economic, technological context, found hardly any access in these developments. It no longer seemed necessary, since the modern concept of the subject could no longer find any direct reference in the complexity of social relations. This was most clearly expressed by Niklas Luhmann (Society of Society,

From Subject to User: And Back?

183

et al.) in the strict conceptual distinction between social system and mental system. But this is no longer as conclusive as it initially seemed. For the subject-model was not quite so homeless or left to its own devices, thrown back on its psyche. It was given a new world status and commonplace name: User.

9

Affiliation Icon Collective

Looking back at the 1990s and 2000s, something else is striking. Under the influence of HCI terminology, networking empiricism (Castells) and the selfimage of users as central actors in networks, the conversation quickly changed in favour of community and collective. Whereby two fundamentally different ideas were associated with it: Community (virtual communities, Rheingold) referred to concrete self-imposed and self-organized projects, to the development of solutions to problems in groups brought together by their interests. This was quickly exploited by companies by including these communities as an outsourcing address in the development competition. Thus a structure of “communities of projects” (Faßler) emerged. In a fundamentally different way, the term collective spread as a substitute for society. Particularly in the 2000s, collective moved into the however controversial status of a promise of sovereignty: it applied to the user-subjects. Initiated by Levy (1997), the discourses aimed at the emergence of “collective intelligence” in the interaction of humans and data technology. Rheingold (2003) did not follow the evolution-weighted argument of P. Levy, but took the idea of “collective action” to protect his “smart mobs”. Eugene Thacker wrote about “swarms – collectives without a center” (2009). Wiedemann criticized (Wiedemann, 2016) the reversion to classical sovereignty thinking that does not capture the “interconnectedness and multiplicity of collaborative constitutional processes” (op. cit., p. 263). B. Coleman and F. Stadler were even more explicit. They pointed out that collective-user ideals remained “faithful to the classical notion of subject” “rather than exploring the interweaving of material and affective effects in the constitutional processes of collectivity.” All positions, of which I can only hint at a few here, are united by an important change: the collective is no longer described in terms of a normative idea, nor in terms of a rule-based representation. Collective is a “mass ornament”, as Simons calls it (Simons, 2014). Its automaticity is determined by “mediatized acts of imitation that (...) shape all stages of web communication” (Simons, 2014,

184

M. Faßler

p. 256). Collective is brought forth in data networks through “perception” (Kaldrack & Röhle, 2014). In this account, subject can no longer be understood as a social sovereign, but as a promise reduced to serial moments of confirmation and adaptation. Social was preserved without going into the technological-operational fields. The situation was made even more difficult by the fact that many of those who spoke of culture, identity and the subject hardly or not at all addressed the sociotechnological dispositions of all these noble categories. For many, technology was (and still is) something alien and hostile to man, something to be ‘overcome’, to be ‘transcended’. I will not go into this line of thinking in detail here. Rather, I place the question of the category ‘subject’ at the centre of socio-technological developments. In doing so, I delimit subject as a category of observation, which is at the same time self-observation and observation of others. It is an adaptation-sensitive means of describing people in their social, professional, communicative tasks and in their ‘self-understanding’.

10

Icon of Data Networks: Teleoperational Connections

Do sociologists think of subject when they talk about users? Do we think of confirming relationality of subjective practices when we research human-computer interaction/HCI? And if we do: What is the meaning of ‘tele’ in such work? Does this socio-technical formalism of tele-operational, tele-present, tele-productive worlds stand in opposition to ‘inter’ (Keibl)? At the very least, it is not easy to speak confidently of a symbolically consolidated ‘inter’ in the case of real-time teleoperations that occur in perceptual real time (and are significantly faster in the background of human perception, i.e. up to 40 ms. in the realm of high frequency trading). The notion that ‘inter’ is preserved and transmitted through faciality and understanding has already been put in the romantic box by man-machine theses, and even more so by HCI. Social constitutions are not only massively industrialized. These basic conditions of production technology have been extended by the “rule of mechanization” in homes (Giedion, 1987), offices, and especially by the “rule of mathematical rules” (Heintz) and the information technologies used everywhere. It is precisely these tele/simulation/augmentation technologies that compete with the classical ‘inter-techniques’ for their influence in the reorganization and rule-based constitution of the social. New models of organization, freedom and coherence are emerging.

From Subject to User: And Back?

185

The triumphant advance of tele-technologies has long been prepared. Telescopes (Dutch telescope 1608; Lipperhey) and microscopes (Janssen 1590; Galilei 1609), Samuel F. B. Morse (first usable ‘electrical telegraph’ 1833, with J. Henry and A. Vail), telegraphy (telegraphic dispatch), telegrams, radio (nineteenth to the twentieth century), television and above all telephony prove the long technological development of tele-cybernetics, i.e. of network technologies (beginning Dec. 1969 between Stanford – UCLA: Login) or telematics (Flusser, 1989). Certainly one could still refer to the representational models for ‘remote’ state leaders, gods, or a god. For reasons of space, I will not go into this in detail here. What remains interesting is the conflict between ‘inter’ as a symbolically controlled, institutional setting of order and ‘tele’ as an economically, procedurally controlled non-institutional organizational structure. If ‘portables were the mobility icons of the late 20th century’ (Weber, 2008), digital platforms, global instant networking, device-human networks are the social icons of the early twenty-first century. Without irritation, specific network platforms are spoken of as ‘social networks’. They are tele-operational and tele-active social laboratories whose experimental status is determined on the part of the operators, not on the part of the users, – or only rarely. To speak of social networks is a poor minimum consensus when dealing with change-resistant participation offerings. If you are dealing with open systems, things look different. But even there, in open source, open culture, open knowledge networks, it is by no means easy for the category of subject. The joint, response-intensive modification of offered software that is possible there leaves open in principle how distinction becomes difference, how it is decided. And it leaves open how difference and distinction are brought together.

11

Subject, from the Distant Vicinity?

But how might a subject concept be written in online-offline structures? The first forty years, in which computer technology was positioned in social contexts via personal computing (1980), digital networks, the World Wide Web (1990) and platforms (in the 2000s) in an increasingly action-oriented way, are behind us. Looked at closely, they have not only been inserted into social contexts. They have long since formed socio-technical formations in their own right. These include terrains, national societies and their normative orders, which appear as independent social constitutions, earth-wide. M. Castells calls them “information societies.” I prefer technosocial habitats (Castells, 2001). And for these,

186

M. Faßler

A. Reckwitz’s consideration can be applied, “the sociologically common equation of ‘sociality’ with ‘intersubjectivity’” seems to him “implausible”. (Reckwitz, 2003, p. 292). The place of a sociology of the medial self and the medial subject would thus not be the collective mind, not the philosophical self-interpretation of man, but ‘social practices’: The shower, the fridge, the online newspaper, tweeting, online and offline research, etc.: ‘A practice consists of certain routinised movements and activities of the body’ (Reckwitz, p. 290). This with the postscript that it is still largely unresolved how subjectivity can be formulated situationally, structurally and socially under global communication conditions. De Kerkhove noted in grand gesture (2002), “We need a set of globally valid, immediate, enduring, cross-linguistic, and immediately usable as well as empowering transcultural and cross-locational metaphors.” (De Kerckhove, 2002, p. 87). Since then, an enormous amount has happened technologically; sociological research and theory-building are now lagging behind by a few softwaretechnological processes of implementation. Orientations about a subjectivity that could creatively ‘come to terms’ with the cybernetic and digital networked states are missing. Too often, either a typographically socialized subject of reflection or an industrial-bureaucratic subject of self-administration is defended. In contrast, it is not only partial structures of commercial, entrepreneurial areas of organization that have changed, not only industrial-bureaucratic foundations of society. In the expanding use of data-technical networks, not only social constitutions without precursors emerged. The regularities of their abstractions (digitalization, algorithmization, networking, virtualization, etc.,) appropriated, among other things, the reformulation of belonging, connection, rule behavior, subjectivity, intelligence, creativity, innovation.

12

User Subject – Ipv6

A post-fordist, data technology ecology has emerged. At its core, the Internet of Things (IoT) has been positioned, giving rise to large-scale concepts of intelligence (Levy, 1997), transport logistics, smartness and Industry 4.0. Its future, from 2020, will be Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). With it, subject and thing not only move enormously close together in terms of time, data, control and observation. Things and subjects become state variables of the data streams, they each become the ‘common second’. Contexts that were thought of institutionally, territorially,

From Subject to User: And Back?

187

linguistically, architecturally, normatively, and functioned as a ‘common third’ are taken up in a calculative context. What is meant by a calculating context is: we can speak of millions and billions of ‘users’ and ‘things’ whose data bodies are calculated in the medially composed space-times (on demand), are made sensually present, i.e. interfaceable. They disappear again, become the database of coming requests, are stored in cloud(s), become ad-hoc personalities, collected and correlated user-bodies. IT networks in this way become the common second, the closest relative (Christaller). The logic of the third (“When two argue, the third is happy [principle of winning], the third decides [principle of judging], the third reconciles [pastor, therapist, good friends,... ]”) is undermined, – and with it also the dominance of subjective models of reflection and decision-making. In these changes, a paradoxical mode of organization is emerging that seems to contradict all previous socio- and culture-genetic rules. This mode consists of • formal imperfection of the networks. Whereas theories of society, culture and action referred to forms, rules and conflicts of form, the current focus is on circuit states, immersion, correlations, ad hoc communication. They are claimed to be organization-forming without showing a social-organizational reference in the conventional understanding. This can be addressed as a self-deception of network use. • the promise of the multiplication of goals and decisions, the multiplication of options for action and rationality. But precisely this explicit and coded multiplication of goals, choices and decisions does not take place, which means that an important compensatory element, i.e. the compensation for conflicts, is omitted. What can be observed are demands for creativity and innovation, which then open up the pathways of re-entry, i.e. the re-entry of changed demands into the permanent conflict zones. • Following this, the indeterminate goals multiply, the aimless storage of data over which the cloak of correlations is thrown in order to escape causes, reasons, effects. • This is how powerful structures of undirected discrimination potentials emerge. They only gain direction when there is an interest in data. And this interest is consensus-free. Interest is set by a (market) sovereign. Traditionally, such an architecture is described as a state of exception. • To it belong currently uncountable amounts of data without purpose reference of the distinguishing features. This in no way confirms the common claim that data have lost their discriminatory quality, have none, are neutral differences. With each software a physical

188

M. Faßler

discrimination and social model is set, which leads to a kind of double life of the discrete orders. This is because the primary circuit model of the 01 data is associated in each case with specific grouping and search logics that enable the user to employ switchable relevance criteria in order to turn undirected data sets into directed information streams.

13

Brief Theoretical Aspects

With a few remarks on theoretical aspects I would like to underline the proposal to deal with practices and actors = practors. N. Luhmann called “super theories” those buildings of thought that make a “claim to universality of object coverage”. He counted his system theory among them, as well as the communication theory of J. Habermas. For N. Luhmann, the concept of system is based on the guiding difference between system and environment. He thus sets himself apart from the “primitive” (Schluchter, 2000, pp. 112–113) thought pattern of the ‘whole and its parts’. At the same time, he distances himself from the classic: ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’. Systems and subsystems (such as ‘generalized media’: Economy, Science, Art, Love, Society) are thought of as operationally closed in order to acknowledge at the same time their informational, energetic, material openness. The open environmental reference guarantees the supply of energy and information, which make a “chaotic” (Küppers, 1996) self-organisation possible again and again. Operational closedness designates the assumed ability of systems to resist chaos and de-differentiation from the environment (entropy). This is called ‘negentropy’. It makes it possible to form differentiated, specialized levels of order again and again. Giddens came a little closer to things, and thus to factual relations. Referring back to Goffman’s frame analysis, Giddens offered in “The Consequences of Modernity” (Giddens, 1991, p. 92) a theory of commitments. The, it could be said, communicative surface of trust, he linked to the following steps: Access points, faceless commitments (where abstract systems predominate), facework commitments, focused interactions. ‘The faceless commitments’ are, according to Giddens, “disembedded mechanisms interact with re-embedded contexts of action” and “similarly linked in an ambiguous way with those demanding faceworks”. This strong reference to the non-face-to-face ‘understandings’ that co-ground the subject would meanwhile need to be extended with models of choosing interaction, algorithmically generated net-tele-action, observing/monitoring interfaces and cameras.

From Subject to User: And Back?

189

In my view, a subject model grounded in immersive/virtual/interface commitments is needed. Currently, the contexts of application and use of information and computer technologies are changing the organizational code of the anthropologically modern social: The medial self, with which people accomplish ego and selfmodeling. The medial self is configured (1) as a (tele-) operative self [HCI], as a (tele-)apparative self [networking], (2) as a media-technically anonymous self [Big Data], (3) as a techno-(broad)casting self [selfies, tweets], (4) as an unstable project self [communities of projects], and (5) as a telesocial self [earth-wide habitat ties]. While industrial-bureaucratic societies were describable, among other things, through the imagination of symbolic contexts and, above all, symbolically regulated belonging (Mead), since the WWW, i.e. since 1990, a net-technological disenchantment of the socially symbolic has been taking place. Interaction in IT networks can hardly be experienced any more as confirmation of a generally valid/binding social order that takes active people (parental-authoritarian) into its symbolic tentacles. Instead of continuity-acceptance (or form-continuation), there are inconsistent but structurally similar processes that I call serial participation, serial self, and discontinuous, project-bound affirmation.

14

In Conclusion

The working question was: From subject to user and back? The answer is: No, there is no return to the subject of the written world. For 150 years it has been industrialized, for 40 years it has been digitizing itself. A transfer of the subject ideals familiar from the written world and early industrialisation is not possible. For both subject and user, self-organization is always provisional, and without a longterm goal. The observation of all this is connected with the question of whether one recognizes that the difference between social and technological constitution is becoming smaller and smaller in the present case. This would remove the competition for justification between an individual and social-systemic notion of subject or user. This then makes room for the human actor in practices, the practor.

References Bröckling, U. (2007). Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform. Suhrkamp. Castells, M. (2001). Das Informationszeitalter. Leske + Budrich.

190

M. Faßler

Crouch, C. (2015). Die bezifferte Welt. Wie die Logik der Finanzmärkte das Wissen bedroht. Suhrkamp. De Kerckhove, D. (2002). Die Architektur der Intelligenz. Wie die Vernetzung der Welt unsere Wahrnehmung verändert. Birkhäuser. Dormehl, L. (2014). The Formula. How algorithms solve all our problems . . . and create more. WH Allen. Falb, D. (2015). Kollektivitäten, Populationen und Netzwerk als Figurationen der Vielfalt. transcript. Faßler, M. (2012). Kampf der Habitate. Neuerfindung des Lebens im 21. Jahrhundert. Springer. Faßler, M. (2014). Das Soziale. Entstehung und Zukunft menschlicher Selbstorganisation. Fink. Flusser, V. (1989). Ins Universum der technischen Bilder. European Photography. Giddens, A. (1991). The consequences of modernity. Polity. Giedion, S. (1987). Die Herrschaft der Mechanisierung. Athenäum. Kaldrack, I., & Röhle, T. (2014). Teilmengen, Mengen, Teilen. Taxonomien, Ordnungen und Massen im Facebook Open Graph. In I. Baxmann (Ed.), Soziale Medien – Neue Massen (pp. 75–102). Diaphanes. Küppers, G. (1996). Chaos und Ordnung. Formen der Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft. Reclam. Levy, P. (1997). Kollektive Intelligenz. Eine Anthropologie des Cyberspace. Bollmann. Mayer-Schönberger, V., & Kenneth, C. (2013). Big Data. John Murray. Prinz, W. (2013). Selbst im Spiegel. Die soziale Konstruktion von Subjektivität. Suhrkamp. Reckwitz, A. (2003). Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 32(4), 282–301. Reckwitz, A. (2012). Die Erfindung der Kreativität. Zum Prozess gesellschaftlicher Ästhetisierung. Suhrkamp. Rheingold, H. (2003). Smart mobs. The next social revolution. Perseus. Ross, A. (2016). The Industries of the future. Simon & Schuster. Schluchter, W. (2000). Handlungs- und Strukturtheorie nach Max Weber. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 10, 125–136. Simons, S. (2014). Ornament der Masse Costumization. Zum Kollektivbewusstsein verstreuter Examinatoren. In I. Baxmann (Ed.), Soziale Medien – Neue Massen (pp. 237–260). Diaphanes. Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, creativity, and leadership. Harvard University Press. Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. Abacus. Ullrich, W. (2016). Der kreative Mensch. Streit um eine Idee. Residenz Verlag. Weber, H. (2008). Das Versprechen mobiler Freiheit. transcript. Wiedemann, C. (2016). Kritische Kollektivität im Netz. Anonymus, Facebook und die Kraft der Affizierung in der Kontrollgesellschaft. transcript.

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic Gerrit Fröhlich Abstract

In the context of this contribution, the medial constitution of self-technologies will be brought into focus. This will be done, on the one hand, in the form of a general theoretical concept and, on the other hand, along the case studies of the diary and digital self-measurement. Self-guidance, as captured by Foucault under the concept of technologies of the self, has a strong media-related component. On the one hand, it takes place through medial exchange with others, but on the other hand, it also takes place in direct engagement with media artifacts, their given technical structures, and thus their concrete material properties and affordances. Thus the diary, based on writing and narration, evokes other forms of self-exploration and thus favors other subject forms than digital selfmeasurement, in which self-thematization takes place primarily in confrontation with number and algorithm. Using these and other examples, the concept of media-based technologies of the self will be used to show how approaches from the sociology of media can be made fruitful for a sociology of the subject.

1

Introduction I am beginning an enterprise that is without precedent and that no one will imitate. I want to show my peers a man in all the truth of nature, and that man will be me. I alone. I read in my heart and know men. I am not made like one of those whom I have seen;

G. Fröhlich (✉) Soziologie, Universität Trier, Trier, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_10

191

192

G. Fröhlich

and I dare even to think that I am not formed like one of the living. If I am not better, at least I am different (Rousseau, 2012, p. 9). I got up this morning at 6:10am after going to sleep at 12.45am. I was awake once during the night. My heart rate was 61 beats per minute, my blood pressure was 127/74. I had 0 minutes of exercise yesterday, and that’s why my heart rate during exercise was not calculated. I had about 600 milligrams of caffeine, 0 of alcohol, and my score on the narcissism-personality-index, called the npi-16, is reassuring 0.31 (Wolf, 2010).1

Here are two statements by a person about himself, both formulated from the desire for sober and comprehensive self-knowledge: on the one hand Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the well-known beginning of his Confessions, on the other an initial lecture of the Quantified Self movement by Gary Wolf. In the case of the one, the self-revelation of an individual who concludes from his uniqueness to the uniqueness of his text (and vice versa), in the case of the other “self-knowledge through numbers”.2 Between the two lies not only a temporal difference of over 200 years, but above all diverse developments in the areas of media use, semantics employed, motif and mode of self-thematization – and these developments are mutually dependent. Self-thematization and, concomitantly (as will become clear in the further course), self-knowledge and self-transformation are tied to the media used: “There is only ever that of people which media can store and pass on.” (Kittler, 1986, p. 5). Identity and subjectivity are closely tied to the respective technical and medial opportunity structures in which one’s own self and one’s own behaviour can be thematised. Communication provides “on the one hand the occasion and on the other hand the semantics for self-reference” (Reinhardt, 2006, p. 36): By perceiving the possibility of self-reference, by adopting a distanced position to oneself and thus making oneself the object of one’s own cognition, the individual first constitutes him/herself as a subject. The subject “speaks itself, but thereby only becomes what it is”, as Judith Butler (Butler, 2007, p. 118) has put it – or rather: It writes itself (Rousseau) or calculates itself (Wolf). Insofar as self-thematization for the purpose of self-knowledge or selftransformation takes place in engagement with media artifacts, one can speak of media-based technologies of the self. Media increase the likelihood of the

1

https://www.ted.com/talks/gary_wolf_the_quantified_self [Last accessed Jan. 17, 2018]. This is the motto of the professionalized self-surveyors, see for example http://quantifiedself. com/ [Last accessed on Jan. 17, 2018]. 2

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

193

occurrence of communications about the self as well as the emphasis on certain facets of that self while underexposing others. Which aspects of life thus come into the focus of self-direction, in which way and with which effects, thus also becomes a question of the media involved in the process, the media artefacts as well as their concrete material nature. The ‘order’ of one’s own life is determined by media orders, which is why the focus will be placed on the shaping of self-direction by the respective media formats. In a first part, Michel Foucault’s concept of the technologies of the self will be introduced and the extent to which the thematization of the self plays a central role will be clarified. In addition, the influence of the media on the structuring of this self-thematization will be shown. In the second part of the paper, this will be demonstrated by means of two popular media practices: Diary-keeping around 1800 and contemporary digital self-measurement.

2

Media-Based Self-Technologies There are moments of interim balance all the time: bathroom mirror, lint filter, job interview, flirtation, tax return; at the therapist’s, a look at the passport, an itemised telephone bill, discovering cinema tickets or small sugar sachets from last year in the inside pocket of the winter coat, when everything was still a little different (. . .). All opportunities for a brief pause, sometimes sentimental, sometimes shocked, rarely satisfied: Aha, THAT [sic] is my life then (Stuckrad-Barre, 2016).

Forming oneself as a subject is the result of a shared social experience within a certain social as well as – as will be made clear in the course of the paper – (media) technical framework. To ask about the subject requires the analysis of the underlying order in which the members of a group constitute and recognize themselves as subjects of what they “do, think and say [. . .]” (Foucault, 1990, p. 49). The practices and procedures of self-knowledge and self-experimentation, self-control and selfinfluence that largely determine the process of subjectification can be summarized under the term technologies of the self.3 These are considered key to Foucault’s late phase (Gehring, 2014, p. 102), in the course of which he surprised us with a “serene

3 See, for example, the prominent examples in volumes 2 and 3 of the trilogy on sexuality and truth (Foucault, 1989, 1995). In addition, reflections on the technologies of the self can be found scattered in various interviews and contributions (Foucault, 1987, Foucault, 1993a, b, Foucault, 2005a, b).

194

G. Fröhlich

turn towards the individual, the distinctive forms of his conduct of life and possibilities of his shaping of himself” (Hesse, 2003, p. 300). A relevant definition can be found in the second volume of Foucault’s Sexuality and Truth: here, the technologies of the self are to be understood as “deliberate and intentional practices by which people not only establish the rules of their behavior, but also seek to transform themselves, to modify themselves in their particular being, and to make of their lives a work that bears certain aesthetic values and conforms to certain stylistic criteria” (Foucault, 1989, p. 18). Classical technologies of the self include various forms of asceticism or exercise; they also include diets, meditation practices, as well as dream interpretation (Foucault, 1989, p. 98 f.). This extends to contemporary examples of body manipulation – for example, sports, cosmetics or cosmetic surgery (Villa, 2008). Beyond this, however, self-leadership is largely based on the thematisation of one’s own behaviour, thoughts, opinions, feelings and sensations. Accordingly, the focus of this article is not primarily on dieting, asceticism or meditation, nor on beauty practices such as bodybuilding, but rather on those variants that are explicitly based on communication, or more precisely: on the communicative externalization and mediation of one’s own thoughts, actions, (body) characteristics and behaviors. Self-thematization, in its various variations, has become an integral part of the everyday life of contemporary individuals (Schroer, 2006, p. 57), which can be understood not least as an effect of industrialization. Only the freedom from traditional dependencies provides opportunity and motivation for the formation of an intensified self-relationship, as individuals now have to “produce, stage, cobble together (. . .) their biography themselves” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1993, p. 179). What constitutes the person and by what he or she is defined must increasingly be distilled from a principally infinite abundance of potential appearances, sensations and actions. Against this background, identity is attributed, produced, established and stabilised within the framework of communicative acts. However, individuals do not necessarily feel the need to bear witness to themselves, at least not in a quality and quantity that society could rely on (Bublitz, 2010, p. 57). This is why, for example, institutionalized procedures for self-confession have emerged in confession or psychoanalysis, which Alois Hahn subsumes under the concept of biographical generators: “Which of my acts I do not forget, which are not forgotten to me, which acts and experiences thus belong to me, also results (. . .) from the opportunities for representation that the group keeps available, in which an individual ‘expresses’ himself in a socially accountable form.” (Hahn, 1987, p. 11). It is precisely this thematization of the self that can only be grasped at its core when it is analyzed from the point of view of technologies of the self, that is, as a specific way of arriving at a knowledge of oneself and, on the basis of that knowledge,

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

195

guiding and tracking one’s own self-transformation. If, as Butler writes, the subject can be understood as the individual’s linguistic opportunity “to gain and reproduce intelligibility, that is, the linguistic condition of his existence and capacity for action” (Butler, 2001, p. 15), then biography generators are thus institutionalized driving forces of subjectivation designed for the long term. The question of how self-thematization impacts back on the self concerns not only the what of thematization, but also the how – and this how must always be understood medially as well. Interim moments’ take place not only within an institutionalized framework, but also – in the form of the media structures used in each case – in a materialized one. Media are relevant here not only because they mediate social interactions in which the Meadian adoption of an external perspective is accomplished, but this shift in perspective already takes place in the engagement with the media artifacts themselves. Analogous to the function of mass media in enabling society to observe itself (Luhmann, 1996), media artefacts thus enable subjective self-observation. We are thus dealing with media-based technologies of the self when subjects recognize and guide themselves through self-thematization in confrontation with media artifacts: From unmediated conversation to pen and paper, film camera and camera, telephone and television camera, to smartphone, keyboard and motion sensor. Media evoke self-thematization; their presence makes individuals speak, write, photograph, and thus, in Foucault’s sense, provides a material incentive for self-revelation. Although they do not determine the communication process, they do structure it. Which aspects of life come into the focus of self-direction in which way thus also becomes a question of the media involved. From this perspective, selfdirection through self-thematization should be understood less as the sum of its contents (Berghaus, 1999, p. 181) than as an effect of the offering character of the media used. Christina Schachtner sums up this research programme at the interface between media materiality and subjectification as follows: Subjectivity-oriented technology research has basic theoretical and evaluative tasks. On the one hand, it develops fundamental insights into the patterns of interaction that arise between subjects and technical artefacts. On the other hand, it seeks to evaluate them. It examines the extent to which the production and use of technical processes and apparatuses opens up spaces that allow subjectivity to be lived and developed in a variety of ways (Schachtner, 1997, p. 21).

In this way, the history of self-technologies can also be told as a history of media technologies. It is true, of course, that the path from media-technological to social processes of change is not a one-way street, but that these processes are intertwined in many ways: Media not only influence individuals and institutions, but are of

196

G. Fröhlich

course in turn shaped by individuals and institutions. Nevertheless, this paper will emphasize the first aspect without denying the second. The focus, then, is not on why media artifacts have become the way they are, but on what they do once they exist and are used. In order to understand what has happened in this respect between diary and self-measurement, Friedrich Kittler will be consulted: Drawing on his concept of systems of writing down (Kittler, 2003, p. 501), it can be argued that in the respective media-historical epochs not only was one medium more dominant than others, but that this medium rather occupied a unique epistemic status that it could not yet have in earlier epochs and lost again in later epochs. A system of record is about networks “of techniques and institutions that allow a given culture to address, store, and process relevant data” (Kittler, 2003, p. 501). These networks and the cultures based on them are summarized by Kittler in terms of two historical caesuras: The media upheavals around 1800 and around 1900. A write-up system 2000 was never made explicit by Kittler himself, but there are sporadic hints in later texts and interviews that will be taken up and developed later in this paper, so that a third major caesura can be identified. Each of these upheavals corresponds with its own forms of self-direction through media artifacts, as will be shown in the following.

3

Writing and Narration in the Writing System 1800 I want all the world to read my heart (Rousseau, quoted in Schneider, 1986, p. 11).

The diary is considered one of the central “media of self-exploration in modernity” (Schroer, 2006, p. 51 f.). Although writing has occupied a special place in the context of technologies of the self since antiquity, for example in the form of dream diaries, accounts of deeds and chronicles (Gruber, 2008, p. 16), it is only in the writing system of 1800 that the tradition of self-direction in the engagement with writing coincides with its revaluation. The frequently expressed assumption “that subjectivity is configured through technologies of writing and reading” (Allard, 2014, p. 79) can be related to a comprehensive program of connecting writing and (inner) nature through the example of diary-keeping around 1800. Through the spread of writing as part of successful literacy efforts, language became a “general, purified, and homogeneous medium” (Kittler, 2003, p. 47). That is, it became: (1) disseminated through literacy and the establishment of an educational system, (2) purified of dialect, and (3) part of a continuous cycle of speaking, writing, and reading. Against this background, not only the sharp rise in diary literature (Wolf,

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

197

2002, p. 1) becomes understandable, but equally how the text could appear as a mirror of the subject, so that the chronistic tone was replaced by a more subjective one (Gruber, 2008, p. 22). In the period around 1800, various institutions, educational worldviews, and newly emerging bourgeois family structures were involved in installing reading and writing as a kind of quasi-natural view of the world and the self. In addition to new language acquisition techniques such as the phonetic method and concentrated learning to read in the bourgeois nuclear family, silent reading with the inner voice should be mentioned here, which contributed in a special way to the naturalization of writing. While it had previously been customary to “read aloud and in a circle of listeners” (Sarasin, 2001, p. 167), silent reading was accompanied by an individualization of the readers, who could and should engage with textual products in a concentrated and withdrawn manner. This style of reception manifested itself concretely in the dissemination of instructions for proper reading, such as those published by Johann Adam Bergk in 1799 (Bergk, 1799). Since the actual sensory impressions could not be stored and disseminated objectified in auditory and visual media – at least not until the writing down system of 1900 – this function was inevitably fulfilled by handwriting and reading, which in the course of this appeared as natural vehicles for the ‘real’ as the photograph, film and gramophone later did. “Writing had been made effortless and reading soundless in order to confuse writing with nature. To letters, over which they could read as literate readers, people had faces and sounds” (Kittler, 1986, p. 18). Pen and paper emerged as a reliable medium of soul and inner nature. The subjective inner world, charged with meaning, was not alone externalized in the gesture of writing, but in large part brought forth in the first place. The diary as an artifact thus became both an instrument and evidence of the formation of subjectivity. At the same time, the fact that subjective feelings were now increasingly available in the form of this ‘purified’ written version led to an understanding of a subject who was characterized by continuity, who appeared as the conscious director and author of his life story. The diary was also distinguished by its ability to structure events in narrative form: Through the linearity of written expression brought to the subject by the medium, a structuring of one’s motives and decisions took place within the narrated life story. The biography was presented in the form of a (seemingly) consistent story, which made it possible to discover patterns in which, despite all differences, a uniformity of identity emerged. It was not possible to write unconsciously, and those who attempted to get to the bottom of their souls in the textual mirror could not write without reflecting. Narrative self-thematization thus generated the concept of authorship and with it a sense of one’s own identity and subjective influence on one’s life.

198

G. Fröhlich

Diarists were thus stylized as authors of their own lives, analogous to the ‘invention’ of authorship. In the course of the practice of silent reading and rereading of canonical works, the rereading of one’s own self-testimonies, i.e. the constant, silent, reflected rereading of what had been written down, also gained in importance. From the perspective of the time, rereading served the purpose of constantly improving one’s own work and conforming to the ideal of self-inspiration and self-correction (Zanetti, 2008, p. 98). One thus has time to consider, since the text does not disappear like the spoken word. Since texts can be read multiple times, communicative interaction with texts establishes a check for internal coherence; closer scrutiny mobilizes counterarguments and allows for second-order observations that expose, interrogate, criticize, or accept the distinctions underlying the text (Bohn, 1999, p. 215).

If one transfers this approach to writing to text-based self-thematization in diaries, the following observation by Butler becomes almost literal: “I cannot explain exactly why I have just become this way, and my efforts at narrative reconstruction are subject to constant revision.” (Butler, 2007, p. 57). In diaries and autobiographies as writing-based biographical generators for the self-referential sharpening of one’s own identity, one’s inner life could now be stored and reflected upon, and readers encountered this self-written subjectivity in the re-reading of their own records like a mirror image that was distinguished by identity and individuality, that appeared identical and coherent with itself to the same degree as it also differed from other persons (and their texts). The new techniques of writing and reading encouraged an apparent equation of writing and inner nature, so that the text could rise to mirror inner truth and self-direction now became a matter of organizing feeling, morality, and religiosity. Diary-keeping as a media-based technology of the self was based on the text as a mirror of introspection and self-direction based on inwardness, individuality and identity, based on ‘feeling and behaviour’ (Boswell, 1996, p. 49). ‘Transparency of heart’ became ‘moral imperative’ (Han, 2012, p. 73). The result was a discourse production system within the monopoly of writing, based on endless repetition of (re)-reading what was written and perpetuating what was read. Subjectivity became “an effect of this reading writing and writing reading” (Volkening, 2008, p. 24). At the same time, the linearity of the writing medium as well as the imperative to reread ensured the fulfillment of consistency requirements in the struggle with one’s own identity. Distinctive handwriting and inner introspection, combined with a medium that allowed experimentation with originality and uniqueness, were intended to clarify

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

199

difference from others and contributed to the fact that since then “by ‘individual’ is no longer to be understood an indivisibly small single thing, but a single subject” (Frank, 1988, p. 7). Discourse production around 1800 functioned as a “machine that produced confessions, confessions, and thus that individuality that Romanticism called productive” (Kittler, 2013, p. 21). In this way, the ‘I’, one’s own distinctive identity, became a guiding concept to be traced in the diary, quill in hand (Breithaupt, 2014, p. 27). In writing as well as in reading the diaries, it was demonstrated in the linear medium of writing as well as in the tangible object of the book that an individual truth belonged to an individual character, and that with the writing down of this truth and from the creation of a unique text, the individual could draw his or her boundaries vis-à-vis others. Thus, the discovery of the self in the mirror of the text “initiated a turn to one’s own person” (Abraham, 2002, p. 140) The imperative to discover the particular within one’s own life in the examination of one’s own handwritten self-testimonies can be understood, at least in part, as a result of media pedagogical influences around literacy and handwriting. Whoever wrote now wrote as a human being, as an individual and as a citizen – not better or worse than others, but at least: differently. The transformations that led to the cooling of written language in the transmission and constitution of inwardness (Schneider, 1986) and that thus accompanied the path from the inward orientation of the bourgeois subject to the outward orientation of white-collar culture were initiated with the writing system in 1900.

4

Recording and Playback in the Recording System 1900 The electric writing of thoughts, the electrenkephalogram, has just been reborn. (. . .) Today the brain still writes to us in secret signs, tomorrow we will perhaps be able to read mental and brain diseases from it, and the day after tomorrow we will write the first sincere letters to each other in brainwriting (Finkler, quoted in Borck, 2008, p. 413).

Whereas storage, transformation and transmission of self-thematization in the recording system of 1800 – in the truest sense of the word – took place only manually, in the recording system of 1900 storage was first automated. In the decades before the turn of the century, physiologists and physicians, such as Angelo Mosso, conducted experiments with apparatuses (Felsch, 2007), through which various bodily functions such as brain activity and pulse could be visualized in their temporal course in the form of the curve, and which in this way were supposed to make formerly subjective, inner experience such as stress objectively ‘readable’.

200

G. Fröhlich

Transparency of the heart’ could no longer be understood only in the sense of Rousseau, but was now literally writing in the form of pulse curves, which could be recorded by the heart without the detour via consciousness and self-reflection. The epoch around 1900 with its pulse meters and scales was thus, in other words, the time of “registration apparatuses and registration methods,” as Ernst Mach (2002, p. 21) described it. Media prevailed whose new quality was that the connection between signifier and signified was one of physical production – in addition to the apparatuses just described, these were above all film, photography and the phonograph. The phonograph, for example, was able to store “what laryngeal heads eject in sound before any order of signs and all word meanings” (Kittler, 1986, p. 29). Literature was joined by media artefacts that could accurately store shape, movement, voice – previously part of the imaginary world of silent readers. Against this new background, writing was “no longer a natural extension of the human being, who would give birth to his voice, soul, individuality through handwriting” (Kittler, 1986, p. 305). What man reproduces in conversation and soliloquy is – as the new storage technology now painfully brought to light – by no means always thought through and reflected. Whereas in 1800 the inarticulate was still excluded from storage, since nothing could be written down that had not been consciously formulated beforehand, around 1900 the media dispassionately recorded everything that could be seen or heard without regard to its meaning. No consciousness was any longer necessary in order to be able to record or reproduce something – and what was stored in this new way revealed precisely for this reason that language and thought apparently never belonged together as necessarily as was still assumed a hundred years earlier. In psychoanalysis, self-direction through self-thematization accordingly meant directing one’s self-direction toward those deficiencies that consciousness could not possibly track down itself – quite the opposite of diary-keeping. In short: the pencil was taken from the diarists and – apparently – put into the hands of nature. “In analogue media (. . .), as the inventor of the photocopying process called it, nature itself takes up the pencil.” (Kittler, 2002, p. 60) The self no longer wrote itself in the writing down system in 1900, but was written by all kinds of (media) recording apparatuses. No subject was needed through which events would have to pass in order to be archived, no narration and no list to bring order to things. The subject no longer appeared only in the word, but in the sound of his voice, in his movements, his gestures, his motor activity, his breathing, his pulse – in short, as the result of all kinds of mechanics that recorded physical effects in which subjects could then find themselves, and which thus fundamentally changed what subjects are, how self-direction can take place, and what goals and motives play a role in it. With the establishment of mechanical writing systems, the notion

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

201

that man (exclusively) found his soul in handwriting and rereading also became obsolete: self-knowledge here meant the experience of an autarkic body that incessantly sent signals, could not not communicate, and in which an ego was materialized that did not steer itself, but remained a passenger, and which one did not discover through a – now disenchanted – rereading of oneself, but by focusing on physical processes and unwanted expressions. How these mechanical writing systems evolved into digital self-reading in the course of the twentieth century is the content of the following chapter.

5

Number and Algorithm in the Recording System 2000 Some guy walks in late. We’re having beverages, about to introduce ourselves, and Kevin said: Okay, you came in late, you go first. So instead of giving a little discourse, the guy just opened his computer and showed us the most amazing visualization of every minute of his time over the past year. And he said: Okay, well, so this is who I am. You know, I’m gonna show you something about myself rather than tell you something about myself.4

Digital self-measurement is to be understood as a bundle of media formats with a focus on technical artefacts for the – largely independent – knowing collection, storage, processing and dissemination of data relating to one’s own body, behaviour and personal environment. One of the essential core aspects of self-measurement is the transformation of various aspects of life into numbers with the aim of selfknowledge as well as working on oneself. So now again: “loud things that must be ‘measured’” (Foucault, 1989, p. 131), and this in engagement with technical media that can store, digitally process and transmit information in quantified form. From the perspective of this contribution, these are also permanent incentives for selfthematization in the confrontation with media artifacts. These separate the relevant from the irrelevant, so that from the perspective of an analysis of media-based selftechnology they can be understood as the ideal case of a biography generator that is less institutionalized than materialized. At the same time, the artifacts of digital selfmeasurement thus represent a current example of the technologies of the self, in which writing about oneself (Foucault, 2012) has been replaced by the digital collection, processing, and transmission of data about oneself. These media interactions are in turn framed by institutional conditions on the one hand, and 4

Gary Wolf on the beginnings of Quantified Self Meetups (https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=moEXxSdKqpc, last accessed Jan. 17, 2018).

202

G. Fröhlich

technical ones on the other. Therefore, digital self-measurement will be described here as the media-based self-technology of the writing-down system 2000, which generates biographies on the basis of numbers and algorithms by means of automated storage, transformation and transmission of self-thematization. After the storage of media had already been automated around 1900, both the storage, transmission and processing of data about the self are now automated in the Recording System 2000. The permanent and seamless recording of everyday life in numerical form takes place without too much attention having to be paid to this process. Hidden in this imperative to count not only sporadically, but as comprehensively as possible, is the notion that self-knowledge derived from numbers would be all the more reliable the more consistently and seamlessly they were collected. This was made possible by the predominant position of number in the 2000 system of recording, both on the technical backstage in the form of processors, programs, and algorithms, and by the institutionalization of number as a medium of communication (Mau, 2017). Statements communicated in the form of numbers experience a higher acceptance, so that on the one hand they are assumed to have a higher truth content compared to linguistic statements, but on the other hand they also make connection communications more likely. Numbers have begun to free themselves from letters in the 2000 system of writing down (Flusser, 2002, p. 29), but they are “not timeless ideas, but historical aprioris that are produced operatively and medially” (Kittler, 1992). Therefore, the use of numbers is accompanied by a particular idiosyncratic logic that is transferred to the mode of self-direction and thus structures the users’ self-relations. These idiosyncrasies give rise to the conspicuous focus of digital self-measurement on physical and physiological characteristics: Since only that which can be easily quantified can be stored at all in automated form, self-thematization and thus self-direction in the context of digital self-measurement are primarily directed at the individual body, its weight, shape, or performance. In this way, physiological characteristics become the central content of self-thematization, while someone who wants to record happiness or satisfaction, for example, quickly finds themselves confronted with the limits of quantifiability (Kappler & Vormbusch, 2014). Writing and mechanization are now replaced by a computational calculus that places transformation between recording and representation. Technologies of digital self-measurement not only register, they transform and order. Quantitative statements are transformable independently of content and meaning according to mathematical and calculative rules, which can increasingly be implemented in the form of algorithms in the recording system 2000 on the technical side. “Although the production of figures (statistics, balance sheets, etc.) requires a multitude of decisions, they are usually taken for the thing itself (. . .). Statistics pretend to show a

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

203

reality that lies outside of them and is made visible by them” (Heintz, 2010, p. 170). In the case of digital self-measurement, this reign of the rule (Heintz, 1993) on the media-technical backstage goes from the simple request of activity trackers to walk a certain number of steps per day, to recommendations of diet trackers like myfitnesspal, which point out too high or too low calorie intake, to complex pattern recognition by services such as tictrac, which are supposed to point out correlations between different data – for example, comparing the frequency of migraine attacks with the number of appointments in the Google calendar in order to make the user aware of the connection between stress and health. Even more subtle forms of data processing such as visualization represent the result of an automated number-based transformation process, which can no longer be seen in the graphic itself: “Between the measured object and its pictorial representation lies a multitude of recordings and processing steps, which in principle can branch out in different directions at any point.” (Heintz, 2007, p. 78). This aspect of data visualization, which is dominant in digital self-measurement, is to the same extent as the quantification hidden in it an expression of the idea that truthful self-knowledge is only possible via the detour of mathematical abstraction, but less so by means of photographs or even the simple observation of the present bodies themselves (and certainly not in unreliable written records). The quantification that takes place on a technical level makes it possible to outsource the recognition of patterns in everyday life to technology, which entails a shift in the instance of interpretation. The transformation of indeterminate characteristics into numbers, just like the transformation of life course into biography, requires work that in the case of digital self-measurement, however, is not performed and controlled by the user himself or herself, but is handed over to technological processes and thus ultimately to programming power. The transformation of the data entered into time histories takes place automatically, graphics are created without the user’s intervention, and patterns are subjected to analyses that often end with an imperative for action or at least an evaluation in the form of green or red signal colors. In the case of digital self-measurement, moreover, different individuals, but also different stages of the same individual, become ‘commensurable’, that is, comparable in at least one respect, while maintaining the possibility of differing in terms of concrete value. Here we find a functional equivalence to diary-keeping around 1800 in the Aufschreibesystem 2000, through which above all identity and individuality were worked out: Numerical comparison also allows us to establish identity on the one hand, and difference on the other. Steps are taken by almost all persons, but the number of steps can differ. Especially in the case of intrapersonal comparison, biographical coherence can be combined with an emphasis on individuality in

204

G. Fröhlich

this way: “The digital data may be different for each individual, but as digital values they are all the same and comparable.” (Belliger & Krieger, 2014). In short: in the course of a technically conditioned and institutionally supported reduction of all messages to the format of the number, not only the transmission and storage, but also, by means of mathematical algorithms, the processing of information is taken out of the hands of the users in the System of Record 2000. This threefold automation of self-thematization is not without consequences: Various aspects of the self can be automatically stored, processed, and transmitted through transformation into numbers, always provided that they can be expressed in quantified form at all, which is why, in the transformation of life course into biography, only what can become number is relevant. As a result, physiological aspects are upgraded and inwardness devalued. Quantities are, with Luhmann, not as innocent as they might seem (Luhmann, 1996, p. 60). Numbers and the visualizations based on them refer to a supposedly objectively existing reality and appear as a blind spot of self-representation, but precisely because of this they bracket out the norms of measurement, transformation and communication of numbers. Thus, on the one hand, certain tendencies in society as a whole towards the use of numbers are inscribed in the applications surrounding digital self-measurement; on the other hand, they structure the actions of users and suggest to them, too, that they express themselves in the form of quantified data in order to track down true, ‘authentic’ knowledge about themselves there.

6

Conclusion Each of these kinds of signs [letters, numerals, grammatical signs] asks the writer to think according to the ways of thinking that correspond to them: one has to think differently when writing equations than when writing symbols for rules or words of a language (Flusser, 2002, p. 26).

The path from self-narration to self-narration is an expression of a profound change in media technology and institutions that has taken place primarily over the course of the last two hundred years and can be divided along the major caesurae 1800, 1900 and 2000. In this sense, numerous developments have taken place between Rousseau, who writes himself and thus stands at the beginning of modern self-thematization, to the self-measurers who (let) count with themselves: From handwriting to body traces to statistical curves, from interiority to body-relatedness, from causality to correlation, from identity with oneself to comparison with the

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

205

other. In media-based technologies of the self (that is, self-direction through selfthematization in engagement with media artifacts), social demands for selffashioning intersect with the effects of media properties. The material dimension of the media involved in the context of media-based self-technologies is to be understood as a constitutive element of biography generators, so that cultures of self-direction can be distinguished along the structures of enabling and constraining self-knowledge provided by storage, transformation and transmission media. All media-based technologies of the self in the sense discussed here are based on the conviction that self-knowledge is possible and necessary through the respective media, and that the respective dominant media, used in the right way, would allow an almost natural access to the objectified self. Be it in writing around 1800, in the curves around 1900, or in the figures around 2000: the central idea in each case was that ‘nature’ itself – the inner, psychological, as well as the outer, physical – could be handed the pen, so that by means of an apparent naturalness of media-supported self-recognition, one could come to authentic self-thematization, objective selfknowledge, and thus to successful work on oneself. To ‘put one’s life in order’ therefore means not least to fit it into media orders and to structure it along their technical standards. Through the storage, processing and transmission of those qualities that can be ‘attributed’ to the subject, self-thematization for self-direction is made possible, produced, structured and limited by media artifacts. By means of their storage function, they enable the objectification of the self; in their processing function, they determine the ways in which the subject can arrive at knowledge about himself; and in their transmission function, they involve or exclude others. In this way, media intervene in the production of the self-relationship and thus in the process of subjectivation, evoking identity, individuality, moral and religious selfreflection, but also the focus on physicality and the physically measurable, on rankings and comparisons. Thus, the extent to which the “modes of saying and writing” (Hahn, 1987, p. 16) are (media)technically structured becomes apparent. The question posed by Foucault of how members of a group constitute and recognize themselves as subjects of what they “do, think, and say [. . .]” (Foucault, 1990, p. 49) hinges in large part on the possibilities and limitations of whether and how it can be said, written, recorded, or calculated. To be sure, media-focused analysis of such a complex process can only ever be one piece of the puzzle alongside others. What is available, however, with the concept of media-based technologies of the self is a figure of thought that brings various sub-disciplines of sociology and media and communication studies into dialogue with each other, simultaneously focusing on the underestimated artifacts and media technologies and showing how discourse analysis can slide from the content of the archives to the form of the archives.

206

G. Fröhlich

References Abraham, A. (2002). Der Körper im biographischen Kontext. Ein wissenssoziologischer Beitrag. Westdeutscher Verlag. Allard, L. (2014). Express Yourself 3.0! Über die Auswirkungen des transmedialen Digitalen und der Vernetzung auf die gegenwärtige Subjektivität. In V. Kaufmann, U. Schmidt, & D. Thomä (Eds.), Das öffentliche Ich (pp. 179–202). transcript. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1993). Nicht Autonomie, sondern Bastelbiographie. Anmerkungen zur Individualisierungsdiskussion am Beispiel des Aufsatzes von Günter Burkart. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22(3), 178–187. Belliger, A., & und Krieger, D.J. (2014). Die Selbstquantifizierung als Ritual virtualisierter Körperlichkeit. Oder: Selbstquantifizierung als Ritual des vernetzten Selbst. In R. Gugutzer & M. Staack (Hrsg.), Körper und Ritual. Sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Zugänge und Analysen (S. 389–404). Springer VS. Berghaus, M. (1999). Wie Massenmedien wirken. Ein Modell zur Systematisierung. Rundfunk und Fernsehen, 47(2), 181–199. Bergk, J. A. (1799). Die Kunst, Bücher zu lesen. Nebst Bemerkungen über Schriften und Schriftsteller. Hempel. Bohn, C. (1999). Schriftlichkeit und Gesellschaft. Kommunikation und Sozialität der Neuzeit. Westdeutscher Verlag. Borck, C. (2008). Hirnstromfantasien. Explorationen zwischen Gehirn, Ich und Apparat. In J. Dünne & C. Moser (Eds.), Automedialität. Subjektkonstitution in Schrift, Bild und neuen Medien (pp. 411–427). Fink. Boswell, J. (1996). Journal. Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag (Erstveröffentlichung 1762/1763). Breithaupt, F. (2014). Vom Ich-Zwang zum Ausreden-Ich. In V. Kaufmann, U. Schmidt, & D. Thomä (Eds.), Das öffentliche Ich (pp. 25–38). transcript. Bublitz, H. (2010). Im Beichtstuhl der Medien. Die Produktion des Selbst im öffentlichen Bekenntnis. transcript. Butler, J. (2001). Psyche der Macht. Das Subjekt der Unterwerfung. . Butler, J. (2007). Kritik der ethischen Gewalt. In Adorno-Vorlesungen 2002. Suhrkamp. Felsch, P. (2007). Laborlandschaften. Physiologische Alpenreisen im 19. Jahrhundert. Wallstein. Flusser, V. (2002). Die Schrift. Hat Schreiben Zukunft? (5. durchgesehene Aufl.). Göttingen: European Photography. Foucault, M. (1987). Zur Genealogie der Ethik. Ein Überblick über laufende Arbeiten. In H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.), Michel Foucault. Jenseits von Strukturalismus und Hermeneutik (pp. 265–292). Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (1989). Der Gebrauch der Lüste. In Sexualität und Wahrheit 2. Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (1990). Was ist Aufklärung? In E. Erdmann (Ed.), Ethos der Moderne. Foucaults Kritik der Aufklärung (pp. 35–53). Campus. Foucault, M. (1993a). About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self. Political Theory, 21(2), 198–227. Foucault, M. (1993b). Technologien des Selbst. In L. H. Martin (Hrsg.), Technologien des Selbst (S. 24–62). Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (1995). Die Sorge um sich. In Sexualität und Wahrheit 3. Suhrkamp.

The History of Media-Based Technologies of the Self from Rousseau to Runtastic

207

Foucault, M. (2005a). Die Ethik der Sorge um sich als Praktik der Freiheit. In Analytik der Macht (pp. 274–300). Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (2005b). Subjekt und Macht. In M. Foucault (Hrsg.), Schriften in vier Bänden. Dits et Ecrits. Band IV (S. 269–294). Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (2012). Über sich selbst schreiben. In S. Zanetti (Ed.), Schreiben als Kulturtechnik. Grundlagentexte (pp. 49–66). Suhrkamp. Frank, M. (1988). Subjekt, Person, Individuum. In M. Frank, G. Raulet, & W. van Reijen (Hrsg.), Die Frage nach dem Subjekt (S. 7–28). Suhrkamp. Gehring, P. (2014). Der Gebrauch der Lüste/Die Sorge um sich. Sexualität und Wahrheit 2/3. In C. Kammler, R. Parr, & U. J. Schneider (Eds.), Foucault-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung (pp. 93–102). J. B. Metzler. Gruber, S. (2008). Das Tagebuch. Ein Medium der Selbstreflexion. Hans Joachim Lenz Stiftung. Hahn, A. (1987). Identität und Selbstthematisierung. In A. Hahn & V. Kapp (Eds.), Selbstthematisierung und Selbstzeugnis. Bekenntnis und Geständnis (pp. 9–24). Suhrkamp. Han, B.-C. (2012). Transparenzgesellschaft. Matthes & Seitz. Heintz, B. (1993). Die Herrschaft der Regel. Zur Grundlagengeschichte des Computers. Campus. Heintz, B. (2007). Zahlen, Wissen, Objektivität. Wissenschaftssoziologische Perspektiven. In A. Mennicken & H. Vollmer (Eds.), Zahlenwerk. Kalkulation, Organisation und Gesellschaft (pp. 65–85). VS Verlag. Heintz, B. (2010). Numerische Differenz. Überlegungen zu einer Soziologie des (quantitativen) Vergleichs. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 38(3), 162–181. Hesse, H. (2003). Ästhetik der Existenz. Foucaults Entdeckung des ethischen Selbstverhältnisses. In A. Honneth & M. Saar (Eds.), Michel Foucault – Zwischenbilanz einer Rezeption (pp. 300–308). Suhrkamp. Kappler, K., & Vormbusch, U. (2014). Froh zu sein bedarf es wenig. . .? Quantifizierung und der Wert des Glücks. Sozialwissenschaften und Berufspraxis, 37(2), 267–281. Kittler, F. (1986). Grammophon, Film, Typewriter. Brinkmann und Bose. Kittler, F. (1992). Wenn die Freiheit existiert, dann soll sie doch ausbrechen. www.rudolfmaresch.de/interview/19.pdf. Accessed Jan 17 2018. Kittler, F. (2002). Memories are made of you. In F. Kittler (Ed.), Short cuts (pp. 41–67). Zweitausendeins. Kittler, F. (2003). Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900 (Vierte, vollständig überarbeitete Neuauflage). Fink. Kittler, F. (2013). Der Dichter, die Mutter, das Kind. Zur romantischen Erfindung der Sexualität. In F. Kittler (Ed.), Die Wahrheit der technischen Welt. Essays zur Genealogie der Gegenwart (pp. 9–25). Suhrkamp. Luhmann, N. (1996). Die Realität der Massenmedien (2. erweiterte Aufl.). Westdeutscher Verlag. Mach, E. (2002). Bemerkungen über wissenschaftliche Anwendungen der Photographie. In A. Kümmel & P. Löffler (Eds.), Medientheorie 1888–1933. Texte und Kommentare (S. 21–28). Suhrkamp (Erstveröffentlichung 1888). Mau, S. (2017). Das metrische Wir. Über die Quantifizierung des Sozialen. Suhrkamp. Reinhardt, J. D. (2006). Identität, Kommunikation und Massenmedien. Ergon.

208

G. Fröhlich

Rousseau, J.-J. (2012). Die Bekenntnisse [Zuerst 1782/89]. dtv. Sarasin, P. (2001). Reizbare Maschinen. Eine Geschichte des Körpers 1765–1914. Suhrkamp. Schachtner, C. (1997). Die Technik und das Soziale. Begründung einer subjektivitätsorientierten Technikforschung. In Dies. (Ed.), Technik und Subjektivität. Das Wechselverhältnis zwischen Mensch und Computer aus interdisziplinärer Sicht (pp. 7–25). Suhrkamp. Schneider, M. (1986). Die erkaltete Herzensschrift. Der autobiographische Text im 20. Jahrhundert. Hanser. Schroer, M. (2006). Selbstthematisierung. Von der (Er-)Findung des Selbst und der Suche nach Aufmerksamkeit. In G. Burkart & M. Heidel (Eds.), Die Ausweitung der Bekenntniskultur – neue Formen der Selbstthematisierung? (pp. 41–72). VS Verlag. Stuckrad-Barre, B. (2016). Panikherz (eBook). Kiepenheuer & Witsch. Villa, P. (2008). Schön normal. Manipulationen am Körper als Technologien des Selbst. transcript. Volkening, H. (2008). Szenen des Ghostwriting. In D. Giuriato, M. Stingelin, & S. Zanetti (Hrsg.), “Schreiben heisst: sich selber lesen”. Schreibszenen als Selbstlektüren (S. 21–37). : Fink. Wolf, A. (2002). Diaristen im Internet. Vom schriftlichen Umgang mit Teilöffentlichkeiten. kommunikation@gesellschaft, 3, 1–18. Wolf, G. (02. Mai 2010). The Data-Driven Life. The New York Times, MM38. Zanetti, S. (2008). Sich selbst historisch werden: Goethe – Faust. In D. Giuriato, M. Stingelin, & S. Zanetti (Eds.), “Schreiben heisst: sich selber lesen”. Schreibszenen als Selbstlektüren (pp. 85–113). Fink.

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital Holger Herma and Laura Maleyka

Abstract

In contrast to face-to-face communication, digital communication lacks conventional speaker positions. These must first be established through social practices of communication. This is especially true for very low-structured, discursive media formats such as online comment sections. Our contribution asks how actors in such settings manage to establish an intelligible subject positioning. To this end, we conduct a case analysis based on the online commentary section of ZEIT online (ZON). We assume that the participants in the discourse are interested in appearing as sovereign subjects by succeeding in setting up frames of conversation that other participants follow. If actors succeed in establishing such a conversational framework, we speak, following Jo Reichertz, of the attainment of communicative power.

1

Introduction

Is subjectivity in digital communication different or is it structured differently than in analogue communication? In communication among those present, in the face-toface situation, the authority of a speaker is in part already brought along. From certain points of view it is already given, since either it is known to whom one is speaking or this can be checked directly and quickly – i.e. also by characteristics that do not arise from the speech content itself. In the classical dissemination media, H. Herma (✉) · L. Maleyka Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_11

209

210

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

apart from face-to-face, this is the respective authority of the media positions (a newspaper, a TV station, etc.) and it is the respective culturally established sub-positions such as sections and columns from which someone speaks, for example an editorial, a column, a commentator or moderator or an introduced ‘expert’ in a talk show. In fields of digital communication, such as the online commentary field considered below, no such brought-in authority exists. One usually only knows the person’s nickname. Other identity markers that one can fall back on in analogue communication, such as real name, age, gender, profession/ qualification, social background, etc., are unknown. A speaker’s authority must first be established with the help of certain social practices. The way in which this is established therefore reveals practices of subjectification, i.e. specifically those that identify and legitimise the participants as speakers. And with regard to digital commentary areas, speaker authority does not mean authority derived from a tradition, from an institutionally pre-established relationship, or authority enforced through tyranny, but rather authority that is able to establish a discourse that is followed without these means – that thus leads to follow-up communications. We want to observe and develop this in the specific case of an excerpt of a communication in an online comments section. In June 2013, the journalist Harald Martenstein titled a column in DIE ZEIT with the programmatic headline “Schlecht, schlechter, Geschlecht” (Bad, worse, gender), in which he discusses the legitimacy of gender studies. His social role as a journalist predetermines his subject positioning. The situation is different in the online comments section of ZON, where this very article was discussed. Here, 432 comments can be found, written by readers of ZON and appearing in chronological order. Due to the characteristics of this form of discourse (unmanageable participation of discourse participants, difficult traceability of the content-related connections of contributions to contributions of other users), it is initially unclear who is participating. The focus of our contribution is therefore the question of the communicative practices through which these actors design themselves as subjects in a digital forum and gain audience resonance. We assume that processes of subjectification are simultaneously articulated in the recognition and assertion of speaker positions. Therefore, we ask how these can be established under the medial framework of communication in online commentary spaces. And specifically with regard to those that lead to particular resonances, specifically: that lead to communication sovereignties, in the online commentary field. Following Reichertz (2009), we call this communication power in the following. We speak of communication power when speakers succeed in enforcing the validity of framework definitions of a communication event through their contributions. In the course of discussions in an online comment section, we can thus observe ex post that such frame

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

211

definitions have been enforced without at the same time or even before asking how they were enforced or without providing a model for this. With this analytical approach, we point to an aspect of online comment sections that seems important to us: the special conditions of resonance formation that are inherent to the format and which will be outlined in the following sections. For some things are different in digital forms of communication than in face-toface situations or in analogue communication and media formats. The media genre (Ayaß, 2004) of online commentary provides a specific structuring logic that is not found in analogue communication genres. Here, an exclusive form of attention economy comes into play, which is created against the background of an invisible audience. The ‘silent majority’ (Stegbauer & Rausch, 2001) of those reading along leads to certain resonance mechanisms and to specific ways of self-presentation. We assume that participants in online discussions are first faced with the challenge of making themselves perceivable as participants in the discussion, in a way that can claim attention-grabbing status. The lack of physical co-presence means that gestural and mimic feedback mechanisms are not available. Moreover, the social consequences of a dispute do not have to be borne in the online commentary area – in the analogue area, on the other hand, these consequences are great. We therefore do not start with the possible intention and motivation of the actors as to which subject they want to be. On the other hand, we consider the factual practice of communication and assume that subjectivity is only constituted through the identification of a subject in the assumption or assignment of a position in the practice of speaking. These subject positions are prerequisite to speaking, to the extent that we specifically conceptualize subject positions here as speaker positions. If we consider the subject as a process structure, we can therefore also trace its constitution empirically, for example in the tracing of acts of positioning in a communicative event (Lucius-Hoehne & Deppermann, 2004).

2

Online Comment Sections and the Question of Communication Power

As an empirical object, media can be examined in terms of their influence on processes of social change, as is also the case with the concept of mediatization (Krotz, 2001). Within the perspective of mediatisation or mediatised worlds (Krotz & Hepp, 2012), the aspect of the change in communication is of particular importance, as it is able to decisively depict the process of subjectification (Mikos, 2005). With regard to comment areas on the Internet, this means that communication here

212

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

takes place in writing, asynchronously and at a distance (Schuegraf & Meier, 2005, p. 425), but at the same time exhibits a spoken language pragmatics or a conceptual orality (Koch & Oesterreicher, 1985), through which proximity is staged (Schuegraf & Meier, 2005, p. 427). Online comment sections can be seen as a platform for expressing and sharing opinions and experiences. At the same time, they are rather weakly regulated from the outside. Apart from the thematic setting of an online comment area, there are hardly any structural regulations of the communication process: Due to the anonymity, among other things, speaker position, turn change/ sequence, number of speakers, length of a speech contribution (Sacks et al., 1974; Sacks, 1984), content and linguistic connectivity of contributions have to be negotiated first, which is why we assume that forum communication is subject to an instantaneous self-regulatory process. In this respect, actors in an online comment area face a challenge that is characteristic of online communication in general – the negotiation of a speaker position or a form of identity (Döring, 2010; Schmidt, 2011). Due to the diffuse communication situation in online comment areas, it is also difficult for the actors to obtain certainty as to whether or not their intended speaking position is recognised by the other participants in the discourse. Likes, for example, indicate confirmation, approval or applause, but are without proof whether the speaker has been followed discursively. We therefore assume that speakers in online comment areas are interested in establishing an interpretation through their contributions that others will follow. This kind of influence can be described as communication power as defined by Reichertz (2009). For the empirical case of the theoretical concept of communication power, we therefore assume that it cannot simply be counted (e.g. on the basis of likes or reader recommendations). Rather, it must show itself in the way that not only simple reactions are generated, but that the steering wheel is kept in the hand, so to speak – that frames are set in communication which are followed. What is required, therefore, is a discursive resonance. How can participants in an online comments section obtain discursive resonance of their comments? The persuasive argument (Toulmin et al., 1979) alone can hardly do it. This is only truthful within an already accepted framework of propositions to which participants can refer. However, the speakers must first agree on this framework, which is why they initially find themselves in an ‘orphaned’ situation, so to speak, in the online commentary area.1 Who accepts which system of statements

1

This does not mean that the situation will remain without structure. It can be assumed that comparatively clear structures will be established. However, they are not pre-adjusted to such an extent as is the case, for example, for articles in national newspapers.

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

213

and how must first be found out or negotiated. We therefore assume that it is the assertion of authority with which a convincing argument can be made in the first place. What is meant is the assertion and establishment of a speaker position from which arguments are capable of recognition. As an analytical setting for this, we therefore set the focus thus: if a framing system of premises is present as a valid view of a situation and communicative contributions follow a previously introduced framing definition, discursive resonance in the sense of communicative power has been achieved. We show this in the following by means of a case analysis.

3

Lotus Blossoms – Subject Staging Using the Example of a ZON User

User Lotosblüten is a conspicuous discourse participant in the comments section of ZON.2 With a total of 36 postings, she is a participant who participates very frequently. In doing so, she never initiates her own threads, but always responds to posts by other users. Two users she replies to particularly frequently. These are anarkarsis, to whose posts she writes 14 replies, and ATopper, to whom she replies 13 times. Other users to whose postings Lotosblüten replies are AriDeVille and citro, (three replies each) as well as Mario Fox, gorgo and Ortmann (one reply each). The fact that so many replies are made by the users anarkasis and ATopper is due to the fact that they also reply to Lotosblüten, who in turn replies to them. In this way, two independent discourses develop, which we have called discourse networks. As independent discourse networks, they are characterized by the fact that several

2 The material comes from a DFG-funded research project that investigates the differences between digital and analogue communication. For this purpose, communicative framings in debating clubs, in image-based communication (selfies, memes, Instagram), in journalistic speech and in photo and film clubs were reconstructed and examined with regard to the conditions of the production of communicative power. With regard to online comment sections, the corresponding sections on current affairs articles in various well-known daily newspapers were examined. The user Lotosblüten was selected as one of many possible commentators for this contribution because she has written comparatively many and long posts. Thus, we can draw on rich material to present here a saturated analysis of her subject enactment (for further results of the analysis of this comment section, see Maleyka & Oswald, 2017). Likewise, we present here a case study that asks for a decidedly fine-grained analysis. The generalizability of the results, i.e., the question of whether the type of subject enactment identified here is characteristic of comment forums in general, must first be verified through quantitative analysis.

214

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

participants discuss an independent topic over a certain period of time, repeatedly connecting to contributions of other users. Lotosblüten describes herself in one of her postings as a “thinking woman” and a “mathematician” (posting 186) who teaches “mathematics at a university” (posting 188). Through these self-statements, we know something about her gender, educational background, and professional activities. Since Lotosblüten appears under a pseudonym in a digital comment section, her subjectification can be inferred solely through her communicative actions. The first thing that stands out is that Lotosblüten’s postings have certain recurring characteristics. She almost always begins her contribution by quoting an excerpt from another user in order to follow it up. She usually does this in the mode of criticism. She rebukes, corrects, corrects, classifies and admonishes erroneous statements. In doing so, she positions the authors by framing their supposedly erroneous execution as a personal transgression, which they make due to a lack of knowledge or inadequate argumentation, but with the intention of deceiving or placing facts in a false context for tactical reasons. This external positioning of her fellow discussants as notorious deceivers, obfuscators or tacticians enables her to speak from a constant gesture of indignation and outrage. For only in this way can Lotosblüten appeal to moral values; namely, the value of sincerity, which the other participants in the discourse (supposedly) violate. By quoting directly, lotus blossoms equally positions itself. This is because the quotation is an objective means of providing evidence, since it constitutes proof of the statement to which she refers. She can use it to show that she is accurate and precise, and that she has done profound research on the criticized position. Likewise, she can prove that she herself is acting honestly, since the original stands for the unadulteratedness of the statement. Thus, Lotosblüten can lend respectability to her own speech and position herself as a sincere person. In the following, we will now take a closer look at the discourse described in the online comments section, whereby we understand the term discourse here in the sense of linguistic pragmatic linguistics. Following this perspective, we ask within discourse analysis how actors act with language. Since we want to limit ourselves to one case study, two postings of lotus flowers will now be subjected to a linguisticpragmatic analysis (Spitzmüller & Warnke, 2011) by asking which illocutionary indicators can be used to describe the speech acts of lotus flowers and how speech acts (Austin, 1979; Searle, 2007) emerge from this. With regard to the concrete analytical procedure, we investigate on a linguistic-pragmatic level which argumentation schemes, semantics and stylistic devices, i.e. metaphor, pejorations, meliorations, etc. (Klein, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 2000; Weimer, 2005) are used

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

215

to paint positive and negative interpretative horizons (Przyborski, 2004) against which one’s own orientations (Bohnsack, 2003) are then generated and defended. Furthermore, we analyse how the discourse participant Lotosblüten (at least the speaker claims to be female) appears as a subject through her comments. We understand subjectification as an interdependent enactment of the subject, which takes place on the basis of self-attributions and attributions to others. Within the linguistic-pragmatic analysis we therefore work out the self- and other-positionings (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann 2004) of the participants in the discourse. The aim is to elaborate a concrete linguistic habitus (Bourdieu, 1976, 2005, p. 89) that can be used to locate lotus flowers as a subject figure in an online commentary space. We assume that actors have a practical sense (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 63) that gives them knowledge of legitimate language use and the recognition that comes with it. Since actors possess this linguistic capital to varying degrees, a distinction profit arises from linguistic competence. It can thus be assumed that actors move in linguistic fields (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 69), which are at the same time fields of forces, since actors take up a position in these fields and thus also take up positions in relation to other actors. The difference between actors and their positions in the field thus becomes constitutive of the field and its structure. Language is a form of practical action that emerges primarily from bodily conditioning or that is based on a habitus (Rehbein, 2007, p. 125). Therefore, in the following we also want to speak of the linguistic habitus, which determines the social position of the actors, especially in a primarily language-structured field – such as an online commentary area. This then connects to a research-practical approach as suggested by Krais and Gebauer (2017) in relation to the empirical study of habitus, namely to elaborate subject figures: How different the actors can be, or what different positions there are, thus becomes a central question in the study of a particular field. And one can answer this question by examining which actors there are, because actors are nothing other than embodiments, personifications of structures (Krais & Gebauer, 2017, p. 57).

In a linguistic field, which in this case is determined by practices structured by written language, it is therefore the mastery of assertive linguistic acts that confers linguistic authority on an actor or actress (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 63). Thus, on the basis of our analysis, we will derive from the linguistic habitus of lotus flowers a discourse figure that seeks to assert itself as a language authority in the linguistic field of online commentary in order to thus attain communicative power.

216

3.1

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

Lotus Blossoms – Enlightenment in an Ancient Tragedy

For the following analysis, the first post with which Lotosblüten replies to the users anarkasis and ATopper was selected. The reason for this is that two independent discourse networks3 emerge from this, which makes it possible to continue the analysis and to check the consistency of the habitus developed here in further contributions. Lotosblüten is actively participating for the first time in the online comments section of Harald Martenstein’s article with contribution 177: • Lotus flowers • 08 June 2013 23:34 • 177. astrology “(Otherwise, even pure mathematics would no longer be a science. . .)” – Of course, all meaningful science is empirical. What would be the alternative? Speculative science? Metaphysics? Theology? Even where these are seriously pursued at university level, it is a matter of empiricism – of investigating reality or the ways of interpreting it – and the basic principle remains and must be falsifiability and reproducibility. Wherever closed systems of thought are proclaimed, it is ideology; wherever it cannot be refuted, it is faith. And as for mathematics – you probably don’t know it. Mathematics is the science where the empirical method is taken to the extreme. The mathematician doesn’t make things up, he makes assumptions about object relationships, and tries to prove them. Only when he has succeeded in this, he represents this new insight – until then, no matter how overwhelming the evidence for correctness or falsity may be – he does not accept it. This basic attitude would do gender “research” more than good; it would put it on a solid footing. The – if you’ll pardon the expression – perverse verbiage, which helps to prevent clear thought with a torrent of unclear and undefined terms and resists empirical falsification tooth and nail, setting against it the ever-repeated dogmas like mantras, has as much to do with science as astrology has to do with astronomy. 11 Reader recommendations The first discourse network consists of 20, the second of 44 comments referring to each other.

3

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

217

The posting by Lotosblüten is the first reply to user ATopper and is titled “Astrology”. The noun seems difficult to connect contextually at first, as there is no obvious connection to the subject. The Duden gives the following definition: “Doctrine that draws conclusions from the mathematical recording of the locations and movements of celestial bodies as well as location- and time-dependent coordinate intersections in order to assess terrestrial conditions and their development” (Dudenredaktion, 2017). This definition also gives little information about the connection between astrology and Harald Martenstein’s article or gender research. The post then begins with a direct quote from post 123 by ATopper. The quote is a conditional statement. It refers to the proposition4 of this post “sciences are not limited to empirical sciences”. Thus, this proposition states a thesis: There are sciences that are not empirical. This proposition is supported by an exemplification: Mathematics is a non-empirical science. This is now followed by the answer of Lotosblüten in the form of an antithesis; science is always empirical. From this antithesis, one can infer outrage on a connotative level (“Of course [. . .]”, in the sense of self-evident). The gesture of indignation is continued by a series of rhetorical questions in nominal style (“What would be the alternative? Speculative science? Metaphysics?”). This series equally implies the answer: no science can be found that is not empirical. The speaker finds it downright reprehensible that ATopper doubts this. This is followed by an explanation as a sequence of propositions. Empiricism means research and interpretation of reality, its properties are falsifiability and reproducibility. Counter-examples to this are ideology, since it is irreversible, and faith, since it cannot be refuted. What is remarkable here is the style of the statement. The three sentences each begin with the same conjunction “There, where” (anaphora). This comes across as forceful and enhances the effect of the explanation as a central execution. The explanation of science takes the form of an insertion that falls out of the sentence line (anacoluth), thus highlighting on a syntactic level that something central is being explained here. The counter-examples (“ideology”, “faith”) are executed syntactically in the same way (parallelism), which has the effect of presenting ideology and faith as synonyms. Thus, the

4 “Proposition” is used as an analytical category following Searle’s conception of speech acts. The propositional act is the act of speaking by which one refers to “things” in the world and ascribes properties to them; one thus makes statements about facts (Searle, 2007, p. 48 ff.). In this sense, the verb “to propound sth.” is also used in the following when someone makes a statement; the verbs propound sth. and state sth. are therefore used synonymously in the following.

218

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

statement as a whole is a juxtaposition of two opposite thoughts (antithetical): The important thing is science, the diametric opposite is ideology and faith. In the following paragraph, Lotosblüten propounds that ATopper does not know mathematics. The qualifying particle ‘probably’ turns the assertion into a conjecture. Once again, this insertion falls out of sentence order (anacoluth). By the final position added with dash it is emphasized that it is ATopper who has too little knowledge about mathematics. Further, mathematics is personified, which is done by the verb ‘to know’ and the reflexive pronoun ‘she’. Mathematics appears as a woman (an alternative formulation, without personification would be, for example: ‘I guess you don’t know anything about it’). This assumption is supported by an explanation as a sequence of propositions. Mathematics is science in its original form. The proposition is explained by the example of a mathematician and his way of working. The description of the activities of the mathematician represents an increase of his activities, which culminate in their valency at a climax: “not to think up”, “to make conjectures”, “to try to prove”, “to succeed”, “to represent knowledge”. These positively increasing activities are embedded in a secondary process. This subsidiary process again occurs as an anacoluth, for it is highlighted by the dashes at the end of the enumeration. The sub-process itself juxtaposes two opposing thoughts without forming a contradiction of them (antithetical) “however oppressive” vs. “do not accept”. By intertwining the climax and antithetical, a heroic scenario is built here: The mathematician as hero performs actions that increase in valence. He does this embedded in a battle scenario of adverse circumstances and his own opposition. Thus the personification of mathematics becomes a representation as a demigod (allegory), for the mathematician becomes the embodiment of the ideal of empirical proof. The third paragraph begins with a directive in the form of advice and justification. Lotosblüten makes the recommendation to adopt the procedure as practiced in mathematics (‘basic attitude’), because gender research lacks substance. Here, gender research is personified through metaphorical use of language: ‘doing well’ is originally used in the word field of health, a medicine/treatment/nutrition does the body good. Gender research is thus portrayed as a person who is ill. The rationale is equally metaphorical, as ‘solid firm’ is an obsolete term for a foundation or footing. What is meant, then, is that gender research lacks a foundation; it has no subject matter and is therefore not research. This interpretation of the metaphor is confirmed on a pragmatic level. The word part research in the noun gender research is placed in quotation marks. This indicates that the word is used in an ironizing way between these signs. Thus, as a form of mockery, what is meant here is that gender research is exactly the opposite of research. Furthermore, the sentence is in the subjunctive; a

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

219

mode that emphasizes the potentiality of the statement, but at the same time doubts its realization. Lotosblüten follows this with an explanation as a sequence of propositions. In the following, she discusses the extent to which gender research is not a science. The verbs of the sentence increase in their negative valence (climax). Unscientificness is personified here by means of verbs. The “word clang” “helps prevent”, “resists” and “opposes”. This is the tripartite climax, culminating in a fourth link with a resultative function: “[. . .] has as much to do with science as X has to do with Y” (comparison as antithetical). Here, then, a scenario of greater magnitude is described, which ends in a climax, the consequences of which have the result that gender research is in absolute opposition to science. This larger scale scenario is thereby developed on a metaphorical level. The personified “clatter of words” is joined by an equally personified “torrent” consisting of “unclear and undefined terms” (alliteration), as well as the “beliefs like mantras”. These three animate abstracts enter into a battle with the also personified abstracts “clear thought” and “empirical falsification.” The antithetical that follows from this scenario is an alliteration (astrology/astronomy) that describes the contrast within the scenario by establishing an analogy (which likewise the words themselves exhibit) between the two contrasting disciplines. The connotation of the comparison is also applied to the scenario: astrology and astronomy are very similar in form (signifiant), but the meaning (signifié) is exactly the opposite. What is meant, then, is that gender research and science are empirical in designation, but their contents are in absolute opposition to each other. Thus, it is also only in this last sentence that it becomes clear to what extent the title of the article is related to the topic of the online comments section. Astrology is introduced as a synonym for gender research. To understand this, however, the entire argument of the post must be read and understood: There is a diametric opposition between science and unscience. Mathematics is thereby presented as science in its purest form, gender research as unscience. This is found in analogous form in the disciplines of astronomy and astrology. However, this punch line can only become apparent to the reader at the end of the article; before that, the headline cannot be placed in any contextual context. In her contribution, Lotosblüten thus builds up an arc of tension. The reason for which Lotosblüten participates in the discursive event is indignation. She is outraged because another participant misrepresents a supposedly indisputable fact. Lotosblüten follows this indignation with a correction, which is based on a clear binary classification: Scientificity and Unscientificity. Since ATopper fails to recognize this classification, she positions him as an ignoramus. In response, she clarifies in what follows by personifying mathematics and presenting it as a heroic

220

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

allegory of scientificity. She then transposes the glorified description of scientificity into a scenario of contestation in which scientificity must stand up to the confusing tactics of the unscientific nature of gender studies. The tension is resolved at the end, when it becomes clear how the dualism can be resolved. Lotus Blossoms points it out clearly; it is the classic battle between good and evil. On the basis of the analysis of a further posting it will now be examined whether the structuring and stylistics of the speech acts show themselves as a consistent communication pattern. • Lotus flowers. • June 10, 2013 3:07 pm. • 358. miracles I “Therein lies the rejection of continuous consequentialism and structural consistency” – True, but at the same time the gender acrobats implicitly insist on precisely this consequentialism in their every utterance to prove the truth of their theory – you can’t eat the cake and have it. The abandonment of consistency, i.e. of logical conclusiveness, cannot be had partially, but only at the price of the whole, of the ability to communicate par excellence. The program of this kind of “thinking” is to abolish thinking and arguing itself and leads to speechlessness. As much as the post-turkuralists criticize logic and its coldness or indict its claim to dominance, in each of their propositions, insofar as it claims consistency, they refute themselves, for they presuppose that very dominance in order to be understood at all. And the impoverishment of concepts has reached a peak in Foucault: the mere fact of being an object of knowledge is for him already “enslavement”, cognition thus already “domination” (and he thus ultimately makes concepts arbitrary). 11 Reader recommendations This post is the first reply by lotus blossoms to a post by participant anakarsis. It is titled “Miracle I”. This noun again seems difficult to connect, as again no obvious connection to the context of the topic can be found. The following definition can be found in the Duden:

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

221

1. (exalted) miracle, miraculous event 2. Miracle Play Synonyms: Miracle, miraculous occurrence, miraculous phenomenon, miraculous work; (educationally) mysteryOrigin: Latin miraculum = miracle, to: mirari = to wonder (Dudenredaktion, 2017). As in the previous post, the Duden’s definition does not yield a broader context of meaning that seems connectable in this discourse. The roman one merely suggests that there will be at least one subsequent follow-up post. The post then begins with a direct quote from post 350 by anarkasis. The quote itself is a proposition in the form of a justification. In his post, anarkasis makes the proposition that “Butler’s and the relevant advocates’ opinions on the anatomical realities of men and women” can be justified. The justification is cited here by lotus flowers. Now her answer is given as an expressive in the form of a valuation and a statement. Lotosblüten agrees with the quoted proposition of anarkasis (“- Correct”) and supplements it with a statement that refers to a contradiction (“yet”). The contradiction consists in the fact that the “gender acrobats” insist on something (consequentialism) which they equally reject. Lotosblüten repeats this contradiction between the attitude and action of gender research on a metaphorical level by referring to the representatives of gender research as “gender acrobats”. An acrobat represents an analogy to the behavior criticized here in that they perform complicated physical movements that often contradict gravity (e.g., balancing on a rope, juggling). The metaphorical contradiction is also evident in the verbs. The verb ‘throb’ is an elevated expression and in its metaphorical use denotes ‘to insist vigorously, unyieldingly’. As a linguistic image, throbbing is a noisy activity. The pronunciation of the word itself supports its meaning by imitating the sound of the activity (onomatopoeia). However, this thumping is ‘implicit’, that is, indirect, not explicit. The ‘implicit throbbing’ is, strictly speaking, impossible, since the two words logically exclude each other (oxymoron); stylistically, however, they repeat the admonished contradiction between attitude and action. Finally, an English idiom is added by a dash, which intensifies the contradiction by pointing out the impossibility of a paradox: eating up a cake and keeping it at the same time. The use of an English idiom has an emphatic effect, emphasising not only the contradiction but also the absurdity of the criticised behaviour. The next paragraph begins with an explanation. Lotosblüten leads here a statement which reflects a symmetrical relation (juxtaposed condition): From X (consequentialism) follows Y (communicability). The nominal style (giving up, consistency, conclusiveness, the whole, communicability) is used as a passive construction. Thus the statement appears sober and factual. Lotosblüten diagnoses

222

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

here a compelling consequence derived from an inevitable causality. At the same time, a metaphor of the market is opened up. If ‘something is to be had for the price’, then the image of a commercial exchange emerges. This exchange is equally embedded in a larger scenario, namely an absolute one. It is not about parts (partial), but about everything (par excellence). This gives rise to a hybrid pragmatic style. On the one hand an argumentation is formally built up, on the other hand it is transferred on a figurative level into an idea of victory or defeat. Lotosblüten thus shows herself to be a controlled analyst, for in the dramatic scenario she is still able to recognize the objective connections. Lotosblüten then affirms her competence in seeing through confused circumstances by means of an explanation. She explains the intention (“to cancel out thinking and reasoning itself”) underlying a certain action (“kind of ‘thinking’”) and what consequences (“speechlessness”) result from it. As a passive construction, it is unclear here who performs the actions described. However, the unknown person does it on a metaphorical level (aufheben as a figuration of ‘to make something cease to exist’). This undoing is disguised by a transformed action, namely the “program of this kind of ‘thinking’”. A program can be understood in terms of an agenda, such as organizations have, or as software. In either case, something other than actual thinking is being carried out. This is indicated by the phrase “kind of [. . .]”, as well as the quotation marks. This then “results” in “speechlessness”. Lotosblüten thus points out that unknown actors and actresses here execute something in an organized way, i.e. according to a plan, and at the same time conceal this. The result is the dysfunctionality of the system (speechlessness). In the next paragraph she shows, through an explanation as a sequence of propositions, how this obfuscation can be debunked. Lotosblüten propounds that “the post-turkuralists” [sic!] are contradictory in their argumentation, thus rendering themselves untrustworthy. This statement is presented in the form of an intensification. The step sequence of the poststructuralists’ actions is thereby enumerated as a sequence of negative activities (anticlimax): “criticize”, “accuse”, “refute”, “presuppose” and culminates negatively in “to be understood at all”. The verbs belong to the word field of jurisprudence and give rise to the image of the poststructuralists as accusers in a court of law. The defendants here are “logic and its coldness” personified in this sentence. The accusation ends tragically, however, as it cannot even be “understood.” The statement thus becomes a metaphorical representation of the tragedy of an anti-hero who takes up a (legal) fight only to appear at all, failing miserably as he fights something contradictory (a rule they themselves presuppose). In the last paragraph there is a further explanation. Lotosblüten puts forward the thesis that Foucault uses technical terms in a maximally erroneous way. She

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

223

explains this using the terms “object of knowledge” and “cognition”. The proposition establishes a development that has reached a climax. The explanation of this proposition is analogically stated through an anticlimax (enslavement, domination, making arbitrary), which underlines the rhetoric of escalation of Lotus Flower’s argument on a syntactic level. On a metaphorical level, the image of deprivation of a group of people is drawn here: Destitution is personified (“the destitution of [. . .] has reached [. . .]”). The latter supposedly suffers from enslavement and domination. This lamentable circumstance is tragic, however, because it is based on Foucault’s misinterpretation (indicated by the quotation marks). The use of the particles (and, merely, already, thus, ultimately) underlines the fatalism of the scenario, in which a supposedly trivial fact is misclassified at an early stage, from which fateful developments subsequently arise. In this post, lotus blossoms also creates a closed narrative. The occasion of her post is the posting of another participant, whose statement she validates. However, she does not merely leave it at validating anarkasis’ post, but points to deeper connections. She points out a perverse aberration that gender research is committing. However, the aberration is not only inconclusive, but leads to an essential decision between victory or defeat. Lotosblüten presents this decisive finalization in a gesture of sober objectivity, with which she positions herself as an analyst. She takes up the topos of the aberration again in her remarks on the post-structuralists, but expands it into a tragic struggle of an anti-hero. Using Foucault as a concrete example, she repeats the tragedy of the antihero, this time embedded in a different metaphorical scenario and with a shift in the tragic finale. Here the hero is no longer tragic only because he destroys himself, but also because he destroys what he supposedly wants to save. A second post follows this one: • Lotus flowers. • June 10, 2013 3:07 pm. • 359. miracles II The poststructuralist attack on reason only finds expression in gender studies, it does not originate there. And so the immanent hostility against natural science is only an expression of hostility against cognition where this could have a claim to validity – and undermines, largely unconsciously, its own claims.

(continued)

224

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

Not being able to see through all this is one of the miracles of gender studies (and not of gender studies alone). 11 Reader recommendations This post is obviously meant to be a follow-up post, as it has the same heading. The number Roman Two now indicates the connection to the previous post. So far, no meaningful reading has emerged to help understand the heading in semantic context. The posting now begins with an explanation. Lotosblüten propounds that the dualism between gender studies and the natural sciences is merely a manifestation of a contradiction between poststructuralists and the natural sciences that was started by the former. Once again, abstract concepts are personified (“poststructuralist attack”, “reason”) and thus replace concrete persons as abstract agents as agents of action or agency. Once again, this takes place as a juxtaposition of two opposing thoughts (antithetical) (“only expression, [. . .] not its origin”), which also refers to a contradiction on the syntactic level. This is followed by an explanation. Lotosblüten propounds that the opposition (of the poststructuralists) to the natural sciences is actually an opposition to knowledge and that the poststructuralists thus ultimately dismantle themselves. This thesis is again presented on a pragmatic level as a personification. Here, there are two antagonistic parties (“the enmity” against “the natural sciences”, “cognition”) that carry out the actions (“having a claim”, “unconsciously undermining”). At the same time, the problem highlighted is not between the two parties, but is attributed to one side and psychologized in the process (“immanent enmity”, “expression of”, “largely subconscious”). In this, Lotosblüten resolves the tragic scenario by ontologizing it: The essence of tragedy lies not in the discord between the parties, but in poststructuralism itself. Poststructuralism is constituted exclusively by its hostile anti-attitude to the natural sciences, which is why all its actions are selfdestructive aberrations. Thus, Lotosblüten can only interpret poststructuralism as a single agony, which she depicts in a tragedy of the anti-hero in error with himself. In the last sentence of the posting there is again an explanation. Lotosblüten states that gender research inexplicably does not recognize the described problem. It is only in this last sentence that the headline of the two postings becomes understandable. By “miracle” is meant the lack of understanding of the failure of gender research to recognize the problem pointed out. Due to the semantic context, the word itself can only be interpreted with a negative connotation as ‘mystery’, i.e. as a phenomenon that cannot be explained logically. The behaviour of gender

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

225

research is thus declared here to be convoluted and inscrutable. The note in the added parenthesis is an allusion (allusio), suggesting that there are other actors and agents involved in this miracle. Who exactly is meant is implicitly established, but in fact remains open to interpretation.

3.2

Linguistic Habitus of the Enlightenment Lotus Blossoms

At the outset, we assumed that an online comments section is a place where power can be gained over the way of communicating. Given the exclusive availability of language, it is thus also the kind of (linguistic) action that is available to actors to position themselves as subjects and to struggle for communicative power. Lotosblüten’s linguistic habitus frequently shows speech acts of judgement (expressives), rebuke (directives) and explanation (representatives). In terms of her speech act, this means that she makes known the mental state she has in the face of another speaker’s utterance. Accordingly, she asks the speaker to behave in a different way. And she arranges propositions in such a way that they represent the world, that is, that they reflect truth. Thus she is a person who wants to set things right and restore order. She does this by means of self-positioning (indignation, agreement, rejection) and by means of other-positioning by clearly denouncing the misconduct of other participants in the discourse and the presentation of truth. These speech acts are embedded in a distinctive stylistics. The sentence structure of their statements often combines main and subordinate clauses (hypotaxis), which makes their statements rather elevated, but also lengthy. The interlacing of stylistic devices, such as the climax with the antithetical, complicates the statements. She often chooses nominal style by personifying abstract words. Personifications and elevated as well as metaphorical word choices give rise to figurative language, which are transformed into allegories of good and evil. These classical rhetorical stylistic devices (Fuhrmann, 2011; Lakoff & Johnson, 2000; Ueding & Steinbrink, 2005), such as metaphor, personification, climax, antithetical, which Lotus Blossoms makes frequent use of, have the effect of staging an ancient tragedy. In this way, she succeeds in creating a clear idea of gender research as unscientific and, in contrast, natural science as scientific. The supposedly context-free headings of their postings, which are generally similarly detailed to the examples examined here, ultimately provide an equally contoured picture when viewed together (cf. Table 1). On the one hand, the headings refer to gender research. Here, synonyms for gender research are introduced (e.g. “astrology”, “fashions”, “tautology”, etc.), framing the discipline as mystical, abstract, counter-intuitive and seductive. On the other hand, the

226

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

Table 1 Headings of the contributions of lotus flowers Gender research Astrology Freedom and behaviour Fashions Tautologies

Discourse participants There’s a rustling in your own net Followers of Fashion I Followers of Fashion II Adepts

Tautologies, secondly I Tautologies, second II

Reduced to quarter knowledge I Reduced to quarter knowledge II

Tautologies, second III Miracle I Miracles II

Reduced to quarter knowledge II On the high wagon Stepped on the toes. . .(apparently a man?). A teacher by his own grace . . . I

The whole thing remains alien to us Other oddities

Instructions Here you go I Here you go II Where. . .? Exactly, then what for? Maybe Apply that to yourself. . . . Too short

A teacher by his own grace . . . II A teacher by his own grace . . . III A teacher by his own grace . . . IV Unsuitable means I Unsuitable means II Shocking and hard to believe I Shocking and hard to believe II

headings refer to the discourse participants (e.g. “Followers of Fashion”, “Adepts”, etc.) to whom lotus blossoms refer with their contributions. In this, the discourse participants are positioned as obsequious, ignorant, arrogant, pretentious, and deceitful actors and actresses. Lastly, there are headings that give instructions directed at the other discourse participants, admonishing their faulty behavior (e.g., “Here you go,” “Too short,” etc.). Thus, lotus flowers not only closes a narrative gestalt internally to the contribution, but likewise conveys it through its headings by identifying the wrongdoers it identifies one more time therein. The contoured image of this closed narrative shape now consists in the fact that Lotosblüten makes her discursive position known in a subtle way. She not only positions herself through her postings, but also positions gender research and the discourse participants by repeatedly referring to them already in the headline (Table 1).

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

227

In terms of Lotosblüten’s linguistic habitus, it can thus be said that she follows the scholarly ethos of clarity. This is the absolute goal and at the same time the broadest rule of selection under which any of her contributions can be subsumed. We come to this conclusion based on the linguistic pragmatic analysis, the linguistic acts presented above show that there is a very specific ethos underlying Lotosblüten’s contributions. She pursues this ethos by enlightening the audience of discourse participants and silent co-readers. She enlightens about how things are in reality. She enlightens who the evildoers are who obfuscate and spread falsehoods. And she is outraged that there are people who fight against the ethos of spreading clarity. In this way, she corresponds to the subject figure of the Enlightener, who fights against inscrutable claims to power before an audience of the immature and ignorant.5 This ethos of preventing obscurity is at the same time Lotosblüten’s competence, for it unfolds practical effects. Lotosblüten clarifies by creating a selfcontained narrative and establishing a mode of communicating that all participants in the discourse ultimately follow. This following is demonstrated by the fact that some users do not answer her (anymore) and thus allow her framing to apply. Other users, such as ATopper and anarkasis, answer and contradict her, but follow her in their communicative actions, thereby confirming and acknowledging the mode of leading the conversation (it is thus accorded validity). This kind of affirmation and willingness to follow can be seen as evidence that Lotosblütens communicative actions unfold communicative power within this discourse. Discussion 4 – Typical Subject Figures in Online Communication? Our analysis of the excerpt from the online discussion can now also be seen as a cartographic sketch of subject positions that we were able to observe in the field under investigation. It is precisely this ‘doing subject’ that interests us, not at all the theoretical-contentual stringency of the arguments of the discussants. Subjectivity emerges here through the staging of written language, which is why we speak of subject staging. And by staging we mean the practice of designing, i.e. that which is commonly denoted by terms such as self-design. This, however, does not remain chimerical or artificial, but is constitutive for every practice of producing speakers and identities, which produce social reality through reciprocal references and attributions. The material analysis shows how a communicative cosmos is formed in this way, without the actors demanding verifying evidence in the offline world or even arranging to meet there.

5 On the metaphor “arguing is war” and the subject figure of the warrior (Lakoff & Johnson, 2000, p. 11 ff.).

228

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

Further possible specifications can now be added to the subject positions considered for our purposes. For example, a stronger typification of subject positions in the online discussion. Such positions can be schematically described as typical subject figures. These schemata mark certain figurations of self- and other-descriptions, which are represented in society, or in other words: which a discourse provides as a possible repertoire of identities, or ways of being. Our material already allows for a number of typifications in this regard. In the sense of our cartography of subject positions, they provide information about the network and the figures of a battlefield for resonance and the favour of an audience. If this is applied to our material in this typifying way, salient figures can be identified. Thus, Lotosblüten has acquired communicative power, since it has established a framework that is ascribed validity as such. What is the nature of this frame? Firstly, it is agonal. Lotosblüten constantly repositions, identifies opponents, and agitates. The basis of this typification is the competition for scientific stance that is pronounced in her case. She thus strives for a scientific ethos and constantly points out deficits to others, assumes competencies for herself and denies them to others. But she is obviously able to establish a sovereign position with it, because others are guided by it. It thus establishes a framework that opens up a space of discourse in which one can position oneself, e.g. put oneself in competition with others. This framework is recognized, even or especially when the opposing fighting position is taken. This is also acknowledged by ATopper,6 who, while disagreeing with her, allows the frame to stand as such. In ATopper’s case, the other is not excluded or questioned in his or her self-positioning. ATopper is also a scientific figure, but a very different one. He practices scientific interaction with an ethos of respect and, despite all his passionate commitment to the cause, ultimately with detachment. He embodies more the figure of the ‘convinced factual fighter’, who can nevertheless spend a cheerful evening together with his opponent in the wine bar after work. As a contrasting foil, we can consider a type that can be found very often in online commentary areas, including our research. We only want to mention it here because in this case study we focus on the exact reconstruction of a linguistic habitus (lotus flowers). We call this the ‘angry citizen’. That is, the politically disappointed and vehemently protesting, mostly conservative citizen, as the Duden now defines him. In the forums, this type very often wins the most likes

ATopper as a further subject figure is only given here as an example and in a very abbreviated form for illustrative purposes. The typifications are based on a corpus of three national newspapers, each with around 400 comments per online comment section.

6

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

229

for itself, but receives little to no response in the form of comments and references. This appears as an important moment in the establishment and perpetuation of framings to speak of communication power or its absence (Maleyka & Oswald, 2017).

4

Conclusion

Our material analysis was guided by the question of how the discovered positionings of the discussion participants can be read in terms of subjectification processes. We understand the positionings presented as access to modes of subjectification in the field of online commentary, and we see the starting point for subjectification in the self- and other-positionings that the participants in the commentary area themselves undertake. We thus observe a textual constitution of subjectivity, or more precisely: a linguistic writing that takes place through mutual attributions in the communication of the online commentary area. If one understands subjectivation fundamentally as the production of existence in a social event, the participants under consideration have attained existence. They perceive themselves and this in a specific way; that is, through the assignment and identification of subject positions. Certainly, speakers with comments also exist without resonance in the sense that they have left entries. But they are not followed, they could not set frames that would have given them communicative power. Consequently, they do not exist as discourse carriers in the communicative events of the online commentary area. In the analysis of the comments section we can show that the speakers create a relational arrangement of subject positions through the interdependence of their contributions. According to the specificity of the media genre, they cannot refer to subject positions brought along, taken over or assumed, but to how these are first created or staged within the discussion. In a subsequent step, the question could then be asked as to how framework definitions of the thematization of an object (in this case, H. Martenstein’s column from the ZEIT online magazine) are at all recognizable as such and can be followed in principle. That is, which modes of thematization individuals resort to in the process, for example, which culturally established ways of speaking and setting topics are generally opportune, available, and assertive. However, communication power does not unfold in this point, but – as the material analysis shows – in the setting of frames that are followed. We can thus show that a specific form of resonance formation is practiced in the media format of online commentary and that a form of social order formation can be observed that

230

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

takes place communicatively through acts of positioning. However, these do not determine modes of subjectivation, but at best prefigure them. In this respect, subjectivity is not inherent to a digital, analogue or otherwise well-founded nature, but is a fluid entity in a network of subject positions that are communicatively and performatively produced, stabilised and continued, and can also disintegrate again. In this sense, subjectivity has no original medium to which it is statically bound, but is at best brought into different opportunities for form via different communicative frameworks of media genres. Therefore, we can speak of digital practices that lead to subjectification, and the technically enabled scope leads to modes of subjectification that have not come to the fore so far, if we take the online commentary area as a comparatively anarchic discourse space. At the same time, we note that subjectivity does not disappear with digital communication; on the contrary, it can be argued that communication in online comment areas demands subjectivity; it even functions as a generator of subjectification. With regard to processes of mediatization, we therefore assume that media communication – depending on the respective media format – sets the conditions for staging subjectivity in different constellations. The commentary area not only structures the conditions for this differently, but also places the well-rehearsed culture of discussion7 under different auspices. Imagine that in a face-to-face communication one would be constantly confronted with replies such as “you have completely lost touch with reality”, “I don’t want to repeat myself”, “you pull this popanza out of your bag of tricks”, “have you ever dealt with sub-fields of mathematics such as mathematical logic?”, “surely not, otherwise you could falsify some of your statements yourself”, as can be observed in the online comments section (here too: lotus flowers). This may be part of the repertoire of some experienced politicians in talk shows or other discussion groups, but it is rather not part of the standards of ad hoc discussions between people unknown to each other, moreover in a discussion area usually higher educated people. The anonymity of the net and the physical non-presence of the participants, for example through a lack of gestural resonance, creates other free and protective spaces here and sets other buffer qualities for regulating affect. The question of our contribution was directed at how certain frameworks have to be set in online commentary areas so that it is possible to establish interpretive sovereignty in discussions, or in other words: to install centres of action on stages of action. Taking this further, one could ask whether communication in digital areas

7 “Discussion culture” is used here in an everyday language understanding and does not connect to Gabe theories.

Subject Staging and Communication Power Digital

231

requires very specific frames and whether these are additionally supported by the staging of certain subject figures with hegemonic potential. Whether online communication, or especially communication in commentary areas – and here again especially in certain sections and via the respective audiences involved – produces special subject figures is a point that was not the focus of the empirical consideration here. Nevertheless, it could be asked in perspective whether communication in commentary areas favors and promotes special subject figures.

References Austin, J. L. (1979). Zur Theorie der Sprechakte. (How to do things with words). Reclam. Ayaß, R. (2004). Konversationsanalytische Medienforschung. Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, 1, 5–29. Bohnsack, R. (2003). Orientierungsmuster. In R. Bohnsack, W. Marotzki, & M. Meuser (Eds.), Hauptbegriffe Qualitativer Sozialforschung. Ein Wörterbuch (pp. 132–133). Leske + Budrich. Bourdieu, P. (1976). Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis auf der ethnologischen Grundlage der kabylischen Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp. Bourdieu, P. (2005). Was heißt sprechen? zur Ökonomie des sprachlichen Tausches. Braumüller. Döring, N. (2010). Sozialkontakte online: Identitäten, Beziehung, Gemeinschaft. In W. Schweiger & K. Beck (Eds.), Handbuch Online-Kommunikation (pp. 159–183). VS Verlag. Dudenredaktion, Wissenschaftlicher Rat. (2017). Duden: Die deutsche Rechtschreibung (Bd. 1, 24. völlig neu bearb. u. erw.). Dudenverlag. Fuhrmann, M. (2011). Die antike Rhetorik. Eine Einführung. Artemis & Winkler. Klein, W. (1980). Argumentation und Argument. Vanderhoek & Ruprecht. Koch, P., & Oesterreicher, W. (1985). Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz. Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spannungsfeld von Sprachtheorie und Sprachgeschichte. Romanistisches Jahrbuch, 36, 15–43. Krais, B., & Gebauer, G. (2017). Habitus (6th ed.). transcript. Krotz, F. (2001). Die Mediatisierung kommunikativen Handelns. Der Wandel von Alltag und sozialen Beziehungen, Kultur und Gesellschaft durch die Medien. Westdeutscher Verlag. Krotz, F., & Hepp, A. (2012). Mediatisierte Welten. Forschungsfelder und Beschreibungsansätze. VS Verlag. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2000). Leben in Metaphern. Konstruktion und Gebrauch von Sprachbildern (2. Aufl.). Carl Auer. Lucius-Hoehne, G., & Deppermann, A. (2004). Narrative Identität und Positionierung. Gesprächsforschung – Online-Zeitschrift zur verbalen Interaktion, 5, 166–183. http:// www.gespraechsforschung-ozs.de/heft2004/ga-lucius.pdf. Accessed 6 Juni 2016 Maleyka, L., & Oswald, S. (2017). Wenn “Genderwahn” zur “Tautologie” wird. Diskursstrukturen und Kommunikationsmacht in Online-Kommentarbereichen. Zeitschrift für Diskursforschung, 2(17), 159–182.

232

H. Herma and L. Maleyka

Mikos, L. (2005). Alltag und Mediatisierung. In L. Mikos & C. Wegener (Eds.), Qualitative Medienforschung. Ein Handbuch (pp. 80–94). UVK. Przyborski, A. (2004). Gesprächsanalyse und dokumentarische Methode. Qualitative Auswertung von Gesprächen, Gruppendiskussionen und anderen Diskursen. VS Verlag. Rehbein, B. (2007). Bourdieus Habitusbegriff und Wittgensteins Sprachphilosophie. In A. Lenger, C. Schneickert, & F. Schumacher (Eds.), Pierre Bourdieus Konzept des Habitus. Grundlagen, Zugänge, Forschungsperspektiven (pp. 123–128). Springer. Reichertz, J. (2009). Kommunikationsmacht. Was ist Kommunikation und was vermag sie? Und weshalb vermag sie das? VS Verlag. Sacks, H. (1984). Notes on methodology. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures of social action. studies in conversation analysis (pp. 21–27). Cambridge University Press. Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversations. Language, 50(4), 696–735. Schmidt, J.-H. (2011). Das neue Netz. Merkmale, Praktiken und Folgen des Web 2.0. UVK. Schuegraf, M., & Meier, S. (2005). Chat- und Forenanalyse. In L. Mikos & C. Wegener (Eds.), Handbuch Qualitative Medienforschung (pp. 425–435). UTB. Searle, J. R. (2007). Sprechakte. Ein sprachphilosophischer Essay. Suhrkamp. Spitzmüller, J., & Warnke, I. H. (2011). Diskurslinguistik: eine Einführung in Theorien und Methoden der transtextuellen Sprachanalyse. De Gruyter. Stegbauer, C., & Rausch, A. (2001). Die schweigende Mehrheit – “Lurker” in internetbasierten Diskussionsforen. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 30(1), 48–64. Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1979). An introduction to reasoning (2nd ed.). Macmillan. Ueding, G., & Steinbrink, B. (2005). Grundriß der Rhetorik. Geschichte, Techniken, Methode. Metzler. Weimer, W. (2005). Logisches Argumentieren. Reclam.

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education Kerstin Jergus Abstract

The article illuminates the connection between education, subject and mediality from an educational science perspective. Based on current developments in the light of digitalized media, it discusses how the education of the subject is categorically and procedurally connected with mediality. It is shown that educational processes fundamentally have a medial side. This becomes clear, among other things, from the fact that technologies of the self and of knowledge are historically and systematically interwoven with education, just as pedagogical relations take shape through processes of mediation. As a result, it is shown how the relational mediation in the ‘in-between’ is fundamental for educational processes.

1

Introduction: From the Pedagogization of the Media

Current mediatisation processes are increasingly calling for appropriate education in the age of digitalised and technologised living, working and social conditions: Concerted political initiatives and programmes such as the recently launched “Education Offensive for the Digital Knowledge Society” (BMBF 2016) state that there is an urgent need to catch up in the area of education and dealing with digitalised media. The focus here is on enabling citizens to participate in sociocultural life and employees to carry out and cope with digitalised working K. Jergus (✉) University of Technology Braunschweig, Braunschweig, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_12

233

234

K. Jergus

environments (BMBF 2016, p. 2 ff.). These and other initiatives articulate not only the concern for (societal) survival in an increasingly digitised future, but also the conviction that the gap between what is humanly possible and what is technologically possible can be minimised through appropriate educational measures. At the same time, such initiatives are supported by the more or less clear insinuation that educational and learning worlds have so far been subject to a certain media oblivion or even abstinence. Although there is much to be said for the diagnosis of a forgetfulness of the media in pedagogical theories and pedagogical settings, media-didactic rather than media-pedagogical considerations dominate in large parts of the discussions, and this also applies in particular to the “education offensive” mentioned above. The focus is on the ability to deal with media and thus the idea of instrumental mastery of media technology arrangements is privileged. From such a competence-oriented perspective, media become things and objects to be used and operated as instruments. In this way, the mediality embedded in pedagogical processes recedes into the background. There is a wide range of work that assigns media an important place in the context of socialisation processes (Vollbrecht & Wegener, 2009), and there is also a great deal of research activity in which specific media genres such as film, cinema and literature are examined in terms of their educational theoretical content (Wimmer et al., 2009; Sanders et al., 2016; Koller & Rieger-Ladich, 2005; Zahn, 2012). A common trait of these approaches can be seen in the fact that media are conceived here as something that confronts human beings. However, as Käte Meyer-Drawe (1995) writes, the seemingly self-evident opposition between humans and media technology has emerged from and is interwoven with the specific history of Western Europe, in which technical developments and conceptions of humans are closely intertwined and have at no time remained untouched by the “signature of the technical” (Meyer-Drawe, 1995, p. 359). If one follows the reflections of Michael Wimmer (2014), there is a categorical proximity in educational thinking to ambitions of optimization and perfection, which makes any dichotomous juxtaposition of humanistically oriented education here and inhuman media technology there questionable. The attempt to privilege a humanistic education and separate it from a media-technical side, according to Wimmer’s critique, refers to “a certain non-thinking of the technical, which is conceived as something external, secondary, purely instrumental and object-like, and is set against the human as subject” (Wimmer, 2014, p. 239). This understanding of the opposition between media and human beings is embedded in a tradition of media-theoretical ideas of media as human extensions and tools (McLuhan, 1964), which corresponds

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

235

to a long tradition of thinking about subject formation ‘by means of’ the world and things in educational theory. The semantics and practices of ‘mediation’ stand in a broader horizon of reference to pedagogical processes than a reduced perspective on media as instruments of human references to the world and the self is able to catch up with. For such a narrowing of perspective obscures the fact that the antagonism between media and human beings has not come about without media traces and images in which people have revealed their humanity. By contrast, those media-theoretical perspectives that take into account the mediatory quality of media are more far-reaching at this point. “Mediality,” as Benjamin Jörissen (2017, p. 441), for example, puts it, “refers [...] to that constitutive level without which no sign, ergo no meaning, ergo no culture and no aesthetics would be conceivable. But what comes to appear in medial processes [...] are signs, not media themselves”. The medial cannot be experienced in itself, but only in its effects. Consequently, one characteristic of mediality consists less in the technical side than in the fact that media perform relations without themselves being the relatum of a reference (Krämer, 1998). With Gerhard Gamm (2004, p. 160), mediality can thus be understood as a “global means of exchanging socially agreed signs” and thus as a “transformation space of information, power, knowledge and energy”. In this broader sense, mediality is understood as “that which is in between, intervenes, the middle or the mediating” (Krämer, 1998). Such a broader understanding of mediality1 is able to catch up with the extent to which the mediating dimension of education and upbringing disappears from view through a narrowing to media-technical apparatuses and their modes of application or reception. On the other hand, from the point of view of the mediating relation, the systematic implication of the medial in pedagogical processes – for example, also in semantic and practical aspects of ‘mediation’ – can be brought to the fore. Against this background, the following remarks make it their concern to illuminate the formation of the subject from the point of view of the mediality of the pedagogical. This is done in three steps: Historically and systematically, it is shown how education in its modern form as ‘general human education’ is related to developments in media technology in terms of social and conceptual history (Sect. 2). This is followed by a categorical examination of how education as an interrelationship between the self and the world is constitutively related to the

1

The categorical, analytical and semantic differences and references between mediality and mediatization are elaborated in Hepp (2014), while an empirical perspective on mediatization processes is grounded by Krotz (2017).

236

K. Jergus

possibility of an ‘in-between space’ and draws on a logic of transgression (Sect. 3). In a third perspective, the medial dimension of the ‘in-between’ is discussed at the level of pedagogical processes, which are always embedded in social relations of intersubjectivity and determined by mediations (Sect. 4). Finally, the connection between pedagogization and mediatization is bundled and related to the media oblivion of the pedagogical (Sect. 5).

2

On the Formation of the Subject in Technoanthropologies

The notion of education that still shapes us today cannot be deciphered without its medial mediation in and through technologies of humanization, for example through modern sciences and through modern institutions such as schools. The word technology already contains the connection between productive production (techné) and the interwoven formation of ways of conceiving the possible (logos). This connection between techné and logos can also be found in the pedagogical tradition of thought, which in various respects follows the view that man is brought forth in and through education. Bildung’ has a future relation to ‘Bild’ or ‘Bildhaftigkeit’ and in this etymological trace refers to a technological grounding. In the gerund ‘Bild-ung’ there is not only a procedural but also a productive dimension. Historically, the pedagogical tradition can hardly be separated from the media-induced images that people have made of their humanity.2 The pictorial mediation stands at one of the beginnings of ancient educational traditions, when, for example, in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, the educational course of man is structured by manifold forms of the pictorial – the medium of the parable, the shadow projections of the transient, the sun as an image of the eternal idea of the good, etc. This idea is also found in the Neoplatonic and Christian conception of an absolute order that can be experienced through participation in the eternal truth or the divine doctrine of creation. This idea is also found in the Neoplatonic and Christian conception of an absolute order that can be experienced through participation in the eternal truth or the divine doctrine of creation. In the course of social and technical changes during the Renaissance, the question of the

2

Conceptions of imagery are still largely moderated by the Platonic, metaphysicaleschatological image-image dichotomy (Mersch, 2014), with the result that the understanding of education interwoven with this is still largely presented as an imitative or representationallogical appropriation of the world, and the medial character is concealed.

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

237

position of man in relation to this absolute order arises. In the early Renaissance, Pico della Mirandola rewrote the image of man in the image of God (imago dei) as a similarity with regard to the fundamental possibility of free creative activity. The puppets and clockworks that emerged in this period shaped the idea of being able to move and bring forth things and objects in the world. Thus the Renaissance humanist Comenius, whose pedagogical reflections are situated on the threshold of modern educational thought, was also convinced of the fundamental possibility and necessity of human participation (collusor dei) in the realization of the divine order. In order to make this harmonious order comprehensible to man, Comenius not only advocated a general education accessible to all, he also developed textbooks in which the recognisable world (Orbis Sensualium Pictus, Comenius, 1658) was depicted in its divine orderliness and was given to man to recognise – from today’s point of view, the first didactic teaching media designed to convey and show. Such an understanding of the human being as a creative and self-determined subject is no longer founded in an eschatological conception of order in the modern era; rather, the subject itself is made the ground of any reference to order. For the modern educational thinking of the Enlightenment and, above all, of New Humanism, the human is no longer regarded merely as an element in an irrevocable and transcendent order, but as the measure and centre of any order, i.e. one that is also possible in other ways. The study of man, as it was formed in the emerging new logic of science as an ordering dissection of the world through disciplines of being and as a disciplining of man (Foucault, 1974), intensified this question of the relationship between man and social order. The modern conceptions of man as an intrinsic being are shaped not least by semantic traces and images of technical machines (Meyer-Drawe, 1997), which, guided by an inner centre – in the language of education: the law of reason, the educational instinct or the moral law – receive a drive and an orientation. It is no coincidence that the neo-humanist conception of pedagogy as an education starting from the human being and oriented towards the holistic bringing forth of the human being emerges in that period of incipient industrialization, in which technical developments, machine processes and dissected work steps made the romantic stylization of the human being as self-purposeful, holistic and natural all the more fascinating. In terms of social history, technologies such as printing and media such as money led to the formation of modern social relations. The concept of man as a

238

K. Jergus

legal subject and citizen3 was strongly interwoven with the nation-state dimensioning of education as a public task. To this day, it can be seen that – as an example, let us recall the “education offensive” mentioned at the beginning – nation-state interests and societal requirements are translated into pedagogized formats of change and empowerment of the individual (Tröhler, 2016).4 This modern notion of the human being as a citizen brought forth through education is also closely interwoven with colonial projections of the alien and the uncivilized – both within modern society in the “medium of the child” (Luhmann, 2006) and outside modern societies in the image of the “savage.” The establishment of modern institutionalized education in the late 18th century was based not least on the media of teaching developed specifically in this context, such as textbooks. The form of extensive reading (as opposed to the repetitive reading of the old Latin schools) that spread through book printing and literacy, not least in the emerging fictional literature, inscribed an aesthetic space of experience of what was also possible in other ways in the self- and social relations. Consequently, in terms of social and conceptual history, there is a close connection between humanistic anthropology and educational thinking, the mediatechnical traces of which often remain concealed. This forgetting of the medial side of education and its media-technical signatures in conceptual and social history currently leads, in view of the possibilities transcending the human being – and producing transhumanist ambitions – more and more frequently to education being displaced and replaced by medial and digitalized offers of optimization and technologies of perfection.5 The expansion of mediatized teaching-learning settings – for example in the form of databases, learning platforms and ‘tutorials’ – permeates pedagogical settings, it overwrites and replaces pedagogical practices. Privatised and individualised media and digital formats increasingly permeate the 3

The anthropology of educational thought contains not only a Eurocentric, but above all an androcentric view, which – not only beginning with Rousseau’s twofold educational process of Emile and Sophie – undermined the supposed universality of modern educational thought through particularizations, such as the two-gender order. 4 This ‘pattern’ of pedagogizing social and political problematic situations, which is currently also evident in a very similar way in the fields of migration and inclusion, very often served in the past as well as in the present to depoliticize socio-structural problematic situations such as social inequality and the consequences of globalization, which are directly borne, caused and experienced in and through developments in media technology. 5 This can be seen, for example, in possibilities for improvement at the level of physicalphysical phenomena, as well as in increasing physiological interventions, ranging from bodily enhancements to neuro-enhancement, which point to the limits of conventional concepts of health, development and education (Schäfer, 2015).

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

239

space of education. In particular, these mostly commercially and economically organized formats promise improved and more efficient education through greater individualization; MOOC’s come to mind here, for example, as does the proliferation of OER’s. These formats are oriented towards and in part imitate traditional pedagogical formats of teaching and learning, whereby a specific orientation becomes predominant that encodes individualisation as personalisation (Ode, 2014). Something similar can be observed with regard to current datafication techniques, such as forms of ‘self-tracking’, which promise to improve individual lives through recording and incentive mechanisms. This claim to be able to improve human life in every respect not only raises the question of the possibilities and limits of the human. It also directly affects, if not challenges and overwrites, the possibility and legitimacy of public education. However, a competence-oriented view that declares media to be instruments of the human being and didactically foregrounds the use of media obscures the fundamental connection between media and education. In particular, such a conception remains conceptless and speechless in relation to the penetrations of the human by media. The notion of an instrumental mastery of the media makes it impossible to bring to bear and experience the distance between individuals and the world that characterizes modern educational thinking. This results in the fundamental necessity of paying attention to the media traces in the educational process itself.

3

About Education as a Process of Mediation and Transgression

While up to this point the focus has been on the socio-historical and conceptual connection between the formation of the subject and the mediality of education, the following section will examine the concept of education on a categorical level with regard to the points of reference to mediality embedded in it. To this end, it is useful to look at the foundations of modern educational thought in order to uncover its categorial content for media-theoretical considerations. Special attention is thus paid to the systematic implications of the relation between subject and world, which makes media necessary. The modern version of education, as it was prominently formulated by Wilhelm von Humboldt as the “most general, regeste und freieste Wechselwirkung” (Humboldt, 1980, p. 235) between ego and world, already presupposes a decisive motif of modernity. The human being of modernity is not fixed in an order of eschatological or metaphysical doctrine of unity in which his place, identity, and

240

K. Jergus

becoming would already be perfectly determined. The distinction of man formulated by Rousseau in the second Discours through “perfectibilité”, the fundamental indeterminacy of man, presents him as a changeable being capable of perfection, but not (yet) perfect. Already in Rousseau’s work, there is an irrevocable tension between the potentiality of perfection and the constant threat of its failure. The indeterminacy of man is the one important side of this modern idea of education. This view opens up the fundamental possibility of imagining a changeability of the human being – as well as of human structures of order – and thus also implies a fundamental distance from determinations of purpose of any kind. Following Kant’s explanation of the self-purposefulness of man, Humboldt understands education as that event which comes to man qua his freedom from causal-legal determinations and in which his humanity takes shape. The second important aspect of this concept of education lies in the emphasis it places on the worldliness or sociality of the educational process (Dörpinghaus, 2004). For Humboldt’s conception of education, it is crucial that education is not understood as an internal event of the individual. In order to make education possible, Humboldt writes, “[...] man needs a world outside himself” (Humboldt, 1980, p. 235). Without a reference to an other of the self, to the world outside the ego, education is not possible. Yet this world, which Humboldt generally defines negatively as “non-ego (i.e. world)” (Humboldt, 1980), is not readily accessible to the self. It requires the self-activity of the human being to expose himself to the multiform world and at the same time to show himself receptive to it and to open up to it. The decisive factor is therefore a distance, a ‘non-identity’ and thus a strangeness between the self and the world, which characterises the educational process. Stepping out of a self-referential individualism, whose monadological traces can still be found in Humboldt’s understanding of individuality, is central to education. There is a rift between the world and the subject that opens up the space for educational experiences (Thompson, 2009). The world and the self remain mutually unavailable, there is a fundamental difference between them. Education’ addresses that mediating in-between area – that ‘medium’ – in which the relations of this constellation (ego and world) separate from and relate to each other. At this point, Humboldt’s theory of language provides important indications that education cannot be thought of as beginning with the ‘entry’ into the world as the starting point of this interrelation. By means of language(s), the ego is always connected to the world, the world is always already proportionately in it. Language exists temporally and spatially prior to the individual: language comes upon the individual, it is for Humboldt (2013) the ‘forming organ of thought’ as a medium of knowledge of self and world, from which the self is at no point able

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

241

to fully distance itself.6 For this reason, for Humboldt, the study of languages also does not represent an exclusive supplementary program or an exemplar among others. According to Humboldt (2013, p. 191), every language contains a “view of the world” (Humboldt, p. 223); for Humboldt, speech is a medium of experiencing the self and the world (Wimmer, 2009). It is this constitutive difference between the self and the world that sets in motion a permanent relationship of mediation, a medial reference of the infinite transgression of the one towards the other and vice versa.7 Education is thus a place of “inbetween” (Thompson & Jergus, 2014), where the modern subject enters into a relation with the social order. Against the background of current developments in the field of digitalized media worlds, these considerations can be used to develop the question of how such ‘inbetween spaces’ can (still) emerge, where a void or a distance can be experienced. In particular, the enormous expansion of datafication processes makes differences between the individual and his or her world disappear, shrinks or destroys spaces of ‘non-identity’. This can be said with regard to personal and data protection aspects of new control possibilities in public spaces, as well as in the claim of different datafication apps to record all areas of lifestyle from sleep to child rearing to nutrition in a personalized and individualized way. Spaces of unavailability and the experience of the unknown are marginalized, if not marked and perceived as disturbances. For Humboldt, the relational interaction between the ego and the world was still a movement oriented towards harmonious reconciliation. However, doubts have been raised about the reconciliation ideas of a harmonious interrelation between subject and social order from the very beginning, the conciseness of which became particularly clear not least in the horizon of the experience of fascism and late capitalism. It was Max Horkheimer (1985), among others, who rejected the classical version of education on the basis of the observation that the “process of education had turned into that of processing” (Horkheimer, 1985, p. 411). “There is nothing left untrodden” (Horkheimer, 1985), Horkheimer writes, referring to the lack of space of a mediating between that could make experience possible. According to Horkheimer, the reified world no longer offers an unprocessed access that is not 6

This implies an indelible strangeness in one’s own, which is called alterity (Jergus, 2017; Schäfer, 2004; Wimmer, 2013). 7 The logic of a process that is set in motion that emerges here not only contains traces of a technical language of machine production on the semantic level (Meyer-Drawe, 1996), but also conceals the fact that there is no beginning and no end to this process in the strict sense (Dörpinghaus, 2003).

242

K. Jergus

already pre-structured and grasped. Here, with regard to mediatization tendencies, a connection could be seen that concerns the current transformation of public spheres and, in particular, their fragmentation in new media. Pre-structured information and world mediation in the context of new social media, adapted to the consumer behaviour of users, vividly demonstrate how the neglect of the worldly part can lead to an immunisation against the concerns of the social and cultural world (Simanowski, 2018). What tends to be lost in this personalized and excerpt-oriented approach to the world is, in an increasingly comprehensive way, the possibility of experiencing something unknown and misunderstood at all. The transgression of one’s own towards a world as well as the coming of the world towards one’s own, both movements have already come to a standstill in Horkheimer’s view, in that highly industrialized processes of late modernity have completely understood man and the world. According to Horkheimer, this results in a view that truncates education as the appropriation of the world. The subject is used as an agent of world mastery and disposition, and education is consequently only conceivable as self-education in the sense of self-perfection. In contrast, Horkheimer (1985, p. 415) refers to the necessity of “devotion to a cause”. The fact that “appropriation is not enough”, as Horkheimer (1985, p. 415) writes, but that education goes hand in hand with becoming alien to oneself and a fundamental change in the way one relates to the self and the world, is repeatedly emphasized in current educational theory (Koller, 2012; Thompson, 2009; Schäfer, 2011). However, the categorical logic of transgression and perfection in educational thinking has not infrequently led to the privileging of self-education and the blunting of the social side of education (Pongratz & Bünger, 2008). If education is mainly founded on egology and thought of as appropriation, but less as a process of transgression and translation in the interstice of world and self, this entails not least the problem of becoming language- and conceptless in the face of demands for optimisation (Mayer et al., 2013). The permanent self-observation and provision of personal data through Big Data may be considered here as an example. The possibilities of automatic facial recognition can be and are seamlessly used – stored and used by global corporate groups through the active assistance of those who have their private photos identified by algorithms – for increased control and surveillance. The boundaries of access to the self are thereby not determined by the self in a way that can be seen – no matter how media-savvy that self may be. Rather, access possibilities and rights to individuals are monopolized by supranational corporations removed from public debate and shared co-determination, without the need for and ability to know about this connection for the competent use of digitalized media.

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

243

In this respect, the transgression of the self towards the world can hardly appear otherwise than as a transgression of the human, from which transhumanist ambitions of overcoming human deficiencies feed (Wimmer, 2014). Both the dichotomizing separation between world and self and, as described by Horkheimer, the congruent interlocking of world and self make it impossible to experience an in-between, that relational middle, through which a reference between the relations of the relationship – ego and world, self and social order, subject and society – can arise in the first place. Up to this point, it has been worked out in two respects how the formation of the subject is to be understood as an event of transgression: both with regard to the anthropotechnical formation of neo-humanist-bourgeois subjectivity and in the categorial version of formation as an interrelationship in the ‘between’ of ego and world. In this way, it was possible to illustrate how the formation of the subject (in the double genitive) is always integrated into medial conditions and made possible by them. In this respect, both in social history and in the history of ideas, the becoming of the human being as a subject is grasped through projections and images of the transgression of the given in educational processes. For this, mediamediated techniques and as well as “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1993) were and are always of fundamental importance. From this point of view, we can ask, in relation to current media technologies, how the possibility and structure of the ‘inbetween’ is currently constituted. What options are there for experiencing the ‘untrodden’, for surrendering to something or for experiencing the new and unknown? How can we forget and take a new perspective in datafied spaces? Is change – entering a new space, taking on a different position, etc. – (still) possible?

4

On the Mediality of the Pedagogical

Up to this point, it has been possible to demonstrate how the formation of the subject has a medial side in terms of social history and conceptual system. The constitutive dimension of the ‘in-between’, which seems to be increasingly marginalized or abolished in current datafication and digitalization arrangements, proved to be central. In the following, attention will be focused on the procedural dimension of education, since here, too, relational in-between spaces determine the possibility of pedagogical processes. This can be shown in particular in three respects: The relation between generations, the relation between subjects in pedagogical interactions, and the relation to the other or the third party.

244

K. Jergus

It is not only with modern pedagogy and Schleiermacher’s famous dictum that the present of the child should not be sacrificed to its future that the relationship between the generations has been at the centre of pedagogical questions and problems. The Platonic periagogé or Comenius’s renaissance humanist notion of education as imitatio point to the problem that there is an irremediable gap between what exists and what is to come. Even though Plato and Comenius imagined the question of generationality as a disciplining indenture into the existing, they nevertheless point to the problem that the existing is not readily transmitted. The fact of human finitude calls into question the substance of every order, whose forcible closure through ontologizing gestures of substantializing existing orders has always implied a close connection between politics and pedagogy. In contrast to the claims to determinacy of ancient and Christian eschatologies, which attempted to bring people and order into a perfect relationship, the modern conception of human indeterminacy and capacity for change poses the question of the order appropriate to human beings in the long term. The relation between the present and the coming generations no longer becomes an issue solely on the basis of the power of existing orders, but in modernity generates an ongoing conflictuality, in which the modern profession and theory of pedagogy intervenes as mediation and translation. The politicity of this generational relationship is highlighted by Hannah Arendt (2000), for example, as a question of the new in the sign of birth. The arrival of the new and the possibility of beginning, as Jan Masschelein (1996) then concludes, constitutes pedagogy as a response event. Pedagogy does not result precisely from the superiority of a position of knowledge, which occurs as the mediation and transmission of the given – the disciplining and cultivation. Pedagogy arises from the questioning and questioning of the given and reveals a fundamental defencelessness as well as culpability in answering. With regard to mediatized and digitalized lifeworlds, this relation of generational orders can currently be related above all to newer reproductive technologies that claim to be able to optimize or even erase the openness to the future. In particular, however, databases and learning environments promise to be able to preserve and process what is knowable and recognizable in the world, independent of tradition and mediation. In this context, the question can be raised as to how the political moment in processes of transmission – as that which is able to point beyond the disciplining indentation of the existing – can come to bear and how the irreversible gap between transmission and the new can be brought to bear. Furthermore, the mediating interstices can be addressed from the point of view of relations in pedagogical relationships. Pedagogical processes take place in the medium of intersubjectivity, which creates the addresses and relations of

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

245

pedagogical relationships. In the pedagogical relationship, the positional addressing of the relations of this constellation as pedagogue and addressee takes place – even where a position of superiority is claimed through an advantage in knowledge and experience. Intersubjectivity is in this respect prior to any sovereign subjectivity, as subjects are constituted in social and other relations and learn themselves from others (Meyer-Drawe, 1990; Ricken, 2013). Against this background, Norbert Ricken and Nicole Balzer write that recognition is a “medium of the pedagogical” (Balzer & Ricken, 2010; Ricken, 2016, p. 142), insofar as in processes of recognition moments of speech and address fall into one another in the act of addressing. Recognition takes place – this is also argued against a purely moral-theoretical notion of praising appreciative action (Hetzel, 2011) – as a performative act of identity formation. Addressing invocations form the place in which a self is to locate itself (Butler, 2001). As has already been argued in relation to the medial position of language for world and self-knowledge, this points to the fact that a “self emerges through others” (Schäfer & Thompson, 2010, p. 11), and thus otherness and strangeness are prior to the self. For pedagogical constellations, this means not only that the relations of the pedagogical relationship exist neither spatially nor temporally prior to this relationship, as if they were first entering a pedagogical space that could be exited again at will or according to external standards. Rather, pedagogical relations create these addresses in the first place, in that individuals are included in pedagogical relations through addressing invocations – as a child, as a pedagogue, as a pupil, and so on. From this point of view, it becomes clear why we can speak of a pedagogical event at all: The starting point lies in the openness to experience and the possibility of change of subjectivity – the possibility of being addressed by and through others. This medium of intersubjectivity – together with the relation between the generations – is increasingly and first and foremost overwritten by digitalized media, in that individuals are made addresses of pedagogical ambitions and are required to understand themselves as such, for example as ‘information recipients’ or ‘knowledge acquirers’. In the process, the practice of addressing is lost sight of, which not least contains the option of being able to place oneself in a relationship to the invocations. Reference has already been made to the overwriting of the individual through personalisation, for example in ‘tutorials’ or ‘MOOCs’. The relationality of educational processes is dissolved here, as modes of countability, dissection and visibility dominate, encoding address and addressability as ‘information content’ and ‘information processing’. Knowledge transfer processes are consequently only perceived as transfer problems, which require more efficient teachers and learners and demand the optimization of teaching-learning settings. As a result, knowledge appears as an object of appropriation, the self of education as an

246

K. Jergus

address of information processing and the world as a learning environment (Masschelein & Simons, 2007). The world as well as the self are treated in learning environments as identifiable and objective addresses of intervention and access. The word learning environment resonates with the notion of a passport-like connection between self and world that no longer requires mediation or translation between these relations. Closely related to this, a third relation – that to the Other – must be taken into account. Not only are generational structures determined by processes of mediation between tradition and innovation through socio-cultural references, but the intersubjectivity of pedagogical processes also goes beyond a two-digit relation. Pedagogical processes take place both with and in front of others, who are the counterpart and part of pedagogical processes – as a class, as a school community, as a social space, as a listener, etc. The social dimension is central to educational thinking. The social dimension, which is central to educational thinking, is increasingly being lost from view, as it seems to interfere with or threaten the efficiency and progress of individual possibilities for optimisation. The medial place in the in-between, which first figures the subject positions of teachers and learners in pedagogical relations, can be linked to theories of the third (Bedorf, 2010): The figure of the third is characterized precisely by not possessing a substantial quality as an identity that can be ontologized and attributed, nor is it a substantial-physical dimension in the sense of an instrument of transmission. Rather, as the other of others – as a third position, as a boundary, as a difference – it enables references between ego and alter, between self and world, etc. (Fischer et al., 2010). The figure of the third mediates and interrupts, it opens up the in-between as a space of translation. In relation to pedagogical processes, this means that more and other is present in them than is represented in the structure of dyadic relations. The blinding off of the medial side of education – which transcends every dyadicity through a third – not infrequently leads to marking the limits of the disposal of oneself and others then as a failure in practice, for instance as a failure of pedagogical agency or as an individual developmental or learning deficit. Objectification ambitions that stylize subjects as bearers of knowledge and experience invisibilize the relational center, the level of entanglement, and the power of orders that eludes any attribution to intentional acts.

5

From the Pedagogisation of the Media to the Mediality of the Pedagogical

The train of thought developed here followed an arc that ran from the pedagogisation of the media via the education of the subject to the mediality of the pedagogical. In the balance of this train of thought, it was possible to show how

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

247

a superficial competence orientation as a concern for the ability to deal with media technologies falls short. For such a reduction would not only cause the double genitive in the formation of the subject to be forgotten, by blunting how ideas of the human being as a subject are marked by media-technical traces. The dichotomous juxtaposition of man and media also obscures the medial side of subject formation by stylizing media as a reified object of appropriation and disposal. If, on the other hand, the idea is taken up that pedagogy and mediality are interconnected in a more fundamental way than the calls for the empowerment of competent ways of dealing with media and digitalisation suggest, then these demands seem to be about more and different things. In this context, it can be pointed out that the current mediatization tendencies in the form of increasingly privatized educational arrangements, as they emerge with ‘MOOCs’, ‘tutorials’ and algorithmic databases, are accompanied by a more fundamental shift between the spheres of the public and the private. The current penetration of the public by individualized privatisms, as well as the unbounded encroachment of the public on the private, can also be perceived for pedagogical spaces. The personalization and identification of world and self offered in digitalized educational spaces, which promises to offer learning opportunities that are tailored to fit and need and to level out the necessity of space and time for education, therefore has consequences for the impossible experience that has been circumscribed by education. For example, concepts such as ‘lifelong learning’ assert the identity of learning and life, which can apparently be implemented in all areas of life by means of digitalised media with few resources, without still relying on education and mediation. Instead of the worldliness of the self that is constitutive in educational thinking, an ‘immunisation’ (Masschelein & Simons, 2005) towards all worldly parts becomes predominant in the formation of the self, which no longer makes spaces of translation or crossing between spheres seem necessary or desirable. In this way, the assignable allocation of instrumental availability over self and world forces immunizing “illusions of autonomy” (MeyerDrawe, 1990) that seeks to sever relations with the world and others and transfer them into calculable, passport-like relations. Such an immunized subject is urged to purge itself of the touches and testimonies of others, and to treat all social and media references only as voiceless noise (Rancière, 2002) without any possibility of reference. The media oblivion in the education of the subject has the consequence that the tense, fundamentally conflictual difference between world and self is made to disappear, the relation between self and world that is constitutive for education is made impossible. Both world and self become identifiable and objective addresses of interventions and accesses in ‘learning environments’. All those forms of

248

K. Jergus

‘devotion’ and entanglement that made the formation of the subject possible in the interstice of education in the first place are thus consigned to speechlessness. Contradictions, ambivalence and conflict disappear, because they do not present themselves as offers of learning and in the form of options, but rather allow a limit to emerge in experience, in knowledge, in speech. A technologized understanding of knowledge as transferable information, in the consequence of which self and world are understood as sender and receiver, as uniform poles of an information channel (Kittler, 1997), leads not least to an all the more comprehensive control and disciplining option of access to the identity of the subject understood as an attributable unit. Not without reason, however, the modern formulation of education was closely related to the establishment of a public sphere, which as a space of experience and reference of a supra-individual (and always precarious) ‘common’ contained the possibility of transcending the given and being able to leave a position. Since antiquity, the notion of education has been very closely tied to boundary relations and transgressions between oikos and polis, and recurs in various respects to a ‘whole’ that transcends idiosyncratic self-reflection. Following the theoretical figure of the third, this sphere of the public can be conceived as a medial in-between, as an unassociated space in which other and more can become present than univocal attributions to acting subject addresses are able to deal with. This opening towards the other is constitutive for the formation of the subject. Forgetting the medial side in the formation of the subject closes off the constitutive, medial position of the in-between, in which subject and social order or I and world could enter into a relationship.

References Arendt, H. (2000). Die Krise in der Erziehung. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Übungen im politischen Denken (Bd. 1, S. 255–269). Fink. Balzer, N., & Ricken, N. (2010). Anerkennung als pädagogisches Problem. Markierungen im erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs. In A. Schäfer & C. Thompson (Eds.), Anerkennung (pp. 35–87). Schöningh. Bedorf, T. (2010). Verkennende Anerkennung. Über Identität und Politik. Suhrkamp. Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF). (2016). Bildungsoffensive für die digitale Wissensgesellschaft. Strategie des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung. Butler, J. (2001). Psyche der Macht. Das Subjekt der Unterwerfung. .

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

249

Comenius, J. A. (1658). Orbis sensualium pictus. Faksimile-Ausgabe. http://www.hsaugsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost17/Comenius/com_o000.html. Accessed 17 Dez 2017. Dörpinghaus, A. (2003). Von unbewegten und bewegten Bewegern. Bildungstheoretische Vermerke zur Frage nach dem Anfang. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 79(4), 449–461. Dörpinghaus, A. (2004). Sprache und Sozialität. Über gemeinsame Welten und geteilte Auffassungen. In L. Koch (Ed.), Pädagogik und Rhetorik (pp. 71–85). Ergon. Fischer, J., Lindemann, G., & Bedorf, T. (2010). Theorien des Dritten. In Innovationen in Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie. Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (1974). Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften. Suhrkamp. Foucault, M. (1993). Technologien des Selbst. In M. Luther, H. Gutman, & P. Hutton (Eds.), Technologien des Selbst (pp. 24–62). Fischer. Gamm, G. (2004). Der unbestimmte Mensch. Zur medialen Konstruktion von Subjektivität. Philo. Hepp, A. (2014). Mediatisierung/Medialisierung. In J. Schröter (Ed.), Handbuch Medienwissenschaft (pp. 191–196). Metzler. Hetzel, A. (2011). Alterität und Anerkennung. Einleitende Bemerkungen. In A. Hetzel, D. Quadflieg, & H. Salaverría (Eds.), Alterität und Anerkennung (pp. 11–34). Nomos. Horkheimer, M. (1985). Der Begriff Bildung. In G. Schmid Noerr (Hrsg.), Max Horkheimer. Gesammelte Schriften: Bd. 8. Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen 1949–1973 (S. 409–419). Fischer (Erstveröffentlichung 1952). Humboldt, W. V. (1980). Theorie der Bildung des Menschen. Bruchstück. In W. V. Humboldt Werke in fünf Bänden: Bd. 1. Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte (3. Aufl., S. 234–240). Wissenschaftlicher Buchverlag (Erstveröffentlichung 1793). Humboldt, W. V. (2013). Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts. Holzinger. Jergus, K. (2017). Alterität. Eine Einführung. In A. Kraus, J. Budde, M. Hietzge, & C. Wulf (Eds.), Handbuch Schweigendes Wissen. Erziehung, Bildung, Sozialisation und Lernen (pp. 202–215). Beltz Juventa. Jörissen, B. (2017). Digitale Medialität und implizites Wissen. In A. Kraus, J. Budde, M. Hietzge, & C. Wulf (Eds.), Handbuch Schweigendes Wissen (pp. 439–447). Beltz Juventa. Kittler, F. (1997). Kommunikationsmedien. In C. Wulf (Ed.), Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische Anthropologie (pp. 649–661). Beltz. Koller, H.-C. (2012). Bildung anders denken. Kohlhammer. Koller, H.-C., & Rieger-Ladich, M. (2005). Grenzgänge: Pädagogische Lektüren zeitgenössischer Romane. Transcript. Krämer, S. (1998). Das Medium als Spur und Apparat. In S. Krämer (Hrsg.), Medien, Computer, Realität. Wirklichkeitsvorstellungen und Neue Medien (S. 73–94). Fink. Krotz, F. (2017). Mediatisierung: Ein Forschungskonzept. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M.-M. Kruse (Eds.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess. Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (pp. 13–32). VS Verlag. Luhmann, N. (2006). Das Kind als Medium der Erziehung. Suhrkamp.

250

K. Jergus

Masschelein, J. (1996). Pädagogisches Handeln und Verantwortung. Erziehung als Antwort. In J. Masschelein & M. Wimmer (Eds.), Alterität, Pluralität, Gerechtigkeit (pp. 163–186). Academia Verlag. Masschelein, J., & Simons, M. (2005). Globale Immunität. Oder: Eine kleine Kartographie des europäischen Bildungsraums. diaphanes. Masschelein, J., & Simons, M. (2007). Arme Pädagogik. Über ungetaufte Kinder. Ein Versuch. In A. Schäfer (Ed.), Kindliche Fremdheit und pädagogische Gerechtigkeit (pp. 231–244). Schöningh. Mayer, R., Thompson, C., & Wimmer, M. (2013). Inszenierung und Optimierung des Selbst. Zur Analyse gegenwärtiger Selbsttechnologien. Springer VS. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man. McGraw Hill. Mersch, D. (2014). Sichtbarkeit/Sichtbarmachung: Was heißt ‘Denken im Visuellen’? In M. Beck & F. Goppelsröder (Eds.), Sichtbarkeiten 2: Präsentifizieren. Zeigen zwischen Körper, Bild und Sprache (pp. 17–70). Diaphanes. Meyer-Drawe, K. (1990). Illusionen von Autonomie. Diesseits von Ohnmacht und Allmacht des Ich. Fink. Meyer-Drawe, K. (1995). Von der Marionette zum autopoietischen System. Maschinenbilder in der Pädagogik. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 71(4), 368–373. Meyer-Drawe, K. (1996). Menschen im Spiegel ihrer Maschinen. Fink. Meyer-Drawe, K. (1997). Maschine. In C. Wulf (Ed.), Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische Anthropologie (pp. 726–736). Beltz. Ode, E. (2014). MOOCs – Anfang oder Ende der modernen Universität? Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 90(4), 532–550. Pongratz, L., & Bünger, C. (2008). Bildung. In H. Faulstich-Wieland & P. Faulstich (Eds.), Erziehungswissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs (pp. 110–129). Rowohlt. Rancière, J. (2002). Das Unvernehmen. Politik und Philosophie. Suhrkamp. Ricken, N. (2013). Zur Logik der Subjektivierung. Überlegungen an den Rändern eines Konzepts. In A. Gelhard, T. Alkemeyer, & N. Ricken (Eds.), Techniken der Subjektivierung (pp. 29–47). Fink. Ricken, N. (2016). Pädagogische Professionalität – revisited. Eine anerkennungstheoretische Skizze. In J. Böhme, M. Hummrich, & R.-T. Kramer (Eds.), Schulkultur. Theoriebildung im Diskurs (pp. 137–157). Springer VS. Sanders, O., Besand, A., & Arenhövel, M. (2016). Ambivalenzwucherungen. Breaking Bad aus bildungs-, kultur- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Blickwinkeln. Halem. Schäfer, A. (2004). Alterität: Überlegungen zu Grenzen des pädagogischen Selbstverständnisses. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 50(5), 706–726. Schäfer, A. (2011). Das Versprechen der Bildung. Schöningh. Schäfer, A. (2015). Schulische Leistungsdiskurse. Zwischen Gerechtigkeitsversprechen und pharmazeutischem Hirndoping. Schöningh. Schäfer, A., & Thompson, C. (2010). Anerkennung. Eine Einleitung. In A. Schäfer & C. Thompson (Eds.), Anerkennung. Schöningh. Simanowski, R. (2018). Stumme Medien. Vom Verschwinden der Computer in Bildung und Gesellschaft. Matthes & Seitz. Thompson, C. (2009). Bildung und die Grenzen der Erfahrung. Randgänge der Bildungsphilosophie. Schöningh.

On the Mediality of Pedagogical Relations and the Medial Side of Education

251

Thompson, C., & Jergus, K. (2014). Zwischenraum: Kultur. “Bildung” aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht. In F. V. Rosenberg & A. Geimer (Eds.), Bildung unter Bedingungen kultureller Pluralität (pp. 9–26). VS Verlag. Tröhler, D. (2016). Educationalization of social problems and the educationalization of the modern world. Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. https://doi.org/10. 1007/978-981-287-532-7_8-1. Vollbrecht, R., & Wegener, M. (2009). Handbuch Mediensozialisation. VS Verlag. Wimmer, M. (2009). Vom individuellen Allgemeinen zur mediatisierten Singularität. Sprache als Bildungsmedium bei Humboldt und Derrida. In M. Wimmer, R. Reichenbach, & L. Pongratz (Eds.), Medien, Technik und Bildung (pp. 57–83). Schöningh. Wimmer, M. (2013). Vergessen wir nicht – den Anderen! In H.-C. Koller, N. Ricken, & R. Reichenbach (Eds.), Heterogenität – Zur Konjunktur eines pädagogischen Konzepts (pp. 219–240). Schöningh. Wimmer, M. (2014). Antihumanismus, Transhumanismus, Posthumanismus: Bildung nach ihrem Ende. In S. Kluge, G. Steffens, & I. Lohmann (Eds.), Menschenverbesserung – Transhumanismus. Jahrbuch für Pädagogik 2014 (pp. 237–265). Peter Lang. Wimmer, M., Reichenbach, R., & Pongratz, L. (2009). Medien, Technik und Bildung. Schöningh. Zahn, M. (2012). Ästhetische Film-Bildung. Studien zur Materialität und Medialität filmischer Bildungsprozesse. transcript.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation Sascha Oswald Abstract

Memes are Internet phenomena, or more precisely: user-generated content of various kinds (images, videos, texts), which are characterized in particular by the way they are disseminated and processed. They are predominantly image-based forms of mass communication. This is accompanied by the dissemination of values, norms, views and ideals as well as identity concepts and self-designs. The article deals with memes as visual practices of subjectification and discourses. As an example, the friendzone discourse within the online community 9gag, which is predominantly transported via images, is reconstructed and it is shown how a certain form of the male subject is constituted in this discourse and at the same time statements about gender relations are produced and established. The communicative and medial properties of the memes as well as their appearance and circulation in a very specifically structured digital space provide for altered perceptual schemata and new techniques of selfthematization.

1

Introduction

Memes are viral internet phenomena and often take the form of visual running jokes. In social networks, but also elsewhere on the World Wide Web, there is hardly any way around them anymore. Even journalism, marketing and politics S. Oswald (✉) Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 P. Gentzel et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Subject, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42872-3_13

253

254

S. Oswald

(Asendorf et al., 2014; McCrae, 2017; Schmehl, 2017) have already become aware of the presence and potential of image memetics. In doing so, they are symptomatic of a very general trend towards digital image communication. Thus, it can be observed that the inclusion of images in everyday (digital) communication has become increasingly important in recent years. This is also reflected in technical developments: SMS, for example, has been replaced by MMS and eventually by multimedia apps such as WhatsApp, and the digital camera has become largely obsolete in view of integrated and increasingly potent smartphone cameras. Recently, the Google Pixel touted the “best rated smartphone camera[s]” and an “unlimited storage for all your photos and videos.”1 Almost every social networking site has now adapted to the mass uploading and sharing of images on their pages. Many have already elevated it to the primary medium of sharing, for example, such seemingly disparate providers as Pinterest (which is for compiling one’s own image galleries), Instagram (where mostly private photographs are shared), or 9gag (a site for spreading memes). The image-centricity of modern communication is not an absolutely new phenomenon and has often been taken up and processed in literature and the media. Social science is now also registering the shifts that are taking place in the field of everyday communication and is beginning, albeit hesitantly, to address the research challenges that this entails. Although there are already some qualitative studies dealing with everyday digital image communication (including Astheimer et al., 2011; Walser & Neumann-Braun, 2013; Autenrieth, 2014; Lobinger, 2015; Niemann & Geise, 2015; Schreiber & Kramer, 2016), given the boom of Instagram, Snapchat, Whatsapp and Co. the research landscape is nevertheless comparatively manageable, at least in German-speaking countries. Burri even states that sociology has “forgotten about images” (2008). He does not mean that sociology has neglected the image as a medium – but that sociology has so far been too concerned with the image as an individual work and document and less with the everyday integration of this medium in actions and practices (Burri, 2008, p. 345). An increased attention would not remain without consequences: Müller (2016), for example, sees the need for new methodological approaches in order to do justice to the changing ways in which images are used. For him, it is a matter of devoting oneself to images in the plural and their respective figurations. This is accompanied by a fundamentally new understanding of images: their significance and value for communication and social interaction is not exhausted in their semantics, but is of a thoroughly pragmatic nature. Images thus never stand for themselves alone, they do not simply derive their meaning from an immanent

1

https://madeby.google.com/intl/de_de/phone/, Accessed 06th March 2018.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

255

Fig. 1 Ducreux’s ‘selfportrait as a mocker’ in the Louvre. (Source: http://i. imgur.com/SO3WJlT.jpg Accessed: 15th January 2018)

pictorial logic and from socially inscribed meaning. What and how much a picture ‘says’ only emerges from the interplay of sensory acts of perception and from the integration of the communicative into complex, social practices. Anyone who wants to deal with the image as a social artefact cannot avoid examining the related pictorial actions of the individuals involved, as well as their aggregations into pictorial practices. It makes a difference whether I look at Joseph Ducreux’s “Self-Portrait as Mocker” in the Louvre in Paris, whether I see it in the context of a special exhibition on eighteenth-century portrait painting, whether I tag a digital copy of it and thus add it to my image archive, whether I send it as a reply to a WhatsApp message via smartphone, or whether I add a caption to the initial motif in order to post it in a forum (see Figs. 1, 2 and 3). On closer inspection, image communication also turns out to be a kaleidoscope of “language games” (Wittgenstein, 1984) – what matters is not only the material object itself; it is the different ways in which it is used, the situations in which images play a role and what role they play there. In Wittgenstein’s sense, not only the “speaking of language” but also the showing of images is always to be seen as part of an “activity, or form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 250). This paper will accordingly deal with a particular form of pictorial language and how it is used in an everyday world context as a medium of relating to the self and the world. How are processes of subjectivation initiated and consolidated with, in and through images, image actions and image practices? I will approach this question on the basis of a certain type of visual language games, so-called memes on the site 9gag.com. The analysis of discursive digital image practices on the basis of case studies will show how subject forms are constituted and enforced in image-mediated communication

256

S. Oswald

Fig. 2 Ducreux’s ‘selfportrait as a mocker’ on wikipedia. (Source: https:// uploads4.wikiart.org/ images/joseph-ducreux/ portrait-de-l-artiste-sous-lestraits-d-un-moqueur-1793. jpg/ Accessed: 15th January 2018)

processes. In particular, we will trace how the medial properties and structures of ‘memetic’ image communication on 9gag shape the self-image of its users.2

2

Memes – Definition

Image macros are probably the best known and most popular form of memes. They usually consist of a standardized image and two individualized lines of text at the top and bottom of the image. The memes in Figs. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are particularly striking examples of conventionalized image-language games. The “Bad Luck Brian” meme describes 2

For general observations, I will use gender-neutral language in the following. In the case studies that revolve around self-descriptions of young men, I will resort to the generic masculine. However, this is not meant to imply that female users do not also participate in the image practices described.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation Fig. 3 Ducreux’s ‘selfportrait as mocker’ as meme. (Source: https:// memeexplorer.com/cache/ 180.jpg Accessed: 15th January 2018)

Fig. 4 Meme “Bad Luck Brian”, Derivative A. (Source: http://www. printoctopus.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/ Bad-luck-brian-620x350. png. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

257

258

S. Oswald

Fig. 5 Meme “Bad Luck Brian”, derivative B. (Source: http://www. printoctopus.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/ Bad-luck-brian-620x350. png. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

Fig. 6 Meme “Success kid”, derivative A. (Source: http://www.printoctopus. com/blog/wp-content/ uploads/2017/09/Successkid-620x287.png. Accessed 15 th January 2018)

unexpectedly unfavorable situations, while the “Success Kid” meme describes exactly the opposite experience. Both memes are limited to a narrow pragmatic framework. This is also stated by the linguist Osterroth:

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

259

Fig. 7 Meme “Success kid”, derivative B. (Source: http://www.printoctopus. com/blog/wp-content/ uploads/2017/09/Successkid-620x287.png . Accessed: 15th January 2018)

The meme carries a special meaning and can only be used in certain pragmatic contexts. [...] Even today, one can have entire conversations that are based exclusively or largely on memes (2015, p. 27).

Image macros are the best-known and most widespread meme variant, but not the only one. Memes can manifest themselves in the most diverse forms, each with very specific rules of application and meanings. But given these conditions, how can we determine what content counts as a meme form of communication?3 Shifman (2014) and also Breitenbach (2015) understand memes as specific internet phenomena, more precisely: user-generated content of various kinds (images, videos, texts) that are characterized by certain properties. However, a meme analysis that is based solely on image properties misses the point. Criteria such as emotional charge, humour or simplicity are neither necessary nor sufficient to define memes. Rather, it is the concrete link between virality and modification – and thus the collective, participatory image practice – that ultimately decides whether something becomes a meme or not. In other words, content is memetic if it is modified and disseminated by many (Oswald, 2018). Finally, the following working definition can be derived from these observations: Internet memes are to be understood as cultural units of any form 3

Here I am guided by Holly’s definition, according to which forms of communication are “medially conditioned cultural practices” (2011, p. 155). Since the site 9gag.com combines two forms of communication with memes and the comment function, we can speak of a communication platform (Sievers, 2016).

260

S. Oswald

or mediality – from images to videos to songs, lines of text, single words or abstract concepts – that are disseminated on the Internet by a critical mass of users and thereby deliberately varied in form or content. A meme analysis should always also ask about the specific places and contexts of origin of memes. The language codes of memes are not designed for general comprehensibility, but require a certain prior knowledge from the recipients, which is mostly acquired in specific language circles (Osterroth, 2015, p. 34). Although memes circulate in social networks such as Facebook or Twitter, their origin and actual ‘habitat’ are so-called image boards such as imgur, reddit, 4chan, Tumbler, Pinterest or 9gag, on which thousands of new images are posted, rated and subsequently disseminated every day. While we can in principle find memes everywhere, their “semiosis process” – their emergence and unfolding of meaning (Herwig, 2010, p. 10) – begins predominantly on image boards. The place of investigation in this case is the imageboard 9gag. The images are displayed here in different sections depending on popularity and subject matter, and are shown there in each case from new to old. The greatest visibility is given in the “Hot” section, on which an image only gets with enough positive ratings in the ‘lower’ sections. To navigate the sections, you have to scroll down. Clicking on an image or its caption opens a separate page showing the image in its full resolution. The subpages contain a comment area, which is used by the users to discursively respond to the picture contributions and to comment on or evaluate them, in addition to the regular voting.4 The voting system and the visibility architecture of the 9gag site promote an agonal economy of attention (Franck, 1998), which exposes the creations to a double selection pressure: On the one hand, they should exhibit a certain degree of simplicity and standardization in order to ensure connectivity in the form of recognition value and ease of repetition. On the other hand, the meme should also convey a novelty value and a difference that makes it stand out from the mass of other memes. With 165 million daily users, updates every second and a reception attitude that the 9gag community self-ironically describes as “too long didn’t read”, the volume of user-generated content and the attention span of individual users are in an opposing relationship. Since there is no other evaluation instance besides the audience or even objective criteria that guarantee that one’s own contribution is

This “peer-reviewing” (Authenrieth 2014) is carried out extensively and represents another important aspect of image communication and reception on 9gag, which, however, cannot be dealt with here. Cf. Oswald (2018). 4

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

261

seen, the contributions are adjusted to the audience and their reception attitude as well as to the circulation speed of the competing contributions. In this battle for the favor of an invisible audience (Werron, 2011), the actors on 9gag primarily orient themselves to trends, hypes, and popular and common patterns, and usually only add individuating accents to their creations in the form of minimal unique selling points.

3

Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of the Study

3.1

Theoretical Foundations

The present study is to be located in the context of sociology, linguistics, image studies and communication studies. The theoretical basis is a practice- and discourse-theoretical model of subjectification (Alkemeyer, 2013; Reckwitz, 2003, 2008), which emphasizes in particular the level of doing and its material dimensions. According to this, discourses only emerge “in a particular social use, as a system of statements that is received and produced in particular contexts” (Reckwitz, 2003, p. 298). The human self, in turn, is understood as a self-referential interpretive performance that only emerges processually “within the consummation of social practices” as “the sequence of acts” (Reckwitz, 2003, p. 296) in which people participate.5 Self-interpretations are not to be understood as purely cognitive acts. They can equally take place in external practices and bodily routines, explicit as well as implicit (Rosa, 2012). From a praxeological point of view, a person’s self is thus the result of many different “doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 1996), both his own and those of others involved. It emerges within a multifaceted network of relationships and meanings, in which both human and non-human “participands” (Hirschauer, 2004), e.g. technical artefacts, are integrated.6 Last but not least, mediatization processes play a major role here, by which is meant the (increasing) interweaving of everyday life, society, culture and media. According to Krotz et al., mediatization refers to “an

For example, Hanover defines self as “the view the individual has of his or her own personality” (2012, p. 17). 6 Hirschauer subsumes under this term all “those entities [...] that participate in practice and are implicated in its dynamics. People and other living beings, bodies and textual documents, artefacts and settings” (2004, p. 74). 5

262

S. Oswald

overarching development process similar to globalization or individualization, namely the increasing shaping of culture and society through media communication” (Krotz et al., 2017, p. 2). Today, the question of the self can also no longer be thought of in isolation from media technologies and media architectures by which people are surrounded on a daily basis. “The respective available and appropriated media” as well as the different communication formats that emanate from them “influence how people (can) perceive and experience themselves and others, what and how they (can) think, how they (can) relate to each other communicatively”, according to Reißmann (2015, p. 31). Accordingly, this paper will examine how self-perception, experience and thought perspectivation are shaped, i.e. mediatized, by a visual form of communication (memes) and within the structures of a digital platform (9gag). It is more appropriate to such a processual understanding of self-formation not to speak of subjects as quasi-closed entities. Instead, we should speak here of practices of subjectivation. For Alkemeyer, this means asking “how individuals enter into world and self relations through their engagement in social practices,” whereby “practices and their subjects [mutually] constitute [and] thus also jointly [change] their shape” (2013, S. 33–34). Such an understanding of the subject thus moves outside the structure-action dualism, that is, the reduction of subject constitution to a purely intentionalist or a purely structure-determined view (Reckwitz, 2003).7 The relationship between subject, practice and media (materiality) can be illustrated, among other things, with the concept of affordances: Media but also communication (plate) forms always exhibit a specific (culturalized) character of offer. This means that the design, structure and properties of things and technologies suggest a certain use or perception or incite certain actions (Gibson, 1982). In contrast to the concept of request, which carries deterministic implications, the concept of offer emphasizes the mutual interpenetration of users and technology, but also the possibility of deviation from normed routines of action. Impulses emanate from both sides, constituting specific self-references on the part of the users, which may be solidified (ingrained), but can never be fixed. Subjectivation is therefore not a purely active, consciously controlled process, but neither is it a purely passive process of being controlled by others. Subjectification as a process takes place in explicit actions as well as in implicit routines and between individuals with ‘leeway’ on the one hand and ordering structures on the other.

7

Gentzel (2015, p. 192 ff.) sees in this not least a correspondence between practice-theoretical and mediatization approaches.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

3.2

263

Methodological Principles

Both memes as a formalized form of communication and 9gag as a communication platform represent such ordering (communicative) structures. In the following, I will trace how a certain discourse complex – the concept of the friend zone (FZ for short, p. 4.1) – is negotiated in the context of meme communication on 9gag, and how collective, standardized self-interpretations emerge from more or less individual reflections of users. I will use the term image practices to describe and analyse memes. The term refers to “the well-rehearsed, consummate patterns of pictorial production, expression, perception, understanding and action that are not reflected in actu” (Reißmann, 2015, p. 61). Methodologically, I will undertake a linguisticpragmatic and contextual analysis of image production and image use (Meier et al., 2014). In a first step, I will analyze several memes that address FC using discourseanalytic and semiolinguistic approaches and match them with script-based definitions of the concept of FC on the internet dictionary urbandictionary.com in order to elaborate patterns of perspectivization of male self-understandings. In doing so, I am guided by linguistic and image-pragmatic methods of analysis: Meier’s image-discourse analytical concept (Meier, 2008, 2010), Stöckl’s hermeneutics of language-image-texts (Stöckl, 2011) and Schmitz’s visual surface research (Schmitz, 2011). All authors see their concepts as analytical tools (Stöckl, 2011, p. 67) for decoding multimodal communication rather than as completed procedures. The primary aim is to elicit “the complex interrelation between language and image and their communicative effects” (Stöckl, 2011) and the “patterned communication on a social topic” (Meier, 2014, p. 230). In the second step, following on from the previous image analyses, I will present the specific characteristics of the communication form meme as well as the communication platform 9gag and elaborate their role for subjectification processes. Since memes rarely occur only as images with purely iconic content, but usually include text, they are treated here as viewing surfaces. Schmitz refers to viewing surfaces as “surfaces on which texts and images form common units of meaning in a planned layout” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 25). They are multimodal connections “in which writing and images play inseparably into each other in terms of form and content through a design that connects the two sides” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 26). In the memes in this paper, image and text elements have also been interwoven and arranged in a specific, non-random relationship. In this process, image producers have conscious or unconscious competences and arrange visual surfaces with a view to the respective communicative potentials of the different semiotic systems. Stöckl speaks of a

264

S. Oswald

division of labour between language and image, whereby “the strengths of one semiotic system compensate for the weaknesses of the other and vice versa” (Stöckl, 2011, p. 48). While meaning is “firmly anchored” in language, for example, images are notoriously “vague and undermined” (Stöckl, 2011). “Rather, images offer the recipient a potential for meaning that must be activated and tapped through an appropriate context. Such contexts can be (linguistic) accompanying texts, genre, style and encyclopaedic knowledge as well as experience with the represented section of the world and associable facts” (Stöckl, 2011, p. 49). For meme analysis, this means that memes (a) must be examined for their immanent linkage structure or grammar, i.e., for the relationship between image and text as well as the individual multimodal visual surface elements. Of particular interest are (b) also the modulations: The meaning of a meme depends not only on what is shown, but at least as much on how it is shown. However, whenever possible, (c) the communicative context must also be taken into account in order to catch up with the pragmatic meaning that emerges in the meme use in question. Here, questions arise such as: Where is the meme posted? Who is it addressed to? How is it disseminated and modified? The procedures thus shed light on the communicative and subjectivizing functions that memes addressing the concept of FC perform in the respective contexts.

4

Text-Based Friendzone Discourse

4.1

Friendzone – Definition

The term friendzone was coined in the early 1990s and has since come to refer to a friendly relationship in which one person has a romantic or sexual interest, but the other is only interested in a platonic relationship.8 The Internet dictionary urbandictionary.com (UD) brings together a variety of user-generated definitions of the term and can also serve as a gauge of its popularity.9 The site is hardly moderated and therefore has a high proportion of racist and sexist entries, for example, which is why it is not without controversy. However, the unfiltered character of the site offers the advantage of gathering a very heterogeneous set of

8

http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/friend-zone, accessed 06/03/2018. Most entries on FC date from 2012-2015, so the term has enjoyed increased demand in recent years, but has already passed the peak of its popularity. 9

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

265

Fig. 8 Nice Guy Discourse I. Screenshot. (Source: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define. php?term=Friend%20Zone. Accessed: 02.11.2015)

definitions. On the other hand, the definitions, unlike in classical dictionary entries, do not follow the attempt to denote terms as objectively as possible, but are oriented towards subjective ways of using terms (hence the name urban dictionary). The top definitions of a term result from user rankings (up- and down-votes) and the number of entries for a term is a good indicator for its economic situation – on the UD there is a kind of struggle for interpretative sovereignty. I will abbreviate my presentation at this point and only briefly outline the results. I will limit myself to three dominant and maximally contrasting discourses of masculinity in the distribution, which will serve as a comparative foil for the image discourses yet to be elicited.

4.2

Friendzone Discourses on the Urban Dictionary10

The Nice Guy discourse is crystallised in statements exemplified by Figs. 8 and 9. Here, an almost ‘tragic’ masculinity is modelled. The man’s unconditional love for 10

At the time of data collection in late 2015, the definition in Fig. 8 was the top definition. The definitions in Figs. 9, 10 and 11 currently ranked 13th, 16th and 54th, respectively.

266

S. Oswald

Fig. 9 Nice Guy Discourse II. screenshot. (Source: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define. php?term=Friend%20Zone. Accessed: 15.01.2018)

his beloved remains unrequited. The woman, however, interprets his obligingness only as a sign of friendly affection and not as romantic interest. Accordingly, she herself values him only as a friend. In this portrayal, the man passively submits to the woman’s definition of the relationship. According to the narrative, this passivity, as well as the woman’s ignorance or unwillingness, has a negative impact on the lives of both parties. In an ideal, just world, this would be avoided by the woman acknowledging the man’s qualities and accepting him as a partner and not just a friend. Figure 10 is an example of the weakling discourse; this explicitly criticises the male image of the Nice Guy and thematises man and woman within the framework of an economic exchange logic: woman and man are rational actors on the partner market. The FC man is assumed to be incapable of matching his offer to demand (he is ‘nice’ but ‘boring’). In this narrative, the rejection by the woman is no longer a tragic coincidence, but proves to be a consequence of self-responsible action. In this reading, the man himself determines success or non-success – his rejection is therefore seen as a failure and an expression of deficient personal qualities. In the discourse of sexism (Fig. 11), a “negative andrology” (Kucklick, 2008) is again formulated. In this reading, the man is transformed from victim to perpetrator.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

267

Fig. 10 Weakling discourse. Screenshot. (Source: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define. php?term=Friend%20Zone. Accessed: 15.01.2018)

Fig. 11 Sexism discourse. Screenshot. (Source: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define. php?term=Friend%20Zone. Accessed: 15.01.2018)

268

S. Oswald

He is accused of blaming the woman’s rejection as culpable behaviour. The concept of FC, it is argued, merely serves to exercise male hegemonic power of definition. According to this interpretation, the man’s motives are exhausted in the egoistic pursuit of power and status. In this discourse on masculinity, it is not homo oeconomicus but the clinical clinical picture of psychopathy that provides the interpretative foil for the ‘FC man’. The above examples clearly show how the meaning of one and the same term continues to shift and multiply through constant work on the term. The discourses described each interpret FC very specifically and produce, among other things, very different views of masculinity.

5

The Friendzone in Memetic Image Discourse

This chapter will now examine how the self-interpretation slides just presented are transformed in the use of memes. We can now concretize the insight interest mentioned at the beginning and ask: How do (a) the pictorial mode of communication and (b) the communication structures of the platform 9gag affect the FC concept and thus the images of masculinity embedded in it? To this end, I will analyse four FC memes as examples, each of which made it into the “Hot” section on 9gag. These FC memes are interesting for an analysis of image science from the perspective of subjectivation theory for several reasons: 1. These are not individual images, but rather thematically and/or formally related images within the framework of an (unfinished) series of images. 2. These are digital images that have been deliberately modified by users.11 3. These are images that are deliberately distributed on an Internet platform with very specific interaction rules. 4. These are images that are thematically centered and whose content anchors are gender relations. From a mediatization-theoretical perspective, the subject matter is again interesting for two reasons: first, the imageboard 9gag must be understood as a translocal community, since “communication media [...] are needed” to maintain it “in terms

11

Conscious in the sense of not random. Modifications that occur automatically as part of ‘wear and tear’ processes in digital image circulation are therefore not meant (Marek, 2014).

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

269

of its structure, of we-feeling(s), and of distinction” (Hepp & Hitzler, 2014, p. 47). Second, mediatized self-understandings emerge in the memes on 9gag: Experiences and experiences in offline everyday life are transferred into a digital space and transformed there. The type of transformation and the structure of the digital space, in turn, have an effect on the efficacy and perspectivization of those offline experiences and constitute a special form of masculine self-understanding. In short, the FC memes, as digital communication practices within a mediatized community, shape the image of the man by visually processing and collectively negotiating experiences of rejection.

5.1

The Gay Best Friend Zone

Figure 12 is in the style of the so-called Rage Guy comics. The narrator – Derp12 – briefly describes his relationship with a young woman with whom he is in love: both like each other, are on friendly terms and enjoy spending time together. At a party, Derp learns from the young woman that he is only a “gay best friend” to her. After this revelation, the drawing style changes. We now see only the young man, who looks past the viewer into nothingness with fixed eyes and a slight smile, and then jumps into an acid container. The change in drawing style highlights the change in perspective that has taken place: We are now no longer in the outside world (at the party), but in the metaphorically illuminated interior of Derp, who vividly and figuratively shows us his emotional reaction to the woman’s statement. The metaphorical leap into the acid pool not only symbolizes the emotional height of the fall, but also emphasizes the significance of this drastic experience: Derp literally dissolves in the female judgement.

5.2

Friendzone-Fiona

In Fig. 13 we see a young woman, Fiona, and two lines of text. The text refers to the woman depicted, who – as we learn in the first line – considers the viewer to be the “perfect man”, but only for all other women, as the second line enlightens us. Fiona herself has no interest whatsoever. The formal structure of the text at the same time reflects the structure of experience or perception of the fictional viewer: the first line stirs up euphoria about the young woman’s interest and affection, while the second

12

A placeholder name popularly used on 9gag.

270

S. Oswald

Fig. 12 Gay Best Friendzone. Screenshot. (Source: https://9gag.com/gag/1310429/the-gaybest-friend-zone-worse-than-the-friendzone. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

line reflects the subsequent disillusionment. The spatial gap between the lines of text functions as an additional symbol of the discrepancy that lies between these two experiences.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

271

Fig. 13 Friendzone-Fiona. Screenshot. (Source: https:// 9gag.com/gag/1057576. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

While in the first image the narrator was at the same time the protagonist of the story, in the second image we as viewers are directly addressed and identified with the rejected man. In both pictures, the focus is on the man’s emotional world, which, however, is not explicitly rendered in words, but is conveyed pictoriallymetaphorically and through formal-compositional elements. The image of the man in both cases is not one of deficit, but emphasizes his positive qualities. The woman’s behaviour is portrayed as irrational and unmotivated.

5.3

The Friendzone Army

Figure 14 is composed of the headline and two large horizontal image sections. In the first image section, we see a screenshot of a Facebook status message, and in the image below, a military honor guard during a funeral ceremony and two lines of text calling for a moment of silence. The Facebook status message is from a woman

272

S. Oswald

Fig. 14 Friendzone Army. Screenshot. (Source: https://9gag.com/gag/av0q5VX/friendzone-level-5000. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

named Brittany, who lets us know that her best friend Andrew was always “there for her.” At the same time, she also lets us know that his status is (only) that of a “best friend”. Although the status message can be interpreted as public recognition, the caption gives it a new framing. This identifies the expression of friendship as an act of

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

273

humiliation: “Level: 5000” ironically exaggerates the high degree of this humiliation. The semantic ambiguity of honour and humiliation is less a contradiction than an ‘irony of fate’. The formal connection of the image sections also establishes a link between the contents ‘escort of honour’ and ‘expression of friendship’. The combination with the escort of honour brings the declaration of friendship close to a quasi-‘death sentence’. As in Fig. 13, the rejection by the woman seems sufficient here to infer the symbolic death of the man. The association of military and gender relations also invokes the connotation of gender struggle. The narrator addresses the viewer of the picture directly in the first person plural (“our brothers”) and identifies him as part of a male alliance involved in the battle of the sexes, a collective of ‘brothers’. In the tribute to the brothers ‘fallen’ in this way, sympathy and group solidarity are expressed – ironically exaggerated and visually condensed. The soldiers depicted symbolically stand for the imagined community of suffering of those rejected. They can be understood as an expression of a sense of ‘we’ and a group identity – the so-called FriendzoneArmy .13

5.4

Ser Jorah of House Friendzone

In Fig. 15, we see three still images from the television series Game of Thrones. The conquering queen Daenerys harshly dismisses her advisor Jorah, who has already saved her life three times, as an exdiegetic reference emphasizes. Daenerys’ facing back functions in the image-text composition as another symbol of her indifference to Jorah. In the second panel, we see Daenerys with the figure of the mercenary Daario Naharis. The commentary refers to three flowers that the latter gives to Daenerys, contrasting with the three times Jorah saved Daenerys’ life. Daenerys is visibly more fond of the mercenary. Their distributions of sympathy are portrayed in comparison as disproportionate, unfair, and unaccountable. In both text and image (note the eyes replaced by hearts – Daenerys is proverbially blinded by love), the image of a naively infantile girl in the world-forgetting twilight of adolescent crush is painted. While Naharis’ portrayal refers to the type of the clumsy seducer, Jorah Mormont is described as a virtuous hero who has actually earned Daenerys’ affection. He is the figure of identification within this narrative.

13

The Friendzone Army is a reference to the 9gag Army, a semi-ironic self-designation of the 9gag community.

274

S. Oswald

Fig. 15 Ser Jorah of House Friendzone. Screenshot. (Source: https://9gag.com/gag/ a6Lwg3m/friend-zone-can-be-cruel. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

5.5

275

Image of Men and Women in the Pictorial Memes

Compared to the posts on UD, the memes presented here paint a much more homogeneous picture of FC and the gender codings embedded in it.14 The following statement elements are typical for the FC discourse on 9gag: The protagonists of the narratives are men and women who represent generalized qualities: The man is said to have positive qualities, especially morality and virtue. He experiences rejection by the woman and endures it in fateful passivity. The act of rejection is described as inconsiderate and unjust, the woman herself as ignorant. In the context of these narratives, however, she is not accused of calculation or malice. Instead, the images describe her as acting out of an attitude of naïve, childlike innocence. The woman is not sane and her judgement is an irrational choice of grace over which the man has no influence. The ignorance and naivety of the woman and the virtuousness of the man are diametrically opposed in these depictions and prevent a happy outcome to the relationship. This image-discursive framing of gender relations as a tragic deadend situation corresponds in large part to the Nice Guy discourse identified on the UD.

6

Formal-Aesthetic Features of Meme Communication on 9gag

What role does the format of memes play in the establishment of this discourse? The formal-aesthetic characteristics of the memes are not meme-exclusive in detail. However, according to the thesis, the use of imagery and humor in combination produces very specific mediatized images of masculinity.

14

Only empirical values can be used here for proportionality. The statements made are therefore not statistically reliable generalizations. There are also FC memes on 9gag that would have to be assigned to the sexism discourse, for example. However, these are clearly underrepresented. On the UD, on the other hand, the various FC definitions are ranked according to their approval by the user community, but the visibility gap is much smaller.

276

6.1

S. Oswald

Narration, Metaphor and Collective Symbolism

What is particularly striking is that the contents of the memes are not explained abstractly, but illustrated in stories. In a sense, FC is told by example. The internet memes do not abstract the experience of rejection, but wrap it up in a concrete story that provides culturally established figures, situations and topoi as points of identification and horizons of interpretation. In this case, the quotations largely make use of current, pop-cultural references. This can be taken as an indication that the appropriation of the more cultural products by the actors takes place within a milieuor generation-specific framework or linguistic space (Kumpf, 2013). By consciously referring to a specific pop-cultural knowledge and relevance horizon, 9gag users create an in-group habitual framework for interpreting the respective content. Convergent consumption habits and spaces of experience thus act as an intersubjective bridge between individuals and refer to a shared group membership. The image-mediated discourse on 9gag is additionally characterized by dense metaphor. According to Lakoff and Johnson (2000), metaphors structure an abstract concept through concrete experiences. An example of this would be the jump into the acid bath shown earlier (see Fig. 12). In Figs. 16, 17 and 18, FC is compared, for example, to a job application situation or to a net in which one gets caught. By resorting to metaphors, an attempt is made to give a concrete, articulate and experientially adequate form to a bodily being affected, i.e. a diffuse experience. Furthermore, the FC discourse is composed of a broad fund of collective symbolism – the Friendzone-Fiona described above, for example, functions as a symbolic condensation of the desirable girl-next-door, or the Friendzone-Army as a symbol of a loyal group unit. Discourse is permeated by an inventory of collective images “through which the much invoked ‘consensus’ is generated to a much greater extent than through the matching of arguments and validity claims in rational dialogue” (Link, 2006, p. 58). The use of collective symbolism can thus be seen as a complexity-reducing and group-integrating pictorial practice of understanding recipients, in which they identify not least as a collective subject – as a 9gagger or Friendzone Army.

6.2

Humor

In addition, FZ memes are also characterized by a special modulation, namely by their humorously exaggerated reframing. The images have an appeal character and call for laughter.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

277

Fig. 16 FC as job interview part I. Screenshot. (Source: https://9gag.com/gag/ 6761698/job-interviewequivalent-of-friendzone. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

Helmuth Plessner describes laughter as a reaction to a “resistant situation”: (Plessner, 1970, p. 122) The FC memes, according to the thesis put forward here, respond to the ‘resistant’ act of rejection, which challenges male self-esteem within the framework of culturally established norms of masculinity. 9gag users confront rejection as a ‘borderline situation’ (Plessner, 1970, p. 101) of masculine identity and in doing so embrace the principle of laughter: In the performance of the comic and the funny, they collectively cope with this borderline experience and thus domesticate the accompanying feelings of powerlessness and shame.

278

S. Oswald

Fig. 17 FC as job interview part II Screenshot. (Source: https://9gag.com/gag/ 6761698/job-interviewequivalent-of-friendzone. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

In contrast to crying, in which the weeper closes himself off from the world, laughter, according to Plessner, is characterized by openness. The ‘resistant situation’ distances the human being from the world, but in laughter he restores the lost closeness. The special visibility architecture and networking structure of the site 9gag now makes it possible for users who are unknown to each other and far away to perceive each other as a community connected in this laughter. In this way, the members of the 9gag community each deal with individual borderline experiences collectively. Group dynamic processes, but also the voting dynamics, make it possible for users to participate in these language games who have never had such or similar experiences themselves. Last but not least, humour as a rhetorical device – as it is used for the memes quite concretely in the form of irony, the running gag and gallows humour – requires specific background knowledge within the group, without which the joke

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

279

Fig. 18 FZ as a network. Screenshot. (Source: https://9gag.com/gag/ad6YwLD/trying-toget-out-of-the-friendzone-like. Accessed: 15th January 2018)

and the punch line cannot be understood. Humor thus forges bonds on the cognitive level, in terms of shared knowledge horizons, and on the somatic level, through the affective, pleasurable experience of comedy. It also serves as a group-identifying stylistic device that shapes the general habitus of the community and as a means of positive affective recasting and validation of a concrete subjectification foil of masculinity.

7

Conclusion – Memes as Practices of Subjectification

7.1

Interpretive Power and Self-Normalization in the Discourse of Images

The FC memes on 9gag are the product of image practices that respond to a problem of self-location within the framework of male subjectification. Specifically, the problem of rejection is processed in and with the images: Users make reference to experiences that threaten their masculine image. By recourse to established motifs such as that of the tragic hero, it becomes possible to retroactively reinterpret these

280

S. Oswald

experiences and thus reintegrate them into existing cultural patterns of interpretation and one’s own self-image. The actors normalize themselves by no longer interpreting the rejection and the ‘failure’ as a problem of a deficient ego, but rather as an imbalance caused by the ignorance and misbehavior of others. In the comment columns, these offers of interpretation are additionally negotiated, i.e. validated in writing or iconically, but in part also criticized and differentiated.15 In this way, users ascribe to each other the “status of an intelligent subject recognized as ‘capable of playing along’” (Alkemeyer, 2013, p. 34). Unlike in UD, for example, these self-normalizations do not take place on the basis of fixed definitions or abstract theories, but within the framework of reciprocal visual-mediatized practices that concretize diffuse experiences and feelings. In doing so, common orientation horizons of modern forms of subjectivation are interestingly bypassed. For example, one searches in vain for optimisation imperatives or claims to authenticity in the FC memes on 9gag. Instead, the selfinterpretations in the FC discourse are strongly influenced by the inherent logic of the medium image as well as the communication space 9gag. The following five aspects are of constitutive importance here: 1. The communication mode of imagery that is primary on 9gag allows for a (relatively) low degree of abstraction or differentiation. Both the weakling discourse identified on UD and the sexism discourse are based on comparatively complex interpretative schemes that are difficult to package in figurative language and even more difficult to package in a few images. The Nice Guy discourse, on the other hand, is based on quite simple schematic and culturally handed-down motifs that can be translated into the mode of imagery without much loss. 2. The strong use of metaphorical imagery also reinforces the intelligibility of the interpretive offers. Individual emotional states and experiences are made intersubjectively accessible, ‘readable’ and understandable. In the FC memes, the images of masculinity transported in them are thus made available as intelligible subjectification foils. 3. The establishment and repetition of collective symbolism also makes it possible for 9gag users to perceive themselves as a group unit through this language code. Overall, the shared visual language not only ensures a reduction in the complexity of everyday experiences, but also a heightened sense of community.

15

Cf. Oswald (2018).

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

281

4. While the use of metaphors makes the affective occupation of the thematized content visible and sayable, it is especially the humorous framing of the content that answers its emotional charge and dissolves it in a pleasurable experience. With the memes (as a specific form of visual humor), the 9gag users appropriate the stigma of rejection and thus ensure a reclaim of the foreign position. In the mode of imagery, the actors have at their disposal possibilities of humorous exaggeration and hyperbole as well as direct illustration, which written language does not have in this form. 5. Last but not least, the specific media structure of the page 9gag promotes the emergence of a culture of attention economy, which demands quick and concise content from the producers. Such a communicative setting or digital ecosystem favours a mode of communication in visual language, which, as shown above, is characterised by high information density and vividness. Both ultimately have the consequence that it is not experimentation and originality that are rewarded, but rather playing with familiar and established patterns. The narrowing of the FC concept to 9gag cannot therefore be explained in a mono-causal way, but is the effect of manifold mediatized structural and action elements that interlock in the communication space of 9gag, mutually potentiate each other, and from whose interweaving the subjectification foil of the Nice-Guy ultimately emerges as the dominant self-interpretation.

7.2

Outlook – Mediatized Subject Designs on 9gag

On a more general level and independent of the thematization of FC, the 9gag community presents itself as a special type of digitally mediatized community that develops its own subjectification practices and codes. These will be roughly outlined here in conclusion.16 The use of humorous images as the primary medium of communication and their mass circulation are the main features of the communication space 9gag. In collective symbols, shared language codes and style types, the habitual structures of a pseudonymous and yet, especially in the comment sections, always present and

16 According to Reckwitz, subject codes structure ways of behaving and thinking; they are “central distinctions that define and differentiate subject forms” (2008, p. 135 f.).

282

S. Oswald

visible to one another, visual community are condensed.17 At the center of the practices of this viewing community are not originality and authenticity as meaningful motifs, but rather the cultivation of a sense of community, the lavish pleasure of doing, and a circular logic of competition.18 The patterns of representation express a habitus whose attitude to the world is not critical-commentary, but playful-appropriating and competitive. The predominantly humorous framing of the contributions ensures that the actors simultaneously establish distance and proximity to their world of experience. The ambiguity of the positioning is not a by-product of habitual indecision, but the effect of a consciously playful approach to the world. Unambiguity is abandoned in favor of ludic qualities of experience. 9gag users design and produce themselves as individuals in their (sometimes more, sometimes less) creative and competitive acts of creation, but at the same time bind themselves strongly back to the collective through adherence to a rigid visual grammar and the use of semantics that emphasize the we. Thus, a communal selfconcept emerges that is characterized by an emphasis on the collective while simultaneously aligning with a competitive-individualistic self-concept that emphasizes originality.19 The visual practices on 9gag code-switch constantly between cultural ciphers such as collectivity and individuality, imitation and re-creation, humour and seriousness, between different types of styles and thematic foci. They do not produce one fixed subjectivity, but shape the self of the user partially, dynamically and through the overlapping and intersection of different forms of subjectivation. As Reißmann writes, “insofar as they accumulate power, media can develop a standardizing power in terms of content, aesthetics, form, and communication practice” (2015, p. 29). If one takes into account that most media – computers, smartphones, but also the (smart) television – are now digitized and that Internet communication offers a whole range of multimodally constituted and prosumeroriented forms and platforms of communication, then not only the communicative

17 According to Jürgen Raab, visual communities are “relatively permanent aesthetic spaces of perception and action [...] secured by stable routines and independent of each other”. (2008, S. 306). 18 It is not about linear competition with the goal of unlimited outbidding and optimization, but about competition as a game that always starts over again. 19 The individualistic orientation can be seen, among other things, in the desire of the users to make it onto the main page with their creation, either by creating a popular derivative of a meme or even launching a completely new meme. The play with existing forms and the attempt to bring new forms into play that are nevertheless capable of gaining majority support are, however, always related back to the community whose acceptance is sought.

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

283

power of media, but also – much more differentiated – that of the individual formats integrated in them must be taken into account. The example of memes showed very concretely the communicative power of subjectification that can emanate from memes: Events and experiences that have taken place offline are made accessible to a dispersed audience by means of memes and here experience a new aesthetic processing and a strong expansion of their radius of effect. The content-related and formal-aesthetic standardization of the concept of the friend zone in turn perpetuates a semantic perspectivization of masculinity. Of course, these are not global but only partial subjectification effects. However, this only corresponds to the trend of a loss of holistic identity offers and a resulting increasing fragmentation of (post-)modern selves (Simmel, 2009; Kucklick, 2014; Reckwitz, 2017). Mediatization as a metaprocess entails the increasing pluralization of subjectification practices that differ in terms of structure, content, and formal aesthetics, and thus produce increasingly diverse and differentiated self-interpretation foils. Memes are just one example that shows that it should not be enough for a visual sociology to consider only the semantic level of the image. Instead, in future studies of digital image practice, images must be taken seriously as elements of actions and (discourse) practices that are integrated into the structures of digital communication spaces. It is only from this that their communicative power and their significance for life and everyday life emerge. Only in this way can it ultimately be determined how processes of subjectivation take place in the age of digitalization and mediatization, that is, in what way media, communication formats, and self-understandings are interrelated and continually reconstitute each other.

References Alkemeyer, T. (2013). Subjektivierung in sozialen Praktiken. Umrisse einer praxeologischen Analytik. In T. Alkemeyer, G. Budde, & D. Freist (Eds.), Selbst-Bildungen: Soziale und kulturelle Praktiken der Subjektivierung (pp. 33–68). Transcript. Asendorf, K., Kasper, T., Fach, O. (2014). Das Orakel von Erdoğan. http://www.zeit.de/ community/2014-11/erdogan-weltbild-meme. Accessed: 6th March 2018. Astheimer, J., Neumann-Braun, K., & Schmidt, A. (2011). MyFace. Die Porträtfotografie im Social Web. In K. Neumann-Braun & U. Autenrieth (Eds.), Freundschaft und Gemeinschaft im Social Web (pp. 79–122). Nomos. Autenrieth, U. (2014). Die Bilderwelten des Social Network Sites. Nomos. Breitenbach, P. (2015). Memes. Das Web als kultureller Nährboden. In C. Stiegler, P. Breitenbach, & T. Zorbach (Eds.), New Media Culture: Mediale Phänomene der Netzkultur (pp. 29–50). Transcript. Burri, R. (2008). Bilder als soziale Praxis: Grundlegungen einer Soziologie des Visuellen. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 37(4), 342–358.

284

S. Oswald

Franck, G. (1998). Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit. Hanser. Gentzel, P. (2015). Praxistheorie und Mediatisierung: Grundlagen, Perspektiven und eine Kulturgeschichte der Mobilkommunikation. Springer VS. Gibson, J. (1982). Wahrnehmung und Umwelt. Urban & Schwarzenberg. Hepp, A., & Hitzler, R. (2014). Mediatisierung von Vergemeinschaftung und Gemeinschaft: Zusammengehörigkeiten im Wandel. In F. Krotz, C. Despotovic, & M. Kruse (Eds.), Die Mediatisierung sozialer Welten: Synergien empirischer Forschung (pp. 35–52). Springer VS. Herwig, J. (2010). Fluktuierende Kollektive, lebendiges Archiv. Semiologische Praktiken im Imageboard 4chan. Manuscript. http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jana.herwig/PDF/Herwig_ Jana_Fluktuierende_Kollektive_lebendiges_Archiv_4chan.pdf. Accessed: 2nd May 2017. Hirschauer, S. (2004). Praktiken und ihre Körper. Über materielle Partizipanden des Tuns. In K. Hörning & J. Reuter (Eds.), Doing Culture – Neue Positionen zum Verhältnis von Kultur und sozialer Praxis (pp. 73–91). Transcript. Krotz, F., Despotovic, C., & Kruse, M. (2017). Zur Einleitung. In dies. (Ed.), Mediatisierung als Metaprozess:Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem (pp. 1–10). VS. Kucklick, C. (2008). Das unmoralische Geschlecht: zur Geburt der negativen Andrologie. Suhrkamp. Kucklick, C. (2014). Die granulare Gesellschaft. Ullstein. Kumpf, S. (2013). “Ich bin aber nicht so ein Freak” – Distinktion durch Serienaneignung. In L. Mikos & R. Winter (Eds.), Transnationale Serienkultur (pp. 347–366). Springer. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2000). Leben in Metaphern. Carl Auer. Link, J. (2006). Zum Anteil der medialen Kollektivsymbolik an der Normalisierung der Einwanderung. In S. Maasen, T. Mayerhauser, & C. Renggli (Eds.), Bilder als Diskurse – Bilddiskurse (pp. 53–70). Velbrück. Lobinger, K. (2015). Praktiken des Bildhandelns in mediatisierten Gesellschaften – eine Systematisierung. In K. Lobinger & S. Geise (Eds.), Visualisierung – Mediatisierung. Bildliche Kommunikation und bildliches Handeln in mediatisierten Gesellschaften (pp. 37–58). Halem. Marek, R. (2014). Understanding YouTube. Über die Faszination eines Mediums. Transcript. McCrae, J. (2017). https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2017/05/08/ meme-marketing-how-brands-are-speaking-a-new-consumer-language/#2db96b7937f5. Accessed: 6th March 2018. Meier, S. (2008). (Bild-)Diskurs im Netz. Halem. Meier, S. (2010). Bild und Frame – Eine diskursanalytische Perspektive auf visuelle Kommunikation und deren methodische Operationalisierung. Manuskript. https://www. tu-chemnitz.de/phil/imf/mk/online-diskurse/pdf/meier/meier_bild-frame_diskursanalyse. pdf. Accessed 6th Mar 2018. Meier, S. (2014). (Multimodale) Diskursanalyse. In N. Bildphilosophie (Ed.), Bild und Methode. Theoretische Hintergründe und methodische Verfahren der Bildwissenschaft (pp. 229–235). Halem. Meier, S., Sachs-Hombach, K., & Totzke, R. (2014). Bild und Methode. Theoretische Hintergründe und methodische Verfahren der Bildwissenschaft. In N. Bildphilosophie

Friendzone Level 5000: Memes as Image-Mediated Practices of Subjectivation

285

(Ed.), Bild und Methode. Theoretische Hintergründe und methodische Verfahren der Bildwissenschaft (pp. 11–22). Halem. Müller, M. R. (2016). Bildcluster. Sozialer Sinn, 17(1), 95–141. Niemann, J., & Geise, S. (2015). Exploring the Visual Sphere of Youth‘. In J. Niemann & S. Geise (Eds.), Visualisierung – Mediatisierung. Bildliche Kommunikation und bildliches Handeln in mediatisierten Gesellschaften (pp. 207–233). Halem. Osterroth, A. (2015). Das Internet-Meme als Sprache-Bild-Text. Image, 22, 26–46. Oswald, S. (2018). “Try not to cry” – Memes, Männlichkeit und Emotionen. Zur Entstehung von Affektstrukturen in digitalen Bildpraktiken. kommunikation@gesellschaft, 19, 1–29. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56038-3. Plessner, H. (1970). Philosophische Anthropologie. Fischer. Raab, J. (2008). Visuelle Wissenssoziologie. Theoretische Konzeption und materiale Analysen. UVK. Reckwitz, A. (2003). Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 32(4), 282–301. Reckwitz, A. (2008). Subjekt. transcript. Reckwitz, A. (2017). Die Gesellschaft der Singularitäten. Suhrkamp. Reißmann, W. (2015). Mediatisierung visuell. Baden-Baden. Rosa, H. (2012). Vier Ebenen der Weltinterpretation. In H. Rosa (Ed.), Weltbeziehungen im Zeitalter der Beschleunigung. Suhrkamp. Schatzki, T. (1996). Social practices. A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press. Schmehl, K. (2017). Mit diesen Memes wollen AfD-Trolle die Bundestagswahl beeinflussen. https://www.buzzfeed.com/karstenschmehl/willkommen-in-der-welt-von-4chan?utm_ term=.hhqEZL1Rr#.rqlMWxj2e. Accessed: 6th March 2018. Schmitz, U. (2011). Sehflächenforschung. Eine Einführung. In H. Diekmannshenke, M. Klemm, & H. Stöckl (Eds.), Bildlinguistik. Theorien – Methoden – Fallbeispiele (pp. 23–41). Schmidt. Schreiber, M., & Kramer, M. (2016). Verdammt schön. Methodologische und methodische Herausforderungen der Rekonstruktion von Bildpraktiken auf Instagram. Zeitschrift für Qualitative Forschung, 17, 81–106. Shifman, L. (2014). Meme: Kunst, Kultur und Politik im digitalen Zeitalter. Suhrkamp. Sievers, C. (2016). Foto-Communitys als multimodale digitale Kommunikationsform. In N. Klug & H. Stöckl (Eds.), Handbuch Sprache im multimodalen Kontext (pp. 455–475). DeGruyter. Simmel, G. (2009). Soziologie : Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Suhrkamp. Stöckl, H. (2011). Sprache-Bild-Texte lesen. Bausteine zur Methodik einer Grundkompetenz. In H. Diekmannshenke, M. Klemm, & H. Stöckl (Eds.), Bildlinguistik. Theorien – Methoden – Fallbeispiele (pp. 45–70). Schmidt. Walser, R., & Neumann-Braun, K. (2013). Freundschaftsnetzwerke und die Welt ihrer Fotoalben – gestern und heute. In C. Wijnen, S. Trültzsch, & C. Ortner (Eds.), Medienwelten im Wandel. Kommunikationswissenschaftliche Positionen, Perspektiven und Konsequenzen (pp. 151–166). Springer VS.

286

S. Oswald

Werron, T. (2011). Zur sozialen Konstruktion moderner Konkurrenzen. Das Publikum in der ‚Soziologie der Konkurrenz‘. In H. Tyrell, O. Rammstedt, & I. Meyer (Hrsg.), Georg Simmels große “Soziologie”. Eine Sichtung nach hundert Jahren (pp. 227–259). transcript. Wittgenstein, L. (1984). Philosophische Untersuchungen. Suhrkamp.