The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals 9780824891442

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The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals

Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 28

The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals

By S. Cromwell Crawford

Asian Studies Program U N I V E R S I T Y OF H A W A I I

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF HAWAII

First e d i t i o n c o p y r i g h t © 1974 by S. C r o m w e l l C r a w f o r d S e c o n d revised e d i t i o n © 1982 by S. C r o m w e l l C r a w f o r d All r i g h t s reserved M a n u f a c t u r e d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a

Library of C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g in Publication Data C r a w f o r d , S. C r o m w e l l . T h e e v o l u t i o n of H i n d u e t h i c a l ideals. ( A s i a n s t u d i e s at H a w a i i ; n o . 28) B i b l i o g r a p h y : p. I n c l u d e s index. 1. H i n d u e t h i c s — H i s t o r y . 1. Title. 11. Series D S 3 . A 2 A 8 2 n o . 28 [BJ122J 950s [ 2 9 4 . 5 ' 4 8 ' 0 9 ] 8 1 - 1 3 1 1 4 ISBN 0-8248-0782-0

AACR2

For Suzanne and Christine, my daughters and friends

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction The Evolutionary Character of Hindu Ethics—Definition of Hindu Ethics—Type of Approach. 1. T H E E T H I C S O F T H E VEDIC P E R I O D Introduction—Ethical Thought in the Mantras— Brahmanas—Upanisads.

ix xi xiii

1

2. T H E E T H I C S O F T H E SUTRA A N D E P I C P E R I O D Ethical Thought in the Dharma Sutras—Dharma Sastras— Epics—Bhagavadglta.

51

3. T H E E T H I C S O F T H E D A R S A N A P E R I O D Introduction—Ethical Thought in Nyaya-Vaisesika— Sarhkhya-Yoga—Purva MTmartisa—Vedanta: Advaita, Visistadvaita.

85

4. S U M M A R Y A N D C R I T I C A L R É S U M É O F H I N D U E T H I C S The Relation between Philosophy and Ethics—The Four Ends of Life—The Three Debts—Objective E t h i c s Subjective Ethics—Transcendental Ethics—The Ecological Conscience of Hinduism.

130

Notes Bibliography Index

153 169 173

Acknowledgments

In writing this book I have received inestimable help f r o m colleagues at the University of H a w a i i : K. N. U p a d h y a y a , P h i l o s o p h y ; J. P. S h a r m a , History; Lee Siegel, Religion; Walter M a u r e r a n d R a m a N a t h S h a r m a , I n d o - P a c i f i c L a n g u a g e s . T h e resultant work still leaves r o o m for imp r o v e m e n t , but w i t h o u t the expert c o n t r i b u t i o n s of my f r i e n d s I would be less c o n f i d e n t of w h a t has been p r o d u c e d . I a m also deeply g r a t e f u l to P r o f e s s o r Philip Jenner, C h a i r m a n (1980) of the Asian Studies P u b l i c a t i o n C o m m i t t e e , University of H a w a i i , f o r his enthusiastic s u p p o r t , a n d also t o the m e m b e r s of the C o m m i t t e e f o r their g e n e r o u s acceptance of this work f o r publication: Alice Dewey, G a y a t r i K a s s e b a u m , David K o r n h a u s e r , a n d J o h n S t e p h a n .

Abbreviations

Ait. B. Apas. Asv. G. S. AV. Baud. BG. Brh. Up. BS. Chand. Up. Gaut. JB. Manu Mait. S. Mbh. M u n d . Up. MS. NS. NB. Paflc. B. PP. RV. SB. SPS. SK. SV.

Aitareya Brahmana Apastamba Dharma Sutra Asvalayana Grhya Sutra Atharva Veda Baudhayana Dharma Sutra BhagavadgTta Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Brahma Sutra Chandogya Upanisad G a u t a m a Dharma Sutra Jaiminlya Brahmana Manava Dharma Sastra Maitrayani Samhita Mahabharata M u n d a k a Upanisad Mimartisa Sutras Nyaya Sutras NySya Bhasya Paflcavirtisa Brahmana P a d a r t h a d h a r m a s a m g r a h a of Prasastapada Rg Veda Satapatha Brahmana Sartikhyapravacana Sutra Sarhkhya Karika Slokavarttika

xii TS. Taitt. U p VS. VB. Vas. Ved. S. Yaj. YS. YB.

ABBREVIATIONS

TaittirTya Sarhhita Taittiriya U p a n i s a d Vaisesika S u t r a s Vaisesika B h a s y a Vasistha D h a r m a S u t r a Vedanta S u t r a s Yajnavalkya Smrti Yoga S u t r a s Yoga Bhasya

Introduction

H i n d u s call their religion Sanatana Dhanna, which literally means " E t e r nal L a w . " T h e n a m e should in n o wise suggest that the ethical ideals connected with this religion are eternal in the sense of being fixed, static, u n c h a n g i n g substances. To the contrary, H i n d u ethics., like the river Ganges, has been in a state of ceaseless flow t h r o u g h the ages, constantly c h a n g i n g its course a n d currents relative to the h a r d , intervening realities of Indian history. All of its f u n d a m e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s — k a r m a n , samsara, dharma— have evolved f r o m s t r e a m s of t h o u g h t originating in earliest times. These elements have survived until the present day, not inspite of c h a n g e but because of c h a n g e . T h u s , u n d e r the rubric of eternal, universal law, H i n d u ethics combines continuity with d y n a m i c diversity. T h e merit of viewing H i n d u ethics as a process is t h a t , with the aid of historical tools, we can evaluate later m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t s by j u d g i n g t h e m in relation to the original intentions of their sources. M a n y exciting discoveries a r e m a d e . We find, f o r instance, that while jati (caste) is a t r i b u t a r y of varna (class), it has so widely m e a n d e r e d f r o m the psychological insights of the original social scheme that it has b e c o m e something entirely d i f f e r e n t . T h e e v o l u t i o n a r y character of H i n d u ethics also gives it a c o n t e m p o rary relevance. Being o p e n to c h a n g e , its principles can be a d a p t e d to c o n t e m p o r a r y ethical situations. In t h e critical R é s u m é , C h a p t e r 4, I h a v e tried to show, f o r example, how H i n d u i s m ' s reverential a t t i t u d e tow a r d N a t u r e can provide m o d e r n technological societies with guidelines f o r an ethics of ecology. This study will follow the evolution of H i n d u ethics t h r o u g h three m a i n periods covering m o r e t h a n twenty-five h u n d r e d years. T h e y a r e

xiv

INTRODUCTION

t h e Vedic P e r i o d ( 1 5 0 0 - 5 0 0 B . C . ) ; t h e S u t r a a n d E p i c P e r i o d ( 5 0 0 B . C . 3 0 0 A.D.);

and the Darsana

s o u r c e s will b e u s e d c h i e f l y .

Period These

(to

1 1 0 0 A.D.).

include:

Primary

the Vedas,

literary

Brahmanas,

Upani$ads, Dharma Sutras, Dharma Sastras, Epics, Nyaya,

Vaise$ika,

Sarhkhya Yoga, P u r v a MTmamsa, and the Vedanta. O n c e t h e s e s o u r c e s h a v e b e e n e x a m i n e d t h e r e will b e n o m i s t a k e t h a t t h e y a r e all p a r t o f a s i n g l e t r a d i t i o n a n d a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t t h e s a m e s u b j e c t , b u t e a c h views it f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r s t a n c e c r e a t i n g d i v e r s i t y w i t h i n unity. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e r e a d e r will f i n d it d i f f i c u l t t o s p e a k g e n e r a l l y

about

" H i n d u e t h i c s " w i t h o u t q u a l i f y i n g it w i t h s p e c i f i c t e x t u a l r e f e r e n c e s . J u s t as it is u n f a i r a n d i n a c c u r a t e t o say " t h e B i b l e s a y s , " o r even " t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t s a y s " o r " t h e N e w T e s t a m e n t s a y s " ; it is e q u a l l y u n s c i e n t i f i c t o s p e a k o f Sruti

e t h i c s o r Smrti

ethics without locating the particular

a u t h o r . T h e p o i n t is, b e c a u s e o f t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y f a c t o r in H i n d u e t h ics, c h a n g i n g m e t a p h y s i c s g i v e rise t o c h a n g i n g e t h i c s . E x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d u n u s u a l s i t u a t i o n s a l s o p r e c i p i t a t e s h i f t s in e t h i c a l p o s i t i o n s . T h e n e x t t e r m in t h e title o f this b o o k w h i c h r e q u i r e s s o m e e x p l a n a t i o n is t h e w o r d " H i n d u i s m . " T h i s t e r m is a p p r o p r i a t e f o r l a t e r p e r i o d s o f I n dian religion which must be distinguished f r o m the earlier period m o r e p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d as Vedic B r a h m a n i s m . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , it is e q u a l l y m i s l e a d i n g t o d r a w h a r d a n d fast d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e t w o . Scholars w h o claim a generic discontinuity between B r a h m a n i s m and H i n d u i s m deny a linear evolution t o s o m e o f the I n d o - A r y a n ideas which l a t e r b l o s s o m e d in t h e U p a n i $ a d s . N o t h a v i n g a s e n s e o f t h e i r i n n e r e v o l u t i o n , t h e y c o n s i d e r s u c h n o t i o n s as samsara,

karman,

a n d ahimsa

" e n t i r e l y u n k n o w n t o p r e - U p a n i $ a d i c Vedic r e l i g i o n , ' " a n d , a s c r i b e t h e m t o n o n - V e d i c s o u r c e s . T r u e , b e l i e f in samsara

as

therefore,

b e c a m e full-

b l o w n o n l y b y t h e t i m e o f t h e B u d d h a , b u t , as D e u s s e n s h o w s , it is p o s s i b l e t o t r a c e its g r a d u a l e v o l u t i o n f r o m e a r l i e r t i m e s . 2 Karman

is n o t

c l e a r l y f o r m u l a t e d in t h e R g V e d a , b u t its e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e e v i d e n t w h e n R g v e d i c s e e r s r e c o g n i z e d s u f f e r i n g as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f p r e v i o u s sin. Ahimsa

h a s p s y c h o l o g i c a l r o o t s g o i n g b a c k t o t h e r e v e r e n c e with

w h i c h p r i m i t i v e m a n l o o k e d u p o n all o f life. T h e Vanaprasthas first t o g i v e it d e f i n i t e s h a p e . S i n c e ahimsa

were the

was a V a n a p r a s t h a ideal, the

o b j e c t i o n t h a t it c o u l d n o t b e Vedic b e c a u s e it c o n f l i c t s w i t h a n i m a l s a c r i f i c e , s i m p l y d o e s n o t apply. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e i d e a l s , s e v e r a l o t h e r e t h i c a l c o n c e p t s c a n b e listed t o d e m o n s t r a t e the continuity between the early and later periods o f Indian religious thought. Worth particular mention are: world order t r u t h (satya),

(rta),

t o l e r a n c e , h o s p i t a l i t y , duty, a n d t h e w h o l e n e t w o r k o f v a l -

ues c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e j o i n t f a m i l y .

INTRODUCTION

XV

Aside from ethical links, such scholars as L. D. Barnett (Antiquities of India), A. A. Macdonell (India's Past), A. L. Basham (The Wonder that was India), and W. Norman Brown (Man in the Universe) have brought to light other aspects of cultural continuity. According to Brown, It w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e t o c o m p i l e a c a t a l o g u e o f m a n y h u n d r e d s o f c u l t u r a l i t e m s a p p e a r i n g in a n c i e n t I n d i a n c i v i l i z a t i o n w h i c h a r e t h e n r e b o r n o r at least r e a p p e a r in c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g f a s h i o n in s u c c e e d i n g p e r i o d s d u r i n g centuries, even millennia.1

On the basis of these researches, it seems eminently justifiable to use the word " H i n d u i s m " to cover both the earlier and later periods of Indian religious thought. The third term in the title which bears clarification is the word "ethics." Technically speaking, Webster defines ethics as "the science that treats of the principles of human morality and duty." Hinduism does not have a science of morals in the fashion of some Aristotelian or Thomistic model. However, it does have a moral philosophy which postulates a summum bonurn and specifies the proper means for achieving it. This highest ideal is the state of liberation or moksa. In it a man finds his selffulfilment and deepest bliss. It is founded on the metaphysical conviction of the oneness of reality which is attainable through direct experience. Moksa serves as the ultimate standard of right conduct. It measures the value or disvalue of an act by the extent to which it either helps or hinders the attainment of freedom. Actions most distinctively oriented to moksa are those characterized by truth, nonviolence, sacrifice, and renunciation. There is no denying the fact that the philosophers were keenly interested in moral conduct, but this did not make them the authors of morality. Habits of life regarding right or wrong conduct were already part of a long-standing tradition. However, as part of their practical teachings, the sages integrated traditional morality into their respective systems in accordance with their own standards of ultimate value. Therefore, in my opinion, it is not correct to say that the philosophers simply "assumed morality." How could they adopt so nondeliberate an attitude toward a discipline which they all recognize as the necessary propaedeutic for enlightenment? They all agree with the M u n d a k a Upani$ad: "This Soul, (Atman) is obtainable by truth, by austerity (tapas). By proper knowledge (jnana), the student's life of chastity (brahmacarya), constantly [practised]." 4 Sankara is a good illustration of the philosopher who, though recognizing that ethics belongs to the phenomenal world which must be tran-

xvi

INTRODUCTION

scended, nevertheless r e m a i n s true t o the Upani$adic insistence u p o n m o r a l qualifications f o r intuitive knowledge. S a n k a r a does not leave the impression that he is just tagging t r a d i t i o n a l morality o n to his system, but his critical exegesis of the scriptures clearly d e m o n s t r a t e s a process of selectivity in keeping with his o w n metaphysical p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . It is precisely this element of selection which lends variety to the ethics of t h e different philosophical systems, a p h e n o m e n o n which we could not have f o u n d had all the p h i l o s o p h e r s merely accepted the t r a d i t i o n a l morality, lock, stock, a n d barrel. Even if that were the case, it must be remembered that o r t h o d o x morality was by n o means monolithic. T h e philosopher was, t h e r e f o r e , always c o n f r o n t e d with at least three o p t i o n s . T h e r e was the discipline k n o w n as pravrtti or 'active life'; the discipline k n o w n as nivrtti or ' q u i e t i s m ' ; a n d the c o m b i n a t i o n of the t w o in the discipline called niskamakarman or ' d e t a c h e d a c t i o n . ' T h e ethics of each system of t h o u g h t will be treated comprehensively on three different levels. O n the objective level, we explore the social dimensions of ethics. O n the subjective level, we search f o r personal elements of ethics. A n d on the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level, we analyse the m o r a l s t r u c t u r e of the " l i f e a b s o l u t e . " Because of the close ties between ethics a n d metaphysics, wherever necessary, there will be a clear-cut elucidation of the philosophical facets in which the ethics is set. It is possible that the plurality of t h o u g h t covering so vast an area of time a n d literature is likely to leave the reader s o m e w h a t c o n f u s e d a b o u t its unity. For this r e a s o n , at the risk of repetition, an extensive s u m m a r y is provided in the concluding chapter. A l o n g with the s u m m a r y there a p p e a r s a critique of H i n d u ethics. In part, this, t o o , is a r é s u m é of the critical c o m m e n t a r y that has been maintained t h r o u g h o u t the text. T h e critical a n d analytical a p p r o a c h has been dictated by two considerations. First, I have tried t o avoid looking at H i n d u ethics in the style of a biologist observing an insect u n d e r a microscope. " O b j e c t i v i t y " a n d " d e t a c h m e n t " a r e w o r d s with a c a d e m i c a p p e a l , but the values by which people live d o not reveal their inner secrets to o n e w h o curiously a n d coldly scrutinizes t h e m f r o m w i t h o u t . T h e r e a r e t o o m a n y subtle n u a n c e s which prove elusive f o r the scientific a p p r o a c h . This is especially t r u e of H i n d u values which, within their internal s t r u c t u r e , are vignettes of I n d i a ' s long a n d c h a n g i n g history. In this context o n e can say, to k n o w India, try grasping the m y r i a d f o r m s of dharma, f o r in the d e p t h s of this single word lies an entire civilization! At t h e same time, perusal of several Indian texts dealing with H i n d u ethics f r o m within has convinced m e t h a t the inside view of the religious partisan is t o o o f t e n m a r r e d by an e x t r a v a g a n t , blind, u n r e a s o n i n g , a n d

INTRODUCTION

xvii

a r r o g a n t a t t a c h m e n t . T h e r e are f a r t o o m a n y cultural chauvinists endlessly h a r p i n g on the so-called spiritual ideais of India versus the material ideals of America a n d the West. T h e a p p r o a c h taken in this b o o k is o n e that steers a course between t h e Scylla of d e t a c h m e n t a n d the C h a r y b d i s of a t t a c h m e n t , a n d in so d o i n g c o m b i n e s the merits of b o t h a p p r o a c h e s . Wherever I have m a d e j u d g ments regarding truth a n d value, they have been based u p o n a criterion of h u m a n authenticity consistent with the H i n d u u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m a n . I have also evaluated the system by its inner coherence a n d by the f u n c tional consistency of its m a j o r c o m p o n e n t s . However, this critical stance has not prevented me f r o m standing sympathetically within the system a n d seeing beyond the s h a d o w s to the substance. This " d e t a c h e d - w i t h i n " a p p r o a c h has been possible for me because, t h o u g h I am not a H i n d u , I was b o r n , e d u c a t e d , a n d spent twenty-seven c o n t i n u o u s years in India. H a v i n g learned the language, culture, a n d religion of the people, as a son of the soil, I can d o no less than a d o p t a scholarly respect for the values of the land.

CHAPTER 1

The Ethics of the Vedic Period

I. Introduction O u r s t u d y of H i n d u ethics goes b a c k t o a n c i e n t t i m e s with t h e A r y a n inv a s i o n s of N o r t h I n d i a w h i c h w e r e c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y parallel t o t h e H e l lenic i n v a s i o n s of G r e e c e (circa 2 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 ) . T h e A r y a n s w e r e tall, fair people w h o spoke an I n d o - E u r o p e a n language. These pastoral n o m a d s h a d m i g r a t e d f r o m the s t e p p e s of E a s t e r n E u r o p e , finally m a k i n g their new h o m e o n t h e u p p e r b r a n c h e s of t h e I n d u s River in t h e n o r t h w e s t e r n r e g i o n of I n d i a . T h e c u l t u r e of these c o n q u e r i n g tribes w a s in s h a r p c o n trast t o t h a t of the d e c l i n i n g I n d u s civilization. N o t l o n g a f t e r their o c c u p a t i o n of the l a n d , t h e A r y a n s c o m m e n c e d their s p e c u l a t i v e activities w h i c h issued in t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e Vedas. T h e w o r d v e d a m e a n s " k n o w l e d g e " a n d is e t y m o l o g i c a l l y related t o t h e E n g l i s h w o r d s " w i t " a n d " w i s d o m . " T h e Vedas a r e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e m a i n sections: (1) t h e M a n t r a s , (2) t h e B r a h m a n a s , a n d (3) t h e U p a nisads. (1). T h e M a n t r a s o r h y m n s a r e f o u n d in f o u r c o l l e c t i o n s called S a r h h i t a s w h i c h a r e t h e c o r e of Vedic l i t e r a t u r e . T h e s e a r e : T h e R g Veda S a r h h i t a ; T h e Y a j u r Veda S a r h h i t a ; T h e S a m a Veda S a r h h i t a ; a n d T h e A t h a r v a Veda S a m h i t a . P r o f e s s o r H . Z i m m e r o b s e r v e s t h a t " t h e Vedic h y m n s a r e the oldest e x t a n t literary a n d religious m o n u m e n t of t h e socalled I n d o - E u r o p e a n f a m i l y of l a n g u a g e s . ' " M a n y of t h e t h e o l o g i c a l , ethical a n d ritualistic e l e m e n t s of t h e Vedic p e r i o d a r e strikingly similar t o t h e H o m e r i c p e r i o d . T h e p r e s e n t f o r m of t h e M a n t r a s w a s p r o b a b l y fixed circa 1 5 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 B.C.

2

E T H I C S OF T H E V E D I C P E R I O D

Interpretation of these hymns is often difficult, because they are written in old Sanskrit and represent a very ancient tradition whose meaning is sometimes lost. The problem of interpretation is compounded by the selective character of this collection. Only those hymns which conformed to the ritualistic interests of the compilers were included. This makes the Sarhhitas a partial and one-sided source of information—a factor we shall have to bear in mind when assessing the early Vedic interest in ethics. (2). The Brahmanas were formed in the centuries immediately following the Sarhhitas (1000-700 B.C:.). They are prose writings which attempt to elucidate the meaning and significance of the Sarhhitas, but often misread them. Because they are chiefly preoccupied with the discussion of Vedic sacrifices, modern philosophers unfortunately tend to bypass the Brahmanas. (3). The age of the Aranyakas and Upanisads (700-500 B.C.) followed the Brahmanic period. Traditionally, the Upanisads are closely associated with Brahmanas, but in spirit they are quite distinct. Whereas the Brahmanas are theological and liturgical, the Upanisads are philosophical, and mystical. This is the reason the Upanisads are known as the Jnanakan^a or knowledge part of the Veda, while the Brahmanas are called the Karmakantfa or ritual part. The Upanisads provide the foundation for the Vedanta philosophy which, in the opinion of Max Miiller, is " a system in which human speculation seems to have reached its very acme." Together, the Mantras, Brahmanas, and Upanisads constitute the three main classifications of the Vedas and are revered as Sruti or revealed literature. The reverence attributed to the Vedas ensured their preservation and authenticity to a degree unmatched by other works of antiquity. Speaking of the accuracy of the oral tradition, A. A. Macdonell declared: " T h e Vedas are still learnt by heart as they were long before the invasion of Alexander, and could now be restored from the lips of religious teachers if every manuscript or printed copy of them were destroyed." 2 So here, in pristine form, is a body of literature which has guided the spiritual destiny of the Hindus from ancient times and which is no less sacred to this day. Ethically, the chief contribution of these scriptures lies in their evolution of such seminal concepts as: rta (cosmic order), varna (class) and asrama (stages of life) dharmas, the law of karman (moral causation), sarhsara (transmigration), ahithsa (harmlessness), and moksa (liberation). The fact that these ancient ethical concepts have survived more than three thousand years of turbulent history indicates their survival value and justifies their contemporary investigation.

E T H I C S OF T H E V E D I C P E R I O D

3

I I . E t h i c a l T h o u g h t in t h e M a n t r a s

The ancient Indian seers recognized a cosmic order which served as the foundation of their ethics. They called it rta, a concept which an eminent historian has described as "the highest flight of Rg-Vedic t h o u g h t . " ' Originally, Rta was a concept pertaining to the physical universe, denoting the Law of Nature operative in the movement of the planets, the succession of night and day, and the rotation of the seasons. As the principle of order in the universe, it endowed all of the natural phenomena with symmetry and aesthetic form. The beauty and uniformity of heaven and earth were looked upon as proceeding from their unalterable observance of cosmic law. Gradually, the cosmic sense of Rta as Natural Law developed into the social sense of Rta as Moral Law. The nature of this development was crucial for the status of morality. It meant that virtue was given the same immanental position in the social world as law occupied in the physical world. The Moral Law, like the Law of Nature, was intrinsically real, and not relatively real. It endowed the chaotic striving of human nature with ethical form in the same manner as Rta, cosmically conceived, imposed beauty and order upon physical chaos. The idea of Rta as Moral Law became a salient feature of Vedic thought. It is the sense of value based on this idea which accounts for the remarkable unity of thought among the poets. They are all agreed: A m a n should think o n wealth, and strive to win it by a d o r a t i o n o f the path o f Order, C o u n s e l himself with his o w n mental insight, and grasp still nobler vigour with his spirit. 4

Exhortations of this kind are numerous. They point to the fact that Rta was the summum bonum around which the whole of Vedic religion and society was modelled. So great was its influence that in later times its principles were perpetuated through the characteristic Hindu concepts of dharma and the law of karman. The ethical impact of Rta on the Vedic mind is seen in the confidence it generated in respect to the goodness of life in this world. All of the events in nature and in history were teleologically understood. Consciousness of Rta imparted the feeling of being at-home in the world. It offered solace and security. The world was not a place where blind, capricious forces held sway, but was a benevolent habitat in which men could expect to enjoy all of the good things of life—material and spiritual. To be sure, the Vedas always recognize the reality of evil: but since righteousness is as much part of the cosmic structure as the laws by which the planets move, there is no reason to doubt that "as the sun rises to-

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morrow, virtue will triumph." Unlike Zoroastrianism where good and evil are on par with one another, there is no trace of moral dualism in Vedic religion. The forces of good are generally represented by Indra (god of the heavens), while the forces of evil are represented by the demon Vrtra. The battle between the two is fierce, but Indra always prevails. The poet says: 1 will d e c l a r e t h e m a n l y d e e d s of I n d r a , t h e first t h a t h e a c h i e v e d , t h e Thunder-wielder. H e slew t h e D r a g o n , t h e n disclosed t h e w a t e r s , a n d c l e f t t h e c h a n n e l s of t h e mountain torrents. H e slew t h e D r a g o n lying o n t h e m o u n t a i n : his h e a v e n l y b o l t o f t h u n d e r Tvastar fashioned. L i k e l o w i n g k i n e in r a p i d flow d e s c e n d i n g t h e w a t e r s g l i d e d d o w n w a r d s t o the ocean. I m p e t u o u s as a bull, he c h o s e t h e S o m a , a n d in t h r e e s a c r e d b e a k e r s d r a n k the juices. M a g h a v a n g r a s p e d t h e t h u n d e r f o r his w e a p o n , a n d s m o t e t o d e a t h this firstb o r n of t h e d r a g o n s . W h e n , I n d r a , t h o u h a d s t slain t h e d r a g o n ' s f i r s t b o r n , a n d o v e r c a m e t h e c h a r m s of t h e e n c h a n t e r s , T h e n , giving life t o S u n a n d D a w n a n d H e a v e n , t h o u f o u n d e s t n o t o n e f o e to stand against thee. I n d r a with his o w n g r e a t a n d d e a d l y t h u n d e r s m o t e i n t o pieces V r t r a , w o r s t of V r t r a s . A s t r u n k s of trees, w h a t t i m e t h e a x e h a t h felled t h e m , l o w o n t h e e a r t h s o lies t h e p r o s t r a t e D r a g o n . 5

The hymns not only present us with a universal standard of morality represented by Rta, they also lay down certain duties as the concrete manifestation of Rta. The first set of duties is religious, consisting of prayers and sacrifices to the gods. Without going into the specific nature of these duties, we shall enquire into their bearing on the moral life. In the opinion of some scholars, Vedic worship is utilitarian and lacking in sincerity. We f e a r t h e g o d s w h o s e e f f e c t s a r e d a n g e r o u s t o u s , a n d love t h o s e t h a t h e l p us in o u r d a i l y p u r s u i t s . We p r a y t o I n d r a t o s e n d d o w n r a i n , a n d yet b e g h i m n o t t o s e n d t h e s t o r m . T h e s u n is i m p l o r e d t o i m p a r t a g e n t l e w a r m t h , a n d not force the world into drought and f a m i n e by scorching heat. T h e g o d s b e c o m e t h e s o u r c e s of m a t e r i a l p r o s p e r i t y , a n d p r a y e r s f o r t h e g o o d s of t h e w o r l d a r e very c o m m o n . '

This description of Vedic worship as lacking moral qualities is t o o onesided to do justice to the facts. Professor R. C. Majumdar is nearer to

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the truth when he observes that although the process of Vedic sacrifice was relatively simple, "the theory about it was quite a complex one, as the object and necessity of sacrifice were often regarded f r o m radically different points of view." 7 According to one point of view, sacrifice was a barter between God and man: man offered God food and drink, and God reciprocated by blessing him with material prosperity, many sons, and long life. But sacrifice was also approached in a nonutilitarian manner. There is absolutely no idea of give and take; instead, "sacrifice becomes an act of thanks-giving, mingled with affection and gratitude to the gods for the benefits already received from them, and expected in future." 8 Worship on this second level was morally structured. Emphasis was placed on the spirit of sacrifice as against its mechanical performance. The poet says: "Utter a powerful speech to Indra which is sweeter than butter or honey.'" Like Indra, the gods penetrate the depths of men's hearts to find out what are their true motives. Worship which is properly motivated is offered in the spirit of rta (moral law), salya (truth), sraddha (faith), and tapas ("kindling of the spiritual fire"). This definition of worship seems to warrant the conclusion that Vedic worship is grounded in the Vedic values. 10 Having described the moral aspects of Vedic worship from the manward side, let us now enquire into its moral aspects from the godward side. If the characterisation of the gods, who are the chief objects of Vedic worship, is, indeed, a projection of the people's own idealized selfimage, theology should offer us some clues about how the people envisioned their own moral possibilities, embodied in the persons of the gods. A theological investigation of the hymns shows that the Vedic deities " f o r m e d a motley group of varied and complex character."" These deities were the personification of natural phenomena, as their very names indicate: Surya (the sun god), U$as (the god of Dawn), Agni (the fire god). In the process of personalizing the agencies of nature, some of the gods continue to be viewed rather physicalistically. Those who are more completely personalized are often attributed h u m a n passions and instincts no better than those of the worshippers in whose image they are made. These gods are viewed as "strong rather than good, powerful rather than moral.'" 2 Worship of such deities naturally tended to be more utilitarian than moral. Yet, in spite of these moral deficiencies in Vedic theology, the overall picture of the gods is one that testifies to the "strong moral sense of the Vedic Aryans.'" 3 Their ethical aspirations could not be satisfied by relating to the gods on a materialistic basis. In the final analysis, the ethical aspirations prevail over the utilitarian considerations, and these aspira-

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tions are projected in a conceptualization of the gods which is predominantly moral. The ethicising of the gods began at a very early age. Professor E. W. Hopkins has shown that the Indie tribes, prior to being domiciled between the Indus and Ganges rivers, " h a d passed beyond the stage of undiluted fear in the presence of unnamed demons and had already invested with a moral quality the 'kind bright' devas or spirits of light, which quality differentiated these powers from the rakshas or 'injurers that go about by night' and 'rejoice in darkness'.'" 4 Certainly, there is the element of fear in man's relation to the gods, but this fear rises out of the sense of having violated a divine law and is, therefore, infused with the feeling of moral culpability. The gods are feared because they send disease, but this punishment is not regarded as capricious or accidental. It is the just recompense of moral wrongdoing. The age-old problem of physical evil is thus explained in terms of moral evil. On the whole, the gods are approached through love rather than fear. The first steps in the development of bhakti-marga (the path of devotion) can be traced to the Vedic attitudes toward the gods. The relationship with Indra affords a good illustration. It is said that when Indra's lightning bolt strikes, "the world is full of fear." But although Indra is feared because he punishes sin, he is loved and admired for his beneficence. The poet sings: In perfect u n i s o n all y e a r n i n g h y m n s o f m i n e that find the light o f h e a v e n h a v e s u n g forth I n d r a ' s praise. A s w i v e s e m b r a c e their lord, the c o m e l y b r i d e g r o o m , s o t h e y c o m p a s s M a g h a v a n a b o u t that he m a y h e l p . "

The devotee's love for the deva (god) is in the nature of a response to the deva's love for the devotee. Agni is particularly praised for his love toward man. A g n i , t h o u art o u r P r o v i d e n c e , o u r Father t h o u : w e are thy brethren a n d t h o u art o u r spring o f life. 1 6

Such outpourings of love indicate that karman (duty) ensued f r o m bhakti (devotion). The bhakti nature of this relationship between m a n and God is of great ethical significance. Since motives determine the quality of an act, it makes a world of difference when an act is impelled by love instead of being compelled by fear. We have shown that the distinction between the raksasas and the devas is such that whereas the former capriciously hurt man and inspired fear, the latter were benefactors of mankind and inspired loving devotion. However, the goodness of the gods does not lie principally in their being good to man, but in being morally good. It is this moral element which

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absolutely distinguishes the "kind bright" devas f r o m the raksasas who "rejoice in darkness." The moral character of the gods springs f r o m their association with Rta. Belief in Rta had distinctly ethicising effects upon the nature of the gods. Since Rta was Eternal Law, they were all subject to it. All of the gods are viewed as "strengthened of the L a w " and "furtherers of Rta." Agni is addressed as "Ruler of sacrifices, guard of Law eternal, radiant One.'" 7 Visnu is described as "primeval germ of Order even from his b i r t h . " " Indra says to one uncertain about his existence, "I exist, O Singer, look upon me here, all that exists I surpass in splendor. The Eternal Law's commandments make me mighty."" Like the Warrior god, Brhaspati is called "guilt scourger, guilt avenger," " w h o slays the spoiler and upholds the mighty Law." 2 0 Chief among the guardians of Rta are Varuna and Mitra. The poet joyously acknowledges their leadership in the moral realm: T h o s e w h o by Law u p h o l d the Law, Lords of the shining light o f Law Mitra 1 call and Varuna. 1 1

Varuna, as the root (var) of his name suggests, is the exalted coverer of the universe. His eye is the sun, the sky is his robe, and the storm his breath. 2 2 As the Universal Monarch, Varuna sits in his great heavenly palace, surrounded by his messengers who report on the moral conditions prevailing on earth. 2 3 Varuna is a dhrtavrata, one of steady and consistent resolve. He is just, but there is kindness in his justice. The intimate relation between Varuna and the ethical order is clearly brought out in the following hymn. The first verse refers to Rta as cosmic order. The last one has reference to the ritual order. The remainder of the hymn is a celebration of Rta as the ethical order. 1. Wise, verily, are creatures through his greatness w h o stayed even s p a c i o u s h e a v e n a n d earth asunder; W h o urged the high and mighty sky to m o t i o n , the Star o f old, and spread the earth b e f o r e him. 2. With m i n e o w n heart I c o m m u n e o n the q u e s t i o n h o w Varuna and I m a y be united. W h a t gift o f mine will he accept unangered? W h e n m a y I calmly look and find him gracious? 3. Fain t o k n o w this m y sin I q u e s t i o n others: I seek the wise, O Varuna and ask them. T h i s o n e same answer even the sages gave m e , Surely this Varuna is angry with thee. 4. W h a t , Varuna, hath been m y chief transgression, that t h o u w o u l d s t slay the friend w h o sings thy praises?

8

E T H I C S OF T H E V E D I C P E R I O D Tell m e , U n c o n q u e r a b l e L o r d , and q u i c k l y sinless will I a p p r o a c h t h e e with m i n e h o m a g e . 5. Free us f r o m sins c o m m i t t e d by o u r fathers, f r o m t h o s e w h e r e i n w e h a v e ourselves o f f e n d e d . O King, l o o s e , like a thief w h o f e e d s the cattle, as f r o m the c o r d a c a l f , set free Vasistha. 6. N o t our o w n will b e t r a y e d us, but s e d u c t i o n , t h o u g h t l e s s n e s s ,

Varuna?

w i n e , dice, or anger. T h e old is near t o lead astray the y o u n g e r : even sleep r e m o v e t h not all evil-doing. 7. S l a v e l i k e m a y I d o service t o the B o u n t e o u s , serve, free f r o m sin, the G o d inclined to anger. T h i s gentle L o r d gives w i s d o m t o the simple: the wiser G o d leads o n t h e wise to riches. 8. O L o r d , Varuna, m a y this l a u d a t i o n c o m e close to thee and lie w i t h i n t h y spirit. M a y it be well with us in rest and labour. Preserve us e v e r m o r e , ye G o d s , with b l e s s i n g s . 2 '

It is worth noting that the elements of fear and utility do not enter i n t o the devotee's relationship with Varuna. The god-man relationship is c o n ceived purely in moral terms. Hence, sin, which is the disruption of this relationship, is also morally conceived. However, it is fair to state that sin is not consistently perceived through moral categories in the Vedic literature. O f t e n , the sin against Agni is nothing more t h a n an i n f r a c t i o n of some liturgical rule. In such cases, ritualistic rectitude is given p r o m i nence over ethical rectitude. Sometimes sin is construed physicalistically and is deemed capable of transference f r o m one person to a n o t h e r by means of magic. But whenever the sense of satya and rta prevails, sin is ethicised. Ethically perceived, as in all relationships with Varuna a n d Mitra, sin is asatya (untruth), and anrta (injustice). Sinners, t h e r e f o r e , are k n o w n as anrta (without rta), and asatya (without truth). The moral character of m a n ' s relationship with Varuna is also b r o u g h t out in the recognition of h u m a n f r e e d o m , in the hymn just q u o t e d , we note the emergence of a strong sense of individual responsibility within the traditionally c o r p o r a t e structure of collective guilt. T h e n o t i o n of solidarity in sin is not questioned. In all tribal states of society the g r o u p , be it family or clan, is the primary responsible unit. However, the Vedic Indian, within this general orientation, is nevertheless struggling t o w a r d a morality of individual responsibility. Vasi$tha prays: " F r e e us f r o m sins committed by our fathers," 2 5 and thereby raises the question of culpability: Is it right to be held responsible for what others have d o n e , just because they h a p p e n to be blood relations? Vasi$tha also distinguishes corp o r a t e sins f r o m " t h o s e wherein we have ourselves o f f e n d e d . " 2 6

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The struggle for individual responsibility is further evidenced in the distinction made between voluntary and involuntary sins: N o t our o w n will betrayed us, but s e d u c t i o n , thoughtlessness, Varuna! wine, dice or anger. 2 '

A third pointer in the direction of asserting individual responsibility is the need for an existential knowledge of oneself. This internal grasp of spiritual truth as the expression of one's personal freedom should serve as a light by which one walks along the moral path. Knowing the sacred mantras by heart is mechanical as compared to a personal knowledge of the Supreme One who dwells in the heart and who sustains all that is through the operation of Rta. So far we have seen the correlation between Vedic worship and Vedic values. For the most part, the religious duties satisfied the ethical aspirations of the people. While it was the duty of men to serve the gods, it was the function of the gods, all of whom were ethical personalities, to help the devotees reach the highest goal of union with the Divine. In addition to these religioethical duties, men also had socioethical duties. Much emphasis was placed on the need for cultivating the virtues of cooperative living. A. C. Bose draws attention to the frequent usage of the prefix sam (syn—Greek; cum—Latin; com—English) as expressive of an ethic of collective living. He says: "We find a systematic attempt to build up sarhhrdaya (or sahrdaya), literally, concord, that is, the union of hearts, and samjrlanam, unity through c o m m o n understanding, at all social levels." 28 We shall now list some of the duties and virtues aimed at bringing about social concord. The most celebrated virtue is Satya or Truth. Its social importance is derived f r o m its metaphysical underpinning. Because Ultimate Reality is Sat (Truth), it follows that in a world structured by Truth, men should live by the principles of Truth. Again, the gods provide the models. Mitra and Varuna are described as "true to Law." By the opposite token, lying is called the " m u r d e r of speech." It is utterly reprehensible "when a mortal knowingly . . . injures with double tongue a fellow-mortal." 2 9 In the hands of Indra, the speaker of untruth becomes "like water which the hollowed hand compresses.'" 0 The mark of a truthful man is consistency. Such a man can be depended upon to act with responsible predictability because he follows the unswerving pathway of Rta. Everything he does is true and ordered. The ideal embodiment of consistency is Varuna. As the upholder of Rta, Varuna can always be relied upon to act with justice and compassion. He is therefore known as a dhrtavrata—one whose ways are unchanging. Another important social duty is dana or offering of gifts. An entire hymn is dedicated to Daksina—the largess presented by the wealthy no-

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bles to the priests who perform the sacrifical rites. The benefactors are praised for not counting the cost of sacrifice, but giving out of the abundance of their hearts. Great are the rewards of such liberality! T h e liberal die n o t , never are they ruined: the liberal s u f f e r neither harm nor trouble. T h e light o f h e a v e n , the universe a b o u t us,—all this d o t h sacrificial G u e r d o n give t h e m . "

Perhaps this eulogy to Daksina and other hymns written in the same vein, suffer as a result of their sacerdotal ties. One gets the uneasy feeling that generosity is being praised because the priests are dependent upon the offerings. A more disinterested treatment of the subject is found in a hymn addressed to Liberality. 32 The first verse declares the need for unquestioning philanthropy in the presence of human want. There is no justification for refusing food to the poor and the hungry, even on religious pretexts. To the argument that the hungry are probably being punished by the gods for their sins, the answer is: " T h e Gods have not ordained hunger to be our death: even to the well-fed man comes death in varied shape." 3 3 The hymn also praises Liberality, because it breeds prosperity and success. " T h e riches of the liberal never waste away.'" 4 "Success attends him in the shout of battle." 3 5 Liberality is further enjoined because of certain prudential considerations. There is no telling what the future holds—today a prince, tomorrow a pauper! The wise will, therefore, try to build up goodwill as insurance against the lean years of their lives—"let the rich satisfy the poor implorer, and bend his eye upon a longer pathway." 3 6 The last two considerations seem to place liberality within the framework of an ethic of reciprocity, rather than an ethic of disinterested service to one's fellowman. Actually, the two ideals are not in conflict. Aside from the observable fact that generosity does have its rewards, the hymn writer is realistic enough to know that the spirit of dana varies in quality from person to person. All men ought to be generous, but all men cannot be expected to be generous in the same way. T h e h a n d s are b o t h alike; their l a b o u r d i f f e r s . T h e Yield o f sister m i l c h - k i n e is u n e q u a l . T w i n s e v e n d i f f e r in their strength a n d v i g o u r : t w o , e v e n k i n s m e n , d i f f e r in their b o u n t y . 3 '

We now turn f r o m the subjective treatment of ethics to its objective treatment, and shall examine the social organization within which the individual was supposed to develop his personal capacities.

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In the Rgvedic period the f o u r traditional asramas or stages in life were not developed. But even at this period Vedic culture was ahead of its time in respect to the premium it placed u p o n education. T h e Brahmacarya or Student stage was compulsory for all. T h e p u r p o s e of education was to cultivate in youth a sense of responsible citizenship. Hereditary privileges played no part. Education was free and open. All that the r$is (Seers of truths f o u n d in the Vedas) expected of the pupil was a dedication to his studies, and an espousal of the celibate life. Sexual continence was not treated as an end in itself, but only as a means to bringing the sexual life under the discipline of Rta. Support for the centres of learning was underwritten by the community at large and by members of the royalty. Fathers initiated their children into Vedic studies and taught them family crafts. At the a p p r o p r i a t e time, the children moved out into the asramas (hermitages) where they were taught by the rsis. These teachers were held in the highest honour. The sage controlled the life of the nation. Wisdom was exalted above both wealth and political power. Having been imbued with wisdom, self-control, and civic responsibility, the young person was deemed m a t u r e enough to start a family of his own. He then became a householder or grhastha. The family was the basic unit of Aryan society. We shall look at the Rgvedic family f r o m the points of view of the family ideal, f o r m s of marriage, and type of family structure. The ideal of marriage in the Rgvedic period is a graceful blending of the biological and spiritual elements. Marriage was more than a contract; it was a sacrament. The sanctity in which society held the institution of marriage is discernible f r o m these verses of the marriage h y m n : I t a k e thy h a n d in m i n e for h a p p y f o r t u n e that t h o u m a y s t reach old age with m e thy h u s b a n d . G o d s , A r y a m a n , B h a g a , Savitar, P u r a n d h i , h a v e g i v e n t h e e t o be m y h o u s e h o l d ' s mistress. O P u $ a n , s e n d her o n as m o s t a u s p i c i o u s , her w h o shall be the sharer o f m y pleasures; H e r w h o shall t w i n e her l o v i n g a r m s a b o u t m e , A n d w e l c o m e all m y l o v e and m i n e e m b r a c e s . F o r t h e e , with bridal train, they, first, e s c o r t e d S u r y a to her h o m e . G i v e t o the h u s b a n d in return, A g n i , the w i f e with progeny. A g n i h a t h given the bride again with s p l e n d o u r a n d with a m p l e life. L o n g lived b e he w h o is her lord; a h u n d r e d a u t u m n s let h i m l i v e . "

M o n o g a m y was the general f o r m of marriage, polygamy being permitted and practised only a m o n g the wealthy social classes. T h e m o n o g a m o u s f o r m of marriage assured a w o m a n her personal prestige. She did not have to suffer the humiliation of playing second fiddle to anyone

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competing for her husband's interest and affection. Levirate forms of marriage were also common. While the marriage hymn entreats the groom to accept his bride as a god-given gift, there are rudimentary references to less spiritual methods of establishing a union. These are raksasa (marriage by forceful abduction of a woman during war), and prajapatya (marriage with the specific purpose of procreation). The Atharva Veda refers also to the gandharva method which is based only on mutual love between the two parties involved. Regarding the conditions of wedlock, we find that the only prohibitions in the Rgvedic period are the ones that forbid marriage between father and daughter and between brother and sister. The Aryan family was patriarchal and patrilinear, and is even until today. The matriarchal family was nonexistent in Vedic society. The patriarch presided over the joint family constituted by the father, grandfather, sons, and their wives. The Rg Veda fosters the ethics of joint family living in mutual love and concord. It likens the home to "a lake with lotus b l o s s o m s . " " The Atharva Veda enjoins the members to "love one another as the cow loves the calf she has borne" and to " b e of one mind, following the leader." 40 Theoretically, the patriarch had absolute control over the property, but in practice adhered to were the rules of equitability. The father was not a dictator, but rather the model of compassion as expressed in this prayer: "Be to us easy of approach, even as a father to his son." 4 1 Before the specialisation of professional roles, the father served his children as a teacher. Every father was a rsi on a small scale. The patriarchal structure of the family elevated the role of the male over the female; even so, women in the Rgvedic period enjoyed more status and freedom than in later periods. There are several supplications in the Rgvedic hymn for the birth of a son. 42 The appreciation of males should not be taken to imply the depreciation of females. "There is no evidence to show that girls were exposed as unwanted babes." 4 3 To the contrary, a maiden was admired for her beauty and purity, was provided with an education, and was given considerable freedom. The sensitivity of the Vedic poet for female grace is shown in his description of the beauty of Dawn. Pictured as a maiden clad in white, she disperses the powers of darkness and evil, and creates a life of order, regularity, and beauty. " T h e Fair, the Bright is come with her white offspring; to her the Dark One hath resigned her dwelling." 44 Like boys, girls were expected to go through the Brahmacarya stage. The importance of female education is shown by the fact that, according to the Atharva Veda, a brahmacariru has better prospects for marriage

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than o n e w h o is u n e d u c a t e d . We are r e m i n d e d that " t h e c u s t o m of upanayana of girls prevailed d o w n to the S u t r a period, t h o u g h it h a d then become a m e r e f o r m a l i t y in the case of the m a j o r i t y . " 4 5 S o m e w o m e n excelled in learning a n d were r a n k e d as rsis. Visvavara, a lady of the family of Atri is credited with a well-known h y m n t o Agni. 4 6 O t h e r cultured w o m e n w h o c o m p o s e d m a n t r a s are A p a l a , G h o $ a , L o p a m u d r a , IndranT, a n d Sasvati. 4 7 Women not only e n j o y e d e d u c a t i o n a l rights but religious rights as well. They j o i n e d their h u s b a n d s in p e r f o r m i n g rituals a n d m a k i n g sacrifices. Before t h e U d g a t r s in the B r a h m a n a period regarded it as their own prerogative, it was c u s t o m a r y f o r a wife to sing the Vedic h y m n s at the time of sacrifice. It is pointed out that " w o m e n p e r f o r m i n g t h e S a n d h y a or offering sacrifices by themselves, u n a c c o m p a n i e d by their h u s b a n d s , figure as late as the time of the R a m a y a n a (11. 20.15)." 4 8 T h e marital rights of a f e m a l e are evidenced by her having a voice in the selection of her h u s b a n d . S o m e t i m e s this m e a n t the f r e e d o m t o m a k e the w r o n g choice. T h e poet laments: " H o w m a n y a m a i d is pleasing t o the suitor w h o f a i n would m a r r y f o r her splendid r i c h e s . " 4 ' F r e e d o m to choose o n e ' s p a r t n e r m e a n s the girl was m a r r i e d at an age of discrimination, following puberty. T h e Rg Veda reflects a society in which b o t h sexes h a d the o p p o r t u n i t y to meet each o t h e r prior to marriage. 5 0 D u r i n g the samana festival, y o u n g , u n m a r r i e d girls h a d f r e e d o m to meet a n d talk with strangers. W o m e n also h a d certain social rights. Wives m o v e d freely in their h o m e s a n d in society. In the m a r r i a g e h y m n there is the specific i n j u n c tion: " G o to t h e h o u s e h o l d e r ' s mistress a n d speak as lady to thy gathered p e o p l e . " 5 ' W o m e n were not c o n f i n e d t o h e a r t h a n d h o m e , nor were they secluded in purdah, but participated in public life, a n d even d e b a t e d in public assemblies. H a v i n g described the rights a n d privileges within the h o m e , we must not overlook t h e essential obligations. T h e chief domestic virtue was hospitality. T h e ideal of f r i e n d s h i p was not limited t o h u m a n s , but included n o n h u m a n c r e a t u r e s as well. T h e Vedic seer prays: Strong One! make me strong, May all beings look on me with the eye of friend May I look on all beings with the eye of friend May we look on one another with the eye of friend." T h e asrama o r g a n i z a t i o n in the early Vedic period s t o p p e d with the Garhasthya stage. T h e Vanaprasthya a n d Samnyasa stages h a d not developed at this time. This does not m e a n there were n o ascetics in the Vedic age. T h e r e a r e references t o munis a n d yatis w h o claimed t o possess

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E T H I C S OF THE VKDIC

PERIOD

occult powers through penances. "The Munis, girdled with the wind, wear garments soiled of yellow hue. They, following the wind's swift course go where the Gods have gone before. Transported with our Munihood we have pressed on into the winds. You, therefore, mortal men, behold our natural bodies and no m o r e . " " Such references to Munis in the early Vedic period are rare and unfavourable, which seems to suggest that they were probably legacies of pre-Vedic non-Aryan culture. Leaving Asramadharma, we now move to a second facet of objective ethics, namely, Varnadharma. This is the ethical pattern for the organization of society. Society was divided into two compartmentalized groups— the Aryans and the Dasas (Dasyus). The division was racial, cultural, and religious. The tall, fair, conquering Aryans were ethnically distinct from the indigenous inhabitants who were short, flat-nosed, and of dark complexion. Apparently, colour was a preeminent line of demarcation. Furthermore, the Dasas represented the survivors of the ancient Harappa culture, and, as such, differed from the Aryans in custom and language which impressed the Aryans as very strange and unintelligible. The religious difference was equally sharp. Whereas the Aryan religion was centred around sacrifice to nature gods, the religion of the Dasas was organized around phallic worship. Because of these deep-rooted differences, the Aryan tribes united with one another for the purpose of subjugating the indigenous people. Indra, the warrior god, is hailed in many a Rgvedic hymn as the one who "smote the Dasyus and gave protection to the Aryan colour.'" 4 The conquered Dasas were kept by the Aryans as slaves. Within the social organization the Dasas were known as the Sudras. The barriers between the conflicting groups were sometimes removed through the marriage of Aryans with Dasa mistresses, and when Aryans, caught in intertribal rivalry, would make alliances with Dasa chieftains. In addition to these two main divisions in Rgvedic society in which the Dasas constituted a distinct "colour," Aryan society itself was divided into separate classes on the basis of profession. An important question is whether these professional classes in this early period had already hardened into castes. Scholarship has been divided on this issue with Geldner, Oldenberg, Macdonell, and Keith answering affirmatively, and with Zimmer, Weber, and Muir responding negatively. To make up our mind on a subject of such crucial importance for social ethics, we shall have to examine the evidence for ourselves. The first reference to the fourfold division of Hindu society is found in a Rgvedic hymn known as Purusa-sukta. The hymn is about the original cosmic sacrifice in which primeval man (purusa) was offered as a sacri-

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fice to himself by the gods w h o were his children. In the process of creation it specifically mentions the traditional f o u r castes: Brahmin, K$atriya, Vaisya, and S u d r a . W h e n t h e y d i v i d e d P u r u s h a h o w m a n y p o r t i o n s did t h e y m a k e ? W h a t d o they call his m o u t h , his a r m s ? W h a t d o t h e y call his t h i g h s a n d feet? T h e B r a h m a n w a s his m o u t h , o f b o t h his a r m s w a s the R a j a n y a m a d e . H i s t h i g h s b e c a m e the Vaisya, f r o m his feet the S u d r a w a s p r o d u c e d . "

On the basis of this hymn it should not be concluded that the castes of the later period were already in evidence in the earliest period. The conclusion is not w a r r a n t e d because the hymn was composed several hundred years later than most of the hymns in the Rg Veda. Mention of the first three Vedas (vs. 9) is proof that this hymn was composed after this separate classification was made. F u r t h e r m o r e , the theme of the sacrifice of the Supreme Being is only a later religious development not f o u n d in other sections of the Rg Veda. Following C o l e b r o o k e , R. C. Dutt states that this h y m n was c o m p o s e d " a f t e r the rude versification of the Rg Veda had given place to the m o r e s o n o r o u s metre of a later a g e . ' " 6 For these reasons it seems safe to conclude that the Purusa Sukta is a late hymn, and, as such, lends no support to the thesis that the castes of the later period were already present in the earliest period. However, there is an earlier hymn in which the three varnas seem to be acknowledged. It reads: G i v e spirit t o our prayer a n d a n i m a t e our t h o u g h t s ; slay ye the R 5 k ? a s a s a n d drive a w a y disease. A c c o r d a n t , o f o n e m i n d with S u r y a a n d with D a w n , the presser's S o m a , A s v i n s ! drink. S t r e n g t h e n the R u l i n g P o w e r ,

s t r e n g t h e n the m e n o f war; slay ye

the

R a k § a s a s and drive a w a y d i s e a s e . A c c o r d a n t , o f o n e m i n d with S u r y a a n d with D a w n , the presser's S o m a , A s v i n s ! drink. G i v e strength u n t o the m i l c h - k i n e , give the p e o p l e s t r e n g t h , slay ye the R a k s a s a s and drive a w a y d i s e a s e . A c c o r d a n t , o f o n e m i n d with S u r y a a n d with D a w n , t h e presser's S o m a , Asvins! drink."

This hymn may be taken to suggest that A r y a n society in the Rgvedic period was divided into three classes, but the statement is by no means clear. F u r t h e r m o r e , it needs pointing out that the social structure in the Rg Veda bears little or no resemblance to that of the D h a r m a Sastras

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where ironclad rules govern each caste with respect to its duties, rights, and disabilities. The class system in the Rgvedic period was elastic and flexible. As evidence of its f r e e d o m and mobility, the following points are worth mentioning. In the first place, if rigid castes did indeed exist in the Vedic period, surely there would have been stronger literary evidence than is available, especially since the collection of the hymns is vast, and these h y m n s were written over a period of some six hundred years. "Is it possible to find a single religious work of later times, of one-tenth the dimension of the Rg Veda, which is silent on the s y s t e m ? " 5 ' Second, the system definitely was not b o u n d by hereditary ties. A single family could represent various occupations. There is a passage in which father, mother, and son are described as physician, corn grinder, and composer of hymns. 5 9 In another passage a sage implores I n d r a to m a k e him a ruler, first; a priest, second; and failing these two, he would settle for becoming a rich man. 6 0 These passages m a k e it a p p a r e n t that professions were not hereditary even a m o n g priestly families. The idea of heredity itself was not given the same esteem it enjoyed in subsequent periods. " K a v a s a , the son of a slave girl, could become a sage." 6 1 Only in a single verse—"thou singest at libations like a B r a h m a n ' s son" 6 2 is heredity praised. But here, also, it is d o u b t f u l whether ' B r a h m a n ' stands for a hereditary class or a professional individual. T h i r d , Vedic society could not have hardened into caste because of the c o m m o n practice of c o m m u n a l dining and intermarriage. There were no restrictions in regarding f o o d and drink between the classes. All varnas shared a c o m m o n diet. Similarly, there were no matrimonial restrictions between the various levels of A r y a n society. These restrictions were not necessary because of the homogeneity of the diverse groups in respect to race, religion, and culture. O n the basis of this evidence we conclude that the varnas in the early Vedic society were " o p e n classes." " T h e y were not watertight c o m p a r t ments, the m e m b e r s h i p of which was determined by virtue of heredity only," 6 ' but were based on individual capacity and aptitude. III. Ethical Thought in the Brahmanas The B r a h m a n a s constitute the second m a j o r body of Vedic literature. They are mainly ritual texts, the concluding portions of which are given to philosophic speculations. T h e Aitareya and S a t a p a t h a B r a m a n a s are the most i m p o r t a n t ones. T h e value of this priestly literature as a source of ethics is difficult to determine precisely. The priests show little interest for questions pertaining to the nature of right action; instead, their imagination runs riot with the theory and practice of ritualism.

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17

It is a m a z i n g how the simple speculation in the Purusa-sukta dealing with the sacrifice of the S u p r e m e Being (Parama Purusa) e x p a n d e d into o n e of t h e most c o m p l e x sacrificial systems ever devised by m a n . E l a b o rate rituals are given mystical meanings k n o w n only to the priests. T h e s e ceremonies included domestic rites a n d great sacrifices. T h e d o m e s t i c rituals covered all h u m a n events f r o m the cradle t o the grave. T h e f o r t y samskaras (sacraments) f o r m u l a t e d at a later time provide a g o o d indication of the type a n d n u m b e r of ceremonies t h a t h a d t o be observed. T h e expansion of sacrifice was based on the s u p p o s i t i o n that it possessed cosmic power. By virtue of this power, all of the orderly processes within the world were m a i n t a i n e d . W i t h o u t sacrifices, the sun would not rise, a n d chaos would bring the universe to an untimely end. T h e g o d s c o n t i n u e to be recognized as the u p h o l d e r s of the cosmic order, but they are sustained in this f u n c t i o n t h r o u g h the energy of regular sacrifices m a d e by the priests. This rendered sacrifice superior to the gods. Faith in the g o d s is shifted to faith in the sacrifice. T h r o u g h faith, the sacrifices o p e r a t e d automatically, w i t h o u t a n y help f r o m the gods. 6 4 Sacrifice was i n d e p e n d e n t of the gods, but the g o d s were not i n d e p e n d e n t of sacrifice. Their divine power a n d m a j e s t y were derived f r o m sacrifice. Their t r i u m p h over the asuras ( d e m o n s ) was m a d e possible t h r o u g h sacrif i c e . " Even their i m m o r t a l i t y was the result of sacrifice. 6 6 A l o n g with the elevation of sacrifice was t h e rise to u n p r e c e d e n t e d p o w e r of the priests w h o jealously g u a r d e d the entire system as their exclusive d o m a i n . T h e priests served as the m e d i a t o r s between the gods a n d men a n d as the d i s t r i b u t o r s of divine f a v o u r s . Their special training gave t h e m mastery of the o b s c u r e language of t h e ancient Vedic h y m n s a n d p r o v i d e d t h e m with the h i d d e n knowledge c o n c e r n i n g the m e a n i n g a n d p e r f o r m a n c e of sacrifice. Knowledge was indispensable because a slight e r r o r in the ritual c o u l d have serious repercussions u p o n t h e priest. Errors in sacrifice cost B h a g a his sight 6 7 , P u $ a n h a d his teeth k n o c k e d out 6 8 , Bhallabeya b r o k e his a r m , 6 ' a n d A s a d h i S a u s r o m a t e y a lost his life. 7 0 T h e point to n o t e is that the error a n d its p u n i s h m e n t were not related to any m o r a l aspects of sacrifice, but t o its magical a n d mechanical sides. T h u s , t h e priest h a d a d a n g e r o u s task; but this was incidental to the p o w e r he could wield t h r o u g h his k n o w l e d g e of the correct p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e rituals. These priestly f u n c t i o n s elevated h i m to t h e position of a divinity o n earth. T h e S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a declares: "Verily there a r e t w o kinds of gods; f o r the gods themselves assuredly a r e g o d s , a n d then the priests w h o have studied a n d teach sacred lore a r e the h u m a n g o d s . " " I n d e e d , t h e h u m a n g o d s were superior t o t h e heavenly deities, because, w i t h o u t the sacrifices of h u m a n s , the deities c o u l d not fulfil their divine

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f u n c t i o n s . This fact placed the gods in the control of the priests. Even mighty I n d r a could be d e t h r o n e d by the o f f e r i n g of a h u n d r e d horse sacrifices. T h e point to be noticed in this context is that the idea of superiority of being is not qualitatively but quantitatively u n d e r s t o o d . S u p e r i o r ity is t a n t a m o u n t to coercive power generated by magic. T h e n o t i o n of m o r a l superiority does not enter into the picture. W h a t were the ends sought t h r o u g h t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of the priests a n d the sacrificial rituals? In place of the earlier, o f t e n d e v o t i o n a l relationship, men contract with the gods f o r m u n d a n e blessings—health, wealth, power, a n d prosperity. 7 2 P r a y e r s o f f e r e d f o r such blessings were essentially magical techniques which ensured t h e sacrificer whatsoever he desired. In a d d i t i o n to earthly profits, prayers are o f f e r e d f o r the r e w a r d s of heaven. Needless to say, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of magic into religion h a d a deleterious effect u p o n morality. This can be illustrated f r o m the B r a h m a n a doctrine of sacrifice; its theology, its d o c t r i n e of sin, a n d its eschatology. T h e overall view of sacrifice (yajna), as 1 have briefly s h o w n , treated it as a sort of machinery which, when correctly m a n i p u l a t e d , gave the sacrificer mastery over a n y t h i n g or a n y o n e , in heaven or o n e a r t h . O f t e n , the ends s o u g h t t h r o u g h this m e a n s were purely selfish. S o m e t i m e s the sacrificial ritual was utilised for criminal p u r p o s e s . " I f t h e priest so wished, he could by m a n i p u l a t i o n bring ruin u p o n t h e sacrificer's senses, his life, a n d his earthly possessions." 7 3 A g o o d example of this criminal use of sacrifice is f o u n d in this passage f r o m the A i t a r e y a B r a h m a n a . T h e silent prayer is the root o f the sacrifice. S h o u l d a H o t r wish to deprive any sacrificer of his standing place, then he must not at his sacrifice repeat the 'silent praise'; the sacrificer then perishes a l o n g with his sacrifice w h i c h thus has b e c o m e rootless. 7 4

This d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t sacrifice h a d n o ethical basis. A f u r t h e r p r o o f of the unethical way of viewing sacrifice is t h e disregard f o r a n y m o r a l attributes as the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r the sacrificer. T h e A i t a r e y a B r a h m a n a states: E v e n if the p e r f o r m i n g priest is not a B r a h m a n (in the strictest sense), or even p r o n o u n c e d to be an ill-reputed m a n , the sacrifice nevertheless g o e s up t o the g o d s , and b e c o m e s not polluted by the c o n t a g i o n with a w i c k e d m a n (as in this case the p e r f o r m i n g priest i s ) . "

Next, let us examine the extent to which B r a h m a n i c a l theology is vitiated by these magico-sacrificial ideas. W h e r e a s in the Rg Veda the g o d s are ethical personalities, in t h e B r a h m a n a s t h e g o d s lack m o r a l qualities. Essentially, the gods a r e selfish. W h e n A g n i , I n d r a , S o m a , M a k h a ,

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19

Vi§nu, and Visve devah performed a sacrificial session at Kuruksetra they could think only of themselves: May we attain excellence; may w e b e c o m e glorious; may w e b e c o m e eaters offood!76

Private gain looms uppermost for the gods that they are prepared to compromise all sense of honour to attain it. They make a solemn pact with the raksasas to share equally in the victory as they solicit their help to fight the asuras; but, once victory comes, the gods go back on their word. Selfishness also incites the gods to jealousy. They are so envious of each other that they cannot occupy the same abode in the spirit of friendship, but must live separately. There is the story of how Visnu, grown proud because of his skill in sacrifice, "was unable to control that (love of) glory of his." 7 ' Agni, lndra, and other gods, hating him for his pride, bribed the ants to attack him, which they did. The story concludes: "Having gone nigh unto him, they gnawed his bowstring. When it was cut, the ends of the bow, springing asunder, cut off Vishnu's head." 7 8 Not only are the gods jealous of one another; they are also jealous of men. Notwithstanding their intimate relations with men, and their vested interests in the sacrifices which men offer, the gods demonstrate nothing of the closeness and fondness of the worshipper that we encountered in the Rg Veda. As noted earlier, this loving relation between god and devotee was of the utmost significance from the ethical point of view, moulding the outlook of the individual and determining whether his life was to be directed by fear or by love. But here, the gods often evince an unmistakable dislike and disgust for men. They inflict them with the six evils of sleep, sluggishness, anger, hunger, love of gambling, and love of women. 79 They are jealous at the prospects of men attaining immortality as they did. To satisfy the god of death who feels he shall be cheated if men became immortal without laying down their corporeal bodies at the time of death, the divine council takes the following action: "Henceforward no one shall be immortal with the body: only when thou shalt have taken that (body) as thy share, he who is to become immortal either through knowledge or through holy work, shall become immortal after separating f r o m the body." 8 0 Such acts of unethical behaviour are recounted without the least effort to take any moral exception. However, the lack of moral sensitivity becomes more pronounced with the attribution of sins of a more serious nature to some of the prominent deities. Like Varuna in the Rg Veda, Prajapati occupies the position of chief importance in the Brahmanas, but unlike Varuna, P r a j a p a t i is not con-

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sistently conceived as an ethical personality. There is the legend which tells of his developing an illicit passion for his daughter. He said: " 'May I pair with her!' thus (thinking) he united with her." 8 ' Though the ideal image of Prajapati is marred by his committing incest, the legend goes on to say that such an act was "a sin in the eyes of the gods," who solicit Rudra to punish him. Indra is another example of the deethicising process within the personalities of the gods. He breaks his word with Namuci; is guilty of the slaying of Visvarupa; and makes love to Ahalya by deceptively taking her husband's form. Thus, the unethical way of viewing the divine in the Brahmanas provides theological evidence for the breakdown of the ethical norms by which earlier generations had conducted their lives. In the Rg Veda, all of the gods were upholders of Rta and were the ideal representatives of moral excellence. In the Brahmanas, excellence is ritualistic excellence. The gods are pictured as saying, in the course of divine worship: " W h o ever of us, through austerity, fervour, faith, sacrifice, and oblations, shall first compass the end of sacrifice, he shall be the most excellent of us.'" 2 In keeping with this norm, human excellence is also ritualistically conceived. 83 Faith is not reliance upon the goodness of the gods, but reliance upon the power of sacrifice. 84 Similarly, truth, as the following verse attests, is the correct performance of sacrificial ritual. T h e g o d s laid d o w n together their favourite f o r m s and desirable p o w e r s , a n d said, " T h e r e b y he shall be a w a y f r o m us, he shall be scattered t o the w i n d s , w h o s o e v e r shall transgress this (covenant) of o u r s ! " A n d e v e n h o w the g o d s d o not transgress that ( c o v e n a n t ) , for h o w w o u l d they fare, were they t o transgress it?—they w o u l d speak untruth, and verily there is o n e law w h i c h the g o d s d o keep, namely, the truth. It is through this that their c o n q u e s t , their glory is unassailable: and so, f o r s o o t h , is his c o n q u e s t , his glory unassailable w h o s o e v e r , k n o w i n g this, speaks the truth. N o w , the T a n u n a p t r a is really that s a m e ( c o v e n a n t o f the g o d s ) . "

Since goodness is ritualistic goodness, it is not surprising that sin and guilt are also unethically conceived. Sin is mechanically understood: "all slaying, even of demons such as Vrtra, brings the taint of bloodshed, whether justified or not, the fault of the sacrifice passes to him who blames it, as does a third of the sin initiated to anyone who speaks ill of them." 8 6 Sin was like a virus, a foreign body, to which one could unwittingly fall prey. The pollutant nature of sin is illustrated by the fact that, through the incantations of a presiding priest, it could be magically

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21

t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m the individual paying f o r the rite to the e n e m y u p o n w h o m he wishes it to be inflicted. T h e p u n i s h m e n t f o r sin is meted out by V a r u n a , but t h e m a j o r cause for p u n i s h m e n t is ritualistic error. T h e cure f o r sin is as external to the individual as the sin itself. U n t r u t h is a pollutant f r o m which the sinner can be freed by the following m e a n s : H e b a t h e s . F o r i m p u r e , i n d e e d , is m a n : h e is f o u l w i t h i n , in t h a t h e s p e a k s u n t r u t h ; — a n d w a t e r is p u r e : he t h i n k s , " M a y I b e c o n s e c r a t e d , a f t e r b e c o m ing p u r e " ; — a n d w a t e r is c l e a n s i n g : h e t h i n k s , " M a y 1 b e c o m e c o n s e c r a t e d a f t e r b e i n g c l e a n s e d ! " T h i s is t h e r e a s o n w h y h e b a t h e s . "

A n o t h e r m e t h o d by which the sinner purifies himself f r o m the impurities of u n t r u t h is by the " p u r e " sacred grass. H e t h e n p u r i f i e s h i m w i t h a c l e a n s e r ( p a v i t r a , s t r a i n e r ) of s a c r e d g r a s s ; f o r i m p u r e , i n d e e d , is m a n : — h e is f o u l w i t h i n in t h a t h e s p e a k s u n t r u t h ; — a n d s a c r e d g r a s s is p u r e : ' H a v i n g b e c o m e p u r e , 1 shall be c o n s e c r a t e d , ' t h u s h e t h i n k s ; — a n d t h e s t a l k s of s a c r e d g r a s s a r e a m e a n s of c l e a n s i n g , — ' H a v i n g b e c o m e c l e a n s e d , 1 shall b e c o n s e c r a t e d , ' t h u s h e t h i n k s ; a n d t h e r e f o r e he p u r i f i e s h i m w i t h a c l e a n s e r of s a c r e d g r a s s . ! !

A n e x a m i n a t i o n of the eschatological ideas of the B r a h m a n a s a d d s test i m o n y to the i n d e p e n d e n c e of ethical criteria in relation t o the destiny of m a n . A f a s c i n a t i n g illustration of this point is a legend which reflects the p o p u l a r eschatological o u t l o o k of this period in respect t o the punishment in store f o r the guilty w h e n they get to t h e next w o r l d . To cure his son V a r u n a of his pride, Bhrgu sends him in every direction to get a view of the state in which men suffer. G o i n g e a s t w a r d , a n d thence s o u t h w a r d , he beheld m e n d i s m e m b e r i n g m e n , a n d saying: " T h u s , indeed these dealt with us in yonder world, a n d so we n o w deal with thee in r e t u r n . " 8 ' V a r u n a asks if there is any a t o n e m e n t f o r this, a n d is told that his f a t h e r k n o w s . C o m i n g t o t h e west, Varuna sees m e n sitting still, being d e v o u r e d by m e n sitting still. In response to his h o r r o r at this sight, he is told again, " T h u s , indeed, these have dealt with us in yonder w o r l d , a n d so we now deal with t h e m in r e t u r n . ' " 0 H e is also told that his f a t h e r k n o w s the a t o n e m e n t f o r this. In t h e n o r t h , the b o y hears the cries of m e n while being c o n s u m e d by o t h e r m e n . H e raises t h e same horrified question, a n d is given t h e same reply a b o u t t h e r e a s o n f o r this carnage a n d the way of a t o n e m e n t . T h e final vision occurs at o n e of the i n t e r m e d i a t e spaces. H e r e he sees t w o b e a u t i f u l w o m e n s t a n d i n g on either side of a black m a n with yellow

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eyes w h o h o l d s a staff. Terror stricken, Varuna returns h o m e , a g o o d deal h u m b l e r t h a n w h e n h e set o u t . T h e father, n o t i c i n g h i s c h a s t e n e d state, p r o v i d e s this e x p l a n a t i o n o f the visions. A s t o t h o s e m e n w h o m t h o u sawest in t h e e a s t e r n r e g i o n b e i n g d i s m e m b e r e d by m e n h e w i n g o f f t h e i r l i m b s o n e by o n e , a n d s a y i n g , " T h i s t o t h e e this t o m e ! " t h e y w e r e t h e trees: w h e n o n e p u t s f i r e w o o d f r o m t h e t r e e s o n ( t h e fire) h e s u b d u e s t h e trees, a n d c o n q u e r s t h e w o r l d of t r e e s . A n d as t o t h o s e m e n w h o m t h o u sawest in t h e s o u t h e r n r e g i o n b e i n g dism e m b e r e d by m e n c u t t i n g u p t h e i r l i m b s o n e by o n e , a n d s a y i n g " T h i s to t h e e , this t o m e ! " t h e y w e r e t h e c a t t l e ; w h e n o n e m a k e s o f f e r i n g with milk he s u b d u e s t h e c a t t l e , a n d c o n q u e r s t h e w o r l d of c a t t l e . A n d as t o t h o s e m e n t h o u sawest in t h e w e s t e r n r e g i o n w h o , whilst s i t t i n g still, w e r e b e i n g e a t e n by m e n sitting still, t h e y w e r e t h e h e r b s : w h e n o n e ill u m i n e s ( t h e A g n i h o t r a m i l k ) with a s t r a w , he s u b d u e s t h e h e r b s , a n d c o n q u e r s t h e w o r l d of h e r b s . A n d as t o t h o s e m e n t h o u sawest in t h e n o r t h e r n r e g i o n w h o , whilst c r y i n g a l o u d , w e r e b e i n g e a t e n by m e n c r y i n g a l o u d , t h e y w e r e t h e w a t e r s : w h e n one p o u r s water to (the A g n i h o t r a milk), he subdues the waters, and conq u e r s t h e w o r l d of w a t e r s . A n d as t o t h o s e t w o w o m e n w h o m t h o u s a w e s t , o n e b e a u t i f u l a n d o n e o v e r - b e a u t i f u l — t h e b e a u t i f u l o n e is Belief: w h e n o n e o f f e r s t h e first l i b a t i o n (of t h e A g n i h o t r a ) he s u b d u e s Belief a n d c o n q u e r s Belief; a n d t h e o v e r b e a u t i f u l o n e is U n b e l i e f : w h e n o n e o f f e r s t h e s e c o n d l i b a t i o n , h e s u b d u e s Unbelief and conquers Unbelief. A n d as t o t h e b l a c k m a n w i t h yellow eyes, w h o w a s s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e m with a s t a f f in his h a n d , he w a s W r a t h : w h e n , h a v i n g p o u r e d w a t e r i n t o t h e s p o o n , o n e p o u r s ( t h e l i b a t i o n i n t o t h e fire), he s u b d u e s W r a t h , a n d c o n q u e r s W r a t h ; a n d , verily, w h o s o e v e r , k n o w i n g t h i s , o f f e r s t h e A g n i h o t r a , thereby conquers everything, and subdues everything." T h u s , t h e l e s s o n l e a r n e d is t h a t b y m a k i n g d u e o f f e r i n g s o n e is s p a r e d t h e t o r m e n t s o f t h e f u t u r e : " M a n is b o r n i n t o t h e w o r l d m a d e ( b y h i m ) . " T h a t is t o say, i n t h e f u t u r e w o r l d a m a n r e c e i v e s t h e r e w a r d o r p u n i s h m e n t f o r the d e e d s d o n e in this present life, but t h e d e e d s are n o t s o m u c h m o r a l deeds, ethically c o n c e i v e d , as ritualistic deeds, sacerdotally

con-

ceived. T h e preceding e x a m i n a t i o n o f s o m e o f the d o c t r i n e s o f sacrifice, sin, t h e o l o g y , a n d e s c h a t o l o g y , s h o w s the p e r v a s i v e m a n n e r in w h i c h

good

a n d evil h a v e b e e n d e e t h i c i s e d . Ritualistic r e c t i t u d e h a s b e e n u p h e l d as the n o r m o f g o o d n e s s , a n d ethical ideas h a v e b e e n c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y neglected. T h e r e is d a n g e r a t t h i s p o i n t t o c o n c l u d e p r e m a t u r e l y t h a t e t h i c a l i d e a s h a v e d i s a p p e a r e d i n t h e p e r i o d o f t h e B r a h m a n a s . T o a v o i d t h i s d a n g e r it m u s t first b e r e c o g n i z e d that t h e ritualism o f t h e B r a h m a n a s w a s o n l y

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one aspect of religion during this period. Second, even in aristocratic circles, ritualism could not completely suppress the older moral ideals or prevent new ones f r o m being born. Third, ethical implications were contained in apparently unethical parables and symbolism. As instances, the earlier story of Visnu's pride and the manner in which the ants brought about his decapitation may imply that "Pride goes before a fall." Even the loftiest god can be humbled by the tiniest of creatures when corrupted by pride. And the story of P r a j a p a t i ' s incest may also be taken to indicate that passion can degrade even a P r a j a p a t i , and that divinity notwithstanding, passion pays a price. To bring out the ethical elements of the Brahmanas we must mention the conception of m a n ' s duties known as the "triad of obligations" or rnatraya. The first of these duties is the old idea that sacrifice is something that man owes to the gods. Magical and mystical developments overshadowed, but did not totally eclipse this notion of sacrifice as a rna or debt. The second duty should highlight the fact that the Vedic ideal did not start and stop with the ideal of sacrifice. It also inculcated a sense of indebtedness to the seers for the cultural heritage they had bequeathed to subsequent generations. This debt was paid by transmitting to posterity the tradition one had been fortunate to receive. The third duty expands the ideal further by making one realize his indebtedness to the race, along with the obligation to establish one's own family and bring many sons into the world. Thus, the ideal of rnatraya is a comprehensive ideal, not only including m a n ' s duty to the gods through sacrifice, but also the perpetuation of the race, and the cultural heritage which it embodies. The individual who fulfils all of these obligations is a good man. He is good because he is not only concerned about what he gets out of life, but what he puts into life. Our own assessment of the specific nature of these duties will certainly differ, but there is no gainsaying the sense of responsibility from which they spring. Life is both a gift and a duty, and it is best lived when one tries to establish harmonious relations with one's total environment. A m o n g the virtues productive of harmony were: honour to parents, hospitality, truth-speaking, self-restraint, austerity, and kindness to animals. Factors regarded as disruptive of harmony were: intoxicants, usury, gambling, women, sloth, hunger, theft, adultery, and murder. Even though sin was predominantly conceived in ritualistic terms, there is the notion that responsibility is contingent upon volition. One passage describes a sacrificer and his wife having a ritual bath for the purpose of cleansing themselves of impurities. When their ablutions are completed it is said: "even as a snake casts its skin, so does he cast away all sin—there is not in him even as much sin as there is in a toothless

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c h i l d . ' " 2 T h e reference to the n e w b o r n child attests t o the belief that sin p r e s u p p o s e s a voluntaristic basis. T h e volitional n a t u r e of sin occurs in the following passage which attributes guilt t o S o m a f o r having entertained t h o u g h t s of o p p r e s s i o n t o w a r d the p r i e s t h o o d : (pavitra). N o w as to why he purifies the S o m a by m e a n s o f a strainer W h e n S o m a had o p p r e s s e d his o w n family-priest Brhaspati, he restored t o him (his property); and o n his restoring it, he (Brhaspati) b e c a m e reconciled to him. Still there was guilt remaining, if only for having c o n t e m p l a t e d o p pressing the p r i e s t h o o d . "

While citing these passages it must be a d m i t t e d that they are rare, a n d t h e r e f o r e " w e have n o reason to s u p p o s e that there was recognized a n y general d o c t r i n e of the necessity of volition to create responsibility.'" 4 Let us now turn to the theological thinking of this time to see whether there are any exceptions f r o m the unethical way of regarding the divine as noticed earlier. P r a j a p a t i occupies a place of t w o f o l d preeminence in the B r a h m a n a s : he is the lord of C r e a t i o n , a n d he is also an ethical authority. In the latter role he serves as the ruler a n d arbiter of ethics a n d as t h e dispenser of divine laws. T h e significance of this role f o r the p e r p e t u a t i o n of ethical ideals is correctly stated by E. W. H o p k i n s : For a t h o u s a n d years or m o r e it s u f f i c e d , if a rule o f c o n d u c t or law e n u n ciated, to m a k e the statement " t h u s said Prajapati" ( L o r d o f Creation) a n d it was as if a M o h a m e d d a n said " s o s p o k e the P r o p h e t " ; it was n o longer a disputable point. H e is the Father-god, " w e are his children," as the sacred texts proclaim over a n d over, and his w o r d is l a w . "

This role of P r a j a p a t i is in keeping with the earlier idea of the g o d s as preservers of the cosmic a n d m o r a l order. C o n t i n u i t y with the earlier view is also seen in the special c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the g o d s as t r u t h . P a s sages such as this o n e c o m e to m i n d : N o w , t w o f o l d indeed is this (universe)—there is n o third—the truth and the untruth: the g o d s are the truth and men are the u n t r u t h . "

Since the g o d s a r e t r u t h , they serve as ethical m o d e l s f o r m a n : Let him then o n l y speak what is true; for this v o w indeed the g o d s d o k e e p , that they speak the truth; and f o r this reason they are glorious: g l o r i o u s therefore is he w h o k n o w i n g this, speaks the t r u t h . "

T h u s , with certain q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , it can be s h o w n that there is a place f o r ethics within t h e system of t h e B r a h m a n a s . This fact m a y be inconsistent with the logic of the sacrificial system in which sacrifice f u n c t i o n s mechanically, is superior t o the gods, a n d a u t o m a t i c a l l y removes sin.

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Nevertheless, the i n f l u e n c e of magic in religion " c o u l d not d o a w a y with the ethical consciousness already a w a k e n e d , n o r did it entirely suppress the idea t h a t morality was an expression of spiritual w o r t h divinely planted in m a n . " 9 8 O u r discussion so f a r has centered a r o u n d m a n ' s religious duties with only passing allusions to his social duties. We shall n o w f o c u s on t h e latter. D u r i n g this time, religion a n d social life were so intermixed that o n e could h a r d l y be distinguished f r o m the other. In large m e a s u r e , life expressed itself t h r o u g h religious ceremonials. T h e p r i m a r y social d u t y t o w a r d a child belonging to the three twiceb o r n castes was to p r o v i d e him with an e d u c a t i o n . Generally, this took place at age twelve. E d u c a t i o n in the Vedic schools was c o m p r e h e n s i v e . In keeping with its literal m e a n i n g of ' d r a w i n g o u t ' , e d u c a t i o n covered " t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of all the faculties of m a n a n d included within its purview the totality of interests which m a k e u p life a n d not merely a section t h e r e o f , viz. the interests of intellectual life. It was e d u c a t i o n not merely in the c o n t e n t s of the sacred lore but also in the m e t h o d s of living a n d self-culture according to the ideals e m b o d i e d t h e r e i n . " " T h e chief end of e d u c a t i o n was to i m p a r t an existential awareness of the Absolute. 1 0 0 This k n o w l e d g e could be received t h r o u g h the p e r f o r m a n c e of rituals, 1 0 1 but the m o r e excellent way was t h r o u g h the study of the sacred texts. Such study was true "sacrifice to the B r a h m a n . " T h e sacrifice to the B r a h m a n is o n e ' s o w n (daily) study ( o f the Veda). T h e j u h u - s p o o n of this s a m e sacrifice t o the B r a h m a n is speech, its upabhrit the m i n d , its dhruva the eye, its sruva mental power, its purifactory bath truth, its c o n c l u s i o n h e a v e n . A n d , verily, h o w e v e r great the world he gains by giving a w a y ( t o the priests) this earth replete with wealth, thrice that and m o r e —an imperishable world d o e s he gain, and w h o s o e v e r , k n o w i n g this, studies day by day his lesson ( o f the Veda); therefore let him study his daily lesson.' 0 2

T h e empirical e f f e c t s of studying the scriptures a r e p o i n t e d o u t . T h e s t u d e n t becomes " r e a d y - m i n d e d , a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of o t h e r s , a n d d a y by d a y he acquires w e a l t h . H e sleeps peacefully; he is the best physician f o r himself; a n d (peculiar) t o him are t h e restraint of t h e senses, delight in the o n e thing, g r o w t h of intelligence, f a m e , a n d the (task o f ) p e r f e c t i n g the p e o p l e . ' " 0 3 To a c q u i r e this e d u c a t i o n , o n e h a d t o enroll f o r m a l l y as t h e pupil of a teacher. T h e r e were instances of the f a t h e r serving as teacher, 1 0 4 b u t , in t h e B r a h m a n i c age, because of the g r o w t h of the ritual literature a n d the need f o r special p e r s o n s t o u n d e r s t a n d its intricacies, " e d u c a t i o n c a m e t o be recognized as a special f u n c t i o n of society.'" 0 5 A father, t h e r e f o r e , m a d e every e f f o r t t o secure the services of a f a m o u s teacher f o r his s o n .

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Teachers usually were m e n of c o m m a n d i n g character a n d intellect. T h e students loved a n d respected t h e m as they did their own fathers. 1 0 6 A s i n d i c a t e d in the p r o p i t i a t o r y verse b e g i n n i n g with Sahanavavatu,

w h i c h is

uttered at the b e g i n n i n g o f e a c h d a y ' s study, the teacher a n d his pupil were u n i t e d by a c o m m o n aim o f preserving a n d p r o p a g a t i n g the sacred learning a n d s h o w i n g its w o r t h in their life and c o n d u c t . S o m e t i m e s , the

antevasins

living in the h o u s e o f the teacher preferred, a n d were p e r m i t t e d , t o c o n t i n u e that life t h r o u g h o u t , b e c a u s e it w a s s o a g r e e a b l e ( C h h a n d . , ii, 23, 2).""

T h e period of s t u d e n t s h i p normally lasted a b o u t twelve years. M o r a l discipline was considered indispensable to scholarly g r o w t h . It is said: H e w h o enters o n a B r a h m a c h a r i n ' s life, i n d e e d enters o n a l o n g sacrificial session: the l o g he puts o n the fire in e n t e r i n g t h e r e o n is the o p e n i n g ( o f f e r ing), a n d that w h i c h (he puts o n the fire) w h e n he is a b o u t to b a t h e is the c o n c l u d i n g ( o f f e r i n g ) ; a n d what (logs) there are b e t w e e n these, are just his ( l o g s ) o f the sacrificial session. 1 ""

Related to the internal discipline was the external discipline. T h e practice of begging f o r alms was aimed at engendering humility within the s t u d e n t . ' 0 9 O t h e r duties, such as tending the sacrificial f i r e s " 0 a n d caring f o r the t e a c h e r ' s h o u s e a n d cattle,' 1 ' taught him the m e a n i n g of responsibility a n d s t e w a r d s h i p . All such disciplines, external a n d internal, were intended to cultivate those m e n t a l a n d m o r a l qualities which were the prerequisites f o r t h e knowledge of B r a h m a n . 1 1 2 In most cases this knowledge only d a w n e d at the end of o n e ' s lifetime, which m e a n t that the disciplines of the B r a h m a c a r i n were c o n t i n u e d b e y o n d the f o r m a l stage of t h e s t u d e n t ' s life. T h e a c a d e m i c aspects of e d u c a t i o n r a n g e d over several b r a n c h e s of knowledge, ethics, arts, a n d sciences, chief of which were the three Vedas. Vedic study was k n o w n as Svadhyaya. T h r o u g h lively discourses a n d discussions, the student was m a d e to b e c o m e involved with his subject in a personal way. T h e chief flaw in this e d u c a t i o n a l system was the fact t h a t it was not o p e n to all castes. S u d r a s h a d n o right to e d u c a t i o n . Instead of being based on ability a n d a p t i t u d e , caste was t h e criterion f o r a d m i s s i o n . O n the s u r f a c e , it was creditable to the system that it related e d u c a t i o n f u n c t i o n a l l y t o t h e f u t u r e p r o f e s s i o n s of t h e students; but since these future p r o f e s s i o n s were dictated by caste, its p r o f e s s i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n lost s o m e t h i n g of its p r a g m a t i c w o r t h . T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to the system, t h e B r a h m i n s were the only ones entitled to a full-fledged e d u c a t i o n . T h e K?atriyas a n d Vaisyas received p a r t of their e d u c a t i o n in t h e Vedas, but

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mostly in arts a n d skills they w o u l d require f o r their f u t u r e p r o f e s s i o n s . Since the j o b description of the S u d r a s did not w a r r a n t a specialized education, they were completely excluded f r o m the system. O n l y in certain exceptional cases were the S u d r a s g r a n t e d the privilege of e d u c a t i o n . T h e next set of social duties p e r t a i n e d to the family. In a d d i t i o n to his ritual duties, the h o u s e h o l d e r was expected to be t r u t h f u l in speech; study the Vedas; exercise liberality to high a n d low; preserve health; multiply e c o n o m i c assets; a n d treat all m e m b e r s of the h o u s e h o l d , including guests, as if they were gods! My interest in the following p a r a g r a p h s is to survey the i m p a c t of ritual morality within t w o i m p o r t a n t areas of family life, namely, the status of m a t r i m o n y , a n d the status of w o m e n . In the Rgvedic period, outside the p r o h i b i t i o n of m a r r i a g e between father a n d d a u g h t e r a n d between b r o t h e r a n d sister, n o o t h e r restrictions were i m p o s e d . In the B r a h m a n i c period, this concern for b a n n i n g wedlock between close relatives is c o n t i n u e d with f u r t h e r p r o h i b i t i o n s . Strictures are placed against m a r r i a g e less t h a n f o u r degrees removed f r o m the p a r e n t s . " 5 There a r e n o specific t a b o o s against m a r r i a g e within the gotra (clan), but m a r r i a g e outside the gotra are the m o r e c o m m o n rule, especially t o w a r d the end of the B r a h m a n a period. T h e reasoning involved in these conditions of m a r r i a g e is ethically s o u n d because it does justice to the social, psychological, a n d especially the biological f a c t o r s involved in t h e marriages within o n e ' s gens. Differences in heredity are g o o d because they elicit new characteristics in the o f f s p r i n g , a n d because they neutralise the weaknesses of h u s b a n d a n d wife, which otherwise would be c o m p o u n d e d . A less restrictive issue t h a n c o n s a n g u i n i t y in m a r r i a g e was the issue of intercaste m a r r i a g e . Strict s e p a r a t i o n of castes a p p a r e n t l y did not prevent the overt or covert i n t e r m i x t u r e of b l o o d on a wide scale. It was legal f o r a B r a h m i n to t a k e a bride f r o m a n y of the f o u r classes, t h o u g h u n i o n with a S u d r a incurred social displeasure. O f f s p r i n g s of these m a r riages o b t a i n e d their f a t h e r ' s r a n k , but it was b e c o m i n g increasingly difficult f o r the son of a S u d r a w o m a n to be so recognized, as the case of K a v a s a Ailusa a n d Vasta would indicate. T h e first p a r t y was only a d m i t ted to sacrifice because the g o d s h a d treated him with f a v o u r ; " 4 the seco n d h a d to d e m o n s t r a t e his B r a h m i n b l o o d by walking on live coals without getting b u r n t . ' " C o v e r t sexual relations with S u d r a girls were not r a r e . " 6 C h i l d r e n of these u n i o n s t o o k their m o t h e r ' s r a n k ; s e p a r a t e castes f o r these mixtures only emerged in the subsequent period. Illicit sexual intercourse m a d e the correct establishment of p a t e r n i t y into s o m e t h i n g of a p r o b l e m . So freely was sex indulged in that a n in-

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junction appears in the Taittiriya Samhita calling for sexual restraint on holy occasions: Let not a m a n , after preparing the altar for the sacred fire, approach a Sudra w o m a n , b e c a u s e in d o i n g so he w o u l d be discharging seed into an improper place. Let n o m a n , after a s e c o n d time preparing the fire-altar, a p p r o a c h another m a n ' s w i f e . " '

The responsibility for this lowering of sexual standards was placed on women. It is taken for granted: "women are irregular in their conduct." Infidelity on the part of a wife did not forbid her f r o m taking part in sacred rites; she was only obliged to confess her guilt so that unfaithfulness might not be compounded by dishonesty. 118 These references would suggest that, though the Brahmin caste made great spiritual pretensions, their sexual life did not always measure up to these claims. A sordid example of priestly morality was Yavakri who sexually seduced every woman he fancied, even though cohabitation would entail the death of his paramour. Finally, he paid with his life for his illicit pleasures at the hands of a gandharva. The close of the Vedic period witnessed the rise of puritanical movements which tried to stamp out the practice of polyandry. Exceptions were made in the case of niyoga or the custom of impregnating the wife of an impotent or dead man so that his family may be preserved. Whereas in the Law Books niyoga was accepted as a dispassionate duty, in the present period "Niyoga was only a restricted form of polyandry freely indulged in by the parties with as much display of passion and zest as the consciousness of performing a d u t y . " 1 " Next, we must consider the effects of religious ceremonialism upon the status of women. Keith views the situation bleakly. He laments: T h e final p r o o f o f the brutal morality o f the priest can be a d d u c e d in the position assigned t o w o m e n : w o m a n in India has a l w a y s suffered m u c h f r o m all religions, but by n o n e has she been so t h o r o u g h l y despised as by the B r a h m a n s o f the period o f the B r a h m a n a s . '

The survey that follows should corroborate Keith's indictment. There is no doubt that as the Aryan tribes settled in India, the status of women did diminish. But, even so, the situation was not as bleak as Keith describes it. First, let us examine the factors which contributed to the degradation of w o m a n h o o d . We begin with the emergence in Vedic belief of an eschatological belief that the spirits of the dead survive in another world, and that it is the duty of sons to help the deceased attain the blessings of heaven through the regular offering of oblations. Failure to make these

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offerings results in the ancestral spirits r o a m i n g restlessly on earth or suffering in hell. This belief, a i o n g with its a t t e n d a n t ritualism, invested sons with the highest i m p o r t a n c e because only t h r o u g h a s o n ' s o b l a t i o n could a deceased f a t h e r attain salvation. H e r e i n lay the ritualistic superiority of a son over a daughter. T h e A i t a r e y a B r a h m a n a m a k e s clear the preference: T h e father, w h o l o o k s u p o n the face o f his s o n , b o r n living u n t o h i m , disc h a r g e s his d e b t in h i m . . . the s o n is to h i m a rescuing b o a t . . .

in h i m ye

h a v e the b l a m e l e s s w o r l d o f h e a v e n . T h e d a u g h t e r is a s o r r o w , w h i l e the s o n is light in the h i g h e s t r e g i o n s o f h e a v e n t o his f a t h e r . m

A n early indication of this preferential a t t i t u d e t o w a r d sons is f o u n d in the A t h a r v a Veda where prayers a n d rituals are p e r f o r m e d f o r the rep l a c e m e n t of a d a u g h t e r by a son in the m o t h e r ' s w o m b . 1 2 2 T h e second f a c t o r reducing w o m a n to the level of a f o u r t h - c l a s s citizen was c e r e m o n i a l impurity. T h e S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a classifies w o m a n with the S u d r a , the d o g , a n d the crow as o b j e c t s of u n t r u t h a n d impurity. 125 A r y a n w o m e n were p r o b a b l y classified in this way because n o n A r y a n females of low social b a c k g r o u n d were i n c o r p o r a t e d into A r y a n families as wives or concubines, a n d the ceremonial uncleanness of ihe latter seems to have been wiped off on w o m e n in general. T h e n a t u r e of this ritual impurity seems to have h a d sexual implications. T h e S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a gives directions f o r the wife of the sacrificer to be gird with a c o r d (yoktra), a n d the reason f o r this is: I m p u r e i n d e e d is that part o f w o m a n w h i c h is b e l o w the navel; a n d therewith s h e will be f a c i n g the sacrificial butter: that part o f her he t h e r e b y c o n c e a l s with the c o r d , a n d o n l y w i t h the pure u p p e r part o f her b o d y s h e then f a c e s t h e sacrificial butter. T h i s is the r e a s o n w h y he girds the w i f e . 1 2 4

In the c o u r s e of t h e sacrifice the wife occupies an inferior position— " t h e wife is truly t h e hinder part of the sacrifice.'" 2 5 " E v e n if m a n y w o m e n are together a n d there is but a small boy, he takes precedence of them all.'"26 A third f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g w o m a n ' s place was specialisation. T h e g r o w t h of specialisation m e a n t that her role was domestically a n d biologically d e f i n e d . H e r real p u r p o s e in life was t o p r o d u c e children, especially sons. " T h e w i f e as P a t n i in her capacity of p a r t n e r s h i p with the lord h u s b a n d (Pati) recedes i n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d , a n d the idea of J a y a , f o r b e a r i n g children f o r the h u s b a n d , becomes m o r e p r o m i n e n t . ' " 2 7 In t h e V a j a p e y a c e r e m o n y it is said t h a t the sacrificer's wife "is o n e half of his o w n s e l f . ' " 2 ' This is not a statement of e q u a l i t a r i a n i s m , but a simple biological t r u t h t h a t w i t h o u t a wife a m a n c a n n o t beget p r o g e n y ! T h e w i f e still

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p e r f o r m e d certain ceremonial roles, especially when these were related t o her biological f u n c t i o n s , b u t , in the m a i n , the priest u s u r p e d t h e role she played in religious ceremonies. 1 2 9 T h e f o u r t h f a c t o r responsible f o r the depreciation of w o m a n h o o d was the spread of a p o l y g a m o u s spirit. P o l y g a m y was practised within limits in the Rgvedic period, but the g r o w t h of aristocratic powers a n d privileges led to the heightening of p o l y g a m o u s tendencies as the elite class of men took u n t o themselves the w o m e n of the c o n q u e r e d race. F r o m ritualistic descriptions in the B r a h m a n a s we gather that it was c o m m o n f o r a king to have f o u r wives. If the f o u r t h wife were of low caste, being t h e d a u g h t e r of a messenger or a courier, she w o u l d only be present at t h e sacrifice, without taking part in the ceremony. 1 3 0 Outside royal a n d aristocratic circles, the practice of polygamy was less evident, but was a p p a r ently widespread e n o u g h to take its toll of w o m e n ' s respect a n d prestige. T h e cumulative effect of these f o u r f a c t o r s placed w o m a n h o o d in a despicable position. She was looked u p o n as a temptress, deserving of care because of her f e m a l e f u n c t i o n s , but not deserving of any rights. T h e MaitrayanT S a m h i t a is most brutal in its assessment: " W o m a n is N i r r i t i " (the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of Evil). She represents u n t r u t h in h u m a n society, a n d is classified with dice a n d d r i n k . ' 3 ' She is even inferior t o a b a d man. 1 3 2 T h e S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a c o n t a i n s the story of the w o o i n g of Vac in which Vac yielded to the allurements of song a n d dance, rather t h a n the recitation of the Vedas. This is taken to explain why " w o m e n a r e given to vain t h i n g s , " a n d why they readily f a n c y " h i m w h o d a n c e s a n d sings.""3 Because of these weaknesses, w o m e n are f o r b i d d e n to a t t e n d assemblies. 134 They a r e required to eat meals a f t e r their h u s b a n d s have dined— a h u s b a n d " s h o u l d not eat f o o d in the presence of his w i f e . ' " 3 5 T h e y must be subservient, never giving their h u s b a n d s any b a c k c h a t . T h e y have n o right to o w n a n y p r o p e r t y ; they d o not even have any rights over themselves! 1 3 6 Keith was correct: I n d i a n w o m e n have s u f f e r e d m u c h f r o m all religions, but they have been most brutalised by the B r a h m i n s of t h e period of the B r a h m a n a s . However, Keith fails to recognise that in spite of the d e r o g a t o r y descriptions a n d denials of basic rights, w o m e n did have s o m e t h i n g to invest t h e m with the dignity of ethical personalities. In the first place, it w o u l d be u n j u s t t o the B r a h m a n a s to fail t o a p p r e ciate the fact that they d o not e n c o u r a g e criminal t r e a t m e n t of f e m a l e children as practised by o t h e r rituals. " T h e e x p o s u r e of f e m a l e children which has been asserted to be m e n t i o n e d in the B r a h m a n a s is a mere error." 1 3 7 F e m a l e children were also protected against marriage p r i o r t o puberty.

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Second, a w o m a n ' s religious rights were curtailed by the priests, but she still had the privilege of reading the sacred scriptures and performing certain sacrifices along with her husband. In the Vajapeya sacrifice, the husband, climbing the ladder, says: "Wife, let us ascend to h e a v e n . " " 8 In the two great sacrificial feasts celebrated by royalty, the Asvamedha (horse sacrifice), and Rajsuya, the chief queen, played a pivotal role. Third, though polygamy was on the incline, and polyandry was on the decline, the custom of niyoga somewhat equalised sexual liberties. Besides, women's sexual needs were recognized by the acceptance of widow marriage." 9 Fourth, there was some equity in the punishment for marital infidelity: "the ethical rules for women were the same as those for men, and the same leniency was shown to women as to men.'" 1 " Summarizing this section, we can do no better than repeat the assessment of Shakuntala Rao Shastri: Taken all in all, the B r a h m a n a s reflect a transitional stage in the p o s i t i o n o f w o m e n ; o w i n g t o the g r o w t h o f rituals a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f social institut i o n s , the s c o p e o f a w o m a n ' s life w a s g r a d u a l l y b e c o m i n g limited. S h e is the partner in religious sacrifices o f a m a n a n d , t h o u g h the o b j e c t o f a w o m a n ' s life is fast g e t t i n g c i r c u m s c r i b e d by the u n u s u a l i m p o r t a n c e a t t a c h e d t o a s o n , still w o m a n w a s not merely an o b j e c t o f pleasure but the c o l l e a g u e in the religious life o f a m a n . " "

We have so far surveyed the duties pertaining to two asramas: the Brahmacarya and the Garhasthya. The full asrama theory along with the Vanaprasthya and Samnyasa stages was only developed in the period of the later Upanisads; 1 4 2 but in the period of the Brahmanas there was already movement in that direction. The effect of this movement was that of moral leaven within society in general and the priestly class in particular. As Duti states it: T h e rigid discipline o f b o t h m i n d a n d body, the ideal o f plain living a n d high t h i n k i n g , the a u s t e r e practices a n d c o n s t a n t m e d i t a t i o n u p o n the C r e a t o r a n d H i s C r e a t i o n , the S o u l a n d the L i f e a f t e r D e a t h , s o f o r c i b l y a n d freq u e n t l y e n j o i n e d u p o n in the U p a n i s h a d s , c a n n o t but h a v e a very e n n o b l i n g i n f l u e n c e u p o n the m o r a l a t m o s p h e r e o f the t i m e . 1 4 1

The asrama ideal thus generated a moral counterforce to the ethical chaos brought about by the introduction of magic into religion. We turn now f r o m the asrama duties to the varna duties. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has stated: " T h e institution of caste is not the invention of an unscrupulous priesthood, but a natural evolution conditioned by the times.'" 4 4 Without discounting the evolutionary aspects of caste, this statement appears to lack historical cogency when examined in the

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context of the Brahmanas which cover the period during which caste was solidified. The system might have been evolving on its own momentum, but the priesthood precipitated this evolution, sometimes using immoral and unjust means to ensconce themselves as the overlords of Aryans and non-Aryans alike. Never in the history of the h u m a n race have men so presumptuously arrogated unto themselves positions superior to the gods. The religious justification for caste is based upon the divine origin of this system as recorded in the Purusa-sukta. Although the Puru$a hymn is found in the Rg Veda, chronologically it belongs to the period of the Brahmanas. By attributing a divine origin to caste, the original social institution was elevated to the position of a religious institution, and its laws were thereby considered immutable. According to Brahinanic interpretation of the hymn, the purpose of this divine creation was to make caste a stabilising factor in society. It was ordained in order that there might be no "confusion of castes," and that society be maintained in "the proper order.'" 4 ' Social stability was achieved, indeed by caste, but this was done at the cost of ethical considerations. We shall now study the consolidation of caste in the age of the Brahmanas and shall indicate the manner in which it obstructed the principled development of morality. We first study the priestly caste. Motivated by guild spirit and class jealousy, the Brahmins made their order inaccessible by closing the canon of Vedic hymns, thus barring poets of lesser ranks f r o m aspiring to the priestly profession. As a further deterrent, they complicated the theoretical and practical aspects of sacrifice with such hair-splitting minutiae that only a specialist f r o m their own learned ranks could understand and execute the sacerdotal duties. The Brahmins not only consolidated their superiority by protecting their office against nonpriestly aspirants, they also protected the purity of their blood against Sudra incursions. The new politics of coexistence meant that Sudras, treated now as subjects and not as slaves, had increased contact with the Aryans. This posed the problem of maintaining the purity of Aryan blood. To meet the emergency, a policy of social exclusiveness was adopted. Although the original intent of this new social policy was to exclude intercourse with the Sudra, its effects were more encompassing, thus raising social barriers between the Aryans themselves. This illustrates one way in which the tactics used to separate Aryans f r o m non-Aryans also separated Aryans f r o m Aryans. Ethnic exclusiveness bred social exclusiveness. The latter tendency was accelerated by the introduction of special rites prescribing different forms of religious and

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social behaviour deemed a p p r o p r i a t e f o r each s e p a r a t e caste. J u d g e d in isolation, these rules seemed merely decorative, but their cumulative effect was socially destructive. T h e y helped create a climate in which each caste was reminded, in a m y r i a d minuscule m a n n e r s , of the place it occupied in the hierarchical o r d e r of society. T h e rationale f o r s o m e of these distinctions was p u r p o r t e d l y ethical, but its underlying concept of sin h a d n o basis in ethics. F o r instance, S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a lays d o w n specifications for the sepulchral m o u n d a c c o r d i n g t o caste distinctions, a n d t o m a k e sure the rules are strictly observed, t h e issue of sin is raised. Let h i m not m a k e it ( t h e s e p u l c h r a l m o u n d ) t o o large, lest he m a k e the ( d e c e a s e d ' s ) sin large. For the Kshatriya he m a y m a k e it as high as a m a n with u p s t r e t c h e d arms, f o r a B r a h m a n a reaching up to the m o u t h , for a w o m a n up to the hips, for a Vaisya up t o the thighs, f o r a S u d r a up to the k n e e ; f o r s u c h l i k e is their vigour. 1 4 6

All of these meaningless distinctions solidified the caste system a n d intoxicated the B r a h m i n s with delusions of godliness. T h e S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a declares: " T h e B r a h m a n descended f r o m a Rishi indeed is all deities.'" 4 7 If divinity were the n o r m of impartial justice, t h e B r a h m i n s m a y be respected as the e m b o d i m e n t s of t h e m o r a l o r d e r ; instead, the B r a h m i n s interpreted their divine status t o m e a n that law served them— they did not have to serve the law. In a strictly ethical sense, there was n o law, only laws, hierarchically conceived. F o r e x a m p l e , the Taittirlya S a m h i t a prescribes: " I f there be a dispute between a B r a h m a n a n d a n o n - B r a h m a n , the king should s u p p o r t the B r a h m a n ; if o n e o p p o s e s the B r a h m a n , he o p p o s e s himself; t h e r e f o r e o n e should not o p p o s e a B r a h m a n . ' " 4 ' This is only o n e a m o n g several o t h e r preferential laws in which the idea of law as justice is entirely a b s e n t . Violations of these laws were t h r e a t e n e d with p u n i s h m e n t s which were grossly unrelated to a n d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e with the n a t u r e of the o f f e n c e . O n e guilty of spitting u p o n a B r a h m i n was sentenced, in the a f t e r l i f e , to sitting " i n the middle of a s t r e a m r u n n i n g with b l o o d , d e v o u r i n g hair." T h e second step in the hierarchy was occupied by the K$atriyas—the p r o t e c t o r s of the people. F o r t h e m , the h a r d e n i n g of caste distinctions m e a n t t h a t their participation in priestly activities h a d t o be t e r m i n a t e d . W i t h o u t B r a h m i n priests, they could not t a k e p a r t in sacrifices, because, it is said, " t h e gods d o not eat the f o o d o f f e r e d by a king w h o has n o p r i e s t . ' " 4 9 However, even t h o u g h the K$atriyas were f o r b i d d e n f r o m entering t h e priestly r a n k s a n d were not permitted t o c o m p o s e the sacred h y m n s , m a n y of t h e m c h a n n e l e d their religious insights a n d a s p i r a t i o n s in t h e direction of metaphysical speculations. T h e case of J a n a k a of Videha is a g o o d illustration of h o w certain

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m e m b e r s of t h e k i n g l y c l a s s w e r e n o t o n l y p a t r o n s o f l e a r n i n g , b u t t h e m selves c o n t r i b u t e d t o its e x p a n s i o n . In a t h e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t a t i o n w i t h t h r e e B r a h m i n sages, J a n a k a a s k e d t h e m a q u e s t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e A g n i h o t r a w h i c h n o n e of t h e m c o u l d a n s w e r c o r r e c t l y . T h e n , w i t h t r u e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c u m e n he h i m s e l f e x p l a i n e d t h e a n s w e r f o r w h i c h h e r e c e i v e d t h e h i g h e s t p r a i s e of t h e s a g e Y a j n a v a l k y a . 1 5 0 A s e c o n d a r e a in w h i c h t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e K s a t r i y a s w a s l i m i t e d w a s c o n t r o l of priestly a p p o i n t m e n t s . " T h e P u r o h i t a s o r f a m i l y p r i e s t s w e r e p r a c t i c a l l y i r r e m o v a b l e , w h i c h o n l y a d d e d t o t h e v e s t e d r i g h t s of t h e B r a h m a n p r i e s t s . ' " 5 1 T h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e k i n g a n d his P u r o h i t a is l o o k e d u p o n as i n d i s s o l u b l e as t h e b o n d s b e t w e e n a m a r r i e d c o u p l e . O n c e i n s t a l l e d , t h e k i n g w a s t o h o n o u r his P u r o h i t a w i t h t h e s a m e o b e d i e n c e t h a t is o w e d by a s t u d e n t t o his t e a c h e r , a s o n t o his f a t h e r , a n d a serv a n t t o his m a s t e r . In r e a d i n g s u c h a s s e r t i o n s o f t h e B r a h m i n ' s s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e K s a t r i y a , t w o q u a l i f i c a t i o n s m u s t be b o r n e in m i n d . F i r s t , t h e l i t e r a t u r e in w h i c h this s u p e r i o r i t y is b e i n g a s s e r t e d is priestly. D o u b t l e s s l y , t h e r e must have been a great struggle for p o w e r between these t w o caste g r o u p s , b u t t h e l i t e r a t u r e is n o t i n t e r e s t e d in r e c o r d i n g t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s t o B r a h m a n i c a l p o w e r . Tactically, this l i t e r a r y " w h i t e w a s h " m a y h a v e b e e n s o u n d , b u t e t h i c a l l y it w a s d i s h o n e s t . S e c o n d , it is q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r the B r a h m i n s did, indeed, attain a clearcut s u p r e m a c y over the Ksatriyas. T h e r u l i n g class d i d s u f f e r a l a s t i n g s e t b a c k , b u t t w o f a c t o r s p r e v e n t e d t h e B r a h m i n s f r o m a c h i e v i n g a n y decisive s u p e r i o r i t y , n a m e l y , t h e dev e l o p m e n t in k i n g l y circles of a n i n d e p e n d e n t m o d e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t that was referred to earlier a n d their f i r m grip over t e m p o r a l affairs. T h e priests a n d w a r r i o r s constituted t w o aristocratic orders which c o n s p i r e d t o s u b j e c t t h e m a s s e s o f t h e A r y a n p e o p l e t o a p o s i t i o n o f virt u a l slavery. T h e i n f e r i o r s t a t u s o f t h e Vaisya in r e l a t i o n t o t h e l o r d l y B r a h m i n s a n d K s a t r i y a s is s t a t e d t h u s , a l o n g w i t h s o m e p s e u d o - e t h i c a l reasoning. And inasmuch as, in going f r o m here, the horse goes first, therefore the Kshatriya, going first, is followed by the three other castes; and inasmuch as, in returning f r o m there, the he-goat goes first, therefore the B r a h m a n a , going first, is followed by the three other castes. A n d inasmuch as the ass does not go first, either in going f r o m here, or in coming back f r o m there, therefore the Brahmana and Kshatriya never go behind the Vaisya and Sudra; hence they walk thus in order to avoid a confusion between good and bad. And, moreover, he thus encloses these two castes (the Vaisya and Sudra) on both sides by the priesthood and the nobility, and makes them submissive. 1 "

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T h e submissive rank of the Vaisya was b r o u g h t a b o u t by the feudalistic tendencies in society which widened t h e g a p between the aristocrats a n a the p r o l e t a r i a t , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d on the o t h e r h a n d , by the fraternizing tendencies which m a r k e d t h e relationship between Vaisya a n d S u d r a as a result of c o m m o n e m p l o y m e n t a n d i n t e r m a r r i a g e . T h e a r i s t o c r a t s began to look c o n t e m p t u o u s l y u p o n m a n u a l l a b o u r once there were e n o u g h slaves to d o such j o b s . M e m b e r s of the A r y a n c o m m u n i t y e m p l o y e d in f a r m i n g , c o m m e r c e , a n d the industrial arts were despised f o r being engaged in such degrading p r o f e s s i o n s , a n d also because of their association with the S u d r a s w h o c a m e to occupy similar positions. C e r t a i n b r a n c h e s in the Vaisya c o m m u n i t y were even looked u p o n as i m p u r e . U n l i k e the m e r c h a n t a n d the farmer, the Vaisya carpenter was considered i m p u r e . A passage in the S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a explicitly states that d e f i l e m e n t is incurred by the t o u c h of " a c a r p e n t e r or s o m e o t h e r i m p u r e p e r s o n . ' " 5 4 In the s u b s e q u e n t period, other such Vaisya o c c u p a t i o n s fell in disrepute. In a d d i t i o n to the c o n t e m p t incurred by the m a n u a l n a t u r e of their p r o f e s s i o n s , the Vaisyas were also d o w n g r a d e d by the aristocracy because of their i n t e r m a r r i a g e with the S u d r a s . M a r r i a g e with the S u d r a s was inevitable because of the closeness of w o r k i n g conditions a n d because the Vaisyas were shut off f r o m the rest of t h e A r y a n c o m m u n i t y . But once they were tainted with black b l o o d , the Vaisyas were all the m o r e excluded f r o m the priestly ruling classes w h o considered purity of b l o o d m o r e excellent t h a n virtue. T h e S u d r a s c o n s t i t u t e d the f o u r t h step within the caste system. T h e ethics w h e r e b y he was excluded f r o m intercourse with the A r y a n c o m m u nity is explained in these lines: N o w the g o d s d o not c o m m u n e with e v e r y o n e , but only with a B r a h m a n , or a R a j a n y a , or a Vaisya; for these are able to sacrifice. S h o u l d there be occasion for him t o c o n v e r s e with a Sudra, let him say t o o n e o f t h o s e , 'Tell this o n e so and so! tell this o n e so and so!' This is the rule o f c o n d u c t for the consecrated in such a case. l 5 S

This religious r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of ethnic p r e j u d i c e gave the A r y a n s a clean conscience in their t r e a t m e n t of the S u d r a s — " t h e S u d r a has n o god a n d n o s a c r i f i c e . ' " 5 6 In the G a n g e t i c plains the S u d r a h a d greater political f r e e d o m t h a n in t h e Rgvedic period; but t h o u g h elevated f r o m a slave t o a d o m e s t i c s e r v a n t , the S u d r a could never achieve the f r e e d o m s of an A r y a n . Even so, s o m e of the f r e e d o m s of the S u d r a d u r i n g this period a r e o v e r l o o k e d by scholars. A t t e n t i o n s h o u l d be called t o the fact that the s a m e t w o steps by which t h e Vaisya c a m e d o w n t h e social ladder, t h e S u d r a went u p . T h r o u g h

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c o m m o n tasks a n d ties of b l o o d the S u d r a established ethnic a n d cultural affinities with the A r y a n c o m m u n i t y . In this process of a c c u l t u r a t i o n t h e S u d r a was g r a n t e d limited f u n c t i o n s a n d privileges in the sacred rites. T h e S a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a , f o r instance, specifies t h e f o r m of speech which must be used in addressing various p a r t i c i p a n t s in a sacrifice, a n d o n e f o r m is prescribed f o r the S u d r a . " 7 T h o u g h the S u d r a s were the lowest within the caste system, they considered themselves superior to the savage races of p r e - D r a v i d i a n stock which occupied s o m e inaccessible areas of t h e country. These people h a d a very low culture expressed t h r o u g h r a t h e r l o a t h s o m e behaviour, a n d were, t h e r e f o r e , treated with c o n t e m p t by A r y a n s a n d D r a v i d i a n s alike. Socially, they were placed in a new order, the f i f t h varna; a n d their very t o u c h was considered defiling. It is to the discredit of the religion of these times t h a t h u m a n w o r t h was based on such externalities as racial stock, colour, a n d material s t a n d a r d s of living. F o r these reasons, no e f f o r t s were m a d e to u p l i f t these savage tribes; instead, they were treated as pariahs a n d were m a d e to p u r s u e the dirtiest tasks. O u r investigation of the ethical t h o u g h t of the B r a h m a n a s has s h o w n that t w o f a c t o r s were mainly responsible f o r the r e t a r d a t i o n of ethical a n d m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t : magic a n d caste. T h e magical interpretation of sacrifice deethicised good a n d evil. C a s t e r o b b e d the S u d r a of " g o d a n d sacrifice" a n d elevated the B r a h m i n s to t h e position of divinities of earth! IV. Ethical Thought in the Upanisads In the Rg Veda the summun bonum was h a r m o n y with the will of the gods w h o m a i n t a i n e d the o r d e r of Rta. In the B r a h m a n a s the summum bonum was sacrificial rectitude. In the U p a n i s a d s the highest ideal f o r m a n ' s ethical e n d e a v o u r s is self-knowledge. Vedic ceremonialism a n d caste duties give way t o a new spiritual quest which turns inward f o r the p u r p o s e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g U l t i m a t e Reality. This quest is eloquently expressed in this well-known prayer: F r o m t h e u n r e a l (asat) lead m e t o t h e real F r o m d a r k n e s s lead m e t o light! F r o m d e a t h lead m e t o i m m o r t a l i t y !

(sat)!

T h e m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d this introspective search is the f u n d a m e n t a l idea r u n n i n g t h r o u g h t h e early U p a n i s a d s t h a t " u n d e r l y i n g the exterior world of c h a n g e there is a n u n c h a n g e a b l e reality which is identical with t h a t which underlies the essence of m a n . ' " 5 9 Stated in the w o r d s of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad: Verily, h e is t h e g r e a t , u n b o r n S o u l , w h o is t h i s [ p e r s o n ] c o n s i s t i n g of k n o w l e d g e a m o n g t h e senses. I n t h e s p a c e w i t h i n t h e h e a r t lies t h e ruler of all, t h e

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lord of all, the king o f all. H e d o e s not b e c o m e greater by g o o d action nor inferior by bad a c t i o n . " 0

The formulation of this ideal was a long time in the making. Summarily stated, the Upanisadic sages synthesised two notions which originally had totally different connotations, namely, 'Brahman' or the ultimate source of the external world, and 'Atman' or the inner self of man. These sages teach that the Brahman of the macrocosm is none other than the Atman of the microcosm—"That self is, indeed, Brahman.'" 6 1 By equating Brahman with Atman, each term came to signify the eternal ground of the universe, including the ground of man's being and the being of nature. Thus, in the course of his speculation, the Indian sage "at last reached the goal of his long quest after unity—a goal which left all mythology far behind and was truly philosophical.'"" The Chandogya Upanisad records a famous passage illustrating this Brahman-Atman doctrine. Svetaketu, son of Uddalaka Aruni, having completed his Vedic studies, "returned at the age of twenty-four, conceited, thinking himself to be learned, p r o u d . " " 3 His father said to him: S v e t a k e t u , my dear, since n o w y o u are c o n c e i t e d , think yourself learned, a n d are proud, did y o u also ask for that teaching w h e r e b y what has not been heard o f b e c o m e s heard o f , what has not been t h o u g h t of b e c o m e s t h o u g h t o f , what has not been u n d e r s t o o d b e c o m e s u n d e r s t o o d ? 1 6 4

Finding his son to be ignorant of the knowledge of Brahman, the father proceeds to impart divine knowledge to him. He posits an ultimate source called Sat or Being. Its essence lies in consciousness. Sat thought to itself: "Would that I were many! Let me procreate m y s e l f ! ' " " Through its act of procreation, Sat brought the whole of the universe into being, including human existence. The unitary World-Soul is thus the immanental reality of nature and of man. Aruni explains to Svetaketu: " T h a t which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is A t m a n (Soul). That art thou, Svetaketu.'" 6 6 This story, along with cognate passages, has five lessons of ethical import. First, the Upanisads postulate that the ethical ideal of realizing one's unity with Brahman is the highest goal for which man can strive. Herein lies man's ultimate value, his greatest bliss, his truest freedom, his deepest peace. By uniting with the Brahman, the Atman transcends all such vicissitudes of mortal existence as hunger and thirst, sorrow and confusion, old age and death. "As the sun, the eye of the Universe, remains far off and unaffected by all sickness that meets the eye, so also the One, the A t m a n , who dwells in all creatures, dwells a f a r and untouched by the sorrows of the world.'" 6 7 Thus, no state can excel the state of realizing one's identity with Brahman.

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Second, the Upanisads teach that though this state of perfect knowledge is so exalted, it is possible to achieve the ideal in one's present life. True, there is the view that Brahma-realization is only reached after death; but there is also the view known as jlvanmukti which states that moksa (liberation) can be reached here and now. The Katha Upanisad affirms: "when all the desires the heart harbours are gone, man becomes immortal and reaches Brahman here.'" 6 8 The shift in the doctrine of moksa from the eschatological realm to the empirical realm is ethically significant. In place of the speculative basis contingent on faith, moksa is given a philosophical basis contingent on reason and will. The goal is still in the distant future, and few there are who attain thereto, but it is no longer a hypothetical future. The end is assured f r o m the beginning as moral progress is made through various stages of life. The saint who reaches this goal expresses his cosmic identity in the phrase "Aham Brahmasmi" (I am Brahman). The third lesson is that liberation is not a new acquisition. It is the knowledge of Brahman, not the product of that knowledge. Causation is inapplicable to Brahman because Brahman is being, not becoming. If moksa were the product of the knowledge of Brahman, then, having had a beginning, it would also have an ending. "Arising f r o m non-existence, it would again dissolve into nothingness.'" 6 ' Fourth, since moksa is not acquired f r o m without but realized from within, the moksa doctrine becomes the basis for moral optimism in that the capacity of the present life to achieve perfection is fully recognized. Fifth, the story of Svetaketu shows there is a correlation between self-knowledge and morality. The former is the foundation of the latter. The presence of pride and self-conceit in Svetaketu was a sure sign to his father that the boy lacked knowledge of Brahman. It was selfcontradictory for an enlightened person to entertain such vanity in his heart, because only the pure in heart see Brahman. Enlightenment presupposes the radical elimination of all manifestations of egocentricity. Though moksa is the present perception of eternal Reality, ignorance prevents men f r o m reaching it. S o , just as those w h o d o not k n o w the spot m i g h t g o over a hid treasure o f g o l d again a n d again, but not find it, even s o all creatures here g o day by day t o that B r a h m a - w o r l d (brahma-loka) [in d e e p sleep], but d o not find it; for truly they are carried astray by what is false.

Untruth lies in the empirical view which accepts diversity as the sole truth about the world instead of probing deep until the unity of Brahman is reached. Metaphysical error translates into evil on the moral level. Whereas in

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the Rg Veda, evil lay in the contradiction of the will of the gods, and while in the Brahmanas it was mostly deviation f r o m sacrificial rectitude, in the Upanisads evil arises out of the mistaken notion that Reality is finite. Finiteness breeds desire. Ignorantly imagining that he is separate from others, man sees others as rivals in the fight for individual survival. All of the evils which alienate man from man, and man f r o m nature are due to the false consciousness of individuality. Such men are prisoners of suffering, sickness, and death because they ignorantly desire what is sensuous and finite. How does one overcome such ego-desires or ahamkara? It is at this point that the Upanisads insist on the indispensability of the ethical life. Identity with the Supreme is impossible for one who has not become "calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected.'" 7 ' Only through purification and concentration is ahamkara overcome. However, because ahamkara is deeply embedded in man's ego, it cannot be eradicated suddenly or automatically. Hence the need for an ascetically progressive period of moral discipline covering one's entire life. The prescribed discipline prerequisite for moksa is known as brahmacarya. " 'Brahmacarya' here takes a new meaning signifying moral conduct conducive to the contemplation of Brahman, the highest t r u t h . " " 2 This meaning is borne out by the tale of Indra and Virocana who, for thirty-two years, lived together "the disciplined life of a student of sacred knowledge.'" 7 3 The M u n d a k a Upanisad emphasises the oft-repeated theme: This Soul ( A t m a n ) is o b t a i n a b l e by truth, by austerity (tapas), By proper k n o w l e d g e (jnana), by the student's life o f chastity carya) c o n s t a n t l y [practised].' 1 4

(brahma-

First, the student must find a spiritual teacher. 175 No amount of individual thinking can take the place of a guru " w h o is learned in the scriptures and established in B r a h m a n . ' " 7 6 Brahmavidya begins as the young man approaches the teacher with sacrificial "fuel in hand.'" 7 7 The fuel symbolises the light of reason to be imparted by the teacher to the student, 1 7 8 and also the resolution of the student to follow the superior wisdom of his guru. Reason and resolution are the basic components distinguishing man, the ethical animal, f r o m all other creatures whose lives are dictated by instinct and impulse. These human capacities which are the psychological bases for the ethical life are clearly delineated in the Ratharupaka or The Parable of the Chariot. It reads: K n o w thou the soul {atman, T h e b o d y as a chariot.

self) as riding in a chariot,

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Know thou the intellect (buddhi) as the chariot-driver, And the mind (manas) as the reins. The senses (indriya), they say, are the horses; The objects of sense, what they range over. The self combined with senses and mind Wise men call 'the enjoyer' (bhoktr). He who has not understanding (a-vijrlana), Whose mind is not constantly held firm— His senses are uncontrolled, Like the vicious horses of a chariot-driver. He, however, who has understanding, Whose mind is constantly held firm— His senses are under control, Like the good horses of a chariot-driver. He, however, who has not understanding, W h o is unmindful and ever impure, Reaches not the goal, But goes on to reincarnation (samsara). He, however, who has understanding, W h o is mindful and ever pure, Reaches the goal From which he is born no more. He, however, who has the understanding of a chariot-driver, A man who reins in his m i n d He reaches the end of his journey, The highest place of Vishnu. Higher than the senses are the objects of sense. Higher than the objects of sense is the mind (manas); And higher than the mind is the intellect (buddhi). Higher than the intellect is the Great Self (Atman). Higher Higher Higher That is

than the Great Self is the Unmanifest (avyakta). than the Unmanifest is the Person. than the person there is nothing at all. the goal. That is the highest course.

An intelligent man should suppress his speech and his mind. The latter he should suppress in the Understanding-Self (jrtana atman). The understanding he should suppress in the Great Self [=buddhi, intellect]. That he should suppress in the Tranquil Self (fanta atman).'1''

Thus, to know the Atman, the brahmacarin must first develop his rational faculties to control his animal impulses, especially the sex im-

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pulses. This is w h y chastity b e c o m e s a special c o n n o t a t i o n o f 'brahmacarya'. T h e struggle between reason and passion is vividly described in the Katha U p a n i s a d as the struggle between sreyas (here, and in the Glta = morally excellent), and preyas (what to m o s t is dearer than the g o o d ) . The better reyas) is one thing, and the pleasanter (preyas) quite another. Both these, of different aim, bind a person. Of these two, well is it for him who takes the better; He fails of his aim who chooses the pleasanter. Both the better and the pleasanter come to a man. Going all around the two, the wise man discriminates. The wise man chooses the better, indeed, rather than the pleasanter. The stupid man, f r o m getting-and-keeping (yoga-ksema), chooses the pleasanter. Thou indeed, upon the pleasant and pleasantly appearing desires. Meditating, hast let them go, O Naciketas. Thou art not one who has taken that garland of wealth In which many men sink down. Widely opposite and asunder are these two: Ignorance (avidya) and what is known as 'knowledge' (vidya). 1 think Naciketas desirous of obtaining knowledge! Many desires rend thee not. Those abiding in the midst of ignorance, Self-wise, thinking themselves learned, Running hither and thither, go around deluded, Like blind men led by one who is himself blind. 1 , 0 Judging by this passage, the wise m a n is o n e w h o is guided by his reason rather than his sensations. H e refuses to allow anything unedifying, n o matter h o w pleasant, to pollute his psycho-physical constitution. Only what is spiritually uplifting is a l l o w e d to enter the d o o r s o f his five senses. A n d so he prays: Aum. May we, may we, O gods, hear what is auspicious with our ears. Oh ye, who are worthy of worship, may we see with our eyes what is auspicious. May we enjoy the life alloted to us by the gods, offering praise, with our bodies strong of limb. By purifying the intake o f his senses through the proper use o f reason, the brahmacarin purifies his w h o l e personality. Being pure in mind and body, he is able to conserve his strength and build up his capacity for the uninterrupted f l o w o f spiritual c o n s c i o u s n e s s which ultimately leads to revelation. 1 8 2

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Together with reason, virtue constitutes the second means for attaining strength (vTrya, bala). Virtue thus plays a pivotal role toward liberation for "this self (Atman) cannot be attained by one without s t r e n g t h . ' " " The primary virtue in the life of the brahmacarin is satya or truth. This ancient virtue, going back to Rgvedic times, is integral to the Upanisads. Asked to identify "the mystic doctrine" (upanisad), the sage replies, "Truth is its a b o d e . " " 4 Truth helps the disciple build u p soul-force by bringing his speech and mental states under the guidance of reason. The first practical precept mentioned by a teacher in his farewell address to his students reads: "Speak the t r u t h . ' " " One should guard himself against speaking falsehood "as a sword-walker guards himself f r o m falling into a p i t . ' " 8 ' Truth starts with reason but does not stop with it. The deepest knowledge can only be seen through the eyes of faith. The disciple must, therefore, have faith in the guru's teaching. This is clearly brought out in the discourse between Svetaketu and his father. Explaining the subtle essence which cannot be perceived but which is nevertheless real, the father says, "Believe me, my d e a r . " " 7 The second exhortation of the teacher to his departing students is: "Practice virtue (dharma).""» Dharma is related to truth as action is related to knowledge. There are three active modes of dharma: yajfla, adhyayana, and dana (sacrifice, study, and dedication)." 9 Yajna or sacrifice is qualified as tapas. The meaning of tapas is soulforce. It refers to the spiritual energy which is generated by bringing one's physical nature under the control of his rational will. Austerities produce a certain spiritual combustion which frees the soul of narrow, selfish accretions of preyas, and expands it in the direction of Sreyas. The second mode of dharma is adhyayana or study. Revelatory knowledge is stored in sruti literature; therefore, it is considered a virtue to make a careful study of the Vedas. Since virtue is relative to personal needs, study is the determinative virtue of the student because it fulfils the specific purpose of his stage of life, namely, the acquisition of knowledge. Failure to gather knowledge would be the undoing of all other virtues the student may otherwise have acquired. Goodness is only good when it is good for something, and in the student's case it is the gathering of knowledge. Related to the study of scriptures is the exposition of the scriptures or pravacana. Pravacana has two values. First, through teaching, one is himself taught. Second, by teaching others, one pays his debt to his preceptor and thereby keeps alive the Vedic tradition, the source of all religion and morality. Together, adhyayana and pravacana provide the common framework for the other virtues such as rta (the right), satya (the

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true), tapas (austerity), dama (self-control), sama (tranquility), manusa (humanity).'" 0 The third mode of dharma is dana. The Chandogya Upanisad describes it as "absolutely controlling his body in the house of the teacher." This form of commitment of the pupil to the guru, carrying him beyond the normal period of the Brahmacarya stage, is called dana because the pupil is offering himself as a gift. Dana in the Upanisads is also the ideal of charity that must govern all human relations. Being a social animal, it is man's dharma to relate to his fellows in a supportive and helpful manner even though this may sometimes entail personal sacrifices. The story of Naciketa offering himself as a gift is an inspiring model of this ideal. However, "the gift without the giver is bare." Therefore, it is not only important that charity be practised but that it be practised in a moral manner. The Taittirlya Upanisad speaks to this requirement. One One One One One One

should should should should should should

give w i t h f a i t h (sraddha). n o t give w i t h o u t f a i t h . give w i t h p l e n t y (srij. give w i t h m o d e s t y . give w i t h fear. give w i t h s y m p a t h y (sam-vid).

91

Commenting on these three modes of dharma, Professor G. Mukhopadhyaya summarises the interrelatedness and ethical intentionality of the ideas expressed above: By yajna or s a c r i f i c e o n e is l i n k e d w i t h t h e w o r l d of t h e g o d s , t h r o u g h s t u d y or adhyayana o n e is j o i n e d with t h e s u p r e m e s p h e r e of S a b d a - B r a h m a n , a n d lastly t h r o u g h dana, s e l f - g i v i n g or g i f t of t h i n g s o n e gets c o n n e c t e d with t h e h u m a n w o r l d . D h a r m a t h u s c o v e r s all t h e s p h e r e s of life a n d is n o t a n isolated s t a t e of t h i n g . " 2

There are two other lists of virtues worth noting. The Chandogya Upanisad provides an allegorical interpretation of life as a great soma festival.' 9 3 We have here "a miniature ethical system" built around the notion of sacrifice to be performed in spirit, without recourse to physical rites. The diksa or initiatory rite is allegorized as privation. Gifts to the priests are in the form of "austerity, almsgiving, uprightness, nonviolence, truthfulness."" 4 It should be pointed out that here is the sole reference to ahimsa in the Upanisads. Nonviolence was only elevated as a supreme virtue in subsequent Buddhist tradition. A second list of virtues is found in a myth where P r a j a p a t i , the great moral lawgiver, speaks through the roll of thunder— 'da'! 'da'! 'da'! The myth begins:

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The threefold offspring of Prajapati, gods, men and demons, lived with their father Prajapati as students of sacred knowledge. Having completed their studentship the gods said, 'Please tell (instruct) us, sir.' To them, then, he uttered the syllable da (and asked) "Have you understood?" They (said) 'We have understood', you said to us "damyata", "control yourselves." He said, 'Yes, you have understood." 95 In this first i n s t a n c e , 'da' is a s s o c i a t e d with 'damyata' or s e l f - c o n t r o l . T h e g o d s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o c u l t i v a t e this v i r t u e i n a s m u c h as they a r e n a t u rally d i s p o s e d t o b e i n g unruly. T h e ' g o d s ' a r e t h o s e m e n w h o a r e g r a c e d with b e n e v o l e n t qualities, b u t lack s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . N e x t , the m e n ask P r a j a p a t i f o r i n s t r u c t i o n a n d t o t h e m he u t t e r s t h e s a m e syllable, 'da'. T h e y a s s o c i a t e it w i t h 'datta' o r give. Since m e n n a t urally t e n d t o be p e n u r i o u s , they a r e a s k e d i n s t e a d t o be liberal w i t h their wealth. In similar f a s h i o n , t h e d e m o n s ask f o r i n s t r u c t i o n . W h e n they h e a r t h e syllable, 'da', they a s s o c i a t e it with 'dayadhvam', meaning 'be compass i o n a t e ' . D e m o n s r e p r e s e n t b e i n g s w h o s e gunas t e n d t o cruelty; theref o r e , they a r e a s k e d t o s h a r e t h e milk of h u m a n k i n d n e s s with all p e o p l e . T h e t w o social i n s t i t u t i o n s m e r i t i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n a r e the f a m i l y a n d caste. F o r all their e m p h a s i s o n r e n u n c i a t i o n , t h e U p a n i s a d s never m i n i mize t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e family. T h e d e p a r t i n g s t u d e n t is i n s t r u c t e d b y his t e a c h e r : " c u t n o t o f f t h e line of p r o g e n y . " " 6 A m a n is i n c o m p l e t e a n d u n f u l f i l l e d w i t h o u t a w i f e , c h i l d r e n , a n d e a r t h l y p o s s e s s i o n s . " ' All aspects of t h e h o u s e h o l d e r ' s life a r e ethically r e g u l a t e d . H e m u s t especially be h o s p i t a b l e t o g u e s t s , o t h e r w i s e , " h o p e a n d e x p e c t a t i o n , i n t e r c o u r s e a n d pleasantness, sacrifices a n d meritorious deeds, sons and cattle"—all of these will b e s n a t c h e d a w a y f r o m h i m f o r t h e n i g g a r d s h o w s h i m self t o be a " m a n of little u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " " 8 B e f o r e he c a n u n d e r s t a n d Brahman t h e h o u s e h o l d e r m u s t p r o p i t i a t e t h e g o d s a n d g r a t i f y his f a t h e r . " 9 In o r d e r t o s h a r e , t h e h o u s e h o l d e r m u s t first possess; he t h e r e f o r e p r a y s f o r all t h e g o o d t h i n g s in this life: w e a l t h , cattle, c l o t h e s , f o o d , d r i n k , p r o s p e r i t y , a n d longevity. A typical p r a y e r : " M a y I b e c o m e glorio u s a m o n g m e n ! M a y I be b e t t e r t h a n t h e very rich! H a i l ! " 2 0 0 T h e s p e a k er, h e r e , is a teacher. All t h e t e a c h e r s of m a j o r U p a n i s a d s , like Y a j f l a v a l k y a , were grhasthas. A s f a r as t h e w o m a n ' s s t a t u s w i t h i n t h e f a m i l y , " t h e B r i h a d a r a n y a k a r e c o r d s o n e of t h e best p e r i o d s of I n d i a n history, w h e n w o m e n w e r e a d m i t t e d i n t o t h e s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u p s a n d w e r e a l l o w e d t o discuss t h e highest s p i r i t u a l t r u t h s o f life." 2 0 1 T h e A i t a r e y a U p a n i s a d suggests t h a t it w a s p o s s i b l e f o r elderly m a r r i e d w o m e n t o b e a d m i t t e d to V e d a n t i c discourses. 2 0 2 T h e r e a r e several r e f e r e n c e s in t h e U p a n i s a d s to w o m e n f u n c t i o n i n g as t e a c h e r s , t h o u g h it is n o t c e r t a i n if t h e y w e r e m a r r i e d .

E T H I C S OF THE V E D I C

45

PERIOD

MaitreyT, w i f e o f Y a j f i a v a l k y a , is k n o w n as a BrahmavadinT (desirous of the knowledge o f Brahman). Her conversation with Y a j f l a v a l k y a on the A b s o l u t e Self shows that " t h e later subjection o f w o m e n and their exclusion f r o m Vedic studies does not have the support o f the U p a n i s a d s . " A n o t h e r Brahmavadinl was GargT. S o great was her desire to know the nature o f Brahman that she could not cease questioning Y a j f l a v a l k y a , despite his threat: "GargT, d o not question too much lest your head fall o f f . " 205 GargT was undeterred. She kept probing the sage's mind until she had extracted from him one o f the profoundest definitions of Brahman. T h e value placed on the intellectual achievement a m o n g w o m e n becomes apparent in ritual prayers that are prescribed for the birth of a daughter w h o , it is hoped, will achieve the status o f pandita or learned w o m a n . 204 Women's education was not limited to household affairs; they also had the right to study the Vedas. S a n k a r a ' s denial o f the latter privilege finds no support from the Upanisadic text and f r o m other related beliefs and practices. Feminine sexuality is lauded as the creation of the divine, and, therefore, is g o o d . Spirit and flesh are blended in this descriptive analogy meant both for excitement and reverence. H e r l a p is a s a c r i f i c i a i a l t a r ; h e r h a i r s t h e s a c r i f i c i a l g r a s s ; h e r s k i n , t h e s o m a p r e s s . T h e t w o l a b i a o f t h e v u l v a a r e t h e f i r e in t h e m i d d l e . Verily, i n d e e d , a s g r e a t a s is t h e w o r l d o f h i m w h o s a c r i f i c e s w i t h t h e V a j a p e y a ( ' S t r e n g t h l i b a t i o n ' ) s a c r i f i c e , s o g r e a t is t h e w o r l d o f h i m w h o p r a c t i c e s s e x u a l interc o u r s e , k n o w i n g this; he t u r n s t h e g o o d d e e d s o f w o m e n t o h i m s e l f .

But

he w h o p r a c t i c e s s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t k n o w i n g t h i s — w o m e n t u r n his g o o d deeds unto themselves.205

Sexual intercourse performed with spiritual knowledge is a thing of j o y because o f the "loveliness a m o n g w o m e n . " 2 0 6 W h e n a w o m a n yields her favours to her lover, exultingly he says: " 'With power, with glory I give you g l o r y ! ' Thus they two become g l o r i o u s . " 2 0 ' We n o w turn our attention to a second important social institution, namely, caste. T h e impact o f Upanisadic thought on the caste system had the effect o f somewhat relaxing its rigidity. T h e story of S a t y a k a m a illustrates the fact that often ethical considerations prevailed over caste considerations in the selection of students to discipleship. W h e n G a u t a m a asked him of his family b a c k g r o u n d , the boy made this candid confession: I d o n o t k n o w this, sir, o f w h a t f a m i l y I a m .

I asked my mother.

She

answered me, " I n my youth, w h e n I went about a great deal as a maidservant, I got y o u . S o I d o not k n o w o f w h a t family y o u are. I a m Jabala by n a m e a n d y o u a r e S a t y k a m a b y n a m e . " S o I a m S a t y a k a m a J a b a l a , Sir. 2 0 8

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Given such a truthful reply, the teacher responded: " N o n e but a Brahmana could thus explain. Bring the fuel, my dear, I will receive you as a pupil. Thou hast not departed f r o m the truth." 2 0 9 Another illustration of the softening of caste attitudes is seen in the admission of women into philosophical circles, as our observations on the status of women have already shown. Women like Gargl and MaitreyT were able to participate in philosophical discussions because the exclusive rights of Brahmins as the purveyors and dispensers of religious truth had been radically questioned and curtailed. The Brahmins began losing their religious prerogatives with the onslaught of Upanisadic thought upon the value of ritualism. It is plain from our study that the metaphysics and ethics of the Upanisads are quite contrary to the system of ideas on which the sacrificial notions of the Brahmanas are based. The Upanisadic hostility toward sacrificial ceremonialism is most clearly expressed in the M u n d a k a Upanisad. Deriding the effectiveness of sacrificial forms against rebirth, the Upanisad says: U n s a f e b o a t s , h o w e v e r , are these sacrificial f o r m s , T h e e i g h t e e n , in w h i c h is e x p r e s s e d the l o w e r w o r k . T h e f o o l s w h o a p p r o v e that as the better, G o again t o old age a n d d e a t h . ! l °

The belittling of the ritualistic system also involved the undermining of the priests who presided over the system. As with their work, they were deemed inferior and devoid of knowledge. This turn of events in religious authority made it possible for Ksatriya religious philosophers to rise to positions of intellectual and spiritual leadership. The Upanisads mention several royal philosophers such as Ajatasatru, Asvapati, Sanatkumara, Janaka, and Pravahana Jaivali. Sometimes these sages even demonstrated superior wisdom over their priestly counterparts as evidenced by the words of Pravahana Jaivali to Svetaketu Aruneya who came to him for enlightenment about the course of the soul after death. The young man assured the king that his father had instructed him, but, upon being questioned, it became apparent that the lad was indeed ignorant. Distressed, the boy returned to his father and said: "Verily, indeed, without having instructed me, you, sir, said: T have instructed you.' Five questions a fellow of the princely class (rajanyabandhu) has asked me. I was not able to explain even one of them."2" The father responded: "As you have told them to me here, I d o not know even one of them. If I had known them, how would I not have told them to you?" 2 1 2

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47

With that, G a u t a m a Aruni went to the king's place and said to him, "The word which you said in the presence of the young man, even that do you speak to me." This made the king perplexed. He then commanded him to stay for some time, and said, "As to what you have told me, O Gautama, this knowledge has never yet come to Brahmans before you; and therefore in all the worlds has the rule belonged to the Ksatriya only." 2 " On the basis of this evidence it seems correct to conclude that by the time of the early Upanisads the Brahmans' superiority in religious knowledge began to be questioned, Ksatriyas came to acquire an upper hand, or at least equality, in matters of religion and philosophy. Women also were freely allowed to participate in learned public discussions. In short, there was a slackening of the rigour and rigidity of caste and sex. The purpose of the personal and social ethics we have just described was to build up soul force by which alone the Atman is realized. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad says: "having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected, one should see the self in the self." 214 It is not our intention to explicate the further stages of religious development; suffice it to say that on the highest stage of contemplation one attains an immediate certainty of Brahman.21' When the supreme knowledge of the Atman is realized, the individual is transported beyond the ethical plane to the religious plane. This is the level of moksa or supreme liberation. On this level one is not only beyond evil, but beyond the good, for the one presupposes the other. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad paradoxically describes this state of freedom: "In the highest state a thief is not a thief, a murderer is not a murderer. He is not followed by good nor followed by evil, for he then overcomes all sorrows of the heart." 2 1 6 The secret of this state is that the enlightened one is devoid of fear and is therefore untroubled about the past. " H i m does not afflict the thought, why have I not done what is good, why have I committed sin." 217 The reason he is fearless is because, whereas on the moral level the individual is the doer, on the religious level he is no longer a doer. The individual is now identified with the Atman who is essentially a nondoer, and hence, for the Atman the issue of good and evil simply does not arise. The Absolute is above all moral distinctions. Thus, the categorical imperative that one ought to do what is good is significant only on the moral level because here the battle between the devas and the asuras is very real; but on the religious level, because the Atman knows no struggle, the battle ceases; therefore, the command to do what one ought to loses its former meaning. Regrettably, this supraethical teaching of the Upanisads is taken for

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the antithesis to morality. Robert H u m e voices the surprise of several Western scholars w h o are shocked by this "unethical c h a r a c t e r " of Hindu religion. H e says: There is a wide difference . . . b e t w e e n the U p a n i s h a d i c theory a n d the theory of the Greek sages that the m a n w h o has k n o w l e d g e s h o u l d thereby bec o m e virtuous in character, or the result o f the teaching s h o u l d be a virtuous life. Here the p o s s e s s i o n o f metaphysical k n o w l e d g e actually cancels all past sins and even permits the k n o w e r unblushingly t o c o n t i n u e in 'what seems to be m u c h evil,' with perfect impunity, a l t h o u g h such acts are h e i n o u s crimes and are disastrous in their e f f e c t s for others w h o lack that kind o f knowledge.2"

H u m e overlooks the fact that morality is the sine qua non of jnana or saving knowledge. T h e Katha Upanisad clearly states: "Truly, that which is steadfast is not obtained by those w h o are u n s t e a d f a s t . " 2 " The same warning is sounded in a score of other texts. 220 All of these passages reinforce the central Upanisadic teaching that spiritual perception is only possible to one whose nature has first been t r a n s f o r m e d by virtuous living. T h o u g h the religious level seems to be discontinuous with the moral level of existence, since the one is the preparation of the other, there is really a continuity between the two. The law of the moral life is fulfilled in the love of the spiritual life. T h e deliberate, conscious struggle of the moral life is joyfully transcended by the natural, s p o n t a n e o u s expressions of the spirit. " T h e soul delights in that s u p r e m e blessedness, perceives the unity of all, and loves the world as we love our separate selves." 2 2 ' T h e U p a n i s a d s are realistic enough to recognize that there are few w h o attain to this sublime level of existence. T h e K a t h a Upanisad observes: H e w h o by m a n y is not o b t a i n a b l e even to hear o f , H e w h o m many, even w h e n hearing, k n o w n o t W o n d e r f u l is the declarer, proficient the obtainer o f H i m ! W o n d e r f u l the knower, proficiently taught! 2 2 3

Until the higher self is realized through intuitive perception, the individual is ruled by the lower self. T h o u g h it is the higher self which is the basic reality of the lower self, it is the latter, the phenomenal self, which undergoes birth and death. T h e wheel of births a n d deaths a r o u n d which most lives revolve is k n o w n as samsara (transmigration). T h e C h a n d o g y a Upanisad describes the doctrine of samsara as follows: T h o s e w h o are pleasant c o n d u c t here—the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter a pleasant w o m b , either the w o m b o f a B r a h m a n , or the w o m b o f a Kshatriya, or the w o m b of a Vaisya. But t h o s e w h o are o f stinking c o n d u c t

E T H I C S OF T H E V E D I C P E R I O D

49

here—the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter a stinking w o m b , either the w o m b o f a d o g , or the w o m b o f a swine, or the w o m b o f a n outcast

(candala).2"

While the roots of this doctrine of transmigration go back to earlier sources, its branches spread across the entire history of Indian thought, reaching out to the present. The significant element in this doctrine f r o m the ethical point of view is its moral optimism. There is strong motivation for moral activity in the hope that there is always some f o r m of existence through which the individual may strive toward f r e e d o m . " A s every existent thing has the f o r m of the Divine, it has also the promise of the g o o d . " Connected with the doctrine of samsara is the correlative doctrine of the law of karman. Karman is the link between rebirth and desire for "whatever a m a n desires he wills, and whatever he wills, he acts." 2 2 4 As the moral principle in the universe, the law of karman regulates the rebirth of the jTvas (individual embodied souls) according to their acts. N o birth is an accident. It is all within a chain of moral causality. Responsibility is placed squarely where it belongs—on h u m a n freewill. T h e present is linked to the past. This does not mean that man is a prisoner of his past. Rather, the past, present, and the f u t u r e are all equally g r o u n d e d in f r e e d o m , a n d , therefore, there is always hope and incentive to moral living. The evil that has been done can be u n d o n e , and the good that has been left u n d o n e can be done. T h e final significance of these two doctrines of samsara and karman does not lie in their eschatological speculations, but in the ethical principle underlying their eschatology. This principle is one that seeks a rational explanation for the sufferings and inequities of life. T h e primary concern is for what happens here on earth. The present is determinative for the f u t u r e . Heaven a n d hell belong to this world of time and space. L o o k i n g back over our study, the U p a n i s a d s provide no grist for the mill of those Western scholars who charge Indian philosophy with being unethical, or not giving morality its due status. T h e U p a n i s a d s presuppose a rigorous ethical discipline prior to the s t u d e n t ' s introduction to his study. However, it must be admitted that t h o u g h the U p a n i s a d s assume ethical excellence in the brahmacarin, they d o not systematically develop any set of ethical principles. Even so, the U p a n i s a d s contain sufficient moral teaching that is grounded in philosophical reflection. T h e sum of its philosophical ethics is in three short words: damyata, datta, dayadhvam. T h e cultivation of self-control, generosity, a n d compassion suggest that the U p a n i s a d s are not only conconcerned with personal ethics, but also with social ethics. It is quite true that ethics is not an end in itself, but only a means to-

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PERIOD

w a r d reaching the experience of B r a h m a n which transcends the m o r a l conflicts of the relative world. But this should not suggest that the enlightened person can act unethically. T h e actual m o r a l influence of t h e U p a n i s a d s on the society of its times is reflected in these words of King Asvapati: ' W i t h i n m y r e a l m t h e r e is n o t h i e f , N o miser, n o r d r i n k i n g m a n , N o n e altarless, n o n e ignorant, N o man unchaste, no wife unchaste.22'

CHAPTER 2

The Ethics of the Sutra and Epic Period

I. Ethical T h o u g h t in the D h a r m a Sutras, D h a r m a Sastras, Epics

Up to this point we have studied the ethics of the Vedic period based on an examination of Hinduism's sruti literature. Our present task is to study the development of Hindu ethical thought in smrti literature covering the period 500 B.C. to 300 A.D. Smrti means "that which is remembered." It incorporates all authoritative texts outside the Vedas. For the purpose of ethics, the most important works in this collection are the Dharma Sutras, Dharma Sastras, and the two epics. The D h a r m a Sutras are aphoristic codes (siitras = threads), succinctly designed to teach students the general principles of dharma or moral law. The sanctions for ethical behaviour were religious and not judicial. There is nothing systematic about these textbooks, nor are their treatments of law very thorough. In the area of civil and criminal law their teachings are negligible. A m o n g these early lawbooks the most significant for our purpose are the Dharma Sutras of Gautama, Baudhayana, Vasistha, and Apastamba. They date f r o m approximately the sixth to second centuries B.C. The D h a r m a Sastras date later than the D h a r m a Sutras and are more precise and complete. Like the early lawbooks, the D h a r m a Sastras are not too keen about legal distinctions and technical definitions as they are concerned with moral duties. The most authoritative text on the subject of dharma, professing divine origin, is The Laws of Manu. It is claimed: " W h a t Manu says is medicine." The date of its composition is sometime

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b e t w e e n t h e first c e n t u r y B.C. a n d the s e c o n d c e n t u r y A.D. N e x t in r a n k t o the c o d e o f M a n u is the Y a j n a v a l k y a s m r t i . It is later t h a n M a n u , p r o b a bly b e l o n g i n g t o the early G u p t a p e r i o d w h e n t h e r e w a s a r e n a i s s a n c e o f Brahmanical culture. T h e M a h a b h a r a t a and R a m a y a n a are the two most cherished works o f p o p u l a r H i n d u i s m . " T h e r e is h a r d l y a H i n d u w h o has n o t h e a r d t h e stories a n d t e a c h i n g s o f these epics f r o m c h i l d h o o d , i m b i b i n g t h e m as it were with his m o t h e r ' s m i l k . " 1 T h e epics a r e s p l e n d i d i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f the evolutionary character o f Hindu thought, having undergone successive a c c r e t i o n s a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s over a p e r i o d o f f o u r t o five c e n t u r i e s . T h e M a h a b h a r a t a or " G r e a t W a r o f the B h a r a t a s " is a h i s t o r y o f the c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n t w o r o y a l h o u s e s , the P a n d a v a s a n d K a u r a v a s . Its present f o r m was s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p l e t e d by the s e c o n d c e n t u r y B.C. It reflects an e r a w h e n H i n d u i s m was b e i n g c h a l l e n g e d by s u c h

heterodox

m o v e m e n t s as J a i n i s m a n d B u d d h i s m , a n d a t t e m p t i n g to c o m e to t e r m s with t h e new liberal spirit t h a t was in the air. Its v o l u m i n o u s verses c o n tain t e a c h i n g s p e r t a i n i n g t o s t a t e c r a f t , religion, a n d m o r a l s . In its later p o r t i o n s its h e r o e s a r e m u c h t a k e n up with the p e r f o r m a n c e o f religious duties. T h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s o f its religious a n d e t h i c a l t e a c h i n g is e n u n c i a t e d in its final s e c t i o n : " W h a t e v e r is w o r t h y to b e k n o w n in m a t ters relating t o the w e l f a r e o f m a n is h e r e ; a n d w h a t is n o t h e r e is n o w h e r e else to b e f o u n d . " T h e h e a r t o f the M a h a b h a r a t a is the B h a g a v a d g T t a ; i n d e e d , t h e G l t a is the heart o f H i n d u i s m itself. " T h e s o n g o f the L o r d " w a s d e v e l o p e d out o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t r i x o f t h e U p a n i s a d s , b u t u n l i k e the m e t a p h y s i cal p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f the U p a n i s a d s , the spirit o f the GTta is p r a c t i c a l . It e m p h a s i s e s bhakti

(religious d e v o t i o n ) a n d dharma

( m o r a l law). A s t h e

i n c a r n a t i o n o f V i s n u , K r s n a the c h a r i o t e e r e n g a g e s in a c h a r m i n g dial o g u e with A r j u n a the w a r r i o r - p r i n c e w h o is up a g a i n s t a p r o d i g i o u s m o r a l d i l e m m a . In the c o u r s e o f a r g u m e n t s a n d c o u n t e r a r g u m e n t s , imp o r t a n t issues o f m o r a l d u t y a r e raised, a n d t h e e t h i c a l validity o f disinterested a c t i o n is c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d . B e c a u s e o f its u n p a r a l l e l e d i n f l u e n c e in s h a p i n g H i n d u e t h i c s t h r o u g h the a g e s , a s p e c i a l s e c t i o n h a s b e e n dev o t e d t o t h e e t h i c a l t h o u g h t in t h e G l t a . T h e second epic, the R a m a y a n a ,

is m o r e s e c u l a r a n d s m a l l e r

than

the M a h a b h a r a t a ( r e c e n s i o n s v a r y f r o m 5 0 , 0 0 0 - 9 0 , 0 0 0 lines a g a i n s t t h e M a h a b h a r a t a ' s m o r e t h a n 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 lines). It i m p a r t s t h e k i n d s o f ideals t h a t m o s t c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e p e r s o n a l , d o m e s t i c , s o c i a l , a n d p u b l i c life o f the H i n d u s . L i k e t h e M a h a b h a r a t a , t h e R a m a y a n a g r a d u a l l y d e v e l o p e d i n t o a t e x t b o o k o f dharma.

V a l m l k i , the a u t h o r , p r o b a b l y g a v e p o e t i c

f o r m t o t h e R a m a legends he h a d c o l l e c t e d in a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e third c e n t u r y B.C. H o w e v e r , e x t a n t v e r s i o n s o f t h e p o e m d a t e f r o m a b o u t 2 0 0

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A.D. The story is a b o u t R a m a who is an incarnation of Visnu. As the embodiment of dharma, he defeats R a v a n a the king of the d e m o n s . Slta, R a m a ' s wife, is the epitome of womanly virtues because of her faithfulness and unwavering devotion to her h u s b a n d . T h e ethical influence of the R a m a y a n a has been popularised through devotional movements in which R a m a and Slta are worshipped as divinities. M a h a t m a G a n d h i was inspired by the epic's ideal of Ramarajya in his nonviolent struggle for India's independence. Judged by its impact b o t h on India's leaders and the masses of her illiterate people, the prophecy in this poem seems to be correct, that as long as m o u n t a i n s stand and rivers flow on the face of this planet, so long shall the f a m e of the R a m a y a n a story and its a u t h o r be perpetuated. With this thumbnail sketch of the literature, we turn to its contents. The smrtis continue to maintain the Upanisadic ideal of enlightenment as the summum bonum. Their institutionalization of the third and f o u r t h asramas emphasizing the ideals of contemplation and renunciation as the means to liberation, attest to the smrti's acceptance of this philosophical ideal. At the same time, the smrti literature continues the tradition of the B r a h m a n a s with a view to evolving a definite order of Brahmanical society. Thus, by espousing the ideals of the U p a n i s a d s and the B r a h m a n a s , the smrti writers unite " t h e realm of desires with the perspective of the eternal." 2 However, of these two goals, the practical goal receives greater attention than the transcendental one. This is evidenced by the f o r m u l a tion of the purusarthas ( h u m a n values) constituting the 'aims of m a n ' . The three aims (trivarga) emphasised are: dharma, artha, and kama. T h e purusarthas provide the psycho-moral basis for the asrama scheme. T h e key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g Brahmanical society is f o u n d in the first purusartha, namely, dharma. Indeed, dharma is the key to u n d e r s t a n d ing the whole of H i n d u culture, past and present. T h e Sanskrit rootmeaning of this protean word is dhr, ' t o hold together'. It is a development of the earlier Rgvedic idea of Rta which, as we have seen, represented cosmic law operating in all p h e n o m e n a — n a t u r a l , religious, and moral. It provided the Vedic seers with the ethical n o r m by which men could relate to nature, to one another, and to the gods. In the smrti period this law permeating the whole universe was called dharma. Within the social order, dharma was explicitly defined in terms of certain duties and obligations which were codified in the great lawbooks. These codes of social behaviour are divided into three main classes: Varnadharma— duties pertaining to the f o u r castes; Asramadharma—duties pertaining to the f o u r stages of life; and Sadharanadharma—common duties binding on all persons, regardless of caste or station in life. T h e preceding ideal social structure provided the f r a m e w o r k with-

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in which all questions of social and moral behaviour were answered. Dharma, expressed through specific duties and obligations, served as the criterion for ethical conduct. Ethical decisions were to be resolved, not on the basis of the private conscience, but social conscience. T h e authority of the social conscience lay in the Vedas, the smrtis, and in the practices of good men. Only as a last resort could the individual determine moral behaviour through his own conscience and the satisfaction of his heart. 3 Thus, there is no gainsaying the fact that the ethics of the smrtis is authoritarian, being rooted in revelation. Even when the individual makes his own decision in some unusual situation, it must entail the rational application of Vedic authority. We will start with the special duties known as Varnadharma. The basic social ideal is the division of society into four castes: Brahmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras. These divisions are of divine origin. The Brahmin was created from the mouth of Brahma; the Ksatriya from his arms; the Vaisya from his thighs; and the Sudra f r o m the L o r d ' s feet. 4 The ethical implication of the divine origin of caste is that it is an integral part of a divine pattern " f o r the sake of the prosperity of the worlds,'" and, therefore, it is morally incumbent that one obediently accepts his role in compliance with "sacred law." 6 To the Brahmin is assigned the roles of "teaching and studying (the Veda), sacrificing for their own benefit and for others, giving and accepting (of alms).'" By virtue of his birth from Brahma's mouth, being firstborn, and possessing the Veda, the Brahmin is considered "the lord of this whole creation.'" No created being can surpass him "through whose mouth the gods continually consume the sacrificial viands and the manes the offerings of the d e a d . ' " A Brahmin who dutifully performs his dharma is the most excellent of created beings. 10 "The very birth of a Brahmana is an eternal incarnation of the sacred law; for he is born to (fulfil) the sacred law, and becomes one with Brahman." 1 1 Of course, the Brahmin was expected to live up to his lordly status. As the educator of youth, the minister of religious and spiritual needs of the family, and as the protector of dharma, the Brahmin had to lead an exemplary life. He was to be a man of tapas, persistently striving for enlightenment. 12 He had to be humble—"a B r a h m a n a shall not name his family and (Vedic) gotra in order to obtain a meal; for he who boasts of them for the sake of a meal, is called by the wise a foul feeder.'" 3 The Brahmin had to "fear homage as if it were poison; and constantly desire to (suffer) scorn as (he would long for) nectar.'" 4 He had to be courteous —"a Brahmana who does not know the f o r m of returning a salutation, must not be saluted by a learned man, as a Sudra, even so is h e . " " A

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55

B r a h m i n teacher was to be a m a n of " s w e e t and gentle s p e e c h , " whose " t h o u g h t s a r e pure and ever perfectly g u a r d e d . " 1 6 H e must place w i s d o m a b o v e wealth, and should be more ready to give than to receive. 1 7 T h e preceding description of the B r a h m i n ' s character is based on M a n u S m r t i , but other sources w o u l d equally support the underlying moral logic that the higher the caste, the greater the ethical expectation. By virtue of the same ethic, the sins of the B r a h m i n were most grievous. G a u t a m a says: " I f a learned m a n o f f e n d s , the punishment should be very much i n c r e a s e d . ' " 8 Similarly, the M a h a b h a r a t a a d d s , the higher the status, the greater the p u n i s h m e n t . " Regrettably, due to f o u r evil influences of the caste system, the ethical norm we have just looked at did not a l w a y s prevail. First, the caste system had the effect of attributing greater moral depravity to the nonB r a h m i n . A B r a h m i n violating a S u d r a ' s w i f e was considered less guilty than a S u d r a ravishing the w i f e of a B r a h m i n . 2 0 S e c o n d , the criterion f o r being a g o o d B r a h m i n was o f t e n more biological than ethical. T h e law stated it was better to give alms to a B r a h m i n , unworthy though he be, than to a n o n - B r a h m i n possessed of merit.-' In the same vein, when m a k i n g o f f e r i n g s to the gods, one must " n o t enquire into the qualities or desccnt of a B r a h m a n a w h o m he means to invite." 2 2 A p p a r e n t l y , his being a B r a h m i n by birth was a sufficient q u a l i f i c a t i o n of merit. T h i r d , notwithstanding the ideal calling f o r humility in respect of birth, there was the arrogant claim: " A B r a h m a n a , though ten years old, and a m e m b e r of the kingly caste, though a hundred years old, must be considered as a father and s o n , " and of these two, the B r a h m i n was the f a t h e r . 2 ' With equal a r r o g a n c e it is stated that should a B r a h m i n and K s a t r i y a cross paths, the B r a h m i n assumes the right-of-way. 2 4 T h e real height of contempt and exorbitant s e l f - i m p o r t a n c e is reached in the law which ordinarily f o r b i d s a B r a h m i n to give l e f t o v e r f o o d to nonB r a h m i n s , but this law is w a i v e d , provided the B r a h m i n " s h a l l clean his teeth and give the f o o d a f t e r having placed in it the dirt f r o m his teeth." 2 5 F o u r t h , despite the ideal that privilege entails responsibility, a great deal of the caste legislation was aimed at securing all kinds of preferential treatment f o r the B r a h m i n s . T h e s e privileges included preferential treatment in respect to sacrifice, 2 6 m a r r i a g e , means of livelihood, 2 7 o f f e r ings, 2 8 property, 2 9 and judicial treatment. 3 0 T h e last mentioned privilege b e c a m e the breeding g r o u n d f o r f l a g r a n t injustices. 3 1 A l l of these discriminatory laws were e n f o r c e d by invoking rewards and punishments. T h e evil influences of caste should not detract f r o m the f a c t that the l a w m a k e r s did try to u p h o l d ethical standards. A g o o d B r a h m i n is still one w h o supports " t h e moral order in the w o r l d , " is " d e e p l y versed in

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the Vedas," and "looks to these (alone), and lives according to these." 32 When these spiritual and ethical concerns of life are neglected, "(noble) families even are degraded." 1 3 Next, let us examine the legislations pertaining to Ksatriyas for their ethical and moral content. The Ksatriyas constituted the warrior caste, but all warriors were not Ksatriyas. 34 Even so, it was possible for nonKsatriyas " w h o live by the use of a r m s " to move upward into Ksatriya ranks as a result of devoting themselves to the duties of the warrior. From an ethical point of view, the most significant feature of this caste revolves around the king. The law-books abound with details connected to the ethics of royalty, an area we must now explore. Government as an extension of the king was invested with the responsibility of upholding dharma, the eternal divine order of society. 35 P r o f . Basham reminds us that in ancient and classical India, government, no matter what its shape, was not an end in itself. " T h e Hegelian concept of the state as an organism of supernatural size and power, transcending all other entities upon earth and mystically linking man with the Absolute, is completely foreign to anything ever thought of in India." 3 6 The state as protector of dharma comes closer to the Thomistic doctrine of government as the means for promoting salvation. The protection of dharma by government was deemed necessary because it was believed that mankind was living in an age of cosmic decline. "Kingship came into existence, in order to preserve as much as was possible of the age of gold in a period of universal degeneration." 3 7 According to one legend of the M a h a b h a r a t a , the king was divinely appointed, upon the request of mankind, to prevent life f r o m becoming " m e a n , brutish and short." 3 8 A second legend has it that kingship is a purely divine imposition upon mankind, designed to help people live by the laws of dharma.39 The means by which the king ruled his subjects was danda (punishment). 40 The use of force was morally legitimised because of the anarchical tendencies in man. Justifying the use of danda, Manu argues: If the king did not, w i t h o u t tiring, inflict p u n i s h m e n t o n those w o r t h y t o be punished, the stronger w o u l d roast the weaker, like fish o n a spit. T h e crow w o u l d eat the sacrificial c a k e a n d the d o g w o u l d lick the sacrificial viands, a n d o w n e r s h i p w o u l d not remain with a n y o n e , the lower o n e s w o u l d (usurp the place o f ) the higher ones. T h e w h o l e world is kept in order by p u n i s h m e n t , f o r a guiltless m a n is hard t o find; t h r o u g h fear o f p u n i s h m e n t the w h o l e world yields the e n j o y m e n t s ( w h i c h it owes).'"

In addition to protecting dharma, the duty of the king was to fulfil other social needs represented by artha and kama.i2 Thus, the duty of the

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57

king encompassed the total welfare of the people. By upholding dharma, he protected social order and brought peace and justice to the land. By promoting artha, he provided people with material prosperity and political stability. And by cultivating kama, he helped bring pleasure into the life of his subjects. All of this is significant evidence that the Purusarthas had a strong hold upon the life of the people in ancient and classical India. Proof that these values were not merely held as ideals but were actively cultivated by royalty is supplied by the testimony of early travellers. Chinese and Arab travellers have substantiated the reports of Megasthenes on the administration of Chandragupta Maurya. Like the ideal king envisaged by such jurists as M a n u , 4 ' Chandragupta was a benevolent autocrat concerned with the freedom and prosperity of his people. 44 Motivation for such benevolent autocracy was twofold. Negatively, the ruler was afraid of rebellion if he acted otherwise. Positively, he was motivated out of a concern for dharma, and a desire to abide by the general will. 45 A striking illustration of the preceding is the story of King Rama. The Ramayana tells of how the king, though convinced of his wife's conjugal purity, was nevertheless prepared to banish her out of deference to his subjects. The people were suspicious that STta had illicit connections while in the court of Ravana, and the guilt of her deed could bring ruin to the realm. Rama had no such doubts, but was willing to bow to the will of the people. This shows that even within an autocratic form of government without any formal checks and balances on the ruler's power, the king could not act unrighteously or in unashamed arbitrariness. Turning from the ethics of domestic affairs to that of foreign affairs, we find that the chief ethical principle of royalty was expediency. The Arthasastra reflects a situation in which several " m i n i " kingdoms existed in a precarious state of coexistence. It was a case of the survival of the fittest, with the big fish always ready to swallow up the little fish. 4 ' In such a situation the fundamental value, requiring no higher justification, was survival itself. Any course of action making for survival was deemed politically sound and morally justifiable. Kautilya's principle of expediency becomes clear by examining the sixfold policy one state can adopt toward another. The six principal policyrelations are: "armistice, war, neutrality, invasion, alliance and peace." 4 7 Interpreting other ancient thinkers, Kautilya recommends: A n y p o w e r inferior t o a n o t h e r should sue f o r peace; any p o w e r superior in might t o another s h o u l d launch into war; any p o w e r w h i c h fears n o external attack a n d which has n o strength t o w a g e war s h o u l d remain neutral; any

58

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PERIOD

p o w e r with high w a r - p o t e n t i a l should indulge in invasion; a n y debilitated p o w e r s h o u l d seek new alliances; a n y p o w e r which tries t o play f o r time in m o u n t i n g an o f f e n s i v e s h o u l d indulge in bilateral policy of m a k i n g w a r with o n e a n d suing peace with t h e o t h e r . 4 '

Faced with the threat of battle, the king and other members of the military caste must consider it their dharma to be willing to sacrifice their lives for the state. "A soldier must not die in a house.'"" Though the jurists consider the protection of the state by war as "righteous killing," ordinarily, such warfare was governed by codes of chivalry, Laws for conduct proper to war are described by Apastamba, 5 0 Gautama, 51 and Baudhayana. 5 2 Manu sums up these duties for honourable warriors: W h e n he fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with w e a p o n s concealed (in w o o d ) , n o r with (such as are) b a r b e d , p o i s o n e d , or the points of which are blazing with fire. Let him not strike o n e w h o (in flight) has climbed on a n e m i n e n c e , nor a e u n u c h , nor o n e w h o j o i n s the p a l m s of his h a n d s (in s u p p l i c a t i o n ) , n o r one w h o (flees) with flying hair, n o r o n e w h o sits d o w n , n o r o n e w h o says 'I am thine'. N o r o n e w h o sleeps, n o r o n e w h o has lost his c o a t of mail, n o r o n e w h o is n a k e d , nor o n e w h o is d i s a r m e d , n o r o n e w h o l o o k s on w i t h o u t t a k i n g part in the fight, nor o n e w h o is fighting with a n o t h e r (foe); N o r o n e w h o s e w e a p o n s are b r o k e n , n o r o n e a f f l i c t e d (with s o r r o w ) , nor o n e w h o has been grievously w o u n d e d , n o r o n e w h o is in fear, n o r o n e w h o has t u r n e d t o flight; (but in all these cases let him) r e m e m b e r the d u t y (of honourable warriors).5'

The ethics of war were particularly framed to protect the dignity of royalty, a fact that should remind us that the ethics we are dealing with is the ethics of royalty. The Institutes of Visnu declare: A king h a v i n g c o n q u e r e d the capital of his f o e , s h o u l d invest there a prince of the royal race of t h a t c o u n t r y with the royal dignity. Let him not e x t i r p a t e t h e royal race; unless t h e royal race be of ignoble descent.' 4

While codes of chivalry were generally adhered to in usual circumstances, "in case of need," duties of morality yielded to demands of necessity in which the only thing considered sacred was the preservation of the state. Thus the ethics of political theory was completely situational. Next, we examine the dharma of the Vaisyas. By the time of the Sutras, the Vaisya caste was shorn of some of its earlier nobility. Distinctions between Vaisyas and Sudras were becoming progressively diffuse. The chief cause for this ignominious descent was not even remotely connected

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with moral considerations but with externalities of professionalism. The Brahmins had developed a postive antipathy toward some Vaisya occupations such as trade, agriculture, and cattle breeding. So despised were these professions that under no circumstance could a Brahmin personally engage in them. Baudhayana states the penalty for any infraction of the law: Let h i m treat B r a m a n a s w h o tend cattle, t h o s e w h o live by trade, (and) t h o s e w h o are artisans, a c t o r s ( a n d bards), servants or usurers, like S u d r a s . ' '

Evidence of the Vaisya's humiliation was apparent in several discriminatory ways. 5 " For instance, a Vaisya guest was to be treated on par with a Sudra in respect to all items of hospitality. 57 Though the Vaisya was reduced to a despicable object because of the menial nature of his profession and because of his occupational and marital contacts with the Sudra caste, nevertheless, by virtue of being an Aryan, he still retained certain religious and status privileges. On the other hand, Sudras who had assimilated the habits and manners of their masters while serving as domestics, were granted certain religious, civic, and professional rights and privileges, as we shall see. The Aryanised Sudra was treated as possessing a moral character and was expected to behave in accordance with "truthfulness, meekness, and purity.'" 8 He was not considered permanently defiled, but could cleanse himself through such purificatory ceremonies as "sipping water," and the washing of the "hands and f e e t . " " He could also take part in minor religious ceremonies, such as offering the Pakayajnas,6° Professionally the Sudra was encouraged to "serve the higher castes'"' 1 as a way of gaining merit, but he could also "live by (practising) mechanical arts." 6 2 The Sudra serving an Aryan had the right to full support, even when disabled. 6 ' Materially, some of these Aryanised Sudras were well off, possessing hoards of wealth. 64 Despite these and other allowances made to certain select Sudras, the majority was still a despised lot, especially the ones who were nonacculturated. Another passage from Gautama starkly brings out the arbitrary and unjust way in which the activities of this caste were rigidly defined. A S u d r a w h o i n t e n t i o n a l l y reviles t w i c e - b o r n m e n by criminal a b u s e , or criminally assaults t h e m with b l o w s , shall be d e p r i v e d o f the limb w i t h w h i c h he o f f e n d s .

If he has criminal intercourse with an Aryan woman, his organ shall be cut off, and all his property be confiscated. If ( t h e w o m a n h a d ) a protector, he shall be e x e c u t e d a f t e r ( h a v i n g u n d e r g o n e the p u n i s h m e n t s prescribed a b o v e ) .

60

E T H I C S OF T H E S U T R A A N D E P I C P E R I O D N o w if h e l i s t e n s i n t e n t i o n a l l y t o (a r e c i t a t i o n o f ) t h e V e d a , h i s e a r s shall b e filled w i t h ( m o l t e n ) tin o r lac. If h e r e c i t e s (Vedic t e x t s ) , his t o n g u e shall b e c u t o u t . If h e r e m e m b e r s t h e m , his b o d y s h a l l be split in t w a i n . If h e a s s u m e s a p o s i t i o n e q u a l ( t o t h a t o f t h e t w i c e - b o r n m e n ) s i t t i n g , in lying d o w n , in c o n v e r s a t i o n o r o n t h e r o a d , h e shall u n d e r g o ( c o r p o r a l ) p u n ishment.65

When all of the castes within the hierarchical system follow their own appointed dharma in the m a n n e r prescribed, h a r m o n i o u s results ensue, both in this life and the next. 6 6 H a r m o n y is the proof of the divine origin and character of the social structure. This explains the severity with which violations of dharma were handled. T h e scriptures warn of the dire repercussions a t t e n d a n t u p o n a failure to preserve the system. T h e BhagavadgTta, through its own " d o m i n o t h e o r y " of social degeneration, describes the consequences of caste violations. In t h e r u i n of a f a m i l y , its i m m e m o r i a l laws p e r i s h ; a n d w h e n t h e laws p e r ish, t h e w h o l e f a m i l y is o v e r c o m e b y l a w l e s s n e s s . A n d when lawlessness prevails, O Krishna the w o m e n of the family are c o r r u p t e d , O V a r s h n e y a , a m i x t u r e of caste arises. A n d t h i s c o n f u s i o n b r i n g s t h e f a m i l y itself t o hell a n d t h o s e w h o h a v e d e s t r o y e d it; f o r t h e i r a n c e s t o r s f a l l , d e p r i v e d o f t h e i r o f f e r i n g s o f rice a n d water. By t h e sins o f t h o s e w h o d e s t r o y a f a m i l y a n d c r e a t e a m i x t u r e of c a s t e , t h e e t e r n a l l a w s of t h e c a s t e a n d t h e f a m i l y a r e d e s t r o y e d . T h e m e n of the families w h o s e laws are destroyed, O J a n a r d a n a ,

as-

s u r e d l y will d w e l l in hell; s o w e h a v e h e a r d . 6 1

T h e moral principle regulating rebirth in accordance with the varna system is the law of karman. A good life merits birth in a high caste; but the deserts of an evil life are rebirth in a low caste. Thus, one's present caste is determined by the past, a n d has a moral basis. A m a n should, therefore, m a k e a t o n e m e n t f o r past misdeeds by adhering to the dharma of his own varna, and by practising a life of virtue. In this way he acquires great glory and ascends to a higher birth in the next life. This moral explanation of caste as the social consequent of an individual's past karman seems to answer the question a b o u t how the system was allowed to prevail without any serious protests against it on the part of the d o w n t r o d d e n . T h e despised S u d r a , ridden roughshod over by members of the higher castes, could not think of cursing his overlords; a f t e r all, both he and they were only reaping what they had sown. In such an ethos it was impossible for some Indian Karl M a r x to raise the cry: " S u d r a s of H i n d u s t a n arise, you have nothing to lose but your caste," and get a following—on moral g r o u n d s !

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The second m a j o r aspect of dharma, having examined the ethics of Varnaaharma, is the scheme of Asramadharma. In the earlier period the stages of life were less definite than is the case in the lawbooks. Now, for Manu and the other lawmakers, the asramas are clearly four in number. These writers devote a great part of their material to a treatment of the dharma belonging to each stage, especially the second one. The Brahmacarya stage is entered upon through the upanayana samskara. This initiation ceremony takes place for a Brahmin at age eight; for a Ksatriya at age eleven; and for a Vaisya at age twelve. 68 Before the ceremony, the boy is a virtual Sudra; after the ceremony he is a dvija or twice-born. He is now born into the world of the Arya, and all its privileges and responsibilities will be taught to him during his years of Vedic studentship. The Asvalayana Grhya Sutra gives detailed descriptions of the elaborate rites of initiation, the intention of which was to create a sense of dignity, duty, and responsibility within the s t u d e n t . " The rituals were not important as ends in themselves, but were means for generating ethical values. Regrettably, some of the earlier dharma writers, such as Apastamba, attribute magical properties to the upanayana ceremony which detracts from its moral aspects." Yajnavalkya is silent about these superstitions, such as the promise of longevity, manly vigour, and so on, which suggests that they were not believed in during his time. The type of teacher-student relationship envisioned by the educational system is dramatised in one part of the upanayana ceremony. The Asvalayana Grhya Sutra stipulates: O n t h e region of the s t u d e n t ' s heart the teacher s h o u l d place his h a n d with the fingers stretched u p w a r d s a n d say: ' I n t o my vow 1 p u t thy heart; a f t e r my m i n d may thy m i n d follow; with single-aimed vow d o t h o u rejoice in my speech; m a y G o d B r i h a s p a t i j o i n thee to me. 7 1

The joining of student to guru involved the student living in the residence of the teacher. The importance of this step for mental and moral development of the student was p r o f o u n d . It provided him with an optimum environment for personal growth under the tutelage of a man who by training and character was best qualified for the nurture of his emotional and intellectual capacities. The epics cite several teachers remembered both for their erudition and quality of life; men like Visvamitra, Vasistha, SandTpani, and Dronacarya, only to mention a few. Because the guru was responsible for bringing to birth the mental and spiritual potential of the pupil, he was honoured as the pupil's father. A p a s t a m b a says:

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E T H I C S OF T H E S U T R A A N D F.PIC P E R I O D H e f r o m w h o m (the pupil) g a t h e r s g i o u s duties

(dharman)

(akinoti)

(the k n o w l e d g e o f ) his reli-

(is called) the A c a r y a (teacher). H i m he s h o u l d never

offend. F o r he causes h i m ( t h e p u p i l ) to be b o r n (a s e c o n d time) by ( i m p a r t i n g t o h i m ) sacred learning. T h e ( s e c o n d ) birth is the best. T h e f a t h e r a n d m o t h e r p r o d u c e the b o d y o n l y . "

H o n o u r to the teacher was shown in several concrete ways. 7 ' The relationship was to be reciprocal: L o v i n g h i m like his o w n s o n , and full o f a t t e n t i o n , he shall teach him the sacred science, w i t h o u t h i d i n g a n y t h i n g in the w h o l e law. A n d he shall n o t use h i m for his o w n p u r p o s e s to the d e t r i m e n t o f his s t u d i e s , e x c e p t in times o f distress. T h e pupil w h o , a t t e n d i n g t o t w o (teachers), a c c u s e s his (principal a n d first) teacher o f i g n o r a n c e , r e m a i n s n o (longer) a pupil. A teacher a l s o , w h o n e g l e c t s the i n s t r u c t i o n ( o f his pupil), d o e s n o (longer) remain a teacher.' 4

The purport of education was the moral and intellectual growth of the students. These two elements were never separated. Indeed, the latter was contingent upon the former. According to the Sacred Law, only the person who is pure may be instructed in the Veda. N e i t h e r (the s t u d y o f ) the Vedas, nor liberality, nor sacrificies, nor a n y ( s e l f - i m p o s e d ) restraint, nor austerities, ever p r o c u r e the a t t a i n m e n t ( o f rew a r d s ) to a m a n w h o s e heart is c o n t a m i n a t e d (by s e n s u a l i t y ) . ' 5

Moral culture not only preceded intellectual culture, but was the weightier of the two: A

Brahmana w h o completely governs himself,

t h o u g h he k n o w s

the

Savitri only, is better than he w h o k n o w s the three Vedas, (but) d o e s not c o n trol himself. 7 *

The secret of self-control was not so much a matter of restraint and repression as " a constant (pursuit of true) knowledge." 7 7 In pursuance of virtue the student of dharma was expected to be "grateful, non-hating, intelligent, pure, healthy, non-envious, honest, energetic." 7 8 Sexual purity was highest in the list of virtues. A Brahmacarin was forbidden " t o gaze at and to touch women, if there is danger of breach of chastity." 7 ' He may "talk to women only for what is absolutely necessary." Should a breach of sexual morality occur, the student must sacrifice an ass at a crossroad to the goddess Nirrti; don the skin of a donkey; and for a period of one year, proclaim his asinine deed. The presence of virtuous fruit in the student's life indicated that true

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knowledge had taken root. Says the M a h a b h a r a t a : "Knowledge of the sastras is said to bear fruit when it produces modesty and virtuous conduct."80 T h u s , the cultivation of the moral life through simplicity, austerity, chastiiy, and obedience, leads to the pure, undistracted development of the intellect. M a n u limits the intellectual curriculum to a study of the three V e d a s , " but, by the time of Y a j n a v a l k y a , the Brahmacarin's studies were expanded to include the P u r a n a s , NarasamsTs, the G a t h i k a s , the Itihasas, and the Vidyas. 82 The Vidyas included professional training in such subjects as medicine, astrology, military arts, music, and so f o r t h . All of these branches of knowledge were integrated with the sacred knowledge of the Vedas, thus linking expertise with ethics, and the acquisition of i n f o r m a t i o n with the development of character. T w o negative effects of Brahmacarya discipline need to be mentioned in passing. First, since the transition f r o m one stage of life to the other was to be s m o o t h and natural, it was inevitable that the ascetical outlook m o u l d e d in the student stage should be carried over into that of the householder stage. Some students continued the life of celibacy by bec o m i n g Sannyasins directly, which gives some indication of the impact of the ascetical training to which they were rigorously subjected. T h e second negative effect of student life was the inculcation of what N. K. Dutt describes as the "pride of scholasticism" a m o n g the professed scholars. 8 ' C o m p o u n d e d with racial and sacerdotal pride, the pride of scholasticism elevated barriers between Brahmins and nonBrahmins. In this way " t h e good effect of the strictness of Brahmacarya in specialising learning and in enforcing high moral discipline was neutralised by the increased rigidness and hauteur of caste, which is one of the m a n y factors making India a land of contrasts." 8 4 The second asrama is that of the householder. T h e Garhasthya stage of life was considered of supreme importance for several reasons. First, as G a u t a m a points out, the Garhasthyasrama is the source of the other asramas "because the others d o not produce offspring." 8 5 Second, Y a j n a v a l k y a correctly observes that this was the only stage in which all of the purusarthas were jointly realised. 8 6 T h i r d , it is the opinion of all the writers that the family was basic to the caste system. It provided the regulatory machinery for the strict e n f o r c e m e n t of caste, i n f o r m i n g its m e m b e r s of their duties, and imbuing them with the caste spirit. These are s o m e of the reasons why the householder stage was given a central place a n d why the ethical codes governing it were invested unequivocally with divine authority. T h e rules of dharma regulating the Garhasthyasrama are voluminous in scope, intricate in detail, and o f t e n variant in prescription.

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PERIOD

We start with the list of ethical duties prescribed for the householder by Yajnavalkya. It consists mainly of ritual, procreational, and conjugal functions of the family. A h o u s e h o l d e r s h o u l d p e r f o r m every day a Smriti rite [that is, a d o m e s t i c rite prescribed by t h e Sacred L a w , Smriti] on the n u p t i a l fire or on the fire b r o u g h t in at the time of the p a r t i t i o n of ancestral property. H e s h o u l d perf o r m a Vedic rite o n the sacred fires. H a v i n g a t t e n d e d t o the bodily calls, having p e r f o r m e d the p u r i f i c a t o r y rites, a n d a f t e r having first w a s h e d the teeth, a t w i c e - b o r n ( A r y a n ) m a n s h o u l d o f f e r the m o r n i n g prayer. H a v i n g o f f e r e d o b l a t i o n s to the sacred fires, b e c o m i n g spiritually comp o s e d , he should m u r m u r the sacred verses a d d r e s s e d t o t h e sun g o d . H e s h o u l d also learn the m e a n i n g of the Veda a n d various sciences. . . . H e s h o u l d then g o t o his lord f o r securing the m e a n s of m a i n t e n a n c e a n d progress. T h e r e a f t e r having b a t h e d he s h o u l d w o r s h i p the g o d s a n d also offer l i b a t i o n s of water t o t h e m a n e s . H e s h o u l d study a c c o r d i n g t o his capacity the three Vedas, the A t h a r v a Veda, t h e P u r a n a s , t o g e t h e r with the l t i h a s a s (legendary histories), as also the law relating to the k n o w l e d g e of the Self, with a view t o a c c o m p l i s h i n g \japa-yajna]. successfully the sacrifice of m u t t e r i n g p r a y e r s O f f e r i n g of the f o o d o b l a t i o n [bali], o f f e r i n g with t h e p r o p e r u t t e r a n c e [.svadha], p e r f o r m a n c e of Vedic sacrifices, study of the sacred texts, a n d h o n o u r i n g of guests—these c o n s t i t u t e the five great daily sacrifices d e d i c a t e d respectively to the spirits, the m a n e s , the gods, the B r a h m a n a n d m e n . H e s h o u l d o f f e r the f o o d o b l a t i o n s to the spirits [by t h r o w i n g it in the air] out of t h e r e m n a n t of the f o o d o f f e r e d to the g o d s . H e s h o u l d also cast f o o d o n t h e g r o u n d for dogs, u n t o u c h a b l e s , a n d crows. F o o d , as also water, s h o u l d be o f f e r e d by the h o u s e h o l d e r t o the m a n e s a n d m e n day a f t e r day. H e s h o u l d c o n t i n u o u s l y carry o n his study. H e s h o u l d never cook f o r himself only. C h i l d r e n , m a r r i e d d a u g h t e r s living in the f a t h e r ' s h o u s e , p r e g n a n t w o m en, sick p e r s o n s , girls, as a l s o guests a n d servants—only a f t e r having fed these s h o u l d the h o u s e h o l d e r a n d his wife eat the f o o d that has remained. . . . H a v i n g risen b e f o r e d a w n t h e h o u s e h o l d e r s h o u l d p o n d e r over w h a t is g o o d f o r the Self. H e s h o u l d n o t , as f a r as possible, neglect his duties in respect of t h e t h r e e e n d s of m a n , namely, virtue, material gain, a n d pleasure, a t their p r o p e r times. L e a r n i n g , religious p e r f o r m a n c e s , age, family relations a n d w e a l t h — o n a c c o u n t of these a n d in t h e o r d e r m e n t i o n e d a r e m e n h o n o u r e d in society. By m e a n s of these, if possessed in p r o f u s i o n , even a s h u d r a deserves respect in old a g e . "

This passage is self-explanatory, but a few comments are in order. Mention of the five daily sacrifices points to a broadening of ethical

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awareness as compared with the earlier notion of the three debts to the ancestors, gods, and sages. The concept of daily sacrifices also shows the sense of obligation and interdependence the grhastha felt toward his total environment—seen and unseen, animate and inanimate. This awareness motivated him to engage in ethical actions out of feelings of gratitude and belonging. Gratitude easily spilled over into liberality—"the grhastha should never cook for himself!" What is cooked for himself must first be shared with guests and members of the household, including servants who were Sudras. It was an iron law of the householder: service before self. To ensure that the householder had time to "ponder over what is good for the Self," he had to rise before dawn! The good is defined in terms of three cardinal values: dharma, artha, and kama. By including kama, Yajnavalkya emphasised a value dimension of personality that is not given equal recognition by other writers. For instance, Manu 8 8 and the M a h a b h a r a t a " sometimes overlook kama, emphasising only the acquisition of dharma and artha. The concluding verse classifies the things for which the householder was honoured by society. Learning (knowledge having both intellectual and ethical aspects) stands first. Then follow: religious performance, age, family relations, and last of all, wealth. Money was not devalued, but dharmic concerns always held it in a state of relativity to spiritual values. Even a poor Sudra possessing spiritual and moral qualities was to be treated with the highest honour. Special attention should be given to Yajnavalkya's description of the duties of the householder to his wife. He must be solely devoted to her, having become one through sacramental bonds; he must satisfy her sensuous yearnings, only refraining from sexual intercourse on inauspicious days. Care of the wife is essential because through her the householder begets sons whereby the family is continued, both in time and in eternity.' 0 This brings us to our second ethical concern: attitude toward women. This subject is a tangled web, laced with many contradictions and inconsistencies. Sometimes woman is worshipped as a goddess; at other times she is shunned as a temptress. She is praised as the personification of virtue, and is branded as the incarnation of vice. Though honoured as a queen, she is a prisoner in her own castle. In several instances these contradictory judgments are real. But when the literature is taken as a whole, most of the contradictions can be explained. The clue to resolving the discrepancies lies in the threefold recognition that the literature is not monolithic in thought; that points of

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view c h a n g e d with the passage of time; a n d that w o m e n were at the s a m e time j u d g e d f r o m different perspectives. R e g a r d i n g the first proviso, it is clear that there is a w h o l e s p e c t r u m of opinion ranging f r o m the conservative views of A p a s t a m b a to the m o r e liberal views of Y a j n a v a l k y a . T h e r e f o r e , instead of pitting c o n t r a d i c t o r y j u d g m e n t s against each other, it is m o r e a c c u r a t e to identify these opinions by their a u t h o r s . Similarly, the disparities must be assessed historically, f o r images of w o m e n changed with time a n d place. These t w o points of literary a n d historical criticism are s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . T h e third point requires substantial e x p l a n a t i o n . W o m e n were simultaneously j u d g e d f r o m d i f f e r e n t perspectives; hence, differences of j u d g m e n t . F r o m the point of view of female n a t u r e , w o m e n were regarded morally inferior to men. S o m e early D h a r m a S u t r a writers e q u a t e w o m e n with S u d r a s in terms of their capacity f o r m o r a l achievement. T h a t explains why the penalty f o r killing a B r a h m i n w o m an was n o m o r e t h a n that f o r killing a S u d r a . " Similar views are recorded in the D h a r m a Sastras. F o r instance, a c c o r d i n g to M a n u , w o m e n are naturally wicked: ( W h e n creating t h e m ) M a n u a l l o t t e d to w o m e n (a l o v e o f their) bed, ( o f their) seat and ( o f ) o r n a m e n t , i m p u r e desires, w r a t h , d i s h o n e s t y , malice a n d bad c o n d u c t . For w o m e n n o ( s a c r a m e n t a l ) rite (is p e r f o r m e d ) with sacred texts, thus the law is settled; w o m e n ( w h o are) d e s t i t u t e o f strength a n d d e s t i t u t e o f ( t h e k n o w l e d g e o f ) Vedic texts, (are as i m p u r e as) f a l s e h o o d ( i t s e l f ) , that is a fixed rule.' 2

T h e M a h a b h a r a t a also considers w o m e n to be of weak a n d undesirable character. " B e d , seat, o r n a m e n t , f o o d , d r i n k , m e a n n e s s , harshness of speech a n d love—these P r a j a p a t i gave to w o m e n . ' " 3 In a n o t h e r passage, BhTsma, enlightening Yudhisthira a b o u t f e m a l e n a t u r e , says that w o m e n are seducers, lacking strength to resist t e m p t a t i o n s . 9 4 Such depreciative assessments of female n a t u r e provided the m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r depriving w o m e n of social f r e e d o m , a n d keeping t h e m totally d e p e n d e n t u p o n the strong male. V a s i s t h a " a n d B a u d h a y a n a ' 6 c o n c u r with M a n u : Her f a t h e r p r o t e c t s (her) in c h i l d h o o d , her h u s b a n d p r o t e c t s (her) in y o u t h , a n d her s o n s protect (her) in o l d age; a w o m a n is n e v e r fit f o r i n d e p e n dence."

This c u r t a i l m e n t of f e m a l e f r e e d o m was p r o b a b l y reinforced by the fear of t h e A r y a n s f o r the purity of their race a n d culture against the intrusions of the s u r r o u n d i n g black p o p u l a t i o n eager to mingle with their womenfolk.

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For a totally o p p o s i t e view of f e m a l e n a t u r e t o the one just outlined, we turn to Y a j n a v a l k y a . In praise of w o m e n , this jurist says: " S o m a gave t h e m p u r i f i c a t i o n ; the G a n d h a r v a , sweet speech, A g n i , perfect purity; t h e r e f o r e verily w o m e n a r e always p u r e . ' " 8 T h e s a m e high o p i n i o n of the fair sex can be culled f r o m V a t s y a y a n a ' s K a m a S u t r a . However, t h o u g h Y a j f i a v a l k y a a n d V a t s y a y a n a are positive in their assessment of f e m a l e character, they share the consensus of the o t h e r jurists that w o m e n m u s t always be g u a r d e d by m e n . F r o m this it follows that the p r i m a r y virtue of w o m e n is obedience t o the male sex. O n l y by obeying the lordly male could w o m e n ascend to the joys of heaven. T h u s , aside f r o m the minority opinion represented by Y a j n a v a l k y a a n d V a t s y a y a n a , the D h a r m a Sutras, the D h a r m a Sastras, a n d the M a h a b h a r a t a a d o p t an u n c o m p l i m e n t a r y view of f e m a l e n a t u r e . This not only deprived w o m e n of f r e e d o m , as we have seen, but also of their responsibility. Since it was a s s u m e d that w o m e n were inherently of weak character, guilt could not be justifiably i m p u t e d to t h e m . " T h u s , " b y c o m m i t t i n g a n act of adultery, only the m a n b e c o m e s sullied with sin." This s o u n d s morally fair f o r guilt is relative t o responsibility, but it is also d e h u m a n i s i n g , reducing w o m e n t o a species that is below the capacity f o r answerability. Turning f r o m t h e cynical attitudes t o w a r d w o m e n , we c o m e to a n o t h e r set of a t t i t u d e s based o n the biological a n d m a t e r n a l aspects of w o m a n h o o d . Here, there is an u n m i s t a k a b l e a t t r i b u t i o n of h o n o u r , respect, a n d dignity to w o m e n . A p r o f u s i o n of a d u l a t i o n s p r o v i d e us with an a c c u r a t e picture of the status of w o m e n in the family as wives a n d as m o t h e r s . T h e dirge of M a n u dies as he suddenly changes his t u n e a n d begins t o sing in praise of w o m e n . W o m a n is n o m o r e woeman, as the following sentiments attest: Women must be honoured and adorned by their fathers, brothers, husbands, and brothers-in-law, who desire (their own) welfare. Where women are honoured, there the gods are pleased; but where they are not honoured, no sacred rite yields rewards. Where the female relations live in grief, the family soon wholly perishes; but that family where they are not unhappy ever prospers. The houses on which female relations, not being duly honoured, pronounce a curse, perish completely, as if destroyed by magic. Hence men who seek (their own) welfare, should always honour women on holidays and festivals with (gifts of) ornaments, clothes, and (dainty) food. In that family where the husband is pleased with his wife and the wife with the husband, happiness will assuredly be lasting. For if the wife is not radiant with beauty, she will not attract her husband; but if she has no attraction for him, no children will be born.

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E T H I C S OF T H E SUTRA A N D F P I C P E R I O D If the w i f e is radiant with beauty, the w h o l e h o u s e is bright; but if she is destitute o f beauty, all will a p p e a r dismal. 1 0 0

T h e M a h a b h a r a t a echoes the same c h o r u s of compliments. 1 0 1 It is t r u e , as N. K. Dutt observes, that "even in such passages w o m e n are h o n oured as potential m o t h e r s a n d obedient wives," but even so, a higher note is struck than the generally low tones of the D h a r m a Sastras. 1 0 2 In a d d i t i o n to her biological role, w o m a n is a c c o r d e d highest respect f o r her m a t e r n a l role. It is quite possible that these sentiments were fostered by the sociological influence of the Dravidian m a t r i a r c h a l system u p o n the A r y a n culture. Be that as it may, A p a s t a m b a gives expression to this a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r m o t h e r h o o d thus: A m o t h e r d o e s very m a n y acts for her son, therefore he must c o n s t a n t l y serve her, t h o u g h she be fallen.""

Vishnu is m o r e positive than A p a s t a m b a : A m a n has three Atigurus (or specially venerable superiors): His father, his mother, and his spiritual teacher. 1 0 4

G a u t a m a goes still f u r t h e r : T h e teacher is chief a m o n g all Gurus. S o m e (say) that the m o t h e r (holds that p l a c e ) . ' 0 '

Vasistha sheds the tentativeness of G a u t a m a a n d boldly q u o t e s t h e opinion which elevates m o t h e r h o o d to the highest: T h e teacher (acarya) is ten times m o r e venerable than a sub-teacher ( u p a d h y a y a ) , the father a h u n d r e d times m o r e than the teacher, a n d the mother a t h o u s a n d times m o r e than the father. 1 0 6

This positive e m p h a s i s on w o m a n h o o d helped n u r t u r e certain ideals. T h e story of STta in the R a m a y a n a is one illustration of this process of idealisation. Her h u s b a n d , R a m a , had been exiled by his father, king D a s a r a t h a , to the forest f o r f o u r t e e n years. R a m a b r e a k s the news t o STta a n d a d m o n i s h e s her respectfully to c o n t i n u e in the h o m e a n d t o k e e p her mind " s t e a d y a n d c a l m . " W h e n STta heard it all, her love t u r n e d a violent outcry at the suggestion that she should e n j o y t h e luxuries of the p a l a c e while her beloved w a n d e r s homeless in a pathless j u n g l e . She says t o Rama: A fine speech y o u have m a d e , O K n o w e r o f dharma. It is t o m e a strange doctrine that a w i f e is diverse f r o m her h u s b a n d and that his duty is not hers, and that she has n o right t o share in it. I can never accept it. I hold that y o u r f o r t u n e s are mine, and if R a m a has t o g o t o the forest, the c o m m a n d includes Seeta also, w h o is part o f him. I shall walk in front o f y o u in the forest w a y s a n d tread the thorns a n d the hard g r o u n d t o m a k e t h e m s m o o t h for

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your feet. Do not think me obstinate. My father and mother have instructed me in dharma. What you tell me is totally opposed to what they have taught me. To go with you wherever you go—that is my only course. If you must go to the forest today, then today I go with you. There is no room here for any discussion. Do not think that I cannot bear forest life. With you by my side it will be a joyous holiday. I shall not be a source of trouble to you. I shall eat fruit and roots like you and I shall not lag behind as we walk. 1 have long wished to go to the woods with you and to rejoice in the sight of great mountains and rivers. I shall spend the time most happily among the birds and flowers, bathing in the rivers and doing the daily rites. Away f r o m you I d o not care for Heaven itself. I shall surely die if you leave me behind. I implore you to take me with you. Do not forsake me now. 1 "' In a d d i t i o n to STta, other ideal w o m e n w h o still exercise an inspiring i n f l u e n c e u p o n the H i n d u m i n d are: A h a l y a , D r a u p a d i , Tara, and M a n d o d a r l . T h e recollection o f such personalities is said to cleanse the soul o f its great sins (mahapaiaka). In describing the ethical aspects o f the Garhasthyasrama, it remains for us to say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t marriage. This subject is i m p o r t a n t because, as a primary social institution, it is charged with g o v e r n i n g sex relations, a n d fixing the ties o f a child to his society. First, regarding standards f o r the s p o u s e , the A s v a l a y a n a G r h y a Sutra prescribes: One should first examine the family (of the intended bride or bridegroom), those on the mother's side and on the father's side. . . . One should give his daughter in marriage to a young man endowed with intelligence, beauty, and good character, and who is free f r o m disease. . . ."" N e x t , regarding the f o r m s o f marriages, there are eight different types. F o l l o w i n g M a n u , these eight f o r m s are: The gift of a daughter, after decking her (with costly garments) and honouring (her by presents of jewels), to a man learned in the Veda and of good conduct, whom (the father) himself invites, is called a Brhama rite. The gift of a daughter who has been decked with ornaments, to a priest who duly officiates at the sacrifice, during the course of its performance, they call the Daiva rite. When (the father) gives away his daughter according to the rule, after receiving f r o m the bridegroom, (the fulfilment of) the sacred law, a cow and a bull or two pairs, that is named the Arsha rite. The gift of a daughter (by her father) after he has addressed (the couple) with the text, 'May both of you perform together your duties,' and has shown honour (to the bridegroom), is called in the Smriti the P r a j a p a t y a rite. When (the bridegroom) receives a maiden, after having given as much

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E T H I C S OF T H E SUTRA A N D E P I C P E R I O D wealth as he can a f f o r d , t o the k i n s m e n a n d t o the bride herself, according t o his o w n will, that is called the A s u r a rite. T h e v o l u n t a r y u n i o n of a m a i d e n a n d her l o v e r o n e m u s t k n o w ( t o be) t h e G a n d h a r v a rite, w h i c h s p r i n g s f r o m d e s i r e a n d has s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e f o r its purpose. T h e f o r c i b l e a b d u c t i o n of a m a i d e n f r o m h e r h o m e , w h i l e s h e cries o u t a n d w e e p s , a f t e r ( h e r k i n s m e n ) h a v e b e e n slain o r w o u n d e d a n d (their h o u s e s ) b r o k e n o p e n , is called t h e R a k s h a s a rite. W h e n (a m a n ) by s t e a l t h s e d u c e s a girl w h o is s l e e p i n g , i n t o x i c a t e d , o r diso r d e r e d in intellect, t h a t is t h e e i g h t h , t h e m o s t b a s e a n d s i n f u l rite of t h e Paisacas.10'

With the exception of Apastamba who lists six forms of marriage," 0 all of the other writers, such as Gautama, Baudhayana, Yajiiavalkya, and Kautilya, have lists similar to that of Manu with only slight variations. The first four categories of marriage are morally approved; the remaining are generally disapproved on the grounds that they are based on physical force, and do not have the consent of the father or guardian. An important rule of marriage was that the girl should not be an agnate." 1 M o n o g a m y was the marital norm, though polygamy was permitted, especially if the wife were barren. Rules of divorce varied among the Arthasastra and Dharmasastra writers. The latter were against divorce on the grounds that marriage was a sacrament and therefore inviolable; the former accepted divorce, regarding marriage as a contract. At any rate, both schools of thought continue to uphold the Vedic ideal of marriage as the means by which the householder is enabled to realize the purusarthas, to offer sacrifice to the gods, and to beget many sons. We come now to the Vanaprasthyasrama. The law reads: W h e n a h o u s e h o l d e r sees his ( s k i n ) w r i n k l e d , a n d (his hair) w h i t e , a n d t h e s o n s of his s o n s , t h e n he m a y r e s o r t t o t h e f o r e s t . A b a n d o n i n g all f o o d r a i s e d by c u l t i v a t i o n , a n d all his b e l o n g i n g s , he m a y d e p a r t i n t o t h e f o r e s t , either, c o m m i t t i n g his w i f e t o his s o n s , o r a c c o m p a nied by her. Taking with him the sacred fire a n d the i m p l e m e n t s required for domestic ( s a c r i f i c e s ) , h e m a y g o f o r t h f r o m t h e village i n t o t h e f o r e s t a n d r e s i d e t h e r e , d u l y c o n t r o l l i n g his senses. Let kinds Let in t h e

h i m o f f e r t h o s e five g r e a t s a c r i f i c e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e rule, w i t h v a r i o u s of p u r e f o o d fit f o r a s c e t i c s , o r w i t h h e r b s , r o o t s , a n d f r u i t . h i m w e a r a s k i n o r a t a t t e r e d g a r m e n t ; let h i m b a t h e in t h e e v e n i n g o r m o r n i n g ; a n d let h i m a l w a y s w e a r (his h a i r in) b r a i d s , t h e h a i r o n his

b o d y , his b e a r d , a n d his nails ( b e i n g u n d i p p e d ) . Let h i m p e r f o r m t h e B a l i - o f f e r i n g w i t h s u c h f o o d a s h e e a t s , a n d give a l m s a c c o r d i n g t o his a b i l i t y ; let h i m h o n o u r t h o s e w h o c o m e t o his h e r m i t a g e w i t h a l m s c o n s i s t i n g of w a t e r , r o o t s , a n d f r u i t .

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Let h i m a l w a y s be i n d u s t r i o u s in privately reciting the Veda; let h i m be patient o f h a r d s h i p s , friendly ( t o w a r d all), o f c o l l e c t e d m i n d , ever liberal a n d never a receiver o f g i f t s , and c o m p a s s i o n a t e t o w a r d s all living c r e a t u r e s . 1 ' 2

On the basis of the preceding description of the Vanaprasthya asrama, certain points of ethical interest stand out. First, the ideal of life at this stage is moksa, and, therefore, it is in the light of this spiritual value that the ascetical discipline should be understood and evaluated. The same is true of the following stage of Samnyasa. Asceticism was not an end in itself, but only a means toward achieving self-control and spiritual power—the prerequisites of moksa. In ascetic practice, the body is not treated as an enemy of the spirit; and hence, there is no correlation between asceticism and mortification of the flesh. Second, the life of a hermit was not one of ethereal passivity but ethical activity—"let him be always industrious." Like the householder, he continued to offer the five great sacrifices. But whereas the activity of the householder was prompted by artha and kama, the activity of the hermit was devoid of any motives of personal gain and pleasure. Inspired by the Vedas, he fulfilled his dharma by exercising friendship, liberality, wisdom, and compassion "toward all living creatures." Though he lived "without a fire, without a house," the silent sage patiently endured all manner of hardships, and thus gained power through austerity. The fourth and final stage is that of the Sannyasin. The law reads: H a v i n g t h u s p a s s e d the third part o f (a m a n ' s natural t e r m o f ) life in the forest, he m a y live as an ascetic during the f o u r t h part o f his e x i s t e n c e , a f t e r a b a n d o n i n g all a t t a c h m e n t t o w o r d l y o b j e c t s . ' 1 J

The goal is final liberation, and to attain it he must "always wander alone, without a companion." He should be "indifferent to everything, firm of purpose, meditating (and) concentrating his mind on B r a h m a n . " He should be free of all desire, whether to live or to die, and must wait for his appointed time "as a servant (waits) for the payment of his wages." Though he is beyond ethical striving, his conduct is ethical, in keeping with his goal of moksa. Let h i m p u t d o w n his f o o t purified b y his sight, let h i m drink w a t e r purified b y (straining w i t h ) a c l o t h , let him utter s p e e c h p u r i f i e d by truth, let h i m k e e p his heart pure. Let h i m p a t i e n t l y bear hard w o r d s , let h i m n o t insult a n y b o d y , a n d let h i m not b e c o m e a n y b o d y ' s e n e m y f o r the s a k e o f this ( p e r i s h a b l e ) b o d y .

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ETHICS OF THE SUTRA AND EPIC PERIOD Against an angry m a n let him not in return show anger, let him bless when he is cursed, and let him not utter speech, devoid of t r u t h , scattered at the seven g a t e s . " 4

T h u s , by r e s t r a i n i n g his senses, by d e s t r o y i n g love a n d h a t r e d , a n d by a b s t a i n i n g f r o m i n j u r y to all c r e a t u r e s , the sannyasin b e c o m e s fitted f o r i m m o r t a l i t y . A s t h e text s t a t e s it: A twice-born m a n w h o becomes an ascetic a f t e r the successive performance of the a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d acts, shakes off sin here below and reaches the highest B r a h m a n . 1 1 !

Q u e s t i o n s m i g h t be raised a b o u t the ethical a n d social s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Samnyasa stage. In the earlier stage, t h r o u g h a life of d u t y a n d discipline he c o n t r i b u t e d his s h a r e t o the w e l f a r e of the c o m m u n i t y , but the Sannyasin's life is c o m p l e t e l y i n d i v i d u a l a n d fiercely s p i r i t u a l . A l o n e , he strives to u n i t e with t h e A l o n e . T h e a n s w e r to these q u e s t i o n s is that while the Sannyasin's q u e s t is indeed highly i n d i v i d u a l , it d o e s have a social i m p a c t . W i t h o u t k n o w i n g it, he c o n t i n u e s t o u p l i f t t h e g r o u p t o a d e g r e e w h i c h w a s n o t possible h e r e t o f o r e . In t e r m s of w e a l t h , t i m e , a n d services t h e Sannyasin's c o n t r i b u t i o n is nil, b u t to t h o s e w h o a r e s t r u g g l i n g t o w a r d p u r i t y a n d selfk n o w l e d g e , his life serves as " a n e x a m p l e of f u l f i l m e n t a n d a p r o m i s e of the f u t u r e of a l l . " " 6 O u r s t u d y of t h e specific duties in the Varnasrama s c h e m e b r i n g s us n o w to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o m m o n d u t i e s u n d e r the r u b r i c of Sadharana dharma. In a d d i t i o n t o t h e m o r a l rules p e r t a i n i n g t o the f o u r castes a n d f o u r o r d e r s , t h e l a w - b o o k s i n c l u d e ethical s t a n d a r d s f o r all m e n , r e g a r d less of caste a n d o r d e r . A p a s t a m b a e n u m e r a t e s the " f a u l t s " a n d " g o o d q u a l i t i e s " w h i c h e i t h e r d e s t r o y o r save m a n k i n d . T h e s e are: Anger, exultation, grumbling, covetousness, perplexity, doing injury (to anybody), hypocrisy, lying, gluttony, calumny, envy, lust, secret hatrec', neglect to keep the senses in subjection, neglect to concentrate the mind. T h e eradication of these (faults) takes place t h r o u g h the means of (salvation called) Yoga.

Freedom from anger, from exultation, grumbling, from covetousness, from hyprocrisy (and) hurtfulness; truthfulness, moderation in eating, silencing slander, freedom from envy, self-denying liberality, avoiding to accept gifts, uprightness, affability, extinction of the passions, subjection of the senses, peace with all created beings, concentration (of the mind on the contemplation of the Atman), regulation of one's conduct according to that of the Aryas, peacefulness and contentedness;—these (good qualities) have been settled by the agreement (of the wise) for all (the four) orders; he who, according to the precepts of the sacred law, practises these, enters the universal s o u l . " '

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Similar s t a n d a r d s a r e enunciated by G a u t a m a , " 8 V a s i s t h a , ' " M a n u , 1 2 0 and Yajfiavalkya. 1 2 ' These virtues constituting the m o r a l p r e p a r a t i o n necessary f o r entrance into the "universal s o u l " help place in perspective the relative value of ceremonialism a n d legal rectitude v/5 a vis ethical excellence. Like the B r a h m a n a s , the K a l p a S u t r a s are replete with c o m m a n d s f o r the p e r f o r m a n c e of sacrificial rites. In a d d i t i o n , there are the myriads of traditional duties s u p p o s e d l y based on the Vedas. A perusal of these rites and duties is apt to convey the impression that the morality of this literature is exclusively a u t h o r i t a r i a n , external, c e r e m o n i a l , a n d f o r m a l : a n d that ethical a n d m o r a l values receive short shrift. 1 2 2 Such conclusions fail to take into c o n s i d e r a t i o n the f u n d a m e n t a l place given to ethical excellence, over against the purely ceremonial a n d f o r m a l observance of the law. A p a s t a m b a ' s list of c o m m o n virtues should m a k e it quite explicit that the l a w b o o k s not only talk a b o u t overt acts of c e r e m o n i a l behaviour, but of virtues of the spirit, as well. T h e y p r o b e b e y o n d the deed a n d the w o r d to the underlying t h o u g h t . As a m a t t e r of fact, all three c o m p o n e n t s of a m o r a l s i t u a t i o n — t h o u g h t , w o r d , a n d deed—are integrally connected so that only he w h o is ethically p u r e can enter the p a t h of k a r m a n a n d be qualified to p e r f o r m the sacred rites a n d duties. Vasistha says: Neither austerities, nor ( t h e s t u d y o f ) the Veda, nor ( t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f ) the A g n i h o t r a , nor lavish liberality c a n ever s a v e h i m w h o s e c o n d u c t is vile and w h o has strayed f r o m this ( p a t h o f d u t y ) . T h e Vedas d o not p u r i f y h i m w h o is d e f i c i e n t in g o o d c o n d u c t , t h o u g h he m a y have learnt t h e m a l t o g e t h e r with the six A n g a s ; the sacred texts depart f r o m s u c h a m a n at d e a t h , e v e n as birds, w h e n f u l l - f l e d g e d , leave their nest. A s the b e a u t y o f a w i f e c a u s e s n o j o y to a blind m a n , e v e n s o all the f o u r Vedas t o g e t h e r with the six A n g a s a n d sacrifices give n o h a p p i n e s s t o h i m w h o is d e f i c i e n t in g o o d c o n d u c t . ' 2 '

With similar emphasis on the spirit, a f t e r describing the f o r t y sacred ritual observances which a g o o d m a n should practise, G a u t a m a proceeds to explain the "eight g o o d qualities of the s o u l . " T h e y are: " c o m p a s s i o n o n all creatures, f o r b e a r a n c e , f r e e d o m f r o m anger, purity, quietism, auspiciousness, f r e e d o m f r o m avarice, a n d f r e e d o m f r o m c o v e t o u s n e s s . ' " 2 4 T h e jurist then warns: H e w h o is s a n c t i f i e d by these f o r t y s a c r a m e n t s , but w h o s e s o u l is d e s t i t u t e o f the eight excellent qualities, will not be u n i t e d with B r a h m a n , n o r d o e s he reach his h e a v e n . But he, f o r s o o t h , w h o is s a n c t i f i e d by a f e w o n l y w i t h the eight e x c e l l e n t qualities, will be u n i t e d with B r a h m a n , a n d will d w e l l in his h e a v e n . 1 2 5

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T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of this p a s s a g e lies in its d o u b l e - b a r r e l e d f i r e b o t h u p o n t h e ritualists a n d the mystics. " I t p r o c l a i m s very d e f i n i t e l y t h a t s a l v a t i o n is a m a t t e r of s p i r i t u a l excellence as exhibited by the e t h i c a l , n o t by ritualistic, o b s e r v a n c e s , a n d it e l i m i n a t e s the mystic i n t u i t i o n of G o d in f a v o u r of c o m p a s s i o n , c o n t e n t m e n t , purity, a n d a g e n e r o u s , e a r n e s t disposition.'"26 T h e m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d all of these c o d e s of c o n d u c t a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n s of virtues is e s c h a t o l o g i c a l — t o be " u n i t e d with B r a h m a n " a n d t o " d w e l l in his h e a v e n . " O n e ' s f u t u r e s t a t e w a s m o r a l l y c o n t i n u o u s w i t h o n e ' s p r e s e n t s t a t e ; as B a u d h a y a n a says: t o deserve h e a v e n , o n e m u s t avoid meanness, hardheartedness and crookedness." Eschatology thus b e c o m e s the d e t e r m i n a n t f o r ethics. Since the soul survives d e a t h , it w o u l d be s h o r t s i g h t e d to settle f o r ethical s t a n d a r d s t h a t t a k e o n l y this life i n t o view. H e n c e the a d m o n i t i o n of Vasistha: " P r a c t i c e r i g h t e o u s ness, n o t u n r i g h t e o u s n e s s ; seek t r u t h , n o t u n t r u t h ; look far, n o t n e a r ; l o o k t o w a r d the H i g h e s t , not t o w a r d t h a t w h i c h is not the H i g h e s t . ' " 2 7 Vasistha is n o t a d v o c a t i n g the e l i m i n a t i o n of desire, b e c a u s e h e a v e n is as m u c h a n o b j e c t of desire as is e a r t h . His ethical s t a n c e may, t h e r e f o r e , b e d e s c r i b e d as " s e l f - s e e k i n g b e y o n d t h e g r a v e . ' " 2 8 T h e things of t h e e a r t h m u s t n o t be s o u g h t as e n d s in themselves; b u t this calls not f o r r e n u n c i a tion—only restraint. II. Ethical T h o u g h t in the Bhagavadglta T h e t e a c h i n g of t h e B h a g a v a d g l t a h a s f o r its s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h e m i s e r y o f m u n d a n e existence. 1 2 9 T h e soul is viewed as t r a p p e d in the cycle of reb i r t h s b e c a u s e i m p e d e d e m p i r i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s d e l u d e s it i n t o i m a g i n i n g t h a t it is d e p e n d e n t o n the b o d y a n d t h a t it u n d e r g o e s all the s u f f e r i n g s of f i n i t e existence. Essentially, t h e soul is q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e b o d y ; b u t as l o n g as it is i g n o r a n t of its t r u e n a t u r e , it r e m a i n s a p r i s o n e r in " t h i s perishable, u n h a p p y world.'"30 In the light of t h e h u m a n p r e d i c a m e n t , ' g o o d ' a n d 'evil' a r e d e f i n e d in r e l a t i o n to the s o u l ' s release f r o m o r r e s i g n a t i o n t o the w e a r y r o u n d o f r e b i r t h s . R e l e a s e leads to the a t t a i n m e n t of Nirvana, poetically d e s c r i b e d in t h e s e w o r d s of K r s n a : When the embodied soul transcends these three gurtas, whose origin is in the body, it is freed from birth, death, old age and pain, and attains immortality. 13 ' T h e summum bonum is a p p r o a c h e d f r o m m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d t h e o l o g i cal p o i n t s of view. M e t a p h y s i c a l l y , it is t h e i d e n t i t y of the atman w i t h Brahman. " H e w h o is h a p p y w i t h i n , w h o s e j o y is w i t h i n a n d w h o s e light is w i t h i n ; t h a t y o g i n b e c o m e s B r a h m a n a n d a t t a i n s t o the bliss of

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B r a h m a n . ' " 3 2 T h e o l o g i c a l l y , the g o a l of life is u n i o n w i t h I s v a r a : " H e w h o is disciplined by t h e y o g a of p r a c t i c e a n d m e d i t a t e s o n the s u p r e m e P e r s o n , his m i n d not s t r a i n i n g a f t e r s o m e o t h e r o b j e c t , he r e a c h e s , O P a r t h a , that s u p r e m e divine S p i r i t . ' " " N e i t h e r identity with B r a h m a n n o r u n i o n with I s v a r a is p o s s i b l e witho u t the aid of p r a c t i c a l m o r a l i t y . M o r a l i t y p r o v i d e s the " f o u n d a t i o n o n w h i c h t h e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e of the holy life c u l m i n a t i n g in N i r v a n a is built.'"34 W h a t is t h e n a t u r e of the G f t a ' s ethics? We f i n d a clue as its d r a m a begins t o u n f o l d . T h e o p e n i n g scene p i c t u r e s A r j u n a s t a n d i n g in his c h a r i o t b e t w e e n the a r m i e s of t h e K a u r a v a s a n d P a n d a v a s . Seeing all his kinsm e n s t a n d i n g a r r a y e d , A r j u n a is o v e r c o m e with grief a n d u t t e r s these w o r d s of distress to his c h a r i o t e e r : My limbs collapse, my mouth dries up, there is trembling in my body and my hair stands on end; (The bow) GandTva slips from my hand and my skin also is burning; I am not able to stand still, my mind is whirling. And I see evil portents, O Keshava (Krishna), and I foresee not good in slaying my own kinsmen in the fight. 1 do not desire victory, O Krishna, nor kingdom, nor pleasure. Of what use is kingdom to us, O Govinda (Krishna), of what use pleasure or life? Those for whose sake we desire kingdom, pleasures and happiness, they are arrayed here in battle, having renounced their lives and riches. Teachers, fathers, sons, and also grandfathers; uncles, fathers-in-law, grandsons, brothers-in-law and (other) kinsmen: These I do not wish to kill, though they kill me, O Madhusudana (Krishna); even for the kingdom of the three worlds; how (much less) then for the sake of the earth! 1 " A r j u n a ' s d e p r e s s i o n is a f o r m of s e l f - i n d u l g e n t pity w h i c h p r e v e n t s h i m f r o m d o i n g his d u t y b e c a u s e it will h a r m his k i t h a n d k i n . S u c h sentim e n t a l i t y incurs the r e b u k e of K r s n a w h o e x h o r t s h i m t o act bravely. T h e charioteer asks: Whence hath this despair come to thee in this (time of) crisis? It is unbecoming to an aryan, it does not lead to heaven, it is disgraceful, O Arjuna. Yield not to this impotence, O Partha (Arjuna), for it is not proper of thee. Abandon this petty weakness of heart and arise, O oppressor of the foe.' 1 6 T h e s e w o r d s of K r s n a a r e a c l a r i o n call t o a c t i o n , a n d t h e r e i n lies the m a i n t h r u s t of the G l t a ' s ethical t e a c h i n g s . T h r o u g h several ( a n d s o m e times c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) a r g u m e n t s , it a t t e m p t s t o s h o w t h e k i n d of a c t i o n t h a t m u s t be u n d e r t a k e n in t h e w o r l d .

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T h e G l t a ' s formula for ethical activism is a synthesis o f two conflicting modes o f discipline, both of which were considered o r t h o d o x paths to salvation. T h e first f o r m o f discipline was k n o w n as pravrtli or 'active life'. T h o s e w h o embraced this ideal engaged in Vedic rituals and all of the duties prescribed in the K a l p a Sutras. T h e motive for their actions was reward in heaven. T h e object of desire did not mitigate the basic selfishness of these religious rites. Their selfishness lay in being devoted to the fruit of action, and it made little moral difference as to where the fruit were r e a p e d — o n earth or in heaven. T h e second f o r m of discipline was k n o w n as nivrtii or 'quietism'. T h o s e w h o espoused this ideal a b a n d o n e d all religious and social obligations, relying solely on jnana or knowledge as the p a t h w a y to salvation. It was their reasoning that since all a c t i o n s — g o o d and bad —must have their consequence in reincarnations, the most direct w a y to escape the evil o f rebirth was by minimizing all ' w o r k s ' , good ones included. T h e G l t a counters the preceding argument that karman is evil and should be abandoned because it leads to rebirth by making a shrewd analysis o f human behaviour. It does not stop with karman, but goes beyond karman to kama. Behind the deed lies the desire. Aversions and attachments determine a man's behaviour, therefore, a m a n ' s real enemies are not actions but passions. 1 3 7 A c t i o n s are only the motor manifestations of the impulse to love or to hate. T h e implications of this analysis are that the power to bind one to continued existence resides not in karman but in kama. Accordingly, karman without kama has no consequence for rebirth. O n c e desire is removed f r o m the deed, the deed loses its fateful sting. He w h o k n o w s this is wise. He can w o r k and yet does nothing. A s the Glta expresses it: H a v i n g n o d e s i r e s , w i t h his m i n d a n d self c o n t r o l l e d , a b a n d o n i n g all p o s s e s s i o n s , p e r f o r m i n g a c t i o n s w i t h t h e b o d y a l o n e , he c o m m i t s n o sin. H e w h o is c o n t e n t w i t h w h a t c o m e s b y c h a n c e , w h o h a s p a s s e d b e y o n d t h e p a i r s ( o f o p p o s i t e s ) , w h o is f r e e f r o m j e a l o u s y a n d is i n d i f f e r e n t t o s u c c e s s a n d f a i l u r e , e v e n w h e n h e is a c t i n g h e is n o t b o u n d . 1 "

T h e same applies to the p e r f o r m a n c e o f Vedic yajna. Devoid of any hope for reward, the performer o f yajna w o r k s , but his actions have no future effect. The

o f f e r i n g is B r a h m a n ,

Brahman

is t h e o b l a t i o n ;

it is p o u r e d

by

B r a h m a n in t h e ( r i t u a l ) fire o f B r a h m a n . B r a h m a n is t o b e a t t a i n e d b y h i m w h o c o n c e n t r a t e s his a c t i o n s u p o n B r a h m a n . ' "

T h e foregoing analysis of action as the extension of desire, along with the inference that detached actions per se have no binding power, brings

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one to the conclusion that what is ethically required is not "renunciation of action" but "renunciation in action.'" 4 0 The Glta's expression for detached activism is karmayoga. Karmayoga treats the act as an end in itself and not as a means to another end. The classic formulation of karmayoga is contained in these words: In a c t i o n o n l y hast t h o u a right a n d never in its fruits. Let not thy m o t i v e be the fruits o f a c t i o n ; n o r let thy a t t a c h m e n t be t o i n a c t i o n . " "

Thus, in the principle of karmayoga the Gita synthesises the positive elements of pravrtti and nivrtti. "While it does not abandon activity, it preserves the spirit of renunciation. It commends the strenuous life, and yet gives no room for the play of selfish impulses. Thus it discards neither ideal, but by combining them refines and ennobles both.'" 4 2 Explained in this way, karmayoga sounds ethically desirable. It is said to impart inner poise, self-mastery, and to free one f r o m passion and pride. 143 But granting yoga is desirable; is it possible? Examine the Glta's description of the Sannyasin. " H e who does the action that should be done without concern for its fruits, he is a Sannyasin, he is a yogin, not he who does not light the sacred fires and performs no rites.'" 4 4 Samnyasa or renunciation is described here as an inward attitude—not something connected with outward works. Psychologically, this detached attitude seems impossible. All voluntaristic activity presupposes decision, and there can be no decision without desire. H u m a n behaviour, unlike the instinctive behaviour of animals, is always motivated; hence its moral character. How then are we to understand the Glta's description of the Sannyasin as one who performs his prescribed duty "without concern for its fruit"? Upon closer examination it becomes clear that the detachment which the Gita inculcates is only in respect to worldly aspirations, such as the desire of A r j u n a for the recapture of his ancestral kingdom. Preoccupation with mundane interests prevents the mind from attending to the needs of the inner life and must, therefore, be eliminated. But while karmayoga enjoins the renunciation of all temporal ends, its concept of the self does provide motivation for seeking ends in consonance with its higher nature. When the self's destiny is conceived of as achieving oneness with Brahman, yogins are told to " p e r f o r m actions only with the body, the mind, the intellect or the senses, without attachment, for selfpurification.'" 4 5 The concluding words, " f o r self-purification," illustrate the sole purpose for which the GTta legitimates motivated action. In serving society the yogin is perfectly disinterested, performing works "only with the body," and so on, but this detached action is not without motive. Its motive is cleansing of the heart whereby the goal of selfrealization is achieved. In the case of those yogins whose hearts have al-

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r e a d y been c l e a n s e d , they a r e e n c o u r a g e d t o w o r k f o r t h e w e l f a r e of t h e w o r l d , a n d also t o set ideals f o r o t h e r s . ' 4 6 Similarly, w h e n the s e l f ' s destiny is c o n c e i v e d w i t h i n a t h e o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k , t h e d e v o t e e is t o l d , " W h a t e v e r t h o u d o e s t , w h a t e v e r t h o u eatest, w h a t e v e r t h o u o f f e r e s t , w h a t e v e r t h o u givest, w h a t e v e r a u s t e r i t i e s t h o u p e r f o r m e s t , d o t h a t , O s o n of KuntT, as a n o f f e r i n g t o M e . ' " 4 ' T h e c o n c l u d i n g w o r d s , a g a i n , illustrate t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of all the service t h a t is p e r f o r m e d as G o d ' s w o r k . T h e d e v o t e e disinterestedly p e r f o r m s divine service to place himself in t h e h a n d s of G o d — e t e r n a l l y secure. A r j u n a is a s s u r e d , " k n o w t h o u t h a t M y d e v o t e e never p e r i s h e s . " 1 4 8 U p to this p o i n t we h a v e e x p l o r e d the ethical m e a n i n g of karmayoga w h i c h teaches t h a t a m a n m u s t p e r f o r m his d u t i e s as a m e m b e r of society w i t h o u t a n y t h o u g h t of p e r s o n a l gain. O u r next task is t o fix a m o r e precise d e f i n i t i o n of duty. S o m e t i m e s by d u t y is m e a n t the p e r f o r m a n c e of religious rites. C o n t r a r y t o the view t h a t " a c t i o n s h o u l d be given u p as a n evil," the G i t a a f f i r m s , " a c t s of sacrifice, gift a n d a u s t e r i t y o u g h t not t o be a b a n d o n e d , r a t h e r they s h o u l d be p e r f o r m e d ; f o r s a c r i f i c e , gift a n d a u s t e r i t y are p u r i fiers of the wise.'" 4 '' Religious duties are, t h e r e f o r e , e n j o i n e d b e c a u s e of their p u r i f i c a t o r y e f f e c t s . A t o t h e r times d u t y r e f e r s t o t h e c o m m a n d m e n t s of G o d w i t h o u t a n y specific m e n t i o n of w h a t they a r e definitely. F o r e x a m p l e , A r j u n a is t o l d : " T h e y w h o c o n s t a n t l y f o l l o w M y d o c t r i n e , w h o a r e filled with f a i t h a n d a r e u n c o m p l a i n i n g , they t o o a r e f r e e d f r o m ( t h e b o n d a g e o f ) a c t i o n s . But t h o s e w h o c a r p at m y t e a c h i n g a n d d o not f o l l o w it k n o w these m i n d l e s s o n e s , d e l u d e d in all k n o w l e d g e , t o be l o s t . " " 0 T h e m o s t c o m m o n c o n n o t a t i o n of d u t y in the G i t a is t h a t of social o b ligations. Karmayoga c o n c r e t e l y u n d e r s t o o d is t h e d i s i n t e r e s t e d p e r f o r m a n c e of c u s t o m a r y a n d t r a d i t i o n a l d u t i e s . A r j u n a is c o m m a n d e d : " p e r f o r m a c t i o n as t h e a n c i e n t s did l o n g a g o . ' " " J u s t as m e n of old in q u e s t of l i b e r a t i o n c a r r i e d out their c u s t o m a r y w o r k , so a l s o m u s t A r j u n a rise t o his d u t y as a K s a t r i y a . T h e f a c t t h a t A r j u n a w a s b o r n a K s a t r i y a m e a n t t h a t he w a s e n d o w e d with t h e full n a t u r e of a w a r r i o r . A p e r s o n is b o r n i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r c a s t e b e c a u s e G o d h a d c o n s i d e r e d his n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h a t caste. K r s n a e x p l a i n s : The actions of Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas, and of Shudras, O conqueror of the foe, are distinguished according to the gurtas that arise from their innate nature. Calmness, self-control, austerity, purity, patience, uprightness, wisdom, knowledge and religious belief are the actions of the Brahmin, born of his nature.

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H e r o i s m , majesty, f i r m n e s s , skill a n d n o t f l e e i n g in battle, g e n e r o s i t y a n d l o r d s h i p , are the a c t i o n s o f the Kshatriya, b o r n o f his nature. A g r i c u l t u r e , c a t t l e - t e n d i n g a n d trade are the a c t i o n s o f a Vaishya, b o r n o f his nature; a c t i o n w h o s e character is service is l i k e w i s e that o f the S h u d r a , b o r n o f his n a t u r e . 1 "

By birth, and therefore it is assumed by nature also, A r j u n a ' s own dharma (svadharma) dictated his taking up arms in the cause of righteousness. He is reminded, "having regard for thine own dharma, thou shouldst not tremble. There exists no greater good for a Kshatriya than a battle required by duty."" 3 Good Ksatriyas welcome such holy war as an "open door to heaven."" 4 On the contrary, failure to combat evil is to "incur sin." It is plain that the Gita is committed to the maintenance of caste. In addition to the above religious and biological endorsements, caste is approved on sociological grounds. A r j u n a says: In the ruin o f a family, its i m m e m o r i a l laws perish; a n d w h e n the laws perish, the w h o l e f a m i l y is o v e r c o m e by l a w l e s s n e s s . A n d w h e n l a w l e s s n e s s prevails, O Krishna, the w o m e n o f the f a m i l y are c o r r u p t e d , and w h e n w o m e n are c o r r u p t e d , O V a r s h n e y a , a m i x t u r e o f c a s t e arises. A n d this c o n f u s i o n brings the f a m i l y itself to hell and t h o s e w h o have des t r o y e d it; for their a n c e s t o r s fall, deprived o f their o f f e r i n g s o f rice a n d water.1"

Thus, on religious, biological and sociological grounds, the ideal of caste enshrined in immemorial customs and traditions is upheld by the BhagavadgTta. However, it is necessary to show that the Gita does differ f r o m the orthodox view of caste in two critical areas. First, as Professor K. N. Upadhyaya traces, under the influence of Jainism and Buddhism, the Gita universalises its concept of salvation to make it accessible to all men, regardless of race, sex, or caste.' 5 6 With open arms, Krsna says; T h e y w h o t a k e r e f u g e in M e , O P a r t h a , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y be b o r n o f s i n f u l w o m b s , w o m e n , Vaishyas a n d e v e n S h u d r a s , they a l s o reach the highest goal."'

Second, because the GTta lays so much store by the internal value of an act, it refuses to categorise meritorious actions according to hierarchical standards. To the contrary, irrespective of one's place in the caste structure, a man obtains perfection by being devoted to "his own proper action.""« The discussion of the caste duties of the Ksatriya gives rise to a related

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p r o b l e m : the ethics of war. C a n war ever be c o m p a t i b l e with morality? H a r k i n g back to the p o e m , we find A r j u n a utterly bewildered a b o u t his duty. His p r o b l e m is not o n e of metaphysics but ethics. H e pleads, "tell me decisively which is b e t t e r . " 1 " " A s a m a n of action he asks f o r t h e law of action, f o r his d h a r m a , f o r what he has to d o in this difficulty.'" 6 0 A r j u n a ' s own conclusion is that killing o n e ' s o w n kinsmen, even f o r a righteous cause, is morally u n t e n a b l e , to say n o t h i n g of killing out of greed for a " k i n g d o m on e a r t h " or f o r the "sovereignty of the g o d s . ' " 6 1 " I t would be better f o r m e if the sons of D h r i t a r a s h t r a , with w e a p o n s in h a n d , should slay me, unresisting a n d u n a r m e d , in the battle." 1 6 2 H a v i n g spoken these w o r d s in agony a n d in love, " A r j u n a cast away his bow a n d a r r o w a n d sank d o w n on the seat of his chariot, his spirit o v e r c o m e by g r i e f . ' " 6 3 T h e situation is clear: A r j u n a has laid d o w n his b o w , not out of cowardice but conscientiousness. H e is a f r a i d not of dying but killing. K r s n a sympathetically smiles over the m o r a l q u a n d a r y in which A r j u n a finds himself a n d proceeds to explain the g r o u n d s on which war can be morally justified when waged against evildoers. Repeatedly the moral aspect of the p r o b l e m is emphasised. 1 6 4 Krsna starts by telling A r j u n a that his nonviolent protest indicates a lack of intelligence. " T h o u grievest f o r those thou shouldst not grieve for, a n d yet thou speakest w o r d s that s o u n d like wisdom. Wise m e n d o not m o u r n f o r the dead or f o r the l i v i n g . " " 5 T h e wise are not perplexed because they k n o w that m a n is the c o m b i n a t i o n of two distinct m o d e s of being—body a n d self. T h e b o d y is mortal. 1 6 6 It is perpetually subject t o c h a n g e a n d is constantly rotating within the world of b e c o m i n g . " D e a t h is certain f o r one that has been b o r n , a n d birth is certain f o r o n e that has d i e d . ' " 6 7 These u n a v o i d a b l e facts of our m o r t a l n a t u r e should give one poise a n d a sense of p r o p o r t i o n . By contrast with the body, the Self is " n e v e r B o r n , nor does it die, nor having once been, will it again cease to be. It is u n b o r n , eternal a n d everlasting.'" 6 8 C h a n g e s in the b o d y d o not a f f e c t the self. 1 6 ' " J u s t as a m a n casts off w o r n - o u t clothes a n d takes on others that are new, so the e m b o d i e d soul casts off w o r n - o u t bodies a n d takes on others t h a t are n e w . " " 0 Being i m m u t a b l e a n d indestructible, the self does not slay, nor is it s l a i n . 1 " " W e a p o n s d o not cut it, nor does fire b u r n it; waters d o not m a k e it wet, n o r does wind m a k e it dry."' 7 2 Insights into these facts concerning the b o d y a n d the soul should deliver A r j u n a f r o m grieving over a n y c r e a t u r e . 1 7 ! Instead of s o r r o w , because the physical e m b o d i m e n t of the eternal soul must inevitably c o m e t o an end, A r j u n a should t a k e u p his sword a n d join the battle!

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These a r g u m e n t s legitimising w a r f a r e on the basis of metaphysical concepts of the b o d y / s o u l relation raise s o m e ethical issues. True, h u m a n existence is short, but does the brevity of life a n d the inevitability of death j u s t i f y a p r e m a t u r e e n d , albeit f o r a righteous cause? F u r t h e r m o r e , physical e m b o d i m e n t s in the world d o have their bearing on the soul's destiny, hence, are they not to be treated significantly? Does not the Gita itself a d m i t the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s of worldly existence by emphasising activism; a n d does it not also accept the belief that several emb o d i m e n t s a r e necessary f o r the ascent of the soul b e f o r e liberation? Is it then ethically permissible t o destroy the b o d y w i t h o u t greater regard f o r the b o d y ' s service to the soul t h a n these metaphysical considerations seem to allow? T h e real danger of a r g u m e n t s based on the metaphysical k n o w l e d g e of the imperishable soul lies in its positing a purely speculative basis as the g r o u n d f o r practical morality. By m a k i n g ethics d e p e n d e n t on strictly intellectual theories that have not been n u r t u r e d in the crucible of m o r a l experience, the p u r p o r t of ethics is subverted. Starting with the metaphysical assertion of the inviolability of the soul, it is possible logically to j u s t i f y righteous killing, for, on such p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , n o o n e is really killed, a n d , t h e r e f o r e , there is n o killer, n o guilt, n o b l a m e ! T h e argument may be logical, but it is not legitimate. K. N. U p a d h y a y a , addressing himself to this p r o b l e m , clearly describes the kind of reciprocal relation that must exist between metaphysics a n d ethics if the f o r m e r is to serve as the legitimate basis f o r the latter. H e explains: T h e transcendental truth o f the s u p r a m u n d a n e unity w h e r e the multiplicity o f the world melts away, has t o be realised in o n e ' s o w n direct experience by m e a n s of gradual d e v e l o p m e n t of the natural faculties through proper ethical c o n d u c t . Ethics is, thus, o n l y the m e a n s t o the transcendental or metaphysical plane. . . . It is o n l y o n that higher plane that ethics loses its significance, for it can have m e a n i n g only in the midst o f multiplicity or society o f individuals. But if o n e , instead of g o i n g f r o m ethics to m e t a p h y s i c s reverses the process and p r o c e e d s f r o m s o m e a priori metaphysical a s s u m p t i o n s to ethics, o n e will inevitably be c a u g h t in contradictions. " 4

F u r t h e r o b j e c t i o n s a r e not necessary because K r s n a himself seems dissatisfied with the purely metaphysical a p p r o a c h . T h a t is why he follows u p the metaphysical a r g u m e n t by a p p e a l i n g t o A r j u n a ' s sense of duty. H e states: " F u r t h e r , having regard f o r thine o w n dharma, t h o u shouldst not tremble. T h e r e exists n o greater g o o d f o r a Ksatriya t h a n a battle required by d u t y . ' " 7 5 A K s a t r i y a ' s svadharma was p r e p a r e d n e s s t o c o m b a t the enemies of society. As a Ksatriya, A r j u n a m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , be true t o his law of ac-

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tion a n d take u p a r m s r a t h e r than a s s u m e the p o s t u r e of an ascetic by " s h a v i n g off the hair." Fighting a just war is a n o b l e d u t y which should be happily accepted because it is " a n o p e n d o o r to h e a v e n . " " 6 On the o t h e r h a n d , should A r j u n a fail to engage in l a w f u l battle, he will be violating his sacred d u t y a n d shall " i n c u r s i n . ' " " T h e w a r n i n g is clear: M e n will f o r e v e r s p e a k o f thy d i s h o n o r , a n d f o r o n e w h o h a s b e e n h o n o r e d , d i s h o n o r is w o r s e t h a n d e a t h . T h e g r e a t w a r r i o r s will t h i n k that t h o u hast a b s t a i n e d f r o m b a t t l e b e c a u s e o f f e a r a n d t h e y w h o h i g h l y e s t e e m e d t h e e will t h i n k l i g h t l y o f t h e e . M a n y w o r d s w h i c h o u g h t n o t t o b e s p o k e n will b e s p o k e n b y t h y e n e m i e s , s c o r n i n g t h y s t r e n g t h . W h a t is m o r e p a i n f u l t h a n t h a t ? 1 "

It may be noted in passing that this anxiety expressed over such m u n d a n e concerns as f a m e , earthly reward a n d heavenly gain, is in embarrassing c o n t r a s t to K r s n a ' s later teaching, a b o u t to be e x a m i n e d , e n j o i n i n g on A r j u n a a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a t t i t u d e t o w a r d such e p h e m e r a l considerations. H a v i n g explained the propriety of duty, K r s n a believes the p a t h of action is clear. If A r j u n a p e r f o r m s his d u t y in the correct spirit, he is b o u n d to c o m e t h r o u g h victoriously, o n e way or the other. " I f t h o u art slain, t h o u wilt o b t a i n heaven, or if thou conquer, t h o u wilt e n j o y the earth. T h e r e f o r e arise, O son of KuntT, resolved to f i g h t . ' " " It is ethically i m p o r t a n t that the battle be f o u g h t in the right spirit. This m e a n s that A r j u n a must a d o p t the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a t t i t u d e of equalm i n d e d n e s s . Treating alike pleasure a n d pain, gain a n d loss, victory a n d d e f e a t , A r j u n a will be able to fight without incurring sin. This teaching asking A r j u n a to rise a b o v e praise a n d b l a m e is on a higher level t h a n the earlier teaching urging their c o n s i d e r a t i o n . To enable A r j u n a t o achieve the p r o p e r spirit, K r s n a tells him to consider himself an i n s t r u m e n t in the h a n d s of G o d — h e then c a n n o t fight f o r selfish ends. G o d has already sealed the f a t e of his enemies because of their u n r i g h t e o u s past. Even w i t h o u t A r j u n a ' s intervention, all the warriors s t a n d i n g a r r a y e d in the o p p o s i n g a r m y shall s o o n cease to be. A r j u n a m u s t t h e r e f o r e consider himself a mere sword being wielded by the h a n d of G o d . ' 8 0 S h o u l d A r j u n a at this point lose his nerve a n d decide, " I will not f i g h t , " it will be impossible f o r him to sustain such self-conceited sentimentality. By n a t u r e A r j u n a was a Ksatriya, a n d sooner or later his martial n a t u r e w o u l d surely assert itself. A r j u n a , t h e r e f o r e , is w a r n e d not t o allow egotism (ahamkara) t o h o o d w i n k him i n t o imagining that he is s o m e o n e o t h e r t h a n a m a n w h o was b o r n to fight. " T h a t which t h o u wishest not t o d o , t h r o u g h delusion, O son of KuntT, that t h o u shalt d o helplessly, b o u n d by thine own action b o r n of thy n a t u r e . ' " 8 1

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Delay is d e t r i m e n t a l . If driven to fight by the inner m o m e n t u m of his Ksatriya n a t u r e , the egotism that now prevents him f i o m following his dharma will then propel him to fight with vengeance! C a u g h t u p in the heat of e m o t i o n s , it will be impossible for him to c o n d u c t his actions as the wise w a r r i o r K r s n a would have him be. So the real issue is not whether to fight, but whether to fight out of desire a n d incur sin, or out of duty a n d act righteously. T h e difficulty with the a r g u m e n t s stated earlier is that they seem to undercut m a n ' s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e i m p o r t a n c e of this f o r ethics is vital. T h e g r a n d premise of ethics is that m a n is able to surpass himself. This capacity p r e s u p p o s e s f r e e d o m . But if it is true that h u m a n activity is only the e n a c t m e n t of a r e a d y - m a d e scenario conceived in the mind of G o d ; or if the present is only a p r o j e c t i o n of the past, then could it be that the G l t a in which these ideas are enunciated has been i n a p p r o p r i a t e ly called an ethical treatise on the active life? T h e key to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the G l t a ' s psychology of c o n d u c t lies in its view of life as e m b r a c i n g b o t h prakrti a n d purusa. Prakrti is the psychical a p p a r a t u s with which a m a n is e n d o w e d at birth, being a carryover f r o m his mental d e v e l o p m e n t in a previous existence. Its process is clearly delineated: H a v i n g attained the w o r l d o f the d o e r s o f right, a n d h a v i n g dwelt there f o r m a n y y e a r s , he w h o h a s f a l l e n f r o m y o g a is b o r n in t h e h o u s e o f t h e p u r e and prosperous; O r h e m a y b e b o r n in the f a m i l y o f w i s e y o g i n s ; f o r s u c h a birth as this is h a r d t o a t t a i n in the w o r l d . T h e r e h e a c q u i r e s t h e m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h his p r e v i o u s e x i s t e n c e , a n d h e s t r i v e s f r o m that p o i n t o n t o p e r f e c t i o n . " 2

Since all beings are involved in the process of following the inner workings of their n a t u r e , repression is of n o avail. 1 8 3 " T h e excited senses of even a wise m a n w h o strives ( f o r perfection) . . . violently carry away his m i n d . ' " 8 4 Such passages m a k e it clear that to c o n t r o l the effects of o n e ' s past karmans is difficult indeed. However, t h o u g h sense-control is difficult, it is not impossible. By virtue of his higher n a t u r e , it is possible for m a n to achieve t r a n s c e n d e n c e over prakrti. T h e discipline involved here is o n e that brings the lower faculties u n d e r the c o n t r o l of the higher faculties, until the g o v e r n a n c e of purusa is a t t a i n e d . T h e hierarchical aspect of the discipline is stated thus: The (manas);

senses,

t h e y say, are g r e a t ; g r e a t e r t h a n t h e s e n s e s

g r e a t e r t h a n t h e m i n d is t h e r e a s o n (buddhi);

is t h e

mind

and greater than the

r e a s o n is H e . " '

T h e r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d this discipline is that f r e e d o m is correlative t o consciousness—the greater the consciousness the greater the f r e e d o m .

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The outward life of sense is least free, because consciousness is constricted by the sway of senses. Freedom emerges when the senses are made dependent on the mind. Freedom is enhanced when the mind is yoked with intelligence. Greatest freedom is achieved when intelligence is informed by the consciousness of the Self. Thus, starting from the bondage of the outward life of sensations, the yogin moves inward and upward until he discovers the central and greatest reality of his own being. This is the highest level of consciousness, and with it, the maximization of freedom. The psychological significance of the GTta's analysis of freedom is that it does not fall into the customary traps of modern Behaviourists or Existentialists who argue either for freedom or determinism." 6 Instead of taking a polaristic position, the GTta tries to do justice to all ranges of human experience. On the lowest range, it concurs with Behaviouristic thought that nature is determined. But, unlike the Behaviourists, the GTta does not stop there. In existentialistic fashion it proceeds to qualify the determinism of nature by man's mental and spiritual capacities to control nature. The lower self is progressively brought under the control of the higher Self, but in so doing, the lower is not abrogated by the higher. Instead, the interests and activities of the empirical self are sublimated, so that all aspects of personality are made to function helpfully and harmoniously. Finally, what is the character of the free man? What is his style of life? How does he transcend nature? The GTta responds with this portrait of the free man: H e d o e s not a b h o r i l l u m i n a t i o n , a c t i v i t y o r d e l u s i o n w h e n they a r i s e , O P a n d a v a , nor desire them when they cease. H e w h o is s e a t e d l i k e o n e i n d i f f e r e n t a n d u n d i s t u r b e d by the gunas, t h i n k s " t h e gunas

who

alone act," who stands apart and remains firm,

T o w h o m p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n a r e a l i k e , w h o a b i d e s in the s e l f , t o w h o m a l u m p o f c l a y , a r o c k , a n d g o l d a r e the s a m e , t o w h o m the p l e a s a n t a n d unp l e a s a n t a r e e q u a l , w h o is f i r m , t o w h o m b l a m e a n d p r a i s e o f h i m s e l f a r e the same; T o w h o m h o n o r a n d d i s h o n o r a r e the s a m e , t o w h o m the p a r t i e s o f f r i e n d s a n d e n e m i e s a r e the s a m e , w h o h a s a b a n d o n e d all u n d e r t a k i n g s — h e is c a l l e d the m a n w h o t r a n s c e n d s the

gunas."1

Such a free man, having transcended the gunas, and serving the Lord with unswerving bhaktiyoga, is " f i t to become B r a h m a n . " " 8

CHAPTER 3

The Ethics of the Darsana Period

I. Introduction T h e e v o l u t i o n of H i n d u t h o u g h t c o n t i n u e d f r o m t h e E p i c p e r i o d i n t o the age of t h e S y s t e m s . S i m u l t a n e o u s with the p o p u l a r i s a t i o n of H i n d u i s m a l o n g t h e p a t t e r n of the P u r â n a s a n d t h e T a n t r a s (A.D. 3 0 0 - 7 5 0 ) was a m o v e m e n t a m o n g t h e intelligentia w h i c h led t o t h e s y s t é m a t i s a t i o n of H i n d u i s m i n t o the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u t r a s of the six o r t h o d o x s c h o o l s . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t was t h e r a t i o n a l legacy of the a t t a c k of B u d d h i s m a n d J a i n i s m u p o n the d o g m a t i c f o u n d a t i o n s of t r a d i t i o n a l H i n d u i s m . Critics forced their opponents to employ the natural methods relevant to life and experience, and not some supernatural revelation, in defence of their speculative schemes . . . The force of thought which springs straight from life and experience as we have it in the Upanisads, or the epic greatness of soul which sees and chants the God-vision as in the Bhagavad-gîtâ give place to more strict philosophising . . . the spirit of the times required that every system of thought based on reason should be recognised as a darSana. '

T h e w o r d daréana m e a n s ' p o i n t of view' ( f r o m t h e r o o t drs, m e a n i n g " t o s e e " ) . H e n c e , t h e six classic s y s t e m s a r e r e g a r d e d as six p o i n t s of view f r o m w h i c h t h e single o r t h o d o x t r a d i t i o n m a y be c o n s i d e r e d . D e s p i t e the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a m o n g t h e m , these i n d e p e n d e n t s y s t e m s a r e t a k e n t o be " c o m p l e m e n t a r y p r o j e c t i o n s of t h e o n e t r u t h o n v a r i o u s p l a n e s of c o n sciousness, valid i n t u i t i o n s f r o m d i f f e r i n g p o i n t s of view—like t h e experiences of t h e seven b l i n d m e n feeling t h e e l e p h a n t , in t h e p o p u l a r B u d dhist fable."2 T h e a d o p t i o n of a critical a n d a n a l y t i c a l p o i n t of view e x p l a i n s the

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PERIOD

systematic focus placed by all of these schools on pramanas. Pramana means "the essential means of arriving at valid knowledge or prama.'" Generally stated, there are three pramanas: (1) perception (pratyaksa), (2) inference (anumana), and (3) verbal testimony (sabda). The systems start with Noetics, but having answered the question, " H o w do we k n o w ? " press on to their ultimate aim, namely, moksa. All of the systems concur that "the sum mum bonum of life is attained when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated." 4 Liberation is not just an eschatological possibility but is attainable in this life as jTvanmukti. Ethically speaking, the systems recognize all three levels of moral development. On the Objective level, emphases vary as to the need for adherence to the Varnasrama scheme of life. On the Subjective level, purity of heart (cittasuddhi) is insisted upon. With cleansed heart one must work disinterestedly and unselfishly. Finally, there is the Transcendental level upon which the good is no longer an object of labour but a realized reality. The liberated man transcends the plane of moralistic individualism while bound to the orbit of samsara, and now becomes like a lovely lotus unblemished by the muck and mire whence it grows. The common ethical concepts enunciated earlier—avidya, karman, dharma, samsara, jTvanmukti— provide the basis for the orthodox character of these systems. These ideas are taken from the Vedas, and by virtue of accepting the validity of the Vedas, these systems are called astika, to be distinguished from the nastika systems (Buddhism, Jainism, and Carvakas) which deny Vedic authority. However, it must be pointed out that orthodoxy is very liberal in its handling of Vedic testimony, relying mainly on the jnanakanda (the Upanisads) side of the sruti literature. The manner in which Vedic texts are interpreted is considerably coloured by the peculiar predilections of the exegete. The Brahmanical darsanas we are now ready to study are: G a u t a m a ' s Nyaya, Kanada's Vaisesika, Kapila's Samkhya, Pataftjali's Yoga, Jaimini's Purva MTmarhsa, and Badarayana's Uttara MTmarhsa, or the Vedanta. Apart f r o m their names, we know nothing of these actual or purported founders. We shall be justified in treating them as schools and not individuals. Of these systems, the one of greatest contemporary significance is the Vedanta. For this reason the author has devoted special attention to two Vedantic schools: Sankara's, representing the philosophic rendering of the Vedanta, and R a m a n u j a ' s , representing its theistic interpretation. Since this is a work in ethics, we shall not concentrate on all the philosophical details of each system, but only on those which are relevant to

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ethical theory a n d practice. U n l i k e Western p h i l o s o p h i c systems, the ethic a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e s e darsanas

h a v e not been w o r k e d out, but every

philosophical system has a reciprocally related structure o f values, and this m a k e s it i n c u m b e n t u p o n us t o i d e n t i f y t h o s e v a l u e s w h i c h h a v e b e e n explicitly or implicitly d e t e r m i n e d by the p r o f o u n d philosophical ideas o f these systems. T h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s a s i d e , w e a r e i n s p i r e d in t h i s q u e s t b y t h e ethical attitude o f these philosophers t o w a r d the truth they investigate. R e v e r e n c e f o r t r u t h , a n d a n i n d o m i t a b l e will t h a t it s h a l l p r e v a i l , m a r k t h e s e m e n n o t o n l y as s c h o l a r s t o r e s p e c t b u t t o a d m i r e . W i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l bravery they w o r k out their principles a n d candidly a d m i t the

conse-

quences o f their theories. If they are idealists, even to the verge o f nihilism, they say so. and if they hold that the objective world requires a real, though not necessarily a visible or tangible substratum, they are never afraid to speak out. T h e y are bona fide idealists or materialists, monists or dualists, theists or atheists, because their reverence for truth is stronger than their reverence for anything else. 1 F u r t h e r m o r e , their vision o f the great world rhythm—endless successions o f creation,

maintenance,

and dissolution—make

these

philoso-

p h e r s b e l i e v e r s in p r o g r e s s . R i s e a n d f a l l d o n o t i m p l y n e w b e g i n n i n g s , and absolute cosmic annihilation.

"The

new universe f o r m s the

next

stage o f the history o f the c o s m o s , where the unexhausted potencies o f g o o d a n d evil a r e p r o v i d e d w i t h t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f f u l f i l m e n t . It m e a n s t h a t t h e r a c e o f m a n e n t e r s u p o n a n d r e t r a v e l s its a s c e n d i n g p a t h o f r e a l i s a t i o n . ' " T h u s , t h e i r b e l i e f in t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s c o v e r i n g t r u t h p r o v i d e s t h e m w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y i m p e t u s t o i n c a r n a t e its e s s e n c e in p r o g r e s s i v e l y greater degrees. I I . E t h i c a l T h o u g h t in N y a y a - V a i s e s i k a T h o u g h n o t a s well k n o w n t o t h e W e s t a s t h e S a i i i k h y a - Y o g a a n d V e d a n t a philosophies, the N y a y a and Vaisesika systems o f logic and realism are " a b l e a n d earnest efforts to solve the p r o b l e m s o f knowledge and being o n t h e b a s i s o f r e a s o n e d a r g u m e n t . ' " S c r i p t u r a l a u t h o r i t y is r e c o g n i z e d , w h i c h is w h y t h e y a r e i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e o r t h o d o x s y s t e m s , b u t t h e y rely chiefly on rational endeavour to illuminate Reality. W e p r o p o s e to treat b o t h o f these p h i l o s o p h i c s c h o o l s as o n e s y s t e m . T h e r e is h i s t o r i c a l p r e c e d e n c e f o r t h i s s y n c r e t i c a p p r o a c h g o i n g b a c k t o the t i m e o f V a t s y a y a n a ( 4 0 0 A.D.). T h e t w o s y s t e m s h a v e b e e n t r a d i t i o n a l l y s y n t h e s i s e d b e c a u s e o f t h e i r s i n g l e w o r l d view a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e i r c o m m o n approach to ethics. O f t h e t w o w o r k s , t h e V a i s e s i k a is t h e o l d e r . I t s e a r l i e s t

exposition,

88

ETHICS OF THE DAP.SANA PERIOD

composed in ten books of aphorisms, has come down to us in the name of Kanada. Kanada means 'atom (of grain) eater', a nickname obviously connected to his theory. The earliest exposition of the Nyaya school contained in five books of aphorisms has been passed on under the name of Aksapada Gautama. Aksapada was also probably a nickname, denoting 'one whose eyes are directed at his feet'. By themselves, the aphorisms of both schools are difficult to decode. Stylistically, this was intentional to maintain the veil of secrecy. Futhermore, "it must be assumed that they represent the summing up in definite form of doctrines long discussed in the schools, and that they were meant to do no more than serve as mnemonics, on which to string a full exposition given in the oral method traditional in India." 8 However with the aid of commentaries these works become readily comprehensible. The earliest commentary on Kanada is Prasastapada's Vaisesika Sütra Bhasya, and that on Gautama is Vatsyáyana's Nyaya Sütra Bhasya. The word 'vaisesika' signifies 'difference' and points to the fundamental diversity in the universe. The word 'Nyaya' means argumentation and stands for the intellectual and analytical method that has made the system both distinctive and formative. Taken together, 'Nyaya-Vaisesika' represents a cosmological theory that is realistic and pluralistic, and which is arrived at through the method of logic. Like the other darsanas, the summum bonum of the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems is the attainment of salvation. Moksa is brought about by a knowledge of the sixteen great topics of G a u t a m a ' s philosophy or the six or seven categories advanced by K a n a d a . ' The summum bonum consists in the "final cessation of pain." The cause of possible pain, namely, adrstarh (the resultant energy persisting in the self as a consequence of its prior activities) and samskara (potential tendencies), are neutralised, and thereby pain permanently ceases. The cessation of pain cannot be described as a state of bliss, because pleasure and pain are inextricably mixed. 10 Rather, salvation is a state of absolute unconsciousness, devoid of thought, feeling, and will. The self transcends all of its specific qualities, such as pain and pleasure, for none of these belong to its essential nature. Rid of these qualities, the self enters a condition of timeless freedom, untouched by the weary cycle of birth and death. The pain from which deliverance is sought is the last link of a chain of suffering that begins with false knowledge (mithyajñana). As the sütra states it, "pain, birth, activity, faults (defects) and misapprehension (wrong notion)—on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release."" Diagramatically, the chain of bondage can be illustrated thus: (False knowledge)—(Defects)—(Activity)—(Birth)—(Pain) We shall now examine each of these links to discover their ethical import.

ETHICS OF THE D A R C A N A P E R I O D

89

First, 'False knowledge'. False knowledge refers to various objects of cognition, and is of several forms. In respect to the soul, 'False knowledge' is in the form, 'there is no such thing as Soul.' Similarly, Not-Soul is regarded as Soul; pain as pleasure; the noneternal as eternal; nonsafety as safety; the fearful as free f r o m fear; what is fit to be rejected as worthy of being kept; activity as, 'there is no such thing as karman, nor any result of k a r m a n ' ; defects as, 'metempsychosis is not due to defects'; rebirth as, 'the birth of living beings is without cause'; the Highest Good as, 'it is something terrible, involving as it does the cessation of activity', 'in the Highest Good which consists in dissociation from all things, we lose much that is desirable,' 'how can any sane person have any longing for such Good, in which there is neither pleasure nor pain, nor any consciousness at all?" 2 Second, 'Defects'. From 'False Knowledge' proceeds attachment to the pleasant and aversion for the unpleasant; and under the influence of this attachment and aversion, 'Defects' appear. The sutra states, "There are three Groups of Defects;—-[all being included under] Desire, Hatred and Illusion, which are distinct from one another." 1 ' Vatsyayana enlarges upon this sutra, developing each of the three types. (1) D e s i r e — u n d e r w h i c h are i n c l u d e d L o v e ( f o r the o t h e r sex), S e l f i s h n e s s , L o n g i n g f o r a c q u i r i n g , in a l a w f u l manner, w h a t b e l o n g s to another, H a n k e r i n g ( f o r Rebirth) a n d G r e e d (desire f o r o b t a i n i n g , in a n u n l a w f u l manner, what b e l o n g s t o a n o t h e r ) . (2) H a t r e d — u n d e r w h i c h are i n c l u d e d A n g e r , J e a l o u s y , Envy, M a l i c e a n d Resentment. (3) I l l u s i o n — u n d e r w h i c h are i n c l u d e d Error, S u s p i c i o n , P r i d e , a n d Negligence.'4

Third, 'Activity'. Urged by the preceding 'Defects', when a man acts he commits evil in connection with the body, speech, and mind. Misdeeds pertaining to the body are: "killing, stealing, illicit intercourse." Misdeeds pertaining to speech are: "lying, rude talking and incoherent babbling." Misdeeds pertaining to the mind are: "malice, desire for things belonging to others, and materialism." These evil acts constitute sin and tend to adharma (vice, demerit). On the other hand, there are good acts consisting of the following: pertaining to the body: "charity, protecting and service"; pertaining to speech: "telling the truth, saying what is wholesome and agreeable, studying the Veda"; pertaining to the mind: "compassion, entertaining no desire for the belongings of other people, and faith." All such activities are good and tend to dharma (virtue, merit). 1 ! Vatsyayana further explains that the meaning of 'activity' (pravrtti) in

90

E T H I C S OF T H E D A R $ A N A

PERIOD

the preceding sutra is the result of activity, " i n the f o r m of Merit a n d Demerit; just as life being the result of f o o d , we speak of the life or living beings as ' f o o d ' . ' " 6 F o u r t h , ' B i r t h ' . Pravrtti in the f o r m of merit brings a b o u t high birth, a n d in the f o r m of demerit causes low birth. " B i r t h consists in the collective a p p e a r a n c e (in o n e congregated g r o u p ) of the Body, the SenseO r g a n s a n d the C o n s c i o u s n e s s . " 1 ' F i f t h , ' P a i n ' . F r o m the m o m e n t of birth there is pain. It is experienced as 'badhana' ( h a r r a s s m e n t ) , 'pida' (suffering), a n d 'tapa' (affliction). Everything is intermingled with pain. Life itself is " n o t h i n g but p a i n . " ' P a i n ' is s y m p t o m a t i c of the soul's uneasiness with i t s e l f . " T h u s empirical existence is a chain which holds the individual in bondage f r o m one cycle of existence to the next. O n the basis of this analysis of the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , it seems correct to conclude that the NyayaVaisesika p h i l o s o p h y is pessimistic. However, while the Nyaya-Vaisesika system is pessimistic regarding the way things are, it is optimistic a b o u t the way things can become. Ethically, this optimism lies in its a f f i r m a t i o n of m a n ' s v o l u n t a r y capacities to initiate, select a n d c h o o s e dharma against adharrna. Kanada's sutras o p e n on an ethical note: " N o w , t h e r e f o r e , we shall explain D h a r m a . " " T h e pain in the world is connected directly or indirectly t o m a n ' s selfishness on an individual or social scale, but the m o r a l training prescribed by this system is c o n f i d e n t a b o u t m a n ' s power to o v e r c o m e selfish desires a n d impulses. T h e system is also intellectually optimistic. It insists: k n o w l e d g e of the t r u t h does absolutely abolish pain. " D h a r m a (is) that f r o m which (results) the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of Exaltation a n d of the S u p r e m e G o o d . " 2 0 Since the N y a y a a n d Vaisesika philosophies teach the d o c t r i n e of release f r o m the coil of mortality, they are properly referred to as Moksasastras. We shall now e n q u i r e into the details of this optimistic d o c t r i n e of e m a n c i p a t i o n f r o m pain. Release comes t h r o u g h right knowledge. True k n o w l e d g e destroys the i g n o r a n c e (moha) which falsely i m p a r t s the n o t i o n of ' I ' (egoism, ahamkara). In the light of this saving knowledge, o n e can n o longer mist a k e the purely a d v e n t i t i o u s features connected with the self (pain, pleasure, knowledge, desire, volition, a n d so on) f o r its essential characteristics. N o d o u b t , the b o d y a n d manas are closely related to t h e self, but this relationship is not at all necessary. W h e n moha is d e s t r o y e d , dvesa (hatred) a n d raga ( n a r r o w love) fail to arise. W i t h the passing of aversion a n d a t t a c h m e n t , there is n o reason f o r activity, a n d , t h e r e f o r e , n o cause f o r samsara. N o m o r e birth m e a n s n o m o r e pain, a n d thereby o n e attains the highest good. 2 1

E T H I C S OF T H E D A R S A N A

91

PERIOD

T h e final question is: H o w does one a c q u i r e this true k n o w l e d g e that brings a b o u t the summum

bonum?

T h e discipline leading to the summum bonum is t w o f o l d : ethical a n d intellectual. T h e intellectual discipline c o n s i s t s o f study, r e f l e c t i o n , a n d m e d i t a t i o n . T h e sütra r e c o m m e n d s : [ T h e r e s h o u l d also be] r e p e t i t i o n o f the study o f the S c i e n c e , as a l s o friendly d i s c u s s i o n w i t h p e r s o n s l e a r n e d in t h e S c i e n c e . 1 - '

T h e ' " S c i e n c e " referred to is the " S c i e n c e o f the S o u l . " It is to be read, retained, and c o n t i n u o u s l y reflected u p o n . B y " f r i e n d l y discussion with persons learned in the S c i e n c e " is meant the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f the knowledge a c q u i r e d . It consists in: (1) the removing o f d o u b t s (2) the knowing o f things not already k n o w n (3) t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n (by the o p i n i o n s o f the l e a r n e d ) o f the c o n c l u s i o n s already arrived at ( b y o n e ' s self)-'"

In addition to the S c i e n c e o f the S o u l , the S c i e n c e o f Yoga is e n j o i n e d . T h r o u g h it, " m e t h o d s o f internal d i s c i p l i n e " a r e l e a r n e d . 2 4 T h e s e consist o f " P e n a n c e , C o n t r o l l i n g o f the B r e a t h , A b s t r a c t i o n o f the M i n d , C o n t e m p l a t i o n and C o n c e n t r a t i o n o f mind; and the practice o f the r e n o u n c ing o f o b j e c t s o f s e n s e . " 2 ' Yogic m e d i t a t i o n leads to a direct e x p e r i e n c e o f U l t i m a t e Truth. T h i s b r i e f description o f the intellectual discipline impresses us with the necessity o f an u n c o m m o n degree o f seriousness which is indispensa b l e f o r its u n d e r t a k i n g . T o help the .yog/« a c h i e v e this intense, undivided level o f mental poise a n d power, the ethical discipline is prescribed. T h e ethical discipline is only p r e p a r a t o r y to the intellectual discipline, but w i t h o u t it the second step is i m p o s s i b l e to t a k e . A clear and c o n c i s e description o f the ethical path t o w a r d moksa is f o u n d in the P a d a r t h a d h a r m a s a r t i g r a h a o f P r a s a s t a p a d a ( 4 0 0 A.D.). We shall f o c u s on two key c a t e g o r i e s o f ethics; dharma (merit or virtue), a n d adharma (lack o f merit, demerit). Dharma is described as the property o f m a n . It b r i n g s a b o u t t o t h e a g e n t h a p p i n e s s , m e a n s o f h a p p i n e s s a n d f i n a l d e l i v e r a n c e ; it is s u p e r s e n s u o u s ;

it is d e s t r u c t i b l e b y t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g o f t h e l a s t

i t e m o f h a p p i n e s s ; it is p r o d u c e d b y t h e c o n t a c t o f t h e m a n w i t h t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n , by m e a n s o f pure thoughts and d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; and with regard

to

the different castes and conditions o f men there are distinct m e a n s o f a c c o m plishing it.26

T h e m e a n s o f dharma are f o u n d in the Veda a n d the l a w b o o k s . T h e y c o m p r i s e the traditional varnas a n d asramas, a l o n g with the duties c o m -

92

E T H I C S OF T H E D A R Í A N A P E R I O D

mon to all men. The latter consists of the following: "faith in dharma, harmlessness, benevolence, truthfulness, freedom f r o m desire for undue possession, freedom f r o m lust, purity of intentions, absence of anger, bathing, use of purifying substances, devotion to deity, fasting, and nonneglect (of duties). 27 Adharma is also described as a quality of the self. It makes for sin and has dire consequences. It is imperceptible and is removed by the cognition of the last item of pain which results f r o m it. The causes of adharma are: (1) t h e d o i n g of a c t i o n s which a r c p r o h i b i t e d in the scriptures a n d which a r e c o n t r a r y t o the causes of d h a r m a , f o r e x a m p l e , h a r m f u l n e s s , u n t r u t h f u l ness, u n d u e possession (2) t h e n o n p e r f o r m a n c e of a c t i o n s e n j o i n e d in the scriptures, a n d (3) neglect (of d u t i e s ) . 2 '

These causes, along with impure motives, contaminate the mind, bringing about adharma. When a man who is not yet enlightened, performs the ceremonial acts of dharma for the sake of achieving worldly gain, his virtuous deeds lead him to "contact with desirable bodies and sense-organs and consequent experience of pleasures etc., in accordance with the impressions (left by his previous actions)—in such regions as those of Brahma, of Indra, of P r a j a p a t i , of pitrs (ancestors), or of men." 2 9 By the operation of the same moral law of karman, when a man performs acts which are predominantly of the nature of adharma, these acts bring about his "contact with bodies and sense-organs and consequent experience of pains etc., in such regions as those of ghosts and of the lower animals. And thus by the performance of such virtuous deeds as are in the form of outgoing activity (of the self), accompanied by sin, the man passes through the various divine, human and animal regions, again and again; and this is what constitutes his 'wheel of bondage'.'" 0 On the other hand, rising to an ethically higher plane, when a man performs dharma, motivated by spiritual insight, with no thought for worldly prosperity but only the desire for spiritual good, the result of such dharma for this soul is birth in a pure family. He has a longing to escape "the wheel of bondage," and with the help of a qualified teacher, he studies the six categories of Kanada which banish f r o m his mind all the spectres of illusion. With ignorance removed, he acquires the dispassion that frees him f r o m all attachments and aversions. When such feelings are eliminated, the production of dharma and adharma ceases. Then, when the dharma and adharma of his past lives are depleted, and all his affections have ceased, his future actions are characterised by pure dharma

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E T H I C S OF T H E D A R $ A N A P E R I O D

w h i c h t e n d s t o w a r d " p e a c e . " T h e s e a c t i o n s o f p u r e dharma

c r e a t e in h i m

a s e n s e o f h a p p y c o n t e n t m e n t a n d a d i s r e g a r d f o r his p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e . T h i s dharma

also ceases. " T h u s there being a c o m p l e t e cessation, the self

b e c o m e s " s e e d l e s s , " a n d t h e p r e s e n t b o d y f a l l i n g o f f , it t a k e s n o o t h e r bodies, a n d this c e s s a t i o n o f e q u i p m e n t with b o d i e s a n d o r g a n s , l i k e t h e e x t i n g u i s h i n g o f fire o n all its f u e l b e i n g b u r n t u p ,

being

constitutes

w h a t is c a l l e d " m o k s a " ( " f i n a l d e l i v e r a n c e " ) . " 3 ' I I I . E t h i c a l T h o u g h t ill S a m k h y a - Y o g a T h e a u t h o r s h i p o f the S a m k h y a system has been a t t r i b u t e d to the nigh legendary figure k n o w n as K a p i l a

(circa 7

B.C.).

The

Samkhya-Sutra

w h i c h b e a r s his n a m e , t h o u g h i n c o r p o r a t i n g s o m e a n c i e n t m a t e r i a l , is a l a t e r w o r k b e l o n g i n g t o t h e f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y A.D. T h e e a r l i e s t text o n h a n d d e a l i n g w i t h S a m k h y a p h i l o s o p h y is t h e S a m k h y a k a r i k a o f I s v a r a k r s n a . Its d a t e is t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y A.D. T h i s " p e a r l o f t h e w h o l e s c h o l a s tic l i t e r a t u r e o f I n d i a " h a s b e e n t h e s u b j e c t o f s e v e r a l f a m o u s c o m m e n t a ries, i n c l u d i n g S a m k h y a - t a t t v a - K a u m u d T b y V a c a s p a t i M i s r a , 8 5 0 A.D. Though

originally

opposed

to

the

religion

of

the

Brahmins,

the

S a m k h y a s y s t e m w a s a c c e p t e d a s ' o r t h o d o x ' b e c a u s e o f its a c k n o w l e d g ment o f the infallibility o f the Vedas. Its o w n i n f l u e n c e u p o n the sacred literature has been p r o f o u n d and f a r - r e a c h i n g , m o u l d i n g s o m e o f the i d e a s in t h e M a h a b h a r a t a , t h e L a w s o f M a n u , a n d t h e P u r a n a s . A s o n e s o u r c e s t r o n g l y s t a t e s it, t h e w h o l e o f I n d i a n l i t e r a t u r e " h a s b e e n s a t u r a t ed with the d o c t r i n e s o f the S a m k h y a . ' " 2 T h e s i s t e r s y s t e m t o t h e S a m k h y a is t h e Y o g a . It is a l s o r a n k e d a s o n e o f t h e o r t h o d o x s y s t e m s o f B r a h m a n i c p h i l o s o p h y . Its f o u n d e r , P a t a n j a l i (5 A . D . ) , is a u t h o r o f t h e c l a s s i c a l t e x t c a l l e d t h e Y o g a - s u t r a ,

probably

c o m p o s e d a f t e r A.D. 4 5 0 . I f t h i s d a t e p u t f o r t h b y J a c o b i is c o r r e c t , t h e n t h e a u t h o r is n o t t o b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e g r a m m a r i a n , P a t a n j a l i ,

who

lived in t h e s e c o n d c e n t u r y B.C. I m p o r t a n t c o m m e n t a t o r s o n t h e Y o g a s u t r a s i n c l u d e V y a s a (A.D. 5 0 0 ) a n d B h o j a (A.D. 1 0 0 0 ) . B o t h o f these systems are treated together b e c a u s e the Yoga

system

c o n c u r s w i t h t h e S a m k h y a o n all m a j o r p o i n t s p e r t a i n i n g t o p h y s i o l o g y , p s y c h o l o g y , a n d m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e is in r e s p e c t t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f G o d . W h e r e a s S a m k h y a is a t h e i s t i c , Y o g a is t h e i s t i c .

How-

e v e r , e v e n h e r e , t h e n o t i o n o f G o d is n o t i n t e g r a l t o Y o g a , b e i n g i n s e r t e d to placate the theists, a n d to m a k e a v a i l a b l e the m e a n s o f g r a c e f o r hum a n deliverance. In respect to ethics, the difference between these t w o s c h o o l s lies in t h e f a c t t h a t w h i l e S a m k h y a is t h e o r e t i c a l , Y o g a is p r a c tical. T h e summum

bonum

p e r f e c t i o n o f Purusa.

o f all e t h i c a l e n d e a v o u r s is t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e T h i s is b r o u g h t a b o u t b y t h e h i g h e s t

knowledge

94

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or vivekajnana. Intuitively, the jiva learns to discriminate between the Purusa a n d Prakrti, a n d thereby returns to its true self. E v e r y jTva h a s in it t h e h i g h e r p u r u s a , a n d t o r e a l i s e its t r u e n a t u r e h a s n o n e e d t o g o o u t o f i t s e l f , b u t o n l y t o b e c o m e c o n s c i o u s o f its r e a l n a t u r e . T h e e t h i c a l p r o c e s s is n o t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s o m e t h i n g n e w , b u t a r e - d i s c o v e r y of w h a t we h a v e f o r g o t t e n . "

This brief description of the summum bonum shows that the ethics of this system is f o u n d e d u p o n its metaphysics. T h e r e f o r e , ere we get i n t o the latter we must explicate its metaphysical basis. T h e S a m k h y a - Y o g a system is ontologically dualistic. It postulates t w o u n c r e a t e d , i n d e p e n d e n t , a n d eternal principles k n o w n as Purusa a n d Prakrti. Purusa, the spiritual principle, a n d prakrti, the material principle, are the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l essences of our conscious a n d unconscious experiences. All experiences arise f r o m this duality between Purusa, the knower, a n d Prakrti, the k n o w n . Together they f o r m the matrix f r o m which the p h e n o m e n a l universe evolves. Prakrti, the c h a n g i n g object, is the causa materialis of the whole world of b e c o m i n g . K a p i l a ' s a f f i r m a t i o n of the reality of m a t t e r is in direct opposition to those doctrines that would treat it as illusory a p p e a r a n c e . " T h e theory of causality explaining this evolution is k n o w n as parinamavada. It holds that the effect is only a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e cause. T h e effect resides in the cause in a potential f o r m prior to m a n i f e s tation. W h e n we say, for instance, that curd is p r o d u c e d f r o m milk, we m e a n that milk c o n t a i n i n g the potency of the curd has b r o u g h t it out into actuality. Several p r o o f s are o f f e r e d in s u p p o r t of this t h e o r y . " T h e existence of Prakrti is proved t h r o u g h inferential reasoning, a n d not by recourse to revelation. 3 6 This shows the consistently rationalistic p o s t u r e of the S a m k h y a system. By the aid of reason, the n a t u r e of Prakrti is also explained. Since the effect is only a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the cause, the n a t u r e of the cause can be deduced f r o m the n a t u r e of the effect. U p o n analysis, the physical universe is seen t o possess three basic properties called gunas: t h e r e f o r e , the U n m a n i f e s t cause must also be characterised by similar c o n s t i t u e n t s . " It should be n o t e d that while gunas a r e translated as " a t t r i b u t e s " a n d " q u a l i t i e s , " these attributes are properties n o n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m substance. T h e sattva, rajas, a n d tamas gunas are described as of the n a t u r e of " p l e a s u r e , p a i n , a n d delusion; they serve the p u r p o s e of illumination, action, a n d restraint; a n d they are mutually s u b j u g a t i v e a n d s u p p o r t i n g , a n d p r o d u c t i v e a n d cooperative. T h e Sattva a t t r i b u t e is held to be buoyant a n d illuminating; the r a j a s a t t r i b u t e exciting a n d mobile; a n d t h e t a m a s a t t r i b u t e sluggish a n d enveloping. Their f u n c t i o n i n g is f o r a single

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purpose, like that of a lamp." 3 8 Expanding on the figure of the lamp, the commentator Vacaspati explains: We h a v e all o b s e r v e d h o w t h e w i c k a n d t h e o i l — e a c h , b y i t s e l f , o p p o s e d t o t h e a c t i o n o f t h e f i r e — c o - o p e r a t e , w h e n in c o n t a c t w i t h fire, f o r the s i n g l e p u r p o s e o f g i v i n g light; . . . t h e t h r e e a t t r i b u t e s , t h o u g h p o s s e s s e d o f m u t u ally c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r o p e r t i e s , c o - o p e r a t e t o w a r d s a s i n g l e e n d ; — " f o r t h e single p u r p o s e " o f t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n o f the s p i r i t . "

When the gunas are in a state of equilibrium, there is no evolution. The gunas maintain their dynamic character, but do not interact with one another. Change within unconscious Prakrit from the state of dissolution (pralayaj to that of evolution (sarga) is attributed to the proximity of conscious Purusa (samnidhimatra). Acting like a magnet, the presence of Purusa draws the gunas into a state of excitation, and starts them off on their evolutionary cycle. By combining in various proportions, the gunas give rise to the manifold variety in the physical world. The union between conscious though inactive Purusa with active though unconscious Prakrti is compared to the union that exists between a blind man carrying a lame man on his shoulders, " F r o m this union proceeds evolution." 4 0 The order of evolution is clearly drawn. 4 1 The first product of evolving prakrti is mahat ("the great one"). It is the basis of the individual's intelligence (buddhi). Looked at in its cosmic aspect as that which holds in it potentialities for further development, it is called mahat. Seen from the point of view of forming the physical basis for psychical activity in each individual, it is called buddhi. Though physical, buddhi functions psychically, because of its proximity to, and temporary association with, Purusa. Ahamkara (egoism) is derived from buddhi. It is the principle of individuation. According to the Samkhya-karika, there are three types of ahamkara corresponding to the three gunas.41 The five sensory organs and the five motor organs are derived f r o m the sattva aspect of ahamkara manas (mind). The five subtle elements are produced from the lamas aspect of ahamkara, and from these, the five gross elements are derived. Rajas guna provides the energy for these productions of ahamkara. Some comments need to be made on how these twenty-five principles of Prakrti are related to the ethical process. Unlike some other systems where the principle of matter is equated with the principle of evil, the Samkhya system suggests no such moral dualism. To the contrary, both the design and function of Prakrti are

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aimed at liberation of Purusa. The karika says: "As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of spirit." 4 1 Hiriyanna comments, T h e n o t e w o r t h y p o i n t here is the physical a c c o m p a n i m e n t o f m a n as well as his e n v i r o n m e n t is neither h o s t i l e or i n d i f f e r e n t t o his a t t a i n i n g the ideal o f f r e e d o m . T h r o u g h t h e m rather, Prakrti is ever e d u c a t i n g h i m i n t o a fuller k n o w l e d g e o f h i m s e l f with a view to securing that result. N a t u r e t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t , in the e n d , be said t o e n s l a v e spirit. In fact, it b e h a v e s t o w a r d s m a n as a "veritable fairy godmother."' 1 4

The doctrine of the gunas also has "great ethical significance." 4 5 The gunas provide the foundation for three types of ethical activities. 46 Sattva guna gives rise to virtuous conduct (dharma) expressed as kindness, sense control, absence of hate, reflection. Rajas guna gives rise to indifferent conduct shown by anger, avarice, passion, discontent, rudeness, and violence. Tamas guna gives rise to bad conduct through apathy, sloth, laziness, enslavement to women, intoxication, and impurity. The fact that all of these ethical activities are superseded when enlightenment breaks, should not detract from the preparatory significance of ethics. Through sattva guna, the buddhi arrives at its original condition of purity, and only then is in a position to experience intuitive knowledge. Goodness does not touch the Purusa inasmuch as the ethical life is limited to the empirical sphere, but without goodness the Purusa cannot be distinguished from Prakrti. The principle next to buddhi, namely, ahamkara, is also understood in ethical terms. Unselfish actions, arising from this principle of individualisation, are an indirect means of moksa." Other elements conceived ethically are those which comprise the subtle body or lihgasarTra. In addition to the buddhi and ahamkara, these are the eleven organs of sense and the five tanmatras. The subtle body is attached to the self. It is the empirical storehouse of all past karman. Unlike the gross body, it is unaffected by birth and death. 4 8 The ethical significance of the lihgasarTra resides in the prerequisite that before saving knowledge can dawn, the storehouse, especially in the area of buddhi, must be morally cleansed. Then, when right knowledge comes, the lihgasarTra leaves the self. We had stopped to point out some ethical aspects of Prakrti. We must now move on to a consideration of the second ultimate principle in this dualistic philosophy, and that is Purusa. Like Prakrti, Purusa is without beginning and without end. In all other respects, Purusa is essentially different f r o m Prakrti. Positively stated, all that can really be said of Purusa is that it is 'pure spirit'. 4 9 Neg-

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atively, Purusa is unbound, inactive, impassive, motionless, and attributeless. Five proofs are offered for the existence of Purusa.50 Reasoned arguments are also presented for the "multiplicity of selves." 51 Individual souls are of an infinite plurality and are not to be mistaken for emanations from a World Soul. The relation between the soul and the inner organ (buddhi, ahamkara, and manas) is somewhat difficult to grasp. Though completely passive and independent, 'by virtue of its nearness', the soul excites the incessant processes of the inner organ into a state of consciousness. This influence of Purusa is metaphorically described as illumination, or is illustrated by comparing the soul to a mirror in which the inner organ is reflected. The experience of consciousness which the soul brings about in the internal organ is characterised by suffering. Even pleasure 'is accounted pain by the wise'. The soul, being "by nature, eternal, and eternally pure, enlightened, and unconfined," 5 2 does not suffer; but because, as in a looking glass, it reflects the inner organ which is the seat of all suffering, it seems that the soul itself is bound by p a i n . " The cause of bondage is ignorance of the true nature of Purusa. Through 'want of discrimination' (aviveka), the essential distinction of the soul from the inner organ and senses is not recognized. This ignorance goes back to the disposition inherited from previous births. Release from bondage comes through the highest knowledge (vivekajnana). It is intuitive and consists in the clear recognition that all activity and suffering takes place in Prakrti, and that Purusa stands above all the change and sorrow connected with the weary round of rebirth and death. When this enlightenment dawns, the activity of Prakrti ceases. "As a dancer desists from dancing, having exhibited herself to the audience, so does Primal Nature desist, having exhibited herself to the spirit." 54 Enlightenment does not bring life to an immediate end. As the following verse explains, life persists for some time. Virtue a n d the rest h a v i n g c e a s e d as c a u s e s , b e c a u s e o f the a t t a i n m e n t o f p e r f e c t w i s d o m , the spirit remains i n v e s t e d with the b o d y , b e c a u s e o f the f o r c e o f past i m p r e s s i o n s , like the whirl o f the p o t t e r ' s w h e e l , w h i c h persists f o r a w h i l e o f the m o m e n t u m i m p a r t e d by a prior i m p u l s e . "

How does one attain vivekajMna? The most important path is through the practice of yoga. The Sartikhya Sutra gives prominence to the discipline of dhyana (meditation) as the means for restoring buddhi to its original sattvika condition. With controlled senses and tranquil mind, purified buddhi is able to reflect the effulgence of Purusa.56 On account of the ascetic element engendered by yoga, it would be un-

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fair t o say that asceticism stifles the spring f r o m which the m o r a l life flows. S a m k h y a does not discourage v i r t u o u s c o n d u c t . It only says that good deeds must be p e r f o r m e d in a spirit of d e t a c h m e n t if they are to lead to l i b e r a t i o n . " G o o d deeds d o n e with the h o p e of happiness receive their reward in a t e m p o r a r y heaven. But such morality is shortsighted. It only p o s t p o n e s the c o n q u e s t of evil. It is not the final answer to terminating the " t h r e e f o l d m i s e r y . " " G o o d deeds p e r f o r m e d in the spirit of d e t a c h m e n t are free of hopes a n d fears, rewards a n d p u n i s h m e n t s . Their chief characteristic is kindness f o r all f o r m s of life—not only h u m a n , but animal a n d vegetable also. T h e S a r h k h y a - k a r i k a boldly labels the host or religious rites laid d o w n in the Veda as the m e a n s of t e r m i n a t i n g misery, categorically inefficient a n d i m p u r e . Vacaspati c o m m e n t s : T h e i m p u r i t y lies in t h e fact o f the S o m a a n d o t h e r s a c r i f i c e s b e i n g a c c o m p a n i e d by the killing o f a n i m a l s a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f g r a i n s a n d s e e d s . ' '

As part of its tirade against Vedic morality, the S a m k h y a f o r b i d s gifts to priests in the expectation of collecting merit. This is not to say it devalues the ancient h o n o u r ascribed to the teacher of spiritual w i s d o m . A good teacher is one w h o is himself free; a n d it is not i m p o r t a n t whether he is a B r a h m i n or n o t . Finding such a guru is contingent on virtuous c o n d u c t in the past. A n d as a n o t h e r strike against caste, S u d r a s are not b a r r e d f r o m receiving instruction in the highest knowledge. T h u s , while g r a n t i n g ethical conduct its correct place in the e c o n o m y of life, S a m k h y a radically reinterprets ethics in the light of its metaphysics. As J. G h o s h puts it: It is b a s e d o n a r e v i s i o n o f v a l u e s , in f a c t , o n a n e w c o n v i c t i o n that o u r j o y s and sorrows form a chequered procession o f e m p t y pageantry with which t h e s o u l c a n h a v e n o real c o n c e r n . A n d it i n v o l v e s r e n u n c i a t i o n o f p r i z e s a n d p l e a s u r e s w i t h i n o u r g r a s p as well a s a b s t i n e n c e f r o m a c t i v e s e r v i c e o f t h e h u m a n race, s o that if it d o e s n o t f u r n i s h t h e m o t i v e s f o r a r e s o l u t e a p p l i c a t i o n o f o u r e n e r g y t o w h a t are g e n e r a l l y r e g a r d e d as i m p o r t a n t t a s k s , n e i t h e r d o e s it c h e c k a n d d e f e a t o u r m a n h o o d , f o r in a s k i n g us t o g i v e u p g o o d t h i n g s , it a s k s u s t o b e s t r o n g a g a i n s t t h e s t r e n g t h o f o u r r e b e l l i o u s p a s s i o n s a n d to curb the m a d n e s s o f o u r wills. . . .

It h o l d s that t h e m a n o f t h e w o r l d

d o e s n o t s e e l i f e s t e a d i l y o r s e e it w h o l e , a n d it r e j e c t s in c o n s e q u e n c e t h e r e m e d i e s that h e s u g g e s t s f o r t h e e v i l s that b e s e t l i f e , w h i l e it s e e k s in t h o u g h t a l o n e a w a y o u t o f t h e m b e c a u s e t h e y are f o u n d t o arise out o f a persistent obliquity o f vision.*0

F o r a fuller t r e a t m e n t of the m e a n s t o w a r d the acquisition of saving knowledge, we must turn to the Yoga system of P a t a n j a l i . Its e m p h a s i s is t w o f o l d : ascetic p r e p a r a t i o n a n d yogic training.

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In keeping with the metaphysical presuppositions which are almost identical with Sartikhya, the Yoga system holds the mental state of desirelessness (vairagya) as its ethical ideal. The Yoga Sutra defines desirelessness as the "consciousness of supremacy in him who is free from thirst for perceptible and scriptural enjoyments." 6 1 The bhasya on this verse explains: A mind free from attachment to perceptible enjoyments, such as women, foods, drinks, and power, and having no thirst for scriptural enjoyables, such as heaven and the attainment of the states of videha (disembodied) and the prakrtilaya (absorbed in Nature), has, when it comes into contact with such divine and worldly objects, a consciousness of its supremacy due to an understanding of the defects of the objects, brought about by virtue of intellectual illumination. This consciousness of power is the same as the consciousness of indifference to their enjoyment, and is devoid of all desirable and undesirable objects as such. This mental state is desirelessness (vairagya) kl

Vairagya is of a lesser and higher quality, the latter being consequent upon the knowledge of Purusa.bi Turning from the ethical norm to the practical method of its achievement, we come to the Eightfold Means (astahga) of Yoga. 64 These eight accessories are: "Restraint, observance, posture, regulation of breath, abstraction (of the senses), concentration, meditation and trance." 6 5 Of these, the first two, restraint (yama) and observance (niyama), are of direct ethical significance. The moral ingredients of yama are: "abstinence f r o m injury, veracity, abstinence from theft, continence, and abstinence f r o m avariciousness." 66 The first ingredient, noninjury or ahimsa, provides the ethical framework for all the other virtues. Ahimsa is more than nonviolence; it is nonhatred (vairatyagah).61 Its scope is universal. It is "not limited by life-state, space, time and circumstance." 6 8 That is to say, ahimsa cannot be relativised by a series of " i f ' s " , " a n d ' s " , and " b u t ' s . " The bhasya on this verse exposes some of the rationalisations that would constrict the universal character of ahimsa. Abstinence from injury is limited to life-state, as for example, the injury inflicted by a fisherman is limited to fish alone, and to none else. The same is limited to space, as, for example, in the case of a man w h o says to himself, "I shall not injure at a sacred place." The same is limited to time, as for example, in the case of the man w h o says to himself, "I shall not cause injury on the sacred day of the caturda£l(the fourteenth) of the lunar fortnight." The same in the case of the man w h o has given up the three injuries is limited by circumstance, as, for example, when a man says to himself, "I shall cause injury only for the sake of gods and brahmins and not in any other

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w a y . " O r , as f o r e x a m p l e , i n j u r y is c a u s e d by s o l d i e r s in b a t t l e a l o n e a n d n o w h e r e else. . . . U n i v e r s a l is t h a t w h i c h p e r v a d e s all c o n d i t i o n s of life, e v e r y w h e r e , a l w a y s , a n d is n o w h e r e o u t of p l a c e . T h e y a r e called t h e g r e a t vow."

The second ethical value of the Eightfold Means is observance or niyama. The ingredients of niyama are: "cleanliness, contentment, purificatory action, study and the making of the Lord in the motive of all action." 7 0 The ideas are amplified in the following passage: By c l e a n l i n e s s is m e a n t disgust w i t h o n e ' s b o d y , a n d c e s s a t i o n of c o n t a c t with others. A n d u p o n t h e e s s e n c e (of m i n d ) b e c o m i n g p u r e , c o m e h i g h - m i n d e d n e s s , o n e - p o i n t e d n e s s , c o n t r o l of t h e senses, a n d fitness f o r t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e self. By c o n t e n t m e n t , t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of e x t r e m e h a p p i n e s s . By p u r i f i c a t o r y act i o n s , t h e r e m o v a l of i m p u r i t y a n d t h e a t t a i n m e n t s of t h e p h y s i c a l b o d y a n d t h e senses. By s t u d y c o m e c o m m u n i o n w i t h t h e d e s i r e d deity. T h e a t t a i n m e n t t r a n c e , by m a k i n g Tsvara t h e m o t i v e of all a c t i o n s . "

of

Just as ahimsa is normative for goodness, it is also normative for evil. "Sins are the causing of injury to others and all the rest." The moral ramifications of an evil deed are analysed with respect to agent, cause, scope, and consequence. . . . [Sins] a r e d o n e , c a u s e d t o b e d o n e , a n d p e r m i t t e d t o b e d o n e ; t h e y a r e p r e c e d e d b y d e s i r e , a n g e r , a n d i g n o r a n c e ; t h e y a r e slight, m i d d l i n g , a n d int e n s e ; t h e i r result is a n i n f i n i t y of p a i n a n d u n w i s d o m . 7 2

The method for avoiding the contemplation of an evil deed is by saturating the mind with thoughts of its disgusting effects. "The habituation to the contrary tendencies becomes the cause of removing sins. . . ," 73 Thus, by cultivating yama and niyama, "the Ten Commandments of Yoga," and by avoiding sin, the yogin develops a serene detachment from the pleasures of this world, and from blessings in the world to come. 7 4 Once the individual is ethically prepared, he embarks upon a rigorous course of yogic training aimed at disciplining the body and mind, both of which are seen as closely connected. T h e p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g t h e w h o l e discipline is t h a t m a n ' s f a c u l t i e s a r e b y l o n g h a b i t a d j u s t e d t o t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e e m p i r i c a l self a n d t h a t t h e y m u s t b e r e a d j u s t e d s o as t o s e c u r e t h e t o t a l l y o p p o s i t e a i m of r e s t o r i n g t h e p u r u s a - e l e m e n t in it t o its t r u e c o n d i t i o n . "

The stages in the yogic training are: posture (asana), breath control (pranayama), withdrawal of senses from their objects (pratyahara), at-

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tention (dharana), contemplation (dhyana), and meditative a b s o r p t i o n (samadhi). Step by step, the psychophysical discipline of yoga elevates the seeker f r o m the gross levels of existence to its subtle heights, until the pinnacle of concentration is achieved. This is the state of asamprajnata samadhi.1'' It is 'superconscious' samadhi, leading directly to kaivalya which is complete isolation. In this state the originally pure nature of Purusa is experienced, and all mortal sufferings—psychological (adhyatmika), environmental (adhibhautika), and supernatural (adhidaivika)—are totally transcended. IV. Ethical Thought in the Purva Mimamsa T h e summum bonum in the early M i m a m s a was the a t t a i n m e n t of heaven through the due p e r f o r m a n c e of rituals. Jaimini explains in his M i m a m s a Sutra that the p u r p o s e of sacrifice was to merit the reward of heaven in a n o t h e r world: "Let one desirous of heaven p e r f o r m a sacrifice." 7 7 In c o n j u n c t i o n with this goal, dharma, artha, and kama (trivarga) were a d o p t e d as the values for which men must aspire. T h e absence of moksa f r o m this threefold scheme of values differentiated the M i m a m s a f r o m other systems of H i n d u philosophy. Later developments in the M i m a m s a doctrine entailed the acceptance of the prevailing ideal of moksa as the ultimate aim of life. In place of svarga, the highest good is now defined as apavarga or escape f r o m samsara. W h e n the cycle of rebirths is stopped, the soul enters the state of moksa where it abides in its own essential nature. W h a t is the nature of the soul? While the M l m a r h s a k a writers deny the existence of a C r e a t o r G o d , they entertain no d o u b t s a b o u t the existence of the soul. 7 8 Both P r a b h a k a r a and Kumarila extrapolate the a r g u m e n t s for the soul's existence contained in S a h a r a ' s Bhasya. 7 9 Since the fruits of sacrifice are to be reaped in another world, there must be a p e r m a n e n t spiritual entity which survives the death of the body a n d which reaps what it has sown. If this were not the case it would mean that the Vedas which advocate the rewards of sacrifice in heaven would be of d o u b t f u l validity. A moral objection to the argument claiming it is necessary to posit an eternal entity which sows seed and reaps their result, is that the reaper has n o knowledge of what he has sown in his previous existence. This missing link between the deed and the consciousness of the deed undercuts the value of assuming the need for a p e r m a n e n t moral agent. Besides, it is natural to expect that the agent could engage in f o r b i d d e n acts, a n d yet take c o m f o r t in the realisation that when the day of reckoning d a w n s , he shall be blissfully ignorant of the sins he has sown on earth.

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Lack of terrestrial memories is irrelevant, replies Kumarila. Who is worthy of sacrificing? Only those who are morally and spiritually fit: and men of such character fully realise that what they do is governed by the moral law of the universe even though they cannot establish all the links within the causal nexus. The nature of the soul as " I " is perceived through mental intuition (manasa-pratyaksa). In common with Nyaya-Vaisesika schools, the conception of the soul is realistic and pluralistic. There are many souls, different in each body, all of which are eternal, universal, and permanent substances. 80 Though eternal, the soul undergoes modifications. On this point of modal change in the soul, the Bhatta school parts ways with the view of the Prabhakaras. The Bhattas find no contradiction between permanence and change. Everyday experience demonstrates that things can change constantly without becoming different. The movement of the waves does not change the identity of the ocean, nor does the uncoiling of the snake change its essence. It is, therefore, quite consistent to believe in the eternality of the soul and at the same time to affirm that it undergoes change of form. The soul as eternal, permanent substance is completely different to the body, the senses, and the understanding. Through the instrumentality of its psychophysical organism the soul experiences pleasure and pain, and is able to relate within the world. The soul survives the death of its body, and in the next world assumes another body whose character is fixed by the moral quality of the soul in its previous existence. This shackling of the soul to the world by virtue of the body, the sense, the motor organs, and the mind, constitutes the bondage of the soul. Bondage continues through an unending cycle of lives, each of which has been morally determined by karman. Since karman is the cause of bondage, emancipation is brought about by the removal of karman. One path leading to emancipation is the way of dharma. The purpose of the Mlmartisa Sutra, as stated by Jaimini, is "the enquiry into dharma (duty)." 8 1 He defines the subject as follows: " D h a r m a is that which is indicated by means of the Veda as conducive to be the highest good." 8 2 Central to this scheme of the good life was sacrificial action. There were three kinds of actions: (1) Kamyakarmas or optional deeds which gather merit; (2) Pratisiddhakarmas or forbidden deeds which incur demerit; and (3) Nityakarmas or unconditional duties, such as the regular offering of twilight prayers (sandhya). The Veda is "the means of arriving at the right notion of ' d h a r m a ' ", says the Slokavarttika. 8 3 The Mlmarhsakas generally apply the word 'Veda' to the ritualistic texts of the second stage of Vedic literature and less frequently to the Rgvedic hymns. If the question of the authority of

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these ritualistic texts were raised, the MTmamsa writers would respond with Jaimini that the Veda is superhuman, eternal, uncreated, and therefore not open to doubt. The unquestioned authority of the Vedas is maintained with utmost tenacity, because, if the texts were the works of men, like other human creations, they would be limited and fallible, and, therefore, in no position to legislate duty or promise any rewards, especially the rewards of heaven. Replying to the objection that the Veda's authorship is identified with certain persons and therefore cannot be eternal, Kumarila tries to offer reasons why this is not the case and concludes with this statement: T h e Veda naturally a b a n d o n s the d e n o t a t i o n of non-eternal m e a n i n g s , — i n a s m u c h as such d e n o t a t i o n is f o u n d t o be i m p o s s i b l e with regard t o the Veda, by considering alternatives of eternality and non-eternality with regard to it. B e c a u s e if the Veda be eternal its d e n o t a t i o n cannot but be eternal; and if it be noneternal (caused), then it can have n o validity ( w h i c h is not possible, as w e have already proved the validity o f the Veda); and as for the theory that the Veda consists of assertions of intoxicated (and senseless) people, this theory has been already rejected a b o v e — ( a n d as such the validity and hence the eternality of the Veda cannot be d o u b t e d ) . 1 4

In their anxiety to uphold the supreme authority of the Vedas, the MTmartisakas deny the existence of a creator. 85 Though they continue the Vedic cult of sacrifice to the gods, their only interest is in ceremonialism, and the gods "gradually recede and fade into mere grammatical datives." 86 A deity c o m e s to be described not by its moral or intellectual qualities, but, as that which is signified, in a sacrificial i n j u n c t i o n , by the fourth caseending (the sign o f a dative, t o w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is given). In short, a deity is necessary merely as that in w h o s e name an o b l a t i o n is to be o f f e r e d at a sacrifice. But the primary object o f p e r f o r m i n g a sacrifice, says an eminent MTmamsaka, is not worship: it is not t o please any deity. . . . A ritual is t o be p e r f o r m e d just b e c a u s e the Vedas command us to p e r f o r m t h e m . "

Having no divine dispenser of rewards and punishments, how does the MTmamsa explain the reaping of dharma and adharma in view of the long lapse between act and consequence? Jaimini finds the solution to this problem in the notion of apurva. Literally, it refers to something without previous existence, hence something new. Apurva provides the necessary link between act and consequence. 88 It may be viewed either as "the imperceptible antecedent of the fruit, or as the after-state of the act." 8 9 Thus, the deferred consummation of an act is attained through the unseen efficacy of apurva which remains in the performer and is realized in the future life.' 0 Jaimini says: "There is apurva because action (is

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enjoined)." Through this concept the Mimaitisa philosophy lays down an idealistic and mystical basis for ethical action. Thus far we have stated that dharma is the means to moksa and that the revelation of dharma is found in the Vedas. This dharma is based on the eternal validity of the scriptures; its standard is supernatural; and it is constituted of such duties whose spiritual potency is conserved through the efficient medium of apurva. This definition of dharma obviously excludes common morality. Kumarila explicitly states: "We should distinguish between what relates to dharma and moksa which is known from the Veda and what relates to artha and kama which is learnt by worldly discourse."" At the same time, ordinary morality is considered an essential prerequisite of spirituality, so that though ceremonialism may be distinct from morality, it is not divorced from morality. The correlation is clear: "the Vedas cleanse not the unrighteous." The only time moral laws are suspended is on those rare occasions when the injunctions of dharma are granted precedence as in the case of ritualistic offerings of animals, despite the common ban on injury to living beings. The role of dharma in the process leading to moksa is as follows. First, according to the P r a b h a k a r a school, there is the experience of disenchantment with mortal existence because it is pervasively fraught with pain. To be sure, life has its pleasures, but to gain them is pain and to lose them is pain. This experience of disillusionment over what the world has to offer moves the aspirant to free himself from life in the world. He has the choice to follow a twofold path—the path of karman and the path of knowledge. The discipline of karman calls for the control of passions. By abstaining from forbidden deeds (pratisiddha) which incur demerit and consequent punishment and by eschewing optional deeds (kamya) which produce merit and subsequent reward, the disciple eliminates those karmans which bind him to the world. The only karmans he is obliged to perform are nityakarmas (unconditional duties). The object of nityakarmas is not worship, nor purification, nor moral improvement, but obedience to the commands of the Vedas. 92 These commands being categorical, must be carried out in the spirit of disinterest. Failure to do so is violation of Vedic law, and this is tantamount to the conscious commital of forbidden sins. Thus, by abstention from pratisiddha and kamyakarmas which give rise to demerit and merit, and by adherence to the nityakarmas for no other reason than that are enjoined by the Vedas, passion is controlled, and deeds binding one to samsara are eliminated. Simultaneously, karmans accumulated in the past are gradually exhausted through experience.

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In addition to the discipline of karman is the discipline of jfiana. Through the cultivation of meditation, one gains insight into the true nature of the self, and this self-knowledge ensues in liberation. P r a b h a k a r a argues that liberation must be the product or jfiana because the Vedas prescribe the cultivation of knowledge with no ulterior purpose. Many moral virtues accompany the birth of knowledge, such as equanimity, continence, and self-control. The Kumarila school is substantially in agreement with the P r a b h a k a r a s in respect to the process of liberation. However, it emphasises that jfiana is only an indirect means to moksa. Positively, knowledge of the self and its distinction from the body is an aid to performing obligatory sacrifices. Negatively, it prevents the production of future karman. By itself, jfiana is incapable of cancelling the accumulation of past karmans. The only way the moral stock of past deeds can be dissipated is through the consuming effect of experience. Jfiana is therefore not a direct, but an indirect, means to moksa. How does the Mlmarhsa conceive of moksa? Since bondage is the attachment of the self to the world through the physical body, the organs of sense, and the manas, moksa is the elimination of these ties through the cessation of rebirth." For P r a b h a k a r a , moksa is "the absolute cessation of the body caused by the disappearance of dharma and a d h a r m a . " Kumarila defines moksa as a condition in which the self is delivered from pain. Though the enlightened self realizes that its relation to the world is not essential, there is no implication in either writer that the relationship between the individual self and the world is not real; nor is there any hint of the Vedantic notion suggesting the sublation of the world in moksa. The reality of the physical world is at all times emphasised, because, for one thing, it provides the basis for differentiating between virtue and vice. In the state of moksa the self is unconscious. Consciousness only arises out of the relation of the self to the world by the instrumentality of its psychophysical organism. When this association of body and soul ceases, consciousness and such other mental states as jfiana, pleasure and pain also cease. The self is not even conscious of itself! 94 It is, therefore, erroneous to assert that the state of moksa, is one of 'pure bliss'. All that can be said is that the soul abides in its intrinsic nature as absolute substance having existence, and though not conscious, as having the potentiality for consciousness. So the goodness of moksa is not based on the attainment of bliss, but on the total transcendence of pain. 9 5 Later Bhattas introduced the Advaitin view of moksa as the experience of ananda, but this development has no foundation in Kumarila's teaching. 96 In respect to social ethics, we shall briefly touch on the Mlmamsa's

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views of caste a n d the position of w o m e n . J a i m i n i helps p e r p e t u a t e the caste cult. Replying to the c o n t e n t i o n that "all f o u r castes [are entitled t o t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of sacrifices],—there being n o distinctions," J a i m i n i offers the ' t r u e view' on t h o s e eligible to p e r f o r m sacrifices. In reality, the acts in question can be performed by the three (higher) castes only; as in connection with the "Installation of Fire" these three only have been mentioned: (the sudra) therefore can have no connection with sacrifices; the Veda being applicable to the brahmin (and the other two castes) only;—such is the opinion of A t r e y a . "

T h e rationale f o r arriving at the preceding value j u d g m e n t is based u p o n the exact m e a n i n g of the castes derived f r o m the w o r d s used in the texts. B r a h m i n s , K$atriyas, Vaisyas, a n d S u d r a s respectively refer to: (1) intellect, (2) ahamkara a n d m i n d , (3) the senses a n d (4) the o b j e c t s of senses. 9 8 Since S u d r a has reference to objects of senses, it seems plain t o J a i m i n i that the f o u r t h caste c a n n o t p e r f o r m any act c o n n e c t e d with the intellect. This m e a n s the S u d r a lacks the capacity to p e r f o r m such spiritual acts as sacrifices. Regarding the S u d r a a n d material m a t t e r s , J a i m i n i states: " T h e three castes can acquire wealth because it is a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h a c t i o n . ' " 9 T h e acquisition of wealth is accomplished by intellect, mind a n d the senses — faculties which represent the three u p p e r castes. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the S u d r a s or o b j e c t s of senses c a n n o t a p p r o p r i a t e wealth because they themselves are wealth. 1 0 0 W h e r e a s a S u d r a c a n n o t be considered an actor, a w o m a n can. J a i m i n i clarifies the a c t o r in terms of m a n a n d w o m a n . H e says: According to Aitisayana, an actor should be described as a man (or a word in the masculine gender), because that is the best way of doing so. We should accept his view; but, if in spite of this, we misinterpret or find fault with the text, the error would lie in our own lack of knowledge. Badarayana says that the reference to "man" is to the species or the human race (as opposed to an individual), and so the term is used without any special distinction of sex. For that reason even a w o m a n should be regarded as an actor, because so far as the species is concerned, there is no distinction (between man and woman); and we cannot admit that there is any. But if the term "man" is distinctly said to refer to the male, we should take it to be in accordance with what the sacred books have said. 101

Next, does t h e w o m a n have the right to possess p r o p e r t y ? Against those w h o answer the question in the negative, J a i m i n i a r g u e s t h a t she can, but with a certain provision of limitation. So far as effort to secure a certain result is concerned, there is no distinction between a man and a woman; and this is proved by the fact that the two

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are u n i t e d t o g e t h e r t o s e c u r e a c o m m o n end (an o f f s p r i n g ) . S o far as the purc h a s e o f a w o m a n is c o n c e r n e d , i: is o n l y a m a t t e r o f c u s t o m ; for if w e can see f o r o u r s e l v e s that w o m e n d o p o s s e s s w e a l t h ; a n d if a w o m a n c a n d o so, it f o l l o w s that she c a n a l s o act; a n d this c a n easily be p r o v e d . But e v e n if a w o m a n is " b o u g h t , " s h e c a n still o w n p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h s o m e o n e else (or t h r o u g h d e v o t i o n t o her m a n ) . I n d e e d , she is c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d with the o w n e r s h i p o f property, b e c a u s e w e see that b o t h m a n a n d w o m a n seek the fruit o f a c t i o n j o i n t l y ; a n d w e see that it accrues to b o t h . It is for this r e a s o n that the u n i o n o f the t w o is said to be like a sacrifice o f b o t h . B u t , as in an a c t i o n we h a v e a principle a n d a s u b o r d i n a t e part, the w o r d " s e c o n d " s h o u l d refer to the w i f e , for she is not the e q u a l o f m a n ; but what b e l o n g s specially t o her is the p o w e r to bless a n d to remain c h a s t e . 1 0 2

It is a matter of regret that the ethics of the Mlmamsa system has not received more careful attention of modern scholars, especially in view of the fact that MTmamsa rules are fundamental for the interpretation of the laws by which Hindu society has been traditionally governed. One merit of this system is its attempt to show that the good life is an integrated development of all four purusarthas—kama, artha, dharma, and moksa. The spiritual aspirations of Jainism and Buddhism during these times neglected physical and social values by concentrating exclusively on spiritual values. The one-sided thrust of these heterodox religions created an ascetical ethos in which material and social values were played down. Such an ill-conceived repudiation of the world and the values of artha and kama had to be stopped. This prompted the MTmamsa sages to "reassert the faith in morality, to revive the ethicosocial tendencies expressed in the Vedas and Upanisads, and to bring home to the common man that true renunciation consisted not in giving up ardour for and zest of life, but in subordinating enjoyment to Dharma, sensuousness to the sense of duty and attachment to spiritual realization.'" 0 3 It is also a matter of commendation that the MTmamsakas infused new conviction in the moral conduct of life by upholding the standard of duty for duty's sake. " H e r e the Mlmamsa ethics reaches, through ritualism, the highest point of its glory. . . . '" 0 4 The M l m a m s a ' s concept of duty is more stringent than that of the Glta inasmuch as its understanding of disinterestedness is so pure that it excludes even such spiritual motives as atmasuddhi ('purifying the self'), and subserving the purposes of God. 1 0 5 There is an obvious parallel between this concept of law operative in dharma and the Categorical Imperative of Immanuel Kant. Both state that a moral deed is to be performed because one ought to do it and not because of any attached benefits. The Mlmamsa also agrees with Kant

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that t h o u g h an u n c o n d i t i o n a l deed is to be d o n e with a b s o l u t e disinterest, the doer is finally r e w a r d e d because such is the constitution of the universe. However, whereas the MTmamsa a t t r i b u t e s reward to the governance of the i m p e r s o n a l m o r a l law, Kant attributes it to G o d . T h e t w o also differ in postulating the locus of authority. T h e MTmamsa finds the source of a u t h o r i t y in the i n j u n c t i o n s of the Vedas, while Kant traces it to the c o m m a n d s of the higher rational self. It is f u r t h e r creditable that t h o u g h the M l m a r h s a k a s distinguish between the ideal of dharma with its s u p e r h u m a n s t a n d a r d a n d extraempirical concerns, a n d the lesser ideal of c o m m o n morality with its utilitarian s t a n d a r d a n d empirical concerns; nevertheless, the two spheres are integrated, a n d c o m m o n morality is thereby duly recognized. C o m m e n t ing on this aspect of MTmamsa ethics, P r o f . I. C . S h a r m a remarks: T h e critics f o r g e t t h a t w h e n M i m a m s a n a m e s t h e o b l i g a t o r y a c t s like Y a j n a as D h a r m a , a n d t h e p r o h i b i t e d a c t s ( N i s i d d h a K a r m a s ) like g a m b l i n g a n d killing as A d h a r m a ; a n d w h e n t h e e f f e c t s o f b o t h t h e s e a c t s a r e r e g a r d e d as A p u r v a , t h e i n v i s i b l e p o w e r of t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n of t h e a c t s ( K a r m a s ) , it is e v i d e n t t h a t s o c i a l a n d s p i r i t u a l w e l l - b e i n g h a v e b e e n g i v e n e q u a l s t a t u s in t h e M T m a m s a e t h i c s . If t h e N i t y a K a r m a , o r t h e o b l i g a t o r y a c t s o f p e r f o r m ing a Yajna (sacrifice), lead t o M o k s a , negligence t o w a r d s the p r o h i b i t e d a c t s w o u l d h i n d e r t h e s p i r i t u a l p r o g r e s s o f a n i n d i v i d u a l . It is w r o n g

to

s u p p o s e t h a t t h e f i e l d s of s o c i a l m o r a l i t y a n d s p i r i t u a l m o r a l i t y a r e b i f u r cated.10'

T h e view of m a n on which the MTmamsa system is based is, f o r the most part, ethically s o u n d . F r e e d o m is assumed as the prerequisite f o r responsible action. F r e e d o m is not c o n t r o v e r t e d by the law of karman w h e n this i m p e r s o n a l m o r a l law of the universe is correctly u n d e r s t o o d . Jaimini m a k e s a clear distinction between n a t u r a l action a n d deliberate action that is purposively oriented. H e observes: "We see that w h e n people have a p u r p o s e or a i m in action, it is the result of deliberate intention or precise t h i n k i n g . ' " 0 7 In the s a m e vein, the P r a b h a k a r a s a n a lyse the voluntaristic basis of action. T h e S i d d h a n t a m u k t a v a l T presents P r a b h a k a r a ' s analysis of volition in the following progression: the awareness of s o m e d u t y to be d o n e (karyatajnana); the wish to d o it (cikTrsa), implying the awareness t h a t the task can be a c c o m p l i s h e d (krlisadhyatajnana); the resolve (pravrtti); the m o t o r reaction (cesta)\ a n d p e r f o r m i n g the deed (kriya).108 T h e MTmarhsa's a p p e a l t o the j u d g m e n t of men of ethical s t a t u r e as guides f o r Vedic c o n d u c t indicates that m a n is viewed as a spiritual entity living in a society of similar ethical beings. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , by a p p e a l i n g to Vedic a u t h o r i t y as the source of obliga-

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tion which categorically enjoins dharma, the MTmarhsa postulates a supernatural standard of authority. Its ethics is therefore a u t h o r i t a r i a n in character, to be accepted on faith and not reason. Of course, the Tantrarahasya 1 0 9 and other writings allow for the j u d g m e n t of " o n e ' s own conscience" in determining what is good, but conscience is not viewed a u t o n omously. Far f r o m being a free agency of moral perception, the role of conscience is limited to that of providing a conscientious appeal for the doing of duties learned f r o m external authority. Such a conscience is good for tribalism but is bad for individuality. V. Ethical Thought in the Vedanta The Vedanta System of B a d a r a y a n a is based on the jflanakanda portion of the Vedas. T h e Vedanta Sutra (variously known as B r a h m a Sutra, Sariraka Sutra, U t t a r a MTmarhsa) deals with the final aim of the Veda. The word 'Vedanta' literally means 'the end of the Vedas'. Without the help of c o m m e n t a t o r s , it is impossible to grasp the meaning of the 555 sutras which attempt to systematise the doctrine of the Upanisads. Chief a m o n g these c o m m e n t a t o r s are S a n k a r a (eighth century A.D.) and R a m a n u j a (twelfth century A.D.) who provides us with nontheistic and theistic interpretations of the Vedanta, respectively. S a n k a r a ' s system is monistic, and is k n o w n as Advaita. R a m a n u j a follows a qualified monism called Visistadvaita. A. A dvaita T h e purpose of S a n k a r a ' s philosophy is stated in his introduction to the Vedanta S u t r a . H e declares: With a view to freeing o n e ' s self f r o m that w r o n g notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is b e g u n . " 0

In keeping with the aim of this study, the summum bonum is the intuitive realisation that there is one and only one Reality which is the negation of all plurality and difference. This rigorous monism is the key to S a n k a r a ' s system. It is capsulized in the well-known phrase: " B r a h m a n is real; the world is unreal; the individual self is only the S u p r e m e self and no other.""1 As sole Reality, Brahman is nirguna or indeterminate. This is not to say that Brahman is b l a n k . It means that the Absolute c a n n o t be objectively categorized by empirical thought because it is incapable of objectification. At best it can be indirectly described as not unreal, not unconscious, and not of the nature of pain. But though the Absolute is indefinable and u n k n o w a b l e in terms of discursive thought, it can be di-

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rectly grasped through experience. One can know Brahman by being Brahman. If this be true that Brahman is alone Real, what is the explanation for the world of variety and multiplicity which is part of everyman's ordinary experience? Sahkara answers this question by introducing the principle of nescience. This principle of cosmic illusion which is somehow connected with Brahman is neither sat nor asat. Not being the product of fantasy, it is sat; but inasmuch as it is phenomenal it is asat. This eternal power is the source of phantasmal appearances. Though Brahman is pure intelligence, without form, qualities, or the limitations of time, space, and causality, it appears to possess a phenomenal character because this is erroneously superimposed upon it. Sankara illustrates the process of superimposition springing from nescience by the following example. He says: It is a m a t t e r n o t r e q u i r i n g a n y p r o o f that t h e o b j e c t a n d t h e

subject

w h o s e r e s p e c t i v e s p h e r e s are t h e n o t i o n o f t h e ' T h o u ' ( t h e N o n - E g o ) a n d t h e ' E g o ' , a n d w h i c h a r e o p p o s e d t o e a c h o t h e r as m u c h as d a r k n e s s a n d light are, c a n n o t b e i d e n t i f i e d . A l l t h e less c a n their r e s p e c t i v e a t t r i b u t e s b e i d e n t i f i e d . H e n c e it f o l l o w s that it is w r o n g t o s u p e r i m p o s e u p o n t h e S u b j e c t — w h o s e S e l f is i n t e l l i g e n c e , a n d h a s f o r its s p h e r e t h e n o t i o n o f t h e N o n - E g o , and the attributes o f the object, and vice-versa and to s u p e r i m p o s e the subj e c t a n d t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e s u b j e c t o n t h e o b j e c t . In s p i t e o f t h i s it is o n t h e part o f m a n a n a t u r a l p r o c e d u r e — w h i c h h a s its c a u s e in w r o n g k n o w l e d g e — n o t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e t w o e n t i t i e s ( o b j e c t a n d s u b j e c t ) a n d their r e s p e c t i v e a t t r i b u t e s , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t , but t o s u p e r i m p o s e o n e a c h the characteristic nature and the attributes o f the other, and thus c o u p l i n g the Real and the U n r e a l , t o m a k e use o f e x p r e s s i o n s such as " T h a t a m I", " T h a t is m i n e . " " 2

Regarding the definition of 'superimposition', Sahkara describes it as "the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another." This definition is illustrated by such expressions as: 'mother-of-pearl appears like silver', 'The moon although one only appears as if she were double'."3 Superimposition defined in this way is called nescience (avidya) by the wise, whereas knowledge (vidya) is the correct determination of the being-in-itself of things. The source of avidya is the knowing subject, but the intelligent Self is unaffected thereby. Avidya is the basis of all human knowledge as well as knowledge found in the sacred scriptures. The reason both empirical and scriptural modes of thought spring from ignorance is because "the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing personality, and because

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the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing p e r s o n . " " 4 Thus the common delusion of sacred and secular thought lies in the superimposition of the ' I ' on the body. A further proof that human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the preceding kind of superimposition follows from the similarity in that respect between men and animals. Both animal and human knowledge have egoistic aims. Sankara builds up his case in a most interesting way. A c o w , f o r i n s t a n c e , w h e n s h e s e e s a m a n a p p r o a c h i n g w i t h a raised stick in his h a n d , t h i n k s that h e w a n t s t o b e a t her, a n d t h e r e f o r e m o v e s a w a y ; w h i l e s h e w a l k s u p t o a m a n w h o a d v a n c e s w i t h s o m e f r e s h g r a s s in his hand. T h u s m e n a l s o — w h o possess a higher intelligence—run away

when

they see strong f i e r c e - l o o k i n g f e l l o w s drawing near with s h o u t s and brandishing swords; while they c o n f i d e n t l y a p p r o a c h persons o f contrary app e a r a n c e a n d b e h a v i o u r . W e t h u s s e e that m e n a n d a n i m a l s f o l l o w t h e s a m e course o f procedure with reference to the m e a n s and objects o f k n o w l e d g e . Now- it is well k n o w n t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e o f a n i m a l s b a s e s o n t h e

non-

d i s t i n c t i o n ( o f S e l f a n d N o n - S e l f ) ; w e t h e r e f o r e c o n c l u d e that as t h e y present t h e s a m e a p p e a r a n c e s , m e n a l s o — a l t h o u g h d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y s u p e r i o r int e l l i g e n c e p r o c e e d w i t h r e g a r d t o p e r c e p t i o n a n d s o o n , in t h e s a m e w a y as a n i m a l s d o ; as l o n g , t h a t is t o say, as t h e m u t u a l s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n o f S e l f a n d Non-Self lasts.'"

In sharp contrast to the egoistic aims of Vedic and worldly knowledge which keep man bound to samsara, Vedantic knowledge conceives "the true nature of the self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brahmana and Kshatriya classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence."" 6 The ultimate purpose of Vedantic knowledge is to bring to an end this endless process whereby the things and relations of the objective world are erroneously transferred to the inner self, and once the not-self is distinguished from the self (atman), to allow one's own identity with Brahman to become known. Such knowledge will consist not in the forceful annihilation of avidya, but in the recognition that the content of avidya simply does not exist. The foregoing analysis of the aim of Vedanta makes it clear that since the summum bonum is the realization of what has always been one's own nature but has for a period been obscured by avidya, the only means necessary for liberation is the removal of avidya, by vidya. Sankara explicitly states: " M a n ' s purpose is effected through k n o w l e d g e . ' " " Neither religion nor morality can serve as direct aids to moksa. This description of Advaitic moksa as the knowledge of the identity of

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the jTva with Brahman brings into question the viability of ethics within such a metaphysical system. An immediate reaction to the doctrine of unity of Brahman is that it seems to negate moral distinctions and makes the quest after the good life metaphysically redundant. Responding to the first difficulty, namely, the metaphysical negation of moral distinction, there seems to be logic in the contention that if Brahman alone is real and the world is false, then all ethical distinctions within this unreal world must correspondingly be unreal. There can be no substance to the ethical enterprise because it takes place within a realm of shadows. One can hardly term the taking of life 'evil', or the saving of life 'good', when such categories are shaped only within a world of dreams. However, this logic breaks down when it is understood that though the world of moral experience is unreal in the sense that it has no existence apart from Brahman, this unreality does not make it i l l u s o r y it does have practical existence. Therefore, being related to Brahman, and not a mere illusion, the world of experience serves as a moral arena in which the soul is nurtured for the unitive experience of Brahman. Thus the world along with ethical activity within it is considered significant by Sankara inasmuch as it leads to union with Brahman. The second ethical difficulty arising out of the identity of the jTva with Brahman is whether there can be any room for the pursuit of virtue when the jTva and Brahman are one and the same. This difficulty disappears when we recognize that metaphysical oneness in the Advaita Vedanta is "a task as well as a fact," a " p r o b l e m " as well as a "possession."" 8 Oneness is always one's own innate character, but like the prince reared as a hunter from birth only later discovers his royalty," 9 we forget the fact of our true nature and are therefore confronted by the problem of having to discover what we already possess. Thus, as Radhakrishnan explains, " 'I am Brahman' does not mean direct identity of the active self with the Ultimate Brahman but only the identity of the real self when the false imposition is removed. The ethical problem arises, because there is the constant struggle between the infinite character of the soul and the finite dress in which it has clothed itself. While the natural condition of man is one of integrity, the present state of corruption is due to fall from it by the force of upadhis." 1 2 0 Thus, the monistic philosophy of Advaita Vedanta does not preclude ethical considerations. To establish this claim concretely we shall now proceed to show the role of ethical and moral discipline in respect to Brahma-realization. In view of the fact that Brahma-realization is its summum bonum, the

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Vedanta defines 'good' and 'evil' in terms of whatever helps or hinders this realization. The personal embodiment of this ethical ideal is Isvara who identifies himself with the cosmos and who acts in behalf of the needs of the whole world. Accordingly, the worshipper of Isvara assumes a similar love toward everything in the world. He freely gives of himself to the needs of society, acting on its behalf in the spirit of humility and charity. In this way, the worship of Isvara serves a moral purpose by extricating the soul from a narrow identification of itself with its own organism and thereby freeing it from egocentricity, possessiveness, and alienation f r o m the outside world. The most practical way in which the individual will is trained to rise to the level of the social will is by ascending the progressive steps of communal duties. The detailed description of these duties is found in the general framework of the sastra's scheme of Varnasrama dharma. The relevant passage dealing with karman as the means to knowledge is found in the third adhyaya, pada four. Sankara finds no contradiction between sutra twenty-five which asserts that work enjoined on the different asramas need not be observed because freedom is effected by knowledge, and sutra twenty-six which states that "knowledge has regard for all works enjoined in the asramas and that there is no absolute nonregard." His explanation for the seeming contradiction between sutras is as follows. "Knowledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of something else with a view to its own origination.'" 2 1 Why is this so? " O n account of the scripture statements of sacrifices and so on. For the passage, ' H i m the Brahmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting, declares that sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the text connects them with the 'seeking to know,' we conclude that they are, more especially, means of the origination of knowledge.'" 2 2 Thus, as smrti says, "works are the washing away of uncleanness but knowledge is the highest way. When the impurity has been removed, the knowledge begins to act.'" 2 3 But once knowledge has dawned, the needs for these pious works ceases. In addition to these works in the form of Vedic study, sacrifice, alms, penance, and fasting which constitute the more 'remote' means to knowledge are the approximate means, comprising tranquility, selfrestraint, renunciation, patience and concentration. 1 2 4 Basing his argument on the scriptural passage, "therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, sees Self in Self,'" 2 5 Sankara enjoins, " T h e seeker for knowledge must possess calmness of

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PERIOD

m i n d , m u s t s u b d u e his senses a n d s o o n . ' " 2 6 W h i l e the r e m o t e or indirect m e a n s is d i s c a r d e d u p o n t h e g a i n i n g o f k n o w l e d g e , t h e a p p r o x i m a t e o r d i r e c t m e a n s is c o n t i n u e d f o r t h e k n o w e r . E v a l u a t i n g the f u n c t i o n s o f w o r k s as the m e a n s to k n o w l e d g e , D e u s s e n comments: T h e w o r k s n a m e d d o n o t , strictly s p e a k i n g , p r o d u c e k n o w l e d g e as their f r u i t , b e c a u s e k n o w l e d g e is s u b j e c t t o n o p r e s c r i b e d rule, a n d b e c a u s e its f r u i t ( l i b e r a t i o n ) c a n n o t b e b r o u g h t a b o u t by a n y m e a n s . T h e s e w o r k s a r e o n l y a u x i l i a r i e s ( s a h a k a r i n ) t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t of k n o w l e d g e , in as m u c h as t h e m a n w h o leads a life of h o l y w o r k s is n o t o v e r p o w e r e d by a f f e c t i o n s ( k l e f a ) s u c h as p a s s i o n , etc. A c c o r d i n g t o this their role in t h e s c h e m e of s a l v a t i o n w o u l d be n o t so m u c h m e r i t o r i o u s as a s c e t i c . G r a n t e d t h a t w o r k s i n c u m b e n t u p o n t h e asramas

are n e c e s s a r y

aux-

i l i a r i e s t o k n o w l e d g e , a r e t h e y i n d i s p e n s a b l e ? S a n k a r a r e p l i e s in t h e n e g a t i v e . P e r s o n s n o t b e l o n g i n g t o a n asrama

are q u a l i f i e d for k n o w l e d g e be-

c a u s e the scriptures cite such p e r s o n s as R a i k v a a n d the d a u g h t e r

of

V a k a n u w h o p o s s e s s e d t h e k n o w l e d g e o f Brahman

of

without benefit

prescribed works. Sankara points out: T h e f a v o u r of k n o w l e d g e is p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h special a c t s of d u t y , s u c h as p r a y i n g , f a s t i n g , p r o p i t i a t i o n of divinities, e t c . , w h i c h a r e n o t o p p o s e d t o t h e i r asrama-\zss c o n d i t i o n a n d m a y b e p e r f o r m e d by a n y m a n as s u c h . T h e Smriti says, ' B y m e r e p r a y e r n o d o u b t t h e Brahmana p e r f e c t s h i m s e l f . M a y h e p e r f o r m o t h e r w o r k s o r n o t , t h e k i n d h e a r t e d o n e is called B r a h m a n a ' ( M a n u , S a m h . 11.87), w h i c h p a s s a g e s h o w s t h a t w h e r e t h e w o r k s of t h e asramas a r e n o t p o s s i b l e p r a y e r q u a l i f i e s f o r k n o w l e d g e . M o r e o v e r k n o w l e d g e m a y b e p r o m o t e d by asrama w o r k s p e r f o r m e d in p r e v i o u s b i r t h s . T h u s Smriti a l s o d e c l a r e s , ' P e r f e c t e d by m a n y b i r t h s he finally g o e s t h e h i g h e s t w a y ' ( B h a . GTta V I , 45); w h i c h p a s s a g e s h o w s t h a t t h e a g g r e g a t e of t h e diff e r e n t p u r i f i c a t o r y c e r e m o n i e s p e r f o r m e d in f o r m e r b i r t h s p r o m o t e s k n o w l e d g e . M o r e o v e r k n o w l e d g e — a s h a v i n g a seen result (viz. t h e r e m o v a l of i g n o r a n c e ) — q u a l i f i e s a n y o n e w h o is d e s i r o u s of it f o r l e a r n i n g a n d so o n , t h r o u g h t h e a b s e n c e of o b s t a c l e s . H e n c e t h e r e is n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n in a d m i t ting q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r k n o w l e d g e o n t h e p a r t of w i d o w e r s a n d t h e l i k e . ' 2 ' E v e n t h o u g h it is c o n c e d e d t h a t k n o w l e d g e is p o s s i b l e f o r t h o s e p a y n o r e g a r d t o t h e d u t i e s i n c u m b e n t o n t h e asramas,

who

nevertheless, the

w a y o f d u t i e s is p r e f e r a b l e . A b e t t e r m e a n s of k n o w l e d g e is t o s t a n d w i t h i n o n e of t h e asramas, s i n c e this is c o n f i r m e d by Sruti a n d Smriti f o r s c r i p t u r e s u p p l i e s a n i n d i c a t o r y m a r k in t h e p a s s a g e , ' O n t h a t p a t h g o e s w h o e v e r k n o w s B r a h m a n a n d w h o h a s d o n e h o l y w o r k s (as p r e s c r i b e d f o r t h e asramas) a n d o b t a i n e d s p l e n d o u r (Bri. U p . V. 4.9); a n d Smriti in t h e p a s s a g e , ' L e t a B r a h m a n a stay n o t o n e

E T H I C S OF T H E DAR&ANA P E R I O D day even outside the

asrama\

115

having stayed outside for a year he goes t o ut-

ter ruin'. 1 2 '

It is now clear that works play a significant role in the scheme of salvation. It is all the m o r e regrettable that along with works of a definite moral character are included a medley of ritualistic and ceremonial actions which have no relation to the summun bonum or anything in common with the qualifications necessary for the study of the Vedanta. These qualifications, in addition to the study of the Vedas, include the following requirements: (1) "Discerning between the eternal and non-eternal substance," (2) " R e n u n c i a t i o n of the e n j o y m e n t of reward here and in the other w o r l d , " (3) " t h e attainment of the six means"—tranquility, restraint, renunciation, resignation, concentration, belief, (4) and " t h e longing for liberation." It is a matter of some regret that several of the works included in the Asramadharma have nothing in c o m m o n with the elevated ethical spirit evident in these conditions preparatory for study. Yet, these nonethical works are deemed just as meritorious as the ethical ones in that all works effect an individual's karman, thereby determining the state of his f u t u r e birth. With these c o m m e n t s on S a n k a r a ' s attitude toward Asramadharma as the means to moksa, we move on to a consideration of his assessment of the role of Varnadharma. T h e subject is discussed in c o n j u n c t i o n with his prescription for the external conditions for the study of the Vedanta. A f t e r refuting the exclusive claims of men to knowledge, and having established the rights of gods a n d departed rsis thereto, S a n k a r a raises the question a b o u t whether Sudras are eligible for Brahmavidya. His answer is a categorical ' N o ' . 1 3 0 T h e Sudras' exclusion arises out of the fact that the study of Vedanta requires qualification in Vedic matters, " b u t a S u d r a does not study the Veda for such a study d e m a n d s as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only.'" 1 ' T h e S u d r a may desire the knowledge of Brahman, but " t h e mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere t e m p o r a l capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual m a t t e r s . " 1 , 2 As it turns out, "spiritual capability" is nothing m o r e t h a n the caste right to study the Veda, reserved only for Brahmins, Ksatriyas, and Vaisyas. T h u s "spiritual capability" has little to d o with character, but much with caste. Exceptions to this Vedic injunction are attacked with a good deal of intellectual 'swashbuckling'. S a n k a r a takes up the case of samvargavidya which Raikva c o m m u n i c a t e s to G a n a s r u t i . H e argues that the rsi could not have called G a n a s r u t i a S u d r a "because a (real) b o r n S u d r a is not

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qualified (for the samvarga-vidya).'" 3 3 He suggests that the mention of 'SOdra' should be understood etymologically and not traditionally. Interpreted etymologically: "because Janasruti from sorrow (cu-ca) at the humiliating speech of the goose, had run (dudra-va) to Raikva, this Rishi, who, through supernatural knowledge, became aware of what happened, and wished to make this evident, called him a 'cu-dra' (!)". 1 3 4 Further efforts to discount the Sudra status of Ganasruti are as laboured and artificial as the preceding. Because Ganasruti is praised in the same vidya with the Ksatriya Abhipratarin, Sankara takes this coincidence to mean that Ganasruti must have also been a Ksatriya—"for as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.'" 3 5 Also, Ganasruti must have been a Ksatriya, because he had a doorkeeper and wielded authority belonging to a Ksatriya. Grabbing for such straws in the winds, Sankara concludes: "Sudras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman.)'" 3 6 A second apparent exception to the rule barring Sudras f r o m the knowledge of Brahman is the case of Satyakama, the son of Jabala. Sankara's forced exegesis is as follows: T h e Sudras are not qualified for that reason also that G a u t a m a , having ascertained Jabala not t o be a Sudra f r o m his speaking the truth, p r o c e e d e d to initiate and instruct him. " N o n e w h o is not a B r a h m a n a w o u l d thus speak out ' G o and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate y o u . You have not swerved f r o m the truth' (Kh. U p . IV, 4, 5); which scriptural p a s s a g e furnishes an inferential sign ( o f the Sudras not being capable of initiation). 1 1 7

An unbiased reader of the original story would see the case otherwise as a courageous breakthrough from caste rigidity. Though J a b a l a ' s ancestry was dubious, G a u t a m a initiated him because he thought the lad had the heart and mind of a Brahmin which was of more significance than biological descent. Even had these cases been genuine exceptions to the Vedic rule excluding Sudras f r o m saving knowledge, they would carry little weight with Sankara, because he argues that exceptions are exceptions of the rule and therefore do not contravene what is established.' 3 8 Sankara finds the rule damning the Sudra laid down unequivocally in the smrti, and quotes it with authority. 'The ears o f him w h o hears the Veda are t o be filled with ( m o l t e n ) lead and lac', and 'For a Sudra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not t o be read in the vicinity o f a S u d r a ' . 'His t o n g u e [of the S u d r a s t u d y i n g the Veda] is t o be slit if he p r o n o u n c e s it; his b o d y is t o be cut t h r o u g h if he preserves it'.' 3 9

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117

H o w e v e r , t h e s i t u a t i o n is d i f f e r e n t f o r S u d r a s like V i d u r a w h o a c q u i r e k n o w l e d g e in c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e m o r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y of f o r m e r d e e d s . F r o m t h e s e " t h e f r u i t of their k n o w l e d g e c a n n o t be w i t h h e l d , since k n o w l e d g e in all cases b r i n g s a b o u t its f r u i t . " 1 4 0 M o r e o v e r , even t h o u g h t h e o r d i n a r y S u d r a is n o t q u a l i f i e d t o h e a r t h e Veda, o n t h e a u t h o r i t y of smrti he is " q u a l i f i e d f o r a c q u i r i n g t h e k n o w l edge of t h e itihasas a n d t h e p u r a n a s . " 1 4 ' T h e p u r p o s e of t h e ethical discipline as we h a v e s t u d i e d it w i t h i n t h e general f r a m e w o r k of Varnasrama dharma w a s t o c u l t i v a t e d e t a c h m e n t a n d t h e r e b y assist jnana t o w a r d t h e a t t a i n m e n t of moksa. By c u l t i v a t i n g t h e will a n d p u r i f y i n g t h e feelings, jnana is e n a b l e d t o r e m o v e ajnana, a n d o n c e t h e w r o n g n o t i o n s of ajnana a r e d i s p e l l e d , t h e t r u t h of t h e s o u l ' s i d e n t i t y w i t h Brahman shines f o r t h of itself. T h i s is moksa. T h e r e a l i z a t i o n of moksa in this life is k n o w n as jivanmukti. It f o l l o w s logically f r o m t h e view t h a t moksa is t h e essential n a t u r e of t h e soul a n d is, t h e r e f o r e , i n s t a n t l y realizable t h e m o m e n t t h e o b s t a c l e s t o this t r u t h a r e r e m o v e d by i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e . Since the Vedantic t r a i n i n g leading directly t o jivanmukti is n o t w i t h i n t h e r e a l m of o u r study, we shall only m e n t i o n its t h r e e steps: (1) Sravana— s t u d y of U p a n i s a d s u n d e r t h e direction of a n e x p e r i e n c e d t e a c h e r t o d i s c o v e r saving t r u t h . (2) Manana — a n a l y t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n t o g a i n intellectual certainty, (3) Nididhyasana— m e d i t a t i o n o n t h e u n i t y of Brahman until jnana arises. 1 4 2 At this f i n a l stage of V e d a n t i c t r a i n i n g t h e a s p i r a n t is a b l e t o say f r o m t h e d e p t h s of his o w n e x p e r i e n c e — 'Aharh Brahmasmi' (I a m B r a h m a n ) . 1 4 3 . T h i s is moksa. A s summum bonum, moksa is b o t h t h e raison d'etre a n d c o n s u m m a t i o n of ethical c o n d u c t . By t h e aid of dharma t h e u n r e f l e c t i v e life of p a s sion is raised t o t h e level of r e a s o n a n d responsibility. B u t this, t h e m o r a l level, c a n n o t be a n e n d in itself b u t o n l y a n i n t e r m e d i a r y t r a i n i n g g r o u n d , p o i n t i n g t o a h i g h e r level o n w h i c h t h e c o n f l i c t s a n d c o e r c i o n s of t h e m o r a l life f i n a l l y cease. O n this level, m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is f u l f i l l e d a n d transcended by spiritual consciousness. W i t h s u c h a m o n i s t i c c r o w n , ethical existence is s h o w n t o possess a g r o u n d i n g in reality. R e f e r r i n g t o t h e ethical s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e " f i n a l e o f p e r f e c t s e l f h o o d " w i t h i n t h e s t a t e of moksa, P r o f . S. K . D a s says: An ideal fails to furnish the dynamic of moral life unless it is known to have been realised in toto in some integral experience. Not doing but being in an ultimate reference—that should in all conceivability be the ideal of ethical conduct, and it is only Sankara-Vedanta that has the sufficiency to envisage fully the ideal of perfection and pursue, with vertical consistency to its logical conclusion, the implications of the injunction: 'Be ye perfect'.' 44

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The life of the jivanmukta is characterised by inwardness, 1 4 5 cosmic 146 consciousness, and disinterested activity. 147 We shall examine these characteristics in some detail. On the moral level the individual was bound by prohibitions and permissions because he erroneously connected the self with the body. But for the jivanmukta w h o sees the self to be one only, there is no pressure of obligation to be virtuous, because obligations are externally imposed in respect to things to be grasped or given up. H o w t h e n s h o u l d he, w h o sees n o t h i n g , e i t h e r t o be w i s h e d o r a v o i d e d , bey o n d t h e u n i v e r s a l self, s t a n d u n d e r a n y o b l i g a t i o n ? T h e self c e r t a i n l y c a n n o t be e n j o i n e d o n t h e self. S h o u l d it be said t h a t i n j u n c t i o n s a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s a p p l y t o all t h o s e w h o d i s c e r n t h a t t h e soul is s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e b o d y ( a n d t h e r e f o r e a l s o t o h i m w h o p o s s e s s p e r f e c t k n o w l e d g e ) we r e p l y t h a t ( s u c h a n a s s e r t i o n is t o o w i d e , since) o b l i g a t i o n d e p e n d s o n m a n ' s i m a g ining his self t o b e ( a c t u a l l y ) c o n n e c t e d with t h e b o d y . It is t r u e t h a t o b l i g a t i o n exists f o r h i m only w h o views t h e soul as s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e b o d y ; b u t f u n d a m e n t a l l y all o b l i g a t i o n is a n e r r o n e o u s i m a g i n a t i o n e x i s t i n g in t h e case of h i m o n l y w h o d o e s not see t h a t his self is n o m o r e c o n n e c t e d with a b o d y t h a n t h e e t h e r is w i t h t h e j a r s a n d t h e like. F o r h i m , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h o d o e s not see t h a t c o n n e c t i o n n o o b l i g a t i o n exists, m u c h less, t h e r e f o r e , f o r h i m w h o d i s c e r n s t h e u n i t y of t h e self. 1 4 "

It is thus plain that moral obligation is meaningless for the jivanmukta. However, enlightenment does not lead to the abandonment of virtue. Moksa is only the demise of moralistic individualism, not of morality per se. Addressing himself to this source of grave misunderstanding, Hiriyanna says: T h e j i v a n m u k t a , h a v i n g t r a n s c e n d e d t h e s t a g e of s t r i f e , is s p o n t a n e o u s l y v i r t u o u s . I m p u l s e a n d d e s i r e b e c o m e o n e in h i m . H e is n o t t h e n r e a l i z i n g virt u e b u t is r e v e a l i n g it. ' I n o n e t h a t h a s a w a k e n e d t o a k n o w l e d g e of t h e self, v i r t u e s like k i n d n e s s i m p l y n o c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t w h a t s o e v e r . T h e y a r e s e c o n d n a t u r e w i t h h i m . ' ( N a i s k a r m y a - s i d d h i , iv. 6 9 ) . 1 4 '

An immediate consequence of the jivanmukta's discovery of the Upanisadic teaching, 'That thou art', is the development of a sense of cosmic consciousness or the feeling of universal belonging. The sense of being one with all creation is expressed ethically in the Golden Rule. The connection between the c o m m a n d , "Love thy neighbor as thyself," and the Vedantic principle of cosmic oneness is expressed well in this verse from the Bhagavadglta: T h i s h i g h e s t G o d h e a d h a t h his seat in e v e r y b e i n g , a n d liveth t h o u g h t h e y die; w h o s e e t h h i m , is s e e i n g , a n d h e w h o e v e r y w h e r e t h i s h i g h e s t G o d h a t h f o u n d , will n o t w o u n d self w i t h self. 1 5 0

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T h e spirit of universal love is expressed t h r o u g h disinterested activity in the service of the w o r l d (lokasahgrahartham). P r i o r to knowledge, all activity is m o t i v a t e d by desire. T h e f r u i t of desire keeps the individual b o u n d t o the cycle of samsara. U p o n gaining jTvanmukti, actions are perf o r m e d t h r o u g h unselfish w i s d o m which, t h e r e f o r e , have n o binding effect. S a n k a r a says: " T o one w h o k n o w s , no work will cling even if o n e p e r f o r m s w o r k s d u r i n g his whole life—thanks to the greatness of knowle d g e . ' " " T h u s , r e n u n c i a t i o n , not retirement, is S a n k a r a ' s ideal f o r the jTvanmukta. His own life of selfless l a b o u r is the best illustration of dispassionate action f o r the good of society. T h r o u g h his d o c t r i n e as well as deeds, S a n k a r a asks us " t o suppress our selfishness, a n d , if that requires solitude a n d retirement, these a r e advised as m e a n s to an e n d . O n e w h o has completely shaken himself f r e e f r o m selfishness is at liberty to t a k e u p o n himself the task of the world. His a t t i t u d e will not be world-seeking or world-fleeing, but w o r l d - s a v i n g . ' " " T h e c o m p o s i t e picture of the jTvanmukta is that of o n e w h o is in a "childlike s t a t e . " By this is m e a n t the absence of such evils as guile a n d pride. T h e jTvanmukta does not m a n i f e s t himself by a " d i s p l a y of knowledge, learning, a n d virtuousness, j u s t as a child w h o s e sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive t o m a k e a display of himself b e f o r e o t h e r s . " " 5 In a g r e e m e n t with this p o r t r a i t , smrti writers have said: H e w h o m n o b o d y k n o w s either as a n o b l e or i g n o b l e , as i g n o r a n t or learned, as w e l l - c o n d u c t e d or i l l - c o n d u c t e d , he is a B r a h m a n a . Q u i e t l y dev o t e d t o his duty, let the w i s e m a n pass t h r o u g h life u n k n o w n ; let h i m step o n this earth as if he w e r e blind, u n c o n s c i o u s , d e a f . 1 5 4

T h u s , in S a n k a r a ' s perfectionist ethic we have witnessed a h a p p y blending of m o r a l p e r f e c t i o n a n d metaphysical insight. T h o u g h the t w o have been sharply distinguished when considered separately, the f o r m e r being auxiliary to the latter; within the state of moksa the t w o are also s h o w n to be integrally related. This is because of the w o r d 'jfiana'. In English usage, ' k n o w l e d g e ' is restrictively intellectual, but in S a n k a r a ' s usage it is the c o m p l e t e e x p a n s i o n of the inner life. H e r e , k n o w l e d g e is only the external s y m b o l of an internal experience which e n c o m p a s s e s the entire g a m u t of o n e ' s thinking, feeling, a n d willing. H a d jfiana been limited t o t h i n k i n g , it w o u l d have been possible to gain moksa by intellectually accepting the logic of the V e d a n t a ' s thesis. But this constricted n o t i o n of k n o w l e d g e certainly w o u l d be considered i n a d e q u a t e by S a n k a r a . F o r him, k n o w l e d g e also involves the will—the seat of ethical activity. J u s t as ajMna which destroys jfiana is itself a total living experience involving cognitive error, the a f f e c t i v e response t o

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this error (kamaj, and the expression of feeling through action (karman), so also, jflana involves the total immersion of the self. It is within the context of this holistic experience that ajhana is fully destroyed, and not by some one-sided effort of abstract intelligence. If the latter were true, one would only have to be a logician to say: 'Aham Brahmasmi'. Rather, to know Brahman fully one has to become Brahman—and this is being in its richest, truest, and highest mode. It is nothing short of perfection. It is perfection! This realization of our rootedness in Brahman is a permanent part of our being. It is essentially a state of freedom—including freedom f r o m moralistic individualism, though not freedom f r o m morality. When death finally comes, only name and f o r m are destroyed, never to be reborn. But Brahman remains Brahman—pure existence (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ananda). This is the state of videhamukti. B.

Viiistadvaita

The summum bonum in R a m a n u j a ' s philosophical ethics is the "intuitive knowledge of B r a h m a n , " which is of the nature of supreme unsurpassable bliss. " H e who knows B r a h m a n attains the H i g h e s t . " " 5 The goal of life, therefore, is much more than the nonliability of the freed-self to births and death; it is the attainment of " G o d who in his f o r m of perfect bliss is most dear to his worshipper." 1 5 6 To understand and appreciate R a m a n u j a ' s ethical ideal, we must first inquire into the nature of Brahman, the nature of the atman, and the relationship between the two. R a m a n u j a ' s philosophy of Reality is monistic. All is Brahman. There is no reality other than Him, either of a similar or dissimilar nature. Brahman is the Absolute One. At the same time, the O n e is many. Within the unity of Brahman exist distinct but inseparable realities called cit (self) and acit (matter). These elements are mutually distinguishable f r o m one another and f r o m Brahman. They are without an absolute beginning and shall have no absolute ending. 1 5 7 Thus, the philosophy of R a m a n u j a is actually a qualified monism (Visistadvaita). The analogy on which the relation between Brahman and the universe is conceived is the soul-body relation iariri-sarlrasambandha). The acarya declares: All sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as 'bodiless among bodies' only mean to deny of the Self a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture declares that the Universe is his body. 158

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The ethical implication of the soul-body relation is that inasmuch as the atman is controlled, supported, and directed by the Supreme Person for his own ends, the atman must, therefore, discover the meaning, value, and purpose of its existence to its Inner Ruler. The nature of goodness is inextricably bound up with the nature of godliness. To discover the former, we must delve into the nature of the latter. Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double k i n d . 1 " On the one hand he is free f r o m all imperfections; on the other, he is a "treasure-house of all blessed qualities.'" 6 0 Brahman abides in the soul as its Inner Ruler, but because it is "not subject to the influence of karman, is free from all i m p e r f e c t i o n s . ' " " R a m a n u j a quotes the scripture as saying "that the Supreme Person is free from evil, free f r o m old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst; that all his wishes realise themselves, that all its purposes realise themselves.'" 6 2 Since it is devoid of all evil characteristics common to Prakrti, Brahman can be called nirguna. Nirguna Brahman is simultaneously saguna because he possesses all good characteristics. R a m a n u j a quotes smrti: " H e comprises within himself all blessed qualities, by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him there are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all other noble qualities.'" 6 3 This brief description of the nature of Brahman as at once nirguna and saguna shows that R a m a n u j a conceived of Brahman, the SarTrin, not only in metaphysical and aesthetic terms, but in moral terms as well. "Reality and value are one, and the highest values of life like truth, goodness and beauty are intrinsic and eternal and are conserved in the absolute Self as its essential nature.'" 6 4 The ethical import of viewing the nature of Tsvara in this way is such as to make holiness and righteousness—the moral predicates of the sarTrin— normative for ethical conduct on the part of the sarTra. Man ought to be compassionate, just, generous, and so on, because these are the qualities of the Inner Ruler. Thus the standard for ethical conduct is shifted from the little ' I ' of ahamkara (egoism) to the Absolute ' I ' of the sarTrin. R a m a n u j a also conceived of the atman, like Tsvara, as an ethical personality. It is not "the phenomenalised mode of prakrti," nor is it "the depersonalised instrument of divinity.'" 65 The atman's moral autonomy is first of all maintained by categorically differentiating it f r o m the body in which it dwells. This body, t h o u g h it m a y be put in samanadhikaranya

with the expe-

r i e n c i n g - a t m a n , e . g . in the p r o p o s i t i o n "I a m lean," etc. is different f r o m the latter. S a g e s w h o p o s s e s s exact k n o w l e d g e o f the b o d y call it the expe-

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r i e n c i n g - a t m a n ' s field of experience. A p e r s o n w h o k n o w s this b o d y a n d , because of this very k n o w l e d g e , m u s t be d i f f e r e n t f r o m his b o d y which is the object of his k n o w l e d g e , is called ksetrajna by these sages. T h a t person may, when perceiving entities d i f f e r e n t f r o m the body, consider his knowing a t m a n to be in a relation of samanadhikaranya to his body, for instance, in the p r o p o s i t i o n : " I w h o a m a m a n k n o w this j u g " ; still, when he perceives his b o d y he will k n o w that it is an entity d i f f e r e n t f r o m his a t m a n a n d of the s a m e o r d e r as a j u g , because being an o b j e c t of t h e a t m a n ' s k n o w l e d g e it is of the s a m e o r d e r as o t h e r o b j e c t s of k n o w l e d g e , so that n o w the p r o p o s i t i o n runs: "1 k n o w his b o d y t o o , in the s a m e way as I k n o w a jug.'""'

By drawing this sharp distinction between the atman and the body which particularises it, R a m a n u j a preserves the freedom of the atman against all naturalistic views of morals which, by identifying the atman with prakrti, would subject it to nature's causal necessity. In the second place, the atman's ethical personality is maintained against the possibility of its being conceived of as a depersonalised instrument of God. This danger arises out of R a m a n u j a ' s view of God as Controller (Niyantr) and man as the controlled (niyama). As an instrument in the hands of God, the atman is described as being dependent, controlled, and employed by God for the achievement of his own purposes. This dependency relationship of the atman on Isvara could have become as damaging to the atman's moral integrity as its assimilation within the natural process. Whether a cog within the machinery of nature or a helpless instrument in the hands of God, the atman is in either case depersonalised and deprived of its power to choose. R a m a n u j a is aware of this second threat to the atman's moral freedom as he is of the first. He cites several scriptural passages which seem to support the teaching that "the activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause.'" 6 7 For instance, the GTta says: "The Lord, O A r j u n a , dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling by his mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine.'" 6 8 R a m a n u j a argues that if such scriptures were denials of the individual's freedom because of its dependence on Isvara, then "the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be unmeaning.'" 6 9 The reason is straightforward. " C o m m a n d m e n t s can be addressed to such agents only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action, according to their own thought and will.'" 7 0 R a m a n u j a tries to reconcile divine sovereignty and human responsibility by making the free activity of the individual contingent upon the will of God. He explains:

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T h e inwardly ruling highest Self p r o m o t e s a c t i o n in s o far as it regards in the case o f a n y a c t i o n the v o l i t i o n a l e f f o r t m a d e by the i n d i v i d u a l s o u l , a n d then aids the e f f o r t by g r a n t i n g it f a v o u r or p e r m i s s i o n ( a n u m a t i ) ; a c t i o n is not p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n o n the part o f the highest S e l f . In this w a y (i.e. since the a c t i o n primarily d e p e n d s o n the v o l i t i o n a l e f f o r t o f the soul) i n j u n c t i o n s and p r o h i b i t i o n s are not d e v o i d o f m e a n i n g . T h e ' a n d the rest' o f the Sutra is m e a n t to suggest the grace a n d p u n i s h m e n t s a w a r d e d by the L o r d . T h e c a s e is a n a l o g o u s t o that o f p r o p e r t y o f w h i c h t w o m e n are j o i n t o w n e r s . If o n e o f t h e s e w i s h e s t o transfer that p r o p e r t y t o a third p e r s o n he c a n n o t d o so w i t h o u t the p e r m i s s i o n o f his partner but that that p e r m i s s i o n is g i v e n is after all his o w n d o i n g , and h e n c e the fruit o f the a c t i o n (reward or a n y t h i n g ) properly b e l o n g s t o h i m o n l y . 1 , 1

Thus, human freedom is preserved because men are free to choose without divine interference; but since this freedom is permitted by God, ultimately, it is He who is the subject of all actions. " T h u s the Lord himself says, '1 am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me; knowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge.'" 7 2 Though the atman has affinity with God and is distinct f r o m prakrti, it ignorantly identifies itself with the body in which it resides. This ignorance is the source of all sin and suffering in the world. It binds the atman to the body and makes it the slave of pain and pleasure arising from the body. It breeds a selfish attitude toward others and obscures the atman's dependence on God. 1 7 ' Since all acts have their inevitable consequences, an individual's past acts, freely chosen, determine his future existence. In this way he gets caught in the wheel of rebirth and death. The atman itself does not die, nor is it reborn. These changes only belong to the bodies with which the atman is associated. Though it is immortal, because of its false identification with the body, it appears to be mortal. Thus, through karman and avidya, the atman remains in the bondage of samsara. H o w can the atman be delivered from this life of endless suffering? Since activity motivated by the hope for reward binds the atman to prakrti, the first thing the atman must do to escape this bondage is to eliminate all desire for results, including the desire for heaven which is the reward for virtuosity. This is accomplished by karmayoga. Karmayoga, followed by jnanayoga and bhaktiyoga, constitutes the first of successive levels reaching up to communion with G o d . These are not separate paths but separate stages, integrally related to one another. R a m a n u j a considered them essential elements of Gita doctrine.

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Karmayoga is the primary stage of moral discipline. It is a via media between excessively activistic and ascetic moral perspectives. Its ideal of conduct is niskamakarma— the p e r f o r m a n c e of necessary actions without any egoistic desires. It advocates renunciation in action rather t h a n renunciation of action. C o m m e n t i n g on the i m p o r t a n t role of karmayoga within the m o r a l life, R a m a n u j a expands u p o n Gita 3.19: N o activity in executing a m e a n s is required if a p e r s o n d o e s n o longer dep e n d o n a m e a n s for his c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the atman. W h e n , however, such activity is still required, then karmayoga is the best m e a n s to execute, bec a u s e it is easy to execute, d o e s not c a u s e a person t o be negligent about it, implies true k n o w l e d g e o f the a t m a n a n d because even a jnanayogin is c o m pelled to be active in order t o exist; therefore o n e s h o u l d p e r f o r m acts disinterestedly until o n e has attained the atman. That karmayoga is indeed the best m e a n s even for a jnanayogin is proved by the fact that the rajarsis, w h o were the first of the jnanins, have also availed themselves of karmayoga to attain the atman.1,4

T h e preceding passage makes it a b u n d a n t l y clear that R a m a n u j a considered the ethics of duty for d u t y ' s sake of great importance. 1 7 5 T h e duties included those pertaining to the varnas and asramas.'16 They enable the aspirant to distinguish between the i m m o r t a l atman and perishable prakrti. They help " p u r i f y the worshipping aspirant of his previous karman which is incompatible with his w o r s h i p . " " 7 Along with the destruction of past accretions of karman, duties p e r f o r m e d in the spirit of dedication to G o d , strengthen the sattvic nature of the atman and enable it to behold the truth of things.' 7 8 T h e character of the m a n of duty reflects poise and equanimity. H e neither gloats over success nor groans under failure.' 7 9 At all times a n d in all places he remains calm, subdued, patient, satisfied, and collected. 1 9 0 Having freed his spirit of raga and kama, his work itself becomes worship.' 8 ' Karmayoga prepares the way for jnanayoga. Selfless acts destroy the cumulative effects of bad karman and thereby expand the atman's capacity for knowledge. The true knowledge that is acquired by jnana-yoga consists in constantly realising that " t h e atman is a different entity f r o m prakrti\""2 that G o d is o u r Inner Self; and that as modes of his substance we are dependent u p o n him. T h e precise relation between karmayoga a n d jnanayoga is difficult to determine. Several passages conflict with one another.' 8 3 Van Buitenen's conclusion on the subject is worth noting. He says: It seems t o m e that R a m a n u j a a t t e m p t e d t o reconcile b o t h m e t h o d s o f t h e G i t a , and starting f r o m the emphatically preferable Karma

Yoga tried t o

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reinterpret jñana yoga. By introducing an element of j ñ á n a into karma yoga itself, both disciplines could be stated in the terms of a continuity: jñana yoga is now no longer a separate way—as such it is repeatedly condemned— but an advanced stage of karma yoga. From R a m a n u j a ' s point of view karma yoga has two 'aspects', knowledge and action. That knowledge is originally the mediate, more or less 'abstract' knowledge of the atman, corresponding with the samkhye buddhih of the GTta. This knowledge is acted upon: interested action becomes disinterested action. Gradually (the process may take several lives) knowledge and action interact more directly; knowledge becoming more and more integrated in action, is concretized, action is spiritualized and interiorized, until at last both culminate in yoga where the atman is recognized, karma yoga terminates in jñana yoga and mediate, abstract knowledge is completely concretized in immediate intuitive perception (saksatkara).1,4 T h u s t h e i n t e g r a t e d e f f o r t s of karmayoga a n d jñanayoga lead t h e a s p i r a n t t o yoga w h i c h is t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e atman in h i m s e l f a n d in o t h e r s . R á m a n u j a s t a t e s t h a t t h e r e a r e f o u r d e g r e e s at t h e h i g h e s t s t a g e of development. a) The atmans of all creatures are equal when their proper f o r m is separated f r o m prakrti, for all of them have one and the same form, knowledge; inequality is of prakrti. This proves that a person who has brought his atman into yoga will see similarity in all atmans when separated f r o m prakrti; he will see that his own atman is in all beings and that all beings are in his own atman; in other words he will see that his own atman has the same form as the atmans of all other beings and contrariwise, so that he has seen all that is atman when he has seen one atman. b) A man who has reached the highest stage of development and in the said manner views the equality of God and an atman when the latter exists in its proper form beyond good and evil, will view God in all atmans and all atmans in God; in virtue of their mutual equality he will see by the one what is the other. That man indeed views the proper form of the atman and G o d is equal to that f o r m of the atman; nor will man vanish out of the sight of God who views in him Himself, when in virtue of his equality to God he views his atman as the equal of G o d . c) At which stage will yoga develop into full maturity? When a yogin views his atman in all beings becomes one with them because all have the same f o r m of unrestricted knowledge, and when he renounces the differences of the prakrti and devotes himself steadfastly to G o d , then—whatever condition he is in, even at the moment of awaking from yoga—he will always view his equality to God in his own atman and in all beings. d) He reaches the summit when he no longer perceives any difference between happiness and suffering of his own atman and those of their atmans inasmuch as his atman and the atmans of other beings are mutually comparable and as all atmans are equal and have no relations.' 8 '

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It is clearly manifest from this quotation that the ethics of interpersonal relationships has a solid foundation in jnanayoga. It asserts that all atmans are similar, possessing common qualities. Distinctions of caste are at best relevant to the body, and have nothing to do with the essential nature of the atman. Furthermore, atmans are not simply equal but sacredly equal, being similar to God. An enlightened man cannot, therefore, love God and hate his fellows. Conversely, when he serves his fellows he worships G o d . " 6 Moreover, it is not enough to contemplate such equalitarian thoughts in yoga; they must be habitually practised in everyday life. The highest stage is reached when one acts upon this knowledge by never again distinguishing between one's own atman and the atmans of others. Jnanayoga leads to bhaktiyoga. "Bhakti or devotion is a vague term extending from the lowest form of worship to the highest life of realisation. It has a continuous history in India from the time of the Rg Veda to the present day.'" 8 7 For R a m a n u j a , bhakti stands for the steady contemplation of the mind on God "because one loves God so dearly that one is unable to exist separated from his being, qualities, acts and dominion.'" 8 8 R a m a n u j a explains the proper form of bhakti thus: O n e must f o c u s o n e ' s mind constantly on G o d in all his glory. W h e n focusing o n e ' s mind o n G o d o n e must be animated by the most ardent love for G o d and p e r f o r m sacrifices for the glory o f G o d because o n e recognizes H i m as the i n c o m p a r a b l y a d o r a b l e O n e . But o n e must not stop at merely exerting oneself in this manner; o n e must resolve to prostrate oneself b e f o r e G o d w h o is o n e ' s inner a t m a n . T h e n , w h e n o n e has f o u n d o n e ' s sole support o n G o d and in virtue o f b o u n d l e s s and unsurpassed love enabled o n e ' s mind to experience H i m , o n e s h o u l d attain H i m . 1 "

Thus bhaktiyoga culminates in an intuitive realisation of God " w h o in his form of perfect bliss is most dear to his worshipper.'" 9 0 Bhakti is everlasting, " f o r once a man has attained God he will lose it never m o r e . ' " " Now let us examine some of the ethical facets of bhaktiyoga. First of all, the elaborate preparation for bhakti brings out its moral structure. The Srlbhasya states: " T h e highest self can be apprehended only by the mind purified by meditation on that Self."" 2 This meditation is assisted by seven means: abstention (viveka), freeness of mind (vimoka), repetition (abhyasa), works (kriya), virtuous conduct (kalyana), freedom f r o m dejection (anavasada), abstention from exultation (anuddharsaThe moral elements of this discipline require some exposition. Abstention refers to discrimination of food. "As a man eats, so becomes his mind," warns the Chandogya Upanisad. 1 , 4 The psyche must be supported by the sower.

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"Freeness of m i n d " means the absence of a t t a c h m e n t to desires. The desires to be eliminated are sexual passion, anger, vanity, jealousy, acquisitiveness." 6 " R e p e t i t i o n " means the continuous focusing of the mind on G o d . As a man thinks, so he becomes, and there is no better object of thought than God."' By " w o r k s " is u n d e r s t o o d " t h e p e r f o r m a n c e , according to one's ability, of the five great sacrifices." In addition to sacred study and the offering of oblations to the gods and the manes, it includes hospitality to guests and the offering of f o o d to the lowliest of a n i m a l s . " " Virtuous conduct means the practice of " t r u t h f u l n e s s , honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness, and the absence of c o v e t o u s n e s s . " " 9 Freedom f r o m dejection means one is unaffected by " t h a t lowness of spirit of want of cheerfulness which results f r o m u n f a v o u r a b l e conditions of place or time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow." 2 0 0 By abstention f r o m exultation is meant the possession of such character that one is not swept off his feet by the elation of joy and allurements. 2 0 ' These seven means to the development of bhakti show that morality is an essential content of bhakti. "Bhakti is not mere emotionalism, but includes the training of the will as well as the intellect. It is knowledge of G o d as well as obedience to his will." 2 " 2 A second ethical facet of bhakliyoga lies in its activism. For all its emphasis on prasada (grace), the importance of the devotee's personal efforts is never minimized. 2 0 3 Love, prayer, devotion, and dedication are all h u m a n efforts which serve as indirect means to attaining G o d . " M a n ' s active life becomes thus dedicated to the O n e f r o m w h o m he derives his acting power." 2 0 4 Of course, despite all of his own efforts, the devotee can never be confident that he loves G o d sufficiently, a n d , therefore, beseeches G o d for the grace to know him and love him. Acts are i m p o r t a n t in m a n ' s progress to G o d but so are intentions. T h e outer life is integrated with the inner life, and the latter determines the consequences of the former. R a m a n u j a exclaims: H o w w o n d r o u s is this difference that, t h o u g h d e v o t i n g themselves to o n e a n d the s a m e act, s o m e partake of a very small reward and then fall back by nature a n d others partake o f reward which m e a n s the attainment o f G o d that is perfect b o u n d l e s s bliss—, for the mere reason that b o t h differ in their intentions! 2 0 5

C o m m e n t i n g on the Glta text R a m a n u j a goes on to show the importance of the w o r s h i p p e r ' s intentions. T h o s e w h o intend w o r s h i p p i n g Indra etc. will g o t o the gods; those w h o intend w o r s h i p p i n g the d e c e a s e d ancestors will g o t o them; those w h o intend

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w o r s h i p p i n g g h o s t s will g o t o t h e m . T h o s e , h o w e v e r , w h o w o r s h i p G o d while u t t e r i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n : Let us w o r s h i p by t h e s e s a m e s a c r i f i c e s t h e Sup r e m e A t m a n h i m s e l f , t h e L o r d V a s u d e v a w h o s e b o d y is c o n s t i t u t e d by g o d s , d e c e a s e d a n c e s t o r s a n d g h o s t s , — t h o s e will g o t o G o d a n d n e v e r return.204 Worshippers o f G o d are also distinguished a c c o r d i n g to their intentions. Q u o t i n g the Mahabharata, R a m a n u j a points out: T h e r e a r e v o t a r i e s w h o lovingly o f f e r G o d a l e a f , a f l o w e r , a f r u i t o r water, t h i n g s w h i c h a r e a v a i l a b l e t o a n y o n e . If s o m e o n e o f f e r s G o d s u c h a leaf etc. with p i o u s i n t e n t i o n , this o f f e r i n g b e i n g his sole o b j e c t b e c a u s e his u n c o m m o n love f o r G o d u r g e s h i m o n t o m a k e this o f f e r i n g , t h e n G o d will even acc e p t this leaf etc. a n d p a r t a k e of t h e m b e c a u s e H e will h o l d t h e m d e a r , alt h o u g h H e c a n n e v e r h a v e e x p e r i e n c e of a n y t h i n g b u t H i m s e l f a n d a l t h o u g h this leaf etc. a r e f o r e i g n t o his d e s i r e . 2 0 ' A f o u r t h m o r a l f a c e t o f bhaktiyoga

l i e s in its u n i v e r s a l i t y . A l l b e i n g s

are equal for G o d . R a m a n u j a says: Being a r e f u g e f o r all G o d is t h e s a m e t o w a r d all a t m a n s of g o d s , m e n , a n i m a l s , a n d i m m o v a b l e s , w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r class, c o n f i g u r a t i o n , n a t u r e a n d k n o w l e d g e , exists in a n i n f i n i t e p l u r a l i t y of f o r m s , f r o m t h e highest t o t h e l o w e s t . N o o n e w h o h a s r e s o r t e d t o G o d will b e a b a n d o n e d by G o d b e c a u s e his h u m b l e class, c o n f i g u r a t i o n , n a t u r e a n d k n o w l e d g e is o d i o u s t o H i m , a n d n o o n e w h o h a s r e s o r t e d t o G o d t o g e t h e r w i t h a h u m b l e r v o t a r y is m o r e b e l o v e d of G o d b e c a u s e of his m o r e e x a l t e d class e t c . All b e i n g s w h o w o r s h i p G o d by b h a k t i — w h e t h e r t h e y b e a n e x a l t e d o r h u m b l e class—will at t h e i r d e s i r e f o r e g a t h e r in G o d as if t h e y s h a r e his v i r t u e s , a n d G o d himself will dwell in t h e m as if t h e y a r e m o r e e x a l t e d t h a n H e . 2 0 1 E v e n the m a n w h o has transgressed the rules o f class t o w h i c h he bel o n g s , s h o u l d he be e x c l u s i v e l y d e v o t e d t o G o d , h a s the right t o be "reg a r d e d as a l e a d i n g V a i s n a v a " a n d e s t e e m e d highly.209 Bhaktiyoga karmayoga,

and

f o u n d i n prapatti. tween

its

constitute

several

s u l t . " 2 1 0 Prapatti

two

nonseparable

one path

auxiliaries,

to salvation.

An

jnanayoga

alternate

and

means

is

In the SrTbhasya, R a m a n u j a a l l o w s f o r o p t i o n s be-

meditations

"on

account

of

the

non-difference

of

re-

is a c c e p t e d a s a s e c o n d m e a n s , b e c a u s e i t , t o o , i s s u e s i n

the intuitive k n o w l e d g e o f

Brahman.

R a m a n u j a is s i l e n t o n t h i s d o c t r i n e i n t h e G T t a b h a § y a a n d S r l b h a $ y a . H e t r e a t s o f it i n h i s G a d y a t r a y a , a n d a p o l o g i z e s f o r its e a r l i e r o m i s s i o n : I b o w d o w n t o t h a t d o c t r i n e of r e f u g e w h i c h w a s c o n c e a l e d b y m e e v e n in t h e S r i b h a s y a , b u t w h i c h is b r o u g h t t o light in t h e G a d y a t r a y a . 2 " The

path

bhaktiyoga

of

salvation

represented

by

karmayoga,

jnanayoga

and

is n o t a c c e s s i b l e t o w h o m s o e v e r w o u l d d e s i r e i t . S t u d y o f t h e

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129

scriptures, pilgrimages, building temples, rigorous disciplines, and a host of other details take their toll in terms of learning, money, concentration, and hard work which the majority of people can ill a f f o r d . Does this mean that the doors of salvation are only open to the elite among men? Surely not! Those who find the path of bhakti too difficult to follow can choose prapatti. Prapatti is the absolute surrender of one's individuality to G o d . This attitude of self-surrender is present also in bhakti, but while the attitude is the same the method is different. "Prapatti method is simple in the sense that here the devotee is not in need of any external 'sadhana' to purify his outer organs. A single moment of serious and sincere offering of oneself to God is considered "enough; and as it is immediate and nonlaborious, it is regarded as superior to bhaktiyoga."2'2 Prapatti is distinguished by six elements. They are harmonising one's will with the divine will; renouncing behaviour displeasing to God; confidence in divine protection; choosing God as Saviour of all; feeling hopelessly inadequate to pursue the path of bhaktiyoga; and resigning oneself wholly to God. The last factor is coterminus with prapatti; the five earlier ones are contributive to it. When the heart of the devotee has been purified by prapatti, a certain character emerges as its logical and ethical consequence, marked by freedom from egoistic impulses, immortal bliss, and charity for all beings.

CHAPTER 4

Summary and Critical Résumé of Hindu Ethics

The summum bonum in Hinduism is to break the ties of individuality which bind one to this world and to realize oneness with Brahman. Man must strive toward this spiritual ideal by cultivating a life of contemplation and progressive resignation f r o m the world. Looked at purely f r o m this philosophical ideal, it seems that ethics, which defines man's active role in the world, is of little significance in Hinduism; that it is only a temporary detour from the royal road of philosophy, a shift in direction that is necessitated by man's involvement with the phenomenal world. There is no denying the fact that in Hinduism, the philosophical ideal does indeed transcend the ethical ideal, but, like the rungs of a ladder, the higher and lower are intrinsically connected so that you cannot get to the one without the other. The philosophical ideal is higher than the ethical, but the ethical is the staging ground for the philosophical, and, as such, cannot be underestimated. Thus, while Hinduism draws a sharp distinction between the spiritual and material, the eternal and temporal, these dimensions of existence are not polarised but correlated within the concept of dharma. Dharma is "a unique joint product of the speculative and practical wisdom of the Hindus." 1 The unity between philosophical wisdom and ethical excellence is clearly illustrated in the doctrine of aclhikara. This doctrine teaches that before a disciple can aspire after knowledge, he must first be morally qualified. The Upanisads are replete with references correlating prajMna or saving knowledge with moral practice. Who has not ceased from evil ways, Who is untranquil, unprepared,

131

SUMMARY AND CRITICAL RÉSUMÉ O r w h o s e m i n d is n o t at p e a c e , By k n o w l e d g e cannot win to h i m /

C o m m e n t i n g o n this verse, R a m a n u j a explains it " t e a c h e s t h a t m e d i t a tion, which should b e c o m e m o r e perfect d a y by day, c a n n o t be a c c o m plished w i t h o u t t h e devotee having b r o k e n with all evil. This is t h e indispensable c o n d i t i o n of pleasing the L o r d a n d w i n n i n g His g r a c e . ' " T h e t r u t h of t h e adhikara d o c t r i n e lies in the fact that rationality cannot be divorced f r o m morality. Just as a s o u n d m i n d requires a s o u n d body, a s o u n d p h i l o s o p h y requires a s o u n d ethics. P r o f . S. K. S a k s e n a points out: If w e a n a l y z e t h e b e h a v i o u r o f a truly r a t i o n a l m a n , w e are s u r e t o f i n d a n u m b e r o f q u a l i t i e s in h i m w h i c h will p r o v e t o b e m o r a l . T o b e r a t i o n a l , f o r i n s t a n c e , is n o t t o b e p a r t i s a n , o r t o h a v e p r e j u d i c e s , or t o b e s w a y e d b y p a s s i o n s o r s e l f - i n t e r e s t , o r t o f a l s i f y t r u t h , or t o h a v e d o u b l e s t a n d a r d s , b u t it is t o s t a n d f o r t r u t h u n d e r all c o n d i t i o n s , etc. T h e s e a r e m o r a l q u a l i t i e s .

In

f a c t , t o b e r a t i o n a l is t o b e m o r a l , a n d t o b e c o m p l e t e l y r a t i o n a l is t o b e c o m p l e t e l y m o r a l . T h e m o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f a p h i l o s o p h e r is, t h e r e f o r e , a c o n d i t i o n o f his p h i l o s o p h i z i n g p r o p e r l y . P a s s i o n o r e t h i c a l faili n g s c a n n o t b u t d i s t o r t t h e v i s i o n o f e v e n a p h i l o s o p h e r . In f a c t , w h a t is c a l l e d i n t u i t i o n is n o t s o m u c h a n i n d e p e n d e n t f a c u l t y as a p u r i t y o f t h e m o r a l b e i n g o f t h e k n o w e r w h i c h itself c o n s t i t u t e s e n l i g h t e n m e n t . "

T h e m o r a l discipline which H i n d u i s m e n j o i n s u p o n the seeker a f t e r philosophical t r u t h springs f r o m a c o m p r e h e n s i v e ethic. H i n d u ethics is a systematic progression f r o m the objective level to the subjective level, c u l m i n a t i n g on the super-ethical level. T h e first is the stage of social ethics; the second that of personal ethics; a n d the third is t h e u l t i m a t e end which is " t h e life a b s o l u t e a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . ' " In its objective aspect, H i n d u dharma is t r i d i m e n s i o n a l . Social duties

are classified as: (1) Asramadharma, dharma.

(2) Varnadharma, (3) Sadharana-

T h e Airama scheme provides the f r a m e w o r k within which a n individual may express t h e total needs of his personality. T h e s e needs a r e incorp o r a t e d within the d o c t r i n e of the f o u r ends of life or purusarthas, and

are identified as: kama, artha, dharma, and moksa. The purusartha doctrine constitutes the p s y c h o m o r a l basis of Asramadharma. T h e t h e o r y of the f o u r purusarthas perceives h u m a n personality as a complex o r g a n i s m . It recognizes an empirical side t o life, represented by the first three purusarthas, having n a t u r a l desires a n d social aims. M a n is conceived as naturally craving f o r sex, a n d feeling t h e need f o r wealth, power, a n d the realization of the c o m m o n g o o d . It also recognizes a spiritual side t o life m a r k e d by o t h e r w o r l d l y hungers. M o r e o v e r , b o t h these

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SUMMARY AND CRITICAL RÉSUMÉ

sides are integrated within a holistic view of man. Thus, the purusartha doctrine allows for no schism between desire and aspiration, or between the demands of the kingdom of earth and of heaven. Both are good when viewed relationally. True, the earth perishes while heaven abides, but to treat the perishable as nonexisting is to invite ruin. As the Upanisad states it: "In darkness are they who worship only the world, but in greater darkness they who worship the infinite alone. He who accepts both saves himself f r o m death by the knowledge of the former and attains immortality by the knowledge of the latter." The first ideal which every normal, intelligent person should strive to fulfil is that of kama. This value refers to any pleasure derived through the five senses, and is under the control of the mind. Kama includes sensuous enjoyments found in art, music, literature, and in sexual activity. Sexual pleasure was deemed the best form of legitimate pleasure. P r o f . A. L. Basham reminds us that Hindu religious and secular literature is replete with sexual allusions, symbolism, and undisguised eroticism. 6 In the Middle Ages the sex act was divinized to illustrate the process of creation, and figures of couples in close embrace were elaborately carved on temple walls. The celebration of sex reached its most exaggerated f o r m with the introduction of ritual intercourse by certain religious sects. But this extreme form of sexual religiosity in the later Middle Ages was "only an expression of the vigorous sexuality which was to be found in Indian social life at all times.'" Westerners who fault Hinduism for creating an ethos of asceticism must find this somewhat difficult to reconcile with Hindu India's population explosion! The second need of human personality is artha. This value is cognisant of the economic and political needs of man. Property and power are productive means for developing personality. Through numerous passages, wealth is praised not only for its contribution to the physical well-being of personality, but also for its potency in bringing about a sense of social significance and political prestige. Wealth is said to transform a man of low social status into one of high status. He who possesses it can overcome all obstacles. No kith or kin can do for one what wealth can do. Contrary to the adage, "money is the root of all evil," Hinduism teaches that "all the virtues attach themselves to gold." A paramount virtue connected with wealth is liberality. "Let the rich satisfy the poor; and keep in view the long pathway. Riches come now to one, now to another, and like the wheels of cars are ever turning." Artha was deemed especially important for the king. "Let him be the Lord of endless treasures; let him as king be the master of the people. Grant him great power and strength; let his enemies be deprived of strength and vigor.'"

SUMMARY AND CRITICAL

RÉSUMÉ

133

Such prayers are found not only in the literature of the early Vedic period, but also in the contemplative literature of the Upanisads. The following is a typical Upanisadic prayer: " M a y I become glorious among men! Hail! May 1 be better than the very rich! H a i l ! ' " Contrary to the popular notion that artha is downgraded in the Upanisadic literature, it must be recalled that all the teachers of the m a j o r Upanisads were property holders. Of course, there was Yajfiavalkya, the most eminent of them all, who renounced the world and its riches—but only after he had enjoyed domestic bliss in the company of two wives. While it is good for man to possess, it is evil when the possessor becomes the possessed. As long as artha is guided by dharma it is a blessing; but artha without dharma is a bane. Even when controlled by dharma, the value of artha is limited. This brings us to the third purusartha—dharma. Dharma is one of the oldest philosophical concepts. Its roots go deep into Vedic soil, germinating in the idea of rta. The long history of this concept shows that Hindu anthropology has been morally conceived f r o m earliest times. Prof. K. N. Upadhyaya states: The persistence and intensity with which the inquiry into dharma has been pursued in India is mainly on account of the firm conviction of the Indian people that dharma constitutes the differentia of man, whereby he is distinguished from brutes, just as in the West, following Aristotle, rationality is regarded as the distinguishing mark of man. This approach at once reveals . . . that what is most vital to man's life is not his mental, but his moral and spiritual nature. 10

Dharma is formed f r o m the root 'dhr', to hold, and connotes what upholds a thing and supports it in being. In its broadest sense, dharma represents the ethical laws of the universe which regulate the moral life in the same way as the laws of nature govern the physical world. The universe is moral because it is divine. " T h e world of inorganic and organic nature is not just an evolution of an unconscious material power or force creating and expressing itself in a world of greater complexity and heterogeneity by its own unconscious dialectic. It is a world of divine and spiritual immanence with the fullest reality of moral values and forces flowing f r o m Sakti, or the power of G o d . " " Since life in the universe is morally structured, a man must bring all of his warring passions under this principle of righteousness, both for his own good and for the good of society. This brings us close to the meaning of dharma in the context of a purusartha. Here it refers to the performance of right action out of a consciousness of moral law. The effects of virtuous actions are conserved as merit which bears good fruit in the future.

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SUMMARY AND CRITICAL RÉSUMÉ

We have already m e n t i o n e d that kama a n d artha are to be regulated by dharma. T h e rationale f o r this hierarchy of values is t h a t whereas kama is b o r n or tamas guna (inertia), a n d artha is b o r n of rajas guna (energy), the source of dharma is sattva guna (purity)—the highest of the three f u n d a m e n t a l qualities of n a t u r e . O n the basis of this criterion, M a n u states that " w e a l t h a n d happiness, which are r e p u g n a n t to righteousness, must be d i s c a r d e d . ' " 2 Knowledge of o n e ' s o w n dharma or 'svadharma' as the BhagavadgTta puts it, is possible f o r the c o m m o n m a n t h r o u g h a f o u r f o l d guide: (1) the Vedas, (2) the smrtis which are the expositions of Vedic wisdom, (3) the c o n d u c t of righteous m e n , a n d (4) y o u r o w n conscience. 1 1 T h e three purusarthas studied thus f a r represent the ideals of empirical existence. T h e y recognize a n d provide f o r the balanced satisfaction of all h u m a n desires f o r worldly pleasures. It is to be regretted that these H i n d u values are not emphasised sufficiently, especially in view of their " f o r m a t i v e influence on the everyday life" of the Indian people reaching back into ancient times.' 4 However, higher t h a n the desires of the empirical self a r e the aspirations of the spiritual self. W h e n N a c i k e t a s was given the o p p o r t u n i t y t o receive pleasures here or in the hereafter, he exclaims: E p h e m e r a l t h i n g s ! T h a t w h i c h is a m o r t a l ' s , O E n d m a k e r , E v e n the vigor

(tejas)

o f all the p o w e r s , t h e y w e a r a w a y .

E v e n a w h o l e l i f e is s l i g h t i n d e e d . T h i n e be the vehicles

(vaha)\

T h i n e b e the d a n c e a n d s o n g ! "

In the s a m e spirit, MaitreyT asks Y a j f i a v a l k y a when he was a b o u t to leave her: " I f now, sir, this whole earth filled with wealth were mine, would I be i m m o r t a l t h e r e b y ? " H e r sage h u s b a n d replies in the negative: " A s t h e life of the rich, even so w o u l d y o u r life be. Of immortality, however, there is n o h o p e t h r o u g h w e a l t h . ' " 6 I m m o r t a l i t y or moksa constitutes the f o u r t h a n d highest purusartha. It is the state of liberation wherein t h e spiritual self comes into its o w n . W h e n correctly p u r s u e d , kama, artha, a n d dharma lead to moksa. Moksa is not the denial of these values but their f u l f i l m e n t . T h u s , o n the basis of o u r study of the d o c t r i n e of the f o u r purusarthas we find that H i n d u ethics is a rich c o m p e n d i u m of elements in life which less imaginative systems have d e e m e d exclusive a n d antagonistic. Its complex a n t h r o p o l o g y permits it t o blend activism with r e n u n c i a t i o n , a n d the empirical with t h e spiritual. Its view of m a n is not only holistic b u t optimistic. As in the case of t h e Asramadharmas and Varnadharmas, t h e purusarthas a r e based o n " t h e principle of the progressive realization of the s p i r i t . " "

SUMMARY AND CRITICAL

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The structure of existence defined by the purusarthas calls for a correlative social structure through which human natuie in ail of its variegated forms is actualised. This is supplied in the Airama scheme. Not only does this scheme channel the individual's natural inclinations, it is a practical outlet for his sense of social obligations formalised in the great ethical concept of the 'Three Debts' (rnas). Before a person qualifies for moksa, he must pay off vital obligations incurred as a member of the family of man. There is the debt to the rsis (rsi-rna) who have served as the revealers of truth contained in the Vedas. This is repaid by passing through the Brahmacarya asrama in which the Vedas are studied according to the prescribed rules (vidhivat). Then there is the debt to the ancestors (pitr-rnaJ. This is repaid by passing through the Garhasthya airama. The householder procreates many sons in accordance with dharma (dharmatah) and thereby ensures the perpetuation of his own family and that of the human r a c e . " The third debt is to the deities (deva-rna). It is reciprocated by performing the sacrificial duties of the Vanaprasthya airama according to one's ability (saktitah). Like the purusarthas, the rnas also bespeak an affirmative approach to life. Both doctrines demonstrate the necessity for accepting and appreciating that which is given in nature and in society as good. But the rnas insist that it is more blessed to give than to receive! This goodwill is motivated by a grateful sense of being involved in mankind—the complete opposite of isolation and retreat with which Hinduism is so often maligned. In the spirit of the rnas, a Hindu sage could well have uttered the words of John Donne: " . . . any man's death diminishes me . . . and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for t h e e . " " Having explored the 'Four Ends of Life' and examined the three springs of social obligation, we are now prepared to investigate the ethical organization in which the purusarthas are realized and the rnas redeemed. The Hindu philosophers, unlike their Western counterparts, were not content with theorizing about life. They were practical enough to organize the life of the individual in such a way that he would have ample scope to fulfil himself. This organization for the individual life is known as Airamadharma. ASramadharma enjoins that each individual pass through four stages in the quest after his true self. These stages are: Brahmacarya, the stage of studentship; garhasthya, the period of the householder; Vanaprasthya, the stage as a forest-dweller; and Samnyasa, the stage of complete renunciation. As the term aframa suggests, each of these stages is looked upon as a resting place as well as a training ground. During the formative period of eight to twelve years, the student attaches himself to a teacher who is now looked upon as a spiritual parent.

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His objectives are threefold: to acquire k n o w l e d g e (sacred and secular), to develop character, and to learn to assume social responsibility. H e progresses at his o w n pace and pursues learning as an end in itself and not as a means for material gain. H e submits to an austere discipline aimed at helping him conserve his energy and build a strong mind and body. U p o n c o m p l e t i o n of studies, the brahmacarin takes a bath, s y m b o l i c o f his graduation, and thereby b e c o m e s a snataka or o n e w h o has taken a bath. T h e Taittirlya Upanisad is f a m o u s for its " C o n v o c a t i o n Address" which we repeat here because it provides a clear description of the ethical teachings which characterized Hindu education f r o m ancient times: Speak the truth. Practise virtue (dharma). Neglect not study [of the Vedas], Having brought an acceptable gift to the teacher, cut not off the line of progeny. One should not be negligent of truth. One should not be negligent of virtue. One should not be negligent of welfare. One should not be negligent of prosperity. One should not be negligent of study and teaching. One should not be negligent of duties to the gods and to the fathers. Be one to whom a mother is a god. Be one to whom a father is a god. Be one to whom a teacher is a god. Those acts which are irreproachable should be practised, and no others. Those things which among us are good deeds should be revered by you, and no others. Whatever Brahmans (brahmana) are superior to us, for them refreshment with a seat should be procured by you. One should give with faith (Sraddha). One should not give without faith. One should give with plenty (Sri). One should give with modesty. One should give with fear. One should give with sympathy (sam-vid). Now, if you should have doubt concerning an act, or doubt concerning conduct, if there should be there Brahmans competent to judge, apt, devoted, not harsh, lovers of virtue (dharma)—as they may behave themselves in such a case, so should you behave yourself in such a case. 20 The y o u n g m a n is n o w at the stage w h e n he must take u n t o himself a w i f e and begin living the life o f a householder. Marriage binds couples with sacramental ties and sets t h e m o n a journey o f righteous living. In the Santiparva, the Mahabharata emphasises the place of highest h o n o u r

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ascribed to the Garhasthya asrama. Manu is equally emphatic upon the pivotal significance of Garhasthya a&rama within the body politic. R a m a n u j a only admitted those candidates into the monastic life who had first passed through the householder stage. But there was always room for exceptions, as in the case of Sankara who renounced the householder's life in favour of a life of knowledge. The householder engages in artha and kama within the limits set by dharma. Daily, he recites the Vedas, offers water to the ancestors, sacrifices to the gods, offers sustenance to all beings, and exercises the proverbial hospitality of the Indians. He undertakes these sacrifices out of a respect for learning, pride of family solidarity, dependence on the divine, and a thankful spirit that wants him share the good things in life with man and beast. Thus, the characteristic mark of the grhastha is that of dana or giving. Dana is also a virtue of the householder's wife, especially in her roles of wife and mother. Sankara says, " A bad son may be born, but there never is a bad mother." The mother of a home is loved and revered as a presiding deity. Her honour is higher than that of father or teacher. Without her, a man is not a man, and a home is not a home. The functions of a woman are quite different to that of a man, but unfortunately the difference is mistaken for inferiority. At the same time, it should be admitted that women are restricted by certain religious and social regulations. Most of these restrictions were later developments, and were the consequences of females f r o m backward cultures being assimilated into Aryan society. Men then began to think of women as weak, emotional, and unstable, and, therefore, in need of constant protection by the "stronger sex." When the householder finds his hair grown grey, his skin wrinkled, and he is a grandfather, it is time for him to leave his family and village, and seek retirement in the forest (vana). His wife may accompany him if she cares. Garhasthya asrama is not an end in itself. It is the matrix in which all one's capacities are moralised and socialised, but beyond the social good is a higher value. As one passage states it: " F o r the family sacrifice the individual; for the community the family; for the country the community; and for the soul the whole world." At the Vanaprasthya stage the individual begins sacrificing all of his earlier responsibilities and pleasures in the interests of his soul. He now wants to be alone with the Alone. He knows: "the last part of life's road has to be walked in single file." 21 To develop spiritual awareness, the Vanaprastha espouses a life of rigorous austerity. All avenues of sensuous excitement are kept under tight control. He lives as a strict celibate, eating fruits and vegetables only, and

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dwelling under the trees. Through penances (tapas) he curbs his bodily appetites and strengthens the power of his soul. Studying the scriptures and performing religious sacrifices with undisturbed attention not possible as a householder, he advances in knowledge and acquires merit. His compassion reaches out to all men and to all creatures. Should he die in this stage, he goes to the region of Brahma.12 The Vanaprasthya stage is probationary to the final stage of Samnyasa. The sannyasin completely renounces the world. His sole purpose is to realize spiritual freedom and to become one with the divine. Surrendering the world, he essentially surrenders his consciousness of " I . " Without the sense of "mineness," the Sannyasin develops an evenness of temper and calmness of mind. No more is he impatient, touchy, or hateful. Circumstances may change around him, but inwardly he is above all vicissitudes. He extinguishes all desires, wanting neither life nor death. Mystically united with the Absolute, the Sannyasin treats all life as sacred. He sees everything and everybody through cosmic eyes. "These sannyasins do not serve our policies that make the world unsafe for h u m a n life, do not promote our industries that mechanize persons, and do not support our national egoisms that provoke wars. Patriotism is not enough for these fine souls. Life, and not India's life or England's life, demands their devotion. They look upon all men and all groups as equal (samata sarvasmin)."2' The preceding description should not suggest that the Sannyasin makes no contribution to the society which he has renounced. To the contrary, he is a living proof that spiritual freedom is possible, that man can perfect himself in this world, and that, though the masses live on the level of selfishness and chauvinism, the brotherhood of man is not an impossible dream. Thus, the Sannyasin is the embodiment of the essential humanity of the people, its ground for hope, and its promise for fulfilment. " W h e n the wick is ablaze at its tip, the whole lamp is said to be burning." 2 4 Having described the ethical organization of the individual life, what do we consider to be some of its strengths and weaknesses? First, the institution of Asramadharma is a unique contribution of Hindu religion and philosophy to h u m a n ideals. Perhaps the only parallel to this type of scheme is found in Plato's Republic. Second, unlike other traditional systems of ethics that legislate uniformity with only token deference to individual plurality, the discipline Asramadharma is genetically oriented. It is adapted to the progressive development of a person's body, mind, and spirit, and defines responsibility in terms of the relation of duty to capacity. Third, its holistic view of man recognizes congeries of h u m a n needs, and systematically brings them to fruition on successsive levels of

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m a t u r a t i o n , c o r r e s p o n d i n g to y o u t h , a d u l t h o o d , a n d retirement. A person is considered right f o r a particular stage when he is ripe f o r that stage. H e r e , ethics is not only seen to be c o n n e c t e d with p h i l o s o p h y a n d theology, but also with biology a n d psychology. F o u r t h , Asramadharma is t o be c o m m e n d e d f o r its faith in h u m a n dignity a n d capacity. C o n t r a r y to ethical theories that claim to be realistic, a s s u m i n g the depravity of m a n , Asramadharma assumes that given the p r o p e r n u r t u r e , every m a n has the inner ability to meet all his debts to n a t u r e , G o d , a n d m a n , a n d to a d v a n c e t h r o u g h progressive n o n a t t a c h m e n t to a state of spiritual freedom. Today, Asramadharma is restricted to the t w o stages of Garhasthya a n d Samnyasa, but all the ideals of the f o u r f o l d plan still influence H i n d u culture. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , instead of genuine m o n k s c o m i n g out of h o u s e h o l d s in which they have led full, responsible, a n d p r o d u c t i v e lives, the m a j o r i t y of I n d i a ' s holy men have d o n n e d s a f f r o n garbs to escape the harsh realities of life. T h e c o m m o n people, g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d to the ideal of freely supplying the material needs of p e r s o n s w h o have t a k e n u p the life of holiness, unwittingly lend aid a n d c o m f o r t to c h a r l a t a n s in s a d h u ' s clothing. B e m o a n i n g the d e g r a d a t i o n of so noble an ideal, P r o f . S. K. S a k s e n a c o m m e n t s on how cheats can thrive on charity. " P e o p l e are expected to see that n o holy m a n is ever in need of shelter or his daily r a t i o n of f o o d . This explains why millions of p e r s o n s in India even without requisite moral or spiritual q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a r e still flourishing t o d a y u n d e r the titles of swami a n d s a d h u . In n o other culture or religion, could we have f o u n d so m a n y millions of h u m a n beings living with perfect respectability or prestige without w o r k i n g f o r their livelihood." 2 5 Happily, e f f o r t s have been m a d e to offset this exploitative a n d unp r o d u c t i v e image of the H i n d u holy m a n . In m o d e r n times, S w a m i V i v e k a n a n d a (1863-1902), applying the teachings of his Master Sri R a m a k r i s h n a (1836-1886) to the practical d e m a n d s of n a t i o n a l life, exemplary f o r society, not j u s t in terms of m a d e the o r d e r of Sannyasins religious devotion a n d spiritual achievement, but in social service a n d relief w o r k f o r the s u f f e r i n g a n d d o w n t r o d d e n . We n o w m o v e f r o m the ethical o r g a n i z a t i o n of the individual represented by Asramadharma, t o the ethical o r g a n i z a t i o n of society represented by Varnadharma. B o t h dharmas a r e c o o r d i n a t e d , f o r m i n g a composite system. W h e r e a s the o r g a n i z a t i o n of Asramadharma approaches life f r o m the side of n u r t u r e (srama), training it t h r o u g h successive stages, the o r g a n i z a t i o n of Varnadharma a p p r o a c h e s life f r o m the side of n a t u r e (guna), d e f i n i n g the role of the individual in society by virtue of n a t u r a l tendencies a n d i n n a t e dispositions. T h e Sanskrit w o r d 'varna'

literally m e a n s ' c o l o u r ' . Originally, it was

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connected with the class structure of the Vedic Aryan tribesmen. It is scientifically inaccurate to apply the meaning of 'caste' to varna. Prof. A. L. Basham clarifies the confusion: There are only four varnas. There never have been less than four or more than four. It is said that at the present time there are 3000 castes, and the number of castes is known to have risen, and perhaps has sometimes fallen, over the past 2000 years. Caste and varna are quite different institutions, different in origin, different in purpose, and different in function. 2 '

Originally, the class structure was devised to promote a functional harmony between the various segments of society. Society was conceived of as constituting four distinct types. The Brahmins belonged to the first type. They were the priest-teachers. Due to the prevalence of sattva gunas in their nature, they were capable of living on an exalted plane of intellect and purity. The Ksatriyas belonged to the second type. They were the warrior-kings. Possessing a large portion of rajas guna, they demonstrated uncommon virility, and were primarily men of action. The Vaisyas belonged to the third type. They were traders and craftsmen. The dominance of tamas gunas made them into men of feeling. The Sudras belonged to the fourth type. They were manual labourers. Their professions reflected the fact that none of the aforementioned traits were significantly developed in them. Modern Hindus consider the reasoning behind the original classification of society valid for all times. Realistically speaking, all men are not created equal. There is no democracy in nature. Some men are naturally endowed to become scholars, teachers, rulers and administrators; others are martially equipped to serve as protectors of the nation; others seem to have a yen for commercial enterprises; and a great many lack the gifts and graces to d o anything special on their own, and therefore, must, serve the preceding. Describing the natural orientation of Varnadharma, M a h a t m a Gandhi has said: "It is a law of spiritual economics and has nothing to do with superiority and inferiority." 27 However, it was not long before the "law of spiritual economics" was displaced by the law of heredity, and an iron-clad caste system took on all the marks and trappings of superiority and inferiority in respect to food, clothing, language, ceremonials, social intercourse, marriage, and occupation. Just as Asramadharma degenerated to the point where mendacious monks received the highest honour of society, Varnadharma degenerated into the caste system based on heredity. The evils of the caste or jati system are too well known to bear repetition or reproach. But this should not detract f r o m its lesser-known merits. After all, if jati has survived the centuries, it must have had some survival value.

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It is safe to say that an individual's social position should not be fixed by heredity, but Western critics may question whether their system of an aristocracy of wealth is any more defensible than the Indian's system of an aristocracy of birth. One merit of the caste system is that it has provided the individual with the sense of belonging. By contrast, in Western cities today, loneliness is an omnipotent and painful threat to an increasing number of persons. These individuals describe their predicament as that of being " o n the outside" and isolated. The more educated among them describe their situation as one of alienation. In Hinduism the sense of community has traditionally been so strong that the feeling of being uprooted and dislocated is quite foreign. Wherever the individual travels, the eyes of his community are upon him, watching his conduct and having an interest in his affairs. Even in an urban setting he maintains a closeness of relationship which the atomistic Westerner can only expect in some rural habitat. Second, caste supplies the Hindu with economic security. It eliminates the aggressive "dog-eat-dog" philosophy of a competitive society, and, like a trade union, protects the "little guy" f r o m being exploited by the moguls of business. The preservation of jobs has also meant the survival of several Indian arts and crafts which, in a competitive society, would have become economically extinct. Third, the caste system has helped preserve Indian culture. Dr. Thomas Welty observes that amid extended periods of chaos and disorganization, the caste system helped Indian civilization survive by supplying it with the lifeblood of stability and continuity. " N o matter under what alien king or conqueror the Indian was forced to live, he maintained his loyalty and devotion to the caste and in this way preserved Indian culture." 2 8 However, all of these social, economic, and cultural assets of the caste system were purchased at a great price—the loss of freedom and the sacrifice of social progress. Freedom was lost because the individual had to submit himself totally to the system, and social progress was sacrificed because the principle of heredity was the sole determinant of one's role in life. The doctrine of karman could explain one's present position in relation to the past and even provide incentive to perform good deeds, with a view to meriting a higher caste in a future existence, but too often this doctrine was only a moral rationalization of social inequities. The impression should not be given that Hindus only became embarrased by the caste system upon contact with Western ideals of liberty, fraternity, and equality. Actually there has always been a countermovement, questioning and controverting the rigidity and inviolability of the principle of heredity. In the Chandogya Upanisad there is the celebrated story of Satyakama

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w h o , t h o u g h b o r n out of wedlock a n d i g n o r a n t of his f a t h e r ' s lineage, was considered a B r a h m i n because he was u n a s h a m e d t o speak the truth. 2 9 M a n u , himself a lawgiver, says: " A twice-born m a n w h o , not having studied the Veda, applies himself to other (and worldly study), soon falls even while living, to the c o n d i t i o n of a S u d r a a n d his descend a n t s (after him)." 3 0 In the M a h a b h a r a t a , Yudhisthira teaches: " T r u t h , charity, f o r t i t u d e , g o o d c o n d u c t , gentleness, austerity, a n d c o m p a s s i o n he in w h o m these are observed is a brahmana. If these m a r k s exist in a

sudra and are not found in a twice-born, the sudra is not a sudra, nor the brahmana a brahmana."3I T h e B h a g a v a d g l t a accepts the caste ideal on religious, biological a n d sociological g r o u n d s , but, as P r o f e s s o r K. N. U p a d h y a y a has s h o w n , the Glta universalises the o r t h o d o x concept of salvation to m a k e it accessible to all m e n ; a n d further, it refuses to categorise m o r a l acts by hierarchical s t a n d a r d s . 1 2 S o m e H i n d u sects, such as Saivas a n d Vaisnavas, m a d e n o rule of caste distinctions. In the same spirit, r e f o r m m o v e m e n t s have discarded caste practices. R a m M o h u n Roy (1772-1833), f o u n d e r of the B r a h m o S a m a j which is a school of rational theism based on the U p a n i s a d s , f o u g h t against caste, calling it a d e p a r t u r e f r o m true H i n d u i s m . T h e Arya S a m a j f o u n d e d by Swami D a y a n a n d a (1824-1883), d e n o u n c e d caste as a later d e v e l o p m e n t , having n o s u p p o r t in the Vedas on which the m o v e m e n t took its stand. M a h a t m a G a n d h i (1869-1948) believed in Varnadharma as " t h e law of life," but crusaded against caste as alien to H i n d u i s m . H e was especially b u r d e n e d f o r the U n t o u c h a b l e s — I n d i a ' s outcastes—and gave them a new designation: Harijans or sons of G o d . T h u s it was when India b e c a m e a d e m o c r a t i c republic in 1947, the a b r o g a t i o n of caste by her constitution was in n o conflict with the original spirit of H i n d u social ethics. In a d d i t i o n to visesa or 'specific' duties, objective ethics includes satnanya or 'generic' duties. W h e r e a s the o n e is relative a n d conditional, the other is c o m m o n a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a l . T h e c o m m o n duties or Sadharanadharmas are c o m m o n in the sense of being i n d e p e n d e n t of caste a n d station in life, a n d are binding u p o n m a n as m a n — n o t as a m e m b e r of a c o m m u n i t y . Since h u m a n rights precede c o m m u n a l rights, Sadharanadharmas provide the basis f o r Varnasramadharmas a n d also d e f i n e their b o u n d a r i e s . F o r instance, a B r a h m i n w a n t i n g to m a k e a sacrificial o f f e r i n g is not at liberty to acquire the object of sacrifice by stealth, f o r asteya or nonstealing is a universal duty. Sadharanadharmas a r e thus the p r e c o n d i t i o n s a n d f o u n d a t i o n s of Varnasramadharmas. T h e y p e r f o r m the role of w a t c h d o g over parochial a n d provincial egoism, evaluating c o m m u n a l rights within the larger ethical f r a m e w o r k of h u m a n rights.

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Prof. S. K. Maitra has pointed out that within the humanitarian scheme of Sadharanadharma even the lowly Sudra was granted more civic status than the barbarian and helot could have expected within the Platonic scheme of justice. For P l a t o the barbarian is w i t h o u t any moral standing: there are not o n l y n o duties t o be fulfilled by him but also n o duties t o be fulfilled in respect of him. T h e H i n d u , however, in spite o f the social d e g r a d a t i o n of the Shudra, d o e s not exclude him altogether f r o m moral p r o t e c t i o n , but shelters him f r o m persecution t h r o u g h a c o d e o f universal duties w h i c h are obligatory o n m a n as m a n . T h e s e duties are t o be observed by all alike, being the duties o b l i g a t o r y o n e v e r y b o d y in his dealings with e v e r y b o d y else. T h e y are thus t o be observed not merely by the Shudras but also by m e m b e r s o f the higher caste."

The motivation behind Sadharanadharmas is twofold: the sacredness of life, and gratitude for life. The unity of man is deeper than his diversity, and out of this unity is born the sense of sacredness. We are not Brahmacarins or Brahmins; not Sannyasins or Sudras who happen to be people; but people who happen to occupy this particular station or that particular caste, both of which are relative and changing. Second, there is the same sense of gratitude operant in Sadharanadharmas as in Airamadharmas. Man is indebted to his community and therefore sacrifices; but even more so is he culturally and experientially indebted to humanity and must therefore serve the universal good. What are these universal duties? Following M a n u , the Sadharanadharmas, like the laws of Moses, are ten in number: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Steadfastness (Dhairya) Forgiveness (Ksama) A p p l i c a t i o n (Dama) Nonappropriation (Cauryabhava)

5. Cleanliness 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

(Sauca)

Repression o f the s e n s u o u s appetites W i s d o m (Dhl) Learning (Vidya) Veracity (Satya) Restraint of anger (Akrodha)

(Indriyanigraha)

It is quite obvious that the virtues listed are largely ascetical (steadfastness, application, repression), and dianoetic (wisdom, learning, veracity). Their purport is self-culture, constituting an ethics of self-autonomy. This is in harmony with the moral law of karman which states that a man rises or falls by virtue of his own deeds. The emphasis on self-sufficiency is well made, but we miss any reference to social service.

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The element lacking in M a n u ' s list is partially compensated for in P r a s a s t a p a d a ' s list of generic or samanya duties. The humanitarian ideal of life is brought out more strongly by the inclusion of such duties as ahitnsa (refraining f r o m injury to living beings), and bhutahitatva (seeking the good of creatures). O u r description of Varnasramadharmas and Sadharanadharmas requires one final qualification. The duties and obligations outlined are those done under normal conditions. At the same time, the Epics and D h a r m a Sastras allow for emergency conditions in which the conventional must be superseded in favour of the prudential. For instance, while it is customarily good to speak the truth, under extenuating circumstances when the truth could cause the death of the innocent, it is prudentially expedient to tell lies. In such cases the end justifies the means. Thus, Hindu ethics is not absolutist and unbending but is reflective and contextual in its approach to ethical problems. To safeguard this situationalism from degenerating into privatism, the smrtis make it plain that exceptions are only to be made for the sake of others, not for one's own private advantage. Objective Ethics constitutes the first stage of Hindu Dharma. On this stage morality is represented by social codes demanding external conformity. Psychologically understood, this is the stage of socialization and introjection. The voice of conscience is the interiorized voice of the group. The essence of conscience is a " m u s t . " The feel of conscience is that of fear of punishment for duties not done. Hindu Dharma further teaches that one should progress f r o m the 'must-consciousness' to the 'ought-consciousness'. This transformation comes out of a deepened self-awareness. Looking into the self, one becomes concerned with inner purity and acts of free will. This is the subjective stage known as Cittasuddhi or purification of the mind. Subjective Ethics is an advance over Objective Ethics because "virtues are superior to duties." Whereas duty represents external sanctiors, virtue represents internal sanctions. Duties are related to experiences of prohibition and fear, but virtues arise from experiences of preference and the feeling of self-respect. Duty denotes tribalistic morality; virtue denotes individualistic morality. Duty is ad hoc and specific; virtue is generic and dynamic. Summarily stated, while Objective Ethics springs f r o m a sense of duty, usually entailing an element of coercion, Subjective Ethics springs from virtue which is always a labour of love. This love is either the product of a theistic consciousness that views all life as the handiwork of God and hence sacred, or the perception of a philosophic consciousness which envisions all forms of life as essentially one and therefore always worthy of one's best.

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Capacity to love is dependent on the individual's degree of freedom. The loving individual is a free agent. This is precisely what the word 'individual' means. Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya defines an individual as " a human being who is not entirely an item of Nature, accepting unquestioningly what Nature offers and submitting blindly to its forces, but one who often resists it and initiates new actions, one, in other words, who is as much above Nature as in it. This over-natural status of man is called 'freedom'." 3 4 Freedom is the sine qua non of any system of ethics. Hindu ethics is constantly being attacked on this central issue on the grounds of two doctrines which critics claim are denials of individual freedom. The first is the doctrine of gunas, the other the doctrine of karman. Hindu ethics classifies actions as tamasika, rajasika, and sattvika. Tamasika movements are biological, and, therefore, uncontrollable and unfree. Rajasika movements are propelled by strong passions of love (raga) or hate (dvesa) and are therefore also unfree even though the person knows these actions to be his own. However, while tamasika and rajasika actions provide no room for volition, voluntaristic activity is possible on the sattvika level. Here, actions are characterized by vairagya or detachment. Detachment is believed to undo the consequences of the law of karman. Vairagya admits of degrees. "Short of absolute detachment, it lends to actions which are sociomoral (dharma) at the lower stage and spiritual (adhyatmika) at a higher." 35 The second doctrine critics claim is the negation of freedom is the law of karman. The West knows this doctrine well but comprehends it little. The doctrine is very ancient and is to be seminally found in the Vedic concept of rta. It postulates a universe governed by law. The same immutable law which charts the course of the sun and moon across the sky operates in the rational and ethical realms with equal exactitude. There is nothing sown that is not reaped, and there is nothing reaped that is not sown. Action and retribution are the two sides of karman. This alternation is empirically verifiable, signifying the inherent justice of the universe. Since the universe is morally structured, it must be assumed that an action without retribution is still in the process of maturation, and that eventually in some future life what has been sown will be reaped. Thus, by inference, the theory of samsara or rebirth is deduced from the law of karman. There are three areas in which the moral deserts of past lives determine the present. They are one's psychophysical constitution, family, and caste; one's span of life; and one's activities. By linking the present with

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the past, the law of karman a t t e m p t s t o explicate the mysteries behind individual inequalities, a n d the p r o b l e m of s u f f e r i n g . This shows t h a t karman is not a strange, e x t r a n e o u s force which determines what shall h a p p e n to the individual. Rather, karman is the individual himself, f o r m e d by his own past. Since the individual is the a u t h o r of the story of his life, karman leaves n o r o o m f o r fatalism. F a t e (fatum, ' t h a t which has been said') signifies a c o n t r a d i c t i o n of f r e e d o m , but karman signifies a p o l a r correlation. Karman is not the opposite of f r e e d o m , but points t o the conditions a n d limits of f r e e d o m . Karman is the g r o u n d of f r e e d o m ; a n d f r e e d o m participates in m o u l d i n g karman. This d y n a m i c relationship between karman a n d f r e e d o m becomes a p p a r e n t in the t w o f o l d results of every a c t i o n . First, there are the direct results over which one has n o control. A s stated earlier, o n e ' s physical a n d m e n t a l m a k e u p , family a n d caste are all p r e d e t e r m i n e d a n d o n e has a b solutely n o o p t i o n but to accept the given. However, past actions also p r o d u c e indirect results which f o r m a n individual's n a t u r a l inclinations. Propensities m a y prod but d o riot p u s h the individual in a given direction. W h e r e a s direct results precipitate action, indirect results leave r o o m f o r reaction. T h e reaction is a free act, but it is p e r f o r m e d within t h e limits set by n a t u r e . This m e a n s that the f u t u r e is c o n d i t i o n e d , but it is not d e t e r m i n e d . T h e d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n d i t i o n e d state of m a n a n d the d e t e r m i n e d state of a n i m a l s is the presence of spirit in m a n . M a n , as R a d h a k r i s h n a n states, is m o r e t h a n a c o m p l i c a t e d piece of machinery. The spirit in him can triumph over the automatic forces that try to enslave him. The Bhaguvadglla asks us to raise the self by the self. We can use the material with which we are endowed to promote our ideals. The cards in the game of life are given to us. We d o not select them. They are traced to our past Karma, but we can call as we please, lead what suit we will, and as we play, we gain or lose. A n d there is f r e e d o m . "

T h u s , on the m o r a l a n d spiritual levels of existence, the law of karman is not o p p o s e d to f r e e d o m . This conclusion reconciles the o p e r a t i o n of karman with the spirit of f r e e d o m implicit in the scriptures. T h e scriptures are full of prescriptions a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s , b u t , as R a m a n u j a has p o i n t e d o u t , " c o m m a n d m e n t s can be addressed t o such agents only as are c a p a b l e of entering o n action or r e f r a i n i n g f r o m action, a c c o r d i n g t o their o w n t h o u g h t a n d will." 3 7 T h e claim f o r the f r e e d o m of m o r a l a n d spiritual actions is also supp o r t e d by the theory that the merits or demerits of actions get depleted in their consequences which are experienced as r e w a r d s or p u n i s h m e n t s . In this way justice is m a i n t a i n e d . But if the results of f o r m e r acts were them-

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selves the seed for some future harvest in this world or the next, that would contradict the whole idea of justice that the law of karman is supposed to uphold. It would be tantamount to rewarding or punishing the individual eternally. This possibility is ruled out by the central tenet of the theory that merits or demerits are dissipated in their results. Next, what is the quality of a moral and spiritual deed which is free? It is characterised by vairagya or detachment. The theory of detached action is known as niskamakarma. Whereas karman binds the actor to the fruit of his actions through feelings of attraction or repulsion, niskamakarma frees him from bondage because karman without kama has no potency for rebirth. The practical appeal of this quality of action resides in the fact that it is calling not for renunciation of action but renunciation in action. The Glta arrives at this formula by combining the essential elements of two ideals; pravrtti or 'active life', and nivrtti or 'quietism'. In the spirit of vairagya the unattached individual lives the life of virtue. According to Vatsyayana, dharma or virtue has three forms, namely: 1. Virtues of the body—charity, helping the needy, social service 2. Virtues of s p e e c h — t r u t h f u l n e s s , benevolence, gentleness, recitation of scriptures 3. Virtues of the m i n d — k i n d n e s s , unworldliness, piety

Like dharma, adharma is also threefold: 1. Vices of the body—cruelty, t h e f t , sexual i n d u l g e n c e 2. Vices of s p e e c h — f a l s e h o o d , harshness, scandal 3. Vices of the m i n d — h a t r e d , covetousness, disbelief

The Western student of Hindu ethics quickly perceives that far greater importance is attached to Subjective Ethics than to Objective Ethics. Concern for social welfare is minor as compared to concern for individual perfection. How may we account for this disproportion of interest? First, Hindu philosophers reasoned in a fashion common to preindustrial thinking that to change society one must start with the individual. The whole is made up of parts, and when the parts are healthy, the whole is healthy. This reasoning was adequate for its times, but today Indian society cannot a f f o r d to continue to place personal ethics above social ethics. In modern u r b a n life it is society that makes the individual and not the individual who makes society. Furthermore, in ancient India, common people could be relied upon to play the role of the ' G o o d Samaritan' by following their own dharma. But those were times when religion was vigorous and the country was

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prosperous. Today, the religion is alive but tired because of an impoverished environment, and unless something drastic is done to change the socioeconomic environment, dharma will lose its present appeal to the people. Art ha without dharma is blind, but dharma without artha is empty. On the Objective level the ethical character of the individual was disciplined by codes of duties specifying right and wrong actions. This discipline was preparatory to the higher level of Subjective Ethics. The task on this second level was purification of the mind or Citta&uddhi. By the inwardisation of objective morality, duty was transformed into virtue. However, even Subjective Ethics is not the highest level of spirituality. Like social ethics, personal ethics is not an end in itself but a means toward the ultimate end which is "the life absolute and transcendental." H e r e s o c i a l i t y as w e l l as s u b j e c t i v e m o r a l i t y m u s t b e m e r g e d in t h e e n d a n d t h e r e b y e i t h e r t o b e a n n u l l e d a n d t r a n s c e n d e d o r t o r e - a p p e a r in a n e w light a n d c h a r g e d w i t h a b s o l u t e s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h i s is the u n d e r l y i n g i n t e n t

of

Patanjali's S c h e m e of Yoga, Shankara's view of M o k s h a , R a m a n u j a ' s doctrine o f B h a k t i a n d the B u d d h i s t t h e o r y o f N i r v a n a . A l l t h e s e a g r e e in r e c o g n i z i n g the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l as t h e limit o f t h e e m p i r i c a l life, t h e t i m e l e s s as t h e truth o f all that is in t i m e . T h i s t i m e l e s s , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l i f e is t h e r e f o r e t h e c u l m i n a t i n g s t a g e o f t h e spirit, t h e s p h e r e o f its c o n s u m m a t i o n a n d fruition."

The transcendental life is not a new acquisition. Just as the first three purusarthas were organically related to one's empirical being, moksa, the fourth purusartha, is intrinsically related to one's essential being. The self is already perfect, immortal, and free; only its true nature is concealed by maya or cosmic ignorance. Under the spell of maya, all one can see is the chrysalis, but when knowledge penetrates ignorance, the chrysalis is transformed into a butterfly! This transformation is a total experience, involving both a change of intellectual understanding and a change of heart. A whole new consciousness floods the liberated self, pointing to the essential nature of the soul as pure existence (sat), pure consciousness (cit), and pure bliss (ananda). The transcendental level of life is a postethical plane of being. Ethics is only significant as long as one finds multiplicity in the world, but on the higher plane of supramundane unity, ethics loses its substance. On this level, all empirical contradictions are transcended—cold and heat, pleasure and pain, praise and blame, but also, good and evil, right and wrong! The transcendence of ethics in moksa has led to gross misunderstanding with accusations that Hindu ethics is ultimately antinomian. It must

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be clearly stated, therefore, that though Hindu philosophy teaches that the metaphysical ideal, is higher than the ethical ideal, nevertheless, the two are synthetically related. The person who has achieved the mystical state of moksa does not consciously follow the ethical path, but neither can he deviate from it. The path of an enlightened man is paved with virtue. The Bhagavadgita declares: The holy men whose sins are destroyed, w h o s e doubts (dualities) are cut asunder, whose minds are disciplined and w h o rejoice in (doing) g o o d to all creatures, attain to the beatitude of G o d . "

Thus, love and compassion to all creatures are the spontaneous products of wisdom. This kind of knowledge helps one overcome the world, but since through it one sees the Divine in all beings, one cannot become otherworldly. Social responsibilities are taken all the more seriously. Sankara is a case in point. He is well known as an eminent philosopher. But the philosopher was also a great humanitarian; and that, not in.spite of his philosophy, but because of his philosophy! The unitive view of reality underlying the moksa doctrine has contemporary relevance for several problems besetting American society, but we shall single out the problem of ecology for special focus. In the remaining section of this chapter we shall first try to show the relationship between ethics and ecology, and then proceed to indicate how Hindu philosophy can provide the basis for an environmental ethic. Ecology presupposes ethics. We must view the environmental crisis not only as a physical and technical problem, or one that raises fundamental political and economic questions about private and public planning, but also as a problem rooted within the value dimensions of our culture. Our problem is not that we lack the money, scientific expertise, or legislation that is necessary to overcome the crisis. Americans are the world's experts in all of these areas. We can spend billions of dollars on antipollution programmes, we can tax polluters, we can punish violators, and the president can promote endless roadshows to express executive alarm; but none of these is sufficient to solve the problem. Something more is needed if we are going to recover and preserve our natural environment. This is precisely the one thing money cannot buy, which lawmakers cannot legislate, and which programmes and presidents cannot promote. This is a reverence for nature. To attain a right relationship with nature, modern man must assume vital obligations for the web of life in which his own life is wonderfully woven. Furthermore, if this sense of obligation is to be meaningful, it must become a matter of conscience. This is not to indict the West for thus far not having had a conscience. The problem is, its conscience has

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been predominantly social, whereas the situation in which we find ourselves demands, in additon to a social conscience, an ecological conscience. The ecological conscience views the natural world as a series of interrelated systems which are in a state of dynamic equilibrium, and within which man must play his part as a responsible spectator and participant. In the balance of ecology, the responsibility or irresponsibility of an act is defined by its ability either to preserve or to destroy the integrity of the biotic community. This means, if we are going to be scientific in our approach, we cannot speak of man and nature, but of man in nature. The first view is anthropocentric; the second is biocentric. The first view has characterised Western m a n ' s approach to nature; the second has been more characteristic of the Hindu perspective. The outlook on life underlying the summum bonum of Hindu ethics is fundamentally cosmic. The essential self in man is not only identified with the group, or society, or the nation, or even the whole human race, but it is inclusive of all these and much more! If the nature of the self ended with human identity, we could only expect Hinduism to provide a social conscience, as do the Western religions. But the nature of the self in Hinduism includes all lesser forms of existence, and, therefore, it also has an ecological conscience. The cosmic view of the self is found in such passages as: T h e e s s e n t i a l self o r t h e vital e s s e n c e in m a n is the s a m e as t h a t in a g n a t , the s a m e a s that in a n e l e p h a n t , t h e s a m e as that in t h e s e t h r e e w o r l d s , i n d e e d t h e s a m e as that in t h e w h o l e u n i v e r s e . 4 0

The general idea behind this text is that the individual atman is one with the universal Brahman. Brahman literally means 'the growing or increasing force' (brh). This Brahman force is manifest uniformly in the divinities of heaven, and in human and animal and plant life on earth. All of these entities live an apparently independent existence, but they all emanate f r o m Brahman and are finally reabsorbed into it. Brahman itself is infinite and is, therefore, greater than the sum of all its manifestations, past, present, and future. This belief in Brahman provides the philosophic basis for the Hindu's veneration of the natural world. The natural world is not a commodity which man possesses but a community to which he belongs. The universe appears to be material, but it is the universal consciousness or Brahman. Since all is one, the conquest of nature cannot be true to reality, and our sense of separateness, isolation, and egotism is the product of ignorance. Man cannot act ethically toward nature as long as he is ignorant of himself. Lacking his own sense of identity, he cannot identify with the

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trees a n d the m o u n t a i n s , n o r can he feel e m p a t h y f o r the beasts of the fields. N a t u r e is e m p t y because he is empty. H e m a n i p u l a t e s n a t u r e because he manipulates himself. As psychologist Rollo M a y puts it, " t h e loss of the relation to n a t u r e goes h a n d in h a n d with the loss of o n e ' s o w n self." 4 1 William W o r d s w o r t h perceived this c o r r e l a t i o n between our inner world a n d the outer w o r l d , a n d expressed it in a s o n n e t . T h e w o r l d is t o o m u c h w i t h u s ; late a n d s o o n , G e t t i n g a n d s p e n d i n g , w e lay w a s t e o u r p o w e r s ; Little w e s e e in N a t u r e t h a t is o u r s ; We h a v e g i v e n o u r h e a r t s a w a y , a s o r d i d b o o n ! T h i s S e a that b a r e s her b o s o m t o t h e m o o n , T h e w i n d s that will b e h o w l i n g at all h o u r s , A n d a r e u p - g a t h e r e d n o w like s l e e p i n g f l o w e r s . F o r this f o r e v e r y t h i n g , w e are o u t o f t u n e . 1 2

T h e basic message of H i n d u ethics, rooted in the ancient idea of rta, is that h a r m o n y is already here; that we d o not have to create it—only discover it! Since Brahman a n d N a t u r e are one, we m u s t see the S u p r e m e Being in the whole w o r l d , a n d the whole world in H i m !

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. 2. 3. 4.

L. M. Joshi, Brahmanism, Buddhism and Hinduism (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1970), p. 32. P. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, 1st rev. ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), p. 324ff. W. N. Brown, Man in the Universe (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1970), p. 8. M u n d a k a U p a n i j a d 3.1.5., in R. E. H u m e , trans., Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2d rev. ed. ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d University Press, 1971), p. 374. CHAPTER 1

1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, 8th ed. (New York: The World Publishing C o . , 1964), p. 9. A. A. Macdonell, A History of Sanskrit Literature ( L o n d o n : D. A p p l e t o n and C o . , 1900), p. 8. A. L. B a s h a m , The Wonder that Was India (New York: Grove Press, 1954), p. 236. RV. X . X X X . 1.2. in R. T. H . Griffith, trans., The Hymns of the Rigveda, 3d ed., vol. 2 (Benares: Lazarus and C o . , 1926), p. 425. All q u o t a t i o n s are taken f r o m this source. Ibid., I . X X X 1 I . 1 - 5 . S. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 ( L o n d o n : Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 106. R. C . M a j u m d a r , Ancient India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), p. 51. Ibid. RV. II.XXIV.20 A. C. Bose, Hymns from the Vedas (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 21.

154 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

NOTES M a j u m d a r , loc. cit. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , loc. cit. Ibid. E. W. H o p k i n s , Ethics of India (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1924), p. 2. RV. X.XL.III.I. RV. I . X X X I . 1 0 . Ibid. 1.1.8. Ibid., I.CLVI.3. Ibid. Ibid., 1I.XXII1.17. Ibid., 1.XXIII.5. Ibid., V I I I . X L I . 7 - 1 0 . Ibid., X . X . 2 , 8 . Ibid. V I I . L X X X V 1 . 1 - 8 . Ibid. V I I . L X X X V I . 5 . Ibid. Ibid., vs. 6. Bose, op. cit., p. 14. RV. 1.CXLVII.5. Ibid., VII.CIV.8. Ibid., X . C V I I . 8 . Ibid., X.CXV1I. Ibid., X.CXVI1.1. Ibid. Ibid., X.CXVI1.3. Ibid., X . C X V I I . 5 . Ibid., X.CXV1I.9. Ibid., X . L X X X V . 3 6 - 3 9 . Ibid., X . C X V I I . 1 0 . A t h a r v a Veda III.30. RV. 1.9. Ibid., X . L . X I I I . 1 5 . Vide S. R. Shastri, Women in the Vedic Age (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 1954), p. 2. RV. I . C X I I I . 2 . The Cultural Heritage of India, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Calcutta: R a m a Krishna Institute of C u l t u r e , 1958), p. 222. RV. V.XXVIII. Ibid., V I I I . L X X X ; X . C L X X 1 X ; VII.1; X . X X X I X ; X . L X X X V I . Cultural Heritage, op. cit., p. 223. RV. X . X X V I I . 1 2 . Ibid., I . C X I I I ; X . L X X X V I . Ibid., X.LXXXV.26. Yajur Veda, vs. 36.18., in Bose, op. cit., p. 11. RV. X . C X X X V I . 2 , 3 . Ibid., III.XXXIV.9; I I . X I I . 4 . Ibid., X . X C . 1 1 - 1 2 . R. C . D u t t , The Early Hindu Civilization (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1963), p. 57.

NOTES 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

155 RV. VI II. XXXV. 16-18. Dutt, loc. cit. RV. I X . C X I I . 3 . Ibid., III.XLIII.5. Cultural Heritage, op. cit., p. 226. RV.II.XLIII.2. P. H . P r a b h u , Hindu Social Organization (Bombay: P o p u l a r P r a k a s h a n , 1963), p. 288. TS. VII. 1.8.2; TS. 1.6.8.1; MS. 1.4.10. SB. III.2.1.18-23. Ibid., XI.2.3.6; X . 4 . 3 . 3 - 8 . Ibid., 1.7.4.6-8. Ibid. Ibid., 1.7.3.19. Ibid., VI.2.1.37. J. Eggeling, trans., Satapatha Brähmana in Sacred Books of the East, F. M. Müller, ed. (Oxford: C l a r e n d o n Press), 11.2.2.6. All q u o t a t i o n s are taken f r o m this source. SB. X I 1.8.7.1-22; TS. II. Keith, infra, p. 463. Ait. B. 1.25. Ibid., 1.26. In J. McKenzie, Hindu Ethics (Oxford: O x f o r d University Press, 1922), p. 30. SB. XIV.1.1.3. Ibid., 1.1.6. Ibid., 1.1.9. JB. 1.98. SB. X.4.3.9. Ibid., 1.7.4.1. Ibid XIV.l. 1.4. Ibid., 1.8.1.1-10. TS. VII.1.8.2. SB. III.4.2.8. A. B. Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, vol. 32, H a r v a r d Oriental Series, C . R. L a n m a n , ed. (Cambridge: H a r v a r d Oriental Press, 1925), p. 477. SB. III.1.2.10. Ibid., III.1.3.18. Ibid XI.6.1.4. Ibid., XI.6.1.5. Ibid X I . 6.1.8-13. Ibid., 1V.4.5.23. Ibid., IV.1.2.4. Keith, op. cit., p. 478. H o p k i n s , op. cit., p. 50. SB. 1.1.1.4. Ibid., 1.1.1.5. H o p k i n s , op. cit., p. 62. R. K. M o o k e r j i , Ancient Indian Education (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1960), p. 85. SB. XIII.2.6.10; X.3.5.16; Ait. B. IV.11.6-9; Taitt. B. III.8.13.1.

156 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150.

NOTES SB. II.3.1.31; Taitt. B. II.7.1.1. SB. XI.5.6.3. Ibid., XI.5.7.1. Ibid., 1.6.2.4. S. P. Kanal, Dialogues on Indian Culture (Delhi: Panchal Press, 1955), p. 81. SB. XI.5.4.17. M o o k e r j i , op. cit., p. 101. SB. XI.3.3.2. Ibid., XI.3.3.5. Ibid., XI.3.3.4; XI.5.4.5. Ibid., III.6.2.15. M o o k e r j i , op.cit., p. 96. Kanal, op. cit., p. 74. Ait. B. 11.19. Parte. B. XIV.6.6. TS.VII.4.19. Ibid., V.6.8.3., in Dutt, op. cit., p. 95. SB. II.5.2.20. Dutt, op. cit., p. 100. Keith, op. cit., p. 475. Ait. B. VIII.13-18., in Dutt, op. cit., p. 103. AtharvaVedaVI.il. SB. XIV. 1.1.31. Ibid., 1.3.1.13. Ibid., 1.3.1.12. Ibid., 1.3.1.9. Dult, op. cit., p. 102. SB. V.2.1.10. Ibid., 1.1.4.13. Ibid., XIII.2.6.7. Mait. S. III.6.3. TS. VI.5.8.2. SB. III.2.4.6. Mait. S. IV.7.4. SB. X.5.2.9. Ibid., IV.4.2.13. Keith, op. cit., p. 475. SB. V.2.1.10. Ait. B. III.12; TS. VI.6.4. Dutt, op. cit., p. 105. Shastri, op. cit., p. 80. M a i t r i U p . IV. 1-3. Dutt, op. cit., p. 109. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , op. cit., p. 132. SB. V.4.4.19. Ibid., XIII.8.3.11. Ibid. XII.4.4.6. TS. II.5.12. Ait. B. V i l i . 2 4 . SB. XI.6.2.10.

NOTES 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162.

163. 164. 165. 166.

167. 168.

169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. ¡75. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182.

183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188.

189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195.

157 Dutt, op. cit., p. 75. Ait. B. VIII. 27. SB. VI.4.4.13. Ibid., 1.1.3.12. Ibid. III.1.1.10. Paflc. B. VI.1.11. SB. 1.1.4.11. Brh. Up. 1.3.28. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 42. Brh. Up. IV.4.22, in Hume, op. cit., p. 143. Vide Tait. 2.8; 3.10.4; Maitri. 6.17; 7.7; Brh. 5.15; Isa 16. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 55. C h a n d . Up. 6.1.2. Ibid., vs. 3. Ibid., 6.2.3. Ibid., 6.9.7. K a t h a U p . 5.11. Ibid., 6.14. Swami Nikhilananda, The Upanishads (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 63. C h a n d . Up. 8.3.2. Brh. Up. 4.4.23. K. N. Upadhyaya, Early Indian Buddhism and the BhagavadgTta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), p. 85. C h a n d . Up. 8.7.3. M u n d . Up. 3.1.5. K a t h a U p . 2.7.8. M u n d . Up. 1.2.12. C h a n d . Up. 8.7.2. M u n d . Up. 1.3.12; P r a s n a U p . 1.1. K a t h a U p . 3.3-11. Ibid., 2.1-5. Prayer of invocation in Prasna Up. C h a n d . Up. 7.26.2. M u n d . Up. 3.2.3. K e n a U p . 4.33. Taitt. Up. 1.11.1. Vide M u n d . Up. 3.1.6. C h a n d . Up. 6.12.3. Taitt. Up. 1.11.1. C h a n d . Up. 2.23.1. See Prof. Mukhopadhyaya's commentary, infra, p. 152ff. Taitt. Up. 1.9. Ibid.,1.11.3. G. Mukhopadhyaya, Studies in the Upanisads (Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press, 1960), p. 157. C h a n d . Up. 3.16.1. Ibid., 3.17.4. Brh. Up. 5.2.1.

158

NOTES

196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220.

Tain. Up. 1.11.1. Brh. Up. 1.4.17. K a t h a U p . 1.8. Ibid., 1.10-13. Taitt. Up. 1.4.3 Shastri, op. cit., p. 81. Ait. Up. II.1. Brh. Up. 3.6. Ibid., 6.4.17. Ibid., 6.4.3. Ibid., vs. 6. Ibid., vs. 8. Chänd. Up. 4.4.4. Ibid., vs. 5. Mund. Up. 1.2.7. Brh. Up. 6.2.3. Ibid., vs. 4. Chänd. Up. 5.5.7. Brh. Up. 4.4.23. Mund. Up. 2.2.2; 3.2.7; Prasna Up. 4.9.10. Brh. Up. 4.3.22. Ibid. 4.4.22. Hume, op. cit., p. 60. K a t h a U p . 2.10. Ka(ha Up. 3.7-8; Mund. Up. 3.1.5,8; 3.2.3; Brh. Up. 4.4.23; Taitt, Up. 1.4; Chänd Up. 8.4.3. K a t h a U p . 2.7. Chänd. Up. 5.10.7. Ibid. Brh. Up. 4.4.5. Chänd. Up. 5.11.5.

221. 222. 223. 224. 225.

CHAPTER 2 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

V. Raghavan, "Introduction to Hindu Scriptures," The Religion of the Hindus, ed. K. W. Morgan (New York: Ronald Press, 1953), p. 271. S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of ¿//e(New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 56. Tr. G. Bilhler, The Laws of Manu in the Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886), 11.6.12. All quotations taken from this source. Manu 1.87. Ibid. Ibid., 1.98. Ibid., 1.88. Ibid., 1.93. Ibid., 1.95. Ibid. Ibid., 1.98. Ibid., XI.238. Ibid., III.109. Ibid., 11.162.

NOTES 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

159 Ibid., 11.126. Ibid., 11.159. Ibid., 1.107. G a u t . XII. 17. M b h . 12, 268, 15. Also, M a n u VIII.336. Trans. G. Bühler, Aspastamba and Gautama in the Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller ( O x f o r d : Clarendon Press, 1879), vol. II, G a u t . X I I . 1 - 6 . Trans. Julius Jolly, The Institutes of Visnu in the Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880), vol. VII. L X X X I I . 1 - 2 . Ibid. Ibid., X X X I I . 1 7 . Äpas. 11.5.11. Ibid., 1.11.31.24. Hiranyakesin Srauta Sütra VI.4. Äpas. II.2.4.24-27. Ibid., II.6.15.12. Visnu III.81. G a u t . VIII.13. Ibid., X I I . 8 - 1 3 . Ibid., VIII.1,4,7. Baud. 1,5,10.26. Vide Dutt, op. eil., p. 135. Apas. 1.6.18.19; Artha IX.2. M a n u VII.35. A. L. Basham, Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1970), p. 5. Ibid., p. 14. Mbh. XII.67. Ibid., XII.59. G a u t . X.32. Manu VII.20,21,22. A r t h a VI. M a n u VII. Basham, Aspects, op. cit., pp. 22, 23. A r t h a 1.16. Vide, Basham, Wonder, op. cit., ch. IV. Artha 41. Trans. T. N. Ramaswamy, Essentials of Indian Statecraft: Kautilya's Arthasästra for Contemporary Readers (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), ch.41. M b h . X I I . 97,25. Äpas. II.5.10.11. G a u t . X.17.18. Baud. 1.10.18. M a n u VII. 90-93. Visnu 111.47,48,49. Baud. 1.5.10.24. G a u t . V.41-42. Ibid., V.45. Ibid., X.51. Ibid., vs. 52.

160 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105.

NOTES Ibid., vs. 65. Ibid., vs. 56. Ibid., vs. 60. Ibid., vs. 61. Ibid., vs. 63. Gaut. XII.1-7. M a n u 1.31,87. Trans. E. Deutsch, The BhagavadgTtä (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 1 , 4 0 - 4 2 , 3 4 . Trans. S. C. Vidyarnava, Yäjrlavalkya Smriti in the Sacred Books of the Hindus (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1918), vol. XXI.1.1.14. All q u o t a t i o n s are taken f r o m this source. Äsv. G. S. I. 19ff. Ä p a s . 1.1.20. Äsv. G. S. 1.21.7. Äpas. 1.1.1.13-17. Ibid., 1.1.2.20ff. Äpas. 1.2.8.25-28. M a n u 11.97. Ibid., 11.118. Ibid. 11.96. Y ä j . 1.11.28. Ä p a s . 11.16. M a h ä . S a b h ä . 5.112. M a n u III. 1. Yäj. 1.11.40-46. Dutt, op. cit., p. 182. Ibid. G a u t . III.3; also, M a n u 111.78. Y ä j . l.V.l 15; also, G a u t . 1X.46. Y ä j . 1.97-116, passim, in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. W. T. De Bary (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1966), vol. 1, pp. 226, 227. M a n u IV.92. C o n t r a s t with Y ä j . 1.115. M b h . XIII. 104.16. Y ä j . 1.111.78-81. Ä p a s . 1.9.24.5.; G a u t . X X I I . 1 7 . M a n u IX.17,18. M b h . XIII.40.12-13. M a h ä . A n u . 38-39. Vas. V.l. Baud. II.2.3.45. M a n u IX.3. Y ä j . 1.111.71. M a h ä . Sänti. 266,38,40. M a n u III.55-62. M b h . IX.46. Dutt, op. cit., p. 46. Ä p a s . 1.10.28.9. Vi$nu X X X I . 1-2. G a u t . 11.50,51.

NOTES 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152.

161 Trans. G . Bühler, Vasistha and Baudhayana in the Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1382), vol. XIV, Vas. XIII.48. Trans. C. Rajagopalchari, Rämäyarta (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), pp. 72, 73. Äsv. G. S. 1.5.1-3. M a n u III.27-34. Äpas. II.5.11.17-20. Yäj. 1.111.52. M a n u VI. 2 - 8 . Ibid., VI.33. M a n u VI. 46-48. Ibid., 85. K. M o t w a n i , Manu Dharma Sastra (Madras: Ganesh and C o . , 1958), p. 61. Ä p a s . 1.9.23.5-6. G a u t . VIII.22,23. Vas. X.30. M a n u X.63. Yäj. I.V. 122. C o m p a r e J. McKenzie, op. cit., p. 41. Vas. V I . 2 - 4 . G a u t . VIII.23. Ibid., vss. 24,25. Hopkins, op. cit., p. 91. Vas. X X X . 1. Hiriyanna, Outlines, p. 109. BG. VIII.15. Ibid., IX.3. in Deutsch, op. cit. All quotations are f r o m this source unless otherwise noted. Ibid., XIV.20. BG. V.24. Ibid., VIII.8. U p a d h y a y a , op. cit., p. 408. BG. 1.29-35. Ibid., 11.2,3. Ibid., III.34. Ibid., IV.21,22. Ibid., I V.24. Hiriyanna, Outlines, op. cit., p. 121. BG. 11.47. Hiriyanna, loc. cit. BG. 11.48. Ibid., VI.1. Ibid., V . U . Ibid., III.25-26; VI.3. Ibid., IX.27. Ibid. IX.31. Ibid., X V I I I . 5 . Ibid., III.31,32. Ibid., IV. 15. Ibid. XVIII.41-44.

162

NOTES

153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

Ibid., 11.31. Ibid., 11.32,33. Ibid., 1.40-42. U p a d h y a y a , op. cit., p. 507. BG. IX.32. Ibid., XVIII.45. Ibid., II.7. Trans. S. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , The Bhagavadgitä ( L o n d o n : Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 101. BG. 1.45;11.8. Ibid., 1.46. Ibid., 1.47. Ibid., 1.31; 1.38, 39; 1.36; II.7; HI.2. Ibid., 11.11. Ibid., 11.18. Ibid., 11.27. Ibid., 11.20. Ibid. Ibid., 11.22. Ibid., 11.21. Ibid., 11.23. Ibid., 11.28. Upadhyaya, op. eil., p. 422. BG. 11.31. Ibid., 11.32. Ibid., 11.33. Ibid., 11.34-36. Ibid., 11.37. Ibid., 11.32,33. Ibid., XVIII.60. Ibid., VI.41-43. Ibid., III.33. Ibid., 11.60. Ibid., III.42. C o m p a r e J. P. Sartre's Existentialism and Human Emotions, and B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Destiny. BG. XIV.22-25. Ibid., XVIII.53.

161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188.

CHAPTER 3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

S. R a d h a k r i s h n a n and C. Moore, eds., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 349. H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India (New York: World Publishing House, 1964), p. 605. Hiriyanna, Outlines, op. cit., p. 177. S. Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 75. F. Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy ( L o n d o n : L o n g m a n s , 1928), p. x. Radhakrishnan and Moore, op. cit., p. 354. B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism (Oxford: C l a r e n d o n Press, 1921), p. 3.

163

NOTES 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

Ibid. NS. 1.1.1; VS. 1.1.2. NS. 1.1.21. NS. 1.1.2. in S. C. Vidyabhusana, trans., The Nyäya Sütras of Gotama in Sacred Books of the Hindus, ed. B. D. Basu (Allahabad: Panini Office, 1930), vol. VIII. NB. 1.1.2. in G. J h a , trans., Gautama's Nyäyasütras fwith Vâtsyayana bhäsya) in P o o n a Oriental Series ( P o o n a : Oriental Book Agency, 1939) no. 59. NS. IV.1.3. NB. IV.1.3. NB. 1.1.2. Ibid. Ibid.

NS. 1.1.21. VS. 1.1.1. in N. Sinha, trans., The Vaisesika Sutras of Kanada in the Sacred Books of the Hindus, ed. B. B. Basu (Allahabad: Panini Office, 1923), vol. 6. VS. 1.1.2. NB. 1.1.22. NS. 4.2.47 in J h a , op. cit. NB. 4.2.46. NS. 4.2.46. NB. 4.2.46. Trans. G. J h a , Padärthadharmasamgraha of Praéastapâda (Allahabad: E. J. Lazarus and C o . , 1916), VI 133. Ibid. PP. VI.134. Ibid., VI. 134. Ibid., VI. 135. Ibid., VI. 136. R. Garbe, Sankhya, in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. J. Hastings (New York: Scribners, 1925), vol. XI, p. 189. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy ( L o n d o n : Allen and Unwin, 1951), vol. 2, p. 309. Kärikä XI in G. J h a , trans., The Tattva-Kaumudi, 2d ed. ( P o o n a : The Oriental Book Agency, 1934), p. 42. SK. IX. Ibid., XV. Ibid., XI. Ibid., XII, XIII. Tattva-Kaumudi, op. cit., p. 49. SK. XXI. Ibid., X X I I . Ibid., XXV. Ibid., LVII. M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy ( L o n d o n : Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 119. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 310. C o m p a r e F. Max Müller, op. cit., p. 255. Saitikhya P r a v a c a n a Sutra, 1.82,85. SK. X L .

164 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

NOTES SPS.I.19. SK. XVII. Tat. Sam. 1.149. SPSI.19. SPB. 1.58. SK. LIX in J h a , trans., op. cit. Ibid. LXVII. SPS. III.30. VB. III.74. SK. I. Tattva-Kaumudi, op. cit., p. 6. J . Ghosh, Samkhya and Modern Though! (Calcutta: The Book Company, 1930), pp. 9 7 , 9 8 . The Yoga Sutras of Patafijali in the Sacred Books of the Hindus, ed. B. D. Basu (Allahabad: Panini Office, 1924), 1.15. YB 1.15. YS. 1.16. Ibid., II.29ff. Ibid., 11.29. Ibid., 11.30. Ibid., 11.35. Ibid., 11.31. YB. 11.31. YS. 11.32. Ibid., 1140-45. Ibid., 11.34. YB. 11.34. YS. 1.15. Hiriyanna, Outlines, op. cit., p. 296. YS. 1.34. 'svargakamo yajeta.' M l m a m s a Sutras of Jaimini in N. V. T h a d a n i , trans., Mimansa: The Secret of the Sacred Books of the Hindus (Delhi: Bharati Research Institute, 1952), XII.IV.38-47. See also pp. xxx, xxxi, xlv, xlviii, Ixxiv, xci, xcii, civ, clxxvii, cxxi, clxxxix. Vide G. J h a , Purva-mimamsa in its Sources (Benares: Benares H i n d u University Press, 1942), p. 26 for S a h a r a ' s views; p. 28 for P r a b h a k a r a ' s views; and p. 32 for R u m a n i a ' s views. C o m p a r e Slokavarttika, A t m a v a d a , Sastradipika. M l m a m s a Sutra 1.1.1. in Mlmamsa Sutra, trans. G. Jha (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1936). Ibid., 1.1.2. Kumarila Bhatta, Slokavarttika, trans. G. J h a (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909), 15, p. 555. Ibid., 13-14. Ibid., 16. S. C. C h a t t e r j e e and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1968), p. 339. Ibid. Tantravartika, pp. 368-372 (Benares edition).

NOTES 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

111.

112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

165 R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 124. Vide P ä r t h a s ä r a t h i ' s Sästra-Dlpikä (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1915), p. 80; S a l i k a n ä t h a ' s Prakarana-Paftcikä (Benares: C h o w k h a m b a , 1903), pp. 184-95; S a b a r a - b h ä s y a , 11.1.5. Tantra- Värlika, 1.111.2. Prakarana-Pañcika, op. cit., pp. 185, 186. Ibid., pp. 154-160. Ibid., VIII., pp. 152-153. Sästra-Dipikä, op. cit., pp. 126-127. Manameyodaya, 2.26. Mimämsä Sütra VI. 1.26 in J h a , trans., op. cit. Vide T h a d a n i , op. cit., pp. 416-420. MS. VI. 1.39 in T h a d a n i , trans. T h a d a n i , op. cit., f o o t n o t e , pp. 121, 122. MS. VI. 1.6-9 in T h a d a n i , trans. Ibid., VI.1.12-24. I. C . S h a r m a , Ethical Philosophies of India (Nebraska: J o h n s e n Publishing C o . , 1965), p. 217. C h a t t e r j e e and Datta, op. cit., p. 339. BG. V . l l ; 111.20; IX.27. S h a r m a , op. cit., p. 229. MS. 1.1.26 in T h a d a n i , trans. Vide R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, op. cit. p. 419. Tantrarahasya, p. 66. Trans. G . T h i b a u t , The Vedänra-Sürras with Sañkara's Commentary in Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1890), vol. XXXIV, p. 9. Brahma satyam jagan mithya jtvo Brahmaiva näparah, in M a d h a v a n a n d a , Vivekachüdämani of Sankarächärya (Almora: Advaita A s h r a m , 1944), vs. 20, p. 8. V E D . S., op. cit., pp. 3, 4. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., pp. 7, 8. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., III.4.25. S. K. Das, A Study of the Vedänta (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1937), p. 339. Brh. U p . , II.1.20. S. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , The Vedänta ( L o n d o n : Allen and Unwin, 1928), p. 188. V E D . S. III.4.26. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., III.4.27. Brh. Up. IV.4.23. V E D . S. III.4.27, op. cit., vol. X X X V I I I . Paul Deussen, The System of The Vedänta (Chicago: Open C o u r t , 1912), pp. 411,412. V E D . S. III.4.38, op. cit. Ibid., III.4.39.

166

NOTES

130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

V E D . S. 1.3.34. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.,1.3.34. Deussen, op. cit., p. 63. V E D . S. 1.3.35. Ibid. Ibid. 1.3.37. Ibid., 1.3.34. Ibid., 1.3.38. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., IV. 1.1-2. Ibid. Das, op. eil., p. 341. Trans. Swami G a m b h i r a n a n d a , Eight Upunisuds (Calcutta: Advaita A s h r a m , 1957), p. 2 3 I f f . VED. S. IV.1.13. SBG. IV.19. VED. S. II.3.48. Hiriyanna, Outlines, op. cit., pp. 381, 382. BG. XIII.27-28. VED. S. III.4.14. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Vedänta, op. cit., p. 199. V E D . S. III.4.50. Ibid. Trans. G. T h i b a u t , Vedänta-Sülras (with Rämänuja's Commentary) in Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), Vol. XLVIII, III.3.57. G l t ä b h ä s y a 9.2. in J. A. B. van Buitenen, Rümänuja on the BhagavadgTtä (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968), p. 113. Srlbhasya III.2.28. Ibid., II.1.9. Ibid., III.2.1. Ibid., III.2.11. Ibid., III.2.1. Ibid. Ibid., III.2.11. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Vishistadvaita (Madras: Vasanta Press, 1943), p. 94. Ibid., p. 147. G l t ä b h ä s y a 13.1. Srlbhasya II.3.40. BG. XVIII.61. SnbhäsyaII.3.40. Ibid. Ibid., II.3.41. Ibid. G l t ä b h ä s y a 18.13. Ibid., 3.9.20.

146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174.

167

NOTES 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212.

BG. III.19. SrTbhäsya 3.4.12. GTtäbhäsya 18.5. Ibid. 18.56. Ibid., 11.48,68. Brahma-Sütra 3.4.27. GTtäbhäsya 18.46; Srlbhasya 4.4.22. Ibid., 6.8. C o m p a r e , ibid., 2.54-58; 2.72; 3 . I f f ; 4.8; 4.17ff; 3.34; 3.37; 4.18; 5 . I f f ; 5.27-28. Van Buitenen, op. cit., p. 21. GTtäbhäsya 6.29, 32. Ibid., 18.46. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 704. GTtäbhäsya 7.1. Ibid., 9.34. Ibid., 9.32. Ibid. SrTbhäsya 1.2.2. Ibid., 1.1.1. C h ä n d . Up. 6.6.5; 7.16.2. Srlbhasya 1.1.1. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, pp. 704, 705. Srlbhasya 4.4.22. Van Buitenen, op. cit. p. 23. GTtäbhäsya 9.25. Ibid. Ibid., 9.26. Ibid., 9.29. Ibid., 9.30. SrTbhäsya 3.3.57. G a d y a t r a y a , quoted in K. D. B h a r a d w a j , The Philosophy of Rämänuja (New Delhi: Sir S h a n k a r Lall Charitable Trust Society, 1958), p. 202. A. S. G u p t a , A Critical Sludy of the Philosophy of Rämänuja (Benares: C h o w k h a m b a , 1967), p. 151. CHAPTER 4

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

R. N. Dandekar, " T h e Role of Man in H i n d u i s m , " in M o r g a n , op. cit., p. 134. Kafha Up. 11.24 in J. Rawson, trans., The Katha Upanisad ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d University Press, 1934), p. 115. SrTbhäsya IV. 1.13. S. K. Saksena, " T h e Philosophical Theories and the Affairs of M e n , " The Indian Mind, ed. C. E. M o o r e (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), pp. 33, 34. S. K. Maitra, The Ethics of the Hindus (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1925), p. 1.

168 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

NOTES Basham, Wonder, op. cit., p. 170. Ibid., p. 171. RV. X . C X V I I . 5 . Taitt. Up. 1.4.3. K. N. U p a d h y a y a , " D h a r m a as a Regulative Principle," p. 1 (unpublished paper). S. K. Saksena, Essays on Indian Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1970), p. 40. M a n u IV. 176 in U p a d h y a y a trans., op. cit. M a n u 11.12. Basham, Aspects, op. cit., p. 10, K a t h a U p . 1.26. Brh. Up. 2.4.1-3. D. S. S h a r m a , " T h e Nature and History of H i n d u i s m , " M o r g a n , op. cit., p. 21. M a n u VI.36. J o h n Donne, " D e v o t i o n s . " Taitt. Up. 1.11.1-4. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Hindu View, op. cit., p. 64. M a n u VI.32. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Hindu View, op. cit., p. 65. Ibid., p. 66. Saksena, op. cit., p. 48. Basham, Aspects, op. cit., p. 6. M. G a n d h i , Young India, September 22, 1927. T. Welty, The Asians: Their Heritage and Destiny (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), pp. 90, 91. C h a n d . Up. IV.4. M a n u 11.168. Mbh. III.CLXXX.2,25. Upadhyaya, Early Buddhism, op. cit., p. 507. Maitra, op. cit., p. 18. K. Bhattacharya, " T h e Status of the Individual in Indian Metaphysics," Indian Mind, op. cit., p. 300. Ibid., p. 301. R a d h a k r i s h n a n , Indian View, op. cit., p. 54. SrTbhasya, II.3.40. Maitra, op. cit., p. 5. BG. V.25 in R a d h a k r i s h n a n , trans. Brh. U p . 1.3.22. Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself {New York: N o r t o n , 1953), p. 75. William Wordsworth in The Golden Treasury, ed. P. T. Palgrave ( L o n d o n : Nelson and Sons, n.d.), p. 310.

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Index

Abhyâsa, 126 Abstention, 126 Àcârya, 62 A cil, 1201. Activism, xvi, 52, 75, 77, 78, 89, 114, 119, 124, 125, 127, 134, 147 Adharma, 89, 91, 92, 103, 108, 147 Adhikàra, 130, 131 Adhyâlmika, 101, 145 42, 43 Adhvâyana, Adultery, 23, 28, 67, 89 Advaita, 109-120 Agni, 5, 7, 13, 18, 19, 67 Agnihotra, 22, 34, 73 Agriculture, 59 Analyâ, 20, 69 Ahamkâra, 38, 39, 82, 95, 96, 97, 106, 121 Ahimsâ, xiv, 2, 43, 99, 144 Akrodha, 143 A k ç a p â d a , 88 Alliance, 57 Almsgiving, 26, 43, 54, 55, 70, 92, 113 A n a n d a , 105, 120, 148 Anavasâda, 126 Ancestors, 79, 127 Anger, 7, 8, 19, 72, 89, 92, 100 Animals, xiii-xiv, 12, 14, 15, 23, 71, 92, 98, 104, 111, 127, 128, 138, 149 101 Apavarga, Application, 143 Apurva, 103, 104 Aranyakas, 1 A r j u n a , 75, 80, 81, 82 Armistice, 57

Arrogance, 32, 55 Artha, 53, 56, 57, 65, 71, 101, 104, 107, 132, 133, 134, 148 A r t h a s a s t r a , 57 Arya S a m a j , 142 A r y a n , 1, 11, 14, 28, 29, 32, 34, 35, 36, 59, 61, 66, 68, 75 Ascetic, 13, 71, 82, 97, 107, 114, 124 Asramas, 9, 11, 31, 53, 91, 114, 115, 124, _ 135 Asramadharma, 2, 53, 61, 115, 131, 134, 138 Asleya, 142 A t h a r v a Veda, 1-16, 29 Aliguru, 68 Aslika, 86 Asura, 17, 19, 47 Asvalayana G f h y a Sutra, 61, 69 Asvamedha, 31 Asvin, 15 Atmasuddhi, 107 Atman, xv, 37, 39, 40, 42, 47, 64, 65, 72, 74, 111, 120-128 A t t a c h m e n t , 89-92, 127 Austerity, xv, 20, 23, 42, 43, 77, 78, 136, 137 Authority, 24, 46, 54, 73, 86, 87, 103, 108, 109 Avarice, 73, 96 Avidya, 41, 86, 110, 111, 123 Aviveka, 97 Avyakta, 40 B a d a r S y a n a , 109 Badhana, 90

174

B a s h a m , A . L . , 5 6 , 5 7 , 132, 140 B a t t a , K u m a n l a , 102, 103, 105 B e a u t y , 3, 12, 5 1 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 6 , 121 B e h a v i o u r i s t s , 84 B e n e v o l e n c e , 9 2 , 147 B h a g a , 17 B h a g a v a d g l t a , 6 0 , 7 4 - 8 5 , 118, 1 2 2 - 1 2 7 , 134, 142, 147, 149 Bhakli, 5, 52, 127, 129, 148 Bhaktiyoga, 8 4 , 123, 126, 127, 128 B h a l l a b e y a , 17 B h a t t a c h a r y a , K . , 145 Bhlsma, 66 B h o j a , 93 Bhoktr. 40 Bhutahilalva, 144 B i r t h , 2 2 , 9 0 , 9 1 , 96 B o d y , 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 6 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 8 9 , 102, 105, 111, 1 18, 1 2 0 - 1 2 6 , 136, 138, 147 Bose, A . C . , 9 B r a h m a , 54, 9 2 , 138 B r a h m a S u t r a , 109

Brahmacarin, 11, 12, 2 5 , 2 6 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 9 , 62, 63 BrahmacarinI, 12 Brahmacarya, x v , 11, 3 1 , 3 9 - 4 3 , 6 1 , 6 3 , 135 Brahman, 16, 2 5 , 2 6 , 3 7 , 3 9 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 7 , 50, 7 1 , 7 2 , 7 4 - 7 7 , 8 4 , 1 0 9 - 1 2 1 , 128, 130, 150, 151 B r a h m a n a s : 1, 2, 1 6 - 3 6 , 53; A i t a r e y a , 16, 18, 2 9 ; S a t a p a t h a , 1 6 - 3 6 BrahmavadinT, 45 Brahmavidya, 3 9 , 115 B r a h m i n , 2 6 - 3 4 , 4 6 - 4 8 , 54, 55, 59, 61, 6 3 , 6 6 , 7 8 , 9 8 , 9 9 , 106, 111, 1 1 4 - 1 1 6 , 130, 140, 142 B r a h m o S a m a j , 142 B r e a t h i n g , 9 9 , 100 B r h a s p a t i , 7, 2 4 , 61 B r o w n , N . , xv Buddhi, 40, 83, 9 5 - 9 7 B u d d h i s m , 5 2 , 7 9 , 8 5 , 8 6 , 107 C a l m , 3 9 , 4 7 , 7 8 , 113, 124, 138 C a l u m n y , 72 Candala, 4 9 , 7 2 C a s t e , 14-16, 2 6 - 3 6 , 4 4 - 4 9 , 54, 55, 60, 6 3 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 9 1 , 9 8 , 106, 111, 115, 116, 126, 128, 1 4 0 - 1 4 6 Cauryabhava, 143 C e l i b a c y , 11, 137, 138 C h a r a c t e r , 25, 54, 55, 59, 61, 6 6 - 6 9 , 73, 7 7 , 8 4 , 102, 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 C h a r i t y , 4 3 , 8 9 , 113, 142, 147 C h a s t i t y , x v , 4 1 , 5 0 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 6 4 , 107

INDEX

C h i l d , 12, 2 5 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 30, 4 4 , 6 3 , 6 4 , 67 C h i v a l r y , 58 Cil, 120, 148 Cittasuddhi, 8 6 , 144, 148 C l e a n l i n e s s , 100, 143 C o m p a s s i o n , 4 4 , 4 9 , 71, 7 4 , 8 9 C o n c e i t , 38 C o n c e n t r a t i o n , 3 9 , 113, 115 C o n s c i e n c e , 2 5 , 5 4 , 109, 134, 144, 149, 150 C o n s c i o u s n e s s , 2 5 , 83, 8 4 , 117 Consistency, 40 C o n t e n l m e n t , 7 4 , 9 3 , 100 C o n t i n e n c e , 9 9 , 104 C o u r a g e , 79 C o u r t e s y , 54 C o v e t o u s n e s s , 7 2 , 7 3 , 9 2 , 127, 147 C r i m i n a l , 18, 59 C r u e l t y , 147

Daksina, 9f. Dama, 4 3 , 143 Damyata, 44, 49 Dana, 9 - 1 6 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 137 Dan