The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma: Analysing the 1942 Colonial Disaster 9781474211024, 9781441140906

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Dedicated to Professor Ian Brown, distinguished scholar, inspirational teacher, brilliant raconteur and generous friend.

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List of Figures 0.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3

Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith greeting General Che’en Portrait of an Indian evacuee in 1942 Air-raid shelter under construction in Rangoon in February 1942 A bomb-wrecked street in Rangoon in February 1942 Evacuation of European civilians from Rangoon in February 1942 Botatoung fixed moorings, Rangoon Indian evacuees flee along the road to Prome, January 1942 HMIS Indus in Akyab harbour, March 1942 BISN Co. vessel SS Baroda BISN Co. steamer alongside the Latter Street wharf before the war River-steamer Yengyua Bomb blast at Mandalay Railway Station, 3 April 1942 Oil tanks ablaze in Yenangyaung, April 1942 Demolition of oil plant at Yenangyaung, 16 April 1942 Burning houses in Central Mandalay on 3 April 1942 Gharry driver and dead pony after bombing raid on Mandalay, 3 April 1942 Refugees leaving Mandalay on the road to Shwebo, 3 April 1942 Pilots and evacuees from Myitkyina in Dinjan in April 1942 Approximate population in South-East Asia, 1941–2 Civilian internees in Asia, 1941–5 Civilian internees in Asia (excluding NEI), 1941–5

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9 58 81 84 86 97 105 119 127 129 136 145 151 152 159 160 162 178 196 198 198

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List of Maps Map P.1 Outline map of Burma Map 0.1 Japanese military advance through Burma, January–May 1942 Map 5.1 Civilian evacuation from Burma 1942: Taungup Pass route Map 6.1 Civilian evacuation from Burma 1942: Transport routes

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xiii 8 101 124

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List of Tables 1.1 Register of European deaths and burials 1.2 Total number of all nationalities recorded in the Register of Evacuees 1.3 Comparative list of European and Indian occupations in Register of Evacuees 3.1 Indian population in Burma, 1881–1941 3.2 Arrivals and departures from Burma, 1927–35 3.3 Occupations of Indian evacuees, 1942 5.1 Numbers of evacuees passing through Taungup in 1942 6.1 Officers and ‘Native’ seamen lost on SS Sir Harvey Adamson, 18 April 1947 6.2 Schedule of IFC Paddle Steamer, Siam, 20 March–4 May 1942 6.3 Burma Railways, 1896–1939 7.1 Evacuation camps in Mandalay, March–April 1942 9.1 Civilian internees held in camps in Burma 10.1 Names of IFC vessels sunk, abandoned or last sighted, May 1942 10.2 Total number of IFC vessels scuttled, bombed or sunk during 1942 10.3 Indian employees of BOC

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19 28 30 56 57 59 113 130 139 142 155 203 213 214 217

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Abbreviations ABM AVG ARP ADC BACSA BBTC BISN Co. BOC BWCA CAS (B) CNAC DC DSP ICS IFC INA ITA NEI POW PWD R.E.T.S. Co. WAS (B)

American Baptist Mission American Volunteer Group Air-Raid Precaution Aide de Camp British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia Bombay Burmah Trading Company British India Steam Navigation Company Burma Oil Company Burma War Comforts Association Civil Affairs Service (Burma) China National Aviation Corporation District Commissioner or Divisional Commissioner District Superintendent of Police Indian Civil Service Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Indian National Army Indian Tea Association Netherlands East Indies Prisoner of War Public Works Department Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company Women’s Auxiliary Service (Burma)

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Note on Colonial-Era Names Colonial-era names have been used throughout the text and on maps, for example, Rangoon (Yangon), Akyab (Sittwe), Maymyo (Pyin Oo Lwin), Prome (Pyay), Arakan (Rakhine), Sandoway (Thandwe), Syriam (Thanlyin), Tavoy (Dawei), Pegu (Bago) and Moulmein (Mawlamyine). Colonial-era names have also been used for place-names in Yangon, for example, Windermere Road (Thanlwin Road), Lake Victoria (Inya Lake), Royal Lake (Kandawgyi Lake), Scott’s Market (Bogyoke Aung San Market), Merchant Road (Konthe Road) and Prome Road (Pyay Road). The abbreviation Rs for rupees has been retained as it was in use throughout the colonial era. The modern symbol (`) was adopted only in 2010 so its use would be anachronistic and would imply current values.

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Introduction: Setting the scene

This is the story of the civilian evacuation from Burma, or at least the first part of it. The story began with the bombing of Rangoon on 23 December 1941 and ended with the fall of Myitkyina on 8 May 1942. The second part is for another day. The focus here is on an industrial-scale ‘heavy lifting’ operation that helped most of the 300,000–400,000 evacuees to escape to India or allowed them to die on the way. Much has been written already about the hardships suffered by individual evacuees in the ‘jungles of death’ of northern Burma. They should not be forgotten. But there are other equally important stories to be told. There is, for example, the workaday account of how vast crowds were shifted in a short space of time by road, rail, air and sea. The contributions of the Evacuation Department and commercial companies in Burma must also be examined. The rambling saga of the Indian evacuation is rarely examined in detail, but will be scrutinized here. It is packed with hints of grinding poverty and allegations of discrimination. Then out of the murk looms a political drama – politics with a small ‘p’ of course, a drama in which arguments raged and heroes and villains cast long shadows. Unimaginable crises blew up in the twinkling of an eye and awful tragedies came out of the blue. But no story in history ever began and ended according to a timetable – least of all the epic story told here. *

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A melancholy little drama was acted out at dawn on 4 May 1942. It took place against the backdrop of a solitary Blenheim bomber that was standing on the runway at Myitkyina airport in northeast Burma. In the half-light, a tall, distinguished civilian gentleman walked onto the tarmac. He clasped a few official papers and a tiny bundle of personal belongings. After chatting earnestly with a gaggle of British officers who had gathered around him, he exchanged hurried farewells and clambered nervously onto the Blenheim bomber. It took off with a roar and the men left behind on the tarmac watched as the plane

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disappeared over the jungle into the morning sky.1 This edgy, unprepossessing little moment was one of those forgotten turning points of history. The tall gentleman was Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Governor of Burma.2 Ironically he flew out of Burma exactly one year after his swearing-in ceremony in Rangoon.3 That occasion had been full of pomp and ceremony. This one was solitary and sombre. He slumped on the plane lost in thought, and watched Burma slip past below. Dorman-Smith had crept out of Government House on 1 March, as the Japanese closed in on Rangoon. Since then he had been on the run, managing to stay one step ahead of Japanese troops as he flitted furtively from one hiding place to another on an ‘inglorious retreat’ through Burma. He flew out of Myitkyina three days before Japanese troops entered the town on 8 May. It was a close run thing and to all intents and purpose signalled the end of colonial Burma. The beginning had been very different. Nearly 60 years earlier a splendid drama had unfolded. It contrasted so sharply that it is well worth telling. In November 1893 the Viceroy of India Lord Lansdowne visited Burma soon after a bruising military campaign had drawn to a close. The British had snuffed out the last vestiges of Burmese insurgency.4 Burma had been made safe, was subdued and firmly under British control. On this odyssey a glittering array of notables accompanied Lord Lansdowne.5 Spectacular celebrations took place along the way. One durbar was held at the old Royal Palace in Mandalay – a fitting setting for so brilliant a scene. Another took place aboard a magnificent houseboat moored on the Irrawaddy at Bhamo, not far from Myitkyina. Bands played, gold braid glistened and medals jangled on the dress uniforms of the glitterati. It was an intimidating display calculated to thumb imperial noses at a defeated ‘native’ population.6 No two episodes could have been more different. One marked the virtual end of British rule in Burma, and the other the beginning. *

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Six generations of colonial servants had grappled with local politics between 1893 and 1942, the years ‘bookended’ by the events described. There was a constant struggle between Burmese nationalism and British colonial rule, and in a sense the evacuation was the culmination of those decades. It was full of the DNA of all that had gone before. One curious omission from the pages that follow is the lack of reference to Burmese politics and society in the years. The omission is only semi-intentional and scarcely justified, except that during the five months of the evacuation domestic politics were put on hold. However, they

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Introduction: Setting the Scene

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were never far from the surface and might have exploded at any time between December 1941 and May 1942. In 1885 a British expeditionary force had crushed the Burmese army and deposed King Thibaw. The colonial officials served under a succession of luminaries from Sir Arthur Phayre to Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. Burma was formally annexed as a colony in 1886 and as if to complete the humiliation was made a province of the Indian Empire. It was not even a British colony in its own right. There followed a brief golden age of colonial rule that ended with the outbreak of the First World War. By 1920 the colonial government had lost its swagger and its moral authority. During the 1920s subversive nationalist ideologies seduced young Burmans and nudged Buddhist modernists to challenge Christian missionaries. The Young Men’s Buddhist Association organized anticolonial protests that occasionally sputtered into violence.7 A university boycott sucked dissidents into Rangoon and a prolonged period of civil disobedience spread across the country.8 Worse was to follow in 1929 with the collapse of Burma’s economy.9 It shattered the myth of British commercial invincibility as ambitious Burmans realized that the colonial state could no longer provide employment, security or prosperity. A very serious rebellion broke out in 1930 when impoverished rice cultivators and small landowners were goaded into action by the millenarian rhetoric of Hsaya San.10 During the 1930s colonial coercive forces were run ragged as interreligious rivalries, school strikes and huge demonstrations by industrial workers flared up in quick succession.11 By the end of the 1930s (just three years before the evacuation), the Thakin leadership of the Dobama Asiayone, a nationalist political organization, openly demanded political independence.12 A tetchy lull during the early 1940s was misleading. It belied the fact that political dissidents had gone to ground and were planning to fight another day. The febrile atmosphere of this period is brilliantly captured in Ma Tin Hlaing’s and much-read novel, Not out of Hate. Every Burman worth his salt realized that the long-suffering heroine, Way Way represented Burma and that her husband, the overbearing and insensitive U San Han was the personification of colonial rule. In the end U San Han drugs Way Way into submission prompting her to whisper bitterly, ‘You have no pity for me . . . you do not really love me’.13 Of course it was an allegory for Burma ravaged and blighted by colonial rule. It articulated an underlying sense of malfeasance and went on to affect the evacuation in 1942, causing both Europeans and Indians to fear that Burmese communities would impose a violent revenge upon them.14

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The colonial history of Burma was defined through millions of transactions, many of them intimate, personal and unrecorded. Student strikes were among the most personal, most trivial and yet most undermining of these transactions. Radical students infiltrated many provincial secondary schools in 1939. They incited disobedience and undermined relations between pupils and teachers. Serious demonstrations placed European teachers on one side of a racial divide and Burmese students on the other. It created bitterness and mutual suspicion that simmered until all schools were closed in February 1942. The impact was deeply corrosive, largely unreported and affected most households in the land.15 Other examples of moral ambiguity were re-enacted time and again during January 1942 when scores of European families prepared to trek out of Burma. Each emotional farewell with a faithful Burmese house-servant and each little valedictory drama was laden with guilt and betrayal. For one party was fleeing to save its skin while the other was staying to face the music. A raw nerve was touched whenever a departing master and memsahib pressed cash into the hands of a remaining servant. A sincere expression of thanks each cash gift may have been, but each also carried a hint of conscience money. No newsreel recorded these private moments and no journalist described them, but they scratched like acid across thousands of Burmese minds. Two turbulent forces gripped colonial Burma during the late 1930s. They twisted around each other like a double helix. One of them was the nagging force of domestic politics that had perplexed and irritated the colonial government for the past sixty years. The other was the ‘sudden rampage’ of Japanese military power.16 In 1941, three Burmese agencies – the ‘39 Comrades’ (a group of young nationalist heroes), the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and a politician called U Saw – contrived to bring the two strands together to focus their efforts on destroying British authority in Burma. The second of the two forces, Japanese military power, was considered to be so obviously the cause of the evacuation that historians have rarely bothered to look for other reasons. However, the evacuation was also shaped and complicated by the vicissitudes of the 1930s. The evacuation was precisely the moment at which the disintegrative pressures of the 1930s brought the whole colonial pack of cards tumbling down. Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith was an archetypal predator turned victim. He complained bitterly that only ‘those who have been the victims of invasion can realise what it means to have a ruthless enemy ever pressing forward’. In this respect he was squaring the circle between the last ruler of the Kingdom of Burma and the last Governor (almost) of colonial Burma, for cynics might wonder why

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at that moment Dorman-Smith’s heart did not bleed for King Thibaw, who in 1885 was also the victim of an invasion.17 It exemplifies a curious symmetry that was at work in Burma, for colonial rule began legally in 1885, but did not start practically until the 1890s when resistance had finally been crushed. Legally Burma became independent on 4 January 1948, but practically colonial rule ended in 1942 when colonial leaders evacuated. The domestic strife of the 1930s did not cause the evacuation, but it undermined confidence, gnawed away at European morale and overstretched the coercive forces so that in 1942 colonial officials were indecisive and uncertain. *

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Military history is not the main purpose of this book. Excellent works of scholarship by Alan Warren, Graham Dunlop Christopher Bayly, Tim Harper and others have already performed the task extremely well.18 Nevertheless it is important to place the civilian evacuation in some sort of military context. After all, the Japanese invasion was both cause and conditioner of the civilian evacuation. James Lunt described the military campaign as a succession of ‘irretrievable disasters saved by near miracles’ and Raymond Callahan suggests that ‘Burma was lost before the first shot was fired’.19 Both are correct, for the British command structure was deeply flawed and British combat troops were poorly trained and equipped. Even senior officers acknowledged that the Seventeenth Indian Division was completely unfit for purpose.20 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 came as a total surprise and the blitzkrieg across South-East Asia altered the war planners’ perceptions.21 Still, in December 1941, few predicted that Burma would be a target for Japanese aggression. British strategists seemed to have overlooked the fact that Japan might be interested in capturing the Port of Rangoon, seizing oil supplies and gaining control of the so-called Burma Road (the overland supply route from Rangoon to Kunming). At its peak in March 1942, 20,000 tons of supplies had passed along the Burma Road.22 It had always been assumed that Burma’s eastern frontier was impenetrable and as a consequence British military preparations had been woefully neglected. The command structure changed confusingly. For example, even on the eve of conflict in December 1941 operational responsibility passed from General T. J. Hutton to General Wavell.23 Some analysts suggested that British tactics were designed for desert warfare rather than jungle combat. Military intelligence was inadequate and lines of communication were vulnerable.24 On top of all this Vice-Admiral Ozawa and Vice-Admiral Nagumo had sunk two British cruisers, an aircraft carrier and

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90,000 tons of merchant shipping in December 1941 putting Burma’s coastal approaches at risk. By far the most significant military problem was the chronic lack of air cover. Colonel Chennault’s American Voluntary Group and the RAF were vastly outnumbered.25 From the end of December 1941 Japanese warplanes were able to attack targets in Lower Burma with impunity and by February 1942 the British air defence system crumbled completely.26 The consequences of the bombing of Rangoon on 23 and 25 December 1941 were devastating and the raids continued day after day for weeks on end. It demoralized civilians and government officials alike and relations between the civil and military authorities were often strained, although Dorman-Smith denied this and he seemed to enjoy cordial relations with General Hutton, General Alexander, Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson and the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Wavell. He strenuously denied ever having tried to interfere in military affairs.27 On 20 January 1942 Lieutenant General Shojiro Iida’s XV Army (Fifty-fifth Division) crossed the Thai frontier into Burma. The battle-hardened troops and officers were steeped in the imperial warrior tradition and as a consequence they travelled lightly along jungle tracks, taking British defence forces completely by surprise. There was a short chain of command so Iida reported straight to Field Marshal Terauchi at Southern Army headquarters in Saigon. The Japanese battle tactics were well prepared, thoroughly rehearsed and well supported by excellent military intelligence. It enabled them to exploit to the full the elements of surprise and speed to brilliant effect. Undetected Japanese spirited equipment along apparently impassable jungle tracks and breathtakingly original outflanking manoeuvres wrong-footed British commanders. The unexpected speed of the Japanese advance dictated the tempo and course of the civilian evacuation. The infamous Sittang River Bridge disaster in February 1942 perfectly illustrated the disparity between the Japanese and British forces. Sappers prematurely and inexplicably demolished the bridge, trapping two brigades of British combat troops on the wrong side of the river with most of their field equipment. It freed up Japanese forces to advance up the Sittang, Salween and Irrawaddy valleys and led, a few days later, to the fall of Rangoon.28 Japanese strategic objectives were few and flexible. At first they had only two – to cut off the supply route to China and to seize the airfields in Tenasserim, but a series of swift victories encouraged the Japanese High Command to authorize Iida to press forward and seize the Port of Rangoon and the oil towns of Yenangyaung and Chauk. Although the oil installations were destroyed before the Japanese arrived, it made possible an invasion of India. Japanese soldiers were reputed

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to be arrogant and cruel which is why so many Indians and Europeans civilians were desperate to leave Burma. Most Burmans were apprehensive. The principle of gekokujo, or ‘rule from below’ ensured unpredictability, placing authority in the hands of junior field officers and NCOs. The Japanese War Institute claimed that all soldiers exercised the highest ethical standards, but this was not always the case. The apparent arbitrariness of this situation was very unsettling.29 By contrast the British were reactive, defensive and predictable. Their objectives were to slow down the Japanese advance and to defend Rangoon. When both failed, the British Army retreated northwards, intending to establish redoubts around Mandalay and Maymyo, which they believed lay beyond the range of Japanese aircraft. However on 3 April 1942 Japanese planes bombed Mandalay, then Maymyo and other towns. On 25 April the British High Command decided to abandon Burma altogether and orders were issued for a full-scale military retreat.30 The situation was further complicated by the involvement of Chinese forces in the Burma theatre of war. Bitter arguments erupted between senior British commanders. In December 1941, General Archibald Wavell sacked Lieutenant General D. K. McLeod and appointed in his place Lieutenant General Thomas Hutton. Within a few weeks Hutton was at loggerheads with Brigadier J. G. Smyth, who was duly relieved of his command. Not long afterwards Hutton was demoted and replaced by General Sir Harold Alexander.31 Many commentators suspected that Wavell was a pathological interferer, for he often meddled in quite low-level operational matters. On occasion too he was known to humiliate senior officers in public.32 *

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The evacuation of civilians from Burma is the central focus of this book, and the following is a brief resumé of the main events and issues. Each of them is examined in more detail in subsequent chapters. Outwardly life in Rangoon seemed to continue normally right up to midDecember 1941. Weekly race meetings were held at the Turf Club, polo was played at the Gymkhana, paper chases were run at the Country Club and young people danced the night away at the Silver Grill Café. In Mandalay too, leading Europeans congratulated themselves that the city was quieter than it had been for many years. The war seemed very far away, an impression slyly captured in the words of an old music hall song: Where was I when the war was on? I can hear a faint voice murmur. Where was I when the war was on? In the safest place – in Burma.33

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wi

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Myitkyina

Kalewa

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ind

Shwebo

wi n Monywa

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addy Irraw

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Extent of the Japanese Advance: Mergui

at 08.5.42 at 28.4.42 at 17.4.42 at 07.3.42 at 20.2.42

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Victoria Point

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Map 0.1 Japanese military advance through Burma, January–May 1942. By Philip Storey, psmapping.

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Figure 0.1 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith greeting General Che’en, Commander of the Fifty-fifth Division of the Chinese Sixth Army at Loilem in March 1942. General Joseph Stilwell (Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-Shek) was instrumental in bringing Chinese forces into the war against the Japanese in Burma. Sir Charles Frederick Byrde Pearce, ICS is standing immediately behind Dorman-Smith in the photograph. By kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

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The mood changed suddenly on 23 December 1941 when Rangoon was bombed. It was bombed again on 25 December 1941. Thousands of refugees streamed out of the city. At first many of them sailed to Calcutta or Chittagong from the Port of Rangoon, but the Port was closed at the end of February 1942, forcing many evacuees to take the hazardous overland route via the Taungup Pass to Akyab then on to India by sea. By the beginning of March 1942 this route had also been closed. A few evacuees now flew from Magwe, Shwebo or Myitkyina, but most chose to take the long overland journey north to Mandalay. The city became extremely crowded, was bombed on 3 April and finally fell on 1 May 1942. By the beginning of May the remaining evacuees were being funnelled either by train or by riverboat up the Irrawaddy to Myitkyina. Others were making their way along the Chindwin Valley to Imphal and onto Dimapur. Myitkyina the last functioning airport in Burma, but the town was abandoned on 8 May after Japanese air strikes had wreaked destruction on the town. A week later (on 12 May 1942) Kalewa the last portal to Imphal and India was closed to evacuees. *

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Later chapters will show that the evacuation threw up many problems. However, seven of the most important (each of which will be expanded later) are outlined. First, the evacuation was a mass transmigration. Size matters. From that simple fact flowed everything else. Between January and June 1942 up to half-a-million ordinary people might have fled from Burma into India. The exact number will probably never be known. Indeed, in the tale that follows, few sums seem to add up. There were always too few coolies, too many people on the roads and too many evacuees crammed into trains, boats and planes. There was not enough food, too much rain and too few lorries when they were needed the most. The bottom line is that it is not known how many escaped from Burma (Indians or Europeans), how many reached safety and how many died on the way. The sine qua non of British imperial planning had always been the decennial census. In 1942 all the data for the 1941 Burma Census (together with the registers of births, marriages and deaths) was destroyed in Japanese bombing raids. As a consequence no one knew how many people lived in Burma, where they lived or what they did. It was frustrating because size mattered. The 1931 Census (long out of date) provided the most recent statistical information available. During the evacuation refugees streamed out by sea, a few by air, many by train, river-steamer and lorry and many more – men, women and

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children – walked vast distances. Exactly how many evacuees there were remains something of a mystery, but the book will attempt to put some facts and figures together. Second, an internal struggle festered behind closed doors in Government House. Senior officials locked horns and fierce disputes raged between military chiefs and civilian officers over the distribution of food, oil, vehicles and medicines. Complaints shot back and forth about civilians jamming the roads, the army’s lack of fighting spirit and its failure to protect the civilian population. The blame culture had become overbearing. More specifically senior figures squabbled over the civilian evacuation plans and particularly when the Governor appointed ‘a civil defence expert’ from outside.34 The situation would have been almost laughable had not these shenanigans cost lives. Other issues to ruffle feathers included the government’s scorched earth policy and air-raid shelter designs until the unity of the normally tight-knit British community was sorely tested.35 The third problem was the much more serious issue of racial discrimination. Throughout South-East Asia, invasion conditions were making Eurasians feel insecure. In Hong Kong the evacuation was limited to ‘those of pure British descent’ and there were similar tensions in Malaysia.36 Anglo-Indians in Burma found themselves on the wrong side of almost every racial argument while evacuees of all races and colours feared reprisals from resentful Burmans. A myriad of complaints from the Indian community in Burma exercised Indian politicians and British administrators alike. Dorman-Smith stoutly denied that there had been discrimination but circumstantial evidence suggests otherwise. Prejudicial treatment inflamed Indian nationalists and embarrassed well-meaning British liberals. At this of all times racial conflict in India was unthinkable because of the distinct possibility of imminent Japanese invasion. The British propaganda machine worked overtime to persuade the undecided that all was well. However the racial problem was far from simple. Muslims were divided from Hindus, untouchables from Brahmins and sweepers from Chettyars. Burmese nationalists disliked Indians while Indian evacuees were estranged from India and were looked down upon by Europeans. The Indian ‘question’ left a legacy of bitterness, guilt and betrayal. The evacuation was more than a simple matter of life and death for many Indians. It would affect the future prosperity of their descendants too. R. H. Tawney once compared the Asian labourer to ‘a man standing permanently up to his neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him’.37 Indian coolies and sweepers were just like that. They had gone to Burma to make

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money only to be submerged in a tidal wave. Whereas European evacuees were covered by insurance policies and war compensation schemes, most Indians had no protection. They and their descendants stood to lose everything. It was little wonder therefore that Indian evacuees dragged behind them all their earthly goods, including cupboards, battered old bicycles, kitchen ranges, pots, pans and kettles, many of which they had to discard along the road. The fourth problem was one of identity. While the evacuation was overwhelmingly Indian, the accounts written after the event were all Eurocentric. Official reports, memoirs, diaries, letters, jotted notes, spun yarns and published books were written in English and written from a British point of view. Imaginations were caught by visions of noble Englishmen fleeing, of tyrants humbled and of victors vanquished. Epic stories of the evacuation tend to mythologize it as a European event. It is a contradiction that still perplexes and influences historians today. The fifth problem was organizational, for this was total war and in order to emerge victorious it was necessary to have the backing of a substantial organization and major commercial companies. Firms such as the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company (IFC), Steel Brothers, the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation (BBTC), the Burma Oil Company (BOC) and the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) rode to the rescue. They performed very important roles in the evacuation, as did the Evacuation Department, which built refugee camps, provided transport, organized lorries and distributed food supplies. Without a substantial and competent central organization a civilian evacuation on this scale could not have happened. The sixth point concerns shortcomings. Far too much was left to chance, too many mistakes were made and the evacuation scheme frequently ran into profound difficulties. Oilfield engineers, American journalists and Rangoon lawyers lined up to criticize Dorman-Smith for the failings in the scheme. He was accused of mismanagement, of being out of touch, failing to provide adequate resources and of being overindulgent to Burmans. An obdurate Scot hit the nail on the head when he described the evacuation as ‘a pretty horrid mess’ and at one point even Dorman-Smith had to acknowledge that the whole thing was a ‘first-class disaster’.38 The trouble was that it was a many-headed hydra, not one evacuation, but many. There was no nice steady flow of calm refugees. It consisted of a series of angry surges. Everywhere facilities were overwhelmed by the sheer weight of numbers. At times adverse weather conditions and constant harrying by enemy forces made the task almost impossible. Nothing was predictable in a scheme that was beset by internal bickering. In the end like

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everyone else Dorman-Smith, Vorley and other key players had to suffer the indignity of fleeing from Burma. The seventh and final point is that refugees who did not get away have often been overlooked. Burma was different from other colonies in South-East Asia because of the proximity of India so internment was always considered to be a marginal issue. Nevertheless it was not insignificant and it affected many people. It is addressed in a later chapter. *

*

*

This volume focuses on a brief five-month period between December 1941 and May 1942. During this time – at least in theory – the Government of Burma was in charge. By 8 May 1942 a remarkable metamorphosis had taken place. Myitkyina, the last bastion of colonial rule, had fallen. The Government of Burma had collapsed. The most senior officials, including the Governor, Wise, Vorley, de Graaf Hunter, Wilkie and Rossington had become fugitives themselves. Other members of the colonial ruling elite had been on the run since the fall of Rangoon at the beginning of March 1942. The Army was in full retreat and Burma was no longer under British control. Thus in May 1942 the first phase of the evacuation came to an end and a new phase began. Vorley threw down the gauntlet when he wrote ‘When all the stories of these journeys come to be written there will surely be many a tale of courage, kindness and self-sacrifice . . . to bring a catch to the breath or a tear to the eye.’39 It is more than 70 years since the evacuation happened, so perhaps now is the time to re-evaluate the event before it is too late. It was indeed a horrid mess, sullied by incompetence, prejudice, fear, bitterness, uncertainty, suspicion, guilt, pathos and pain, but it was also illuminated by tiny shards of light, myriad acts of selfsacrificial heroism and loyalty. The account that follows is part thriller, part adventure yarn, part epitaph to colonial rule and part corporate whodunit. But above all it pays tribute to the quiet courage of unsung heroes. In a sense the story has been told many times before but the last word on such an epic has not, and never can be spoken. It was so fragmented and multilayered that even at this late hour more specks of detail, unrevealed experiences unsolved riddles and shafts of insight emerge from dusty archives, official reports, newspaper articles, telegrams, letters and long-forgotten private papers.

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Facts, Figures and Guesstimates

The impression is sometimes given that civilian evacuees from Burma were relatively few in number and mainly British by nationality. The statistics tell a different story. The evacuation was a mass movement and most of the evacuees were Indians. In normal circumstances the most recent census would be the starting point for an analysis of sections of a colonial population. Every ten years, British authorities counted, measured, weighed, compared, analysed and recorded their colonial subjects in every corner of Empire. However, there was nothing normal about Burma in 1941. The raw data for the census of that year went up in smoke in a Japanese air raid. The statistics relating to the population, its profile, size and racial composition, where people lived, what work they did and their ages were all destroyed. The Census in 1951 did not take place, so it will never be known how the population changed during the war. The most recent reliable information available was provided by the 1931 Census.1 The total population of Burma in that year was 14,647,497, of which 1,017,825 were Indians. Seventy-five per cent of all Indians were males and 63 per cent had been born in India. The combined total of Europeans plus AngloIndians and Anglo-Burmans was 30,851.2 Because Anglo-Indian and AngloBurman often took European names, the Census Superintendent confided that up to 3,000 or 4,000 Anglo-Indians might have been wrongly designated as ‘Europeans’.3 Be that as it may, 11,651 Europeans were recorded as resident in Burma in 1931. Only 6,426 of them had been born in Great Britain and Ireland. These totals were consistent with previous censuses.4 A steady stream of Europeans had left Burma in the months preceding the Japanese invasion, so the European population in Burma had probably decreased by the beginning of 1942. At the same time (and for the same reason), the Indian population had probably declined as well.

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The occupational statistics in the Census for 1931 contained few surprises, except perhaps that only 365 Europeans were described as public administrators. This confirmed the view that before the war a very small number of British officials had governed the whole of Burma. On the other hand, 1,594 of the Europeans held senior positions in the law, medicine and engineering. About the same number were in the ‘liberal arts’, most of them teachers and missionaries. A further 3,821 were identified as managers, industrialists, technicians and businessmen; 1,638 were in the Army and 1,793 were in the ‘public force’ (police, jailers, etc.). By contrast only 26 Burmans were in the Army and 10,576 were in jail. The majority of medical practitioners, policemen, railway employees and soldiers were Indians and very large numbers of Indians were traders and ‘producers of raw materials’. Three conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First, the ratio of Indians to Europeans living in Burma in 1941 was probably about 130:1. Second, fewer than 12,000 Europeans lived in Burma at any one time. Third, even if the exact population of Burma in 1941 was known, it would still be impossible to deduce how many of them became evacuees in 1942. *

*

*

Two other statistical sources shed light on the European population at the time. The first was the British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia (BACSA) Register of Deaths and Burials. Britons who died in colonial Burma were almost always buried in European cemeteries. The Public Works Department (PWD) and local churches kept these cemeteries in good order before the war, but after the war most of them fell into disrepair. Cattle grazed among vandalized headstones and some cemeteries reverted to jungle. In the nick of time, BACSA stepped in to draw up the Register of Deaths and Burials (Table 1.1). It casts further light on pre-war colonial society in Burma.5 Climatic conditions, poor sanitation, limited health provision and frequent outbreaks of violence, all contributed to the high mortality rates among the 12,000 or so Europeans normally resident in Burma during the twentieth century. The BACSA records bear witness to conquest, epidemics, floods and rebellions, and provide details of nearly 2,000 Europeans buried in Burma between 1682 and 1948.6 They include 1,263 men (533 military and 730 civilians), 366 women and 211 children. Most of the deceased were buried in Rangoon (806), Maymyo (268), Moulmein (236) and Akyab (128).7 Some of the most poignant memorials were the most recent, none more so than the monument erected at Thanbyuzayat to the 3,771 Prisoners of War (POWs) who died while constructing the Thailand

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19

Table 1.1 Register of European deaths and burials Location

Rangoon Mandalay Maymyo Myingyan Bhamo Chin and Naga Hills Pakokku, Magwe and the Oilfields Kyaukse, Meiktila and Yamethin Myitkyina Shwebo and Sagaing Katha Mawlaik, Kalewa and Kindat Northern Shan States Taunggyi and Southern Shan Kalaw and Southern Shan Pegu Prome Akyab and District Kyaukpyu Bassein Salween District Moulmein Mergui and Tenasserim District Thayetmyo Toungoo Unknown places in Burma or Abroad Total

Tables

Men

Women Children Total

Military

Civilian

Total

235 26 92 5 19 11

308 13 98 6 2 14

543 39 190 11 21 25

173 0 50 2 1 0

90 0 28 2 0 0

806 39 268 15 22 25

18

8

11

19

3

2

24

19–21

4

5

9

1

0

10

22 23–24

4 6

11 6

15 12

1 0

0 0

16 12

25 26–28

1 0

3 10

4 10

0 0

0 0

4 10

29

0

6

6

0

0

6

30

1

9

10

7

2

19

31

8

34

42

12

0

54

32 33 34–35 36 37 38 39–41 42–43

4 5 31 7 3 2 35 2

1 4 45 3 7 8 89 9

5 9 76 10 10 10 124 11

0 0 24 3 6 0 58 6

0 0 28 4 1 0 54 0

5 9 128 17 17 10 236 17

44 45–46 47

0 24 0

3 13 12

3 37 12

0 18 1

0 0 0

3 55 13

533

730

1263

366

211

1840

1–9 10 11 12 13 14–17

Source: Drawn up from BACSA Records.

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma

to Burma Railway. At the other end of the scale, the BACSA Register records hundreds of individual tragedies – the deaths of infants, teenage girls, young wives in childbirth and of the many young men cut down in their prime. Tropical disease, unclean water and heat were usually to blame. The Europeans’ average age at death was 38. The deaths recorded during, before and after 1942 challenge the assumption that all colonials were strapping young men. Many European women had gone to live in Burma, and by the 1930s and 1940s several Europeans had become elderly and infirm. Take the European cemetery in Maymyo, for example; 16 of those buried were in their sixties, 13 were in their seventies and 11 were in their eighties – Elizabeth Shephard (80), Lieutenant Commander Stanley Higgins (81), Eric McColl (81), Laura and James Gahan (both 82), Frederic Griffiths (83), Edward Richardson (84), Charles Edward Court (86) and A. E. C. Walker (89). Frances Lutter was 96 and Henry Lutter died at the age of 100. Nor was Maymyo unique. Two 99-year-old Europeans (Dr Charles Lawrie and William Smith) died in Kalaw in the late 1930s. Burma was obviously not just a place of work for Europeans; it was also a place for retirement. It would be safe to assume that a good number of elderly Europeans still lived in Burma in 1941 and that many of them had to be evacuated in 1942. Indeed in 1942, 188 of those listed in the BACSA Register were aged 60 or more and 41 of them were over 80 years of age. The not insignificant geriatric element in the population must have added to the evacuation organizers’ difficulties. At the other end of the spectrum, in the BACSA Register, 110 European infants are recorded as having died before their first birthdays. It goes without saying that many more infants lived than died during the early 1940s.8 Soon after the evacuation, Reginald Clarke wrote home to tell his wife that Muriel Horrocks had had a son on 23 December, that Joan Robertson had had a third son in November, that Billie Hughes was having her first child, that Mrs Marsden-Ranger had had a daughter and that Mrs MacWhite was about to have her first child. It prompted a friend, Mrs Beryl Parry, to remark that Burma must have been ‘a very relaxing place’.9 Of course, scores of infants and nursing mothers heaped more logistical difficulties on the Evacuation Department. The Register highlights another problem. The European population in Burma was widely scattered. Although most of them lived and died in the major conurbations of Rangoon, Mandalay, Maymyo, Moulmein and Akyab, others were buried in 30 different cemeteries scattered around the country. Each of these cemeteries served as a hub for a far-flung hinterland in which lived tiny communities of Europeans.10 Gathering these people together in

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Facts, Figures and Guesstimates

21

1942, transporting them and monitoring their movements were very difficult tasks. The BACSA Register recorded the circumstances of many of the deaths that occurred during and immediately after the evacuation. Raymond Hall, an Assistant in the Steel Bros Timber Department was one of the earliest European casualties of the war. He was killed on 20 January 1942 when Japanese troops overran his outpost in south-east Burma. He was buried in Kawkareik. J. G. Fielding-Hall was buried in the Pegu cemetery in March 1942. He committed suicide in Prome after being blamed (quite unfairly) for the premature release of prisoners and ‘lunatics’ in Rangoon a few weeks earlier. Japanese soldiers shot G. G. Evans of BBTC in Prome in March 1942. He was also buried in Pegu. William Michael Van Wyck (Burma Civil Service, Class 1) was buried in Akyab in February 1944. He was killed while gathering intelligence in Arakan. Two employees of MacGregor & Co., William Nimmo and E. McGrindle were both killed by the Japanese after being parachuted behind enemy lines in 1944. They were buried in the Papun cemetery. J. Cook of the Burma Agricultural Service was buried in the Toungoo cemetery. Japanese troops shot him while he was working for CAS (B). The deaths of several ‘last ditchers’ are recorded in the BACSA Register. These were men who courageously stayed behind to implement the government’s scorched earth policy. For example, D. H. Hutchinson, a BOC superintendent died of heatstroke while demolishing the Chauk oilfield on 18 April 1942. Brigadier F. A. G. Roughton CBE who liaised between the Army and the Oil Companies also died of heatstroke at Yenangyaung during the demolition in April 1942. Roughton was a retired Indian Army officer in the Burma Frontier Force and he had been ADC to Dorman-Smith. D. K. Milligan of the Burma Forestry Service was killed in late 1942 and was buried in the Chin Hills. R. W. H. Peebles of the Burma Civil Service, Class 1, was killed in a motor accident while evacuating from Falam. Captain P. R. S. Banks, MC, of BBTC was accidentally shot and killed by his own sepoys while escaping on 28 November 1943. Two other employees of the Imperial Forestry Service – G. F. Ball MC (in May 1942) and J. H. MacKay (early in 1943) – were killed during the evacuation and buried in the Falam cemetery. Jules Martin, who was a Roman Catholic priest-cum-trader, was murdered by the Japanese. He was one of several Europeans buried in Mandalay cemetery in April 1942. Most of the others were killed in the air raid of 3 April 1942. Among the airraid victims was Major Mills, the Senior River Pilot from Moulmein. Two ‘old Burma characters’ survived the War. One was Rev. W. R. Garrad, who was in

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma

charge of the Winchester Mission in Mandalay. He escaped from the city in 1942 and returned to Burma in 1945. He died in Rangoon in 1951 and was buried in Mandalay. Eric Gordon MacColl was born in Maymyo in 1892 and lived most of his life there. He was an artist and in 1942 was accused of kicking a Japanese officer (and he probably did). He was interned from 1942 to 1945. After the war he continued to live reclusively in a dilapidated hut in Maymyo until his death in 1973. He was buried in Maymyo cemetery. *

*

*

The second source of information is a little more obscure. Although Who’s Who in Burma (1927) was well past its sell-by date in 1942, it still sheds light on the mores of Burma’s ‘elite’ on the eve of the evacuation. Of the 452 entries in Who’s Who, 168 were Burmans, 124 Indians, 98 British and 39 Chinese. Indian ‘Owners/Directors and Proprietors’ (with 37 entries) outnumbered all the other ethnic groups including the British. There were also many more Indian contractors, bankers, moneylenders, merchants, barristers, physicians, surgeons and general practitioners than those in any other single ethnic group. It is a timely reminder of the significant numbers of very wealthy Indians who lived in Burma. Who’s Who reveals that a smattering of the wealthiest Indians lived in Mandalay, Maymyo and other towns, but the overwhelming majority (53) lived in Rangoon. Money did not necessarily buy social position in pre-war Burma. Even the wealthiest Indians were excluded from the European Pegu Club and Gymkhana Club and had to make do with the Orient Club. Many of the leading Indian businessmen were not university-educated, but those who were, attended Calcutta or Madras universities. A steady trickle had also begun to find their way into English and Scottish universities and to London Inns of Court. By contrast, 36 of the British entries were First Division Government Officials and 11 were High Court Judges. Almost all of them lived in Rangoon, 27 were members of the Pegu Club, 39 had attended English public schools, 28 were educated at Oxbridge and 22 had been decorated in the First World War. It would be fairly safe to assume that not much had changed in the intervening 15 years between 1927 and the civilian evacuation in 1942. Wealthy well-educated Indians at the top of the social pile had little in common except for their ethnicity with the coolies and sweepers at the bottom of the pile. During the evacuation the Indian elite used to resent the way in which British officials insisted on lumping all Indians together. They frequently complained about discrimination. Many of them left Burma in privately

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Facts, Figures and Guesstimates

23

chartered transport precisely to avoid having to mix with their low class, fellow countrymen. Yet, even during the worst moments of 1942 when all refugees of whatever colour were struggling for survival, British and Indian evacuees rarely rubbed shoulders. Despite protestations to the contrary, the British continued to erect barriers designed to separate them from Indian evacuees. It was somewhat ironic that after 1942 the Indian and European elites sank together. Only four European names and one Indian name featured among the 448 entries in the 1960 Burma Who’s Who. The evacuation delivered a deathblow to Indian and European communities alike. *

*

*

A consensus had begun to emerge during the course of 1942. Newspapers and commentators alike seemed to accept that about half-a-million evacuees had escaped to India in 1942 and that about 80,000 of them had died on the way. Both sets of figures may have been ‘guesstimates’. They may have been plucked out of the air for propaganda purposes. For, by exaggerating the number of people who had supposedly escaped from Burma, and by underestimating the number who died on the way, the authorities gave impression that the evacuation was better managed than it really was. It became a case of authentication by repetition. The ‘numbers game’ had begun very early. In January 1942 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith announced to the press that about 200,000 people had already left Rangoon. O’Dowd Gallagher (a sensationalist war reporter) challenged the figure, saying that it ‘was nearer 300,000’.11 In April 1942, Reuters, which collaborated with the British Government, reported that ‘about 500,000 refugees’, that is, nearly half the entire Indian population in Burma, ‘had now arrived in India’.12 At the beginning of May 1942 the Indian Overseas Department issued a press statement saying that at least 250,000 of the 1 million Indians living in Burma had now been evacuated.13 The claim was repeated almost word-forword on 1 May 1942 in a telegram from the Governor-General of India to the Secretary of State in London. In it he said that between 250,000 and 300,000 of the 1 million or more Indians living in Burma had been evacuated to India by sea, air and land.14 Four days later, the Ministry of Information in London declared that by the beginning of March 1942 about 300,000 Indians had already evacuated to India, and that others were now ‘crossing the frontier at the rate of 2,000 a day’.15 In a telegram of 9 June 1942, the Viceroy of India stated that about 400,000 Indian evacuees had arrived in India by the end of May.16 It is noticeable that very little was said at the time about the death toll among the evacuees. Indeed it was barely mentioned afterwards, and remains one of those dark

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma

unknowable areas. The government’s estimate of 80,000 was no doubt plucked from the air, but the figure has never been seriously challenged. Interestingly, Stephen Brookes (himself an evacuee in 1942) suggests that 50,000–100,000 evacuees died on the way out – a figure that was in line with the government’s own estimates.17 The Burma Office in London struggled long and hard with these conflicting pieces of information. Senior Burma Office officials in Whitehall circulated internal memos venting their frustration against Dorman-Smith’s failure to produce reliable facts and figures. Information had to be scraped together from wherever possible. On 22 April 1942, officials pounced on Mr Justice Sharpe’s assertion in Delhi that 200 Indians were still being evacuated every day by air and 1,500 to 2,000 by road. From this fairly flaky information, the Secretary of State drew the conclusion that 300,000 of the 400,000 Indians who wished to leave Burma had already done so.18 In a written parliamentary answer to Sir Ralph Glyn in June 1942, the Secretary of State confirmed that 400,000 evacuees, most of them Indians, had reached India by the end of May 1942. Although the sea and air routes were now closed, he stated that the evacuation was still continuing by land routes, which so far had been used by 125,000 persons.19 It is impossible to say which, if any of the above estimates were accurate. They all seem to cluster between 300,000 and 500,000. However, one estimate stood out and deserves to be treated more seriously than the others. The Viceroy proposed a global total of 400,000 evacuees from Burma in his telegram of 9th June. He went on to break down this total into 6 subtotals: 70, 000 evacuees, he said, had left Burma by sea; 200,000 by land and steamer via Akyab; 12,207 by air from Magwe, Shwebo and Myitkyina; 125,000 had walked to Assam; 25,000 were still en route between Kalewa and Palel; and 25,000 were still en route in Upper Assam. These subtotals added up to a grand total of 432,207 evacuees.20 The methodology is persuasive, for the figures appeared to be compiled from the bottom up. The real question, however, was whether the subtotals were guesstimates or genuine calculations. *

*

*

There is little doubt that the figures for those evacuated by air (12,207) were fairly accurate. In 1942, Burma airports were easier to control and supervise than other exit routes. After all, there were few air evacuees and almost all of them flew from one of four places – Magwe, Shwebo and Myitkyina and Lashio. Moreover, most planes carried between 24 and 50 passengers. The evacuees could therefore

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25

be counted on and counted off again. Thus the authorities could provide precise statistics, and even give an exact breakdown by ethnicity. We know, for example, that 4,801 Indians, 3,863 Europeans, 2,869 Anglo-Indians, 126 Burmans and 548 Anglo-Burmans were evacuated by air.21 However, even these apparently precise figures have to be taken with a pinch of salt, for several of the major companies in Burma chartered planes and airlifted out an undisclosed number of their employees and dependants. Some of the wealthier Indian families also crept out under the radar on privately chartered planes. It was infinitely more difficult to keep tabs on the hundreds of refugees who had shoved and jostled their way onto boats in the Port of Rangoon, many of whom clambered over the sides illegally and stowed away on teeming vessels. Consequently estimates of the numbers evacuating by sea were vague and much less reliable. They ranged widely from 40,000 upwards. The Viceroy estimated that 70,000 Indians had evacuated by sea from Rangoon.22 The Indian Overseas Department was rather more cautious, calculating that the number was probably in the region of 50,000. Mr Hutchins, the India Government’s Agent in Rangoon issued evacuees with tickets for boat passages and tried desperately to regulate the numbers boarding each vessel, but it was impossible to control them. LanghamCarter confidently claimed that about 67,000 refugees were evacuated to Calcutta from Burmese ports between the end of December 1941 and the beginning of March 1942 and that of these, about 40,000 left Rangoon after 15 February 1942. He did not indicate the source of this estimate, but it seems to be as good a guess as any.23 Hilary St George Saunders was more specific. He examined the role played by British India Steam Navigation Company (BISN Co.) vessels in the evacuation. He estimated that the SS Baroda alone carried 20,000–25,000 evacuees from Rangoon to safety. The SS Ailsa, SS Hunka, SS Maymyo, SS Kayan, SS Salona, SS Warialda, SS Szechuen, SS Yengyua, SS Juna, SS Sir Harvey Adamson and others also carried evacuees from Akyab to Chittagong.24 The trouble is that it is not clear exactly which of these numbers were included in which totals. However, it is probable that the Baroda’s passenger numbers were included within the Viceroy’s estimated total of 70,000 Indians evacuated by sea from Rangoon and that the others were included in Mr Burnside’s estimate of 73,722 evacuees from Arakan. During the first four months of 1942, large numbers of Indians tried to evacuate by the Arakan route from Prome via the Taungup Pass to Akyab. On reaching the coast most of them continued by steamer to Chittagong and Calcutta. The Viceroy estimated that 200,000 Indians had left Burma via this route by the end of April 1942.25 This was probably a gross overestimation, and

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma

the meticulous records kept by Mr Burnside (the evacuation officer responsible for the route) were perhaps closer to the truth. Burnside’s calculations suggest that the number of evacuees was much lower. Between 9 February and 26 March 1942, he calculated that 64,722 refugees had travelled to Akyab by boat and that another 9,000 had walked. This made a total of 73,722. Burnside’s records also indicate that 600 evacuees died from cholera on this route. By far the most important overland routes were those that passed through the north-west of Burma via Dimapur and Silchar into Assam. In October 1942, Major General Wood confidently claimed that a total of about ‘220,000 refugees’ had been ‘brought to safety’ by these routes.26 Wood issued a disclaimer, explaining that his administrators had found it extremely difficult to tally the exact numbers of evacuees passing through the camps because (often in atrocious weather conditions), one or two officers would have to deal with up to 2,000 refugees on a shift. The evacuees arrived at all hours of day and night and moved on to the next camp without warning. Eileen K. Sharpe, Registrar of Evacuees, reiterated this point and praised volunteers for devoting ‘days, weeks and even months’ of their time to assembling registers from ‘various different’ scraps of paper containing illegible and ‘badly mutilated’ snippets of information from the refugee camps that were strung along the Burma–Assam frontier.27 Despite these caveats, Wood’s figure of 220,000 must be treated seriously, for it was based on precise information given to him by Brigadier Shortt, who was in charge of the frontier region. In addition to the rain-sodden ‘scraps of paper’ mentioned by Kathleen Sharpe, Shortt factored in medical statistics, sales of meal tickets and issues of free railway concessions. He adjusted his figures to account for the fact that the numbers of meal tickets and railway concessions sold were often considerably greater than the number of evacuees checking into the camps. This was partly because evacuee children were often included in their parents’ allocations of meal tickets and rail concessions. Shortt calculated that a total of 218,455 refugees had arrived in India via the north-western overland routes by July 1942 and that of this number, 150,533 had come through Dimapur, 40,150 through Silchar and 27,772 through Ledo and Dinjan. He went on to explain that he had included in his total between 5,000 and 6,000 wounded British and Indian troops, but had excluded several thousand Chinese Fifth Army troops who had been rescued in August 1942. He claimed that up to the end of July 1942, the ‘ascertainable number of deaths’ along this frontier was 4,268 and that this suggested a death rate of 1.95 per cent. Shortt added that this ‘remarkable achievement’ had ‘brought nearly a quarter

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27

million people, containing a large proportion of the old, the sick, the decrepit, and women and children, along hundreds of miles of poor roads and under the most adverse climatic and transport conditions’.28 Finally, respectful attention must be paid to the ‘approximate figures’ presented by J. S. Vorley in his Evacuations of Indians and Europeans from Burma Report, dated 31 May 1942. They specify that: (1) 25,000 came by boat from Rangoon; (2) 90,000 came via the Taungup Pass; (3) 150,000 came via Tamu; (4) 40,000 came via Homalin and Tonhe; (5) 20,000 came via Hukawng Valley; (6) 6,000 came by plane. This makes a total of 331,000. It is interesting that Vorley also estimates that on average, the casualty rate ran at just under 2 per cent (i.e. 6,620 casualties), although his estimates of the rates of mortality ranged from nil for evacuees by sea and plane, which was palpably untrue, through 2.2 per cent for evacuees on the Taungup Pass route, to 10 per cent for evacuees on the Hukawng Valley route. Although Vorley was undoubtedly the most significant authority in the evacuation process, it must be remembered also that his figures were unreliable because he rushed out his Report even before the evacuation was complete. It is also almost certain that he underestimated both the number of sea and air evacuees by 25,000 and 6,000 respectively. For this reason, we must take his figures with a pinch of salt. To sum up, the best guess would seem to be that a total of about 366,200 evacuees arrived in India in 1942. This figure is made up of the following subtotals: (1) 220,000 by land through Tamu–Dimapur, Ledo, Dinjan and the Hukawng Valley; (2) 60,000 by boat from Rangoon; (3) 12,200 by air and (4) 74,000 through Arakan by land and steamer. In the absence of any other evidence to the contrary, we can probably do no more than accept the government estimate of 80,000 deaths en route. Of course all these figures are highly speculative and there is no way of telling whether or not they are correct. Indeed, it is possible that the oft-quoted figure in the air estimate of ‘half-million’ evacuees may be the correct figure. We will never know. It is very likely, however, that the total number of deaths was consistently underestimated. *

*

*

Here, one other very significant documentary source, the Register of Evacuees from Burma must be considered. So far it has received little more than a passing nod from historians of the period. The Register was concerned almost exclusively with those evacuees who emerged from the north of Burma by the overland routes into Assam. The Indian Government Department of Indians Overseas had compiled the Register of Evacuees from Burma in July 1943 and it contains

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma

detailed information of about nearly 42,000 named evacuees. Of these, 25,559 were Indians, 15,875 were Europeans, Anglo-Burmans, Anglo-Indians and 464 were Burmans. Because it contains details of only a sample of the evacuees, it is not of much help in calculating the total number of people who left Burma and arrived in India in 1942. However, it puts names to the numbers and provides valuable information about 10 to 20 per cent of the 200,000 to 400,000 evacuees who left Burma in 1942. In itself this is a very significant achievement and something of a statistical triumph. The Register tells us the precise place, date and time at which every evacuee arrived in India, and indicates where each evacuee started his/her journey in Burma and where he/she ended up in India. Most interestingly of all, the Register gives details of the evacuees’ occupations and familial groupings. The Register confirms the overwhelming Indianness of the civilian evacuation. However, as Table 1.2 demonstrates, it also significantly represents the numerical superiority of Indian evacuees. There are several possible reasons for this. One is that a significant proportion of the total European, Anglo-Burman and AngloIndian population is listed in the Register. Indeed more than half (16,000) of the 31,000 who are believed to have lived in Burma in 1941 appear in the Register, and many more than half of those who evacuated in 1942. It also suggests that the British authorities kept careful tabs on every one of the European and IndoEuropeans who left Burma in 1942. By hook or by crook they accounted for almost all of them. Of course few Europeans had left by evacuation boats from the Port of Rangoon in 1942 and fewer still had escaped through the Taungup Pass. This means that a higher proportion of Europeans had to turn to the overland routes through northern Burma to Assam. Many of the 15,000 who were not accounted for in the Register were probably Anglo-Indians. Some of them had already left Burma before the evacuation began, others did not bother to register after they arrived in India and a few Table 1.2 Total number of all nationalities recorded in the Register of Evacuees Ethnic Group

Men

Indians 21,281 Europeans & allied races, 5,302 Anglo-Indians, Anglo-Burmans Burmese. Arakanese, Chins, Shans, 347 Karens, Kachins, Chinese Total 26,930

Women

Children

Total

2,258 4,459

2,020 5,480

25,559 15,241

101

16

464

6,818

7,516

41,264

Source: Compiled from the Register of Evacuees.

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were too old or infirm to travel. They had to stay-put in Burma. A number of Anglo-Burmese and Anglo-Indian families also chose to stay in Burma, while others were captured and interned or had been killed in the invasion. Despite being in such a numerical minority, Europeans (and to a lesser extent Anglo-Indians) were the dominant force in pre-war colonial Burma, punching above their weight politically, socially and economically. Their socioeconomic superiority over the Indian population is underlined in the Register. Businessmen and accountants topped the European list of occupations, whereas coolies, labourers and menials topped the Indian list. Table 1.3, compiled from entries in the Register of Evacuees, graphically illustrates this point. It is unsurprising therefore, given their social importance, that Europeans were expected to register with the authorities in India. When they did not, considerable efforts were made to track them down. It was a very different story for the large numbers of Indian evacuees. The details of many of them – in fact, more than 25,000 thousand of them – were entered in the Register of Evacuees from Burma. However, this number was only 0.2 per cent of the pre-war Indian population in Burma, and only 8 per cent of the total number of Indian evacuees in 1942. One reason for this small percentage was that many Indians who sailed from Rangoon or Akyab refused to register when they arrived in Calcutta and Chittagong, giving officials as wide a berth as possible. They suspected that if they registered they would be taxed or forced to do communal work. *

*

*

One reason for the apparently low rate of registration by ethnic Indians was that many of them had decided to stay in Burma in 1942. It is probable that many Indians and fewer Anglo-Indian than Indian families chose to stay. The obvious risks were much greater for the latter, but nevertheless, assurances to those deemed to be in essential occupations (railwaymen, mechanics, lorry drivers, marine engineers, etc.) encouraged some to take a chance. It is possible that up to 700,000 Indians might have chosen to stay in Burma in 1942 but establishing an actual number lies beyond the realm of facts, figures or even guesstimates. For the most part it is relatively unknown territory, but Chapter 9 will discuss the issue in much greater detail. *

*

*

Little may be known about those who stayed-put in Burma, but the Register of Evacuees has much more information to divulge about the individuals who chose to leave the country. We know, for example, that there was a significant

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma

Table 1.3 Comparative list of European and Indian occupations in Register of Evacuees European Occupations

Number

Businessmen and accountants

255

Schoolteachers Burma Railway managers Stenographers and secretaries Professional Engineers Pensioners Oil Industry Nurses Post and Telegraphs managers HM Customs and Excise Military Clerks Police, Prisons and Frontier Services Government Officers/ICS Telephonists and wireless operators Missionaries and clergymen Pupils/Students Shop owners and salesmen Mechanics and electricians Sea, air transport and motor drivers Banking, insurance and finance Rangoon Port Commission Fire Service Officers WAS (B) River transport captains and officers Medical doctors Mining engineers Journalists, printing and media Forestry, timber merchants, saw millers Public Works Department Hoteliers, restaurants, clubs, entertainers Lawyers, Judges, barristers and pleaders

236 207 198 170 125 125 113 111 106 105 96 91

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Indian Occupations Coolies, labourers, porters, menials Housewives and widows Cultivators Merchants and contractors Street-sellers, shopkeepers Clerical and office workers Domestic servants Milkmen and cowherds Blue-collar workers Watchmen, durwans Railways workers Motor drivers Fitters

Number 4,232 1,702 758 742 720 629 611 370 365 337 327 229 227

86 84

Maistries, supervisors Sweepers

187 158

73 71 56 54 47

Peons & boys servants Seamen and boatmen Moneylenders and bankers Dockworkers Restaurant workers

103 102 98 94 82

46 44 42 42 37

Students and pupils Teachers and lecturers Firemen Civil police NCOs and junior managers

80 72 65 61 53

35 32 30 29

Carters Fishermen Pensioners Mechanics

49 48 47 46

28 26

Businessmen Military personnel

40 37

25

Nurses and ward assistants

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Facts, Figures and Guesstimates

European Occupations

Number

Electricity Supply Industry 24 (R.E.T.S. Co.) Factory and contract 22 supervisors Hospital matrons and nursing 21 sisters Store keepers and store 21 managers Rangoon Corporation officials 19 Rice brokers and millers 19 University/college lecturers and 14 professors Dressmakers 13 Housekeepers and school 12 matrons Musicians 12 Health administrators and 11 support services Hairdressers 9 Landowners and estate agents 6 Dentists 5 Rubber planters 4 Architects and surveyors 3 Confectioners and bakers 3 Agriculturalists and cultivators 3 Plumbers, builders, gardeners 3 Lighthouse keepers 3 Senior politician 1 Photographers 1 Total European 3,084

Indian Occupations

31

Number

Medical doctors

31

Engineers

26

Gold and gem workers

25

Religious leaders

25

Sundry employees Lawyers Posts and telegraph workers

24 21 19

Prison warders Draughtsmen

12 11

Tallymen Beggars and scavengers

9 8

Politicians and officials Forestry workers Cinema managers Surveyors Dentists Journalist

4 3 3 3 2 1

Total Indian

12,934

Source: Compiled from entries from the Register of Evacuees.

gender imbalance among Indian evacuees, that Indian men outnumbered woman by about three to one. We also know that relatively few Indian children (just over 2,000) appear to have been registered. Of course the gender imbalance reflected a long-standing trend. From the earliest times many more Indian males than females had come to work and live in colonial Burma. However, the gap probably widened during the turbulent 1930s as many Indian women and children prudently elected to remain in India until communal violence had subsided and the war was over.

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It comes as no great surprise to discover that the biggest occupational group among the Indian evacuees was the 4,400 ‘coolies, labourers, khalasis and porters’. They topped the list by a very long way. In addition, 338 on the list admitted to being sweepers. It may not have been difficult to distinguish the wealthiest merchants at the top of the pile from the poorest street-sellers at the bottom of the heap. However, demarcation lines between the 1,408 Indians designated as ‘merchants, shopkeepers and petty traders’ were often blurred. The same was true of another large group of 1,169 described as ‘cultivators, cowherds, milkmen and fishermen’. Another 1,300 were described as being employed in ‘blue-collar’ trades. This might include anything and everything from boatmen, serangs, engine drivers and railway guards on the one hand to blacksmiths, boilermakers, wrenchmen, mechanics, fitters and umbrella-repairers on the other. Large numbers of the Indians were employed in the ‘service sector’ as domestic servants, chaukidars, durwans (i.e. watchmen) and office peons (i.e. dogsbodies). The occupational statistics also confirm that there was a rigid employment glass ceiling in place in colonial Burma. It prevented Indians from reaching the top of the professions. Very occasionally a distinguished Indian popped up above the reams of labourers, blue-collar workers, subalterns, stationmasters, policemen, teachers, imams, auditors, accountants and traders listed in the Register – evacuees, for example, like Galam Ahmed MP and two Editors, Mirza Anwar Beg of the Muslim Daily and Rask Sarma of the India News. Several academics such as Professor Sailesh Guha CH, Professor Hari Chandra Choudhury, Professor Hem Chandra Choudhury and Dr Sidiq Khan, Lecturer at Rangoon University also appear alongside R. L. Adhikary, Head Accountant in the Treasury. A bevy of successful High Court Advocates appeared in the list, including such luminaries as S. Bhattachararya, Bar-at-Law, A. K. Chatterjee B.Sc., Bar-at-Law, J. C. De, M.A., Bar-at-Law, A. K. Guha M.Sc., Bar-at-Law and S. C. Noyigi MA, Bar-atLaw. There were several civil surgeons such as Dr Giyun Singh, Dr Gagendra Lal Choudhury, Dr J. N. Choudhury, and general practitioners like Dr M L Gandhi, Dr M. N. Haq, Dr L. M. Roy, Dr N. D. De, Dr Bedi and Dr K. K. Choudhury. Three of the country’s leading dental surgeons – Dr F. S. Panthaku, Dr K. D. Mannon and Dr B. D. Gour appear in the Register. Several headmasters are listed too, although one suspects that they were often heads of smaller village and township schools. They included Messrs Danish David, S. Devar, S. Davas, S. K. Paul and Maidu S. R. P. Swami. Large numbers of businessmen, traders and merchants also appear on the list. However, it is impossible to distinguish the wealthy and influential from the petty backstreet trader. For example, into which

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category should Mohammed Sujat Ali (Businessman), Babulal (Cloth Merchant), Sukhadoyal Behal (Director), Naderjan (Broker) and R. M. Sattapam (Banker) be placed? Much less ambiguous were Abdul Sattar and Dhari Lal (both Rice Mill Owners), Amotandra Sengupta (Factory Owner), A. R. Suker (Managing Director of Knitting Works), Dr Gnanada Roy CH (Owner of Ayiwinedi Pharmacy), G. C. A. Artha (Rubber Planter), Nath Kedar and Hari Datta (both Saw Mill Owners), M. E. David (Cinema Proprietor) and J. C. Desai (Oil Mill Owner). Men like B. A. Joseph (Superintendent Conservator of Forests), K. P. Haran (Geologist) were among the more unusual professionals. Apart from this select few, not many wealthy Indian businessmen, doctors or lawyers showed up on the evacuation lists. Perhaps some had left early and others had melted into the community without registering once they had arrived in India. It was a different story in the European section of the Register, although it did contain a few surprises of its own. One is that children outnumbered both men and women evacuees, and another that 236 schoolteachers (including the headteachers of ten of Burma’s most prestigious schools) topped the list of occupations. Next came 207 employees of Burma Railways including the Chief Controller and the Controller. There were 198 secretaries, 170 engineers and 152 businessmen, including the directors and senior partners of most of Burma’s best-known firms. It is also a surprise to discover that 125 retired pensioners, including a Chelsea Pensioner came high up the occupational list. Less unexpected was the appearance of a galaxy of men and women in high position, making the Register of Evacuees sometimes sound more like Who’s Who and suffice it to say that the Register cut a swathe through European colonial society from top to bottom. Some of the most noteworthy European entrants were distinguished lawyers such as Sir Ernest Goodman Roberts (the Chief Justice in Burma), Mr Justice Sharpe (High Court Judge), Mr Justice Shaw (High Court Judge) and A. Gledhill (District and Sessions Judge, Mandalay). Burmese onlookers might have cheered their departure as agents of colonial coercion along with Colonel C. G. Stewart, OBE (Indian Police), J. A. Foster (Chief Jailor) and Lieutenant Colonel L. H. Moore (Indian Army Garrison Commandant). A great batch of prominent politicians, civil servants and administrators is mentioned. They included Sir William and Lady Carr, Sir Paw Tun (Premier of Burma), J. G. Cooper (Deputy Conservator of Forests), R. F. Craen (Superintendent, Land Records), T. C. Davis (Secretary to the Central Jail Board), C. Duroiselle (Superintendent Archaeological Survey), J. M. Ezekiel (Superintendent of Excise), R. Nesbitt-Hawes (Director-General, Burma Posts

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and Telegraphs), Mr Smart (Superintendent of Land Records), Mr Reynaud (Collector of Customs in Rangoon), Lieutenant Peters (Assistant Commissioner, Monywa), Lieutenant Colonel Raymond (Chief Censor), Mr Orchard (Deputy Commissioner of the Lower Chindwin District), J. W. McDonnell (Office Superintendent of the Burma Home & Political Department), H. J. Mitchell (Deputy Commissioner, Homalin), Mr Rosemeyer (Chief Inspector of Burma Customs) and U Aye Maung (Chief Engineer of the PWD). Several officials of the Evacuation Organization had now become evacuees. They included Mr Dawson (Evacuation Officer), D. E. Johns (Office Superintendent of the Civil Defence Commissioner), B. Katz (Refugee Officer), Major Lusk, RAMC (Medical Officer in the Evacuation Department), Dr P. P. G. Ayre (Civil Evacuation Office, Mandalay), F. S. L. Jacobs (Civil Evacuation Commissioner’s Office, Mandalay), U Thein Tun (Evacuation Department Motor Transport Officer), F. G. Cavalho (Civil Defence Organization) and F. E. Taylor (Evacuation Department). Many other well-known public figures were also among the evacuees – W. O’Grady-Tatton (Editor, Rangoon Times), for example, along with a list of most of the leading headteachers. They included Miss Florence May Corner (Headmistress of St Joseph’s Convent, Mandalay), Miss I. Devine (Principal of St Raphael’s Blind School, Moulmein), Miss Ruth Field (Headmistress of Methodist Girl’s High School, Rangoon), A. J. Finlayson (Headmaster of Government High School, Bassein), Mrs Goodwin (Headmistress of Christ Church Diocesan School, Insein), Mrs M. Nethersole (Principal of St Mary’s School, Rangoon), Miss M. Reid (Principal of Methodist Girls High School, Rangoon), Miss Lillan Lutter (Headmistress of ABM Girls High School, Moulmein), Sister Harriet (Sister Superior of St Michael’s School, Maymyo), Mrs F. Wakefield (Matron of Kingswood School, Kalaw) and Mr Edwin Tresham (Principal of St Matthew’s Boy’s School, Moulmein). Other public figures included Colonel M. Treston, IMS (Inspector General of Civil Hospitals), Mrs I. Nesbitt (Matron Military Hospital, Maymyo), E. C. O’Hara (Office Superintendent of the Burma Rice and Cotton Control Board) and very many missionaries, including the distinguished Rev. W. R. Garrad, SPG. Of course many of the leading businessmen and women in Burma were mentioned including, F. L. Sherrard (Sales Manager, Rowe & Co.), J. R. Fairlie and F. B. Hobson (Directors of Haperink Smith & Co.), J. M. Gough (Head Clerk, National Bank of India), Mr Mackenzie (Chief Engineer, BISN Co.), Mrs M. M. Manuel-Viagus (Proprietor of A. Manuel & Co., Stevedore and Shipping Agents), S. C. Moss (Proprietor of Mawlat Rice Mill and Nepean’s Grant Land Estate), W. M. Murray (Partner, Allen Charlesworth & Co.), Mr Stephens

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(Partner, A. C. Martin & Co., Civil Engineering Builders and Contractors), L. A. Crain (Superintendent of the ABM Press), Mr Hayter (former Chief Controller Burma Railways), Mr A. C. Trype (retired Controller of Burma Railways), Mr T. Tsauklas (Manager, Savoy Hotel, Rangoon), Donald Lynam (Manager of Mayo Marine Club, Rangoon), H. V. Nalty (Secretary of Rangoon Gymkhana Club) and Captain Stokes (Superintendent, IFC). *

*

*

Not only did the compilers of the Register provide information about the evacuees’ lives, but also about their deaths. There was a significant attempt to gather the names of evacuees who died on the way; 1269 named casualties are listed alongside information about the circumstances and places of their deaths. Also in 159 cases, the causes of their deaths were given. These included starvation and exhaustion (43), dysentery (42), pneumonia (22), malaria (20), typhoid (8), war wounds (8), ulcers (6), cholera (3), meningitis (2) and single cases of phlebitis, enteric fever, heatstroke, pthisis and acute mania. We discover from the Register, that at least fourteen of the Europeans who died – Edward Pritchard, A. Bald, James Bell, Rose Mary Bell, W. F. Eadon, Ada Maude Forkgen, the Misses Fuller, George Smith and Mrs I. E. Williams were over the age of 60. Elizabeth Beggs was 71 years of age, Mr Vrasalovich, 80 years and Edwin Samuel Henderson was the oldest at 88 years of age. Surprisingly, only eight of the Indian deceased were said to be over the age of 60. They were, Bajro, Beahma (who died in a railcar), Mira Bun, Rajak Khan, Lasho and Bhagawandevi (both females), Rammaya and the oldest of them, a Burmese lady who was aged 78. At the other end of the age spectrum, at least 48 European children died between the ages of 0 and 12. The youngest recorded was Loretta Desmier who was just 2 months old. Many others were probably not much older but the ages were not always given.29 Fifty-two Indian children are listed as having died. The youngest of them was Chintamaya, aged 10 months. In several European families the parents and children all died together by the wayside. Among them were Mr and Mrs J. N. Bastian, their two daughters, a son-in-law and two grandchildren, Mr and Mrs M. J. Brown and their four children, Mr and Mrs Copers and their four Children, Mrs Cruise and her six children, Mrs Grace Davis and her nine children, Dr F. Gomes and his four children, Mrs Norma Harrington and her six children, Mrs Leahy and her six children, Mrs Constance Masson and her four children, Mr and Mrs Mellican and their four children, Mr and Mrs Oscar Scott-Murray and their five children, Mr and Mrs H. R. Newman and their five

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children, Mr and Mrs Nelson and their four children, Mr and Mrs Richardson and their five children and Mr Ben Smith and his five children under 10 years of age. So the catalogue of disaster went on and on. Among the Indians there were similar examples of entire families perishing: Mr and Mrs Anthony and their seven children, Mrs Anthony and her four children, Mrs Anthuma Das and her four children and Mr and Mrs K Cameron with their five children, for example. It was interesting that so many of the Indian names came from the Christian minority and the casualty figures make puzzling reading in other ways too. In the first place, there seemed to be surprisingly few Indian deaths overall. There were 465, compared with 804 Europeans fatalities. Also, 45 per cent of the Indian evacuees (i.e. 209 out of the 465) were reported to have died in hospitals either in India or on the way to India. This compared with only 4.5 per cent (i.e. 36 out of 804) of the European evacuees who reportedly died in hospital. According to the Register, the bodies of only 19 Indians were found by the wayside between one place and another. By contrast, 189 Europeans were reported to have died while trekking between one place and another. Surely it did not mean that fewer Indians perished overall, or that fewer Indians than Europeans died by the wayside. The more likely explanation is that less effort was put into finding the bodies of Indians scattered along the refugee trails and when they were found that little attempt was made to identify them, unless they were Indian Christians. There may also have been a general reluctance to report the deaths of Indian evacuees to the authorities. All in all The Register of Evacuees provides a fascinating series of snapshots of this exodus. It is little wonder that Burmese people watched agog as the great, good, bad, loved and hated of colonial society shuffled past them. The Register remains as a monument to the gulf that separated most Europeans from most Indians, and it is also a fitting epitaph to the death of a colonial venture.

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2

Politics: Unprepared for Everything

This chapter is about politics, reputational risk and ‘spin’. At the beginning of December 1941 few could have foreseen the disaster that lay just around the corner. Yet, within a month, thousands of civilian refugees would be pouring out of Rangoon. Three themes will appear and reappear throughout this book. First, the civilian evacuation was profoundly political in nature. Second, it was a mass movement and third, in numerical terms at least, it was an Indian phenomenon. It was certainly political. As the Hon. Syed Muhammed Husain delicately pointed out in 1942, the British authorities in Burma seemed ‘unprepared for everything’.1 Of course political fallout is the inevitable consequence of every national disaster. But the civilian evacuation in Burma was particularly toxic. It undermined colonial rule in Burma, sparked unrest in India and reverberated around the corridors of power in Westminster. What follows is not a review of macropolitics, but an analysis of political fortunes (politics with a small ‘p’) in a colonial administration under extreme duress. Although European evacuees were few in number they represented some of the most powerful and influential sections of colonial society. They had been humiliated and, despite the ruinous sums of public and private money that had been poured into the evacuation project, they felt betrayed and abandoned. They gave scant regard to the heroic if ramshackle efforts of the Evacuation Department and failed to recognize that it was because of (not despite) the efforts of officials and volunteers that most of them got through safely to India. Early in 1941 few people believed that the war would encroach upon Burma. Neither civilian the military authorities thought invasion was imminent.2 Everyday life in Burma seemed to be rather more tranquil in 1941 than it had been for many decades and people just carried on as if everything was normal.3

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Burma was almost at war, but not quite. It was a phony war in which public confidence belied private anxiety. While British colonials sipped gin, played polo and met in their clubs they became more concerned about the news from abroad – about German advances in Europe, the Blitz in London and the sinking of passenger ships. Closer to home the barrage of bellicose messages coming out of Tokyo began to unsettle them. A steady trickle of Europeans – mainly women and children – began to leave Burma. At the same time an edgy uncertainty descended on the corridors of power in Rangoon. *

*

*

Early in 1941 the Burma Defence Council had set up an embryonic Department of Civilian Evacuation under Wilfred Marsh, a relatively unknown Indian Police Service officer. Marsh was seconded into the post and later he seemed to disappear without trace.4 His brief was simple. It was to draw up plans for the evacuation of non-essential civilians from Rangoon. To avoid public panic Marsh carried out his task in semi-secrecy. Nevertheless, most people knew that the war would bypass Burma and that Marsh’s plan would never see the light of day. With no one to chivvy him, Marsh moved at a leisurely pace. His schemes were considered to be highly speculative and theoretical, but nevertheless, Marsh submitted his Civilian Evacuation Plan to the Defence Council in July/August 1941 and it was adopted with minimal discussion. The central plank in the Plan was that as soon as danger loomed everyone except essential personnel should leave Rangoon. Essential workers would be allocated housing in ‘safe’ areas of the city and essential government departments would be moved out to the University. Women, children, invalids, old folk and non-essential workers together with government departments such as Education, Agriculture and Culture would already have gone. Nonessential government departments would be in Maymyo and it was intended that most evacuees would have gone by boat to India until Royal Navy chiefs warned Marsh that they would not be able to release their vessels. Instead Marsh proposed to accommodate the ‘non-essential’ evacuees in three large ‘dispersion’ camps. They became the cornerstone of the ‘Marsh Plan’ and were already under construction on the northern outskirts of Rangoon. The idea was that the evacuees would be accommodated in the camps temporarily before continuing their journeys northwards by rail and riverboat. They would then be billeted well out of reach of any invader in towns and villages in Upper Burma. One feature of Marsh’s Plan deserves particular mention. He proposed that transport and accommodation should be provided free to destitute evacuees.

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Marsh’s proposals were carefully scrutinized during May and June 1941 and the only real bone of contention was the cost of evacuating ‘non-essential’ civilians from Rangoon. The first sign of trouble appeared on 3 May 1941 when the new Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, arrived in Burma. He knew all about air raids, having come straight from the London Blitz and he was determined to put his own stamp on civil defence arrangements.5 His first acts were to create a new Civil Defence Department and to bring Mr Richard de Graaf Hunter over from London to be the Civil Defence Commissioner.6 Sparks flew as soon as de Graaf Hunter arrived in August 1941. People began to wonder whether Dorman-Smith had made a disastrous mistake, for De Graaf Hunter seemed to be a wunderkind with no understanding of the oriental mind.7 Old colonials questioned Dorman-Smith’s judgement and were dismayed when de Graaf Hunter rejected Marsh’s Evacuation Plan – particularly that section of it that proposed evacuating the ‘non-essential’ population from Rangoon. De Graaf Hunter argued that the evacuation of part of the population would unsettle all the rest and that therefore the whole population of Rangoon (‘essentials’ and ‘non-essentials’ alike) should stay-put in the city. Critics grumbled that de Graaf Hunter naïvely believed Indians and Burmans in Rangoon would react in the same way as phlegmatic cockneys had done in the Blitz in London, that somehow ‘the loyalty and patriotism of all races would be roused and that all would stand by their employers and work for a common cause’.8 Experienced colonials rolled their eyes in dismay and growled in disbelief. Nevertheless de Graaf Hunter stuck to his guns and in September 1941 he persuaded the Defence Committee to abandon the Marsh Plan. The Committee cited the prohibitive costs of free accommodation and transport for destitute evacuees as the main reason for their volte-face. The Defence Council was also persuaded that responsibility for all civil defence measures in the city should be transferred to the Rangoon Corporation (a quasi-private body). Some regarded this decision as a gross abrogation of duty. It certainly had the effect of rendering Marsh and his Evacuation Department redundant. Marsh was baffled by these developments and was incensed because his ‘new boss’ had not deigned to speak to him during his first three months in office. Marsh had no idea where his responsibilities began and ended and his morale deteriorated further when de Graaf Hunter sidelined him and his Deputy Director (Mr Wedderspoon) to a small office in the New Law Courts. Here they were put to work on insultingly trivial tasks. Marsh planned lighting restrictions in Rangoon and Wedderspoon fitted out a ‘control room’ in the New Law Courts. Neither task seemed particularly central to the civilian evacuation

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scheme. Meanwhile the rump of Marsh’s Evacuation Department was shunted off to the Myoma Girls School where it was supervised by the avuncular Mr Pusey, an elderly ex-District Superintendent of Police (DSP). The staff ran around like headless chickens doing nothing in particular. Marsh dared not complain, but ‘old Burma hands’ and newspaper hacks were less constrained. They rallied to Marsh’s defence and launched a barrage of bitter personal attacks against de Graaf Hunter. He was denounced as an outsider, accused of naïvety and lampooned as a ‘chorus-boy’.9 The most frequently repeated and most damaging complaint against him was that he did not understand Burma and refused to listen to those who did. *

*

*

At this moment the imposing figure of J. S. Vorley strode onto the scene. Vorley was the antithesis of de Graaf Hunter. He was a Senior Forestry Officer and had been working in Burma for many years.10 He was clubbable, popular among his chums, resourceful, tough and adept at dealing face-to-face with ‘native labour’ in remote up-country stations. In September 1941 he had been seconded into the Evacuation Department for a period of two months. During this time he had worked closely with Marsh, had got on well with him and had experienced at first hand the mounting tension in the Department since the arrival of de Graaf Hunter. Vorley was quite relieved, therefore, when his secondment came to an end and he was able to resume his duties as a forestry officer. On 1 December 1941, barely a month after he had left Rangoon, Vorley was summoned to return immediately to take up his post again in the Evacuation Department Headquarters. Vorley turned up at the Myoma Girls School at the same time as a retired DSP, named U Ba. Both men were struck by the low state of morale in the office and neither of them had been told what to do. Vorley was described as ‘an attached officer’ but had no job description, no authority, no budget and no access to departmental records. In a fit of pique at their ‘demotion’, Marsh and Wedderspoon had taken all the departmental records with them. U Ba was in an even worse position. His duties duplicated almost exactly those of the Supplies Officer already in the Department. The two men had to dance around each other to avoid treading on each other’s toes. To begin with Vorley twiddled his thumbs and seethed inwardly but eventually he was unable to contain his irritation any longer and he stormed into de Graaf Hunter’s office, complaining about the omnishambles in the Department and pointing out that the Director (Marsh) was ‘Director in name only’. There was no policy, he said, and everything was

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in a ‘state of confusion and disillusionment’. Vorley announced his intention to return home to resume his proper job. Here we must pause for a moment. This charade was being acted out in December 1941 – less than one week before the attack on Pearl Harbour, and barely three weeks before the devastating bombing raids began on Rangoon.11 Of course no one knew that these things lay just around the corner, but it did not need genius to guess that a catastrophe of some sort was about to happen. Vorley was appalled that the Evacuation Department had been dismantled at the very time when it was most needed. On 4 December 1941 (the very next day after his argument with de Graaf Hunter), Vorley was telephoned out of the blue. He was offered the post of Director of the Evacuation Department. He was flabbergasted, but before accepting the post he demanded to discuss terms with de Graaf Hunter who would be his ‘line manager’. It was a frosty meeting during which Vorley was struck by de Graaf Hunter’s complacency, inflexibility and lack of a sense of urgency. He was told that he would have no budget and that he could appoint no additional members of staff. After several very testy exchanges Vorley decided that he would accept the job anyway. What followed next was peculiar to say the least. De Graaf Hunter refused to answer Vorley’s letters, refused to return his telephone calls and refused to meet him face-to-face. If Vorley needed anything he went over de Graaf Hunter’s head to seek ministerial approval and astoundingly there was no direct contact between the two men from then on, even though the evacuation was in full flow. The last time they met or spoke was on 5 January 1942 and after that Vorley did his own thing and de Graaf Hunter did his. Arguments by proxy raged back and forth between Government House, the New Law Courts and the Myoma Girls School as the Governor, Commissioner for Civil Defence and Director of Civilian Evacuation remained at loggerheads. *

*

*

Vorley had to address two immediate problems – the ‘dispersion camps’ and the disarray in the Evacuation Department. It was discovered that there was a major problem in Marsh’s original evacuation scheme. Construction of the three ‘dispersion camps’ had been completed on the northern outskirts of Rangoon. They were in the right place, fully staffed, expensively equipped and ready to go. After the bombing raid of 23 December 1941, tens of thousands of people flocked out of the city along the Prome Road and past the ‘dispersion camps’. Very few evacuees were willing to stay in them. Each camp had been

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built on a grid pattern with row upon row of low dormitory buildings. The evacuees feared that from the air the camps would be mistaken for military barracks and Japanese aircraft would bomb them. Over the Christmas period in 1941 approximately 5,000 people chose to sleep under the trees by the Royal Lake rather than stay in Marsh’s camps, which were almost completely empty. They remained unoccupied for week after week. The camps had proved to be a very costly mistake and de Graaf Hunter appeared to have been vindicated. The second problem concerned Vorley’s own Department. He had inherited a tiny back-office team that consisted of five full-time salaried employees – one superintendent, two clerks and two stenographers. The front-line tasks were performed entirely by voluntary workers. Marsh had employed about 200 competent, hard-working and reliable volunteers – most of whom were schoolteachers. At the beginning of December 1941 the Director of Public Instruction had agreed to pay their full salaries in full as long as they worked for the Evacuation Department. It was a generous arrangement but for some reason de Graaf Hunter disapproved of it. He was ungrateful to the cash-strapped DPI who accordingly gave notice that he would stop paying the teachers’ salaries from the end of January 1942. The result was electric. More than 100 teacher-volunteers resigned from the Evacuation Department. Most of the others stayed on and worked very long hours for no pay but they faced genuine financial hardship. One by one they dropped out until the situation finally became untenable. New evacuation camps were being opened to cope with the surge of refugees, but they could not be staffed. In vain Vorley tried to persuade de Graaf Hunter to do something about the DPI’s decision to stop paying the teachers, but de Graaf Hunter was characteristically evasive and was always too busy to discuss the matter with Vorley. Between January and April 1942 the Japanese Army advanced rapidly through Burma and the British Army retreated equally rapidly. Vorley and his colleagues became hopelessly overstretched as they were called upon to evacuate one town after another, including Prome Yenangyaung, Chauk, Mandalay and Maymyo. In the midst of it all Vorley was promoted to the rank of Commissioner of Civilian Evacuation. He had been demanding precisely this position since the beginning of December 1941, but now it was too late. Within a few weeks the major escape routes would be closed, Mandalay and Myitkyina would have fallen, postal and telegraph services would have collapsed and Vorley, de Graaf Hunter and Dorman-Smith would all have become evacuees in their own

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rights.12 Vorley felt let down by the Governor, the Civil Defence Commissioner and the military commanders.13 *

*

*

It was clear that adversity had done nothing to bring Dorman-Smith, Vorley and de Graaf Hunter closer together and nor had time healed their wounds. Although in fairness it should be noted that in 1950 Dorman-Smith wrote a generous, if slightly barbed Introduction to The Road from Mandalay in which he described Vorley as ‘impetuous, intolerant at times, and always determined to get his own way, a first-class cutter of red-tape, quite fearless, but above all, a man of great human sympathy’.14 As soon as they reached India all three of them rushed to justify their actions. Vorley was first off the mark in June 1942. His Report on the Evacuation was clear and uncompromising. The original document makes fascinating reading not least because of the handwritten comments jotted in the margins by senior civil servants. The Report circulated around Whitehall in January 1943 before ending up on the desk of the Secretary of State for Burma. The Prime Minister would certainly have read the accompanying briefing note if not the whole Report.15 On the very first page of the Report, a civil servant had scribbled that ‘this is no good for publicity’ and on subsequent pages some of Vorley’s more ‘ominous remarks’ were heavily underscored. Another civil servant noted in the margin that Burma’s problems might have been avoided if only the Governor had stuck to Marsh’s original plan. Mr W. Annan wrote the official briefing minute that accompanied Vorley’s Report. He clearly agreed with everything Vorley had written about the events and he hailed the Report as ‘commendably objective’. He accepted Vorley’s verdict that ‘individual personal fortitude co-existed with official confusion and misunderstanding’. Annan went on to make several damning remarks about de Graaf Hunter’s performance as Civil Defence Commissioner. His appointment was ‘unfortunate’ and his ‘inexperience of Eastern races was equalled only by his administrative incompetence’. There were several references to de Graaf Hunter’s lack of managerial and interpersonal skills and Annan did not disguise his disgust at de Graaf Hunter’s habit of leaving his subordinates in the dark and his failure to define their responsibilities. He also denounced his reluctance to give orders, to delegate and to sanction expenditure. He accused de Graaf Hunter of creating a culture of indecision, ambiguity and acrimony throughout his Department.

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It was a comprehensive demolition job, and Annan’s one-sided and condemnatory comments winged their way to the Secretary of State for Burma and even more senior figures beyond him. It was most unusual for a named official to be personally criticized in this way and it is not clear how or why this happened, but whatever the reason, de Graaf Hunter’s reputation would never recover. *

*

*

Thus it was that this obscure domestic spat in Rangoon became a cause celebre in Whitehall. Its prominence might be explained by the fact that the civilian evacuation from Burma had heaped yet more humiliation on Churchill at a time when he was dealing with several others. Having unleashed political fury in India it had now touched a raw nerve in Britain too. The News Chronicle was particularly interested in the issue, which also kept cropping up in parliamentary questions.16 There was more to it than this, for criticism of de Graaf Hunter was an attack by proxy on Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. It was a sine qua non that senior colonial officials did not wash their dirty political linen in public. So DormanSmith now faced the dilemma of defending himself and his protégé de Graaf Hunter without attacking Vorley.17 It was tricky because the latter had become something of a folk-hero in Burma and more recently had won the unambiguous support of William Craig Annan. Dorman-Smith’s Report was not completed until November 1943 nearly six months after Vorley had presented his Report to Parliament. By the time it was published the damage had been done. In contrast to Vorley’s barnstorming effort, Dorman-Smith’s Report contained a long, restrained and detailed analysis of the events leading up to the retreat of 1942. It was scholarly in tone and he did not attempt to justify his own actions until part VI, chapter 4, by which time the readers’ interest was flagging. Nevertheless, Dorman-Smith presented seven significant arguments in defence of his actions. First, he insisted, the appointment of de Graaf Hunter in September 1941 was essential. At the tender age of 33 de Graaf Hunter’s CV already included senior management positions at Civil Defence HQ in London and sales of halfa-million copies of his definitive ARP training manual. His expertise in civil defence was unequalled in Burma and his only fault seemed to be that he had run out of time so was unable to build shelters, train workers and build camps in safe areas before the bombing started.

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Second, the success of any civil defence scheme depended on having sufficient air-raid shelters that people could trust. By the time de Graaf Hunter arrived very few serviceable shelters had been constructed in Rangoon and it was too late to build more. Third, de Graaf Hunter’s stay-put policy was right for Rangoon and Marsh’s partial evacuation scheme was wrong. Marsh’s partial evacuation scheme would have quickly grown into a total evacuation scheme. If a few people were evacuated everyone else was bound to follow. Dorman-Smith cited recent experiences in Calcutta and Alexandria to prove this. If the Government had sponsored a nonessentials-only evacuation scheme from Rangoon it would have been impossible for employers to retain their essential workers. Indeed an article in the Rangoon Gazette of February 1941 had made this very point in warning that the dispersal of government offices would cause panic. Fourth, the mass exodus from Rangoon had not been caused by the abandonment of Marsh’s plan but by the severity of the Japanese bombing raids on Rangoon on 23 and 25 December. Eight hundred high-explosive bombs had been dropped in the two raids (about the same number as had been dropped on Rotterdam during the first two days of bombing there). He insisted that ‘there is no panacea to the evil of fear’. The fact was that, ‘railway workers, clerks, menials in government offices, nursing staff in hospitals and subordinates of commercial firms’ were all essential workers, yet it ‘did not stop them from running away’. Moreover, Burma was not a ‘nazi state’ so it was impossible to fling ‘a barbedwire fence round the city and to erect barriers with armed guards’ to stop people leaving. Fifth, de Graaf Hunter’s decision to hand over responsibility to the Rangoon Corporation had merely brought Rangoon into line with best practice in England, where Air-Raid Precautions (ARPs) were the responsibility of local authorities. Indeed, even in Burma the District Deputy Commissioner was usually responsible for providing civil defence arrangements. If the Rangoon Corporation failed it was not the fault of the system but because most of the subordinate staff had deserted. Sixth, Burmese ministers would have vetoed any proposal to make use of public funds to pay full-time civil defence workers and there was no evidence that paid workers performed any better than unpaid volunteers. In this respect de Graaf Hunter and Marsh were in total agreement. Seventh, complete military disintegration had settled the fate of Rangoon. It was not the fault of de Graaf Hunter, Vorley or Dorman-Smith that morale had

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plummeted. It was because the civilian population of Burma had encountered for the first time a ‘first-class military force and the horrors of modern warfare’ as well as the ‘indignity of a hurried defeat before an Asiatic foe’. At this point Dorman-Smith could not resist reminding readers also that Marsh had made a catastrophic mistake in building three dispersion camps that no one wanted to use. Marsh, he said, had also failed to realize that people in Burma were averse to the use of concentration camps. He pointed out that the horrors of the evacuation were still too fresh in minds. It was too soon for people to make rational judgements. Those who had launched ‘virulent’ and ‘misconceived’ attacks were probably still unstable after emerging from ‘painful and exhausting treks’.18 It is more than likely that Dorman-Smith had in mind critics like Frank A. A. Reynolds, DSP in Lashio, who described the evacuation as ‘a story of incompetency, panic and chaos; of treachery, cowardice and murder; of tragedy, suffering and misery’.19 Of course Reynolds was not the only person to hold these views. *

*

*

In a later journal article, Dorman-Smith attempted to address three other very sensitive issues.20 The first concerned the conduct of civilian District Officers in Burma. There was an imputation (not without foundation) that some officials had deserted their posts.21 Dorman-Smith explained that he had initially ordered all civilian officers to stay at their posts, but because some executive officers had fallen into Japanese hands at Victoria Point and Tavoy the order had then been rescinded. Civilian officers were subsequently instructed to avoid being captured. Reports that the Japanese had ill-treated civilian officers in other countries had confirmed the wisdom of this decision. Moreover, captured officials could help neither the Burmese people nor the British war effort, so it was vital that District Officers lived another day to keep Burma ‘alive’. Dorman-Smith drew attention to General Smyth’s ‘warm tribute to officers of the civil, canal and railway services in Burma’. Dorman-Smith did admit that there had been some ‘desertions among the lower grades’ of civil servants, but he was adamant that retreating British troops had ‘never failed to find civilian officials at their posts’ who were more than willing ‘to shoulder a double or treble burden’.22 The second issue was the accusation that he, Dorman-Smith, should have taken more decisive action at the beginning of 1942. The problem, he explained, was that he was not a free agent. Burma was not a colony, but a self-governing unit within the British Empire so he could not behave as an autocrat by simply issuing arbitrary orders and expecting them to be implemented. Nor was

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he protected by a phalanx of friendly British officials but rather he was at the mercy of Burmese ministers. They were in complete charge of all departments of government except Defence and Foreign Affairs and were responsible to an elected Legislature, not to the Governor.23 In effect, Burma enjoyed domestic home rule. Most Burmese ministers were relatively unsympathetic to European and Indian evacuees and were reluctant to vote through large sums of money for the evacuation of non-indigenous peoples. It was much easier therefore to persuade ministers to vote money for ARPs, which benefited the whole population of Burma than for evacuation, which benefited a few.24 Dorman-Smith was quick to emphasize, however, that not all Burmese ministers were obstructive or anti-British and there were few Burmese ‘Quislings’ among them. He singled out for particular praise the Premier, Sir Paw Tun, who had remained loyal right up to the end. At the opening session of the Burmese Legislature on 13 February 1942, Sir Paw Tun had praised Britain and denounced Japanese aggression (a brave and unfashionable stance).25 He had broadcast regularly on Burma Radio and had never missed an opportunity to appeal to the loyalty of Burmans. In his very last broadcast late in April 1942, Sir Paw Tun had told listeners to remember that it was their duty ‘to display . . . respect and loyalty’ towards the Governor. He had praised Dorman-Smith for his rejection of concentration camps (a swipe at Marsh), his loathing of the brutalities of the enemy and his real love for the Burmese people. Sir Paw Tun had concluded the broadcast by saying Burma ‘should ring with his (Dorman-Smith’s) praise and with a deep sense of gratitude’.26 The third issue was the question of whether martial law should have been imposed earlier.27 Dorman-Smith’s critics argued that had it been, Rangoon would have been less chaotic and more lives would have been saved. DormanSmith insisted that only once, on 21 February 1942, had a senior Army Officer proposed that Rangoon should be placed under military control.28 He had readily agreed to the suggestion and had immediately handed over control to the Military Commandant. General Alexander then issued a proclamation, placing the civil jurisdiction in the hands of military courts and any minor technical differences between the civil and military authorities were quickly and amicably resolved. Dorman-Smith went on to argue that in fact, martial law had made little difference. For example, the military court in Mandalay had sat on only two occasions and there was little evidence that it had offered more protection to law-abiding citizens or had restrained the lawless. The transfer of powers from the police to the army had had little effect. The real problem was that General

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Hutton (Commanding Officer, Burma) had far too few staff officers qualified to take over civilian departments. At no point had General Hutton suggested that the Constitution should be suspended, for to have done so would have been to risk rebellion. As it was, most of the Ministers remained loyal and acted as calming influences. Consequently, retreating British troops encountered little opposition from Burmans. In any case the Army had not been prevented from taking over the Railways, the entire IFC fleet, the PWD (in forward areas) as well as Posts and Telegraphs even before the imposition of martial law. *

*

*

Dorman-Smith had to face a barrage of criticism during 1942. Evacuees, Indian politicians, British liberals and journalists of all hues all expressed their views. ‘Eddy’, for example, was a redneck oil worker in Yenangyaung. He vowed never to trust anyone in government again and particularly what they said over the wireless. He was dismayed by their ‘ineptitude and cowardice’ and could never forgive Dorman-Smith in particular for comparing Rangoon with Tobruk.29 The Governor was especially wary of a galaxy of yellow-press journalists and war correspondents who flitted in and out of Burma – men like Wagg, Leland Stowe, O’Dowd Gallagher – and also William O. Douglas who continued his wartime vendetta against Dorman-Smith long after the war had ended, describing him as ‘imperialist in the full Churchillian sense [whose] measures produced mostly disorders, political disaffection and defiance of authority’.30 Odd mavericks and shadowy subversive groups had also popped up here and there to orchestrate malicious rumours. One of them wrote under the pseudonym ‘Murphy’. He was a sort of oriental Lord Haw Haw who purportedly wrote letters to a ‘Miss McDaniels’ in the United States. The censor, Major F. T. Coulton, explained that ‘Murphy’ regularly delighted in spreading rumours (all of them fictitious but all believable). On one occasion he had fabricated the story of an armed civil war that had supposedly broken out in Burma between British and Australian soldiers.31 All these people shared one thing in common – they viewed Dorman-Smith as the villain of the piece. *

*

*

De Graaf Hunter said nothing for a long time. Perhaps, he was too depressed or he was just too low down the political ‘pecking order’ to be heard. He was also tucked well out of harm’s way in deepest India. Eventually he broke his silence in a long interview with Alfred Wagg in Delhi.32 His case for the defence went as follows. On his arrival the situation in

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Rangoon was bleak. Civil defence provision was virtually non-existent. There was no ARP equipment and the civil defence force was little more than a list of ‘names on paper’. The fire service was inadequate and poorly equipped. In the event of a raid, casualties would be left to the tender mercies of untrained St John Ambulance Brigade volunteers who had no equipment and no ambulances. No arrangements had been made to feed, clothe or rehouse air-raid victims, and almost no air-raid shelters had been constructed. No training programmes were in place and no arrangements had been made for the dissemination of air-raid intelligence. Telephone instruments and lines were in short supply and the air-raid warning system had not been tested. De Graaf Hunter was shocked to discover that hitherto the Rangoon Corporation had been excluded from all civil defence preparations. It made no sense and was a terrible oversight, for it meant that the Civil Defence Department in Rangoon was isolated and pitifully small, whereas in every other part of the country the District Officer was the responsible agency. In contrast to the lack of investment in civil defence, a colossal amount of money had been spent on a ‘gigantic scheme’ for the evacuation of 90,000 nonessential persons from Rangoon. De Graaf Hunter was appalled. Apart from anything else, no system had been devised to distinguish ‘essentials’ from ‘non-essentials’. He dismissed as ‘childlike’ the belief that workers in ‘essential’ occupations would carry on working after everyone else had left the city. Indeed without adequate air-raid shelters it was unreasonable to expect anyone at all to remain in the city. De Graaf Hunter went on to suggest that orientals were unwilling to risk death for the allied war effort. They were rooted in ‘jungles’ not in cities and their instinct was to ‘run for safety’ rather than to ‘stand fast’. It was inevitable therefore that ‘any evacuation’ would lead immediately to ‘total evacuation’. De Graaf Hunter was beginning to sound just like Vorley. De Graaf Hunter’s priorities had remained the same from the beginning. They were to keep the Port of Rangoon open, to abandon the partial evacuation plan, to set up 28 area civil defence organizations and to recruit, train and equip 28,000 civil defence volunteers. It was, he averred, important to prepare the whole population for ‘total war’, but he had been defeated by a chronic lack of time and a lack of competent colleagues (a swipe at Vorley and Marsh!). It was, he said, impossible to build an esprit de corps overnight and as soon as the air raids began his volunteers had deserted, bazaars closed, shopkeepers fled to the jungles, menial staff left hospitals and sweepers left thousands of unemptied bucket lavatories. De Graaf Hunter’ self-righteousness was almost palpable when he reminded Wagg that Marsh’s evacuee camps had been boycotted by the evacuees.

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Shortages of labour and building materials had made it impossible for him to build more than a few air-raid shelters in Rangoon, but enough suitable buildings had been identified to shelter a total of up to 75,000 persons and many miles of trenches had been dug in open spaces. The trouble was that the public had ignored them. There was no doubting de Graaf Hunter’s expertise. He had done his homework and was full of interesting notions. For example, he knew that 390 more trailerpumps were needed in Burma (there were only 10 in the whole country) and warned that there was an acute shortage of heavy fire-fighting appliances. At the end of January 1942 he had removed large amounts of fire-fighting equipment from Rangoon and sent it up to Mandalay, Maymyo, Meiktila, Yamethin and Pyinmana. He had also dreamed up the innovative idea of ‘Civil Defence Mobile Columns’. These were small, highly mobile parties of personnel trained in lifesaving, rescue work, first aid, disposal of the dead, fire-fighting, cooking and feeding the homeless. They were centrally controlled and they whizzed around in specially constructed vehicles. It sounded like a very good idea and no doubt would have been, if only there had been enough time to put them into action. *

*

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Above everything, the terrible crisis in Burma in 1942 needed unity, common purpose and strong leadership at the top. Instead it got the dysfunctional triumvirate of Vorley, Dorman-Smith and de Graaf Hunter. The three men could not have been more different and collectively they exemplified the effect of a flawed leadership team. De Graaf Hunter was a man of mystery and a young man in a hurry. He had arrived in Burma full of preconceived ideas many of which were eminently sensible. He was a shrewd analyst, showed an academic bent and he thought laterally. On the other hand he was incapable of compromise and could not translate ideas into action. He was neither a team player nor a good listener. His charm and arrogance tended to ruffle feathers. His refusal to communicate with subordinates or to meet them face-to-face might have belied insecurity rather than arrogance, but his abject managerial record finally proved his undoing. Vorley was everything that de Graaf Hunter was not. He was an excellent manager – gruff, uncomplicated and a great encourager of men. Pragmatic and practical, Vorley liked nothing more than to get the job done. He knew Burma through and through and was under no illusions about its limitations. He was the salt of the earth and had a supportive wife and a wide network of friends. Yet, there was also a ruthless side to Vorley’s character. He could be pugilistic if

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necessary, a quality that made him the ‘finisher’ he was and also equipped him to engage in a spot of occasional character assassination. Dorman-Smith was complicated. Urbane, scholarly, thoughtful and fair he was prepared to defend the underdog and could be intensely loyal to friends. This was illustrated in his relationship with his protégé, de Graaf Hunter whom he defended through thick and thin and continued when it was impolitic to do so. Perhaps he was not thick-skinned enough to be a great colonial administrator for he could be crippled by personal criticism, and often grappled with a tender conscience. This rendered him indecisive and even self-delusional at times. He was neither a strong nor a weak leader, but his anxiety to do the right thing and to please people made him extremely vulnerable. The trouble was that Dorman-Smith had conflated two very different imperatives. One was to build effective air-raid shelters and create an adequate civil defence system and the other was to evacuate huge numbers of civilians over large distances quickly and safely. One was static, the other fluid. It was not a case of one or the other, but of both. De Graaf Hunter concentrated exclusively on the first while Marsh concentrated entirely on the second. Dorman-Smith’s decision to promote civil defence and to choke off evacuation proved to be almost fatal in the end. He also failed to realize that both civil defence and evacuation would soon affect the whole country and not just Rangoon. Dorman-Smith put all his eggs in the de Graaf Hunter basket. He pleaded with critics to give de Graaf Hunter a chance, to remember his youth, the enormity of his task and the constraints on his authority. Herein lay the problem. The Civil Defence Commissioner was neither fish nor fowl, neither hands-on executive officer nor visionary macroplanner. Dorman-Smith needed both, but got neither. He had to take the blame for this. He had personally engineered de Graaf Hunter’s appointment and felt bound to defend him to the bitter end.33 Dorman-Smith’s reputation was bound up with that of de Graaf Hunter’s reputation and both men sank together. At the end of May 1942, while the evacuation was still limping along in Burma, Dorman-Smith was summoned to London. When he arrived he received no accolades, was damned with faint praise and was given no honours. Churchill presented him with a bunch of flowers in recognition of his work in Burma.34 It would be interesting to know what was discussed in private, but on his return to India on 28 August 1942 Dorman-Smith said nothing about the visit. Later he confessed that ‘the military public relations department felt it incumbent upon them to find a scapegoat for our defeat in Burma and the Governor and his officials served that purpose’.35 Minds may have been made up at that stage

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about Dorman-Smith’s future in Burma, for Sir Hubert Rance was drafted in to replace him as Governor in 1945. After the war Dorman-Smith’s career ended in oblivion. So, what had started as a spiteful little spat in Rangoon causing bitter divisions in India had now ended up by ruffling feathers in London, finally brought low this honourable and well-meaning public figure. Perhaps the last word should go to Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, the sacrificial lamb in this ‘very great drama’. It was simply that the British had ‘neither men, nor planes, or equipment in sufficient quantities to resist the invader’ and that from this ‘plain fact’ flowed all the political woes described earlier.36

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3

The Indian Question

Hugh Tinker bleakly concluded that the Indian evacuation from Burma offered ‘no lesson except the lesson of human endurance’.1 Tinker was firing one of the first salvos in what has become a rather long and bitter debate. Most of the civilian evacuees from Burma were Indians and their collective experiences left deep scars on subcontinental politics. Yet it was the reminiscences, diaries and letters of individual European evacuees captured the limelight, implying synecdochically that the whole evacuation was like this.2 But it was not. It was as if a few standout Englishmen scrambling over mountains had trumped the experiences of thousands of hungry and sweaty Indians who trudged mile after mile along teeming thoroughfares. Many of the former were articulate celebrities’ (at least in the Burma context) while many of the latter were anonymous, poor, illiterate and less eye-catching. Their experiences were very different from the romanticized ‘jungles of death’ accounts (so favoured by Europeans) that dominated the Western press.3 *

*

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About 366,000 civilian evacuees left Burma in 1942 and of these about 350,000 (96%) were Indians. Only about 16,000 (4%) were Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmese. The evacuation should have been remembered as an Indian epic. But it is not. Between January and May 1942 Indians evacuated from Burma in large groups by road, rail, sea and air. They slogged along congested roads, struggled with hunger, thirst and disease and slept in filthy camps. Their memories were of congestion, crowds, noise, laden ox carts, lorries and pedestrians moving slowly along in the same direction. Tinker put his finger on it. He said that nobody directed the Indians to depart, no organization assisted them on the way, and when they arrived at their destination, nobody wanted them to stay.4

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Here is the mystery. Lower-class coolies, sweepers, peons and dhobis can be excused. They were illiterate and ill equipped to write or speak about their experiences. They kept no diaries, wrote no letters and left no memoirs over which historians and journalists could pore. However, this does not explain why well-educated Indian evacuees – and there were many of them – chose not to write about their experiences. Yet even today Indian survivors and their descendants are reluctant to speak about the events of 1942. Perhaps trauma begets amnesia. Instead, both colonial and anticolonial apologists latched onto the silence. For different propagandist reasons they focused on British rather than Indian evacuees. Colonial sympathizers promoted the British evacuees as heroes. Anticolonial nationalists presented them as humiliated tyrants. Through the prism of history, European evacuees have thus been portrayed as idiosyncratic, tragic, sad, noble, defeated, strong, pathetic, romantic and dashing, depending on one’s point of view. On the other hand, Indian evacuees are portrayed as faceless, anonymous members of amorphous crowds. They rarely emerge as individuals with personalities. One newspaperman at the time described them as ‘unending streams of human war waste, sandwiched between armies of friends and foe’.5 It is a tragedy. Perhaps, Indians were victims of media presentation rather than Japanese aggression. *

*

*

Wealthier Indian families had already begun to make their escapes from Burma during November and December 1941. They did so without fuss, almost surreptitiously. European families had been doing the same thing for months. Some left on BISN Co. steamers and others by air. Thousands of Indians flocked out of Rangoon at the end of December 1941, scrambling onto boats in the Port of Rangoon, walking through the Taungup Pass or trekking to Assam. A very few flew from Shwebo or Myitkyina and some hiked over mountains into Northern Assam.6 Collectively they could not be ignored but most are still anonymous to this day. Many reached India. An unknown number died on the way. The Register of Evacuees from Burma provides details of about 25,559 Indian evacuees.7 It individualizes and personalizes men women and children in a way that nothing else has managed to do. Indian names spill across the pages, Ahmed, Ananda, Appanna, Bahadur, Bhattacharji, Bhima, Chakravarty, Chandra, Choudhury, Das, Din, Dutt, Gandhi, Ganguly, Ghosh, Gopal, Hari, Jagganath, Kahar, Karim, Khan, Krishna, Lal, Limbu, Nath, Pillay, Prasad, Ram, Singh, Swami, Tikaram and Venkat, and so on. Coolies are recorded alongside professors and the names of the poorest sweepers with those of the wealthiest

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businessmen. Cartmen, peons, dhobis, merchants, sepoys, cowherds, durwans, goldsmiths, students, khalasis, doctors, bearers, paniwallas, malis, serangs, butlers-to-judges, chaprasis, compounders and all manner of occupations are jumbled together in the Register. They made for Bengal, Madras, Darjeeling, Amritsar and all parts of India, and had trudged from Mawchi, Rangoon, Namtu, Mandalay, Maymyo Lashio, Homalin, Tavoy, Pegu, Toungoo and every part of Burma. Incomplete though the Register is, it slices right through Indian society in Burma and freezes in time husbands, wives, grandparents, children, widows, orphans and great gaggles of single men. Sadly the analysis goes no further than this. It shows no faces and describes no personalities.8 *

*

*

Indians in Burma endured torrid times during the 1930s and early 1940s. They were very raw and recent memories in 1942 explain and inform so much about Indian attitudes during the evacuation. They explain, for example, why so many of Indians felt so vulnerable and so sensitive. Fortunately the works of two distinguished historians, Dr Nalini Ranjan Chakravarti and Mr B. R. Pearn (Advisor to the Government of Burma) are on hand to guide us through the historical maze of Indians in pre-war Burma.9 Anti-Indian sentiment had been bubbling below the surface in Burma for more than a decade. From time to time it flared into violent communal conflict. Burmese nationalists regarded Indians as British lackeys, economic migrants, religious fanatics and cultural vandals. By 1942 many Burmans were as pleased to see the Indians go, as they were to see the British leave Burma. It was an injustice of course, for Indians had provided good service in agriculture, industry, transport, banking, medicine, and so on. The Indian community had provided armies of clerks and domestic servants. Indian sweepers had carted away human excrement, Indian labourers had unloaded vessels in the Port of Rangoon and Indian Chettyars had financed the rice industry. Of course the inevitable corollary of this was that many Burmese workers regarded the Indians as economic interlopers who had undercut their pay, stolen their jobs, taken their land and exploited them financially. The fact was that Indians had been willing to work harder, for less money and in more unpleasant jobs. The Indian community was problematic. First, the Indian population had been growing very rapidly since the 1890s. Pearn had warned of the dangers of unregulated Indian immigration.10 The rate of increase was not the only problem. The geographical distribution of the Indian population also concerned Pearn. He pointed out that in 1881 there were 243,123 Indians living in Burma (6.5% of

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Burma’s total population). The biggest concentration was in Rangoon. By 1921, one in eleven of the inhabitants of Lower Burma was Indian and Rangoon was virtually an Indian city. By 1931, Pearn reckoned that the Indian population in Burma had topped the 1-million mark (Table 3.1).11 Second, Burmese nationalists argued that Burma could not assimilate so many Indians. Indian cultural influences were ubiquitous. Everywhere it seemed that Hindi and Telugu were spoken, Vedic mantras could be heard, kadha masala and shah jeera could be smelled, tilaka and thupattis were always on display. These harmless symbols of Indianness reminded Burmans of the kala presence. AntiIndian feeling fuelled the nationalist Thakin movement during the 1930s. Third, the majority of Indians living in Burma had been born in India and very few settled permanently. Most unskilled coolies from lower-class families in India had been recruited by maistries to work on the rice frontier.12 They arrived by boat at the end of each year and usually stayed for two-and-a-half years before returning to India. During that time they gathered three or four rice harvests. Other Indians worked in the docks or on the roads. They all experienced periods of unemployment and almost all coolies remitted their earnings back to India so as consumers they contributed little to the Burmese economy. The slump in the rice trade in the 1930s caused many labourers to be laid off.13 Indian coolies usually congregated in low-rent ghettos around such locations as the notorious 29th Street in Rangoon. Here they lived in squalid and unhygienic conditions – often 20 or more to a single room in one of the many cheap, dank lodging houses. Disease was rife, sanitation non-existent and starvation was never very far away.14 Few respectable Burmans ventured into these dark streets and few Indians had any wish to integrate into Burmese society. It was a recipe for social conflict.

Table 3.1 Indian population in Burma, 1881–1941 Year

Total Population

1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941

3,736,771 8,098,014 10,490,624 12,115,217 13,212,192 14,667,146 16,823,798

Indian Population 243,123 420,830 568,263 743,288 887,077 1,017,825 918,000

Indian (%) 6.5 5.1 5.4 6.1 6.7 6.9 5.4

Source: Burma Handbook (Simla, Government Press, 1943), p. 4.

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In such circumstances rumours spread like wildfire. Many of them were malicious and untrue. Whispers of sexual predation were the most credible because Indian male immigrants outnumbered Indian females by a factor of five to one. Local people were wary of these concentrations of young, unmarried Hindu and Muslim males. Burmese girls were considered to be at great risk and marriage between Indian men and Burmese women was strongly discouraged. Militant Buddhism was a powerful force and mixed marriages raised questions about cultural contamination, racial honour, religious conversion and the upbringing of children. They had the power to trigger violent anti-Indian protest.15 Fourth, significant divergences between immigration and emigration affected Burma’s economic health and its social harmony. Immigration reached a peak in the boom years of 1927–8 and it declined sharply in 1930–1 when the price of rice dropped to its nadir and 1938 was another bell-weather year (see Table 3.2). Fifth, Indians distorted the Burmese labour market. It was not their fault. The list of evacuees in 1942 reflected the social history of Burma in the 1930s. A third of the 13,000 Indian evacuees whose occupations were recorded in the Evacuation Register described themselves as coolies, labourers, porters or menials in addition to the smattering of scavengers and many sweepers. It is a reminder of the importance of unskilled Indian labour in Burma before the war (Table 3.3).16 Table 3.2 Arrivals and departures from Burma, 1927–35 Year

Arrivals

Departures

Surplus

1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 Total

361,086 360,129 345,906 301,917 266,105 274,193 216,658 228,357 246,059 2,600,410

280,739 263,345 294,574 314,429 288,696 224,098 194,925 179,773 176,470 2,217,049

80,347 96,784 51,332

Deficit

12,512 22,591 50,095 21,733 48,584 69,589 418,464

35,103

Note: There were 383,361 more arrivals than departures during 1927–35 in the Port of Rangoon. Source: N. R. Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma, Appendix 3 (London, Oxford University, 1971).

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Figure 3.1 Portrait of an Indian evacuee in 1942. The Evacuation Registers showed that Indian traders featured prominently among the evacuees. The dignified merchant in this photograph was one of many to flee from Mandalay in April 1942. The photograph is reproduced by kind permission of the British Library.

Indian workers accounted for half the total workforce in the 1931 Census. They dominated transport, police, public services, public administration and domestic service.17 The Evacuation Register confirms that this was still the case in 1942. In third position in Table 3.3 was the category defined as merchants, contractors, businessmen, traders and shopkeepers. Equally important was the distribution of Indian evacuees in blue-collar trades in the large corporations such as Burma Railways, IFC and BOC. They were also well represented in smaller commercial enterprises such as motor garages. Likewise, it indicates that many Indian evacuees were employed in public services such as the police force and hospitals. Many Indians were merchants and traders in the retail and wholesale sectors such as milling and the brokerage trades. A smaller number of evacuees had occupied middle and senior managerial positions in business and the professions, particularly in law, medicine and education. There is evidence from elsewhere that Indians featured among the wealthiest sections of Burmese society, where they were bankers,

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Table 3.3 Occupations of Indian evacuees, 1942 Rank

Description

1 Coolies, labourers, porters, menials 2 Housewives and widows 3 Merchants, contractors, businessmen, traders and shopkeepers 4 Cultivators, milkmen and cowherds 5 Personal and domestic servants, peons and boy servants 6 Clerical and office workers 7 Blue-collar workers 8 Watchmen (chaukidars and durwans) 9 Burma Railways employees 10 Fitters, mechanics, engineers and draughtsmen 11 Maistry, jamaldar, havildar, junior managers and supervisors 12 Motor drivers 13 Sweepers 14 Serangs, sukhanis, lascars and mariners 15 Moneylenders, bankers and financiers 16 Khalasi (dockworkers) 17 Teashop and restaurant workers 18 Students and pupils 19 School teachers and university lecturers 20 Firemen 21 Civil police 22 Jamaldar, havildar and junior managers 23 Carters 24 Fishermen 25 Pensioners 26 Military personnel 27 Nurses, ward assistants and support staff 28 Medical doctors and dentists 29 Precious metal and gem workers 30 Religious leaders 31 Sundry employees 32 Lawyers 33 Posts and telegraphs 34 Prison warders 35 Tallymen 36 Beggars and scavengers 37 Politicians and government officials 38 Forestry workers 39 Cinema proprietors/managers 40 Surveyors 41 Journalist Total Indian entries

Number 4,232 1,702 1,502 1,128 714 629 365 337 327 310 240 229 158 102 98 94 82 80 72 65 61 53 49 48 47 37 36 33 25 25 24 21 19 12 9 8 4 3 3 3 1 12,987

Source: Evacuation Registers compiled by M. D. Leigh.

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insurers and financiers, and that Chettyar moneylenders had a stranglehold on the rice frontier where they supplied much of the capital to the Burmese rice industry.18 *

*

*

Chakravarti estimates that on the eve of the Japanese invasion the total Indian investment in Burma stood at about £142M (Rs 1,890). It was evident that Indians had a considerable (perhaps an overweening) influence at almost every level of business, industry and public service in Burma. During the 1930s many Burmese workers resented the fact that Indian immigrants exerted a stranglehold on industry, commerce and in many sectors of the labour market. They vented their anger on Indian manual workers, accusing them of undercutting wages and stealing jobs. The Indianization of trade and industry had the effect of enticing Indian businessmen and businesses into crowded city localities that were already dominated by Indian migrants. It magnified the detachment of Indians from mainstream society in Burma.19 Another dynamic pressure was also at work. Indian businessmen had been squeezed. From below they were under pressure from vengeful Burmese nationalists who regarded them as colonial lackeys. The Burma Chamber of Commerce representing big British businesses and the Rangoon Trades Association composed of small- and medium-sized British enterprise squeezed them from above. The Indian Chamber of Commerce was no match for British business interests that were determined to retain their competitive advantage. The global depression of the 1930s exacerbated the situation. Ordinary Burmans were forced into a new and unfamiliar economic order in which brutal cash relationships prevailed and Indians were accused of manipulating the markets as well as forcing Burmans to the bottom of the economic pile. Chakravarti suggests that the Indian business community was disunited and poorly led. When times were good they had failed to win friends so in hard times they were friendless and isolated, making them extremely vulnerable to the threats of young nationalists. Finally, Indians were often accused of propping up the colonial regime. The charge was hard to refute. Most Indians had thrown in their lot with the British. They had steadfastly refused to side with Burmese nationalists – a tactical error according to Chakravarti. He argued that Indians would have gained much more from ‘the goodwill of Burmans’ than from ‘alignment with the ruling power’. Instead they concentrated on building ‘separate schools for Indian children, separate Indian business houses in which Burmans had no share, and exclusive

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Indian clubs, banks, co-operative stores’. Thus detached from Burmese national life Indians gave the impression that they had ‘one eye fixed on India and the other on British protection’. Their refusal ‘to sink or swim’ with the Burmans was derided in the Burmese press and led Burmese nationalists to press for ‘the total elimination of Indian interests irrespective of consequences’.20 Disunited and bereft of wise local leadership, the Indian community in Burma resorted to mimicking the politics of the Indian subcontinent where Hindus and Muslims were tearing society apart. This trend was particularly dangerous in Burma where expatriate Indians faced the additional problem of a hostile indigenous population.21 The fraught nature of this pre-war history explains why Indians were particularly anxious during the evacuation. *

*

*

In January 1942 the Indian population grappled with two demons. The first was an innate distrust of the British. For decades they had been the butt of racial prejudice and discriminatory practices, but they hoped now to be treated as comrades in arms. It was not to be. Even in this deepest of crises the British community refused to treat them as equals. Rumours of racial discrimination circulated – true or false did not matter, for the point was they were believable. Decades of socio-racial stratification in colonial Burma had cemented a mindset, and racial prejudices were now so deeply ingrained that even in extremis it could not be set aside. The second demon was the fear of Burmese reprisals. The likelihood of these had been very well trailed. There was plenty of encouragement from the touchline and memories of minor ‘atrocities’ committed by Burmans against them were still fresh in Indian minds. Their worst fears were realized almost immediately after Japanese forces had crossed the border from Thailand in January 1942. Alarming stories began to circulate about the mistreatment of Indian evacuees. Japanese soldiers were not to blame. They had been instructed to behave impeccably towards Asiatic civilians. At first they did. Indian refugees from Tavoy spoke warmly of Japanese officers who had treated both Burmans and Indians in a friendly manner. This perplexed British counter-intelligence officers who were infuriated by the ‘let’s all be Asiatics together’ charm offensive.22 More worrying were the lurid ‘stories of Burmese banditry’ and Burmese villagers were reported to have ‘roughed up’ Indians and pilfered their possessions.23 The accounts caused panic among Indians in Rangoon. They beat a path to Dorman-Smith’s door complaining about the serious deterioration in Indian morale and pleaded for protection. Whether or not these accounts were true cannot be verified for few details survive of dates,

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times, places, names of victims, items stolen and injuries inflicted. Nevertheless the stories heightened fears and caused Indians to be even more nervous about the malicious intentions of Burmans. It also caused them to question further the extent to which they could rely on British protection. Violence and lawlessness were almost inevitable because the police force had melted away and order had broken down completely. Some Burmans were itching to get their own back on evacuating Indians. Attacks on Indians were not well documented and in any case when they happened they were not necessarily politically motivated and nationalist agitators were rarely the perpetrators. More often the motives were straightforwardly theft, robbery or petty revenge rather than nationalist politics. Frequently the culprits appear to have been local opportunists with scores to settle, or large and well-armed bands of dacoits who indiscriminately targeted European, Indian and even Burman evacuees. They singled out whichever group seemed least well protected and most likely to have valuables worth stealing. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that during the Japanese occupation politically inspired violence was directed by the Burmese National Army against minority indigenous groups – Burmese and Karen Christians, for instance – and probably also against Indians. During the evacuation itself, however, although there were many anecdotes about Burman attacks on Indian refugees, there was little hard evidence. *

*

*

In the end it was British racial discrimination not Burmese harassment that captured the headlines. As the last refugees straggled into India, allegations of British racial prejudice began to bubble to the surface. As usual hard evidence was at a premium but there was plenty of hearsay evidence – enough to embarrass the British Government and to inflame Indian political opinion. The resurgence of nationalism in India coupled with the distinct possibility of a full-scale Japanese attack meant that the British Government was anxious to avoid a major public row at all costs. They believed it would compromise national security. However, at the beginning of May 1942, allegations of racial discrimination burst upon the scene in Delhi and in London and could not be ignored. It was difficult, for at the time Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith was flitting furtively from one jungle hideout to another in northern Burma. On 1 May 1942 he received a telegram from Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India and Burma. He was much more interested in his own personal survival than the telegram, but Amery explained that the News Chronicle of 9 April had carried

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an article by the radical journalist, Philip Jordan. It alleged that Indian evacuees had been prevented from flying to India and had been made to feel unwelcome at the frontier.24 Amery was concerned because the article had provoked adverse public interest in Britain – mainly from Mrs Freda Cook who worked for the Congress Press. She held extreme views and was a well-known member of the London ‘awkward squad’. Annan described her as ‘a journalist of sorts’. Mrs Cook had written a long letter to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, which opened with the words, ‘I wonder if you realise the awful despondency which fills the hearts of sensitive British people when they read . . . the account of our discrimination against Indian refugees in Burma.’ The Secretary of State demanded an immediate a response from Dorman-Smith not least because a parliamentary question had been tabled for 7 May asking about arrangements for the evacuation of Indians from Burma and about conditions in evacuation camps.25 Dorman-Smith was in the jungle, on the run, the Japanese were breathing down his neck, he had no records, was fretting about his personal safety and plagued by mosquitoes. Just the previous day he had sent a cable begging Churchill ‘to scrounge a few more aeroplanes’ so that he and other evacuees could be flown out of Burma.26 By the time he replied to Amery’s telegram his answer was uninformative and ungrammatical, his sums did not add up and it arrived too late.27 The Secretary of State had waited impatiently for Dorman-Smith’s response but on 7 May he was forced to give an evasive and anodyne answer to the parliamentary question. Amery assured the House that the authorities in Burma had tackled the evacuee problem ‘energetically and sympathetically’ and that they ‘deserved great credit’.28 He was flannelling of course, and was aware that the issue would not go away. Two days later Amery sent another telegram to Dorman-Smith. This time urging him to answer four ‘simple’ questions: (1) What arrangements had been made to evacuate Indians by sea, land and air? (2) How many Indians had been evacuated? (3) How were the Indian evacuees being treated in base camps? (4) What was happening along the Tamu land route?29 Again there was no reply from Dorman-Smith, but this time the Viceroy of India came to his aid and informed Amery that about 400,000 Indian evacuees had arrived in India.30 *

*

*

While this exchange of telegrams was taking place between Amery and DormanSmith, emotions were running high in Delhi. Indian Government officials were coming under intense pressure to justify their handling of the evacuation.31

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Congress Party had set up an unofficial (and extremely partisan) Working Party to look into allegations of discrimination against Indian evacuees. The damning Report was published on 28 April 1942. It criticized officials in Rangoon for running away when they should have stayed to help the population as a whole. It also condemned the ‘cowardly behaviour’ of European civilians who had commandeered cars belonging to Indians and Burmans, leaving their owners stranded. There followed a familiar litany of criticism, including the usual sneer at the premature release of criminals and lunatics.32 Incompetent British officials were held responsible for dysfunctional ARP arrangements, for food supplies that had run out, for shelters that were shoddily built and for transport facilities that did not operate. As a consequence of official incompetence, it continued, Indian families had been forced ‘to walk out, camp under trees, become destitute and starve’ and they had received no compensation for death, injury, or loss of homes and possessions. The Report accused British of racial discrimination in refugee camps on the routes through north-west Burma. It was also alleged that safer and less arduous routes had been reserved for Europeans while Indians were forced to take longer, more difficult and more dangerous routes. To support this allegation an obscure transport officer, Mr S. T. Da, suddenly turned up unexpectedly from Mawlaik. Mr Da had written to his sister-in-law describing the situation on the roads and corroborating the Working Party’s claims. He knew all four of the evacuation routes that ran through Tamu and had experienced at first hand the discrimination practised on the roads. Mr Da explained that the Kalewa–Tamu road ‘reserved’ for Indian evacuees was little more than a fair-weather earth track. It was by far the longest, most congested and dustiest of the routes to India. Nine camps were under construction and the first had already been built at mile 9. It was intended to accommodate 700 Indians of the ‘coolie class’ and the conditions in it were extremely primitive. The only food provided was uncooked rice, dhal and salt. No free transport was provided along the road although handcarts could be hired at Rs 40–45 per trip and buses at Rs 240 per trip – way beyond the means of the poorer Indians. There were so few buses that wealthy Indians had to bid against each other to hire them, and the going rate was at least Rs 700. Most of the Indian evacuees had to walk the whole way. The second road between Mawlaik and Tamu was even rougher and more mountainous. The only people willing to use it were lower-class Indians who had no alternative. The track was unsuitable for motor vehicles but Manipuri coolies were willing to carry kit for Rs 10–12 per trip. Neither of these routes was

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suitable for upper- or middle-class Indian families and Mr Da strongly advised his own sister-in-law to avoid using either of them. However, no arrangements for Indian evacuees had been put in place beyond Tamu. The stretch of road from Tamu to Palel was a quagmire although it was currently being upgraded for motor transport. Beyond Palel, bus and car transport was available as far as Dimapur – but only at exorbitant rates. The two remaining routes were metalled and much better. However, they were not available to Indians and were reserved exclusively for European and Anglo-Indian women and children. One of the roads ran from Sittaung to Tamu and the other from Yuva to Tamu. Camps had been built every 5–8 miles along both roads. They had good facilities and the evacuees received free food. Elephants were provided to carry heavier items of kit, while young children and the elderly were carried in doolies.33 A rather dubious excuse was given for the segregation of the ethnic groups on the two sets of roads. It was explained that stocks of Indian food had been laid down on the first pair of routes, and stocks of European food on the second pair. The most thumbed-through section of the Congress Report contained the explosive accusation that British soldiers had routinely molested Indian women on trains and buses, and that several Indian women had been shot when they tried to resist the soldiers’ attentions. Officials in India feared that there would be riots if these accusations were published and the Home Department in India decided to gag the Report under the terms of Defence Rule 41 (1b). It was a hopeless gesture for the criticisms were bound to become public knowledge sooner or later.34 In conclusion the authors of the Report warned Indian officials that they must rise above the abysmally low standards set by their counterparts in Burma. They particularly had in mind European officials who ‘had run away from their posts’ letting down ‘whole populations for whom they were responsible’. At a time when the Japanese were knocking on India’s door it was important that Indian officials did not do the same. Finally the Report claimed that ‘at every step racial discrimination’ was in evidence, and that ‘because of the utter incompetence, callousness and selfishness of those in authority, vast numbers of Indians in Burma have lost all they possessed, have undergone unimaginable sufferings [and are] dying on the way’. It added that the Indian’s misfortune was ‘not only to have a foreign Government, but to have a Government that is incompetent and incapable of organising her defence properly’.35 On 4 May 1942 the Overseas Department of the Indian Government attempted to counter this bad publicity by issuing a press release of its own. It

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said that 1 million Indians had been living in Burma before the war. Many of them had wanted to leave in 1942. It was a very big job. The Indian Government had immediately set up a ‘colossal’ and ‘complex’ evacuation organization. Inevitably there had been some teething problems, but so far it had been very successful. Already a number of camps had been built on the Indian side of the border and teams of doctors and nurses had brought a cholera epidemic under control. Railway tickets worth Rs 850,000 had been issued to evacuees free of charge at one station alone and close cooperation between government and non-official organizations had ensured that evacuees were treated in a friendly and efficient way at the frontier. Provincial governments had opened special employment bureaux, universities had waived fees and subsistence allowances had been distributed to evacuees. The Government of Burma had appointed representatives to deal with salary, pension, provident fund and War Risk Insurance payments. Absolutely no racial discrimination had been reported at the reception and dispersal centres in Assam, and evacuees of all races had been admitted to the camps. A few isolated cases of discrimination had been reported, but everyone agreed there had been no institutional discrimination. Officials had certainly made no distinction between evacuees of different races.36 It was an impressive piece of PR. Dorman-Smith had a more difficult task. He confessed to Amery that there had been unexpected problems on the Burma side. Not the least of these were the difficulties on the Tamu Road where the Army had allowed only a handful of evacuees to pass along. A sudden Japanese advance had also meant that evacuees could not get from Katha and Myitkyina to the Tamu route. Dorman-Smith also admitted that British officials at Myitkyina airfield had allowed European evacuees to queue-jump ahead of waiting Indians. He explained that local people in northern Burma were tolerant of Indians (particularly Gurkhas) so it had seemed not unreasonable to leave behind a few Indians in the knowledge that they would not be persecuted. Officials had considered it far more important to remove as many Europeans as possible because they had much more ‘to fear from the animosity of the Japanese’. The Whitehall ‘mandarins’ were very worried about this latter revelation. If the news leaked out that Europeans had been given precedence over Indians they knew that it would cause a great deal of public disquiet in India, so they insisted that the information be ‘wrapped up’ in some way.37 Mr Justice Sharpe reported that wealthy Indian evacuees arriving by air from Magwe had also complained of discrimination.38 However, upon investigation it was established that it was class discrimination rather than racial discrimination.

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The Deputy Commissioner in Magwe (a latter-day ‘Robin Hood’) had apparently been charging wealthy, higher-class Indian passengers more than poorer Indian passengers.39 It was a good idea but had raised some hackles. *

*

*

Unfortunately the tide of complaints had not been stopped and before long allegations of discriminatory treatment against Indian evacuees from Burma began to dominate proceedings in Indian Legislative Assembly. A series of debates on the subject began at the end of February 1942. At first they were fairly innocuous. Indian politicians on all sides were keen to discover what had happened to friends, relatives and fellow countrymen caught up in the recent bombing of Rangoon. Mr G. S. Bozman, Secretary of the Department for Indians Overseas fielded a barrage of questions from representatives who wanted to know how many Indian civilians were trapped in the various territories of South-East Asia, how many had been killed, what steps were being taken to protect them, how many were still trying to escape to India, how many had already arrived and what special arrangements had been made for them in India. The exchanges were civil and Bozman frankly admitted when he did not know the answers.40 After this fairly benign start, some trickier issues were raised. Nawab Siddique Ali Khan wanted assurances that Indians ‘would be looked after in the same way as the British and other foreigners’. Sir F. E. James was concerned that some roads in north-west Burma were being reserved for European evacuees. Bozman was unable to deny it.41 The atmosphere changed completely on 18 March 1942. An Emergency Adjournment Debate took place on the ‘plight of Indian refugees from Burma’. The Hon. Haji Syed Muhammed Husain set the tone with a vitriolic opening speech in which he denounced the ‘preferential treatment [being] given to Europeans and Anglo-Indians while Indians [were] dying on account of want of sanitation, food and water’. He insisted that it was Britain’s war (not India’s war) and fumed that Britain and India had nothing in common with each other. He complained about the incompetence of British officials in Burma, and referred especially to the officer who had released criminals and lunatics (a very familiar charge by now). He had heard that law and order had collapsed and that British soldiers had been caught looting Indian shops. He complained that the government’s scorched earth policy had ruined Indian properties and businesses and that whole bazaars had been destroyed. He understood that Indian millionaires had been reduced to penury and that cholera victims had been left to die on the streets. While Europeans dined lavishly Indians starved. He wanted to know why Indians had been herded onto the racecourse in Rangoon without

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food or sanitation, and why Indians had been packed like sardines into boats. It had been, he continued, a catalogue of disasters for the Indian community in Burma. At this point Haji Syed Muhammed Husain became even more intense. The Chamber fell silent as he described one particular incident that had allegedly taken place in the Port of Rangoon. Thousands of Indians had been waiting on the quayside for hour upon hour. Eventually a long, orderly queue was formed and the evacuees were allowed to board a steamer. After the last person in the queue had boarded, the Captain announced that there was room on the vessel for a few more passengers. There were still hundreds waiting on the quayside and 30 or 40 of them hurried up the gangway. The Captain was perfectly happy to let them stay but, thundered Haji Syed Muhammed Husain, ‘the gentleman who is responsible for protecting Indian rights and interests there, actually and virtually took a whip and he whipped those Indians out of the steamer’ because he wanted to replace the Indians with 30 or 40 Anglo-Indians. It was highly emotive stuff and there was uproar. Of course there might have been another side to this story but it was certainly not heard in the Chamber. Several members of the Legislature leapt to their feet and began demanding that the culprit be named. Haji Syed Muhammed Husain was perfectly happy to oblige and he announced to the Chamber that the perpetrator of this calumny was none other than ‘Mr. Hutchings, the Agent of the Governor of India’. The revelation was greeted with shaking fists, ‘shouting and arguing’ and general disorder.42 Members now queued to have their say. The Hon. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru claimed that the colonial administration had ignored the interests of Indians, many of whom, at great personal risk, had stayed behind in Rangoon at the request of the government to provide essential services. He went on to claim that others, high-placed and wealthy Indians had been prevented from joining Europeans on flights to India. He gave the example of one ‘very wealthy Indian from Bihar’ who had tried to fly to India and was willing to pay a huge amount of money to hire a plane but was told that there were no planes available – no doubt because they were all being used to evacuate Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Next, the Hon. Mr M. N. Dalal wanted to know how much compensation the government intended to pay to Indians who had lost their possessions and property either to looting, or because of the government’s scorched earth policy. Another member, the Hon. Mr V. V. Kaliker was among several who demanded that the Government of India should compensate any Indian who had lost possessions as a result of bombing, looting or arson during the period of martial

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law. Other members were outraged to discover that the Viceroy’s Fund in India was being used to assist foreigners but not Indians. At this point the Hon. Mr P. N. Sapru delivered an impassioned speech containing some tasty bits of tittle-tattle provided by informants who turned out to be two unnamed ‘Indian gentlemen he had met’. They claimed to have been in Rangoon during the air raid on 23 December and had told Mr Sapru how Burmans had been going around Rangoon systematically looting Indian properties. Because there was a complete breakdown in law and order, Indians felt thoroughly let down by the Burmese Government. However, Mr Sapru’s main revelations concerned the hapless Mr Hutchings (who by now had become the victim of an orchestrated character-assassination plot). Sapru explained that Hutchings had been responsible for issuing permits to boat passengers. Hundreds of desperate Indians had spent hours queuing outside Hutchings’ tiny office at the Race Course. On one occasion Sapru’s informants witnessed a completely unprovoked police attack on a peaceful group of Indians who were standing outside Hutchings’ office. The police wielded batons and injured several Indian evacuees. On another occasion, Mr Sapru continued, there was an air raid while people were queuing outside Hutchings’ office. No alarm was given, no shelter was offered and several people were killed. The worst thing was that Hutchings always seemed able to squeeze a few more of his European and Anglo-Indian cronies onto flights or steamer crossings ahead of Indians who were queuing peacefully. Sapru’s informants described another incident in which Hutchings had refused to give either boat or plane permits to a very wealthy Indian and his wife – even though (horrors) the man was the President of a Rotary Club! Instead they were forced to travel by road up to the Indian border in the midst of hordes of lower-class Indians. At the frontier the wealthy Indians were directed by officials to sleep in a filthy coolie hut, even though there were plenty of cleaner huts available. They were told that these huts were reserved for European and Anglo-Indian evacuees. The wealthy man was extremely peeved about his treatment and he persuaded Sapru to take up his cause. In particular, Sapru was incensed to learn that the government had paid Indian National Airlines Rs 4,500,000 from public funds in addition to a large state subsidy. It seemed not unreasonable to expect the airline in return to carry Indian evacuees to India, but they had not. Sapru was disgusted that the Company had been guilty of blatant racial discrimination. The Hon. Saiyed Mohamed Padshah, Sahib Bahadur chipped in to complain that the Army had burned down the whole of the Surati Bazaar in Rangoon in which some of the most influential and wealthy Indian merchants owned

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shops. As a result they had lost goods worth millions of rupees. They were understandably furious and demanded compensation. Saiyed Mohamed Padshah was annoyed because although some poorer evacuees had managed to get places on steamers from Rangoon to Madras, they were given nothing to eat or drink throughout the four-day voyage. They had survived on cups of hot tea, which they had to purchase at the exorbitant price of one rupee per cup. When they arrived in Madras, the authorities would not issue them with railway tickets unless they signed agreements guaranteeing to refund the full cost of their tickets when they arrived home. On one occasion, according to Saiyed Mohamed Padshah, 500 evacuees had been expected to arrive in Madras, but 4,000 had actually turned up. Only 50 of them were willing to pay for rail tickets so the Municipal Authority had been obliged to feed and water an army of penniless refugees who refused to move on.43 In this highly charged atmosphere Bozman had the onerous task of replying to the complaints. He did so with great skill. He told the Chamber that he had been offended by the personal attacks on his colleague, Mr Hutchings and he made it clear that he doubted the authenticity of some of the stories he had heard. He challenged those who had made accusations to produce the names and addresses of informants, victims and eyewitnesses, the dates of alleged incidents, the names of ships, serial numbers of tickets, and so on. Bozman warned that unless this detailed information was forthcoming, he would dismiss the charges against Hutchings. The information was not forthcoming. Whether or not the stories were true or bogus will never be known. However, some of them contained grains of truth. Bozman was able to report that he had recently visited Arakan himself, so he was able to speak with authority about the particular difficulties of evacuees on the Prome to Akyab road. He had seen at first hand the valiant work that had been performed by an Indian medical team that had been sent to combat the cholera epidemic. He explained that as far as the north-west land route was concerned, it was vital for the defence of India that the Army was able to move men and military equipment along the road. He confirmed that in order to keep evacuees moving, alternative routes had been opened at Tamu. Some went to India via Manipur and others via Silchar. He assured Members that restrictions had only been imposed because of limitations on road capacities and not because of any ‘distinctions of race, caste or creed’. He also assured the Chamber that the government was determined to stamp out ‘racial discrimination on the air evacuation scheme’. The assurances were greeted in the Chamber with loud applause. As far as martial law was concerned, Bozman explained that the

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evacuation of Rangoon had been announced on 20 February and that therefore technically the government’s authority and legal liabilities in Rangoon ceased on 22 February. After that date, all claims for compensation would have to be determined in the law courts. Finally, and for the umpteenth time, Bozman reaffirmed that ‘the Government has never wavered from its policy of treating all citizens alike’.44 After his bravura performance Bozman sat down to acclaim. He had made it sound extremely plausible – so much so that the Hon. Haji Syed Muhammed Husain immediately announced that he was withdrawing his Adjournment Motion. *

*

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On 2 April 1942, after a brief respite of a few days, Sir F. E. James returned once again to the question of racial discrimination against Indian evacuees on the roads out of Burma. He had been prompted to ask questions in the Chamber by several recent press reports that had repeated allegations of discrimination. In the debate that followed, the hapless Hutchings was specifically named once again.45 On this occasion it was Mr M. S. Aney whose task it was to answer on behalf of the government. He has clearly exasperated and explained that as the accusations against Hutchings were now in the public domain, for legal reasons members would have to submit any further complaints in writing.46 A number of the usual questions were resurrected on 15 September 1942 immediately after the summer recess. As before, some of the questions seemed innocent enough, but each of them contained a hint of menace. Pandit Lakshmi Kania Maitri wanted to know: exactly how many Indians, Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmans had been evacuated to India; how many of each of them had been brought by government transport; how many had died on the way; exactly how many Indians were still in Burma; how many refugee camps were there; how many staff were employed in the camps; how many Indians had passed through the camps; how much the evacuation had cost and how much the Government of Burma had contributed. Aney was not fazed. He wheeled out the usual array of dubious statistics, but he also provided two interesting new pieces of information. He informed the Chamber that approximately 600,000 Indians had remained in Burma (compared with 740,000 in Malaya), and that Major General Wood had been put in charge of the refugee organization in the Assam–Burma border area. Wood was an authoritative and reassuring figure. He had under his control 30 well-equipped evacuation camps through which nearly 150,000 refugees had already passed.47

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Questions about the discriminatory treatment of Indian evacuees reared their heads again a few days later, when the Hon. Raja Yuveraj Dutta Singh was the bringer of bad tidings. He spoke of the continuing public disquiet over the question of discrimination and mentioned some new areas of concern. One concerned disparities between Indian and European allowances and pay. Replying for the government, Mr A. V. Pai assured the Chamber that differentials were a thing of the past and that Indians and Europeans were now being paid exactly the same salaries for the same work. He said that, pay scales were now linked to the type of work being done rather than the nationality of the employee.48 He also claimed that more Europeans than before were now being housed in evacuee camps (whereas previously most had been placed in superior private accommodation). He suspected (but had no figures to prove it) that Indian evacuees were being treated preferentially in the jobs market. He could not say how many Burmese, Anglo-Burmese and European officials had arrived in India because no figures were available. *

*

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At last the heat seemed to be going out of the evacuation debate even though few issues had been resolved. It had occasioned weeks of impassioned political argument. Lofty matters of principle and minute details had been discussed, many malicious rumours had been spread and a number of petty squabbles rehearsed. The recent events had exposed the wide gulf that had opened between the Indian and British communities in Burma. It was unlikely now that the pre-war colonial partnership between them could ever be revived. There was also some sense of emotional loss. Indians were sometimes surprised to discover that they had become attached to Burma, and that life ‘back home’ was less congenial than life had been in colonial Burma. The experience prompted ‘imperialist urges’ in a few Indians who flirted with the idea of restoring the Indian Empire in Burma under Indian, not British, control. Indeed the President of the Burma–India Chamber of Commerce maintained that India had a better claim than Britain to rule over Burma. In 1943 a group of influential Indians discussed the possibility of reconstituting a ‘triune commonwealth’ consisting of ‘Hindustan, Pakistan and Burma’.49 Interestingly enough in 1944, Pearn warned that Burma now faced a new threat from ‘Indian Imperialism’. Wealthy and educated Indians had been extremely unhappy about being lumped together with the ‘coolie classes’ simply because they were ethnically Indians. Most Indians had experienced humiliation, fear and betrayal during the

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course of the civilian evacuation. They felt betrayed by the British and resented the constant reminders of their supposed inferiority to Europeans. Deep down the evacuation had caused many of the Indians who evacuated from Burma to feel alienated from everyone – from the Burmese, from the British, from the Japanese and from each other. As the world moved on after 1942 the raw-edged immediacy of the evacuation subsided and by the beginning of 1943 thoughts turned from disaster to winning the war. Arguments about the evacuation were replaced by efforts to reconcile new differences between the Indian Independence League, S. C. Bose’s Indian National Army and Gandhi’s Congress Party. *

*

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Indians had to decide what should be their future relationship with Burma and two sharply divergent views emerged after the evacuation debate. Dr N. B. Khare (a prominent member of the Governor-General’s Council for Commonwealth Relations) urged Indians to give full support to the military reconquest of Burma. He argued that Indians should be ‘fully consulted in all plans for the reconstruction of Burma in regard to all matters which may affect their rights, status, position, trade, interests etc.’ Dr Khare was sure that many Indians were now looking forward towards a postwar return to Burma, and he gave ‘categorical assurances that no evacuee who wants to go back to Burma will be restrained’.50 Others, too, were attracted by the prospect of a return to the status quo. The sheer scale of India’s involvement in Burma prompted Mr Vellayan Chettyar to point out that in 1902 ‘there were not even two million acres under cultivation in Burma . . . but in 1942 more than twenty million were brought under cultivation. This [was not] achieved by Government or the British or by Burmese labour alone. The world knows that it was largely due to Indian labour and finance.’51 In his crystal ball he foresaw the day when Burma would be developed again by ‘the joint efforts of British, Indian and Burmese peoples’.52 Sir Annamalai Chettyar insisted that India had invested more than labour and money. Indian troops and Indian civilian evacuees had paid for the defence and reconquest of Burma with their lives.53 These men were convinced that too much was at stake for the old colonial bond to be broken. On the other hand the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce believed that there was no justification for India paying to reconquer a country ‘which for all practical purposes has come to be regarded as a foreign country, having no political, cultural or social contact with India’.54 This view won the day in India. The clock could not be turned back. Those halcyon days when poor Indians

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returned from Burma every year with their pockets bulging with money would never return. If 1942 taught Indians anything, it was that Burma could provide a lifetime’s work, but it could also take everything away in the twinkling of an eye. Burma had been for them a place of precarious existence. After the war an Indian delegation led by Messrs S. N. Haji and R. R. Ayengar estimated that Indian investments had totalled Rs 5,000M, and J. Russell Andrus (former Professor of Economics at Rangoon University estimated that the Chettyars alone had lost £56M (Rs 74.5M) in Burma. After the war, many Indians who had escaped from Burma discovered that they were ‘not wanted in Burma . . . and were equally unwanted in India’.55 Emotionally many had been transformed into stateless persons. This was perhaps the real legacy of the Indian evacuation of Burma in 1942.

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4

Rangoon: The Big Bang

Catastrophe struck Rangoon on 23 December 1941. The city was calm one moment and chaotic the next. The Governor’s wife, Lady Doreen Dorman-Smith chronicled the whole journey from tranquillity to chaos. Indeed her diary is so lively, acerbic, cantankerous and immediate that the reader is persuaded to relive every twist and turn. There was nothing neat or understated about the events in Rangoon at the end of December 1941. They were tragic on the grandest of scales. The most remarkable thing was that people continued to live as normally right up to 8 December 1941. Government House was no exception. Senior army officers came and went as before, among them General McLeod, AirMarshal Darvill, General Sir Thomas Blaney and General Sir Archibald Wavell with his entourage of dashing staff officers.1 They brought splashes of glamour and exuded confidence. Another remarkable visitor was Lady Brooke-Popham from Singapore. She had left her home in Singapore, travelled half way around the war-torn world, adopted an orphan child in Kenya, dropped into Rangoon on the 22 November and returned back home to Singapore.2 Lady Dorman-Smith continued to live life to the full, attending a durbar in Government House one moment and watching a Marx Brothers film at the cinema, the next.3 She resolved arguments between fragile colonial ladies in the Burma War Comforts Association, attended a ‘pathetic’ Burma Women’s meeting for unemployed women and suffered a ‘ghastly’ YWCA concert on 5 December.4 Lady Dorman-Smith put in regular appearances at Rangoon Racecourse and was much in evidence in the royal enclosure. She was there on 25 October 1941, on 15 November and again on Saturday 6 December (Governor’s Cup Day). No top hats were worn in deference to wartime austerity but afterwards race-goers

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could let their hair down at the glittering cocktail ball in the Strand Hotel. It was last night of innocent fun. The mood changed at precisely 6.30 a.m. on Monday 8 December. The DormanSmiths woke to news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and a few hours later they heard that Singapore and Hong Kong were under attack.5 A barbedwire fence was hastily thrown around Government House and gun placements appeared under the toddy palm. That evening Dorman-Smith broadcast to the nation and all day-schools in Rangoon were closed the following morning. Various institutions began to prepare for evacuation and the Government House staff paraded around, wearing gas masks. Pearl Harbour had created general feelings of insecurity, but school closures, trench digging and the wearing of gas masks were really only window dressing. No one seriously believed that Burma was in immediate danger from land, sea or air attack. *

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More bad news followed on Wednesday 10 December 1941. Japanese warplanes sank HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse.6 This really was bad news, for it shattered British presumptions of naval supremacy in South-East Asia. Churchill summed up the mood when he admitted that it left Britain feeling ‘weak and naked’. The implications for Burma were far more specific. Ships bringing essential supplies into the Port of Rangoon had become more vulnerable to attack and it could no longer be assumed that the Royal Navy would protect the coast of Burma. A collective shiver ran down the spine and some Europeans left while they could still get away by sea. Even now it was assumed that attack by land was highly unlikely. Impenetrable jungles, rivers and mountains protected Burma’s northern and eastern flanks and Japanese forces were many miles away. Air strikes were more of a worry but Rangoon was thought to be beyond the range of Japanese bombers. In early December 1941 it was inconceivable that within three weeks Rangoon would be bombed and the Japanese Army would have invaded from Thailand.7 Local residents in a remote part of south-east Burma were aware of this looming threat. In the midst of official complacency, and realizing the imminent danger, they became the eyes and ears of Rangoon. Before January 1942 few people had heard of Myawaddy. It was a small Burmese border town on the banks of the Taunggyi River. Situated on a bend in the river, it jutted into Thailand. The important Japanese airbase at Maesod could be seen with the naked eye. Myawaddy was in a strategic position, but was so exposed and vulnerable that the Burma Army refused to protect it. Instead

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they established their most forward position some 11 miles inside the frontier.8 On 13 December 1941 a British Army patrol was ambushed in Thailand. It was there on a secret reconnaissance mission – one of several on both sides of the border. The Thai police forced the patrol to withdraw. After the episode the area became very unstable and shots were frequently exchanged across the border. Before long most of the inhabitants were forced to flee. Mr Dutt, the sub-postmaster at Myawaddy remained at his post to the bitter end, and as Maurice Maybury (subdivisional officer at Kawkareik 35 miles away) rightly pointed out, he was one of the unsung heroes of the evacuation. Dutt watched as Japanese aircraft from Maesod aerodrome flew low over Myawaddy on their way to bomb targets in Burma and he faithfully reported them to the British Civil Defence Department in Rangoon. He was able to give early warning of the bombing of Mergui on Friday 12 December 1941 and his prewarnings enabled government officials to be withdrawn from Victoria Point in the far south-east of Burma. Dutt would telegraph reports of aircraft movements when they were overhead in Myawaddy. It gave enough time for RAF planes to be scrambled. On one occasion, for example, he reported the arrival at Maesod of about 15 enemy aircraft and as a result RAF planes destroyed several of them on the ground. On 23 December, Dutt reported that large numbers of Japanese aircraft were flying over Myawaddy towards Rangoon and several times a day for weeks after that he reported whenever large concentrations of Japanese bombers flew over. Thus it was that almost single-handedly he provided Rangoon with an early warning system. He also gave the people of Kawkareik about 5-minutes warning of approaching enemy aircraft. Dutt continued to report on aircraft movements every day until 7.30 a.m. on 19 January. He telegraphed his last warning about planes that flew over to dive-bomb British troop positions at Thingannyinaung, Sukli and Misty Hollow along the frontier. At the very last moment when the attacks were getting very close to home, Maybury ordered Dutt to smash his equipment and escape as best he could. During the night of 19–20 January 1942 Japanese troops en masse crossed the frontier at Myawaddy.9 *

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Thanks to the courageous work of Dutt, air-raid alert was sounded in Rangoon for the first time at 12.45 p.m. on 12 December. It sounded next at breakfast-time the following day and thereafter at regular intervals for the next three weeks. Each time the Dorman-Smiths traipsed down to the shelter and waited for the all clear to sound. In this way a curious bond developed between Mr Dutt in

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Myawaddy and the Governor’s family in Rangoon. On Monday 15 December, Dorman-Smith and de Graaf Hunter went out to inspect ARP installations. Lady Dorman-Smith stayed at home to write her Christmas cards. It was, she said, the last moment of domestic normality for many months to come. *

*

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The storm broke at 9.58 a.m. on Tuesday 23 December 1941. Many Rangoon residents remembered what they were doing at that exact time for the rest of their lives. The air-raid warning sounded as it had done many times before. However, this time it was for real. There was the roar of planes overhead and pounding of gunfire. The Dorman-Smiths reached their air-raid shelter at Government House as bombs rained down and great columns of smoke rose from various parts of the city. There were rumours that Japanese paratroopers had landed. Anything was believable. On 23 December, Helen Hughes was in bed in hospital on the other side of the city, but she was due to leave later that day. At the same time – 9.58 a.m. – she heard a terrifying din overhead. There was the drone of aircraft engines and ‘the horrible whine of diving planes’ followed by several appalling crashes as bombs fell. The whole hospital seemed to jump on its foundations. Some of the windows in the ward blew out and smashed to the ground. The hospital staff had disappeared and only one Karen nurse had remained on duty. When Mr Hughes arrived to collect his wife half an hour later, ambulances were delivering dozens of casualties at the hospital door. On the way home, they drove past bewildered groups of people standing outside ruined houses while smoke spiralled up from the centre of the city.10 Sybil Le Fleur was in the city centre that morning. She had been doing her Christmas shopping in Rowe’s Department Store and had walked down Dalhousie Street, admiring the Christmas decorations as she went. At 9.58 a.m. she turned into Fraser Street. She was going to visit a friend. As she did so, the siren sounded and dozens of Japanese bombers and fighter planes roared overhead. Sybil cowered beside a wall and watched in astonishment as bombers pounded the city centre for the next 20 minutes. Buildings collapsed, fires blazed, water gushed from fractured mains and sparks crackled from power cables swinging precariously overhead. Several houses in Fraser Street were hit, and her friend’s neighbour, Mr Singh, lay dead outside his front door. Similar scenes were repeated throughout the city: Merchant Street was badly damaged; over 100 people were killed when a bomb fell near St Philomena’s Hospital; casualties were reported in the St John’s Heights district where Mr and Mrs Pope were among the first Europeans to be killed. Many people died

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Figure 4.1 Air-raid shelter under construction in Rangoon in February 1942. Air-raid shelters caused major political disagreements in 1941 and 1942. Public shelters were generally so poorly constructed that most residents in Rangoon preferred to sleep in the open. The brick-built shelter was a rarity in Rangoon and in any case by midFebruary the air raids had almost ended. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

at Mingladon. The aerodrome had been hit, hangars destroyed and burnt-out planes littered the tarmac. That evening Dorman-Smith went out to see the damage for himself. There was a lot of damage in the dock area and hundreds of casualties had been caused, not by bomb blasts, but by machine-gun bullets. Somehow this made it seem all the more personal and not surprisingly many people were traumatized. The tragedy on 23 December had happened so quickly and was so violent that the population was numb. Nevertheless, Rangoon tried to dust itself down on the 24 December, Christmas Eve. There were no air raids that day and Lady Dorman-Smith went around the city on a morale-boosting tour. All the shops were closed and there were no newspapers on the market. She visited St John’s Hospital and the Diocesan Hospital, both of which were filled to overflowing with casualties.11 Exhausted nurses told her that most of the doctors had run away. She found the whole scene very depressing. *

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The air-raid siren sounded again at 11.30 a.m. on Christmas Day, 25 December. The Dorman-Smiths ran down to the shelter as a huge formation of 27 Japanese planes roared overhead. Minutes later the thud of explosions could be heard from the general direction of the Dufferin Hospital.12 The all clear sounded at 1.00 p.m. The area around Commissioner’s Road was ablaze.13 Mingladon had come under heavy attack once again, and as luck would have it, General Wavell and his staff officers had landed at the airfield moments just before the bombing started. Here they were, the most senior British military officers in South-East Asia, diving helplessly into trenches at the airstrip perimeter as bombs fell around them. Wavell and his party were badly shaken by this close shave and after the all clear they made their way, chastened, to Government House.14 The air-raid warning went off once again at 10.30 that night and the Dorman-Smiths and their distinguished guests spent yet another long spell in the shelter. The next day – Boxing Day – saw Lady Dorman-Smith visiting hospitals once again. The Christmas Day air raid had probably caused fewer civilian casualties because most people had spent the day out in the open. The Dufferin Hospital had been destroyed, and the most seriously injured patients were being moved to Rangoon General Hospital. It was full to overflowing. Only three nurses were on duty. They were rushed off their feet. Everyone else had gone – doctors, sweepers, cooks and coolies – the lot. Dead bodies were piled everywhere at St Philomena’s Hospital. There had been many amputations and the patients were in intense pain. Lady Dorman-Smith witnessed many tragic scenes that day.15 *

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Eight hundred high-explosive bombs had been dropped in the two December raids on Rangoon – the same number as during the first two days of the bombing in Rotterdam.16 One thousand five hundred people were killed in Rangoon in 20 minutes on 23 December – more than the number killed during the heaviest night raid on London.17 The Japanese policy of terrifying civilians as well as degrading the infrastructure – sturm-und-drang – had succeeded completely. It resulted in the ‘complete desertion of all the menial labour’. It was, said Lady DormanSmith, ‘too awful’.18 ‘Masses’ of servants, including 37 malis and all the sweepers had run away from Government House.19 No service could be provided in the Strand Hotel because all the kitchen and domestic staff had gone.20 All the cooks had deserted from the British Army barracks in Mingladon so soldiers had to fight on empty stomachs. What really irritated Lady Dorman-Smith was not the disappearance of Indian menials but that several of her own snooty BWCA

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ladies had ‘run away’ from Rangoon. At that moment they were making their way either to India or to Maymyo.21 As for the Indian population as a whole, Lady Dorman-Smith watched hundreds of them pouring down the road leading past Government House on the evening of 23 December. The next day many more of them were sitting in dazed groups under the trees by the Royal Lake.22 By Christmas Day the Prome Road was crowded with Indians ‘trudging along with bundles on their heads’. In fact so many Indians had fled from Rangoon that the facilities outside the city could not cope with the influx. Officials in Prome stopped the wave of evacuees from going any further and a huge throng of about 20,000 Indians slept out in the open near the town. There was no sanitation and cholera soon broke out. In desperation, many of the evacuees returned to Rangoon and at the beginning of January 1942 Dorman-Smith visited large crowds of these ‘returnees’ in Insein.23 *

*

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There was a brief lull between Christmas Day 1941 and 4 January 1942, but the air raids resumed with a vengeance on 5 January. They continued almost unabated for the next 46 days and nights. During this time there were 53 air raids and the Dorman-Smiths spent more than 100 hours in the shelter. Most of the raids happened in the early hours of the morning. After 5 January, Japanese pilots were assisted by clear, moonlit nights. People in Rangoon were exhausted after weeks of broken sleep. Indeed the raids could and often did happen night and day. They interfered with every aspect of life. A couple of trivial examples illustrate the point. In the middle of a rare visit to the hairdresser, Lady DormanSmith was forced to scuttle to the shelter when the siren went. On another equally rare occasion Lady Dorman-Smith was at a luncheon party. It was interrupted by an air raid. The guests grabbed their food and rushed to the shelter where they had to stay for several hours. It became impossible to plan anything or to do anything and the air raids went on and on. After 24 February there were no warnings because the sirens had been moved up-country. By February 1942 a new order had emerged in Rangoon. The old pre-war order had been based on power, race and wealth. The new order was based on personal survival. In the old days wealth had been used to purchase power and luxury. In the new order it was used to buy air-raid shelters and passages to India. Money bought the promise of life for the wealthy and consigned the poor to mortal danger. The Dorman-Smiths had been top of the heap in the old order, and they were top of the heap in the new. Now their primacy was based on a

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Figure 4.2 A bomb-wrecked street in Rangoon in February 1942. This scene in a shopping street in Rangoon was commonplace after two months of constant bombing. Photograph produced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

well-constructed air-raid shelter. O’Dowd Gallagher trod where angels feared to tread. He claimed that the Governor’s air-raid shelter had cost Rs 30,000 (£2,500) and was ‘one of the few properly constructed shelters in Rangoon’.24 Certainly, no one else in the city enjoyed such luxury, but most European households had organized servants to dig substantial trenches in their gardens. The rest of the population had nothing. Indian menials were particularly vulnerable in their teeming ghettoes and with very good reason they distrusted the jerry built public air-raid shelters. They preferred to huddle under trees in open spaces. The authorities claimed that the geological substratum had prevented the construction of underground public shelters. Critics suspected it was lack of the political will. Whatever the truth, air-raid shelters were politically toxic and bitterly divisive. *

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Not all colonial expatriates were quite as preoccupied as Lady DormanSmith with the bombing raids and air-raid shelters. Thomas and Eva Gill, for example, just got on with things. They were typical of many gritty

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European families. They lived in Forest Road in Rangoon. Thomas Gill was an electrical engineer and worked for the Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company (R.E.T.S. Co.). Eva Gill had recently joined the Cipher Section of the Burma Army in what was known as WAS (B). Their house suffered a direct hit in an air raid in 1942, so they had to move into a flat near the Lake. They vividly remembered the immense turmoil caused by the evacuation, when many families lost everything and were split asunder. Eva Gill left Rangoon for Calcutta on one of the last boats. She carried a bedding roll and a small suitcase with her. That was all. Thomas Gill joined the Army when the remnants of R.E.T.S. Co. were disbanded near Mandalay. He subsequently walked out to Assam.25 One of the most exclusive expatriate enclaves was in Windermere Park. Reginald Clark was a typical resident. He was a distinguished lawyer whose wife had recently returned to England with their two daughters.26 A volunteer ARP Warning Controller in his spare time, Clark plotted Japanese air movements on a big map so he knew exactly what was going on. Strangely enough, however, he rarely mentioned air raids in his letters home. Perhaps he did not hear the sirens or just ignored them. Indeed Clark was the master of understatement. He kept a stiff upper lip and had plenty of sang-froid. He admitted that the air raids of 23 and 25 December caused ‘a certain amount of disorganisation’ but insisted that the Japanese had taken an ‘awful hammering’ in return. They were, he said, paying a ‘big price’ for their ‘ventures’. On 30 December Clark calculated that the Japanese had lost 50 planes (although the official figure was only half that number) and when Moulmein fell on 23 January 1942, he assured his wife that the Japanese were ‘going to be damn sorry they started a rough house’. On that occasion he estimated that British and American fighters had shot down 15 Japanese planes when the official figures put it at half that number. On 24 January he boasted that 46 Japanese planes out of 70 had been shot down or damaged and after the raid of 25 January he reckoned that 16 Japanese planes had been destroyed, including a complete formation of 7 heavy bombers and 9 fighters. ‘Wouldn’t you think’, he asked in exasperation, ‘that they would decide to give it up as useless’?27 Mrs Clark must have felt rather sorry for the poor old Japanese air force! Clark’s letters embodied defiance and determination. He found solace in everyday personal issues and returned over and again to two favourite themes. One was his career, which had been put on hold by the war. He had to keep a wary eye on his high-flying competitors lest they sprint too far ahead. He was determined to climb to the top of the greasy pole one day.28 His second

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Figure 4.3 Evacuation of European civilians from Rangoon in February 1942. The photograph captures a flurry of activity in an affluent area of Rangoon in February 1942. The evacuees would appear to be mainly Europeans and Anglo-Indians who were anxious to leave Rangoon after months of incessant bombing. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of Yad Vashem Photo Archive.

favourite theme was his family and the financial responsibility that was required to maintain them. Despite the desperate circumstances with which he was grappling in Burma, Clark was determined to support his wife and family in England. The problem was that in 1942 there was ‘practically no law work going on’ so his income had declined disastrously. He took the momentous decision to leave Sir Lionel Leach’s Chambers and to take a job as a staff officer with the rank of Major at the Army HQ. Although his salary dropped by Rs 1,800 per month it was at least a steady income. He also decided to give up his lease on 32 Windermere Park because it was far too expensive.29 These calculations – touchingly familiar to family men of that generation – were made while bombs rained down around him. Clark may not have been the most accurate of war reporters, but he was amazingly sociable and extremely influential. His wide circle of upper-middleclass friends respected his views just as he reflected theirs.30 Moreover he perfectly represented the characteristics of ‘middle-England’ in colonial Burma. Like him, Clark’s friends were affectionate, ambitious, high-minded men, who could, if necessary, also be ruthless and single-minded. They were not uncritical of senior

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colonial politicians and high-ranking military officers. In many ways the civilian war effort in Burma depended on these unsung middle-class heroes – doctors, lawyers, teachers, businessmen and engineers who kept their heads, put their shoulders to the wheel and against all the odds, pushed the evacuation effort forward.31 *

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If people like the Gills and Clark’s circle of friend in Windermere Park symbolized phlegmatic calm, the rest of Rangoon certainly did not. Most of the population was living on its nerves and vast numbers were leaving the city. They were sick of the bombs, sleep deprivation and squalor that went with siege conditions. On Thursday 15 January Lady Dorman-Smith noticed that the sweepers who had returned to Government House a few days previously, had left yet again and that huge numbers of coolies were now deserting. It was a sign of the times that fewer than 100 workers and their families had stayed in the Government House compound, whereas once there had been 500.32 Each day crowds of Indians could be seen tramping through the suburb Himawbi on their way towards Prome. There were few women or children among them and the men clearly had no intention of returning. On one of his many visits to the docks, Dorman-Smith was shocked to see thousands of Indians crammed into every nook and cranny of deck space on the BISN Co. Steamship, Baroda. They had been squatting there in the blazing sun for 24 hours, completely open to attack from the air.33 Thousands more Indians were waiting in the open air at the racecourse hoping against forlorn hope to get boat tickets to Calcutta.34 Fights and angry altercations frequently broke out among them as the exodus from Rangoon continued unabated. *

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Indians were not the only people to leave Rangoon at this time. A steady stream of European women and children had already left the city. Lady DormanSmith was affronted by these ‘deserters’ and she ‘almost got up and cheered’ at the Cathedral on Sunday 15 February when the Dean weighed into ‘those memsahibs who not so long ago thought of themselves as the salt of the earth and the most essential people on it and then suddenly [deserted] at the first sign of trouble without attempting to find out if they could be of use’.35 Lady Dorman-Smith was particularly scathing about the dramatic fall in the numbers of women attending BWCA and St John’s Ambulance.36 ‘Amazing how people vanish’, she mused on 29 January when two counsellors and several wives of

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BBTC managers left Rangoon for Maymyo. Ten days later she observed that ‘there is hardly a soul left here now’.37 The tally of ‘deserters’ was bad enough, but the war news was even more depressing. Rangoon was paralysed by shortages of manual labour. Tavoy had fallen on 19 January. Moulmein was bombed on 22 January and evacuated on 31 January. Two ships were torpedoed in the Bay of Bengal on 24 January and another two were sunk on 26 January. Reports from Singapore were ‘pretty grim’ too and news of its fall came through on Monday 16 February. The situation on the Salween front was equally desperate and the Japanese were beginning to press around Thaton. It was clear that time was running out for Rangoon. *

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Rangoon was one of the most populous cities in South-East Asia, but it was also one of the most complex. It was the seat of government and the financial, commercial and industrial centre of the nation. Storage depots, oil refineries, engineering works, shipyards and other industries clustered around the port, which was a major international terminus. While tens of thousands of its residents were fleeing, major institutions and organizations were also on the move. Each of these moves caused unsettling ripples. Two examples remind us that modern evacuations are infinitely bigger and more complicated than thin streams of fugitives fleeing through jungles of death. By the beginning of February 1942 most government departments had already relocated to Maymyo in Upper Burma involving major logistical operations. The Food Department was one of the few to stay in Rangoon. It had not moved because food supplies were strategically important and because the Department needed to be near the major food merchants and the Port of Rangoon, and also the rice mills and paddy fields of the Delta. Reginald Langham-Carter was one of the senior officials in the Food Department. He had to grapple with several perplexing challenges at the beginning of February 1942. Most of his senior colleagues had already left Rangoon. Indeed only 12 out of 57 Indian Civil Servants remained in the city.38 Langham-Carter felt very isolated. Only seven of the forty houses in Windermere Park were still occupied. It was normally such a flag-bearer of public confidence. Many of the senior civil servants, lawyers, doctors and managers (people like Reginald Clark) had voted with their feet. Meanwhile at the other end of the social scale there were similar problems. It was almost impossible to find manual

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labourers, and as a result coolies were able to demand – and get – three times more than their old wages. Although the Food Department remained in Rangoon it had moved out of the city centre because of the bombing. This had caused major disruption. A house had been requisitioned in University Avenue but walls had to be knocked down and rebuilt, trenches dug, furniture moved, documents refiled and domestic arrangements organized.39 To add to the complications Langham-Carter had had to move into a small office in the Law Courts where he could more easily liaise with merchants, railway managers and shipping agents. It meant that he was detached from the rest of his colleagues. There was another complication too. A procession of experienced officers had left the Department to join the army. They were replaced from outside by men who had no experience of food distribution. This had created serious skill and knowledge deficiencies.40 It was a universal problem in government departments at the time but it hit the Food Department particularly hard. When it became clear that Rangoon would have to be abandoned, LanghamCarter had spent his time requisitioning essential foodstuffs, which he sent up to Sagaing by train. At the beginning of February. for example, he requisitioned all the remaining supplies of wheat and salt and despatched them to Sagaing where they were stockpiled with other foodstuffs in huge godowns. He thought that they would be useful for a rainy day when the government had established itself in Upper Burma. The most important question now was whether Upper Burma could survive without access to the Port of Rangoon.41 In the meantime Langham-Carter faced another tricky problem. It concerned Indian merchants who were absolutely essential because they kept Rangoon supplied with food. There had always been tensions between the merchants and the Food Department. They came to a head-on 12 February when a delegation of the biggest merchants from the Surati Bazaar informed Langham-Carter that they intended to leave Rangoon immediately. After much cajoling and haggling a deal was struck whereby the merchants agreed to stay for another ten days. In return, Langham-Carter guaranteed places for them on a vessel bound for India. Luckily for him the BISN Co. agreed to squeeze the merchants onto one of its vessel that was leaving for India on 23 February 1942. In the event the merchants turned up on the quayside at the last moment carrying vast quantities of personal baggage stuffed with valuables. The ship was already grossly overladen and there was an angry standoff between the merchants and agitated members of the crew. The disagreement was only resolved when looters snatched most of the bundles

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from the merchants and ran off into the dark.42 It was curious to think that within a week Langham-Carter and his colleagues would also become fugitives along with everyone else. *

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The Rangoon banks were another interesting case study. Like the Food Department, they faced huge obstacles.43 They performed a vital strategic role in that their major ‘corporate’ customers – namely the government and the large commercial companies – had huge deposits in the form of bullion, paper securities and coinage. These major clients were becoming increasingly nervous and were insisting that their funds must be kept out of the hands of the Japanese. The banks were also coming under pressure from another group of customers. These were the thousands of private depositors. They all wanted the same thing – to remove the last rupee out of their saving accounts. For an evacuee, cash in the pocket made the difference between life and death. Long lines of people snaked around banks day and night as customers queued to withdraw their money. It meant that the banks had to open their counter services for long periods each day. At the same time a third group of customers were placing heavy demands on the banks. Constant air raids had caused bazaars and corner shops to close. It ended all normal trading activities in Rangoon and the owners of these small businesses swamped the banks with requests to transfer funds to India. With so many conflicting demands upon them the banks needed to put ‘all hands-on deck’. However, many of their employees had joined the crowds of evacuees flooding out of the city. As a consequence the banks were chronically understaffed. The situation had become so critical by the end of January that representatives of all the main banks met with Mr Baxter (Financial Adviser to the Government of Burma). At the meeting it was agreed that the banks would remove their securities from Rangoon forthwith and that Baxter would provide government help. It is worth mentioning here that in 1942 all bank records were paper-based, voluminous and heavy. Moving coinage, bullion and vast quantities of paper around was a huge logistical task. Immediately after the meeting with Baxter, Mr Clamp, General Manager of the Chartered Bank of India, arranged to transfer the Bank’s securities to Calcutta by ship, as did the National Bank and the Allahabad Bank. The Mercantile Bank and the Hong Kong Bank followed suit a few days later, while the Imperial Bank elected to dispatch its securities to Mandalay.44 During the first few weeks of February the bankers became increasingly frustrated by the government’s failure to announce a specific date for the general

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evacuation of Rangoon. It had created enormous uncertainty for the banks, and was making it difficult for them to maintain adequate counter services. Feelings ran high on 12 February when news came through that the Dutch, American and Chinese banks were pulling out of Rangoon altogether. Of course, several government departments were relocating at the same time. This caused confusion and congestion in the business quarter of Rangoon as fleets of lorries arrived to load records, equipment, furniture and stationery from offices and commercial premises. Paranoia in the British banks reached fever pitch on 18 February when a very large convoy of vehicles organized by the Standard Vacuum Oil Company departed for Mandalay.45 The trouble was that neither the government nor the bank boards had made plans to transport bank employees and records up to Mandalay. Another meeting took place with Baxter at which it was agreed that the British banks would requisition lorries to take their records to Rangoon Railway Station on 20 February. It just happened to be the day on which the general evacuation of Rangoon was announced. A special ‘bank train’ was provided on the 20th to transport the banks’ staff, securities and records up to Mandalay where they would be accommodated in the Rowe Building. There was a great deal of frenetic activity to get everything done in time. In Bank House (headquarters of the Chartered Bank of India) the staff worked around the clock, packing some records, burning others and locking away the company’s silver and cutlery. Finally on 20 February the bank doors were bolted and barred. Later that evening Mr Jenkin (the Chartered Bank of India’s Submanager) caught the ‘Bankers Train’ and travelled up to Mandalay with the clerical staff and the bank records. Mr Clamp, the General Manager, drove up to Mandalay in his own car and the two subaccountants Messrs McKenzie and Stewart joined a convoy of vehicles that left Rangoon at 6.00 a.m. the following morning.46 *

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As conditions deteriorated in Rangoon, animated debates raged on the merits and demerits of martial law. The increasing lawlessness in the city caused many to argue that the Governor should have handed over control of the city to the military authorities at a much earlier stage. Langham-Carter was certainly one of those who thought so. Indian merchants and politicians were especially vocal in their criticism of Dorman-Smith’s tardiness. The Governor defended himself on the grounds that the civilian authorities were more familiar with local conditions than the Military. There were also legal considerations to take into

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account, but in the event it probably made little difference, for few in Rangoon were aware of the exact moment when control finally passed from the civilian to the military authorities.47 Until that time responsibility for law and order had rested on the shoulders of the few policemen who remained at their posts and on a small detachment of soldiers from the Gloucestershire Regiment who patrolled the streets in their jeeps in an attempt to deter looters and gangs of dacoits. Shots rang out across the city day and night. When the time finally came to decide whether or not to evacuate Rangoon the weight of responsibility rested very heavily on Dorman-Smith. As he confided in his unpublished memoirs, ‘it is no ordinary affair to be compelled to decide whether or not to cede to the enemy a capital city of an Empire-country, and to destroy much of what went to make it a great and important city. For us it was a ghastly day.’48 Dorman-Smith was insistent that he took the decision to evacuate Rangoon and carry out the denial programme jointly with General Hutton who was General Officer in Command of Burma at the time. *

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While anxiety levels were rising in Rangoon, the surrender of Singapore on 16 February together with the incessant bombing raids and advancing Japanese forces added to the worries. A three-phase evacuation plan for Rangoon had already been drawn up and it swung into action on 20 February 1942 when the ‘E’ Signal (‘E’ for ‘Essential’) was hoisted. It was a legal node-point in that control was transferred from the civil to military authorities in Rangoon. In other words it imposed martial law. From now on the General Officer Commanding Forces in Burma was in control of Rangoon. All ‘non-essential’ people were required to leave the city within 72 hours. ‘E’ Labels were displayed in all police stations (indicating that they were now under military orders) and on the windscreens of authorized vehicles. The authorized owners of these vehicles had already been identified. They were government officials and anyone else directly involved in the civil administration of Rangoon together with those responsible for the distribution of food, fuel and water. All non-essential vehicles were disabled in situ or removed beyond reach of the enemy. Only vehicles displaying ‘E’ labels could be supplied with petrol. At this point also, roadblocks were erected on the major routes into Rangoon to prevent vehicles and pedestrians entering the city.49 The effect of these measures was electric. The roads out of Rangoon became choked with cars, bullock carts and pedestrians. At the same time, many police, railwaymen and jailors deserted their posts and joined the throng. Of course the

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exodus had been going on for several weeks, and only the week before (on 11 February), the Governor had complained that ‘more than 100 Burmese sailors were absent without leave’. However, the evacuation accelerated dramatically after 20 February 1941.50 The Dorman-Smiths’ daughters, Jackie and Pat had already been packed off to Maymyo on 17 February. The train they were to travel on made a special stop at the racecourse to pick them up. Thousands of desperate Indians tried to clamber aboard at the same time and had to be beaten back. On 18 February all Europeans were advised to leave Rangoon immediately. All over the city people packed their things away and left behind much-loved domestic pets and precious personal items. Emotional farewells were exchanged with loyal servants. At 11.30 a.m. on the morning of 20 February, Lady Dorman-Smith was packing her things in Government House, when her husband burst in to tell her that the ‘E’ Signal had gone up and that she must be ready to leave in a convoy after lunch. She threw some clothes and a few precious oddments into a trunk, and at 3.00 p.m. that afternoon she left Government House for the last time. The convoy consisted of the Governor’s Rolls Royce, two other cars and two lorries. Lady Dorman-Smith was accompanied by a Burma Police Officer, a Sergeant of the ‘Glosters’, Mrs Oakley, Mrs Hutchins, Williamson, about 60 servants and Miss Gibbs (the Dorman-Smiths’ pet monkey). As they drove out of Rangoon, Lady Dorman-Smith looked back on the city, sickened by the waste and destruction she had witnessed. Columns of smoke rose from innumerable fires that had been started in shops and houses by looters. They had been daily features of the Rangoon landscape for the past several weeks. She thought of the tens of thousands of irreplaceable objects, photographs and precious keepsakes that people were being forced to abandon. She could see evidence of the bomb damage that had been inflicted night after night on Rangoon. But what grieved her most was the prospect of the scorched earth policy that would shortly lay waste to the city.51 *

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Not long after the ‘E’ signal was hoisted, one of the most infamous events of the evacuation occurred. About 1,300 convicts and ‘lunatics’ were released from the city’s gaols and asylums. Although relatively unimportant in itself, the episode achieved notoriety because critics of the colonial regime used it as shorthand to impute administrative incompetence and failure. Dorman-Smith had to devote a great deal of time and energy to defending the action.

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In fact the incident illustrated the ease with which fantastical rumours could be spread in such circumstances. Another story doing the rounds at the time claimed that wild animals – ‘chimps, lions a fierce black panther and . . . the most deadly snakes’ – had been released from the zoo and ‘were roaming the streets and exploring the gardens of our houses’. It was hardly surprisingly therefore that stories about released convicts and lunatics caught the public imagination and caused such widespread hysteria. Dorman-Smith blamed ‘sensation-hunting journalists’ for concocting headlines such as ‘Convicts are loose, and lunatics too’ to whip up civilian emotions. The order to release the inmates had been given by a colonial civil servant called J. Fielding-Hall, ICS. He was widely respected, a ‘good competent officer’ who had only just taken over a new post. According to Dorman-Smith, he ‘got hold of the wrong file’.52 As it was, only the most ‘lowrisk convicts’ from Rangoon Gaol and the most ‘harmless lunatics’ from the asylum at Tadagale had been handed over to the care of their relatives. But it was enough to provoke public revulsion. The inmates would have been moved up-country but all the gaols and asylums in Mandalay were full and there was no spare transport available. Moreover, because many of the warders in Rangoon had deserted, ‘it would have been inhuman to keep the inmates locked up a day longer without food and water’.53 As Dorman-Smith pointed out, the lunatics were dazed and bewildered by their unexpected freedom. They were as afraid of the bombs as everyone else and were anxious to get to their homes as quickly as possible.54 Undoubtedly all this was true but unfortunately many of them also joined in the wave of arson and looting that swept through the Rangoon suburbs of Ahlone, Kemmendine, Tamwe and Puzundaung. In this way they added to the general anxiety and terror that swept through the city.55 *

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A few fragmentary descriptions remain of conditions in Rangoon during the weeklong period of the ‘E’ Stage. They are contained in various letters and memoirs. Reginald Langham-Carter provided one of the most graphic. He had to drive to and from the Port of Rangoon regularly in late February 1942. By this time the area was beginning to resemble the Wild West. It was not unusual, he said, to find the roads blocked by drunks staggering around and brawling. The worst offenders were recently arrived troops and seamen who had spent the evening drinking in bars. Langham-Carter would often see shadowy figures slinking off into dark alleys carrying cases of gin and other commodities they had looted from the quay. The atmosphere was worst late at night just after the

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last ship of the day left port. When the police blocked off the main gate of the Brooking Street Wharf it seemed to encourage crowds of people to wander around threateningly. Langham-Carter was at pains to emphasize that the lawlessness was not confined to the night and that looters could appear on any street in Rangoon at any hour of day or night. They would descend on shops from nowhere and remove materials, drink, food and anything else that took their fancy. On one occasion Langham-Carter watched as a huge mob looted a bazaar in broad daylight. Indian and Burmese soldiers joined in the looting and for some odd reason, a group of Buddhist monks wearing yellow robes and stolen homburg hats carried away huge piles of women’s underwear. None of the looters took much notice of Langham-Carter. They simply pushed past him clutching their booty. Once the mob had grabbed everything that was worth taking, they set fire to the bazaar. The blaze threw up a huge column of smoke, just one of many rising above Rangoon. Most nights the city sky glowed red and because most of the fire-fighting equipment had been taken up-country nothing could be done to control the fires. By the end of February many shops had been stripped bare. Langham-Carter reported a quirky bit of gallows humour that summed up the situation. A British Army officer saw a police sergeant looting a packet of cigarettes and bellowed at him, ‘How do you expect us to win the war if you do things like that’? The sergeant thought very long and very hard before replying (rather wittily, Langham-Carter thought), ‘I don’t know.’56 *

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Philip Arthur Howe, a Steel Brothers Manager provides another glimpse of Rangoon under ‘E’ conditions. He drove down to Rangoon from Prome just as the ‘E’ notice was displayed.57 A Steel Brothers’ lorry laden with valuable equipment followed behind him. They had to battle against hundreds of cars and lorries pouring out of Rangoon in the opposite direction. Many thousands of Indian refugees were also marching steadily northwards along the road. British troops had just set up roadblocks to prevent vehicles and pedestrians going into Rangoon, but Howe managed to persuade the troops to let them through. There was great urgency because Howe had to get to the SS Hmattaing, which was sailing for Calcutta later that evening (20 February). The lorry was carrying valuable equipment that had to be loaded onto the vessel. Howe also had three women passengers in his car – wives of Steel Bros managers. They were hoping to sail to India on the Hmattaing so it was vital that he got to the vessel on time. Apart from anything else they might have been the last vessels to leave the

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port for India. Howe was running late because he had had to report to the Steel Bros Office in Rangoon. Moreover he had no idea where the SS Hmattaing was moored and – as he was about to discover – it was like looking for a needle in a haystack.58 Howe became more anxious as the minutes ticked away. Rangoon was pitch-black and completely deserted. There were no lights anywhere, just odd fires burning here and there. He managed to find his way to the Sule Pagoda, making sure all the time that the lorry was still behind him. He drove onto the Strand and stopped at the gates of the Port Commissioner’s Wharves. After a whispered conversation, the armed sentries opened the gate. Howe drove slowly along the river, examining each wharf in turn but there was no sign of the Hmattaing. He feared that the ship might have left for India already. The river was absolutely silent and there was no one in sight. He decided to turn around and to drive back to Steels’ depot. Fortunately, his colleague, Edmeades, was still on duty there and he explained that the Hmattaing had gone to pick up coolies and their families from the Steel Bros’ sawmill at Dunnedaw. As far as he knew, the vessel had now left Dunnedaw but he had no idea where it had gone.59 In desperation Howe and Edmeades went to ask for help at the Mogul Guard Police Station by the river near the Sule Pagoda. When they arrived they found several policemen helplessly drunk and the place in a shambles. However, for a consideration, a Serang agreed to take them out in a police launch to look for the Hmattaing. Howe and Edmeades loaded the equipment from the lorry into the small launch and the three women squeezed in beside the packages. The Serang took the launch up and down the river for the next two hours looking for the Hmattaing.60 Occasionally they saw lights flickering far away, but there was no sign of a ship’s light or a boat lying at anchor. The river was eerily quiet. It had been cleared to prepare for an important convoy that was due to arrive the following day.61 At 11.30 p.m., feeling very depressed, Howe and Edmeades were about to give up when the outline of a 4,000-ton steamer suddenly loomed out of the night in front of them. It was the SS Hmattaing. They moored alongside her, unloaded the luggage and clambered aboard. The Commander, Captain Phillips made them welcome and explained that the ship would sail the following morning. He had had to take aboard several Indian durwans and their families from the Steel’s Mill. Howe and Edmeades left the three women on the Hmattaing and returned to the wharf. Then they drove back through Mingladon to Prome.62 Several descriptions like this give the same impression of drunkenness, panic

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Figure 4.4 Botatoung fixed moorings. This was typical of the Port in Rangoon in the vicinity of the Brooking Street wharf where P. A. Howe searched for the SS Hmattaing. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the British Library.

and fatalism even among British personnel. It was unremittingly threatening, gloomy and unpleasant. *

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By the end of February 1942 Japanese units began to infiltrate across the Pegu Yoma and there was nothing now to stop a full-scale Japanese invasion from the sea to the south of Rangoon. General Hutton was convinced that that the city could not be defended. He hoisted the ‘W’ (‘W’ for ‘Warning’) at 12 noon on 28 February. This indicated that everyone was required to leave Rangoon immediately unless they were involved in demolition work that was scheduled to begin on 1 March. At this point Dorman-Smith finally accepted that Rangoon had become a military, not a political problem. He decided to leave the city. Many of his critics wondered why he had hung on so long for he had been able to do nothing useful after 20 February. In his unpublished memoirs, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith paints a revealing – indeed an almost lyrical – picture of life in Rangoon during his last few days in the city. It was, he confided, ‘unbelievably fantastic . . . macabre . . . exciting . . . and sad’. The people who lived in this ‘world apart’ may have been fatalistic but they were not defeatist. They seemed to take the view that ‘if disaster comes . . . well – it comes’! Dorman-Smith seemed to derive perverse

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pleasure from slipping out of Government House after dinner and wandering incognito around the streets. Rangoon was a fascinating and tragic place at night. As he walked ‘through streets by the flickering lights of the fires’ he saw ‘great bloated rats slinking about in their hundreds’, and smelled the ‘city dying’.63 During his trips he observed many of the ‘queer things’ that ‘happen at night in this doomed city’. On one occasion, for example he stumbled across a group of looters breaking into a big jeweller’s shop. He hid in the shadows, revolver in hand, and waited for them to reappear. Eventually a man came out. He was ‘silhouetted in the doorway’ and was followed immediately by the rest of the gang who were carrying goods of all description. Dorman-Smith was about to step forward to confront them when he recognized them as American AVG pilot officers, and instead he bade them ‘a quiet goodnight’.64 As his final act, Dorman-Smith performed an oft-quoted and rather violent little valedictory drama in the Government House billiard room. He described it as his ‘Government House denial scheme’. Around the walls hung the portraits of his distinguished predecessors – Governors of Burma from the year dot. Dorman-Smith gazed at the portraits, lost in thought for a moment before solemnly hurling billiard balls at each of the portraits in turn. When they had all been smashed to pieces he was satisfied that they would not fall into the hands of malevolent Japanese troops or Burmese looters. Dorman-Smith gave a last radio broadcast before he left. O’Dowd Gallagher was characteristically vitriolic. ‘Cynical white listeners in the north’ he suggested, would have greeted with sneers ‘the more flowery statements’. He took particular exception to Dorman-Smith’s comparison between the circumstances in Rangoon and the victory in Tobruk. It was, said O’Dowd Gallagher, nothing but a ‘grandiloquent boast’ and ‘such an empty flight of fancy that it gave entirely the wrong impression to the outside world’.65 Dorman-Smith finally left Government House before dawn on the morning of Sunday 1 March 1942. Some Europeans were surprised that he had not burned it down before he left, but presumably he could not bring himself to do it.66 He carried a small attaché case in which were all his worldly goods. Everything else of value had been left behind and he knew in his heart of hearts that he would never return. Similar episodes were being played out in countless households across Burma in 1942. Accompanied by two aides he walked through deserted streets that were shrouded in morning mist. They rendezvoused with the General Officer Commanding Burma who took Dorman-Smith to a small

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airstrip on the outskirts of the city where he took off ‘for whatever the future might hold’.67 *

*

*

For a short time after the ‘W’ Signal was hoisted on 28 February everything was put on hold. Field Marshal Wavell decided that after all Rangoon should be defended if at all possible. He flew down to Magwe to meet Hutton and insisted that all options be kept open. Soon afterwards General Alexander replaced Hutton and immediately reversed Hutton’s decision. There followed a rollercoaster as hopes were first raised and then dashed. Indeed as late as the morning of 6 March 1942 Alexander still believed that Rangoon could be held. It was a very important issue, but later that same day he finally acknowledged that it was not possible and the order was given for demolitions to commence on 7 March. Dorman-Smith pointed out with some satisfaction that ‘Hutton’s decision was right’ after all. *

*

*

The ‘D’ Signal – ‘D’, for ‘Demolition’ – was hoisted at 2.00 p.m. on 7 March. It was the signal that the destruction of key installations should begin. The small band of ‘last ditchers’ commissioned to carry out these last rites had established themselves in messes close to the Mogul Guard Headquarters. They were immensely brave men, mainly Europeans but some Anglo-Indians too. They were not celebrities – just ordinary citizens, oilmen, engineers and explosive experts. We do not know them by name. They might have been blown up on the day or captured by the Japanese afterwards. After they had escaped to Calcutta many chose to come straight back to Burma. The denial scheme in Rangoon was remarkably efficient. R.E.T.S. Co. engineers blew up the Ahlone Power Station.68 The Telegraph Building that contained the central telephone exchange and all the Rangoon district telephone exchanges was burned to the ground. The Port warehouses were set on fire. The huge quayside cranes were all blown up by explosive charges. They toppled into the river or lurched at drunken angles. Black smoke billowed from the BOC and Indo-Burma Petroleum Company distribution plants at Dunnedaw. The oil refineries, at Syriam, Thilawa and Seikkyi, were set ablaze and huge columns of smoke rose 12,000 feet.69 The Commissioner of Police, Mr Prescott, set fire to the Mogul Guard barracks and headquarters.70 Clouds of black smoke clouds rose to 18,000 feet above Rangoon for days on end. According to O’Dowd Gallagher, one of the last ‘last ditchers’ to leave the

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Port of Rangoon was Mr Bobbie McLean-Brown. He had spent the whole day destroying whatever might be useful to the Japanese and right up to the final moment he could be seen chugging up and down the river removing navigation buoys. In the end he was ordered to leave because Japanese units were just minutes away.71 The rest of the ‘last ditchers’ escaped to Calcutta on a small British India cargo ship. It was the last vessel to sail from the Port of Rangoon and was overloaded with army personnel, police and ‘last ditchers’. There was one heart-breaking final episode. A fierce argument raged between some of the ‘last ditchers’ and the crew of the vessel. The ‘last ditchers’ wanted to bring their Burmese servants with them on the boat but the captain refused. As the ship slipped away the servants were left stranded on the quayside. They gradually disappeared into the distance. Nothing more was heard of them. *

*

*

What had happened in Rangoon between 23 December 1941 and 7 March 1942 had enormous repercussions. It signalled the start of the evacuation. Colossal damage had been inflicted on the infrastructure, buildings and industry of Rangoon and immense loss of trade followed the closure of the Port.72 Sixtythree per cent of the European, Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Burmese households who recorded their place of departure in the Register of Evacuees gave Rangoon addresses. The proportion of Indians was probably about the same.73 The explosion in Rangoon sparked the whole thing off. The rest of Burma would follow.

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Taungup: Cholera and Thirst

Buthidaung

IN CH

50

100

150 Yamethin

N SHA

Akyab

miles

Yenangyaug

S LL HI

Minbya

0

Magwe

An R

S HILL

An

Kywegun Letpan Lamu

Ra

m

Sabyin

re

e

kan Ara

Kyaukpyu

Allanmyo Thayetmyo

I Taungup

Toungoo

Taungup Prome Pass Nyaungchidauk 3832 ft Padaung

dy

d wa Irra

a Yo m

Sandoway

Henzada River

Bassein

RANGOON

Pegu

Syriam

Map 5.1 Civilian evacuation from Burma 1942: Taungup Pass route. By Philip Storey, psmapping.

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The evacuation of civilians through the Taungup Pass route was the first overland surge of refugees. It was a forerunner of what was to come and had all the elements of a great tragedy – rivalry, pain, drama, death, suffering, avarice, exhaustion, arrogance, pathos, treachery and terror. Many lives were saved but many were needlessly lost. The preamble to the following account is as important as the events it describes. At the end of December 1941 Vorley was told that his writ did not extend beyond Rangoon.1 It seemed nonsensical at a time when his colleagues were already feeding both thousands of Indian evacuees camping outside Rangoon and thousands more who were trekking towards Prome. Vorley had already drawn up plans for an anticipated increase in the number of evacuees passing through the Taungup Pass in Arakan. No one else was making these preparations and no one was in overall charge of the evacuation route. One officer was responsible for the section up to Prome another for the section from Prome to the Taungup Pass and a third for the section from Taungup onwards, but ‘none of these three officers knew what the other one was doing’.2 Administrative confusion was almost inevitable at a time when operational clarity was essential. Vorley was not happy because Dorman-Smith had put P. C. Fogarty in charge of coordinating the responses of all government departments to the Japanese invasion.3 He felt that it was his job and if there was one thing worse than having no coordinator, it was having two. Dorman-Smith feared that these strong-willed characters would clash and relations soon became strained when Vorley discovered that Fogarty had been systematically countermanding his decisions.4 Fogarty rarely kept written records of meetings or communicated decisions to key people (including Vorley himself). There was a real danger that personality clashes and organizational confusion might lead to the deaths of many evacuees.5 This became even more obvious to Vorley in January and February 1942. His Evacuation Department officials were constantly on duty at the railway station and jetties in Rangoon. They counted evacuees onto boats and onto trains and counted those left behind. Then they submitted daily reports to Fogarty’s office. The reports were always full of facts and figures and details of chronic overcrowding as well as estimated times of arrival but Fogarty ignored them. The information was never passed on to officials in Prome and as a consequence extra transport was not provided for those left behind in Rangoon and Vorley’s officials felt marginalized. During that period of two months Vorley claimed

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to have received only one instruction from Fogarty’s office, and that was to discourage evacuees from travelling to Prome. *

*

*

While Dorman-Smith, Vorley and Fogarty argued about policies, strategies and their relative status, middle managers on the spot in Arakan – unsung heroes like Mr P Burnside, U Kantaya, U Po Choe, Dr Sen, Lieutenant Brown and Oo Kyaw Khine – had to grit their teeth, bend their shoulders to the wheel and make the best of a very bad job. The attitudes of middle-ranking officials and their superior officers were very different. In Vorley’s view, the main lesson to take from the Taungup Pass experience was the importance of strong, overarching leadership. Indeed he was annoyed that he had not been called upon to take immediate responsibility for evacuation in the country as a whole. Not until the early part of April 1942 was he finally made Commissioner for Evacuation for the whole country and by that time it was far too late. Tragically Fogarty was killed in an air crash in February 1942, but Dorman-Smith and Vorley continued to squabble. Each man stoutly defended his own decisions and criticized the other. It was very unseemly but in the process they assembled treasure troves of data, descriptions and perspectives to support their cases. *

*

*

The Arakan evacuation will be remembered for five things – the disastrous cholera epidemic, the desperate search for new sources of drinking water, the mixture of heroism, altruism, selfishness and stupidity that was evident en route, the motley collection of launches and country boats that were assembled to rescue the evacuees, and the thousands who died on the way. The trek through the Taungup Pass was an epic event by any standards. Dorman-Smith may have overestimated the numbers (at 150,000 evacuees) but very many did pass through the Taungup Pass in a very short space of time. There is little evidence, however, that the government used the opportunity to evaluate its performance or to learn anything from it. Almost all the evacuees who trekked out through Arakan were Indians. There were a few Anglo-Indians, but (as far as is known) no Europeans. As a result there were few charges of discrimination although the absence of letters, diaries and personal reminiscences (a European preoccupation) meant that the Arakan evacuation attracted little popular attention in the West. In many ways it was the Cinderella of the evacuation in Burma. Although the middle managers were

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intelligent men of real humanity who solved complex problems and moved large numbers of people, it nevertheless raised important questions about the quality of leadership. Intimations of amateurishness hung over the project as senior managers in distant Rangoon were distracted by personal vendettas. *

*

*

Rangoon and Arakan were joined at the hip in the sense that the fall of Rangoon led directly to the rush through Arakan. It must be remembered that panic gripped Rangoon immediately after the bombing raids of 23 and 25 December 1941 and continued to do so until the end of February 1942.6 Each new raid brought more misery and more broken sleep. By mid-January the poorer classes of Indians in particular were determined to leave immediately.7 Tens of thousands of them walked out of the city along the Prome Road in three great waves at the end of December 1941 (immediately after the bombing raids), on Friday 20 January, when the ‘E’ Notice was hoisted and shortly before 8 March, when the city was finally evacuated. While most Europeans made for Mandalay and Maymyo, most Indians aimed for Prome. From there they would go on to Akyab and then by steamer to Chittagong. It seemed simple enough in theory but was fiendishly complicated in practice and by the beginning of April 1942 the Arakan route was closed to refugee traffic. *

*

*

Immediately after the first wave of Indians left Rangoon for Prome at the end of December 1941, the authorities in Rangoon got cold feet and decided that haemorrhaging manual labour at such a rapid rate was not a good idea.8 The Commissioner in Prome was instructed to prevent the refugees from going beyond Prome. He was told to send as many as possible of them back to Rangoon. By this time most of the evacuees had set up makeshift camps by the side of the Rangoon–Prome road and at least 14,000 refugees had already reached Prome. They were accommodated in very overcrowded camps or in ramshackle and insanitary shacks. Another 3,000 evacuees had managed to cross to the west bank of the Irrawaddy where they had set up camp in Padaung. A total of 2,000 refugees were persuaded to return to Rangoon, but most refused and as a result Prome became more unpleasant by the day. Evacuees crammed into fetid refugee camps and conditions deteriorated rapidly. *

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*

*

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Figure 5.1 Indian evacuees flee along the road to Prome, January 1942. Many of the refugees were coolies, manual workers, domestic servants and menials. They were on their way towards Akyab via the Taungup Pass. The government, concerned about the loss of the manual labour force, attempted to persuade them the return to Rangoon. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

In the middle of January 1942 (after the ‘E’ Notice was hoisted in Rangoon on Friday 20 January) a second wave of evacuees descended on Prome. They arrived at the rate of about 3,000 per day. The earlier refugees had not yet dispersed, so it was not long before some 10,000 people were being herded into camps in the centre of town. The latrines were muddy, stinking and overflowing. Many evacuees took to defecating in the river from which their drinking water was drawn. By the end of January, the first cases of cholera began to appear and little was done to prevent the disease spreading. By mid-February cholera had reached epidemic proportions. Local officials panicked and in order to relieve the pressure on resources in Prome, they encouraged the evacuees to move on towards Taungup. Medical staff made half-hearted efforts to inoculate the evacuees, but most of them refused point-blank to have injections. Nevertheless they were allowed to carry on walking towards Taungup and between 15 and 19 February about 8,000 were to be seen walking along the road towards Taungup. Cholera followed in their wake.9

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The Civil Surgeon in Prome had been on sick leave at the time, but fortunately in his place Dr Sen, an epidemiologist from Insein, arrived to take charge of public health in Prome. Dr Sen was a man of great energy and he immediately traced the cause of the cholera outbreak to drinking water drawn from a stream contaminated with raw sewage. He arranged for latrines to be dug, ordered cholera vaccine from Rangoon and instructed hospitals along the way to compulsorily inoculate as many evacuees as possible. He also prevailed upon the Director of Public Health in Rangoon to despatch a team of Burmese subassistant surgeons to Prome. Unfortunately only two of them arrived, the rest having deserted on the way. Indeed this pattern of desertion became the norm. For example, several doctors were sent to work in Padaung and Nyaungchidauk but they all deserted before reaching their destinations. Undeterred, Dr Sen concentrated on the urgent task of cleaning up the refugee camps in Prome. The bodies of cholera victims were piling up and threatening a catastrophe. Sen closed down contaminated camps. He incinerated the corpses and burned the contaminated camps to the ground with kerosene. Teams of doctors were instructed to set up inoculation points in all the refugee camps and railway stations and another inoculation centre was set up in Shwedaung, a town some 20 miles south of Prome. Next Dr Sen turned his attention to conditions on the Taungup road. He was horrified to hear about the 8,000 uninoculated evacuees who had been allowed to leave for Padaung. It completely undermined his strategy of containment, and threatened to transfer the cholera problem from Prome to Taungup. He drove to the village of Nyaungchidauk where he set up a medical station in which half the 8,000 evacuees were being inoculated. It was already too late for nearby Sen could see the bodies of at least 28 cholera victims by the roadside. One of Sen’s colleagues had come across so many corpses on another section of the road that he had had to drive his car over them.10 The town of Padaung was also a major concern. It had been swamped by the arrival of huge batches of evacuees, perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 of them at a time. Each new influx caused enormous sanitary problems and Sen realized that it was only a matter of time before there were real problems in Padaung. The dead were already taking precedence over the living, and disposing of the corpses of cholera victims became the priority before long supplies of cholera serum began to run out. *

*

*

Cholera was not the only problem on the Taungup route. By the time they reached Prome most of the evacuees had already walked 180 miles. They were

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exhausted before they made their way across the Irrawaddy. The next leg of the journey to Taungup normally took five days. The first 16 miles were reasonably easy, but the next 112 miles became rougher and steeper as the track climbed through the Arakan Yoma mountain range into the Taungup Pass. Food and drinking water supplies were extremely limited. Only once in a blue moon did a lorry laden with drinking water and food manage to grind its way through to the villages of Naungayo and Naungito.11 Otherwise everything had to be carried up by porters. *

*

*

In fact there were plenty of bullock carts available for hire in Padaung but the authorities would only permit a small number of them on the road at any one time. Bullocks were terrible ‘water guzzlers’. Nevertheless wealthier Indian evacuees demanded to travel in bullock carts and they were perfectly willing to pay anything that was asked in order to get hold of one. Before the war the ‘going rate’ for a bullock-cart journey to Taungup had been Rs 25. By March 1942 the hire charge had gone up to Rs 200 rupees. This was beyond the means of most ordinary refugees. Unscrupulous cart drivers regularly extorted money from unsuspecting passengers, a favourite trick being to stop the cart on a remote stretch of road and threaten to kill the passengers unless they handed over money or valuables. The frequency of this sort of highway robbery caused evacuees to think twice before hiring carts. *

*

*

A very important appointment was made at the end of January 1942. Mr P. Burnside (Divisional Forestry Officer) was put in charge of evacuation arrangements in Arakan.12 Of course it was very late in the day and Burnside discovered that although he was in charge, he was not in charge. He had to spend a great deal of his time second-guessing his line managers’ expectations. The trouble was that there were many of them. He was answerable to Vorley for a start, and to Dorman-Smith and for a short while to Fogarty. Then there were the District Commissioners (DC) of Akyab, Sandoway, Kyaukpyu, Taungup and Prome. Nevertheless, Burnside set about his task with gusto.13 He enlisted many former colleagues from the Forestry Service. U Kantaya and U Po Choe became his chief assistants and under them were Maung Tha Tun, Maung Chit Maung, Maung Mi, U Ba Pe, U Ba Thaw, Maung Saw Yein Fan and Maung Tun Pe.14 Burnside could be forgiven for assuming that he had plenty of time to prepare the route before any mass influx of evacuees was likely to arrive in Taungup.

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For at the end of January few believed that Rangoon would fall at any moment. Indeed at the beginning of February 1942 the greater concern was that launches were sailing empty between Taungup and Kyaukpyu because there were so few evacuees. Burnside took up his post in Taungup at the beginning of February 1942.15 The situation changed almost immediately, for as we have already seen, evacuees began pouring out of Prome at the rate of five hundred per day and flooding along the Padaung–Taungup road. The numbers increased steadily. Burnside had not yet managed to construct camps along the route. However, even before the camps could be built a most pressing problem had to be solved. Water was always a major issue in the Arakanese hinterland as temperatures soared during the dry season. By the middle of February 1942, disaster loomed. Thousands of thirsty evacuees arrived at the same time that most of the streams were drying up. There were few accessible alternative water sources. Burnside set out on a frantic tour of inspection of roadside springs and gave instructions for small reservoirs to be dug at each spring. However, it was very slow and labour intensive and each reservoir held only a small amount of water.16 Wells were another possibility but very few wells had been dug and most were extremely unreliable. The nature of the terrain and lack of labour made it impossible to dig more wells or reservoirs in the time available. Nor was the river much help. In its lower reaches it was tidal, salty and undrinkable and in its upper reaches water levels fell rapidly during the dry season. Bullock carts were the bane of Burnside’s life. The trouble was that each team of bullocks consumed five tins of water per day on the outgoing journey and the same amount on the return journey. Five tins of water were the average daily consumption for 30 evacuees, so a team of oxen (there and back) effectively displaced 60 evacuees. Burnside tried to limit the number of bullock carts using the route in order to make way for the maximum number of pedestrians. He decided that only the elderly, infirm, nursing mothers and very young children should be allowed to travel in bullock carts. However, there were many more children, elderly and infirm evacuees than he had anticipated and wealthy Indians demanded bullock-cart transport whether or not they needed it. Even before the water problem was solved, Burnside set about building camps and within a few weeks he had managed to construct three permanent rest camps on the road between Padaung and Taungup – one at Tanagyi, a second at Yebawgyi and a third, specifically for bullock-cart passengers, at Pennebin-

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Saken. He had also managed to build three camps along the Taungup River route and a fourth camp at Sutpya-Chaungwa in the Thayetmyo Division. ‘Mid-day halts’ were also under construction at Salu and Kyauktaga. Burnside delegated the task of running the refugee camps to U Po Choe, under whom he appointed two foresters to be in charge of each camp. The predicted number of refugees was estimated at 500 to 1,000 per day, but the actual number was much larger so the camps were always terribly overcrowded. *

*

*

On 16 February 1942 Burnside had received that fateful telegram from the DC in Prome, informing him of the serious cholera epidemic there. It had explained that 2,000 refugees were leaving Prome and that a cholera epidemic was spreading along the road to Taungup. The number of evacuees was increasing daily until it reached a peak between 21 February and 25 February. At that time 21,000 refugees were estimated to be in transit along the road between Prome and Taungup. Despite all Dr Sen’s efforts, few of these evacuees had been inoculated against cholera and by the time they reached Taungup many were showing symptoms of the disease. Decaying corpses littered the road and in an attempt to escape the infection, coolies, policemen, telegraph linesmen, subordinate officials, medical orderlies and forestry workers were deserting their posts in droves. It made it very difficult for Burnside to distribute food to his network of refugee camps. In the midst of these terrible circumstances, U Kantaya, U Po Choe and two other foresters stuck to their tasks and demonstrated immense courage. Dr Choudhury, a physician from Sandoway, provided valiant support. Between them they cared for the sick and disposed of corpses. They had no vaccines or medicines and found it difficult to distinguish between the symptoms of cholera, enteritis and exhaustion. As luck would have it Burnside was away from his post for a few days at the height of the crisis, so was unaware of the scale of the disaster.17 When he returned on 23 February he was astonished to discover 20,000 evacuees milling around aimlessly in Taungup. Burnside discovered that a very ugly situation had developed in one of the refugee camps. A group of subordinate officers were holding as hostage 2,000 evacuees and extorting money from them. Burnside was appalled by this turn of events. He immediately recovered Rs 5,000 of the extorted money and returned it to the owners. He disciplined the staff involved in the racket although he did not do enough to assuage the fury of the victims.

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Some ‘hotheaded’ young evacuees threatened murder and arson and Burnside’s powers of diplomacy were stretched to the limit. *

*

*

Conditions in Taungup were very difficult. The influx of thousands of evacuees had caused terrible shortages of drinking water, food and medical supplies and imposed immense strains on the sewage system. The town was in a cul-de-sac at the head of a narrow stream and was unsuitable to be a river terminus. Although only a short distance to the sea, the river was tidal and only navigable at certain times of the day. In normal times, two or three boats at the most would call at the town each day, but throughout February and March 1942 the river was filled with vessels of all types and sizes. As more and more evacuees flooded into Taungup, Burnside had to go from camp to camp explaining the extent of the crisis. He told the evacuees that because of acute shortages of clean drinking water they must move on as quickly as possible. The easiest and quickest route out of Taungup was by the river and sea route to Akyab and most people wanted to travel this way. It became extremely congested. As an alternative there was also an overland track to Akyab via Minbya. The poorest class of Indians who could not afford the boat fares to Akyab had little alternative but to go by this route. The death rate along it was very high and the journey involved a gruelling 200-mile tramp over rough terrain. Several wide streams like the Ma-I and An rivers had to be crossed by ferry. Rice and drinking water were at a premium and dacoits posed a threat (although it was often exaggerated). At least a thousand evacuees passed through Kywegum each day on their way to Akyab, and on one celebrated occasion about 10,000 evacuees passed through the town in a single day. Burnside urged all fit young males to walk overland by this route in order to free up places for women and children on the boats. As an alternative he tried to persuade refugees to retrace their steps to the riverine towns of Sinchigaing and Wetcheik where launches were waiting to take them down-river to Kyaukpyu. These exhortations fell on deaf ears, and it soon became apparent that many able-bodied males had no intention of walking by the longer more hazardous overland route. Other evacuees were equally unwilling to retrace their footsteps. There was a distinct lack of altruism. This had been demonstrated in Padaung where wealthy Indian merchants had insisted on carrying vast amounts of personal baggage, valuables, furniture and merchandise in bullock carts, refusing to give lifts even to poor old women. This same callous spirit had reared its head again in Taungup. Whenever a boat arrived the fittest and strongest

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always managed to muscle their way to the front. Burnside was convinced that this behaviour was costing lives. Most evacuees simply disregarded Burnside’s exhortations and instead they hung around in Taungup determined to fight their way onto the next boat to arrive. Burnside was forced to look for new ways in which to ration dwindling supplies of drinking water. In the end he resorted to charging money for the use of water. It was a crude mechanism that ensured the wealthy a better chance of survival than the poor. Evacuees who were unable or unwilling to pay for water had to wash in muddy puddles in nearby creeks from which drinking water was also drawn. Enteritis became very common, and wells had to be constantly policed in order to prevent refugees ‘stealing’ drinking water. It was a struggle to prevent refugees from bathing in drinking water. *

*

*

The river from Taungup was navigable down to the coast and evacuees jostled and fought for boat tickets at the booking office by the riverside. As the crowds increased ticket touts began to operate freely and a black market in boat tickets flourished. Refugees were willing to pay double or even treble the official price for a ticket. Women were supposed to take precedence on the launches but more often than not, men would unceremoniously barge in front of them. On most launches only about 25 per cent of the passengers were women. It was not unusual to see women reselling their tickets to single men at a considerable profit. Pickpockets had a field day in the dense crowds, and if arrested they could usually bribe the policemen. All in all, Taungup had become a thoroughly lawless and unpleasant place. The trip by boat to Akyab usually took about four or five days and because of the turnaround time, evacuees with tickets often had to wait several days before they were able to board a boat. The wait became longer and longer as time went by. Burnside sent many urgent requests to officials in Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Sandoway, asking them to send more country boats up to Taungup. Despite these appeals, the launches rarely carried more than 300 passengers per day. Even the arrival of several IFC vessels from Bassein seemed to make little difference partly because of a very high attrition rate among crews. Vessels were frequently left stranded on the river and those boatmen who did remain at their posts were often corrupt. One of the most common ploys was to turf passengers off the boats at Kyaukpyu rather than take them all the way to Akyab. Burnside became thoroughly despondent. He had no legal powers and could do little to remedy the various malpractices that proliferated. Belligerent evacuees often threatened

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him and, for example, on one occasion a demented man followed him around all day violently demanding a place at the front of the boat queue. Tempers always boiled over when a launch drew alongside the jetty in Taungup. The crowd would surge forward and break through the barriers. They would trample over officials. Refugees clambered over barbed-wire fences, tearing their clothes and flesh in the process. The local police were generally ineffective but attempted to keep the mob back by administering severe beatings. Burnside dismissed as ‘next to useless’ two officials, U Kyin Lynn and U An, who had been sent up from Kyaukpyu to assist with law and order.18 The situation seemed to improve slightly when Mr Orr (DSP) arrived in mid-March. *

*

*

The experiences of the boat passengers were bad enough, but thousands of refugees who could not afford boat tickets had no alternative but to walk to Akyab via Minbya. It was a long and extremely hazardous route. Before they left Taungup each evacuee was issued with enough rice to last ten days, and then instructed to follow a seemingly endless line of telegraph poles out of town. A ferry service was organized to take the evacuees across the An Chaung River, but otherwise the evacuees were left entirely to their own devices.19 Many of them died of cholera, exhaustion, hunger and dehydration on the way. Indeed, the DC of Kyaukpyu was so alarmed that he did his very best to prevent the evacuees from entering. Burnside kept a tally of evacuee movements in and out of Taungup in February and March 1942 (Table 5.1). It was a remarkable achievement because he had to collect the data in very difficult circumstances. He put the table together in equally difficult circumstances in Margherita in July 1943.20 It comes as no great surprise to discover that his figures do not always add up. Nevertheless, the overall message is very clear. Burnside’s difficulties were compounded by the fact that numbered tickets were issued to all refugees who arrived in Taungup from Prome between 13 and 23 February. This is why the numbers are so precise between those dates. However, the numbered-ticket system had to be abandoned after 24 February because an extortion racket was uncovered. After that date the evacuees arriving in Taungup were counted manually (and therefore inexactly). From then on the entries became estimates. It explains also why so many round numbers (e.g. 2,000) appear within the ‘arrivals’ column after 24 February. Until 13 March, the numbers of passengers departing by launch were also calculated by the use of numbered-ticket sales. On that date it became clear

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Table 5.1 Numbers of evacuees passing through Taungup in 1942 Date

9/2–12/2 13/2 14/2 15/2 16/2 17/2 18/2 19/2 20/2 21/2 22/2 23/2 24/2 25/2 26/2 27/2 28/2 2/3 3/3 4/3 5/3 6/3 7/3 8/3 9/3 10/3 11/3 12/3 13/3 14/3 15/3 16/3 17/3 18/3 19/3 20/3 21/3 22/3

Arrival

2,000 559 1,089 – 225 785 875 1,272 1,815 2,807 4,316 9,000 5,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 2,100 850 760 780 900 1,000 800 1,200 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,500 2,000 2,500 1,500 600 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,600 2,000 2,500

Departures

Walk

Launch

Boat

Total

500 380 300 – 235 307 – 300 460 328 90 335 – 494 197 683 700 250 450 1,100 100 300 800 400 350 – 700 700 300 – – 250 275 300 300 – 600 –

1,300 350 497 – 127 180 3,200 618 1,060 2,355 784 312 – 741 579 463 1,869 1,000 1,000 1,568 2,033 2,726 1,971 1,180 987 1,721 1,965 706 600 2,560 1,200 964 1,500 1,000 2,700 1,600 1,550 1,500

1,800 730 797 – 362 487 320 918 1,520 2,683 874 647 – 1,235 776 1,326 2,569 1,250 1,450 2,668 2,133 3,026 2,771 1,580 1,337 1,721 2,565 1,406 900 2,560 1,200 1,214 1,775 1,300 3,000 1,600 2,150 1,500

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Balance [A]*

– – – – – 105 200 – – – – – – – – – 600 200 8,000 200 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

[B]*

– – – – – – – – – – 496 600 1,053 200 1,406 800 1,702 1,000 2,826 1,000 6,268 2,000 14,621 – 19,621 – 21,386 – 22,610 – 22,284 – 19,000 – 18,000 – 10,000 – 6,000 – 6,000 – 4,000 – 3,000 – 3,000 – 4,000 – 3,000 – 2,000 – 4,000 – 5,000 – 5,000 – 5,000 – 4,000 – 4,000 – 3,000 – 1,500+ – 1,500 – 1,500 – 2,500 –

Burials Total 200 200 442 – 200 1,098 1,253 2,206 2,702 3,826 8,268 14,621 19,621 21,386 22,610 22,284 19,000 18,000 10,000 6,000 6,000 4,000 3,000 3,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 4,000 5,000 5,000 5,000+ 4,000+ 4,000 3,000+ 1,500+ 1,500+ 1,500 2,500

– – – – – – – – – – – – – 16 17 49 38 20 25 20 41 45 38 55 25 32 23 17 15 11 10 6 12 5 3 8 5 3

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Table 5.1 Continued Date

Arrival

Departures Launch

23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 Total

2,500 350 3,000 1,000 3,000 – – – 75,433 13,834

Boat

Walk Total

1,700 2,050 2,000 3,000 2,500 2,500 1,000 1,000 50,888 64,722

Balance [A]*

[B]*

Burials Total

– 2,000 – 2,000 2 – 2,000 – 2,000 – – 2,500 – 2,500 – – 1,500 – 1,500+ – 9,000 [225,773 5,600 243,917] 600

Notes: 1. *[A] = Taungup, [B] = Kyauktaga 2. Burnside’s figures are taken warts and all (i) The total arrivals (column 2) should read 75,333 not 75,433. (ii) The total departures by boat (column 4) should read 53,666 not 50,888. (iii) The total departures by boat plus launch (column 5) should be 64,700 not 64,722, but some of the other figures in the column are incorrect – e.g. the entries for 18 February (3200, not 320), 27 February (1,146 not 1,326) and 11 March (2,665 not 2,565) – so the actual total should read 67,500. (iv) The total number of ‘walking evacuees’, (column 6) is 9,405 and not 9,000. (v) Total burials (column 10) is 541 not 600. (vi) Columns 7, 8 and 9 are incomprehensible as it stands. The total of 243,917 evacuees (in column 9) is almost three times larger than those mentioned elsewhere in the table. Source: BL/OIR/EUR/MSS/M/3/955/: P. Burnside, Report on Civil Evacuation: Report on Evacuation by the Taungup Pass, Arakan Division, Appendix 3 (12 July 1943).

that the ticket sales and actual numbers of passengers travelling did not always tally, so the passengers began to be counted as they boarded vessels. Again the figures should be regarded as estimates. Despite these shortcomings, Burnside’s statistics are immensely valuable. They reveal that well over 75,000 refugees passed through Taungup during February and March 1942. Almost 65,000 of this number travelled by riverboat from Taungup to Akyab and over 9,000 trekked out overland. The figures also reveal that 600 were buried – and many more died – within the space of a few short weeks. By any standards, this was evacuation on a grand scale. Burnside pointed out that there was more in the statistics than met the eye. For example, children (of whom there were very many) were not included in the total numbers of arrivals or departures. Had they been included the total number of evacuees might have been nearer 90,000. He also mentioned that the actual number of boat passengers was probably considerably greater than the number recorded in the data. An unknown number of refugees managed to ‘stow away’ illegally on vessels without the requisite boat passes and they were therefore not included in the total. On the other hand Burnside was adamant that the total of 9,000 that he gave for the number of evacuee ‘walkers’ was

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fairly accurate as they were counted on and off the An Chaung Ferry en route to Akyab. One major puzzle remains. The 600 or so burials recorded in Burnside’s statistics (Table 3.2) seem surprisingly few in view of the harsh conditions and cholera epidemic. However, the number of burials should not be confused with the number of deaths. It is almost certain that many dead bodies remained undiscovered in remote valleys and jungles. Perhaps, also, many hundreds of corpses were thrown into the river and flowed out to sea. Moreover, the figure does not include a total of 296 corpses disposed of by U Kantaya on a 40-mile stretch of road on the Arakan side of the boundary. Had they been included the total would have been 837. Almost certainly as many evacuees died on the Prome side of the border as died in Arakan. If this was the case, it is safe to assume that at least 2,000 of the 75,000 or so refugees died in the space of a few days after leaving Prome and before reaching Akyab between 9 February and 26 March. Probably most of the deaths occurred among the 9,000 evacuees who walked out by the overland routes among whom the mortality rate seems to have been 9 per cent – not surprising in these atrocious conditions and during a cholera epidemic. Cholera was not the only reason for the high mortality rate. Dorman-Smith cited poor transport as a contributory factor. The acute shortage of cars, buses and petrol supplies meant that riverboats, ox carts and shanks’ pony were the only forms of transport. Another reason was that many evacuees refused to register with the authorities at Taungup and as a result they rendered themselves ineligible for the standard ‘dole’ of rice that was handed out to ‘registered’ evacuees. Those who did not receive the ‘dole’ were therefore more prone to exhaustion, less resistant to disease on the onward journey and more likely to die. Burnside reported that corpses lay everywhere along the overland evacuation route and that they made the air unbelievably foul. Local villagers were unwilling to bury the dead unless they were paid enormous sums in return. In the end, the gruesome task was left to gangs of Madrassis who were willing to dispose of the corpses, burn contaminated belongings and clear up the mess generally in return for U Kantaya’s generous inducements of guaranteed free places on the launches, free rations and Rs ⅛ per day. Local licensees were more than happy to ply the men with liquor to help them cope with the stench. *

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*

*

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Among the evacuees were many Indian doctors, and Burnside had fondly hoped that they would linger in Taungup to help with the unfolding humanitarian crisis there. Instead most of them badgered him for priority tickets, and were only too keen to scramble onto the first launch to leave for Akyab. Burnside found it hard to forgive them, but even harder to forgive charitable organizations that purported to offer selfless service in the national interest. In Burnside’s view many of them were utterly bogus. The Ramakrishna Mission was a case in point. Burnside considered it to be completely fraudulent. The Special Commissioner for refugees in Prome cabled Burnside asking him to provide spacious accommodation for the Ramakrishna Mission, which he promised, would soon be caring for the sick and maim in Taungup. Dr Dutta of the Ramakrishna Mission duly arrived, and Burnside welcomed him with open arms. Dutta explained that he could not stay long, and that he would only stay long enough to set things up before travelling on to Akyab to do the same thing there. It was very exciting and breathless stuff, although Burnside was later to observe that the only ‘setting up’ Dutta did was to obtain a complementary first-class priority boat ticket to Akyab. Before he left he urged the rest of his Ramakrishna Mission colleagues to come up to Taungup as quickly as possible. A few days later a Ramakrishna Mission swami arrived, accompanied by two or three other men. They had no medicines, cared for not a single sick patient and took full advantage of Burnside’s generous hospitality. After a couple of days they too disappeared into thin air. Shortly afterwards another man arrived bearing a piece of Ramakrishna Mission headed notepaper on which was scribbled a note demanding that he should be given a priority ticket to Akyab. Burnside had had enough, and by this time recognized fraud when he saw it. He told the man ‘to shove off ’ and no more Ramakrishna Mission employees arrived after that. Burnside felt particularly aggrieved because humanitarian help was desperately needed in Taungup, but the only charitable donation he received during the whole time was from Mr Guha of Farekh Bros in Akyab, who occasionally sent up a few boxes of vegetables. The death rate among the evacuees stayed extremely high until 12 March when the Bengal Mission arrived in Taungup with significant stocks of medicines. A Medical Officer of the Madras Medical Mission followed soon afterwards. He was an outstanding man. In the space of two days, he and Burnside supplied more than 2,000 penniless refugees with free boat and launch passages and sent them down to Akyab. It was a remarkable feat in view of the fact that during the

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whole two-month period of the evacuation, only 2,500 refugees (including the above 2,000) had been helped in this way. *

*

*

Acute shortages of rice at the end of February came at the point when the influx of refugees from Prome had reached its peak. It meant that profiteers and confidence tricksters had a field day. Local villagers charged exorbitant prices for rice and on 23 February when Burnside tried to buy 100 baskets of rice from the local Township Officer he was told that not a single basket was available. It appears that unscrupulous brokers had bought the lot and were making huge profits by reselling it. Burnside had to ship in rice and salt at great expense from as far away as Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Sandoway. He set up distribution centres in Taungup, Wetcheik and Sinchigaing and each day he supplied 1,000–2,000 evacuees with free rice. Condensed milk was another essential staple commodity that was targeted by black marketers. The average Burmese labourer consumed two tins of condensed milk each day, although most refugees could survive on one tin per day because they were not involved in hard physical labour. Nevertheless, the black market in condensed milk encouraged evacuees to sell their surplus cans at grossly inflated rates. An illicit trade in water also reached epidemic proportions. Richer refugees illegally bought water for Rs 2–5 per tin and sold it on at a profit. Local villagers were also quite happy to make money from the sale of water, and, as usual, the poor lost out in the cruel mechanisms of black-marketeering. Boat owners were among others who also made vast profits out of human misery. The cost of hiring a boat from Taungup to Akyab rose from Rs 250 per boat at the beginning of February to Rs 2,000 by the end of March. Also during March 1942 touts in Taungup preyed on richer evacuees who had been arriving in large numbers. Most of the new arrivals were willing to pay the earth for a quick passage to Akyab. On 24 February 1942, the DC tried to fix the price of launch hire at Rs 3 per head, but the going rate had risen to Rs 5 per head, by 14 March. It had to be refixed at Rs 8 per head and at the height of the ‘rush to the coast’ the rich were willing to pay whatever price boatmen demanded. Exploitative boatmen not infrequently dropped off their unsuspecting passengers in Ramree or Kyaukpyu so they could get back more quickly to pick up the next load of passengers. Because everyone was so anxious to get away as quickly as possible, the police had great difficulty in persuading witnesses to testify against criminals and few thought it worth reporting crimes. As a result there were few prosecutions.

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Only one case of armed robbery was reported during the whole time and no eyewitnesses were prepared to come forward to testify. In any case the police force was so seriously undermanned because of desertions that it was not in a position to investigate crimes. Burnside’s organization was also seriously understaffed because of sickness and deaths and also because there were over 1,000 deserters during March 1942. The result was that lawlessness and crime flourished and also went totally unpunished. *

*

*

The death and sickness rate among evacuees increased exponentially during March. This was partly due to the fact that thousands of evacuees had left Prome without adequate food supplies, partly because temperatures in Arakan had soared and partly because the streams and wells had dried up. In desperation, parched evacuees would often resort to drinking tidal saltwater causing them to become seriously ill as a result. It is possible that many lives would have been saved had more evacuees been able to get to Taungup during January 1942 rather than a month later. In January the weather was cooler, streams were full of running water and the cholera epidemic had not yet started. The decision to close the Arakan road to evacuees for a whole month in January 1942 had profound consequences. Officials reached the decision to prevent coolies, cooks, sweepers, police railwaymen and other essential workers from leaving Rangoon. As it was, many of those who had left Rangoon in December and January were forced to squander their meagre resources on journeys back to Rangoon or in weeks of inactivity in Prome. Most of them eventually turned up penniless in Taungup. Burnside’s socialist principles bubbled to the surface and he delivered a rare peroration. ‘The rich man’, he said, ‘did not give a damn for his poor brother’. Many of these rich men were not refugees in its strict sense. They came with cartloads, moving house and home. One marwari actually continued to sell his cloth wares after he had boarded the launch at Taungup. They were a curse when it came to boarding the launch with piles of boxes, trunks, and so on. With no labour to handle the luggage it took time to load it and the situation was made worse by the mob rushing the launch. ‘Many a launch was almost swamped out and crews scared out of their lives’.21 *

*

*

Refugees who had left Taungup by boat began arriving in Kyaukpyu from midFebruary onwards. Kyaukpyu was a coastal town of 4,000 inhabitants. It was situated on the north-west extremity of Ramree Island. If they still had sufficient

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Figure 5.2 HMIS Indus in Akyab Harbour, March 1942. The Indus was one of three naval vessels involved in the controversial and ‘premature’ escape of Mr R. P. Abigail ICS and British officials on 30 March 1942 and also in the subsequent evacuation of many civilians from Akyab. Japanese planes sank the Indus off Akyab on 6 April 1942. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

money in their pockets, the evacuees would queue at the jetty to buy tickets for the steamer to Calcutta or Chittagong. They often had a very long wait and on one occasion when a steamer failed to arrive at Kyaukpyu, a crowd of 10,000 refugees built up. In this case they waited several days until the next steamer arrived. It took the authorities a very long time to clear the backlog of passengers. Kyaukpyu was extremely fraught during the whole of February and March. Corruption, fraud and extortion were ubiquitous, while arguments and fights broke out over the sale of steamer tickets. It was complicated by the fact that steamer passengers had to be ferried in small craft from the jetty to the steamers, which lay at anchor in the harbour. This practice gave rise to yet more arguments, more fighting, more opportunities for stowaways to get on board, more extortion and more corruption. Not until 26 March (by which time the situation had become really desperate) were evacuees permitted to travel free on steamers to India. At the bottom of the social pile were hundreds of destitute evacuees. By the time they reached Kyaukpyu they had completely exhausted their resources and were certainly unable to afford the steamer fare. They tended to wander around town creating mayhem and hoping for a miracle to happen. Food and water supplies were very limited and sewage disposal became a real problem. Kyaukpyu

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had become a perfect breeding ground for cholera and the Kyaukpyu Municipal Committee was openly hostile to the evacuees. They tried to prevent them from entering the town. However, a charitable trust was set up by a group of wealthy Indian residents who genuinely wished to help the refugees. It provided them with food and shelter and very occasionally steamer tickets were bought for those in desperate need. For the most part, however, the evacuees who could not afford to buy steamer tickets had to trust to the few remaining country boats, which were still operating between Kyaukpyu and Akyab. It required a considerable act of faith to sail in them. They were large, unwieldy, sail-assisted rowing boats. They often leaked like sieves and were always grossly overloaded. The passengers had to squeeze together on the deck. Often there was standing room only, and cholera sufferers had to stand hugger-mugger with healthy passengers. The passage to Akyab could take five or six days and during this time there was no protection from the prevailing westerly wind. The sea was often very rough and the experience was thoroughly dangerous and unpleasant. *

*

*

By the end of February large numbers of evacuees had begun to arrive in Akyab.22 The town was totally unprepared to receive them. No camps had been prepared, ticket sales were disorganized and it was left to one of the harbour pilots, Mr Thomsett, to collect and issue rations. Large groups of evacuees camped all around the jetty in the most insanitary conditions. The military situation determined how and when the evacuation in Arakan would end. It became clear immediately after the Sittang Bridge debacle that the Japanese Army would eventually cut off the evacuation route to Prome and thence to Taungup. The first unmistakable sign that the end was in sight came when Akyab was bombed on 23 March. Many civilians had already left for India by this time, but now the police deserted their posts in large numbers, municipal services ceased to function, bazaars closed, food ran out and the remaining civilians fled en masse. By the end of March the town was empty. Many riverlaunches and wharves were destroyed. Vessels stopped sailing up the Kaladan River and along coastal stretches between Taungup and Akyab. The bombing of Akyab had several unexpected political consequences. The Commissioner of the Arakan Division, R. P. Abigail ICS, left his post on 30 March with the rest of the British civilian administration. They all slipped out of Akyab in one of three naval vessels that had been lying at anchor in the harbour. Abigail promised everyone waiting on the quayside that the two remaining

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vessels would pick up those who wanted to get to India. It was not true. Abigail faced widespread criticism when he decided to leave for India. Sections of the press accused British officials of ‘cowardice’ and of ‘cutting and running’. The criticisms were hard to rebut in view of the fact that the Japanese did not actually occupy Akyab until a month later. The three service chiefs based in Akyab remonstrated against Abigail’s decision and urged him to stay. Even DormanSmith expressed surprise that Abigail had left on the first and not the last of the three ships in Akyab harbour, and also that he had chosen to go to Calcutta rather than to withdraw to a safer part of Arakan.23 The Commissioner’s flight played into the hands of mischief makers who were able to spread rumours that Japanese agents had landed in the Kyaukpyu District, although the town was not actually occupied until 3 May. More ominously, perhaps, the vacuum left by the Commissioner’s departure allowed serious communal disturbances to flare up between the Arakanese Buddhists and Chittagonian Muslim settlers in Buthidaung.24 Tribute must be paid to the valiant work of the Deputy Commissioner, Oo Kyaw Khine, who set up his headquarters in Buthidaung. For the next month, Oo Kyaw Khine did his best to end the communal violence but he paid the ultimate price and was murdered in the process. Sandoway had been evacuated on 25 March and on the same day the Japanese Fifty-sixth Division had arrived in Rangoon by sea. It wasted no time in advancing northwards to link up with Japanese units in the Sittang Valley. A full-scale attack was launched on Toungoo, and the town fell on 26 March. At the same time, complex manoeuvres around Paungde and Shwedaung succeeded in cutting the main Rangoon–Prome road. Prome fell to the Japanese Thirty-third Division on 1 April 1942. The civilian evacuation in the Taungup area that had reached its zenith on 23 February finally came to an end on 3 May 1942. *

*

*

On 14 March 1942, Burnside had been ordered to leave immediately and a few days later he and his colleagues had boarded one of the last boats to sail from Taungup.25 Burnside felt very guilty because he left behind 1,500 refugees on the jetty. He had no idea, how, when, or even if, they would be able to leave, and was relieved a few days later to discover that most of the evacuees had managed to get away by boat. Lieutenant Hardy of the Burma Commandos was able subsequently to corroborate the information. On 3 April, Hardy had come through to Kaukpyu via the Taungup Pass route. He was one of the last people to do so. He reported that only three or four refugees were still on the road

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and that a few more were waiting for boats but that most of the evacuees had reached Kyaukpyu where they were waiting for steamers to Calcutta. Burnside felt considerable relief at this news, and took great pride in the fact that 70 per cent of his Forest Department staff had worked on the evacuation project in Arakan. Many of them had remained loyally at their posts to the bitter end. After 30 March 1942 the naval authorities took charge of evacuation arrangements in Akyab where thousands of refugees had been left behind after the Commissioner’s departure, and thousands more arrived during the next few weeks. The navy estimated that between them, naval vessels and country boats took 35,000 refugees off from the Arakan coast during the course of April 1942 and the early part of May.26 Thousands were thought to have died on the beaches and many more were left stranded. Of those who arrived in Calcutta many were reported to be skeletal, having survived starvation and dehydration. Thus the first surge of the evacuation which had passed through Taungup and Arakan came to an end.

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Buthidaung

IN CH

50

100

150 Yamethin

N SHA

Akyab

miles

Yenangyaug

S LL HI

Minbya

0

Magwe

An R

S HILL

An

Kywegun Letpan Lamu

Ra

m

Sabyin

re

e

kan Ara

Kyaukpyu

Allanmyo Thayetmyo

I Taungup

Toungoo

Taungup Prome Pass Nyaungchidauk 3832 ft Padaung

dy

d wa Irra

a Yo m

Sandoway

Henzada River

Bassein

RANGOON

Pegu

Syriam

Map 5.1 Civilian evacuation from Burma 1942: Taungup Pass route. By Philip Storey, psmapping.

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The evacuation of civilians through the Taungup Pass route was the first overland surge of refugees. It was a forerunner of what was to come and had all the elements of a great tragedy – rivalry, pain, drama, death, suffering, avarice, exhaustion, arrogance, pathos, treachery and terror. Many lives were saved but many were needlessly lost. The preamble to the following account is as important as the events it describes. At the end of December 1941 Vorley was told that his writ did not extend beyond Rangoon.1 It seemed nonsensical at a time when his colleagues were already feeding both thousands of Indian evacuees camping outside Rangoon and thousands more who were trekking towards Prome. Vorley had already drawn up plans for an anticipated increase in the number of evacuees passing through the Taungup Pass in Arakan. No one else was making these preparations and no one was in overall charge of the evacuation route. One officer was responsible for the section up to Prome another for the section from Prome to the Taungup Pass and a third for the section from Taungup onwards, but ‘none of these three officers knew what the other one was doing’.2 Administrative confusion was almost inevitable at a time when operational clarity was essential. Vorley was not happy because Dorman-Smith had put P. C. Fogarty in charge of coordinating the responses of all government departments to the Japanese invasion.3 He felt that it was his job and if there was one thing worse than having no coordinator, it was having two. Dorman-Smith feared that these strong-willed characters would clash and relations soon became strained when Vorley discovered that Fogarty had been systematically countermanding his decisions.4 Fogarty rarely kept written records of meetings or communicated decisions to key people (including Vorley himself). There was a real danger that personality clashes and organizational confusion might lead to the deaths of many evacuees.5 This became even more obvious to Vorley in January and February 1942. His Evacuation Department officials were constantly on duty at the railway station and jetties in Rangoon. They counted evacuees onto boats and onto trains and counted those left behind. Then they submitted daily reports to Fogarty’s office. The reports were always full of facts and figures and details of chronic overcrowding as well as estimated times of arrival but Fogarty ignored them. The information was never passed on to officials in Prome and as a consequence extra transport was not provided for those left behind in Rangoon and Vorley’s officials felt marginalized. During that period of two months Vorley claimed

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to have received only one instruction from Fogarty’s office, and that was to discourage evacuees from travelling to Prome. *

*

*

While Dorman-Smith, Vorley and Fogarty argued about policies, strategies and their relative status, middle managers on the spot in Arakan – unsung heroes like Mr P Burnside, U Kantaya, U Po Choe, Dr Sen, Lieutenant Brown and Oo Kyaw Khine – had to grit their teeth, bend their shoulders to the wheel and make the best of a very bad job. The attitudes of middle-ranking officials and their superior officers were very different. In Vorley’s view, the main lesson to take from the Taungup Pass experience was the importance of strong, overarching leadership. Indeed he was annoyed that he had not been called upon to take immediate responsibility for evacuation in the country as a whole. Not until the early part of April 1942 was he finally made Commissioner for Evacuation for the whole country and by that time it was far too late. Tragically Fogarty was killed in an air crash in February 1942, but Dorman-Smith and Vorley continued to squabble. Each man stoutly defended his own decisions and criticized the other. It was very unseemly but in the process they assembled treasure troves of data, descriptions and perspectives to support their cases. *

*

*

The Arakan evacuation will be remembered for five things – the disastrous cholera epidemic, the desperate search for new sources of drinking water, the mixture of heroism, altruism, selfishness and stupidity that was evident en route, the motley collection of launches and country boats that were assembled to rescue the evacuees, and the thousands who died on the way. The trek through the Taungup Pass was an epic event by any standards. Dorman-Smith may have overestimated the numbers (at 150,000 evacuees) but very many did pass through the Taungup Pass in a very short space of time. There is little evidence, however, that the government used the opportunity to evaluate its performance or to learn anything from it. Almost all the evacuees who trekked out through Arakan were Indians. There were a few Anglo-Indians, but (as far as is known) no Europeans. As a result there were few charges of discrimination although the absence of letters, diaries and personal reminiscences (a European preoccupation) meant that the Arakan evacuation attracted little popular attention in the West. In many ways it was the Cinderella of the evacuation in Burma. Although the middle managers were

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intelligent men of real humanity who solved complex problems and moved large numbers of people, it nevertheless raised important questions about the quality of leadership. Intimations of amateurishness hung over the project as senior managers in distant Rangoon were distracted by personal vendettas. *

*

*

Rangoon and Arakan were joined at the hip in the sense that the fall of Rangoon led directly to the rush through Arakan. It must be remembered that panic gripped Rangoon immediately after the bombing raids of 23 and 25 December 1941 and continued to do so until the end of February 1942.6 Each new raid brought more misery and more broken sleep. By mid-January the poorer classes of Indians in particular were determined to leave immediately.7 Tens of thousands of them walked out of the city along the Prome Road in three great waves at the end of December 1941 (immediately after the bombing raids), on Friday 20 January, when the ‘E’ Notice was hoisted and shortly before 8 March, when the city was finally evacuated. While most Europeans made for Mandalay and Maymyo, most Indians aimed for Prome. From there they would go on to Akyab and then by steamer to Chittagong. It seemed simple enough in theory but was fiendishly complicated in practice and by the beginning of April 1942 the Arakan route was closed to refugee traffic. *

*

*

Immediately after the first wave of Indians left Rangoon for Prome at the end of December 1941, the authorities in Rangoon got cold feet and decided that haemorrhaging manual labour at such a rapid rate was not a good idea.8 The Commissioner in Prome was instructed to prevent the refugees from going beyond Prome. He was told to send as many as possible of them back to Rangoon. By this time most of the evacuees had set up makeshift camps by the side of the Rangoon–Prome road and at least 14,000 refugees had already reached Prome. They were accommodated in very overcrowded camps or in ramshackle and insanitary shacks. Another 3,000 evacuees had managed to cross to the west bank of the Irrawaddy where they had set up camp in Padaung. A total of 2,000 refugees were persuaded to return to Rangoon, but most refused and as a result Prome became more unpleasant by the day. Evacuees crammed into fetid refugee camps and conditions deteriorated rapidly. *

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*

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Figure 5.1 Indian evacuees flee along the road to Prome, January 1942. Many of the refugees were coolies, manual workers, domestic servants and menials. They were on their way towards Akyab via the Taungup Pass. The government, concerned about the loss of the manual labour force, attempted to persuade them the return to Rangoon. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

In the middle of January 1942 (after the ‘E’ Notice was hoisted in Rangoon on Friday 20 January) a second wave of evacuees descended on Prome. They arrived at the rate of about 3,000 per day. The earlier refugees had not yet dispersed, so it was not long before some 10,000 people were being herded into camps in the centre of town. The latrines were muddy, stinking and overflowing. Many evacuees took to defecating in the river from which their drinking water was drawn. By the end of January, the first cases of cholera began to appear and little was done to prevent the disease spreading. By mid-February cholera had reached epidemic proportions. Local officials panicked and in order to relieve the pressure on resources in Prome, they encouraged the evacuees to move on towards Taungup. Medical staff made half-hearted efforts to inoculate the evacuees, but most of them refused point-blank to have injections. Nevertheless they were allowed to carry on walking towards Taungup and between 15 and 19 February about 8,000 were to be seen walking along the road towards Taungup. Cholera followed in their wake.9

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The Civil Surgeon in Prome had been on sick leave at the time, but fortunately in his place Dr Sen, an epidemiologist from Insein, arrived to take charge of public health in Prome. Dr Sen was a man of great energy and he immediately traced the cause of the cholera outbreak to drinking water drawn from a stream contaminated with raw sewage. He arranged for latrines to be dug, ordered cholera vaccine from Rangoon and instructed hospitals along the way to compulsorily inoculate as many evacuees as possible. He also prevailed upon the Director of Public Health in Rangoon to despatch a team of Burmese subassistant surgeons to Prome. Unfortunately only two of them arrived, the rest having deserted on the way. Indeed this pattern of desertion became the norm. For example, several doctors were sent to work in Padaung and Nyaungchidauk but they all deserted before reaching their destinations. Undeterred, Dr Sen concentrated on the urgent task of cleaning up the refugee camps in Prome. The bodies of cholera victims were piling up and threatening a catastrophe. Sen closed down contaminated camps. He incinerated the corpses and burned the contaminated camps to the ground with kerosene. Teams of doctors were instructed to set up inoculation points in all the refugee camps and railway stations and another inoculation centre was set up in Shwedaung, a town some 20 miles south of Prome. Next Dr Sen turned his attention to conditions on the Taungup road. He was horrified to hear about the 8,000 uninoculated evacuees who had been allowed to leave for Padaung. It completely undermined his strategy of containment, and threatened to transfer the cholera problem from Prome to Taungup. He drove to the village of Nyaungchidauk where he set up a medical station in which half the 8,000 evacuees were being inoculated. It was already too late for nearby Sen could see the bodies of at least 28 cholera victims by the roadside. One of Sen’s colleagues had come across so many corpses on another section of the road that he had had to drive his car over them.10 The town of Padaung was also a major concern. It had been swamped by the arrival of huge batches of evacuees, perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 of them at a time. Each new influx caused enormous sanitary problems and Sen realized that it was only a matter of time before there were real problems in Padaung. The dead were already taking precedence over the living, and disposing of the corpses of cholera victims became the priority before long supplies of cholera serum began to run out. *

*

*

Cholera was not the only problem on the Taungup route. By the time they reached Prome most of the evacuees had already walked 180 miles. They were

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exhausted before they made their way across the Irrawaddy. The next leg of the journey to Taungup normally took five days. The first 16 miles were reasonably easy, but the next 112 miles became rougher and steeper as the track climbed through the Arakan Yoma mountain range into the Taungup Pass. Food and drinking water supplies were extremely limited. Only once in a blue moon did a lorry laden with drinking water and food manage to grind its way through to the villages of Naungayo and Naungito.11 Otherwise everything had to be carried up by porters. *

*

*

In fact there were plenty of bullock carts available for hire in Padaung but the authorities would only permit a small number of them on the road at any one time. Bullocks were terrible ‘water guzzlers’. Nevertheless wealthier Indian evacuees demanded to travel in bullock carts and they were perfectly willing to pay anything that was asked in order to get hold of one. Before the war the ‘going rate’ for a bullock-cart journey to Taungup had been Rs 25. By March 1942 the hire charge had gone up to Rs 200 rupees. This was beyond the means of most ordinary refugees. Unscrupulous cart drivers regularly extorted money from unsuspecting passengers, a favourite trick being to stop the cart on a remote stretch of road and threaten to kill the passengers unless they handed over money or valuables. The frequency of this sort of highway robbery caused evacuees to think twice before hiring carts. *

*

*

A very important appointment was made at the end of January 1942. Mr P. Burnside (Divisional Forestry Officer) was put in charge of evacuation arrangements in Arakan.12 Of course it was very late in the day and Burnside discovered that although he was in charge, he was not in charge. He had to spend a great deal of his time second-guessing his line managers’ expectations. The trouble was that there were many of them. He was answerable to Vorley for a start, and to Dorman-Smith and for a short while to Fogarty. Then there were the District Commissioners (DC) of Akyab, Sandoway, Kyaukpyu, Taungup and Prome. Nevertheless, Burnside set about his task with gusto.13 He enlisted many former colleagues from the Forestry Service. U Kantaya and U Po Choe became his chief assistants and under them were Maung Tha Tun, Maung Chit Maung, Maung Mi, U Ba Pe, U Ba Thaw, Maung Saw Yein Fan and Maung Tun Pe.14 Burnside could be forgiven for assuming that he had plenty of time to prepare the route before any mass influx of evacuees was likely to arrive in Taungup.

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For at the end of January few believed that Rangoon would fall at any moment. Indeed at the beginning of February 1942 the greater concern was that launches were sailing empty between Taungup and Kyaukpyu because there were so few evacuees. Burnside took up his post in Taungup at the beginning of February 1942.15 The situation changed almost immediately, for as we have already seen, evacuees began pouring out of Prome at the rate of five hundred per day and flooding along the Padaung–Taungup road. The numbers increased steadily. Burnside had not yet managed to construct camps along the route. However, even before the camps could be built a most pressing problem had to be solved. Water was always a major issue in the Arakanese hinterland as temperatures soared during the dry season. By the middle of February 1942, disaster loomed. Thousands of thirsty evacuees arrived at the same time that most of the streams were drying up. There were few accessible alternative water sources. Burnside set out on a frantic tour of inspection of roadside springs and gave instructions for small reservoirs to be dug at each spring. However, it was very slow and labour intensive and each reservoir held only a small amount of water.16 Wells were another possibility but very few wells had been dug and most were extremely unreliable. The nature of the terrain and lack of labour made it impossible to dig more wells or reservoirs in the time available. Nor was the river much help. In its lower reaches it was tidal, salty and undrinkable and in its upper reaches water levels fell rapidly during the dry season. Bullock carts were the bane of Burnside’s life. The trouble was that each team of bullocks consumed five tins of water per day on the outgoing journey and the same amount on the return journey. Five tins of water were the average daily consumption for 30 evacuees, so a team of oxen (there and back) effectively displaced 60 evacuees. Burnside tried to limit the number of bullock carts using the route in order to make way for the maximum number of pedestrians. He decided that only the elderly, infirm, nursing mothers and very young children should be allowed to travel in bullock carts. However, there were many more children, elderly and infirm evacuees than he had anticipated and wealthy Indians demanded bullock-cart transport whether or not they needed it. Even before the water problem was solved, Burnside set about building camps and within a few weeks he had managed to construct three permanent rest camps on the road between Padaung and Taungup – one at Tanagyi, a second at Yebawgyi and a third, specifically for bullock-cart passengers, at Pennebin-

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Saken. He had also managed to build three camps along the Taungup River route and a fourth camp at Sutpya-Chaungwa in the Thayetmyo Division. ‘Mid-day halts’ were also under construction at Salu and Kyauktaga. Burnside delegated the task of running the refugee camps to U Po Choe, under whom he appointed two foresters to be in charge of each camp. The predicted number of refugees was estimated at 500 to 1,000 per day, but the actual number was much larger so the camps were always terribly overcrowded. *

*

*

On 16 February 1942 Burnside had received that fateful telegram from the DC in Prome, informing him of the serious cholera epidemic there. It had explained that 2,000 refugees were leaving Prome and that a cholera epidemic was spreading along the road to Taungup. The number of evacuees was increasing daily until it reached a peak between 21 February and 25 February. At that time 21,000 refugees were estimated to be in transit along the road between Prome and Taungup. Despite all Dr Sen’s efforts, few of these evacuees had been inoculated against cholera and by the time they reached Taungup many were showing symptoms of the disease. Decaying corpses littered the road and in an attempt to escape the infection, coolies, policemen, telegraph linesmen, subordinate officials, medical orderlies and forestry workers were deserting their posts in droves. It made it very difficult for Burnside to distribute food to his network of refugee camps. In the midst of these terrible circumstances, U Kantaya, U Po Choe and two other foresters stuck to their tasks and demonstrated immense courage. Dr Choudhury, a physician from Sandoway, provided valiant support. Between them they cared for the sick and disposed of corpses. They had no vaccines or medicines and found it difficult to distinguish between the symptoms of cholera, enteritis and exhaustion. As luck would have it Burnside was away from his post for a few days at the height of the crisis, so was unaware of the scale of the disaster.17 When he returned on 23 February he was astonished to discover 20,000 evacuees milling around aimlessly in Taungup. Burnside discovered that a very ugly situation had developed in one of the refugee camps. A group of subordinate officers were holding as hostage 2,000 evacuees and extorting money from them. Burnside was appalled by this turn of events. He immediately recovered Rs 5,000 of the extorted money and returned it to the owners. He disciplined the staff involved in the racket although he did not do enough to assuage the fury of the victims.

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Some ‘hotheaded’ young evacuees threatened murder and arson and Burnside’s powers of diplomacy were stretched to the limit. *

*

*

Conditions in Taungup were very difficult. The influx of thousands of evacuees had caused terrible shortages of drinking water, food and medical supplies and imposed immense strains on the sewage system. The town was in a cul-de-sac at the head of a narrow stream and was unsuitable to be a river terminus. Although only a short distance to the sea, the river was tidal and only navigable at certain times of the day. In normal times, two or three boats at the most would call at the town each day, but throughout February and March 1942 the river was filled with vessels of all types and sizes. As more and more evacuees flooded into Taungup, Burnside had to go from camp to camp explaining the extent of the crisis. He told the evacuees that because of acute shortages of clean drinking water they must move on as quickly as possible. The easiest and quickest route out of Taungup was by the river and sea route to Akyab and most people wanted to travel this way. It became extremely congested. As an alternative there was also an overland track to Akyab via Minbya. The poorest class of Indians who could not afford the boat fares to Akyab had little alternative but to go by this route. The death rate along it was very high and the journey involved a gruelling 200-mile tramp over rough terrain. Several wide streams like the Ma-I and An rivers had to be crossed by ferry. Rice and drinking water were at a premium and dacoits posed a threat (although it was often exaggerated). At least a thousand evacuees passed through Kywegum each day on their way to Akyab, and on one celebrated occasion about 10,000 evacuees passed through the town in a single day. Burnside urged all fit young males to walk overland by this route in order to free up places for women and children on the boats. As an alternative he tried to persuade refugees to retrace their steps to the riverine towns of Sinchigaing and Wetcheik where launches were waiting to take them down-river to Kyaukpyu. These exhortations fell on deaf ears, and it soon became apparent that many able-bodied males had no intention of walking by the longer more hazardous overland route. Other evacuees were equally unwilling to retrace their footsteps. There was a distinct lack of altruism. This had been demonstrated in Padaung where wealthy Indian merchants had insisted on carrying vast amounts of personal baggage, valuables, furniture and merchandise in bullock carts, refusing to give lifts even to poor old women. This same callous spirit had reared its head again in Taungup. Whenever a boat arrived the fittest and strongest

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always managed to muscle their way to the front. Burnside was convinced that this behaviour was costing lives. Most evacuees simply disregarded Burnside’s exhortations and instead they hung around in Taungup determined to fight their way onto the next boat to arrive. Burnside was forced to look for new ways in which to ration dwindling supplies of drinking water. In the end he resorted to charging money for the use of water. It was a crude mechanism that ensured the wealthy a better chance of survival than the poor. Evacuees who were unable or unwilling to pay for water had to wash in muddy puddles in nearby creeks from which drinking water was also drawn. Enteritis became very common, and wells had to be constantly policed in order to prevent refugees ‘stealing’ drinking water. It was a struggle to prevent refugees from bathing in drinking water. *

*

*

The river from Taungup was navigable down to the coast and evacuees jostled and fought for boat tickets at the booking office by the riverside. As the crowds increased ticket touts began to operate freely and a black market in boat tickets flourished. Refugees were willing to pay double or even treble the official price for a ticket. Women were supposed to take precedence on the launches but more often than not, men would unceremoniously barge in front of them. On most launches only about 25 per cent of the passengers were women. It was not unusual to see women reselling their tickets to single men at a considerable profit. Pickpockets had a field day in the dense crowds, and if arrested they could usually bribe the policemen. All in all, Taungup had become a thoroughly lawless and unpleasant place. The trip by boat to Akyab usually took about four or five days and because of the turnaround time, evacuees with tickets often had to wait several days before they were able to board a boat. The wait became longer and longer as time went by. Burnside sent many urgent requests to officials in Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Sandoway, asking them to send more country boats up to Taungup. Despite these appeals, the launches rarely carried more than 300 passengers per day. Even the arrival of several IFC vessels from Bassein seemed to make little difference partly because of a very high attrition rate among crews. Vessels were frequently left stranded on the river and those boatmen who did remain at their posts were often corrupt. One of the most common ploys was to turf passengers off the boats at Kyaukpyu rather than take them all the way to Akyab. Burnside became thoroughly despondent. He had no legal powers and could do little to remedy the various malpractices that proliferated. Belligerent evacuees often threatened

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him and, for example, on one occasion a demented man followed him around all day violently demanding a place at the front of the boat queue. Tempers always boiled over when a launch drew alongside the jetty in Taungup. The crowd would surge forward and break through the barriers. They would trample over officials. Refugees clambered over barbed-wire fences, tearing their clothes and flesh in the process. The local police were generally ineffective but attempted to keep the mob back by administering severe beatings. Burnside dismissed as ‘next to useless’ two officials, U Kyin Lynn and U An, who had been sent up from Kyaukpyu to assist with law and order.18 The situation seemed to improve slightly when Mr Orr (DSP) arrived in mid-March. *

*

*

The experiences of the boat passengers were bad enough, but thousands of refugees who could not afford boat tickets had no alternative but to walk to Akyab via Minbya. It was a long and extremely hazardous route. Before they left Taungup each evacuee was issued with enough rice to last ten days, and then instructed to follow a seemingly endless line of telegraph poles out of town. A ferry service was organized to take the evacuees across the An Chaung River, but otherwise the evacuees were left entirely to their own devices.19 Many of them died of cholera, exhaustion, hunger and dehydration on the way. Indeed, the DC of Kyaukpyu was so alarmed that he did his very best to prevent the evacuees from entering. Burnside kept a tally of evacuee movements in and out of Taungup in February and March 1942 (Table 5.1). It was a remarkable achievement because he had to collect the data in very difficult circumstances. He put the table together in equally difficult circumstances in Margherita in July 1943.20 It comes as no great surprise to discover that his figures do not always add up. Nevertheless, the overall message is very clear. Burnside’s difficulties were compounded by the fact that numbered tickets were issued to all refugees who arrived in Taungup from Prome between 13 and 23 February. This is why the numbers are so precise between those dates. However, the numbered-ticket system had to be abandoned after 24 February because an extortion racket was uncovered. After that date the evacuees arriving in Taungup were counted manually (and therefore inexactly). From then on the entries became estimates. It explains also why so many round numbers (e.g. 2,000) appear within the ‘arrivals’ column after 24 February. Until 13 March, the numbers of passengers departing by launch were also calculated by the use of numbered-ticket sales. On that date it became clear

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Table 5.1 Numbers of evacuees passing through Taungup in 1942 Date

9/2–12/2 13/2 14/2 15/2 16/2 17/2 18/2 19/2 20/2 21/2 22/2 23/2 24/2 25/2 26/2 27/2 28/2 2/3 3/3 4/3 5/3 6/3 7/3 8/3 9/3 10/3 11/3 12/3 13/3 14/3 15/3 16/3 17/3 18/3 19/3 20/3 21/3 22/3

Arrival

2,000 559 1,089 – 225 785 875 1,272 1,815 2,807 4,316 9,000 5,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 2,100 850 760 780 900 1,000 800 1,200 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,500 2,000 2,500 1,500 600 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,600 2,000 2,500

Departures

Walk

Launch

Boat

Total

500 380 300 – 235 307 – 300 460 328 90 335 – 494 197 683 700 250 450 1,100 100 300 800 400 350 – 700 700 300 – – 250 275 300 300 – 600 –

1,300 350 497 – 127 180 3,200 618 1,060 2,355 784 312 – 741 579 463 1,869 1,000 1,000 1,568 2,033 2,726 1,971 1,180 987 1,721 1,965 706 600 2,560 1,200 964 1,500 1,000 2,700 1,600 1,550 1,500

1,800 730 797 – 362 487 320 918 1,520 2,683 874 647 – 1,235 776 1,326 2,569 1,250 1,450 2,668 2,133 3,026 2,771 1,580 1,337 1,721 2,565 1,406 900 2,560 1,200 1,214 1,775 1,300 3,000 1,600 2,150 1,500

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Balance [A]*

– – – – – 105 200 – – – – – – – – – 600 200 8,000 200 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

[B]*

– – – – – – – – – – 496 600 1,053 200 1,406 800 1,702 1,000 2,826 1,000 6,268 2,000 14,621 – 19,621 – 21,386 – 22,610 – 22,284 – 19,000 – 18,000 – 10,000 – 6,000 – 6,000 – 4,000 – 3,000 – 3,000 – 4,000 – 3,000 – 2,000 – 4,000 – 5,000 – 5,000 – 5,000 – 4,000 – 4,000 – 3,000 – 1,500+ – 1,500 – 1,500 – 2,500 –

Burials Total 200 200 442 – 200 1,098 1,253 2,206 2,702 3,826 8,268 14,621 19,621 21,386 22,610 22,284 19,000 18,000 10,000 6,000 6,000 4,000 3,000 3,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 4,000 5,000 5,000 5,000+ 4,000+ 4,000 3,000+ 1,500+ 1,500+ 1,500 2,500

– – – – – – – – – – – – – 16 17 49 38 20 25 20 41 45 38 55 25 32 23 17 15 11 10 6 12 5 3 8 5 3

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Table 5.1 Continued Date

Arrival

Departures Launch

23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 Total

2,500 350 3,000 1,000 3,000 – – – 75,433 13,834

Boat

Walk Total

1,700 2,050 2,000 3,000 2,500 2,500 1,000 1,000 50,888 64,722

Balance [A]*

[B]*

Burials Total

– 2,000 – 2,000 2 – 2,000 – 2,000 – – 2,500 – 2,500 – – 1,500 – 1,500+ – 9,000 [225,773 5,600 243,917] 600

Notes: 1. *[A] = Taungup, [B] = Kyauktaga 2. Burnside’s figures are taken warts and all (i) The total arrivals (column 2) should read 75,333 not 75,433. (ii) The total departures by boat (column 4) should read 53,666 not 50,888. (iii) The total departures by boat plus launch (column 5) should be 64,700 not 64,722, but some of the other figures in the column are incorrect – e.g. the entries for 18 February (3200, not 320), 27 February (1,146 not 1,326) and 11 March (2,665 not 2,565) – so the actual total should read 67,500. (iv) The total number of ‘walking evacuees’, (column 6) is 9,405 and not 9,000. (v) Total burials (column 10) is 541 not 600. (vi) Columns 7, 8 and 9 are incomprehensible as it stands. The total of 243,917 evacuees (in column 9) is almost three times larger than those mentioned elsewhere in the table. Source: BL/OIR/EUR/MSS/M/3/955/: P. Burnside, Report on Civil Evacuation: Report on Evacuation by the Taungup Pass, Arakan Division, Appendix 3 (12 July 1943).

that the ticket sales and actual numbers of passengers travelling did not always tally, so the passengers began to be counted as they boarded vessels. Again the figures should be regarded as estimates. Despite these shortcomings, Burnside’s statistics are immensely valuable. They reveal that well over 75,000 refugees passed through Taungup during February and March 1942. Almost 65,000 of this number travelled by riverboat from Taungup to Akyab and over 9,000 trekked out overland. The figures also reveal that 600 were buried – and many more died – within the space of a few short weeks. By any standards, this was evacuation on a grand scale. Burnside pointed out that there was more in the statistics than met the eye. For example, children (of whom there were very many) were not included in the total numbers of arrivals or departures. Had they been included the total number of evacuees might have been nearer 90,000. He also mentioned that the actual number of boat passengers was probably considerably greater than the number recorded in the data. An unknown number of refugees managed to ‘stow away’ illegally on vessels without the requisite boat passes and they were therefore not included in the total. On the other hand Burnside was adamant that the total of 9,000 that he gave for the number of evacuee ‘walkers’ was

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fairly accurate as they were counted on and off the An Chaung Ferry en route to Akyab. One major puzzle remains. The 600 or so burials recorded in Burnside’s statistics (Table 3.2) seem surprisingly few in view of the harsh conditions and cholera epidemic. However, the number of burials should not be confused with the number of deaths. It is almost certain that many dead bodies remained undiscovered in remote valleys and jungles. Perhaps, also, many hundreds of corpses were thrown into the river and flowed out to sea. Moreover, the figure does not include a total of 296 corpses disposed of by U Kantaya on a 40-mile stretch of road on the Arakan side of the boundary. Had they been included the total would have been 837. Almost certainly as many evacuees died on the Prome side of the border as died in Arakan. If this was the case, it is safe to assume that at least 2,000 of the 75,000 or so refugees died in the space of a few days after leaving Prome and before reaching Akyab between 9 February and 26 March. Probably most of the deaths occurred among the 9,000 evacuees who walked out by the overland routes among whom the mortality rate seems to have been 9 per cent – not surprising in these atrocious conditions and during a cholera epidemic. Cholera was not the only reason for the high mortality rate. Dorman-Smith cited poor transport as a contributory factor. The acute shortage of cars, buses and petrol supplies meant that riverboats, ox carts and shanks’ pony were the only forms of transport. Another reason was that many evacuees refused to register with the authorities at Taungup and as a result they rendered themselves ineligible for the standard ‘dole’ of rice that was handed out to ‘registered’ evacuees. Those who did not receive the ‘dole’ were therefore more prone to exhaustion, less resistant to disease on the onward journey and more likely to die. Burnside reported that corpses lay everywhere along the overland evacuation route and that they made the air unbelievably foul. Local villagers were unwilling to bury the dead unless they were paid enormous sums in return. In the end, the gruesome task was left to gangs of Madrassis who were willing to dispose of the corpses, burn contaminated belongings and clear up the mess generally in return for U Kantaya’s generous inducements of guaranteed free places on the launches, free rations and Rs ⅛ per day. Local licensees were more than happy to ply the men with liquor to help them cope with the stench. *

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*

*

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Among the evacuees were many Indian doctors, and Burnside had fondly hoped that they would linger in Taungup to help with the unfolding humanitarian crisis there. Instead most of them badgered him for priority tickets, and were only too keen to scramble onto the first launch to leave for Akyab. Burnside found it hard to forgive them, but even harder to forgive charitable organizations that purported to offer selfless service in the national interest. In Burnside’s view many of them were utterly bogus. The Ramakrishna Mission was a case in point. Burnside considered it to be completely fraudulent. The Special Commissioner for refugees in Prome cabled Burnside asking him to provide spacious accommodation for the Ramakrishna Mission, which he promised, would soon be caring for the sick and maim in Taungup. Dr Dutta of the Ramakrishna Mission duly arrived, and Burnside welcomed him with open arms. Dutta explained that he could not stay long, and that he would only stay long enough to set things up before travelling on to Akyab to do the same thing there. It was very exciting and breathless stuff, although Burnside was later to observe that the only ‘setting up’ Dutta did was to obtain a complementary first-class priority boat ticket to Akyab. Before he left he urged the rest of his Ramakrishna Mission colleagues to come up to Taungup as quickly as possible. A few days later a Ramakrishna Mission swami arrived, accompanied by two or three other men. They had no medicines, cared for not a single sick patient and took full advantage of Burnside’s generous hospitality. After a couple of days they too disappeared into thin air. Shortly afterwards another man arrived bearing a piece of Ramakrishna Mission headed notepaper on which was scribbled a note demanding that he should be given a priority ticket to Akyab. Burnside had had enough, and by this time recognized fraud when he saw it. He told the man ‘to shove off ’ and no more Ramakrishna Mission employees arrived after that. Burnside felt particularly aggrieved because humanitarian help was desperately needed in Taungup, but the only charitable donation he received during the whole time was from Mr Guha of Farekh Bros in Akyab, who occasionally sent up a few boxes of vegetables. The death rate among the evacuees stayed extremely high until 12 March when the Bengal Mission arrived in Taungup with significant stocks of medicines. A Medical Officer of the Madras Medical Mission followed soon afterwards. He was an outstanding man. In the space of two days, he and Burnside supplied more than 2,000 penniless refugees with free boat and launch passages and sent them down to Akyab. It was a remarkable feat in view of the fact that during the

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whole two-month period of the evacuation, only 2,500 refugees (including the above 2,000) had been helped in this way. *

*

*

Acute shortages of rice at the end of February came at the point when the influx of refugees from Prome had reached its peak. It meant that profiteers and confidence tricksters had a field day. Local villagers charged exorbitant prices for rice and on 23 February when Burnside tried to buy 100 baskets of rice from the local Township Officer he was told that not a single basket was available. It appears that unscrupulous brokers had bought the lot and were making huge profits by reselling it. Burnside had to ship in rice and salt at great expense from as far away as Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Sandoway. He set up distribution centres in Taungup, Wetcheik and Sinchigaing and each day he supplied 1,000–2,000 evacuees with free rice. Condensed milk was another essential staple commodity that was targeted by black marketers. The average Burmese labourer consumed two tins of condensed milk each day, although most refugees could survive on one tin per day because they were not involved in hard physical labour. Nevertheless, the black market in condensed milk encouraged evacuees to sell their surplus cans at grossly inflated rates. An illicit trade in water also reached epidemic proportions. Richer refugees illegally bought water for Rs 2–5 per tin and sold it on at a profit. Local villagers were also quite happy to make money from the sale of water, and, as usual, the poor lost out in the cruel mechanisms of black-marketeering. Boat owners were among others who also made vast profits out of human misery. The cost of hiring a boat from Taungup to Akyab rose from Rs 250 per boat at the beginning of February to Rs 2,000 by the end of March. Also during March 1942 touts in Taungup preyed on richer evacuees who had been arriving in large numbers. Most of the new arrivals were willing to pay the earth for a quick passage to Akyab. On 24 February 1942, the DC tried to fix the price of launch hire at Rs 3 per head, but the going rate had risen to Rs 5 per head, by 14 March. It had to be refixed at Rs 8 per head and at the height of the ‘rush to the coast’ the rich were willing to pay whatever price boatmen demanded. Exploitative boatmen not infrequently dropped off their unsuspecting passengers in Ramree or Kyaukpyu so they could get back more quickly to pick up the next load of passengers. Because everyone was so anxious to get away as quickly as possible, the police had great difficulty in persuading witnesses to testify against criminals and few thought it worth reporting crimes. As a result there were few prosecutions.

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Only one case of armed robbery was reported during the whole time and no eyewitnesses were prepared to come forward to testify. In any case the police force was so seriously undermanned because of desertions that it was not in a position to investigate crimes. Burnside’s organization was also seriously understaffed because of sickness and deaths and also because there were over 1,000 deserters during March 1942. The result was that lawlessness and crime flourished and also went totally unpunished. *

*

*

The death and sickness rate among evacuees increased exponentially during March. This was partly due to the fact that thousands of evacuees had left Prome without adequate food supplies, partly because temperatures in Arakan had soared and partly because the streams and wells had dried up. In desperation, parched evacuees would often resort to drinking tidal saltwater causing them to become seriously ill as a result. It is possible that many lives would have been saved had more evacuees been able to get to Taungup during January 1942 rather than a month later. In January the weather was cooler, streams were full of running water and the cholera epidemic had not yet started. The decision to close the Arakan road to evacuees for a whole month in January 1942 had profound consequences. Officials reached the decision to prevent coolies, cooks, sweepers, police railwaymen and other essential workers from leaving Rangoon. As it was, many of those who had left Rangoon in December and January were forced to squander their meagre resources on journeys back to Rangoon or in weeks of inactivity in Prome. Most of them eventually turned up penniless in Taungup. Burnside’s socialist principles bubbled to the surface and he delivered a rare peroration. ‘The rich man’, he said, ‘did not give a damn for his poor brother’. Many of these rich men were not refugees in its strict sense. They came with cartloads, moving house and home. One marwari actually continued to sell his cloth wares after he had boarded the launch at Taungup. They were a curse when it came to boarding the launch with piles of boxes, trunks, and so on. With no labour to handle the luggage it took time to load it and the situation was made worse by the mob rushing the launch. ‘Many a launch was almost swamped out and crews scared out of their lives’.21 *

*

*

Refugees who had left Taungup by boat began arriving in Kyaukpyu from midFebruary onwards. Kyaukpyu was a coastal town of 4,000 inhabitants. It was situated on the north-west extremity of Ramree Island. If they still had sufficient

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Figure 5.2 HMIS Indus in Akyab Harbour, March 1942. The Indus was one of three naval vessels involved in the controversial and ‘premature’ escape of Mr R. P. Abigail ICS and British officials on 30 March 1942 and also in the subsequent evacuation of many civilians from Akyab. Japanese planes sank the Indus off Akyab on 6 April 1942. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

money in their pockets, the evacuees would queue at the jetty to buy tickets for the steamer to Calcutta or Chittagong. They often had a very long wait and on one occasion when a steamer failed to arrive at Kyaukpyu, a crowd of 10,000 refugees built up. In this case they waited several days until the next steamer arrived. It took the authorities a very long time to clear the backlog of passengers. Kyaukpyu was extremely fraught during the whole of February and March. Corruption, fraud and extortion were ubiquitous, while arguments and fights broke out over the sale of steamer tickets. It was complicated by the fact that steamer passengers had to be ferried in small craft from the jetty to the steamers, which lay at anchor in the harbour. This practice gave rise to yet more arguments, more fighting, more opportunities for stowaways to get on board, more extortion and more corruption. Not until 26 March (by which time the situation had become really desperate) were evacuees permitted to travel free on steamers to India. At the bottom of the social pile were hundreds of destitute evacuees. By the time they reached Kyaukpyu they had completely exhausted their resources and were certainly unable to afford the steamer fare. They tended to wander around town creating mayhem and hoping for a miracle to happen. Food and water supplies were very limited and sewage disposal became a real problem. Kyaukpyu

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had become a perfect breeding ground for cholera and the Kyaukpyu Municipal Committee was openly hostile to the evacuees. They tried to prevent them from entering the town. However, a charitable trust was set up by a group of wealthy Indian residents who genuinely wished to help the refugees. It provided them with food and shelter and very occasionally steamer tickets were bought for those in desperate need. For the most part, however, the evacuees who could not afford to buy steamer tickets had to trust to the few remaining country boats, which were still operating between Kyaukpyu and Akyab. It required a considerable act of faith to sail in them. They were large, unwieldy, sail-assisted rowing boats. They often leaked like sieves and were always grossly overloaded. The passengers had to squeeze together on the deck. Often there was standing room only, and cholera sufferers had to stand hugger-mugger with healthy passengers. The passage to Akyab could take five or six days and during this time there was no protection from the prevailing westerly wind. The sea was often very rough and the experience was thoroughly dangerous and unpleasant. *

*

*

By the end of February large numbers of evacuees had begun to arrive in Akyab.22 The town was totally unprepared to receive them. No camps had been prepared, ticket sales were disorganized and it was left to one of the harbour pilots, Mr Thomsett, to collect and issue rations. Large groups of evacuees camped all around the jetty in the most insanitary conditions. The military situation determined how and when the evacuation in Arakan would end. It became clear immediately after the Sittang Bridge debacle that the Japanese Army would eventually cut off the evacuation route to Prome and thence to Taungup. The first unmistakable sign that the end was in sight came when Akyab was bombed on 23 March. Many civilians had already left for India by this time, but now the police deserted their posts in large numbers, municipal services ceased to function, bazaars closed, food ran out and the remaining civilians fled en masse. By the end of March the town was empty. Many riverlaunches and wharves were destroyed. Vessels stopped sailing up the Kaladan River and along coastal stretches between Taungup and Akyab. The bombing of Akyab had several unexpected political consequences. The Commissioner of the Arakan Division, R. P. Abigail ICS, left his post on 30 March with the rest of the British civilian administration. They all slipped out of Akyab in one of three naval vessels that had been lying at anchor in the harbour. Abigail promised everyone waiting on the quayside that the two remaining

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vessels would pick up those who wanted to get to India. It was not true. Abigail faced widespread criticism when he decided to leave for India. Sections of the press accused British officials of ‘cowardice’ and of ‘cutting and running’. The criticisms were hard to rebut in view of the fact that the Japanese did not actually occupy Akyab until a month later. The three service chiefs based in Akyab remonstrated against Abigail’s decision and urged him to stay. Even DormanSmith expressed surprise that Abigail had left on the first and not the last of the three ships in Akyab harbour, and also that he had chosen to go to Calcutta rather than to withdraw to a safer part of Arakan.23 The Commissioner’s flight played into the hands of mischief makers who were able to spread rumours that Japanese agents had landed in the Kyaukpyu District, although the town was not actually occupied until 3 May. More ominously, perhaps, the vacuum left by the Commissioner’s departure allowed serious communal disturbances to flare up between the Arakanese Buddhists and Chittagonian Muslim settlers in Buthidaung.24 Tribute must be paid to the valiant work of the Deputy Commissioner, Oo Kyaw Khine, who set up his headquarters in Buthidaung. For the next month, Oo Kyaw Khine did his best to end the communal violence but he paid the ultimate price and was murdered in the process. Sandoway had been evacuated on 25 March and on the same day the Japanese Fifty-sixth Division had arrived in Rangoon by sea. It wasted no time in advancing northwards to link up with Japanese units in the Sittang Valley. A full-scale attack was launched on Toungoo, and the town fell on 26 March. At the same time, complex manoeuvres around Paungde and Shwedaung succeeded in cutting the main Rangoon–Prome road. Prome fell to the Japanese Thirty-third Division on 1 April 1942. The civilian evacuation in the Taungup area that had reached its zenith on 23 February finally came to an end on 3 May 1942. *

*

*

On 14 March 1942, Burnside had been ordered to leave immediately and a few days later he and his colleagues had boarded one of the last boats to sail from Taungup.25 Burnside felt very guilty because he left behind 1,500 refugees on the jetty. He had no idea, how, when, or even if, they would be able to leave, and was relieved a few days later to discover that most of the evacuees had managed to get away by boat. Lieutenant Hardy of the Burma Commandos was able subsequently to corroborate the information. On 3 April, Hardy had come through to Kaukpyu via the Taungup Pass route. He was one of the last people to do so. He reported that only three or four refugees were still on the road

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and that a few more were waiting for boats but that most of the evacuees had reached Kyaukpyu where they were waiting for steamers to Calcutta. Burnside felt considerable relief at this news, and took great pride in the fact that 70 per cent of his Forest Department staff had worked on the evacuation project in Arakan. Many of them had remained loyally at their posts to the bitter end. After 30 March 1942 the naval authorities took charge of evacuation arrangements in Akyab where thousands of refugees had been left behind after the Commissioner’s departure, and thousands more arrived during the next few weeks. The navy estimated that between them, naval vessels and country boats took 35,000 refugees off from the Arakan coast during the course of April 1942 and the early part of May.26 Thousands were thought to have died on the beaches and many more were left stranded. Of those who arrived in Calcutta many were reported to be skeletal, having survived starvation and dehydration. Thus the first surge of the evacuation which had passed through Taungup and Arakan came to an end.

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6

Mass Transportation

The evacuation of almost half-a-million civilians from Burma within 180 days did not just happen by chance. Men, women, old, young, rich, destitute, Indian and European had to be moved over difficult terrain and under attack. The process stretched political wills, organizational structures and personal courage to the limit. It also required heavy lifting on an industrial scale, commercial commitment, deep pockets and shareholder sacrifice. Regiments of coolies and tonnes of ‘plant’ in the form of steamers, riverboats, aircraft, lorries, cars, bullock carts and railway rolling stock were deployed in the project. Only in the very last stages did the collective endeavour collapse. This was no ‘boys own’ adventure. It was a grown-up contest between mass transportation, time and disaster. Two modes of transportation are featured in this chapter. The first was ‘international’ in the sense that it took evacuees directly from Burma to India either in ocean-going vessels or by plane. The second was domestic. It was hybrid and complex, and it involved combinations of riverboats, railways, cars, lorries and much footslogging within Burma itself. In the earlier stages of the evacuation, before April 1942, many of the evacuees who fled northwards from Rangoon had no intention of leaving Burma. Some of them (mainly Indians) simply wanted to get away from the bombing, and a few (mainly Europeans) hoped to re-establish government or businesses in Mandalay or Maymyo. Most regarded Upper Burma as a safe place beyond the reach of Japanese bombers. They were proved wrong. *

*

*

Flotillas of ocean-going steamers were the first to come into play. With Rangoon in flames at the beginning of January 1942 many Indians wanted to do nothing more than board a ship and sail to India. For several months past British and

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IA

Pangsau Chaukkan Pass Pass

D

Dimapur

Myitkyina

Ch ind wi

n

IN

Kohima

Imphal

Homalin

Irrawaddy

A

Ye-U

een Salw

dwin

Okma CHITTAGONG

Chin

Kalewa

IN

Katha

Yuwa Indaw Mawlaik

H

Bhamo

Tamu Pass

Tamu

C

To Chunking

Palel

Lashio

Kyaukmydung Shwebo

Monywa MANDALAY Maymyp Sagaing Myingyan

Pakokku

Kengtung Thazi Kalaw

Akyab

Taunggyi

Magwe

Toungoo

Prome Shwedaung

ddy Irrawa

Shwegyin

Salw een

Pyinmana Allanmyo Thayetmyo

Pyuntaza

Henzada Pegu Yangdon Bassein

0

100

miles

200

RANGOON

Mingladon

Moulmein

300

Map 6.1 Civilian evacuation from Burma 1942: Transport routes. By Philip Storey, psmapping.

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American families had been doing just that – not to India, but to South Africa, Australia and the United States. In due course a defence ordinance was issued which staunched the flow. It prohibited European (although not Indian or Anglo-Indian) males from leaving Burma, but in any case the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse had made the high seas much less safe than they were before.1 The bombing of Rangoon on 23 and 25 December was the trigger. Crowds of Indians mobbed shipping offices in Rangoon demanding boat tickets to India. There were far too few ships and far too many evacuees.2 Robert Hutchings (the Government of India Agent) was deputed to distribute tickets, but violence broke out, people brawled, touts resold tickets at vastly inflated prices, while extortion and bribery were rife. The police had to intervene repeatedly to restore order. It was suggested that destitute Indian evacuees should be transported free of charge, for many had walked from Moulmein, were exhausted and had no money. However, Burmese ministers would have none of it. Spending public money on non-indigenous peoples was not an option. The Government of India eventually relented and agreed to buy tickets for Indians who could not afford them, but it was too late.3 On 17 January the Evacuation Department was given sole responsible for issuing tickets and allocating berths and told to sort out the problem. In future, deck tickets would be sold only at the Rangoon Race Course (no back street deals) and under strict controls. Even this did not prevent angry scenes or huge mobs from smashing up ticket offices. Armed police frequently had to intervene. The situation was complicated because the government did not want able-bodied workers to leave the country. It decreed that an adult male could only sail to India if he was accompanied by at least five women evacuees. This requirement was difficult to supervise, and gave rise to endless arguments. There were other, far knottier problems to resolve – how to satisfy the demand of wealthy Indians and Anglo-Indians for saloon-class accommodation, for example. They were even prepared to accept deck accommodation as long as coolies, sweepers and others were kept well away. In response, Vorley commissioned SS Chilka for one voyage only. He reserved all 2,800 berths for wealthy Indians and Anglo-Indians. They paid through the nose for the privilege, and for one day only the SS Chilka became a sort of luxury cruise ship. Its better-class passengers were assembled at the Burma Athletics Association field and, in best cruise-line tradition, they were transported to the docks in fleets of buses. They had to dodge bombs and air raids on the way. The freshly fumigated SS Chilka waited for them in the harbour and they steamed off to Calcutta. Money could buy almost anything even in time of war.4

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Evacuation by sea was politically charged. Its military ramifications exercised minds at the highest level. Senior naval officers were reluctant to allow civilian evacuees to use Royal Navy vessels, fearing it would compromise security, lead to leaks of information about sailing schedules and would extend turnaround times.5 On 14 January 1942, Hutchings warned Dorman-Smith that he must tell the Royal Navy that if they did not clear the backlog of 40,000 Indian evacuees waiting for boat passages there was a risk of serious civil disorder. The Naval and Military chiefs relented, and agreed to carry evacuees on troopships on certain conditions. Only ships returning empty to India would be used and only then if they were not required for other military tasks. Turnaround times would not be extended and food would not be provided for evacuees. All evacuees had to be medically inspected prior to embarkation and each evacuee would be restricted to 50 lbs of baggage. Finally, evacuees would only be permitted to travel as deck passengers (i.e. not cabin passengers) on any Royal Navy vessel.6 On 16 January the War Cabinet ratified the decision and the Commander-in-Chief East Indies was instructed ‘to co-operate in the evacuation of these persons from Burma’.7 It was a sure sign that the civilian evacuation from Burma had leapt up the priority list and was now regarded as a matter of considerable political importance. *

*

*

Several shipping companies had initially expressed a willingness to help in the evacuation of civilians from Rangoon. However, they dropped out one by one. The French liner, President slipped away from Rangoon with no passengers on board, and the Scindia Steam Navigation Company withdrew all its ships from the Port of Rangoon in mid-January 1942. Before long the BISN Co. stood alone.8 The Company had always been willing to give unreserved support to the British Government in times of war.9 Now, in April 1940 the Admiralty took over the entire BISN Co. fleet. Twenty-three ships were based in Calcutta, nine in Bombay, ten in Rangoon, two in Liverpool and many others were scattered in various ports around the world. At the time the BISN Co. ran no fewer than 22 regular commercial services worldwide. Some BISN Co. vessels were immediately deployed as hospital ships and troopships, although for the time being most were allowed to carry cargo and passengers as well. By February 1942 many of the Company’s ocean-going ships were helping with the evacuation of civilians from Rangoon and Akyab. The steam ships Sir Harvey Adamson, Warialda, Szechuen and Ellenga were the most significant, but the SS Baroda and SS Neuralia deserve special mention.10

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The SS Baroda had first arrived in Rangoon on Christmas Day 1941 immediately after the air raid. The city lay under a great pall of smoke and public services were at a standstill. The Baroda’s Chief Engineer, Mr S. J. King, was alarmed to see ‘men, women and children swarming out to the ship in sampans’. The crew had no alternative but to allow them aboard, but they kept arriving in desperate waves, preventing the crew from discharging the cargo.11 Despite difficulties in obtaining coal and water, the Baroda left on time and sailed to Chittagong via Akyab on 27 December. It had 1,400 passengers on board although the ship was designed to carry only 800. King was impressed by many of the passengers, but particularly by ‘a perfectly dressed man with an American accent’ who had led about 40 Europeans from northern Siam, through the Shan States to Rangoon. The Baroda returned to Rangoon on 11 January and remained in the Port for over a week during which time Japanese bombers flew over every day and often several times a day. Pandemonium broke out before each raid as all the ‘ships in the port gave warning by long blasts on their whistles’. On 19 January the Baroda left Rangoon for the last time with 3,000 passengers on board. For the next two weeks, it continued to ply back and forth between Akyab and Chittagong, carrying 1,800 to 2,400 evacuees on each voyage. Each time she came into port the crew had to fend off crowds of Indians, Burmese

Figure 6.1 BISN Co. vessel SS Baroda. The SS Baroda evacuated thousands of refugees from Burma in January and February 1942. Other BISN Co. vessels like the Sir Harvey Adamson also played a very significant role in the evacuation of civilians by sea. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of P&O Heritage Collection.

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and Chinese who tried to clamber aboard illegally. The Baroda always carried far more passengers than safety permitted, causing shortages of drinking water. Onboard sanitation was always a problem. On one voyage from Akyab to Chittagong doctors came aboard to inoculate the passengers and crew after a cholera outbreak. The Baroda made seven runs between Akyab and Calcutta, the last of which was on 1 April when it carried 4,554 adults and about 1,500 children. Within an hour of embarkation every passenger had been ‘given a drink of tea, some biscuits, and a ticket to his destination in India’. It was estimated that in total the Baroda alone had carried between 20,000 and 25,000 to safety in India.12 The Neuralia’s story was different, but equally heroic. Two days after the fall of Rangoon, Captain A. A. Kay sailed her from Madras to Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. His instructions were to evacuate everyone who wished to leave. It was a very dangerous assignment. A Royal Navy cruiser escorted the Neuralia across the Bay of Bengal, but from then on Captain Kay had to sail her through the Manners Strait without escort. The sea lane was littered with mines and reefs, but he manoeuvred her into the inner harbour (a forensic feat for a vessel of her size) and took on board most of those who wanted to leave the islands. The High Commissioner chose to stay on the Andamans for the time being, although he subsequently escaped. The Neuralia left in the pitch dark at 2.00 a.m. and had to thread its way gingerly through mines and the reef, guided only by a small launch with a tiny light astern.13 It was equally dangerous in the Port of Rangoon. Picture the scene on 21 February 1942, for example. The last ocean-going vessel was about to leave Burma for India. A convoy of merchant ships had just arrived in the Port from North Africa carrying men of the Fourth Hussars armoured brigade. The dockworkers had deserted long ago so the troops had to unload their tanks themselves. While this was going on, the SS Jalligopal slipped out of the port with 2,000 Indian evacuees on board. A vast, disappointed crowd was left behind on the quayside. For the past day they had been trying desperately to clamber onto the ship. When they saw the Jalligopal cast anchor a collective scream went up and thousands of people surged towards the dock gates. A group of 500 bazaarmerchants, hospital servants and their families was swept along in the middle of this mob. They were only there because Vorley had persuaded them to remain at their posts in Rangoon until the very last moment. He had promised them places on the SS Jalligopal. Now they were trapped. They felt betrayed and were understandably very angry. Vorley stormed off to Government House. He complained to Dorman-Smith about the chaos at the docks. Dorman-Smith, taken aback, summoned the Royal

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Navy Commodore and instructed him to find a ship to transport Vorley’s stranded party to India.14 Vorley and the Commodore returned to the docks together. By the time they arrived the dock gates were wide open. Sinister Burmans were driving away with busloads of stolen service rifles. Gangs of seamen were ‘rolling, staggering, some crawling, some flat out dead drunk’. Drunkards, armed with rifles and ammunition, were shooting indiscriminately. Bottles of wine had been plundered from a warehouse and there was a continuous din of smashing glass and yelling. A drunken quartermaster sprawled across the gangplank of one ship prevented Vorley and the Commodore from getting aboard. On the next boat, drunken sailors smashed tear gas containers on the main deck. Their officers were imprisoned below deck. After several hours of searching and abortive negotiation the commodore finally managed to find a merchant ship willing to take the party of 500 merchants and hospital orderlies to India. Vorley brought them down to the docks at the crack of dawn the following morning, but by the time they arrived, the Army had already requisitioned the ship. After a great deal of argument a senior officer agreed to allow 300 of Vorley’s refugees to board. The remaining members of the

Figure 6.2 A BISN Co. steamer alongside the Latter Street wharf before the war. Although this is a tranquil scene it is not difficult to imagine the wharf and steamer teeming with refugees in January 1942. BISN Co. vessels played a very important part in the evacuation. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the British Library.

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party were taken to the railway station and put on a train to Prome. Huge crowds of Indians were still waiting on the quayside and when they realized that yet another vessel was about to leave without them, they charged through the dock gate and started clambering onto the boat. In desperation the crew cut the ropes, the gangway crashed onto the dockside and the boat sailed off.15 Thus the sea-borne evacuation from Rangoon came to an end. It was shortlived, having started on 20 January and ended on 23 February. Vorley reckoned that during that time about 70,000 evacuees had left by sea.16 Dorman-Smith estimated the number more conservatively at 25,000.17 The managers most prominent in the operation were Mr Fforde of the River Police, Mr Gibson of BISN Co., Mr S. A. S. Tyabji, a leader of the Indian community, Swami Punyananda of the Ramakrishna Mission and of course Mr Hutchings, Agent for the Government of India. Miraculously, not one of the overladen BISN Co. ships was sunk during the evacuation, but 27 BISN Co. ships were lost between 1941 and 1942 – six of them in the Bay of Bengal – and in all 51 BISN Co. vessels were lost during the course of the war; 114 European officers (including 63 engineering officers

Table 6.1 Officers and ‘Native’ seamen lost on SS Sir Harvey Adamson, 18 April 1947 Officers: Captain J. R. D. Weaver – Commander; H. Becher – Chief Officer; P. J. Allitt – Second Officer; H. Simpson – Third Officer; G. Wright – Chief Engineer; G. Patterson – Second Engineer; D. Bell – Third Engineer; A. D. Lees – Fourth Engineer. ‘Native’ Seamen: Jan Mohamed – Purser; Fong Sing – Carpenter; Yeacub Ali – Serang; Yeacub Ali – Tindal; Muckbul Ahmed – Cassab; Abdul Razaque – Winchman; Shariatoolla – Seacunny; Seedique Ahmed – Seacunny; Allee – Seacunny; Abdul Jalill – Lascar; Habibullah – Lascar; Leakat Ali – Lascar; Serajuddin – Lascar; Faizallah – Lascar; Syed Ali – Lascar; Mohamed Azim – Lascar; Fazal Ahmed – Lascar; Omer Meah – Lascar; Abdul Mannan – Lascar; Syed Rahman – Bhandary; Ramcharita – Topass; Chella Duria – Topass; Ibrahim – Barber; Fazal Rahman – Serang; Darbesh Ali – First Tindal; Abdul Malik – Second Tindal; Abdul Samad – Cassab; Currim Bux – Lampman; Nazir Ahamed – Oilman; Saleh Ahmed – Oilman; Badsha Meah – Fireman; Abdul Kahleq – Fireman; Abdul Rashid – Fireman; Badsha Mian – Coal Trimmer; Doola Mian – Coal Trimmer; Cherag Ali – Coal Trimmer; Monir Ahamad – Bhandary; Abdul Mazid – Fireman; Ersad Ali – Fireman; Mohd Yeacub – Butler; Kala Achba – Chief Cook; Abdul Rahman – Second Cook; John Singh – Third Cook; Lall Meah –Pantryman; Sk Minno – Captain’s Boy; Abdul Ghaffur – Chief Engineer’s Boy; Johoor – Servant; Sk Abdul Khaliq – Servant; Fazal Rahman – Servant; A. Swami – Servant; Iyya Swami Fernando – Servant; Abdul Aziz – Servant; Gazi – Topass; Budhia – Topass. Source: Adapted from H. St George Saunders, Valiant Voyaging (London, Faber & Faber, 1948), pp. 171 and 193–4.

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and 8 ship’s captains) and 915 Indian seamen lost their lives during the war; 58 European officers and 49 Indian seamen were taken POWs; 43 British officers were awarded Honours for gallantry and 13 were mentioned in despatches; 16 Indian seamen received gallantry awards. A sad reminder, if one is needed, of the size, complexity and vulnerability of these ocean-going vessels, is provided by the SS Sir Harvey Adamson, which sank with all hands in April 1947, having struck an enemy mine. Although hostilities had ended, it was effectively the last BISN Co. casualty of the war (see Table 6.1). *

*

*

As the evacuation by sea ended, the evacuation by air began. Planes were much quicker and slightly less uncomfortable than the alternatives, but they were also more expensive and could carry fewer passengers. However, the biggest drawback was that planes and runways were vulnerable to attack. On 22 February BOC executives took the view that the collapse of Burma might be imminent and began flying out the wives and children of their European and Anglo-Indian employees. R. C. Kemp of the Indian Survey and Transport Department was put in charge of the flights from Magwe, 30 miles south of Yenangyaung. At first only a few light aircraft were used but in due course bigger planes from CNAC and Tata Airways were introduced.18 BOC also offered places to the families of government officials and employees of other oil companies.19 Each evacuee was charged Rs 280 for a flight to Chittagong and Rs 330 to Calcutta. Children were half fare and infants travelled free. The airlines limited the weight of luggage each passenger could carry, but the authorities had to be on their guard. When Mrs Lindop (wife of the Magwe DC) was supervising a queue at Magwe airport, she noticed that a little old Gurkha woman was walking ponderously. Closer examination revealed that she was carrying several bags of gold sovereigns and heavy gold jewellery under her petticoats.20 Gerald Bourne described how he took two women from Maymyo to catch the last flight from Magwe on 6 March.21 By that time about 280 European and 320 Anglo-Indian dependants had been evacuated. Soon afterwards the RAF took over the airstrip and it was bombed on 22 March with the loss of most of the RAF planes. The RAF moved its remaining planes and equipment to Lashio.22 *

*

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The BOC initiative proved to be so popular that the government started an air evacuation scheme of its own, using the airstrip at Shwebo.23 In February 1942 Colonel M. J. Clarke, Commissioner of the Mandalay Division had first mooted

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the idea. Initially it was used only for women and children evacuees. Later the officials relented and agreed to allow a few Indian men to travel as chaperones to Indian women (one male per five females). At all times, preference was given to evacuees incapable of walking out of Burma. At the beginning of March 1942 the evacuation offices in Maymyo and Mandalay began to compile lists of evacuees who wished to fly from Shwebo. Dorman-Smith insisted that there were equal numbers of Indians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians although at the time it did seem that most of the evacuees from Shwebo were Europeans. Between 8 March and 5 April 1942, trains and convoys carrying evacuees arrived in Shwebo at all hours of day and night.24 For a short time, flights were suspended to allow military casualties to be flown out. The last groups of civilians to be evacuated were victims of the 3 April bombing raid on Mandalay. In all about 3,300 civilians were evacuated from Shwebo.25 Reginald Langham-Carter was in charge of the Shwebo air evacuation scheme.26 It happened by chance. He arrived in Maymyo the day after the first flight in March 1942. There were serious teething troubles and unfortunately the first evacuees could not have been more ill chosen. They were army officers’ wives from Maymyo and were accustomed to luxury. They complained long and loud about the lack of creature comforts at Shwebo. They slept in bug-infested beds in old wooden barracks. The food was basic. They had no servants and there was a lack of privacy. It was too awful! In disgust they returned to Maymyo where they regaled the cocktail circuit with horror stories of their privations. The colonel blimps in Maymyo club gleefully latched onto their complaints.27 This was the first that Langham-Carter had heard of the scheme, but one of the organizers, his old acquaintance Trevor Hay, recommended Langham-Carter, who was duly appointed as Air Evacuation Officer.28 On 9 March 1942 he drove to Shwebo. The runway was badly overgrown. Mr John Flux of the PWD was busily cutting down trees and laying a surface. The runway was being extended so that Dakotas could land. They were the only planes powerful enough to clear the surrounding hills. A DC3 airplane was duly hired from CNAC at a cost of Rs 8,500 per trip and it was decided that evacuees were to be charged a maximum of Rs 280 per person per flight. In theory at least it would enable the poorest passengers to travel free. The evacuees’ accommodation was in a shabby barrack building. Remembering the military wives’ tales, Langham-Carter carried out a health inspection and appointed a medical doctor, Captain Clarke, to the operation in Shwebo. Langham-Carter also canvassed the views of evacuees and pilots as they waited for the CNAC aircraft to take off for Chittagong. The pilots were all appalled

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at the state of the airfield but were willing to give it a go.29 Unfortunately only a few Dakotas were available and Captain Eadon (Director of Civil Aviation) continued to request extra planes. Langham-Carter worked closely with Colonel Matthew John Clarke the Commissioner in Mandalay. Clarke was in charge of the refugee scheme in Upper Burma. He liaised with the government and with other DCs, coordinated train and convoy schedules and agreed the order in which batches of evacuees should arrive in Shwebo. Clarke and Langham-Carter developed an effective partnership. Clarke telephoned Langham-Carter each morning with the anticipated numbers of evacuees and the estimated times of arrival of refugeetrains and convoys in Shwebo. In the light of this information, Langham-Carter organized fleets of buses and cars to meet the evacuees at Shwebo station. They were always hot, tired and hungry, after very long journeys. They gathered in a marquee in the SPG compound where missionaries and employees of the BBTC dispensed tea and sympathy.30 Tickets were checked and money was collected before Langham-Carter compiled the boarding schedules. He kept the evacuees informed about how long they had to wait for a flight. Most of the evacuees were ‘wonderfully patient and uncomplaining’. The procedure was that after Eadon and his Aviation Department colleagues had published the final flight lists, the passengers’ baggage was weighed and the passengers were transported to the airfield by bus. At the height of the evacuation, there were three flights a day, each flight carrying between 24 and 50 evacuees. An adult’s baggage allowance was 33 lbs, children’s 16½ lbs and babies had no allowance. As in Magwe, passengers often tried to cheat. One woman tried to secrete a sewing machine under her sari and piles of discarded possessions were left behind after each flight. The evacuees’ strategy was to wear as much clothing as they could bear in the tropical heat. They struggled onto planes wearing winter hats, fur coats, dinner jackets and many layers of underclothing, often doubling their bodyweights. On the flights (which took two hours to Chittagong) the evacuees leaned against aluminium ledges, with their baggage piled in the middle. In Chittagong the evacuees were taken to the English Club where they were fed, issued with rail tickets and taken in trucks to the station.31 There was always a chronic shortage of both staff and planes. At one point a few additional officers arrived, but no aircraft. CNAC planes landing from India brought in essential goods so Shwebo became the gateway to Burma. Medicines, sugar, salt, tinned milk, tinned foods, dhal and even rice were imported from Chittagong and Calcutta to be stored in huts in Shwebo.

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Langham-Carter found it almost impossible to plan ahead and the following series of events on 14 March illustrated his difficulties. The refugee camp was empty because an expected convoy of evacuees from the Shan States had failed to turn up. Two planes had been waiting to fly them to India, but now they would have to leave empty – it was a terrible waste. At the last moment, LanghamCarter heard that an unscheduled special train full of evacuees had turned up at a station several miles down the line. He drove down to the station, selected enough ‘priority’ cases to fill two planes, drove back to Shwebo and organized a fleet of buses to meet them at Shwebo Station. When the ‘priority’ passengers arrived they were hustled into the buses, rushed to the airfield and put straight onto the two planes waiting on the runway. The planes took off a few minutes later. It was unbelievably slick, very unusual and completely unplanned. As soon as the planes flew off, it began to rain so heavily that no more planes could land or take off for the next 24 hours. Every day was similarly unpredictable. On 20 March, two RAF Dakotas made unscheduled landings at Shwebo. The planes were based at Magwe, and after discussion the pilots agreed to take refugees back to India on a regular basis. The RAF Dakotas were more battered and could carry fewer evacuees than the CNAC aircraft, but every little counted. However, the arrangement was short-lived and it ended two days later when Japanese bombers attacked Magwe airport. Langham-Carter feared that Shwebo would be next on the list, and the noose tightened as first Prome was occupied on 1 April 1942, then Mandalay was bombed on 3 April. Finally, Yenangyaung fell on 17 April 1942. The government became reconciled to the possibility that Katha and Myitkyina would soon be the only parts of Burma under British control. It was decided that the Shwebo operation would close and that everything would be transferred to Myitkyina. A new military and administrative headquarters would be built there and a road constructed from Myitkyina through the Hukawng Valley to India. On 28 March the CNAC announced the suspension of all its flights from Shwebo with effect from 10 April and in future, it said, it would fly evacuees only from Myitkyina to Dinjan in Assam.32 Langham-Carter was appalled at the prospect of the move to Myitkyina, which was accessible only by a very long and hazardous single-track railway line. Moreover, it had no telephone links with the rest of Burma. However, he set about the task of transferring stores and staff from Shwebo to Myitkyina.33 Finally, on 1 April, Langham-Carter travelled up to Myitkyina himself in order to prepare the airstrip there for refugee flights. The journey confirmed all his worst fears. The train arrived 4 hours late at Shwebo and reached Myitkyina at 7.00 p.m. on 3 April, more than two days later.

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In the meantime, flights from Shwebo ended abruptly as the Japanese advanced towards the town. Now only the Myitkyina and Lashio airstrips remained operational. Before the war CNAC planes had stopped at Lashio en route from China to Rangoon. After Mingladon was bombed in February 1942, the Rangoon flights ended but CNAC planes continued to fly from China and went to Calcutta, still stopping for fuel at Lashio. CNAC officials agreed to allocate a limited number of seats on each flight to the Evacuation Department. This enabled a few Europeans from Maymyo to travel to Calcutta. It caused grumblings from those who wanted to fly but could not. However, over two hundred refugees were evacuated from Lashio in this way, and as LanghamCarter never tired of pointing out, it meant that an extra two hundred evacuees were saved.34 Lashio airfield had to close suddenly because of the Japanese advance. It meant that Myitkyina had become the only remaining airfield in Burma. The story of the evacuation from Myitkyina is told in Chapter 8. *

*

*

‘Domestic’ modes of transport were all that remained after the end of evacuation by sea and by air. River-launches, railways and various forms of road transport took refugees from the war zones in Lower Burma northwards towards the apparent safety of Upper Burma. The Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers flowed from north to south through the country. They were navigable for hundreds of miles and the two rivers joined at the confluence near Pakokku.35 In 1942, thousands of evacuees escaped northwards through the river system and the legendary IFC played a major role in this epic story. However, it must not be forgotten that BISN Co. river-launches also played an important supporting role under their Marine Superintendent, Captain Reddish. The first BISN Co. vessel to carry evacuees (long before Rangoon fell) was the 250-ton river-launch, Yengyua. It was based in Tavoy, hundreds of miles south of Rangoon. The Commander of the Yengyua, Captain R. Burch had for many years run a daily passenger and cargo service from Tavoy to its sea anchorage at Grindstone Island some 25 miles away.36 Here, passengers and cargo were transferred to the BISN Co. vessels SS Juna and the SS Sir Harvey Adamson (mentioned earlier), which plied along the coast between Mergui and Rangoon.37 Tavoy was only 40 miles from the Siamese border. So Japanese attacks were not unexpected and indeed Burch had taken the precaution of reinforcing the Yengyua’s deck with steel plates and sandbags. On 15 January 1942 Japanese troops crossed from Siam and seized a hill 3 miles from Tavoy. The town’s Indian residents panicked

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Figure 6.3 River-steamer Yengyua. One of the first river vessels to take part in the evacuation, the Yengyua was originally part of the Arakan River Company fleet. IFC vessels provided most river transport for evacuees. The photograph was probably taken at the riverine port of Tavoy. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of P&O Heritage Collections.

and began loading their possessions into bullock carts while ‘Burmans stood around in groups to jeer’. At midnight on 17 January, Burch, the DC and other leading officers held an emergency meeting in Tavoy Club.38 It was decided that Burch should sail the Yengyua to Mergui (125 miles to the south) to collect reinforcements and bring them back to Tavoy. In the early hours of the morning, Burch and his Chief Engineer, Johnson, loaded 27 evacuees (including 5 Europeans) onto the Yengyua. They sailed down-river to the sea anchorage, arriving at dawn. Burch had been ordered to proceed to Mergui, although he had only a road atlas of Burma with which to navigate. As he was about to start out, news came through that Japanese troops had entered Tavoy. He ditched the roadmap and made for Rangoon instead, arriving on 20 January. He reported to Captain Reddish who instructed him to evacuate a group of wireless operators from Diamond Island. Afterwards Burch proceeded to Akyab from where the Yengyua made several more trips to Calcutta, evacuating refugees. *

*

*

In mid-February, Captain Reddish ordered all the BISN Co. river-launches to move up the Irrawaddy to Prome.39 On 20 February, Captain Maskell left Rangoon in the middle of an air raid. He made for Henzada with the river-launches Hunka

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and the Kayan. They each towed two flats loaded with evacuees. Reddish and Cruickshank took the Maymyo and Salona as far as Yandon. They were heavily laden with refugees and the water levels were too low to go any further. Yandon had been abandoned to mob rule. Looting, killing and setting fire to buildings was happening all around. Reddish and Cruickshank had to walk from Yandon to Henzada where they joined Maskell and the Hunka and Kayan. The three of them continued on to Prome, which was gripped by a cholera epidemic. Indians were ‘dying on the road in their thousands’. Reddish insisted that his party stayed on the launches until everyone had been inoculated. From Prome, Reddish, Cruickshank and Maskell continued to Pakokku. They arrived on 5 March only to find that cholera had brought the town to a standstill, so they sailed on to Mandalay and arrived just after the bombing raid of 3 April. The city was deserted. They moored the vessels in the government dockyard, unloaded the evacuees and paid off the crews. Reddish, Maskell and Cruickshank were anxious to leave Burma. In order to obtain exit permits they had to appear before a ‘committee of leading European citizens’. That done, they flew to Lashio where they transferred to a CNAC plane and flew to Calcutta. It brought to an end BISN Co.’s role in the evacuation.40 *

*

*

The IFC was one of the great institutions in Burma. It had started in 1865, had come into its own during the Third Burmese War of 1885 after which it expanded very rapidly.41 The Company had fingers in many pies – a shipbuilding and repair business at Dalla and foundries and ship-repair facilities in Rangoon, Mandalay and Moulmein. IFC also had the contract for buoying channels and siting anchorages in the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers and it operated the Thaton–Duyinzeik Railway and the Irrawaddy Flotilla & Airways Ltd. By 1939 the IFC fleet consisted of over 600 vessels and it was carrying approximately 8 million passengers and about 1¼ million tons of cargo annually.42 The Company operated four ‘Express’ passenger sailings per week (6 days up and 5 days down) between Rangoon and Mandalay and a weekly express steamer service between Mandalay and Bhamo (5 days to cover 320 miles). The weekly Mandalay–Bhamo cargo service took 10 days because the steamers also functioned as floating bazaars for villages along the way. Scores of IFC ferry and creek services also operated throughout the country.43 IFC ship’s officers were recruited in the United Kingdom and served for a year as second-officers on IFC main-line steamers before sitting their First-Class Inland Master’s Certificate examinations. Engineering officers served their apprenticeships with Wm Denny

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& Bros in Dumbarton before arriving in Burma. They started as fourth-officers on cargo or mail steamers before climbing up the ladder.44 It must be emphasized that the civilian evacuation and events of 1942 brought the IFC to its knees. Robert Galloway (Managing Director) and J. Morton (Rangoon Manager), the senior men on the spot, had to take some agonizing decisions.45 The commanders of the principal ships were the real heroes of the hour. The most senior of them, Captain Coutts (Nepaul), Captain Chubb (Siam), Captain Rowley (Japan), Captain Atkinson (Assam), Captain Railston (Mysore), Captain Brentnall (Ananda), Captain Watts (Minion) and Captain Gilleson (Panthay II) continued to sail vessels overloaded with evacuees through extreme danger and without regard to their personal safety. Captain H. J. Chubb, one of the most senior ‘front-line’ commanders, kept meticulous records of his own activities during the evacuation.46 Table 6.2 illustrates how his vessel, the Siam left Rangoon for the last time on 10 February 1942 and from then until the beginning of May 1942 it plied up and down the Irrawaddy carrying evacuees, rice and war materials.47 Chubb was not alone. Dozens of his IFC colleagues were doing similar work.48 Mr Adkins (Creek Superintendent) was a ‘last ditcher’ involved in demolition work, Captains Rowley (Commander of Java), Bentnall and Mitchell continued to transport evacuees until 3 May when they abandoned their vessels at Katha and drove off together in a car. Commander Atkinson, Pilot Superintendent Garven, Commander Railston (SS Mysore), Commander Davison (SS Sinkan), Chief Engineer McWatt, (SS Siam), Chief Engineers McKinstry and Frain (SS Mysore), Chief Engineer Patrick, Commander Watts, Office Engineer Harris, Extra Engineer Halliday and Chief Engineer MacAllum also carried evacuees until 4 May and then scuttled their vessels in Katha before walking to India.49 The heroic Captain N. K. S. Adam, Dockyard Manager of the IFC Dalla Shipyard, was not untypical of many IFC commanders. He plied up and down the Irrawaddy ferrying evacuees to safety. Like the other captains he intended to travel by train to Lashio and then to catch a CNAC flight to Calcutta. However, he had first to obtain an exit permit, which was not straightforward, then the rail services to Lashio were cancelled when the airport was bombed. So Adam agreed to continue working for several more weeks. He transported war materials down the river to Myingyan and brought refugees back up the river several times.50 During this time he commanded several IFC vessels, including SS Ngaman. Captains McIntyre and Bell did the same thing in the Taping, and as late as 21 April, Adam noted that the stream at Myingyan was full of IFC vessels

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Table 6.2 Schedule of IFC Paddle Steamer, Siam, 20 March–4 May 1942 From

To

Notes and Dates

Mandalay

Theedaw

Theedaw

Mandalay

Mandalay Thangine Sagaing

Thangine Sagaing Kanhla

Kanhla Theedaw Htondine

Theedaw Htondine Palanyone

Palanyone

Kanhla

Kanhla

Magwe

Magwe

Nyounghla

Nyounghla Mandalay

Mandalay Myingyan

Myingyan Nyounghla

Nyounghla Mandalay

Mandalay

Sagaing

Sagaing

Mandalay

Mandalay

Myingyan

Loaded cement for military authorities, plus Steel Bros coolies plus evacuees (21 March) Several crew members desert in Mandalay (22 March) Pick-up station flat (23 March) Pick-up Oil Flat 241 (24 March) Leave Flat 241; pick up BOC oil and equipment (25 March) Dropped Thangine flat (26 March) Picked up Oil Flats 254 & 231 (27 March) Dropped Flats 254 & 231 at Yathaya Refinery (28 March) Picked up Flat 241 and BOC motor barge Rhaka (29 March) Transferred Rhaka to Woito; took on flat 143 (with coal and oil): Magwe bombed previous day (30 March) Loaded 7 road-rollers and pre-mixers; took in tow barge no. 23 (with aircraft spirit) and IFC Scow no. 226 with telegraph stores (1–2 April) Dropped tows in Mandalay (3 April) Left Mandalay after air raid (3 April) for Myingyan; loaded 73 country carts, 146 bullocks, 970 bales of hay (4 April) Disembarked carts, etc. at Nyounghla (5 April) Embarked Base Hospital unit no. 3 with 571 casualties under Colonel Barrett; Chauk on fire (6 April) Embarked 270 casualties in Mandalay; remained in Sagaing for six days disembarking stores; transferred casualties to hospital-trains for Monywa (7–14 April) Crew deserted at Mandalay; Morton persuaded them to take the Java (with casualties) to Sagaing in return for their passes and pay (14–25 April) Proceed to Myingyan with ‘scratch’ crew (Robinson plus 1 Sukani, 10 Sikh soldiers and a few hospital orderlies). Only four on deck, including Chubb. Took two days to Myingyan because of lack of steam (26 April) Continued

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Table 6.2 Continued From

To

Notes and Dates

Myingyan

Sagaing

Sagaing

Khattin

Khattin Kyaukmyaung

Kyaukmyaung Katha

Chubb has enteric fever; Capt. Garven and Capt. Atkinson (Second Officer on Mysore) take the Siam; to Sagaing with sick and wounded evacuees (27–28 April) Siam in Sagaing during demolition of the IFC fleet in Mandalay; Left (with casualties) Wilmo removes dead cholera victims from Siam for burial (29 April) Siam takes on many casualties (30 April) Siam leaves Kyaukmyaung: anchors at defile near Male village. Men, disguised as Burmans seen carrying rifles across defile. Siam anchors at Tagaung; bad river conditions; Siam overtakes 16 IFC vessels laden with evacuees; anchors at Katha; disembarks at 9.00 a.m. Siam scuttled at Katha (1–4 May)

Source: Compiled from Captain H. J. Chubb, Notes on Irrawaddy Flotilla Company in BL/IOR/MSS/ EUR/E/375/11 (Personal Accounts of the 1942 Retreat).

working as hospital ships. They included Waikato under Captains McNaughton and Garven (Superintendent of Pilots). In the end, Adam and his colleagues were left with no option but to escape up the Chindwin River themselves.51 In Monywa, Adam met up with others of his IFC colleagues, Kinnear and Garstin. He left on the sternwheeler, Rover, on 4 April. On 27 April, in Kalewa, Adam visited Captain McCrea (a legendary IFC figure, who was suffering from appendicitis). On 28 April the IFC party transferred to the Tamadaw, where they found another colleague, Fernie who was suffering from severe steam burns. They arrived in Tamu on 30 April and were joined by yet another colleague, Captain Tait. On 3 May they set off in lorries on the last overland, stage of their journey to Dimapur.52 They had all played an extraordinary part in the evacuation. Every IFC vessel that went up-river between 20 February and 29 March (when Prome was evacuated) carried a maximum load of evacuees. It was estimated that IFC vessels carried about 35,000 refugees and 10,000 tons of rice northwards during February and March 1942. In April, a further 50,000 refugees were evacuated from Mandalay by IFC river-steamers. Dorman-Smith noted that 100 of IFC’s powered craft were scuttled, and that the dockyard in Mandalay was set on fire. The remaining 44 steamships were scuttled at Katha on 4 May 1942.53

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For the record, after the war, on 1 June 1948, the remnants of the fleet passed into the hands of the independent Burmese Government and the Company finally went into voluntary liquidation on 26 June 1950. *

*

*

Railways had been a central part of Burma’s transport infrastructure since 1877 when the Rangoon–Prome railway line was opened. The Rangoon to Mandalay section followed in 1889, and the line from Mandalay to Myitkyina was completed in 1899.54 A branch line from the main Rangoon–Mandalay railway ran through Pegu, over the Sittang Bridge and on to the ferry terminal at Moulmein.55 Another important branch line had been built from Mandalay through Maymyo to Lashio in the Southern Shan States. The main line from Rangoon to Prome connected with river-steamers to Mandalay and Burma Railways boasted several iconic structures such as the Ava Railway Bridge at Sagaing and the Gokteik Viaduct on the Lashio line.56 Some sections of the railway in the Shan hills were so steep that they required reversing stations and special Garrett and Mallet locomotives. The British-built locomotives were all coal-fired. The coal had to be imported from India. The Burma Railway network did not extend north of Myitkyina or north-west of Kalewa.57 Nor was it compatible with networks in neighbouring countries – Indian Railways and the Royal Thailand Railway, for example. Lord Curzon (an opponent of interterritorial connectivity) famously excused the mismatch on the grounds that the whole of Sino-Burmese trade could be transported across the Salween in two dugout canoes.58 In 1896 the state-owned railway was leased to a private company. Revenues and profits increased steadily for the next quarter of a century, peaking in 1928–9. However, gross earnings declined by 31 per cent between 1927 and 1933.59 The lease agreement was terminated in 1929. Prior to 1937, Burma Railways came under the Railway Board in Delhi, although it went its own way in terms of locomotives, rolling stock, and so on. In preparation for the Separation of Burma from India in 1937 a national balance sheet was drawn up and Burma Railways was identified as the largest single debtor to India. Nevertheless, as Table 6.3 shows, by 1941, Burma Railways operated 2,060 miles of metre-gauge track.60 Before the war the journey from Rangoon to Mandalay by rail took 13 hours, and the journey from Rangoon to Lashio took 28 hours – substantial times, but substantial distances too. It was not surprising therefore that Burma Railways played a crucial role in the evacuation of civilians in 1942. Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Mains was appointed Head of Army Security on 20 January 1942.61 He was responsible for maintaining law and order on the railway

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The Evacuation of Civilians from Burma Table 6.3 Burma Railways, 1896–1939 Year

Mileage

1896 1914 1920 1929 1936 1937 1938 1939

872 1,552 1,606 1,931 2,060 2,060 2,060 2,059

Capital Charge 77 210 216 328 349 347 346 345

Gross Return Net Return Millions of Rs on Capital (%) 8 25 33 50 37 38 37 37

3.87 5.45 6.63 6.01 2.51 3.35 3.18 3.15

Source: John Leroy Christian, Burma and the Japanese Invader (Bombay, Thacker, 1945), p. 212.

network and later became Military Governor of Rangoon.62 Mains established an elite Field Security Force, which he placed under Bill Talbot (General Staff Officer) and Captain McGilp of the Fifth Gurkhas (Chief Field Security Officer).63 The Force comprised of five or six Gloucesters, a Jemadar and six Indian private soldiers. As the evacuation gathered pace, the Field Security Force was assigned to guard Rangoon Station. Mains himself worked closely with Lieutenant Colonel Brewitt, Deputy Director of Burma Railways and Senior Railway Officer in the Rangoon Area.64 Many railwaymen had deserted by this time and a handful of British officers, Anglo-Burmese traffic staff, guards, drivers and firemen and a young Burmese Assistant Traffic Superintendent attempted to operate the entire network. To add insult to injury almost all the Indian coal coolies had fled, so overworked engine staff had to coal their own engines. One of Mains’ biggest challenges was maintaining discipline at Rangoon Station. He had so few men at his disposal that it was extraordinarily difficult to supervise the loading of trains. The Railway authorities ran one evacuation train to Mandalay each day for so-called privileged evacuees who had been guaranteed safe passages out of Rangoon. In addition, one shuttle service ran to Prome each day. It was provided for the rest of the evacuees. The latter caused few problems although the train was always dangerously overcrowded. The privileged evacuees’ train caused most headaches. Everyone wanted to get onto it and it was difficult to know who was ‘privileged’ and who was not. The category included the great and the good as well as government subordinate and clerical staff, hospital sweepers and some menials. All tickets and passes had to be checked carefully and interlopers turned away.

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The Mandalay trains left Rangoon at 3.00 p.m. each day. Mains and Brewitt developed a procedure that worked well. Each morning Brewitt gave Mains a list of the departments permitted to travel that day and the rough numbers of passengers in each group. By noon every day the station was a seething mass of humanity and baggage was piled everywhere. The leaders of all the parties reported to Mains. He gave them instructions and checked with them the exact numbers in their parties. After delivering a stern lecture about baggage, procedures, behaviour, and so on, he sent the leaders to instruct their respective parties. When the train drew into the platform, Mains walked up and down the train allocating accommodation and marking the compartment doors with the names of each party. Then he bellowed instructions through a megaphone, summoning each party in turn to the barrier. The evacuees had to line up in single file with the leader at the front of each party. In an orderly fashion they were required to walk, not run onto the platform and along to their designated compartments. Gatecrashers and miscreants were severely beaten by Field Security Officers armed with lathis. On one occasion over a hundred uniformed and armed Indian constables of the City Police congregated in the station forecourt after a drinking and looting spree. They demanded places on the ‘privileged’ train to Mandalay. Mains refused to let them onto the platform because they were not on Brewitt’s list. The constables threatened to storm the barrier, so the Field Security Officers set about them with lathis. In the middle of the fracas, Mr Prescott, the Police Commissioner arrived. He berated Mains for allowing his men to beat the police. Mains responded with equal fury. It was a very ugly scene. Only the intervention of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mr Bestall, saved the day. He grabbed the megaphone and calmed everyone down. The train left for Mandalay without the police who were later loaded onto the Prome train. However, the incident soured relations between Mains and the remnants of the Rangoon police force. In February 1942, Mains was appointed Military Governor of Rangoon. Hitherto there had been no British Military Police in Rangoon and by January 1942 many Indian and Burmese policemen had deserted. The small paramilitary Burma Military Police composed of Gurkhas and Indian soldiers was overwhelmed by the waves of dacoity sweeping through the city. It was a big job and Mains delegated to McGilp responsibility for security at the railway station. Mains stuck doggedly to his task in Rangoon until he was forced to retreat to Maymyo on 8 March 1942. The whole railway network seethed in February 1942. Employees worked around the clock and locomotives struggled to shift the hordes of soldiers and

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civilians who pressed northwards. Trains turned up where and when they were least expected. Miss Dorothy Mackley discovered this as she waited at Kyaukse Railway Station on a slightly eerie evening at the end of February. All was quiet when suddenly an unscheduled train clanked up from the south. Such a thing had never happened before at that time of day. The train was full of badly wounded British soldiers, survivors of the Sittang Bridge debacle. Miss Mackley described how an officer was amazed to discover that Upper Burma was so far unaffected by the war and even more amazed to see an Englishwoman on a station in the back of beyond.65 In February 1942 the six-year-old David Reed had a railway experience of his own. His evacuation from Mandalay left an indelible impression on him. Much later in life David, now Doctor, Reed described what it felt like to stand on Mandalay railway station in the midst of the tumult, noise and smells of heaving crowds of refugees and to experience the collective sense of doom in an overcrowded evacuation train that crawled along from Mandalay to Monywa.66 Early in April 1942, Colonel Mains went off to inspect the railway system in Upper Burma.67 He joined the train at Myohaung (just south of Mandalay), went over the Ava Bridge to Ywataung and then on to Shewbo.68 Brewitt had allowed him to use the Burma Railway’s Executive Saloon. It was furnished with sofas, beds and chairs and boasted an en suite bathroom with a basin, shower and lavatory. There was a kitchen in the adjoining servant’s quarters. On his return journey, Mains woke up on 3 April 1942. He had enjoyed a good night’s sleep and ate a leisurely breakfast while the train stood in the marshalling yard at Mandalay. In the middle of the war it felt too good to be true, and indeed it was too good to be true. At 11.00 a.m. there were tremendous explosions. Bombs crashed all around the train and Mains was badly cut by flying glass. It was a miracle that no one was killed because the station and forecourt were crowded with evacuees. All the points and signals were gridlocked and they could only be released by pulling the levers in the correct sequence, which no one knew. Brewitt and other senior officers arrived on the scene and began pushing and pulling levers but to no avail. Suddenly another huge explosion rocked the whole area. It wrecked the station and caused an overbridge to collapse. Coaches and wagons were thrown around in heaps.69 The Good Friday raid of 3 April 1942 set the whole of Mandalay on fire, but Mandalay station was completely wrecked. From then on trains had to terminate at Myohaung and operations were complicated on the whole railway system. Railway journeys to Myitkyina became particularly unpleasant towards the end of April 1942. It often took five days to get from Maymyo to Myitkyina. The

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Figure 6.4 Bomb blast at Mandalay Railway Station, 3 April 1942. Col. Mains had witnessed the huge blast that was caused by a direct hit on a wagonload of RAF bombs at Mandalay Railway Station. This remarkable photograph was taken at the precise moment of the explosion, which was one of the most important moments in the history of the evacuation. It caused widespread destruction in Mandalay (see Chapter 7) and also cut the whole railway system in two. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the British Library.

trains had no lavatories and were hot, dirty and overcrowded.70 From Shwebo onwards the trains were hideously crowded. It was not unusual to discover that ‘every seat was occupied, every inch of floor space was covered and the view from the window was blocked by people hanging on to the outside’.71 It is not known how many evacuees Burma Railways carried on this route but it must have run into tens of thousands. Safety had been seriously compromised by the abandonment of the blocktelegraph system. This had been designed to prevent more than one train at a time travelling along a single-track section of the railway. It had worked without a hitch for many years but had been abandoned (disastrously) in 1942 because of shortages of staff and instrumentation. Meanwhile, trains laden with Chinese units were in full flow along the railway. The Chinese were taking up positions vacated by the retreating British Army. Little love was lost between the two. On one occasion, for example, a train carrying British ammunition approached head-on a train carrying Chinese troops. It was dark, there was bomb damage on the line, the staff had deserted, the block-telegraph system was not working and neither side would give way. It was a recipe for disaster.72 The Chinese troops

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threatened to open fire unless the British ammunition train reversed. Brewitt was called in to adjudicate. He insisted that the ammunition train be allowed to go first and the Chinese responded by arresting him. In the midst of the melée came the news that the Ava Bridge had been demolished. This severed the only connection between the northern and southern sections of the railway network. The rail system finally ground to a halt on 4 May 1942 after a serious incident that involved five trains north of Indaw. It was only at this late stage that the loyal and hard-working remnants of the railway staff bowed to the inevitable and began thinking about their own escapes.73 *

*

*

Road transport was the most ubiquitous and obvious means of escape. The main roads between Rangoon and Mandalay were extremely congested. Army convoys, bullock carts, pedestrians, lorries and cars all competed for space as they crawled northwards. Scores of European families from Rangoon, Pegu, Taunggyi, Tavoy drove their treasured cars hundreds of miles up to Maymyo and beyond. Many were the tales of derring-do. Gerald Bourne escaped in his trusty Buick convertible nicknamed The Queen Mary.74 Pete Aratoon, Manager of the Silver Grill in Rangoon loaded tins of food into his van and drove up to Maymyo where he opened another restaurant.75 Not everyone travelled by car – three Methodist missionaries hitched a lift in a Rangoon Corporation lorry. They had to sit on piles of boxes of confidential Rangoon Corporation records.76 Alistair Rose drove his Hillman car all the way from Moulmein to Myitkyina.77 He had to abandon it in a huge traffic jam near Myitkyina. The jam was caused when a Brigadier closed the Nahlon Bridge, declaring it to be unsafe. Hundreds of cars and lorries (many of them part of a huge EasternAsiatic convoy) were abandoned on the road. For some inexplicable reason the Brigadier ordered all vehicles (except cars) to be burned. Ammunition exploded in all directions and in the midst of the mayhem an inebriated staff captain was seen pushing a truck over the khud while an old lady was asleep inside. People desperately hunted through smouldering debris for their personal possessions while Kachin villagers hovered like vultures by the side of the road.78 A few lucky Indian and Anglo-Indian evacuees managed to get lifts in the lorries and buses laid on by the Evacuation Department. However, the vast majority of evacuees had to walk in great gaggles, hundreds of miles up to Mandalay. The Evacuation Department constructed and serviced a string of refugee camps along the way. Vorley always rued the fact that if only he had been

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given complete control of evacuation transport arrangements and also more than his seven buses and three lorries, he could have improved the situation. As it was, his staff had to ferry thousands of refugees from camp to camp and between boats and trains at all times of day and night with very limited resources. Two unsung heroes deserve mention here – Mr Puddin (Controller of the Civil Transport Park) coped with acute shortages of mechanics and spare parts, and Mr Green (Transport Officer) coped with acute shortages of drivers. Although Burmese drivers were notoriously unreliable, U Thein Tun, U New, Maung Hla Maung and Maung Aung Thein were singled out for their extreme loyalty and for their willingness to work up to 20 hours a day. Green managed his staff with consummate skill. His unfailing energy and motivational skills ensured that the vehicles kept going to the end. The Evacuation Department left Rangoon for the last time at the beginning of March 1942, its buses, lorries and cars full of evacuees. They all reached Mandalay without mishap, but in an oil-rich country fuel was an unexpected problem. Petrol stations were often closed, and Vorley had to order petrol direct from BOC. The Evacuation Department struggled to cope with the relocation of many government departments to Maymyo, as well as large numbers of ordinary evacuees.79 It gave rise to another of Vorley’s frustrations, for the government had not put him in charge of accommodation in Maymyo (it was the Deputy Commissioner’s responsibility), which led to considerable confusion. *

*

*

All the mass transportation schemes shared one thing in common. Despite glitches they were generally well managed. The strategic leadership was in the hands of sound men like Vorley and Sir John Rowland (Chief Railway Commissioner and Director of the Burma–China Railway Construction Company), under whom were fine managers like Reddish, Kemp, Eadon, Mains, Brewitt, Langham-Carter, Puddin, Green and Burch. These men rolled up their sleeves and got the job done. On the next level down were countless unsung, and largely anonymous heroes – mechanics, pilots, signalmen, lorry drivers, stokers, engine drivers, engineers, navigators and ships captains who stepped into the breach and continued to evacuate people until the shutters finally came down. After the last train, plane, steamer had gone, most of them just melted away without fuss and escaped themselves.

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7

Mandalay, Maymyo and the Oilfields

All eyes turned towards Upper Burma as soon as evacuation by sea ended and the Taungup Pass evacuation route was closed. There was a quaint belief that Mandalay was a safe stronghold and Upper Burma a Shangri-la, beyond the reach of bombs, fighting and Japanese troops. Spurred on by this myth thousands of evacuees trudged along the road or piled into trains and riverboats to Upper Burma. As will be seen later in this chapter, the vast majority of the evacuees flooded into Mandalay – hundreds of them every day between mid-February and the end of April 1942. Some of them continued onwards and upwards to Maymyo. First, however, the spotlight must fall on the oil towns of Upper Burma, for Upper Burma’s strategic importance lay in its oilfields and oil storage tanks – particularly those in Chauk and Yenangyaung.1 *

*

*

Petroleum was desperately needed for the lorries, tanks and aircraft of fighting forces, so to gain control of the oil wells and storage tanks was a major objective. The Japanese High Command was as determined to seize the Upper Burma oil installations intact as the British High Command was to prevent them.2 It became a deadly race and in anticipation of the inevitable showdown, oil companies started to evacuate their non-essential workers at an early stage. On 12 March an IFC steamer carried 4,500 non-essential employees and their families from the oil fields up to Mandalay.3 A second steamer sailed with a similar number on 16 March and a third followed on 25 March. By 6 April, IFC steamers packed with jail warders, hospital staff, postal workers and employees of the cement, oil and gas companies were sailing or had sailed up the Irrawaddy from Thayetmyo while Burmese residents were streaming or had streamed out into the surrounding villages.4

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Jim Lindop was the legendary Commissioner of Magwe District in which the oil towns were located. He and his wife Janet made a great personal sacrifice by setting their own house on fire rather than let it fall into Japanese hands.5 All their treasured possessions went up in smoke. Now Janet Lindop was an evacuee. On 3 April 1942 a young journalist drove her along the winding and congested road to Mandalay. She arrived after the Good Friday bombing raid when the city was ablaze. She was a friend of the Vorleys and had volunteered to help in the Evacuation Department. Although she stayed in Mandalay for only ten days, they were tumultuous days and the story of that time will be told later in the chapter. Suffice it to say that the evacuation of the oil towns was a prelude to the implementation of the denial programme (part of the scorched earth policy) in Upper Burma. It began in earnest on 30 March 1942 when the oilfields and refineries in Thayetmyo, Minbu and Yethaya were destroyed.6 It was a dress rehearsal for the destruction of the more important installations clustered around Yenangyaung, Chauk, Lanywa and Yenangyat. The ‘D’ Signal was posted at Yenangyaung at 5.00 p.m. on 14 April and later that evening steamers and country boats evacuated 5,000 essential workers up-river. Only 300 ‘last ditchers’ remained in the oil towns. They worked through the night to prepare the oilfields and power station for demolition the following day. Those in Chauk, Lanywa and Yenangyat followed next and by 19 April the work was complete. The whole area was ablaze. At the end of 1941 the Government of Burma had appointed a British Petroleum Engineer to coordinate demolition efforts in the oil industry. He advocated the construction of a series of small bunds around major oil storage tanks. These were to be flooded with oil. The idea was that when the ‘D’ Orders were posted these oil ‘lakes’ would be set alight and encouraged to flow back to ignite the tanks. The trouble was that it did not work. BBPC had two tanks each containing 1 million gallons of oil and BOC had 18 even larger tanks. Such massive volumes of oil were surprisingly difficult to set on fire as the flames burned themselves out within a few minutes. Moreover, there was a distinct possibility that burning oil might flow into the Irrawaddy and engulf IFC vessels that were transporting evacuees upstream. It was discovered that the solution was to lay charges about 3 feet from the top of each tank. When the charges were detonated, the explosions displaced enough burning oil to ignite the rest of the tank. In the end all the tanks were demolished using this method. The smoke they caused blotted out the sun for several days, and drifted in the wind for 30 miles or more.

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Figure 7.1 Oil tanks ablaze in Yenangyaung, April 1942. As part of the government’s ‘scorched earth’ policy, ‘last ditchers’ destroyed two huge oil storage tanks in Yenangyaung. The smoke was reported to have drifted 35 miles, blotted out the sun and raised air temperature for several days. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

The ‘last ditchers’ threw electrical equipment down oil wells, smashed up machinery, and managed to light with a single match at least one site that was flooded with oil. All the stores, water pumping stations and buildings in the vicinity were burned to the ground. Refinery pipes would have been flooded with water if time had allowed.7 The ‘last ditchers’ were heroic, for demolition work was dangerous work and it required immense courage and skill. William Mennie was a BOC engineer and a member of the demolition squad in Yenangyaung. He was typical of his breed – taciturn and fearless. He had to carry out the demolitions in almost total darkness and extreme heat with flames from the oil wells pouring overhead. After many hours’ work Mennie was exhausted and hungry, yet he and his colleagues worked hour after hour without fuss.8 The task was finally completed at 2.00 p.m. on 19 April. There was not a minute to spare when Mennie and the other ‘last ditchers’ crossed the river in a great rush and were driven away in waiting cars and lorries.9

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Figure 7.2 Demolition of oil plant at Yenangyaung, 16 April 1942. The Yenangyaung– Chauk oil wells produced 85 per cent of Burma’s oil. British engineers destroyed oil installations so effectively that the Japanese were unable to extract oil for more than a year. The wooden derrick nearest the camera was still ablaze when the photograph was taken. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

Rev. H. Crowther Willans experienced the whole thing rather differently. He had recently arrived from Rangoon.10 By the time he arrived Chauk was a ‘men only’ town. All the women had been evacuated. Everyone clutched inoculation certificates in readiness for a quick getaway and European evacuees occupied every bit of accommodation in Chauk. Japanese planes circled overhead, dropping propaganda leaflets and it was very obvious that Japanese ground forces were not far away. On most days the temperature reached 110° in the shade. The final orders for the demolition were issued on 14 April. Willans was startled to hear a series of deafening explosions that shook the whole town and suddenly the sky was filled with acrid black smoke. Hundreds of men spent hours queuing for boats at the foreshore. When his turn came, Willans clambered onto a steamer. The man behind him in the queue was less fortunate as he died from heatstroke. Some steamers sailed up the Irrawaddy and disgorged their passengers into the refugee camps scattered along its banks. Others sailed up the Chindwin. When Willans’ steamer reached Yenangyat, 30 miles up-river, word got around that Japanese troops had already taken Chauk. Willans was invited to join a party of

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BOC managers, and they set off up the Chindwin Valley in a convoy of ten cars that reached Tamu on 21 April. *

*

*

Two tragic events occurred in Mandalay during March and April 1942. The first was a terrible cholera epidemic and the second a hugely destructive bombing raid. In any case it was as plain as a pikestaff that Mandalay could not cope with the influx of evacuees. It was already hideously overcrowded and to obviate the problem the authorities devised a twofold strategy. First they tried to delay the refugees’ arrivals in Mandalay for as long as possible, either by holding them in camps along the road, or by persuading them to break their train journeys in places like Kyaukse. As the Japanese bombing raids spread northwards it became clear that few evacuees wanted to linger on the way and most were determined to reach Mandalay without delay. Many intermediary camps were never built and the first part of the plan did not work. The second part of the plan was no more successful. Colonel M. J. Clarke, the Commissioner for Mandalay wanted evacuees to move out of Mandalay as quickly as possible. He arranged for parties of women and children to be taken up the Chindwin Valley to India – first by train or by road to Monywa, then by river-launch to Kalewa and finally by lorry or bus to Manipur. The first convoy left Mandalay on 25 February and the second on 2 March but then the programme petered out. The fly in the ointment was that work was still in progress on a military road-building programme. The Army was unwilling to allow any civilian evacuation west of the Irrawaddy until the road was completed. To this end, soldiers patrolled the river and a barbed-wire barrier was thrown across the Ava Bridge.11 It effectively cut off the refugee route between Tamu and Imphal, and as if that was not enough, the Commissioner for Sagaing did his best to prevent evacuees from seeping onto his patch.12 In any case, rail and road traffic came to a halt in mid-March because of a serious outbreak of cholera to the north of Mandalay. The consequence was that while refugees flooded into Mandalay from the south, few were able to escape to the north. As a result the city began to expand like a balloon ready to burst. *

*

*

The effect on Mandalay of this ‘entrapment’ was that by the beginning of March 1942 about 25,000 Indian evacuees were cooped up in the Tagundaing and Taungmyint camps (5 miles south of Mandalay) and were spilling out into the surrounding open spaces. By mid-March it was estimated that the

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number of Indian evacuees living in Mandalay had grown to 50,000. Some of them were in camps, but many of them were not. The influx of Indian and European evacuees was bitterly resented by Burmans in Mandalay. The city was much less cosmopolitan and much less tolerant than Rangoon had been and its predominantly Burmese Buddhist population was more suspicious of nonindigenous peoples. Tensions increased as the numbers of refugees grew. By the end of March more than 100,000 evacuees were estimated to be living in the city. At the same time hundreds more were arriving every day. Many of the new arrivals simply squatted at the railway station or by the river jetties. Others slept in the open on any spare bit of land. From time to time the authorities tried to round up the squatters and to move them into makeshift camps in the suburbs of Mandalay, but it was a losing battle. To make matters worse, banks, commercial establishments and government departments had come up from Lower Burma at the same time. They brought with them scores of European and Anglo-Indian employees who requisitioned every available public building and most private houses in the city. They made a beeline for that quarter of the city lying to the south and east of the Fort. They took over houses in the former European civil lines and some of the more important European evacuees occupied the colonial mansions lining South Moat Road behind which were several schools. Officials wasted no time in requisitioning the American Baptist Mission School in order to house Pyinmana air-raid victims, while the Evacuation Department commandeered the Wesley Girls High School and turned its garden into a transport park. The Rangoon Telegraphic Corporation installed itself in the Mandalay Boys High School and the Rangoon Corporation requisitioned the Mandalay Girls High School while the leading Rangoon banks occupied the whole of the Rowe Building.13 *

*

*

On 20 January the Principal of the Agricultural College had been put in charge of the arrangements for evacuees within Mandalay itself. It was a very big job and proved to be too big for the unfortunate College Principal. An ambitious plan had been devised to build ten new camps around the perimeter of the city. Each camp would accommodate 500 refugees, and each would have huts, latrines, kitchens and dining sheds. It was a noble ideal, but like so many others in Burma in 1942, it did not work. The evacuees refused to use the latrines and insisted on leaving food lying about. The absence of sweepers – they had all deserted – meant that human excrement accumulated very quickly. Shortages of transport meant that food could not be imported into the camps and evacuees

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Table 7.1 Evacuation camps in Mandalay, March–April 1942 Camp Amarapura Tagundaing Taungmyint Total

Capacity

Actual Number

3,000 5,000 1,500 9,500

6,000 15,000 1,500 22,500

Source: J. S. Vorley, Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma, Part II, Mandalay, p. 96, BL/IOR/M3/955 (B70/4).

could not be despatched. Table 7.1 shows that by the middle of March the camps were overcrowded. They were also filthy and disease ridden. Conditions in the Amarapura Camp were worst of all. Hungry, thirsty and dishevelled refugees huddled miserably along the riverbank for as far as the eye could see. They were surrounded by litter, had little shelter and no latrines or clean water. It came as no great surprise when smallpox cases began to appear. The Tagundaing Camp was not much better and complaints about insufficient latrines, inadequate water supplies, overcrowded huts and poor food became commonplace. The evacuees voted with their feet, preferring to squat outside the camps rather than live inside them. Conditions in the camps deteriorated further as trains packed with evacuees continued to arrive in Mandalay. By mid-March many of the new arrivals showed symptoms of cholera and the corpses of cholera and smallpox victims were strewn along the railway tracks. Other cholera or smallpox sufferers collapsed and died on the streets outside the railway station as soon as they arrived in Mandalay. The diseases soon reached such epidemic proportions that municipal workers refused to remove corpses from the streets. The Department of Public Health had no vaccines and most of its doctors, vaccinators and sanitary inspectors had deserted long ago. Mandalay had become a disaster area. On 14 March 1942 a crisis meeting was held in Maymyo. Dorman-Smith, Vorley, Clarke, General Hutton, Major General Goddard and others attended. They spent a long time searching for solutions to insoluble problems. In the end it was decided that Vorley should take over as Commissioner with complete responsibility for all evacuation in the whole country.14 The Mandalay Commissioner, Colonel M. J. Clarke confirmed that Vorley was now in charge of all evacuation arrangements. Vorley had been angling for precisely this authority for many months but it was now almost too late in the day. Hutton and Goddard assured Vorley that Upper Burma would be defended at all costs and that work on the Tamu–Imphal

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road would be completed by 1 May, after which the road would be opened up to refugees. Until then, however, refugees were not allowed to use the road. In the meantime it was proposed that 250 refugees per day should be sent up to Myitkyina and that 1,200 refugees per day should be flown out of Myitkyina. None of these undertakings or targets was realized. Cometh the hour, cometh the man! Vorley set about his new task with a will. He introduced new blood into his trusty old team. Some ‘tough lads’ from the Friends Ambulance Unit joined Green in the transport section. Andrewartha, Forrest and Bott were put in charge of the recruitment and supervision of labour. Mrs Lindop had volunteered to help in the procurement and supplies section. Ricketts, Major Pughe, Booth-Russell and a new recruit, Condie, set about constructing camps and overseeing refugee movements, while Voehringer and Dr Jury were appointed as ‘ministers without portfolio’. In addition Vorley brought in Forbes-Mitchell and Marjory Murray to sort out the Department’s accounts.15 The first disaster was the cholera and smallpox epidemic. By mid-March 300–400 were dying from cholera each day. On 22 March – the day after Vorley took over – Andrewartha and Forrest assembled so-called burial squads, teams of coolies they were deployed to clear away the corpses. About 800 or so dead bodies in various states of advanced decomposition were scattered around Mandalay and during the next three weeks the death squads burned or buried over 5,000 bodies. At the peak of the epidemic over 600 were dying and had to be buried every day. For their efforts the labourers who performed this gruesome task received double pay and endless supplies of liquor. Vorley ensured that every building in the infected camps was razed to the ground. The refugees were relocated to the Tagundaing Camp or to one or other of the nine new camps that had just been built around the outskirts of Mandalay. A huge labour force under Ricketts, Booth-Russell, Condie had completed the camp construction programme with amazing speed. Each new camp had duglatrines, clean wells, rules about cleanliness, clearly defined cooking areas and dispensaries. Between them they could now accommodate up to 50,000 refugees. As soon as the camp-building programme was completed Vorley prohibited squatting in Mandalay. The dead were less of a problem than the dying. Two hundred cholera and smallpox victims had been crammed into a horrible little isolation hospital on the bank of the Irrawaddy. An Indian doctor, one Burmese nurse and a Burmese ward boy struggled to cope with them – but they were overwhelmed. They had no medicines and the District Health officer had fled. A knight in shining armour

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appeared in the form of Dr Lusk, a brilliant Irish GP from Rangoon. He had only just arrived in Mandalay when he joined Vorley’s team. He immediately set about clearing up the chaos in the hospital and when this was done he turned his attention to the much bigger task of bringing the cholera epidemic under control. Shortages of medical staff, vaccines and medicines were the main obstacles. Lusk had several strokes of good fortune. The first was that Hutchings and Tyabji flew a planeload of medical supplies to Shwebo. The second stroke of luck was the arrival of a keen young Anglo-Indian District Health Officer named Dr Mobsby, who organized teams of sanitary inspectors and vaccinators. Mobsby also unearthed supplies of vaccine, lymph, needles and syringes. The third was that Dr Sandy Broatch, another energetic General Practitioner from Rangoon, volunteered to help. He raided medical stores and ‘looted’ large quantities of drugs and syringes. Dr Jury proceeded to fill the syringes with vaccine, thus enabling Lusk to inoculate 40,000 refugees in the first week alone. From then on any evacuee arriving in Mandalay without an inoculation certificate was inoculated on the spot. The results were spectacular. By 12 April the numbers dying from cholera and smallpox had fallen from 600 to 10 per day. *

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The cholera and smallpox epidemic was only one of many challenges that faced Vorley’s team. It also had to feed and water 120,000 evacuees every day, a task that was made more difficult because the bazaars were closed, rice merchants were charging extortionate prices and the military and civil authorities had already requisitioned whatever they could lay their hands on. Vorley had taken the precaution of stockpiling hundreds of bags of rice (together with two bottles of the finest champagne) in the Wesley Girls High School. Mr L. A. Crain’s team went around each day procuring enormous quantities of food. They scoured the local area and expertly scavenged oil, rice and vegetables and anything else that was edible. On top of all this the Army urged Vorley to find thousands of coolies to work on the Shwebo–Chindwin–Tamu road route and on the Hukawng Valley section of the Myitkyina–Bhamo–Shan road. Finding men was difficult enough, but each labourer had to be equipped with a dah as well – and not a single dah was to be found in Mandalay. Voehringer remembered having seen large numbers of dahs stashed away in a warehouse in Prome. He drove all the way down to Prome, located the now bricked-up warehouse and broke in through the roof. He removed thousands of dahs, sold half of them to the Army in Prome and loaded the rest into a river launch. Before returning to Mandalay he also loaded

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several tons of engineering equipment into the launch. Meanwhile, and against the odds, Andrewartha, Forrest and Bott had managed to recruit vast numbers of coolies. They were now able to issue each of them with a dah and to pack them off by train to Myitkyina. The pilfering ‘bug’ had infected even Vorley. He made a couple of trips down to Yenangyaung in his Vauxhall car in order to ‘loot’ (of all things), piles of maps and charts from the empty BOC offices. One thing that troubled Vorley was that the Evacuation Department’s accounts were in a mess. They had not been regulated or scrutinized for months. Of course he could claim that the priority was to save lives, not to balance the books, but nevertheless Forbes-Mitchell and Marjory Murray were instructed to exert a modicum of control over the accounts. The problem was that endless transactions, small sums for wages, rail fares, payments for food, building materials and fuel were taking place every day. They provided rich pickings for potential embezzlers or fraudsters. Thousands of labourers working on the Shwebo–Shwegyin road had to be paid in advance every morning, and 400 coolies working in and around Mandalay had to be paid every evening. It was a very complicated business and to make it all possible, the Department’s heavily guarded van trundled up the road twice a week to the Reserve Bank in Shwebo (80 miles there and 80 miles back) to collect Rs 200,000 (£40,000) in 1-rupee coins – a reminder, if one was needed, of the magnitude and complexity of the evacuation project. Interestingly neither Dorman-Smith nor Vorley dared calculate the total cost of the venture, yet there can be no doubt that it consumed mind-boggling sums of public and private money. Vorley once hinted that the Evacuation Department’s weekly expenditure ran to £20,000 per week. This must have been a miscalculation for it represented only half of one biweekly lorry-load of coins from the bank, although even this, if extrapolated, was the equivalent of about £0.7 to £2.3M in today’s money. However, the sum did not include such hefty items as management costs (salaries, pensions, etc.), accommodation and the cost of equipment, for example. Surely Vorley did not mean £200,000 per week, which would have been the equivalent of a colossal £7M to £23M. However anything was believable by this time. *

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The second disaster struck Mandalay at precisely 11.00 a.m. on Friday 3 April 1942. Mrs Vorley happened to be working in the Evacuation Department in Wesley Girls High School when Japanese planes flew overhead. There had been no warning, so she dived for cover under a writing desk. Fortunately on this

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Figure 7.3 Burning houses in Central Mandalay on 3 April 1942. After she had visited Mandalay soon after the raid, Lady Dorman-Smith wrote that ‘acre after acre of streets are burnt completely flat’ and that it was worse than any other destruction in Burma. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the Imperial War Museum.

occasion the school building was not hit, but shortly afterwards a truck loaded with RAF bombs caught fire at the railway station (see Chapter 6). It caused a mammoth explosion that shook every building within a half-mile radius. The Civil Hospital and the bazaar were both completely destroyed and many wooden houses in the European and Anglo-Indian quarters burned to the ground. By 4.00 p.m. fires were raging throughout the city and a huge fireball was blowing towards the wooden houses on South Moat Road.16 Mr and Mrs Dabey, middle-aged evacuees from Rangoon, had recently arrived in Mandalay. They were billeted in a typical wooden house near South Moat Road.17 At 11.00 a.m. on the morning of 3 April they were relaxing on their verandah when planes roared overhead to drop bombs all around. The Dabeys rushed towards the air-raid trench in the garden, and as they did so another flight came over and dropped more bombs. There was pandemonium as buildings set on fire and a fierce, hot wind blew a fireball in the Dabey’s direction. They grabbed a few essential items and ran towards South Moat Road, where they joined hoards of other people, many with bad wounds, running for their lives. Among them were patients from the Civil Hospital (which had received a direct hit) and a group of wounded Chinese troops hobbling on crutches.18 The

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Figure 7.4 Gharry driver and dead pony after the bombing raid on Mandalay, 3 April 1942. Gharry drivers and their ponies were exposed and vulnerable. Several accounts of deaths and injuries (including one on South Moat Road) were reported during the bombing raid of 3 April. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of Imperial War Museum.

Dabeys took shelter for a moment in the brick-built St Mary’s Church, which was undamaged apart from broken windows that had scattered glass everywhere. A bomb had fallen on the gatepost of the Church, killing five Indians who were crouching in a nearby ditch. Dead cattle and gharry ponies were scattered all around.19 Less than a hundred yards further along South Moat Road the Good Friday service had just finished in the Methodist Church. After the congregation had dispersed, the Revs Chapman, Firth, Reed and U Po Tun were enjoying a cup of coffee in the vestry. They had just been discussing the fact that scores of European evacuees were now flocking into church services, many of them had never been seen before, when a servant rushed in to warn them that Japanese planes were approaching. There had been no air-raid warning, but the four men rushed out and jumped into the trench as incendiary bombs rained down. The bombs gutted surrounding buildings within a matter of seconds, and soon only the brick walls and tower of the church remained standing. Much of the civil lines and the bazaar had been wiped out.20 At 11.00 a.m. on 3 April Vorley was inspecting refugee camps on the outskirts of Mandalay. He gawped in astonishment at the scene that began to unfold in

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the distance. He had seen the planes fly over, and the flames and great pall of smoke that leapt up. Carloads of people were now fleeing northwards along the Shwebo Road. He discovered later that the main railway station was a shambles and a mass of twisted electric tramway wires covered bomb craters and torn-up tramlines. Dacoits, looters and arsonists began to move in almost as soon as the bombers had gone. They started yet more fires. When people finally dusted themselves down it became clear that a huge tragedy had swept over Mandalay. The Evacuation Department had to get large numbers of people out of the city in double quick time. Hundreds of evacuees – Indians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans – had been made homeless by the bombing, people like Captain J. S. Turner, who had only just arrived in Mandalay after a terrible journey from Rangoon. Turner was one of many who had lost everything. He had managed to grab just his passport and a couple of testimonials.21 Rangoon Bank officials had immediately rushed off to Shwebo and had flown in a chartered plane from Shwebo. They left in such a hurry that they had forgotten piles of cash and the Bank’s priceless collection of Georgian silverware. Looters were having a field day. It was not long before noisy crowds began to besiege Vorley’s Evacuation Department offices. They demanded transport to camps, medical treatment, food and priority chits for air tickets. Traders milled around selling their wares at vast profits, and army officers tried to hire coolies. It was bedlam. Several more air raids caused further confusion, not least because the air-raid warning system was no longer functioning. No sooner had the bombed-out Civil Hospital moved all its sick and wounded patients into the ABM School than it was bombed out again in another raid. Fires flared up in the charred ruins with every waft of breeze and temperatures reached 110° most days. The water supply was drawn straight from the moat and had been reduced to a muddy trickle. The electricity supply flickered on and off and Mandalay was hot, smoky, fly-ridden and stinking. Perversely, as thousands of homeless and terrified evacuees tried to leave Mandalay, thousands more flooded into the city by train and by road. Among them were gaggles of exhausted patients (including stretcher cases) from Rangoon General Hospital and Bassein Hospital who had already been victims of air raids in the south. Now bands of armed dacoits waited to accost them as soon as they stepped off the trains in Mandalay. *

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Figure 7.5 Refugees leaving Mandalay on the road to Shwebo, 3 April 1942. The bombing raid of 3 April 1942 caused panic. Immediately thousands of evacuees flooded northwards out of Mandalay and along the road towards Shwebo. Photograph reproduced by kind permission of the British Library.

The Evacuation Department did what it could. Lorries drove around picking up survivors and disposing of bodies. There was little rice to be found and virtually no cooking oil, vegetables and dhal. Yet, Mr L. A. Crain somehow managed to feed the 50,000 refugees now in Mandalay as well as the 15,000 in Kyaukmyaung. The Transport Section was also in crisis. Green had to work around the clock in order to keep his diminishing fleet of trucks and buses in working order. Every day he took busloads of evacuees to the Kyaukmyaung Camp to catch the ferry up to Katha and every day he ferried 250 refugees to catch the train for Shwebo. Since the bombing of Mandalay Railway Station his task had become more difficult because trains had to start and finish to the south of the city. Tempers began to flare between evacuees. Retired British Army officers were reckoned to be the worst of the lot. On one occasion Green put a party of 250 frail and elderly Indian evacuees on a train bound for Shwebo when a British Army officer clambered aboard and demanded an empty compartment. He pulled some elderly female occupants out of their seats and occupied the

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compartment on his own while threatening to shoot anyone who interfered. Another incident involved five British Army officers who allegedly drove up to the barrier on the Ava Bridge and threatened to shoot the Havildar unless he let them through. Vorley insisted that such episodes were rare, but nonetheless they were deeply upsetting. As the situation worsened, Green’s Section began to drive groups of evacuees all the way up to Myitkyina. On 11 April Mr and Mrs Dabey were among those lucky enough to be taken to Myitkyina on one of the Evacuation Department’s buses. It went through the burnt-out and depressing suburbs of Mandalay before taking the road to Myitkyina and arriving many hours later.22 The already febrile atmosphere in Mandalay deteriorated further with the arrival of Chinese troops at the beginning of April 1942. Janet Humble once described them as ‘well behaved, silent ghosts on padded feet’, although others found them uncompromising, callous and extremely dangerous.23 For example, the Chinese imposed a startlingly strict curfew in Mandalay. Anyone seen on the road after dark was likely to be shot dead. *

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Most Burmans went to ground in surrounding villages within hours of the Good Friday air raid, but it was not an option for Indian and European evacuees. For the time being they could still go by air from Shwebo, by steamer up the Chindwin to Kalewa or up the Irrawaddy to Katha. Nevertheless, none of the options was very reliable and it would not be long before the Shwebo airstrip closed down. As long as the Chindwin River Valley remained open it was the most direct overland way to India and evacuees choosing to go by this route went via Tamu and Imphal to the railhead at Dimapur. In due course the Indian authorities and the Indian Tea Planters Association would take responsibility for the Chindwin route and others in northern Burma. There is much more to be said about this extraordinary phase of the evacuation but it is for another time. Suffice it to say for the moment that though the Chindwin to Dimapur route was far from straightforward. It necessitated an exhausting trek. A train service still operated along the first part of it from Mandalay to Monywa until the beginning of March 1942. At Monywa the evacuees were transferred to riversteamers. Most of them slept on the open deck. From Mawlaik they continued up the Yu River to Yuva, where they transferred to fleets of londwins, which took them as far as Hleizeik transit camp. They continued on to a huge transit camp in Tamu, after which there was a very hard slog over the mountains to Palel 36 miles away. The oldest, youngest and most infirm evacuees were carried in

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doolies, but it was impossible to cover more than 7 miles per day on this leg of the journey. At Palel, Indians were segregated from Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Many Indians had to walk the rest of the way while the Europeans and AngloIndians rode along the new road in ramshackle buses and lorries to Imphal, then onwards to the railhead at Dimapur.24 The Mandalay–Monywa railway was very intermittent and only two or three vastly overcrowded evacuation trains ran before it stopped in mid-March because of a serious cholera outbreak. In any case the route to Dimapur was closed soon afterwards. Green and his colleagues continued to take batches of evacuees from Mandalay up to Kyaukmyaung where IFC steamers left daily for Katha. The vessels were always crammed to capacity. At Katha a short railway journey on a branch line took the evacuees to Naba, where they joined the main Mandalay–Myitkyina line. As the Japanese advanced on Mandalay, Vorley believed that the Evacuation Department HQ would have to move to Katha, and he dispatched Major Pughe to Katha to construct a camp and to store emergency supplies of rice and tinned goods. *

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Japanese planes returned to bomb Mandalay on 18 and 20 April. On 19 April, Vorley decided to send his female staff up to Myitkyina. The women left Mandalay at 9.00 a.m. on 20 April in a convoy of three cars and two trucks. A Japanese reconnaissance plane flew overhead watching their every move. It was very tense, and it seemed an eternity when the convoy had to wait in an open paddy field while a long column of Chinese troops crossed over the Ava Bridge. Afterwards the convoy sped across the bridge at breakneck speed. The women spent the night in a Forest Department bungalow at Kyaukmyaung before boarding the mail boat to Katha on the morning of 22 April. The IFC riverboat journey from Kyaukmyaung to Katha was terrifying. The steamer towed a petrol-tank flat on the port side and a cargo boat filled with petrol drums on the starboard side – 90,000 gallons of octane spirit in total. The smell of petrol was overpowering and the boat and flats were both packed with passengers. At the very last minute a large party of Anglo-Indian and AngloBurmans from Maymyo and a large group of patients and staff from Mandalay Civil Hospital arrived. They too were crammed onto the boat. There was standing room only and everyone had to squeeze close together. The most worrying thing was that some passengers insisted on smoking even though the danger that a single lighted match could cause was blindingly obvious. Two BOC managers – the O’Connor brothers – had their work cut out prowling around, chastising would-be smokers and generally trying to maintain law and order. Drinking

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water and food ran out, it was stiflingly hot at nights, there was no escape from the stench of petrol and above all there was the constant fear of a Japanese air attack. The steamer was a sitting target.25 Vorley had fully intended to put the children from Bishop Strachan’s Orphanage on the same boat as his female members of staff. They were due to fly from Myitkyina. As instructed, the orphans waited patiently on the foreshore at Thabyetkyin on 23 April. However, the steamer was so overcrowded that the children were left behind. Mrs Vorley shouted instructions to them. She told them to wait at Thabyetkyin until someone came to pick them up. When she reached Katha she persuaded the Deputy Commissioner to go down to Thabyetkyin to collect them in his launch.26 *

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By the end of April the camps in Mandalay were almost deserted. Most of the evacuees had been transferred to camps in Ye-U, Kyaukmyaung or Kinnu. The civilian population of Mandalay (including the officials) had melted away.27 The city was eerily quiet. Street after street had been burnt to the ground and the atmosphere was fetid and hellishly hot. Only the ‘last ditchers’ now remained and they set about their task on 25 April. They destroyed anything in Mandalay that might be useful to the Japanese. Vorley drew out Rs 98,000 from the Mandalay Treasury, and burned the rest – about Rs 2M – before closing the Treasury doors for the last time.28 A final inspection of the Post Office unearthed hundreds of unopened bags of mail (incoming and outgoing), which had been there for many weeks. There was no time to go through the mail so the post office – bags and all – was burned to the ground. On 26 April the Japanese had already reached Kyaukse and the ‘last ditchers’ began to leave Mandalay. Morton provided an IFC launch to take them up-river to Katha. Five European engineers had volunteered to crew the vessel, and on the morning of 26 April they were on the river foreshore giving the boat a final check. Without warning, two Japanese planes roared low overhead and dropped anti-personnel bombs into thousands of refugees who were waiting to board four river-steamers. It caused carnage, and among the many casualties were the five engineers who had been preparing the launch. Davis, Allison and an unnamed European were killed outright, and Williams and Russell died later in hospital. Hundreds of the 2,000–3,000 Indian refugees waiting on the foreshore were killed or wounded. Lusk was the only physician left in Mandalay, all the others had left. He did what he could do to ease the suffering. Lusk witnessed many harrowing incidents that day, none more tragic than the sight of an Indian woman whose arm and foot had been severed in the blast. She was covered

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from head to toe in smallpox and lay in excruciating pain while her three small children clung desperately to her side. During the evening of 26 April the remaining British troops stationed in Mandalay left the city. Their military vehicles and artillery pieces filled the road. There was now no possibility of resistance in Mandalay. Neither Vorley nor M. J. Clarke had been given warning of the troops’ departure, and they were not well pleased. Nevertheless the time had come for them to evacuate the City. Mr L. A. Crain and his colleagues worked around the clock to provide each evacuee with five days’ rations and they were instructed to start walking straight away.29 *

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A steep, winding road separates Mandalay from Maymyo. It is less than 25 miles as the crow flies but much more by road. In colonial times, Maymyo was cocooned from the rest of Burma. Whereas Mandalay was quintessentially Burmese, Maymyo was a British enclave. It was a holiday destination and the summer headquarters of the Government of Burma. It was home to scores of retired Europeans and Anglo-Indians, a garrison town and a honey pot for Indian traders and servants. Maymyo’s population had recently been swollen by the arrival of thousands of European and Anglo-Indian evacuees. One of them was Gerald Bourne, a distinguished lawyer who, like many other Europeans, had driven up from Rangoon in his smart car. He was almost immediately appointed Food Officer in Maymyo, with responsibility for acquiring and distributing food. He established his Food Office in the small wooden courthouse building where he entertained a stream of judges who passed through the town as well as local food merchants and lorry owners. As a sideline Bourne also operated a sort of up-market corner shop in Maymyo.30 In 1942 the inhabitants of Maymyo seemed strangely detached from events even in nearby Mandalay let alone the war in Lower Burma. Maymyo was considered to be a very safe place indeed. After the fall of Rangoon the authorities began to think the unthinkable. They totted up the number of civilians they might have to evacuate from Maymyo if the worst came to the worst, and arrived at a figure of about 10,000.31 It prompted them to organize a series of convoys to transport ‘non-essential’ citizens to the Chindwin Valley and then on to India. In the event only two such convoys actually left – each consisting of about 250 evacuees – before the scheme came to an abrupt end. Strangely enough, most people in Maymyo were unperturbed and seemed quite prepared to stay-put. The atmosphere changed suddenly at the beginning of April with the news that Japanese forces had advanced north of Toungoo. At the same time, information

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was filtering in about the ill treatment of internees in Hong Kong. People were unnerved. The decisive blow came on 8 April when Maymyo suffered its first air raid. It was heavy and prolonged and damaged property. Several people were killed. Suddenly the war had arrived even here. Despite Bourne’s dismissive claim that 30 per cent of the bombs had failed to explode, bazaars closed, servants fled and there was general panic. The bombing raids continued almost daily (and always in the morning) for the next few weeks. People became quite blasé and got into the habit of going off into the surrounding countryside before lunch, returning to inspect the damage in the afternoons. However, the constant pounding of Maymyo dented morale and those who were able made their way to India. Some went via Mandalay and others via Lashio to Myitkyina. Many of the people who had been determined to stay, changed their minds, but there was an acute shortage of transport because the Army had requisitioned almost every roadworthy vehicle. On 15 April many of the government departments in Maymyo evacuated to Myitkyina and the authorities urged all able-bodied men who had no transport to start walking towards Mandalay. The elderly and frail were advised to stay-put until further notice. By 20 April about 4,000 evacuees remained in Maymyo. During the next few days many of them started to walk. Needless to say Gerald Bourne left under his own steam. He drove his cabriolet out of Maymyo with his head held high.32 On the evening of 26 April the last troops withdrew from Maymyo. It was a symbolic moment. By this late stage, only 400 evacuees – mainly elderly folk and women with young children – still waited to be evacuated. There was more than a whiff of panic in the air.33 One of the difficulties was that telegraph and telephone communications had broken down. The Commissioner had to drive up to Maymyo himself on the evening of 26 April. He explained that Mandalay would almost certainly fall within the next few hours and urged everyone who still wished to leave Maymyo to go to Mandalay immediately. He promised that lorries would take them within the next hour or so.34 The first wave of Anglo-Indians, Anglo-Burmans and Gurkha wives began arriving in Mandalay from Maymyo at midnight on 26 April. The lorries ground up and down the hill throughout the night and the last lorry-load arrived in Mandalay at dawn the next morning. During the course of that night all 400 of the evacuees had been brought down the hill to Mandalay. It was no small achievement. In a short space of time the Army had evacuated 600 military dependants. All told, about 15,000 evacuees had been removed from Maymyo in the space of three or four weeks. *

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The very last IFC boats left Mandalay for Katha during the morning of 27 April. As it left, looters and arsonists moved in. They took whatever they could find before setting fire to buildings. The sound of small-arms fire echoed around the empty streets as Vorley and his colleagues ate their last meal together. Afterwards they loaded servants and servants’ wives, children, pots, pans, kettles, baskets and bundles into lorries and drove in convoy across the Ava Bridge. On the way to Kyaukmyaung they passed columns of British troops, ‘grey with fatigue and lack of sleep.’ Behind them, plumes of smoke rose above Mandalay. It was with some relief that Vorley discovered that about 17,000 of his refugees had reached Kyaukmyaung. He knew that another 8,000 had been moved up to Ye-U and Kinnu. *

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On 28 April Vorley was summoned to a meeting with General Goddard at Army Headquarters in Shwebo. Here he received some devastating news. Goddard announced that he had issued orders for a general retreat of all British forces from Burma. It would begin the next day (29 April) and from midnight evacuees would be prohibited from using the Kalewa–Tamu road.35 It was a bombshell because just two weeks previously Goddard had assured Vorley that the road would be available to evacuees from 1 May. On the strength of this assurance Vorley had promised hundreds of BOC employees that if they remained at their posts in Chauk and Yenangyaung until the last moment he could guarantee their safe passage through the Chindwin Valley to India. Goddard’s latest announcement amounted to a betrayal. Indeed at that very moment BOC workers were in the Kyaukmyaung and Ye-U refugee camps, waiting for instructions to proceed up the Chindwin valley to India. Goddard refused to budge, and informed Vorley that any refugee found crossing the Chindwin River after midnight on 29 April risked being shot. It was ironic that the Army’s road construction programme had depended on some 15,000 of Vorley’s labourers working to the bitter end and now they (and others like them) were going to pay the price. The Evacuation Department was given just 15 hours in which to clear the refugee camps at Kyaukmyaung, Ye-U and Kinnu and to take thousands of evacuees over the Chindwin before Goddard’s deadline expired. It was a colossal undertaking. Mr L. A. Crain issued each evacuee with as much food as he/she could carry, after which Green’s lorries plied back and forth between the camps and Okma on the Chindwin. On each outward journey the vehicles were piled high with evacuees and at Okma the evacuees were given fresh supplies of food and handed over to other members of Vorley’s team who ferried them – thousands

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of them – across the Chindwin River. Green’s lorries continued to work nonstop until the stroke of midnight on 29 April, at which point the Army’s deadline expired. From then on no more evacuees were permitted to cross the Chindwin, and at midnight every one of Green’s vehicles was destroyed to prevent it falling into Japanese hands. It had been a desperate struggle against time and fatigue. *

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Midnight on 29 April 1942 was also a key moment in two other ways. It was the point at which ‘Vorley the Commissioner’ became ‘Vorley the refugee’ and also the moment at which the evacuees became India’s rather than Burma’s responsibility. Specifically the baton had passed from Vorley to General Wood. It was only later that Vorley learned his evacuees had suffered no serious casualties, at least until the evacuation of Tamu, which took place on 15 May. About 125,000 evacuees reached Assam along the route from Tamu during this time – but that is another story. *

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Vorley could now concentrate on saving himself. On 28 April he drove from Mandalay to Shwebo with Lusk and Spence. They arrived in the middle of an air raid, and because the trains from Shwebo had stopped running, they drove on to Tantabin where a train was standing in the station. It was made up of scores of open cattle trucks, each of which was packed with Chinese soldiers many of whom had gangrenous wounds. The troops had been travelling for ten days. Even the most seriously wounded had received no medical attention during that time. Vorley squeezed into the train, which crawled along for the next 64 hours. It eventually reached Katha on 2 May. The town was already seething with evacuees. Within the next few hours six riverboats arrived at Katha. They spewed out yet more evacuees. Vorley estimated that 5,000 refugees were waiting for transport to Myitkyina. Many of them were too ill, wounded or infirm to evacuate on their own. Vorley was one of the lucky ones. He managed to get transport to Myitkyina, where he met Dorman-Smith just before the Governor flew out on 4 May. Flights from Myitkyina ended three days after that, but Vorley’s own escape from Burma was just about to begin. It was a case of physician save thyself!

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8

Myitkyina: Seven Days That Shook a World

In his seminal work, Ten Days That Shook the World, John Reed described epochal events in Russia that led to revolution in 1917. They produced that most rare of moments – a real turning point in history. The events in Myitkyina in 1942 were equally earth shattering, but in a much more limited way. They marked the end of colonial rule in Burma and signalled the coming demise of imperial rule in South-East Asia. This chain reaction would only end when French forces surrendered at Diem Bien Phu, exactly 12 years later.1 Myitkyina seemed an unlikely place for such an event. In 1942 it was a remote provincial town at the end of a railway line, 723 miles from Rangoon and 337 miles from Mandalay. On the airstrip at dawn on 4 May 1942 a tragic little drama was performed – it was described on the very first page of this book. Against the backdrop of a solitary Blenheim bomber stood His Excellency the Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. He clasped a small attaché-case containing his most secret State Papers and all his worldly belongings. He had clutched it for the past 65 days since leaving Government House in Rangoon. By his side stood his Personal Secretary, Maurice Rossington and Burma’s First Councillor, Sir John Wise.2 The men clambered onto the plane, which took off to the northwest. That moment brought to an end nearly 60 years of colonial rule in Burma. Dorman-Smith left the country exactly one year after his swearing-in ceremony. It had taken place amid much pomp in Rangoon.3 British officials had dreamed of making one last valiant stand in Myitkyina. However, it was not to be. *

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Lady Dorman-Smith had left Rangoon on 13 April 1942. She travelled by train to Myitkyina, spending a night on the way huddled alone in a railway carriage

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in a siding at Shwebo. The following morning, the train had crawled along at 10 miles an hour, stopping frequently to take on water, and to negotiate the hill sections in complicated shuttling operations. It finally reached Myitkyina 24 hours late. Lady Dorman-Smith spent her last few days in Burma in an idyllic bungalow. It had marvellous views of mountains and manicured lawns that swept down to the Irrawaddy.4 She filled in her time with drinks parties, fishing trips, picnics and sewing evenings with nuns from the Good Shepherd Convent. Evacuees were streaming into Myitkyina from every point in Burma. The more important of them (people like Paw Tun, Htoon Aung Gyaw and General Wavell) made a point of popping in to see Lady Dorman-Smith. Each new visitor brought a tale of woe – news of train derailments, bombing raids on Shwebo and horrific congestion in Lashio. Japanese forces seemed to turn up everywhere. They had reached Hsipaw, were close to Taunggyi and were already on the outskirts of Lashio. During the whole of this time Lady Dorman-Smith heard no news of her husband, other than that he had left Rangoon and was somewhere en route to Myitkyina. On 30 April a senior official came to tell Lady Dorman-Smith that the situation had become too dangerous, and that she must leave on the next CNAC flight to India. Reluctantly she accepted the inevitable and packed her case with the 40 lbs of luggage that she was allowed to take onto the plane. On Saturday 2 May she was driven to the aerodrome and flew to India. *

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The Governor’s own ‘inglorious retreat to Myitkyina’ is less well documented. It had begun as the Japanese closed in on Rangoon.5 Before dawn on 1 March 1942 Dorman-Smith and a handful of officials crept out of Government House in the morning mist. He clutched a small attaché case. The men made their way silently through the deserted streets to a rendezvous with the General Officer Commanding Rangoon who drove them to an airstrip on the outskirts of Rangoon. From there they were flown to Magwe.6 Dorman-Smith managed to keep just one step ahead of the advancing Japanese. At one stage he had hoped to set up a government ‘in exile’ in Maymyo, but instead he was forced to continue his flight to what he called the ‘outer darkness’ of Myitkyina. It is not clear exactly where he stayed on that journey or how he travelled. He moved rapidly and furtively from one hiding place to another, sending and receiving telegrams as he went. At every turn, Dorman-Smith was badgered to brief the Secretary of State in London or to provide information to the Governor-General or to explain an issue to Viceroy in India. Various tricky matters had blown up in his absence.

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Not least of them was the accusation of institutional racial discrimination against Indian evacuees. In his jungle hideaways Dorman-Smith struggled to find the relevant facts and figures to refute charges or to inform superiors. All the time he battled with a personal sense of guilt. He promised to stay on long enough in Burma to get all the hapless Indian refugees out of the country. It was a hollow pledge. At the same time General Alexander demanded that the Governor leave Burma immediately. He feared that Dorman-Smith would be captured and paraded around as a trophy by the Japanese. As Alexander expressed it so delicately, he did not want the Governor’s body ‘to add to his many anxieties’.7 One moment Dorman-Smith was telling his wife that he intended to hide in the jungle until the war was over and the next he was telling his advisers that he was going to walk out to India through the Hukawng Valley. The Secretary of State told him that neither crackpot scheme made any sense and even DormanSmith had to acknowledge that the Hukawng Valley was ‘no route for obese governors’. After rehearsing these bravura possibilities, he agreed that his only realistic option was to ‘clear out by air’. He was worried about appearances. How would it be received if he took ‘up a seat which could be used by a refugee’? But strangely enough, he seemed less worried about taking up a whole plane than taking up a seat. He telegraphed the Secretary of State for Burma on 2 May 1942, asking whether there was perhaps ‘a Blenheim [bomber] in India which might be used’ to get him out. He was obviously very agitated, adding plaintively ‘May I have your advice immediately?’8 Dorman-Smith spent a miserable day in Myitkyina on 3 May 1942. He had just missed his wife who had flown out the previous day, and he waited impatiently for a reply to his telegram. He confessed to feeling ‘thoroughly trapped’ as the hours ticked by – and he became resigned to the unpleasant inevitability of ‘capture by the Japanese’. Even at this late hour he confessed that he felt guilty about leaving ‘our refugees to their fate’, and that ‘the very idea of deserting them appalled’ him. Late in the evening of 3 May ‘the most unlikely and improbable thing happened’. It seemed to leap straight out of the pages of a Dick Barton adventure yarn. There was a knock on Dorman-Smith’s door and two ‘RAF types’ stood there. They explained that they had been sent over from India by Air ViceMarshal Stevenson with instructions to take Dorman-Smith back to India with them. At exactly the same time a telegram arrived from London. It came from no less a person than the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and read as follows: ‘If and when you feel you cannot do any good by remaining, as seems to be the case, you should return to India. . . . Every effort will be made to send

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a Blenheim. . . . The above is to be taken as an order.’9 Dorman-Smith’s moment of salvation was accompanied by a last pang of conscience and he returned to an oft-rehearsed theme. He could not bear ‘the thought of getting-out myself and leaving thousands of Burmans, Anglo-Indians and Indians to the tender mercies of the Japanese’. Perhaps these were crocodile tears but he comforted himself with the thought that ‘the Japanese had merely humiliated and clapped into prison other Governors whom they had captured’.10 Surely capture would do no one any good, except of course, Japanese propagandists. Exactly the same thought had obviously occurred to Churchill. Things did not work out as happily for the 20,000 or so evacuees (including thousands of women and children) who, by early May 1942, were still waiting anxiously in Myitkyina for flights to Dinjan.11 They were terrified of the Japanese and at the mercy of British officialdom. Most of them had already endured terrible journeys to get to Myitkyina. *

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Since the fall of Rangoon in March 1942 the history of the civilian evacuation had become a history of diminishing options and of abortive trips down futile escape routes. Myitkyina was the very last hope. It was as if the evacuees had been funnelled into a big bag. The mere act of travelling to Myitkyina by railway or by road had become a terrible ordeal in itself. Many women had signed up to a government scheme whereby they paid Rs 100 per person to be put on a list of those eligible to evacuate from Myitkyina airport. They were then told to report to the nearest railway station with three days’ food and no more than 33 lbs of luggage. Several evacuees described in graphic detail their terrible railway journeys to Myitkyina.12 For example, the Seppings family had travelled from Indaw to Myitkyina. The train was already packed to the roof with sick and wounded soldiers and civilians when they got on, so they were very surprised when a guard ushered them into a completely empty compartment. At the last moment they discovered that three dead cholera victims were draped across the seats. Not to be defeated, the Seppings set about the task of removing and cremating the bodies and disinfecting the compartment with phenyl solution. It was late at night by the time they had completed the gruesome chore. An hour later Burmese dacoits attacked the train, smashing windows and ransacking carriages. To cap it all, the next day all the passengers had to get out of the train and unload everything before the engine could inch its way up a steep gradient.13 Road journeys were no better. Alister Rose (Manager of T. D. Findlay & Son Ltd) and T. F. Musgrave (IFC Captain) from Bhamo

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were just two of hundreds of motorists who were caught in a huge traffic jam at Nahlon Bridge a few miles from Myitkyina on 3 May 1942. Burned-out cars and trucks completely blocked the road. Rose, who had driven all the way up from Moulmein, had to abandon his Hillman car and hijack a lorry. He reached Myitkyina the following morning. Musgrave continued his journey on foot. It had taken him 27 hours to cover the 140 miles from Bhamo to Myitkyina.14 *

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By the end of April 1942, the situation in Myitkyina was unbelievably fraught. Food was running out and prices were exorbitant. At best, the local Burmans showed indifference. At worst, they were overtly hostile. Several evacuees noticed that there were no officials to be seen in the town.15 Great heaps of discarded belongings had piled up at the airstrip and around the houses. Ranks of abandoned vehicles littered the roads. Long bedraggled queues of evacuees formed at the airstrip every day. The dispirited evacuees waited patiently for hour after hour, praying for planes to arrive. When an airport official announced that no more Burmans were to be flown out, Burmese women queued at pavement tailors’ shops to have their longyis and aingies remodelled into Western-style clothes in the hope that they would pass as Anglo-Burmans.16 *

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Sybil Le Fleur was one of the evacuees. Accommodation was at a premium and when she arrived in Myitkyina at the beginning of April, she was billeted in a long narrow army hut. Food, medicines and clean water were in short supply and many people in the camp suffered from dysentery and malaria. It was also an open secret that some ‘inmates’ were suffering from cholera.17 Conditions were also grim in another Evacuation Camp that had been set up in the American Baptist School building. Mr and Mrs Dabey (who, it will be recalled, were victims of the Good Friday raid on Mandalay) arrived in the camp on 12 April. They stayed for four days and during that time had no blankets and had to sleep on the hard floor.18 The Dabeys and 28 other evacuees were lucky. They flew out on 16 April. Miss Pascal arrived late at night on 22 April, by which time the Camp was seething with more than 1,000 refugees. It was so badly run and so filthy that Miss Pascal decided to move out with eight other evacuees. They commandeered an empty wooden shack and bathed in the cholera-infested Irrawaddy. Along with hundreds of other evacuees, Miss Pascal went down with dysentery. She flew out at 5.00 p.m. on 3 May on an American transport plane.19 Miss Mary Mack, a teacher at the American Wesleyan School in Rangoon found the overcrowding

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utterly overwhelming and she complained about the unremitting diet of dhal and rice. She flew out to Dinjan in April.20 By the time the Seppings family arrived in Myitkyina at the beginning of May, they were directed to a temporary evacuation camp that had been set up in a marquee. They were handed bowls of inedible pish-pash. Sick, elderly and bedridden evacuees occupied the few charpoys that were scattered around but everyone else had to sleep on the ground. *

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All the evacuees were desperate to get places on flights to Assam as soon as possible. The flights took between 1½ and 2½ hours. The alternative was to walk for several months. There was a great deal of queuing, jostling, shouting, scrambling and haggling as people tried to get their names on passenger lists. Several times a day Sybil Le Fleur joined the crowds of evacuees obsessively checking the departure lists displayed on the camp notice-boards. When at last her name appeared on the list for 10 April, she went off to the airstrip and joined the long queue waiting for a flight. No one dared leave the line for an instant lest they lost their place. Planes flew in and out in an endless stream. As each empty plane landed, it was loaded with refugees as soon as possible. In the late afternoon after queuing for 5 or 6 hours, Sybil was called forward. Her belongings were checked and weighed at the door of the transport plane. She had to drop any non-essential items onto the ground. She climbed the steps of the plane and was packed with everyone else inside the bare fuselage. There were metal benches against the sides and a row of seats in the centre. The evacuees lucky enough to get seats sat squeezed tightly together. Most of the passengers stood. They clung onto webbing straps attached to the roof. It was overbearingly hot, humid and fetid. Indelible memories of these flights remained with Dallas B. Sherman, a leading PAA-Africa pilot. He never forgot the stench of gangrene, which no fumigation or sanitation method could remove, and how many of the evacuees suffered from contagious diseases.21 When the engines burst into life the planes lurched forward and bumped over the uneven 3,000-feet gravel runway until eventually they lumbered off the ground. As they ascended the aircraft became extremely cold inside the fuselage. The constant motion, pent up tension, air pockets and the smell of bodies packed together in an enclosed space made many people sick and the landing at Dinjan was often extremely bumpy. Sybil Le Fleur remembered how at Dinjan airport sympathetic British officials welcomed the evacuees and processed them quickly and efficiently.22

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The last full day of flying from Myitkyina was on 5 May. Captain Chubb of the IFC was very fortunate. He had brought his vessel, the Siam, loaded with evacuees up to Katha on 3 May 1942. No sooner had he discharged them than he went down with enteric fever. He was put onto a hospital train and reached Myitkyina 30 hours later. He was then whisked straight onto a flight to Dinjan on 5 May. It was one of the last planes to leave Myitkyina before the airport was bombed.23 Captain Musgrave of the IFC was also lucky. He managed to elbow his way onto the last plane of the day to leave Myitkyina on 5 May.24 Perhaps Mrs Oakley was most fortunate of all. She and her five children were due to fly from the airfield at 8.00 a.m. on 5 May. There was chaos and no one seemed to be in charge. As they waited to load passengers the CNAC pilots used to rev-up their port engines in order to blow the crowds away from the planes. One man tried to force his way onto a plane with a gun. Hundreds of people sat around helplessly, each one desperate to get a place on an aircraft. As the day wore on, the crowd became larger, the crush more pressing and the anxiety greater. Mrs Oakley, fearing for her children’s safety, had withdrawn them to the edge of the crowd. At 3.30 p.m. a plane landed. The crowd surged forward and fights broke out as people tried to get through the cordon surrounding the plane. Mrs Oakley knew that she and her five children had absolutely no chance of getting on to it, so she watched forlornly as the American pilot pulled up the steps, stood at the door and glared at the crowd. Suddenly a remarkable thing happened. The pilot saw Mrs Oakley standing with the children. He beckoned to her and the children to come forward. They wove through the dense crowd until they got to the front. The pilot ushered them on before anyone else could get onto the plane, which immediately filled up behind them. It took off when there was not an inch of standing room left. During the flight many passengers were sick into their topis.25 One thing puzzled many of the evacuees. Often planes landed and took off, but very few civilians seemed to leave the airstrip. Women, children, the elderly and infirm were supposed to take precedence over everyone else, but it was noticeable that queue jumping had become a way of life. Able-bodied men, who should have been walking out over the hills into India, regularly muscled their way onto the planes, while women and children were left waiting on the airstrip. It caused a great deal of righteous indignation. It was also suspected that those with money and influence could buy their way onto the planes. In Myitkyina at least, the meek did not always seem inherit the earth. Miss Pascal railed against the injustice of it all. She had to wait weeks for a flight. Captain F. G. Burgess, a

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Figure 8.1 Pilots and evacuees from Myitkyina in Dinjan in April 1942. Captains Ziegler and Wayne Eveland (PAA-Africa) were among several CNAC pilots who flew refugees from Myitkyina to Dinjan in April 1942. At Myitkyina evacuees often attempted to rush the planes. Captain Eveland had already narrowly escaped on 28 April when his plane was bombed at Loi Wing in China and he was about to fly to Myitkyina on 6 May 1942 when the airstrip was attacked. Reproduced by kind permission of the PAA-Africa Ltd. Alumni Group.

retired Indian Army officer was just the sort of chap she had in mind. He had driven up to Myitkyina from Pyinmana ‘on spec’. He had arrived on 25 April, and sure enough, three days later Burgess and four of his hale-and-hearty forestry officer chums were on a plane flying to Assam.26 The Register of Evacuees noted that 4,090 evacuees (1,035 Indians, 3,028 Europeans and 27 Burmese) had arrived in Dinjan from Myitkyina by air between the end of March and 8 May 1942. RAF, CNAC and US Army Air Force planes had ferried them out. Don Stoeger, a PAA-Africa pilot explained that as the refugee situation became more desperate, CNAC pilots threw caution to the wind and carried more and more passengers on each flight. DC3 aircraft were authorized to carry a maximum of 28 passengers, but one from Myitkyina carried 71 passengers and a crew of 3.27 *

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The end came (not entirely unexpectedly) on 6 May. Anxiety levels had been rising as each day passed, for it was known that the Japanese were getting closer to Myitkyina. By this time the town was still crammed with Indians

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and Anglo-Indians – most of them women and children. About 4,000 of the evacuees were waiting at the airfield. Yet, it is very curious that 6 May dawned with particular hope. The authorities were confident that they could clear the decks – or at the very least that they could evacuate all the remaining women and children – in a couple of days. Reginald Langham-Carter, the government officer charged with responsibility for the air evacuation arrangement, went down to the airstrip on the morning of 6 May. He helped to load people into two RAF troop carriers, which were about to take off. Suddenly and without warning two Japanese fighter-bombers flew low overhead. According to Langham-Carter, they had their engines switched off. They bombed the two planes on the runway and riddled them with machine-gun bullets. All those inside the planes waiting for take-off were killed. So quickly and silently had the Japanese planes arrived over the airfield that no one waiting on the ground had time to get to the trenches, although Langham-Carter estimated that only about 20 of those waiting on the ground were killed and about 30 were wounded. Most of them had thrown themselves on the ground and hoped for the best. Langham-Carter had run to his car, which was parked close-by. When the fighters had gone, he drove onto the runway and piled some of the wounded into his car and took them to hospital. It was to little avail because most of the doctors and nurses had left by this time. When Langham-Carter returned to the airfield, two more planes had landed from India. They were the last two to land. Evacuees had crowded into the aircraft. Langham-Carter explained to those still standing on the runway that they had a simple choice. Either they could stay in Myitkyina and wait for the Japanese to arrive, or they could set off immediately on the long walk to India. He advised the elderly and infirm to stay (assuring them that the Japanese would treat them kindly) and the able bodied to go.28 Cecil Smith was among those waiting at the airstrip on 6 May. He heard Langham-Carter’s message. He had been waiting with a party of junior civilian officials. Each of them clutched 6 lbs of luggage, which was all that was permitted by this stage. They had been promised places on the last plane. The bombing raid had put paid to that promise. On the evening of 6 May, Smith joined the party of men from the wireless station and they set out on the 270 miles trek to India.29 *

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The last few remaining government officials gathered in Government House in Myitkyina on 6 May 1942. It was a sombre occasion. Theoretically they were the most powerful colonial officials in Burma, but in practice they had no power

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whatsoever. Wilkie (Commissioner, Sagaing Division), MacGuire (Deputy Commissioner, Myitkyina), Potter (ICS), Apedaile (DC, Prome); LanghamCarter (ICS) and Battersby (Governor’s ADC) presented a sorry sight. They were hungry, fearful, scruffy and powerless. Moreover they knew that they were presiding over chaos, and also over the demise of colonial rule in Burma. Wilkie was the most senior man. Dorman-Smith had designated him Governor’s representative in Burma. Late in the evening of 6 May they held a final conference, and were joined by Brigadier Upton, the senior British Army Officer in Burma. Upton announced that the military evacuation of Myitkyina would take place the following morning (7 May). He explained that the few troops still garrisoned in the town would march out of Myitkyina in the morning. The Regimental Sergeant Major would take responsibility for the hospital and those people left in the evacuation camp. Wilkie and the other civilian officials decided there and then that they too would leave by road the next morning. They spent much of the following night preparing for the long walk to India. At 8.30 a.m. on 7 May there was another raid on Myitkyina. ‘It looked and felt like Armageddon as fires blazed everywhere and as immense damage was inflicted on the town.’30 Against this backdrop Wilkie and 15 others left Government House in a motley convoy of cars. Wikie’s party consisted of MacGuire, Potter, Apedaile, Langham-Carter, Battersby, Nell (a military attaché), Bogg, Director of the Maymyo Botanical Gardens, Edmunds, Naik Heriff and Sett Kaing of Burma Railways, the Government House electrician from Rangoon and three of the electrician’s female relations. Last, but not least was Wilkie’s faithful cook.31 The story of Myitkyina was not quite over yet. Unfortunately not all Wilkie’s subordinates had been made aware of the decision. There was final sting in the tail. Many of the evacuees still in the town believed (erroneously) that the evacuation would continue. The Seppings family was among them. They had arrived in Myitkyina late on 6 May, had registered with a junior official in the evacuation camp. He solemnly wrote their names on a flight list for the following day (7 May). They were even given numbered tokens and told to report to the airstrip at first light the next morning. They arrived long before daybreak and discovered that hundreds of other people were already waiting there. Junior officials formed the evacuees into priority groups of 33 according to the numbers on their tokens. The Seppings family was in the first group. They were told to wait in a temporary shelter on the perimeter of the airstrip. There was huge excitement when an aircraft touched down an hour before sunrise. Pandemonium erupted. Alwyn Seppings described how, ‘everyone

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made a mad dash towards the plane. They wrestled, clawed and jostled each other in a frenzied attempt to board the aircraft. Only when a supervisor flanked by two armed policemen threatened to shoot anyone attempting to board did sanity return to the crowd, which sullenly returned to the shelters.’32 The plane was refuelled by a road-tanker, which then drove off to the airfield perimeter. Suddenly a Japanese fighter plane plummeted down from the sky and pumped tracer bullets into the Dakota, which exploded in a mushroom of flame. The evacuees watched in horrified silence at the smouldering carcass of their ‘passport to safety and freedom’. The Captain had been killed in the aircraft. The co-pilot shouted to the ground staff to clear the wreckage as a second plane was about to land. The second Dakota arrived soon afterwards. It circled the runway and was dropping down to land when suddenly it revved up again and disappeared behind the hills to the west of the runway. The reason for this odd manoeuvre soon became clear. Two Japanese bombers were approaching. Everyone took cover in the jungle. The planes dropped a heavy load of bombs and then flew off and bombed the northern suburbs of the town. They returned after a few minutes and circled to inspect the damage they had inflicted. Mr Seppings offered to help patch up the runway, but the supervisor had had enough. He gathered up his equipment and left. The officer in charge of the Transit Camp announced that the RAF would be sending no more planes from India. The game was up. The Seppings had no alternative but to trek out to India.33 When Alister Rose arrived in Myitkyina on 7 May, the town looked like a set from a Wild West film.34 Groups of evacuees were packing things into boxes before starting off on the trek to India. Bungalows were knee-deep in bits of clothing, books, papers, stale food and empty cans. Rose and his colleagues simply walked into Government House, which was wide open and completely deserted. Fine clothing was strewn around, jumbled up with piles of confidential documents. Rose picked one document up from the floor. It was a telegram – marked ‘top-secret’, highly sensitive and couched in the most colourful language, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to Churchill. Rose destroyed it ‘in the public interest’, and he urged an official to set fire to the whole house, but no action was taken. Rose watched as Japanese fighters dive-bombed the airfield a mile or so away and returned an hour later to attack transport aircraft on the runway that were about to take off. Flames and plumes of black smoke billowed up. Rose realized that he was witnessing in that one instant, the end of the air evacuation of Burma. Alister Rose’s refusal to visit the aerodrome in Myitkyina spoke volumes. He ‘did not wish to be associated’, he said, ‘with the air evacuation

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scandal’. The worst thing, according to Rose, was that many able-bodied men got away on one pretext or another, while large numbers of waiting women and children (mostly the Anglo-Indian wives and families of men in the army) were left behind.35 Japanese troops entered Myitkyina on 8 May. This was just four days after Dorman-Smith had flown out, two days after the last evacuation flight had taken off, and a few hours after Wilkie and his party of the most senior British officials had left the town. *

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Immediately after 7 May 1942 the evacuees ceased to be a Government of Burma problem and became instead a Government of India problem. By this stage, of course, the Governor and all his officials had either reached India or were in the process of evacuating to India. It was a sign of the times that on 8 May (the day Myitkyina fell) the Governor-General of India pointed out that many thousands of civilian refugees, mostly Indian women and children and incapable of undertaking a long trek out of Burma, had been stranded in and around Mandalay. He was particularly concerned about the 15,000 dependants of oil and railway workers who had been promised that they would be evacuated if they stayed to the end. The presence of these refugees, he warned, would hinder work on land routes to India. He added ominously that the Government of India had no planes, and that someone, anyone, must supply transport planes as quickly as possible.36 The repercussions of the fall of Myitkyina were immediately felt and the ripples spread outwards very quickly.

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Those Who Did Not Get Away

Hundreds of evacuees were stranded on the runway at Myitkyina on 6 May. The able bodied among them were advised to start walking to India straight away, while the old and infirm had no alternative but to sit and wait for Japanese troops to arrive. On 7 May all the senior British officials packed up and set out for India while the few remaining police and army units marched out of town as well. The raggle-taggle bands of elderly Europeans and Eurasians left behind were terrified. They expected the Japanese to behave badly and everybody feared the worst. On 8 May 1942, a few hours after the last British officials had left, Japanese combat troops marched into Myitkyina. There was no particular policy for dealing with European and Anglo-Indian civilians so they were unsure about what to do with their captives. They herded them into a makeshift internment camp and left them to fend for themselves while crossfire between Japanese and Chinese snipers whistled over their heads. When the shooting stopped the internees were given meagre rations of unmilled paddy, which they had to pound themselves. When this ran out they had to forage for themselves or starve.1 *

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Anxiety levels among civilians in Burma had been running high for many weeks. Anti-Japanese propaganda and gossip had worked on people’s minds. Some of the fears were justified, but what was the bigger picture? The Japanese Government had refused to ratify the 1929 Geneva Convention. However, it had signed the Hague Convention of 1907 and had seemed willing to accept the 1934 Red Cross Convention, which guaranteed the humane treatment of civilian populations. Neither of these applied specifically to internees.2 Nevertheless, in 1941 the Japanese Government agreed to observe the Geneva Convention, mutatis mutandis, promising ‘corresponding application’ of the Convention’s

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conditions with various caveats that ensured its compliance with the reality of Japanese domestic laws and regulations. In 1942 it undertook to treat both civilian internees and POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention, but failed incrementally to meet the terms of the Convention in subsequent months. Nevertheless every Japanese military field unit had also been issued with a copy of the relatively humane Regulations for Handling Prisoners. The trouble was that few people took the promises seriously. Recent events in China, Korea and Manchuria had exposed the yawning gulf between Japan’s rhetoric and its conduct. It was no secret that the Japanese High Command admired the distinguished Japanese lawyer, Shinobe Jumpei. He had criticized the ‘excessive leniency’ shown by Japanese officers towards Russian prisoners during the Russo-Japanese War. He had urged Japanese commanders to treat POWs more harshly in future and, thus encouraged, the Japanese leadership had not declared war on China in 1932. Instead it had categorized the conflict as ‘an incident’ and enemy combatants as ‘bandits’. This semantic chicanery disinhibited the Japanese Government, and at the same time the High Command urged its field officers not to flinch from treating Chinese civilians with brutality.3 Genjushobun (severe punishment) was regularly meted out to the local Chinese and Korean populations during the 1930s, and massacres, summary executions and deportations were not uncommon. The elevation of General Hideki Tojo first to Minister of War and then to Prime Minister in 1941 signalled a victory for the hardliners. Tojo was a career soldier and had been Head of the Military Police and Army Chief of Staff. His extreme right-wing views were well known, and he had been influenced by an extremist group of ultranationalist intellectuals.4 In particular, the historian Ikuhiko Hata called for the wider application of Samurai codes of honour in modern warfare and drew up a new set of instructions for the treatment of POWs. It stated that enemy soldiers who surrendered should be treated with contempt and were not to be treated with ‘excessive humanity’. Their treatment should include severe corporal punishment. Newly appointed commandants of concentration camps were told that they ‘must not allow them [POWs] to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely even for a single day. Their labour and technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered for the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for which no effort should be spared.’ Tojo also decreed that POWs should be forced to work on projects directly assisting Japan’s war effort. Camp commandants had to ensure that all POWs of whatever rank, should be treated in a vastly inferior way to those of the lowest ranking Japanese soldier on the front line.5

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Clearly Western POWs and internees – and there were very many of them in South-East Asia – could expect a rough time. Administrators at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials estimated that 132,134 POWs, including Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, American and 50,000 British soldiers, were held in captivity during the war.6 In addition to these ‘white’ POWs, the Japanese imprisoned approximately 192,000 ‘colonial’ soldiers. Many other indigenous combatants laid down their arms and melted away.7 Between 1941 and 1945 the Japanese authorities constructed 378 POW camps (Tekisei Gaikoku). It was estimated that a third of the POWs died in captivity. Mortality rates were conspicuously high among the 60,000 POWs working on the Burma–Thailand Railway – a project, incidentally, that was personally authorized by General Tojo.8 It is not known how many of the 700,000 or so civilians left behind in Burma in 1942 were Europeans and how many were Indians or Eurasians. In all probability the exact number will never be known, although it is certain that the vast majority were Indians (who incidentally, were rarely interned). There were fair smatterings of Anglo-Burmans and Anglo-Indians and far fewer Europeans (many of whom were known by name). Some of those still in Burma had stayed against their will, but many others had remained by choice. *

*

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Orders drawn up by Japanese Generals in the War Institute in Tokyo usually seemed perfectly straightforward. The trouble was that junior field officers in Burma and elsewhere interpreted them inconsistently and contradictorily. The Japanese phenomenon of gekokujo was partly to blame.9 This principle of ‘rule from below’ or ‘subsidiarity’ was laudable enough in theory. In practice it was subversive. It devolved decision making to junior officers and NCOs. For example, the War Institute might insist to the outside world that all Japanese soldiers would maintain the highest ethical standards, but in practice frontline officers interpreted the term ‘ethical’ in a hundred and one different ways, rendering it incoherent and unenforceable. At the heart of the matter was the fact that some Japanese officers were brutal and arrogant while others were impeccably humane, but both were free to follow their instincts. Civilians at the receiving end had no way of knowing which officer was which. Take the case of 16-year-old Cherie Crowley (née Walmsley), for example.10 She and her family were among those at Myitkyina airstrip when it was bombed on 6 May 1942. They had a very narrow escape and with hundreds of others fled by road. After a few miles they came across an empty train, steam up and ready to go, near the village of Sahmaw. They were about to clamber aboard, when

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Japanese soldiers swarmed out, shooting indiscriminately. Many of the refugees were killed. The terrified survivors (including the Walmsleys) were mustered on the platform, put into cattle wagons and held captive. For some reason an officer singled out Mrs Walmsley for particularly harsh treatment. He put her in a tiny chicken coop and for several days she was kept in solitary confinement without food and water. It was gekokujo in action.11 Or take another example. In May 1942, not far from Myitkyina, a gang of thugs stole a Lushai woman’s food and beat her up so badly that she lost an eye. Her name was Vomasthigni. A passing Japanese officer happened to see what was happening. He intervened, took her to a military hospital and saved her life. It was far beyond the call of duty and another case of gekokujo in action.12 Yet another example was that of Blanche Le Fleur. She experienced gekokujo in its many guises.13 She was a young Anglo-Indian woman and had left Rangoon with her family after the city was bombed on 23 December 1941. They drove non-stop for two days until their car gave up the ghost. They crowded into a hut in a nearby village. It was Christmas Day, stiflingly hot, and a ferocious battle raged around them. In the midst of gunfire, explosions and huge clouds of smoke, Blanche gave birth to her second son. Soon afterwards a detachment of the Japanese arrived. They were fierce and threatening and stole Blanche’s jewellery and money. When she complained to their commanding officer he was very sympathetic, apologized and the stolen items were returned within hours. In due course a new unit of Japanese soldiers arrived. By contrast they were well disciplined and considerate and set about rounding up dacoits, restoring law and order and distributing food to local families. However, the situation changed again when the Kempeitai moved in. They treated the local people very badly indeed and by September 1942, Blanche had had enough. She decided to return to Rangoon with her little boys. By this time, her husband had gone to join the British Army, so Blanche’s brother-in-law accompanied them to the railway station. As the train for Rangoon was departing, a detachment of Japanese troops swaggered onto the platform. They shouted at the passengers and for no apparent reason beat up Blanche’s brother-in-law. Blanche last saw him when he was lying unconscious on the platform.14 It was gekokujo at work again. Most civilians in Burma encountered some form of this ‘Russian roulette’ at one time or another. Sometimes they were lucky, sometimes they were not, but the sheer unpredictability of each encounter with Japanese soldiers was deeply unsettling. It threads through the accounts that follow. *

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After May 1942, Europeans, Anglo-Burmans and Anglo-Indians in Burma could be divided into three groups. First there were those who were not interned, second those who were partly interned and third those who were fully interned. By far the largest group was those who were not interned. The Japanese could not possibly have rounded up and interned more than a small proportion of those who stayed on in Burma. There is no record of how many stayed outside the camps. Afterwards most of those who survived were reluctant to write or speak publicly about their experiences. Perhaps they felt they were too humdrum or even morally ambiguous. But being ‘free’ in Burma at that time was not an easy option. Indeed mere survival required great courage and not a little ingenuity. Fortunately in recent years, a few survivors have been persuaded to speak up about their experiences. The following snippets of narrative serve to illustrate the complications and dangers of life outside the internment camps. Take the cousins, Dhiresh and Amaresh Chakravarty, for example. In 1942 their fathers, like many other Indians in Burma, decided to stay-put during the Japanese occupation. The Chakravartys lived in the Rangoon suburb of Kamayut. Dhiresh’s father was a civil servant in the Government Secretariat and every year during the hot season, he and his colleagues had to decamp up to the Government’s Summer Headquarters in Maymyo. Mrs Chakravarty used to accompany her husband to Maymyo and in 1935 Dhiresh was born there during one of these annual sojourns. One of Dhiresh’s most vivid memories was at the age of 6 when he was playing in the sprawling garden of their house in Kamayut. It was 23 December 1941. Suddenly the sky filled with planes, engines droned and there were explosions and ‘ear-splitting sounds’ all around. Anxious grown-ups explained that Japanese planes were bombing Rangoon. Every time the bombers returned during the next few weeks Dhiresh was reminded of ‘the gravity of war’ and indeed it became too dangerous to venture out into familiar old haunts. Dhiresh’s father decided that he would send the family away to a safer place. Dhiresh’s uncle, aunt and four-year-old cousin, Amaresh, arrived from Pegu and they all boarded a boat at Sule Pagoda Quay and sailed off to the town of Kyaiklat in the Irrawaddy Delta. Dhiresh was disappointed because his father did not come with them, but he was unable to leave his work in Rangoon. After that, the family had little or no news from Mr Chakravarty for several months. In Burma at the time it was not unusual and many Indian families suffered in this way. After they had been in Kyaiklat for some months, Dhiresh’s uncles decided to try to escape. They hired two boats, packed the families into them and chugged up the Irrawaddy. The plan was to get to Akyab and then to sail on to

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Chittagong, but disaster struck on the third or fourth day. Burmese dacoits stole all their belongings and forced the Chakravartys to return to Kyaiklat. By the time they got back the town was under Japanese control and the local schools had been closed. The situation had become uncertain, ambiguous and fraught with danger.15 Sometime later Dhiresh learned that his father had gone up to Mandalay with the rest of the Secretariat. They had then been sent to Myitkyina and from there had trekked out of Burma through the Hukawng Valley, walking non-stop for 30 days before reaching Assam. Dawn Keyes (née D’Mello) had a similarly vivid set of experiences. She was also 6 years old in 1942 and she lived with her family in Toungoo. In 2012, Dawn wrote an elegiac and moving account of events at the time, 70 years after they had taken place.16 Her Eurasian father was a train driver and because he was an essential worker he was not interned. In 1942, Dawn suffered the loss of her best friend, Marjorie Lopez (Marja), who was also 6 years old.17 Marja had left Toungoo with her parents on a train bound for northern Burma. The family knew that they would have to walk to India at the end of the journey. Marja was excited. She imagined that ‘walk’ meant ‘a stroll along a big wide road shaded by large trees beneath which were stalls where people sold food and drink’. It was anything but. Like so many others the Lopez family had to trek through awful jungle tracks during the monsoon rains. First Marja’s mother died. Then her brother and father were drowned. Finally Marja died too. The tragedy of the Lopez family played on Dawn’s mind and she never forgot what had happened. Meanwhile Mr D’Mello had been moved to Thazi and Dawn and her family went with him. Almost immediately they were bombed out of their house. Dawn and her mother evacuated to Mandalay, but had to leave almost immediately when the city was destroyed in the huge bombing raid. Dawn’s father, who was working in Rangoon at the time, rushed up to look for his wife and daughter, and traced them safe and well to a house in Maymyo. Soon afterwards Japanese soldiers arrived to search the house, making them all feel very nervous. The family found a deserted house in which to squat, but when a British plane dropped propaganda leaflets Japanese soldiers accused Mr D’Mello of reading them. Under pressure the family decided to move again. This time they went to Barabarthia, a village where retired Gurkha soldiers and their families had settled. Eventually the Japanese Kempeitai caught up with them again. Mr D’Mello recognized one of them as a photographer in Toungoo before the war. After that the D’Mellos lurched from scare to scare until finally British soldiers liberated them.

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Blanche Le Fleur was also a non-internee. She also experienced the dangers and complications of life outside the camps. After she returned to Rangoon by train, Blanche moved in with her brother, Austin Le Fleur.18 The Kempeitai constantly harassed him, urging him to work on the Burma–Thailand Railway. It became so bad that Blanche and Austin left Rangoon and went to a remote village to the north of the city.19 There was no peace. Austin was rounded up by the Japanese authorities and put to work repairing roads and railway tracks. He worked alongside POWs who looked like skeletons. The guards beat them viciously and constantly, but the POWs rarely tried to escape, fearing Burman sympathizers more than the Japanese. Those who did try to escape were summarily beheaded. Austin was forced to do this gruelling work for month after month. By December 1943 most of the POWs had been moved to other areas so the conscript workers were made to work even harder. Exhausted and suffering serious injuries as a result of continuous beatings, Austin decided that he and Blanche should return to Rangoon. In Rangoon, Austin was caught again. He was forced to work as a labourer at the docks. Allied POWs working nearby were often soaked to the skin and fever-ridden in the monsoon rains.20 On one occasion a Japanese officer ‘befriended’ Blanche and Austin. At first they were alarmed but they soon realized that ‘he felt lost, just as we felt lost’. For a while he was a frequent visitor, and then he suddenly stopped coming. He had been sent to the front line in Imphal and they heard nothing more of him.21 The officer was a symbol of the pernicious fortunes of war in Burma. Blanche reflected that in one way or another everyone at that time was a victim. By the end of 1944, looting and lawlessness engulfed the city and there were daily air raids. By the middle of May 1945, Rangoon was back in Allied hands and on 13 September Major General Jiro Ichida surrendered.22 All this was chillingly unpredictable. The Chakravartys, D’Mellos and Le Fleurs were not interned, but others just like them were. Indeed the thought of internment did not seem to cross their minds. Ironically, Blanche often felt perfectly safe in the presence of ordinary Japanese soldiers and as a general rule of thumb it was the case that conditions deteriorated when the Kempeitai arrived in a locality. Young indigenous males were the most vulnerable. They were often harried, chased, battered and worked to the point of exhaustion. Their plight had nothing to do with internment and everything to do with the exigencies of war. Anglo-Indians either managed to escape scot-free or to suffer terribly – one or the other and for no apparent reason. Bad treatment seemed to depend on being in the wrong place at the wrong time, or on the mood of a junior Japanese officer.

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Such was the arbitrariness of life in Occupied Burma. It was a reminder also that even those who lived ‘freely’ in occupied Burma were anything but free. *

*

*

The second group consisted of individuals who dangled between freedom and internment. Cherie Walmsley was one of those who came within this category. A few days after the Japanese captured her family at Myitkyina they were taken to Yenangyaung. Cherie was put to work in a Kozenkakoo – a sort of transport café. She had to wipe tables, sweep floors, clean toilets and do the washing up. She was ‘paid’ in scraps of food and leftovers. This daily drudgery continued for more than a year, until out of the blue, the Walmsleys were taken to Kalaw where they were interned in a stable. They shared it with an elderly lady, Mrs Childers, the widow of an Army Colonel, who was already being held there. The ‘inmates’ were not badly treated. Their main problem was boredom. They noticed an elderly white man. They saw him every day wearing the same tattered khaki shorts. He never spoke to anyone and was forced to push a heavy wheelbarrow around. They discovered that he was Sir John Whiting, the owner of one of the largest houses in Kalaw. The Japanese Commander, General Murata, had requisitioned the house and turfed Sir John out into a shed where he was kept in solitary confinement and forced to do heavy work. Murata tried to curry favour with the locals by handing out hundreds of valuable books from Sir John’s library. Other internees in Kalaw included Miss Dorothy Edge (a missionary) and an elderly lady called Mrs Calogreedy. They were all really under house arrest rather than interned, and after a few months the Walmsleys were allowed to move into the spacious Methodist Mission House.23 They were still there in 1945 when a Gurkha officer, Lieutenant Simms, knocked at the door and told them they were free. Helen Rodriguez’ story was not dissimilar. She was born in Taunggyi and had lived there all her life.24 She was the matron of Taunggyi Hospital. On 10 April 1942 Japanese planes attacked Taunggyi causing utter carnage. Helen worked around the clock caring for her patients. She was the last European in Taunggyi and was later awarded the George Medal for her bravery and devotion. When the Japanese military arrived they took over the Hospital, so Helen left and went to Rangoon. She managed to get a job as a theatre sister in what had formerly been the Little Sisters of the Poor Hospital. It had become a private clinic owned by a Japanese medical entrepreneur, Dr Suzuki. Before the war he had been physician/spy in Rangoon. Helen’s relationship with her boss soon became very edgy.25 She managed to escape and went to Maymyo where her fortunes changed for the worse. The Kempeitai arrested, interrogated and tortured her and she was

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interned in a camp in Maymyo. It was in the former British Army complex next to St Joseph’s Convent. There were 400 inmates. For the first time she experienced real internment in which the internees were deprived of their names and each was issued with a small piece of wood inscribed with an ID number. Helen’s number was ‘41’. Conditions were crowded and they were kept under lock and key. Rough split-bamboo benches served as chairs, tables and beds and they had an unremitting diet of thin ground rice. Among Helen’s fellow internees was Mr ‘Polly’ Gibbs (of the Customs Department), a well-known local sportsman who was now very frail. George Nicholas of the Land Record Office was chosen as ‘Camp Headman’ and Mr J A King died soon after being incarcerated.26 Among the several orphans in the camp were two small Anglo-Burmese girls, Yvonne and Lesley Pugh and a 17-year-old, auburnhaired English girl named Rosalind Anderson.27 The camp authorities allowed Helen to go out of the camp to nurse in the local community. She was able to visit several old friends and to pick up local gossip. On one occasion an injured British Intelligence Officer, Captain Ward, who was in hiding nearby contacted her. She took him food and treated his wounds. She also managed to smuggle food and medicines back into the camp. The Camp Commandant was a sleazy character. He made the young girls work as waitresses in the officer’s mess where they were often molested. Helen wrote a stern letter to the Commandant reminding him of his obligations under the Geneva Convention. Things changed for the better when Captain Murano became Commandant. He had been a lawyer in civilian life and was strict but fair. He allowed the internees to leave the camp between dawn and sunset each day, so the camp became no more than a safe and not unpleasant dormitory. Helen was put in charge of camp hygiene. She made the men dig rubbish pits and she shaved anyone with an infested head. One incident served to remind everyone that the camp was still a perilous place. Captain Ward asked Helen to take over his radio transmitter. She smuggled it into the camp and hid it in a hencoop. Immediately afterwards Japanese special troops raided the camp and immediately turned Helen’s hut upside down. They did not find the radio but Helen suspected one of the British internees of informing on her. She arranged for the man to be beaten up. At the beginning of 1945, as the Japanese retreated and Allied air raids increased, the atmosphere in Maymyo became very fraught. The Japanese were so short of men that they could no longer supervise the internees properly and Captain Murano had to remove the sentries from the gates. Ironically the internees complained long and loud. They feared attacks from Burmans and

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dacoits, and requested that the sentries be returned. On 11 March 1945 British forces reoccupied Maymyo and despite the fact that a Gurkha regiment nearly bombarded the internment camp, mistaking it for a Japanese barrack, they were freed.28 There is a bittersweet postscript to the story. Captain Murano committed suicide when the British arrived. He was buried in a rough grave and Helen was deeply upset. A British officer once saw her weeping by the grave. He went berserk, chastising her for mourning the death of a Japanese soldier. Helen was outraged and hit the officer for failing to understand that Murano was ‘an honourable man’.29 Good people operated on both sides of this great divide. Walter Sherman was another of those who dangled between internment and liberty. He kept a diary from the time he and his family were stranded in Myitkyina after the airstrip was bombed on 6 May 1942. At first they panicked and ran off into the jungle, but returned to Myitkyina on 7 May where they were interned in the Old School House and then in the Military Camp. However, they were released on 2 June and allowed to live in a private house. On 20 July the Shermans returned to Mandalay where they stayed in St Patrick’s School before finally moving to Maymyo. Here the authorities allowed them to live quite freely in a house called ‘Maryville’ on Circular Road until 12 October 1943 when for some unknown reason all foreigners were rounded up and put into the internment camp. However, they were released four days later and allowed to return to Maryville, ‘happy to be free again in our house’. Walter Sherman managed to get occasional work at the Orient Café in Maymyo and he often visited his friends in the internment camp – attending, for instance, christenings and funerals. Moreover friends from the Camp – people like Mrs Blake and Mr Andreuesz, for example – were often allowed to spend the day at the Shermans’ house. It all seemed very relaxed. However, two things were apparent. First, the number of people from all over Upper Burma who turned up to stay with the Shermans in Maymyo, and second the very high mortality rate. Between 19 June 1942 and 19 December 1944 no fewer than 15 of Walter’s close friends died – several of them in the internment camp.30 The experiences of Cherie Walmsley, Helen Rodriguez and Walter Sherman suggest that many people managed to slide in and out of internment in Burma. Sometimes it hardly seemed like internment at all. It was a small-scale, ad hoc, idiosyncratic, makeshift, confusing and hand-to-mouth arrangement. Cherie Walmsley’s work in the transport café was irksome but hardly harsh and her confinement in a stable in Kalaw was boring, but not unduly unpleasant. In Maymyo, Helen Rodriguez could come and go more or less as she pleased and

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their fellow internees – odd mixtures of old codgers, patricians and ‘conscientious do-gooders’ seemed not unhappy with their lot. There were probably many more like them scattered around the nooks and crannies of Burma. *

*

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The third group was the most important. It consisted of those who were interned for long periods in camps (or in the equivalent of camps). They were a very different kettle of fish, and here we must pause to compare internment in Burma with internment in the rest of South-East Asia. The Japanese classified European civilians as Tekisei Gaikoku Jin (‘hostile aliens’). About 130,000 civilian European civilians – men, women and children – were interned in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong and a tiny number in Burma. They were treated slightly less badly than POWs and mortality rates among civilian internees (usually between 3% and 13%) were much lower than those among POWs. Civilian internees were usually held in the areas where they had lived and were captured.31 Many internees died of starvation, disease and neglect, but there was no evidence of mass extermination, so their plight was eclipsed by the atrocities committed in the holocaust in Europe. As Christine Twomey puts it, Sime Road was no Belsen. Much has been written recently about the psychology of internees, especially the so-called barbed-wire disease whose symptoms included the compulsive hoarding of trivial objects and a reluctance to adapt to normal routines.32 The relationship between allegedly all-powerful captors and apparently powerless captives has excited considerable interest. Hack calls it the ‘oxymoronic camp morality’ in which both captor and captive grappled with complex dilemmas and neither was completely powerful or totally powerless. It led to trade-offs between collaboration and survival in the camps.33 Internees in South-East Asia lacked the networks of ‘friendships based on fictive kinship’ that sustained POWs.34 Indeed some internees were denigrated for having kowtowed to ‘racial inferiors’ and they were imprisoned through ‘circumstance rather than design’. Because so many of them were women and children and were reluctant to ‘talk up’ their suffering, they were rarely regarded as heroes or fêted after the war.35 Utsumi Aiko points out that the internment camps were of no ‘great concern for the Japanese Government’ either.36 Indeed they were considered to be something of a nuisance. Combat units came first in the pecking order for food, medical supplies and other essentials and POW and internment camps came

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last. The best officers were sent off to the front line, leaving the dullest, roughest and possibly the least savoury to administer the camps. Nevertheless, as Hack and Blackburn emphasize, conditions varied from camp to camp and were not uniformly bad. Much depended on the quality of the commandant in charge. Some were honourable men, although many were not. It is worth remembering here that the Census of 1931 in Burma showed that Europeans made up a minuscule percentage of only about 0.2 per cent of the total population. The proportion would have been even smaller if Eurasians were removed from the equation (see Chapter 1). Roughly the same picture emerged in each of the territories of South-East Asia where Europeans represented only tiny proportions of the populations.37 Duus et al. (1996, p. xiii) estimate the total population in South-East Asia was in the region of 146,451,000, including 461,000 in Timor; 5,333,000 in Malaya; 14,451,000 in Thailand; 23,500,000 in French Indo-China; 16,356,000 in Philippines; 16,199,000 in Burma; and 69,435,000 in the NEI (see Figure 9.1). For every one European POW held in captivity in 1942, the Japanese military authorities had to administer 1,000 indigenous civilians. For this reason, Japanese combat troops were instructed to regard indigenous peoples as their first priority and to treat them with concern with courtesy and consideration. The policy seemed to pay off, as Japanese forces were quite often hailed as liberators. However, not all indigenous peoples fared equally well. Thirty thousand Chinese ‘trouble-causers’ were executed in Singapore in March 1942, and were drafted into forced labour. Many of them never returned home again. Before the end of the war, it was the case that most indigenous peoples in South-East Asia, of whatever political persuasion, had suffered food shortages, harsh treatment, Timor Malaya Country

Thailand Indo-China Philippines Burma NEI Borneo 0

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Figure 9.1 Approximate population in South-East Asia, 1941–2. Adapted from the figures provided in Peter Duus, The Japanese Wartime Empire (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. xiii.

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disruption, curtailment of liberties and other privations at the hands of the Japanese. In South-East Asian internment camps men and women were usually separated, but sometimes families were allowed to stay together. Many of the internees were affluent and middle class – businessmen, administrators, missionaries, teachers, nurses, secretaries, doctors, and the like. Their opulent pre-war colonial lifestyles made the experience of internment seem even harder to bear. Colonial families had been pampered. Servants waited on them and their lives had often revolved around exclusive European clubs. James Ballard spoke for many when he reflected that ‘internment was absolutely the reverse of everything that [he] had ever known’ as a boy in Shanghai.38 It must have been especially difficult for ordinary Japanese soldiers, many of them country boys, to guard people like these.39 *

*

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Willem F. Wanrooy (pseudonym van Waterford) did a great deal of pioneering research in the 1960s.40 Much of the subsequent work on internment in East and South-East Asia was based on the foundations laid by van Waterford. Figure 9.2 is adapted from his figures. It shows that 81 per cent of civilian internees in Asia from 1941 to 1945 were incarcerated in the NEI. Van Waterford estimated that 13,567 (almost 13%) of the 105,350 civilians interned in the NEI died in captivity. When the number of internees is combined with the total of 142,000 Dutch POWs it is easy to understand why confinement became such a huge political phenomenon in the NEI after the war. Eveline Buchheim suggests that internment camps were used to remove Dutch nationals from Indonesian society, although the widespread practice of miscegenation in the NEI thwarted this intention.41 There were 114 internment camps in Java alone and many more women and children were interned than in any other colony. Conditions also tended to be much harsher in the NEI than elsewhere and almost 13 per cent of the internees in the NIE died in captivity.42 As far as the rest of Asia is concerned, van Waterford estimated that 250 out of the 9,530 internees held in China died in captivity and that in the Philippines there were 7,800 internees and 453 deaths. In Malaya he states there were 4,525 internees and 218 deaths and in Hong Kong 127 deaths out of 2,535 internees. One suspects that after this his estimates began to be rather more speculative. He suggests that there were 65 internees in Indo-China and 1 death, and 200 internees and 9 deaths in Thailand. He admitted to having little knowledge of either internees or death rates in Burma, but guessed there may have been 200

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Hong Kong

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Figure 9.2 Civilian internees in Asia, 1941–5. Adapted from van Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese in World War II (Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 1994). Van Waterford drew on D van Velden, De Japanse Interneringskampen voor Burgers Gudurende de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1963), pp. 519–44. 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0

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hi na

Deaths

Figure 9.3 Civilian internees in Asia (excluding NEI), 1941–5. Adapted from van Waterford, Prisoners of the Japanese in World War II (Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 1994). Van Waterford drew on D van Velden, De Japanse Interneringskampen voor Burgers Gudurende de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1963), pp. 519–44.

internees, but he understood that 690 internees had been held in Japan and that of these 32 had died. In total Van Waterford estimated that almost 13,000 internees had been held in Asia (see Figure 9.3). There was a certain irony about the evacuation of Malaya in 1941, for initially refugees clambered to reach the ‘safety’ of Singapore.43 When Penang was bombed

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on 11 December the European women and children were evacuated immediately and almost furtively. They were taken by ferry and train to Kuala Lumpur and then on to Singapore. On 16 December all the remaining European military personnel and civilian volunteers in Penang sailed to Singapore on the grossly overloaded SS Pangkor. The arrangements were quite obviously discriminatory and the organizers of the evacuation were much criticized. Most of the major towns in northern Malaya were bombed between 17 and 26 December 1941 and Japanese troops advanced rapidly down the peninsula. Their arrival was preceded by widespread looting and by crowds of European and Asian civilians making a mad dash for Singapore. Soon evacuees from Penang, Ipoh, Taiping, Kuala Lumpur, Malacca, Seremban, Kuala Pilah, Segamat and Johore Bahru were flooding across the causeway into Singapore, which was believed to be impregnable. There had been panic when the Port was bombed on 8 December 1941, the day after Pearl Harbour. Some Europeans vowed to stay as long as possible but many others crept off as soon as possible, leaving overworked subordinates to pick up the pieces.44 In the end, most Europeans were evacuated in a flotilla of 42 ships that sailed from Singapore between 10 February and 15 February 1942. Several of the ships were sunk at sea with heavy loss of life and others were forced to land in Sumatra where the evacuees were promptly interned.45 The Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas had promised to be fair to all races, and no doubt he tried to be so. After a siege lasting 70 days, Singapore fell on 15 February 1942.46 Japanese forces rounded up the remaining Westerners. The women and children were marched in a humiliating crocodile through the streets of Singapore to the notorious Changi Civilian Jail. Before the war, it had accommodated 1,200 convicts, but now 4,000 internees were crammed in. Men and women were segregated. The men were sent to the Changi POW camp, and the women went into Changi civilian prison. Most of the women were so-called mems – wives of British administrators. The men were industrialists, rubber planters and tin miners. There were also teachers, doctors, journalists and missionaries and a few elderly women who had been too infirm to escape. Most of the internees were British citizens, but there were a few Americans, Chinese, Malays, Eurasians, Indians and even a couple Japanese wives of Englishmen. The formidable Dr Eleanor Hopkins emerged as the women’s leader.47 Sir Shenton Thomas and Lady Thomas were interned along with everyone else. Sir Shenton was put in a small, dark cell in Changi. It had water running down the walls. Ironically the British authorities had condemned the cell as unfit

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for occupation before the War. Sir Shenton’s internment was a propaganda gift for the Japanese. Churchill was horrified and was determined that the same fate should not befall Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. Japanese warders regularly beat up the ordinary European internees and imposed heavy punishments for petty infringements. Chinese prisoners were treated much more brutally than the Europeans.48 The Kempeitai headquarters was located in the old YMCA building in Singapore, and from here was launched the Malaya-wide purge (code-named the Double Tenth) on 10 October 1943. Hundreds of suspects were rounded up and the Kempeitai swooped on Changi, removing 70 or so prominent inmates – senior civil servants, doctors, churchmen, and the like. They were beaten up and tortured in an attempt to extract confessions from them.49 Fifteen inmates died on that occasion and the Bishop of Singapore was among those badly beaten. Four women internees were placed in solitary confinement for five months, and were badly treated for the whole of the time. When the Kempeitai took charge of Changi in October 1943, conditions deteriorated. In May 1944 all the women were forced to walk through the streets of Singapore to the former British Army barracks in Sime Road where they were placed at the mercy of particularly thuggish camp officers. In the Philippines about 100,000 American and Filipino POWs were captured during April and May 1942. About 70,000 of them were forced to march from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell and Camp Cabanatuan. Many of them died on the way. American civilians had to register with the authorities when Manila fell and they were interned in the Santo Tomas and Los Banos internment camps. POWs and internees were treated equally badly. Tojo had decreed that civilian internees as well as POWs should be made to work on war-related projects. After October 1942 large numbers of American POWs and internees were transported in so-called hell-ships to Japan where they were put to work in the dockyards and mines, and in factories owned by Mitsubishi and Mitsui. Many POWs were also sent to work on the Thailand–Burma Railway. About 27,000 American POWs and internees died while they were working as unpaid labourers during this period.50 *

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Burma was different. Internment was never a big issue. In fact, Van Waterford guessed that only about 200 ‘hostile aliens’ (as the Japanese called them) were interned in Burma during the war. It was only a guess, based on the assumption that most colonials and ‘foreigners’ who had wished to evacuate and were fit enough to do so, had already left. Europeans in Burma were fortunate because

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India was nearby and the evacuation organization continued to operate until the end of April 1942. Moreover, the geography of the country meant that escape by sea, river, land and air remained options until quite late on. As a result only a relatively small number of Europeans were left in Burma and detained against their will, at least by comparison with those in Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines and the NEI. Possibly it was because the numbers of internees were so much smaller, internees in Burma tended to be less regimented and institutionalized than internees elsewhere in South-East Asia. It is true that some internees in Burma were subjected to flashes of brutality, but few had to endure sustained periods of violence. One of the main differences was that in other South-East Asian territories there was a clear distinction between internees and non-internees. In Burma there was not. Some internees were confined to camps but some were not. Some ‘drifted’ in and out of camps. POWs were sometimes imprisoned with internees, and sometimes they were not. The permutations seemed endless. There were also fewer ‘definite’ internment camps in Burma than elsewhere. Rangoon Central Jail, Maymyo Internment Camp and the Tavoy Wireless Station were the three most significant internment camps. Arrangements for internees in Burma were also on a smaller scale, more ad hoc and more informal than elsewhere. The fact that Burma was a war zone meant that the siting of internment camps was problematic, and the presence of hundreds of POWs and internees would only make a difficult situation more difficult. Internees in Burma were often kept in small groups and held in informal locations, such as private houses, small primary schools (as in Sagaing), stables and barns, for example. By comparison, the camps in the Kiangsu Middle School in Shanghai, the Santo Tomas University in the Philippines, the Stanley Prison in Hong Kong and the Sime Road Barracks in Singapore were enormous. Several camps in Sumatra held up to 14,000 internees. The largest and most oppressive of the internment camps in Burma were those in Rangoon Gaol and the notorious Tavoy Wireless Station. *

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Neither the British nor the Japanese authorities in Burma kept accurate records of the civilian internees. The names of internees and the whereabouts of camps were not always known. The International Red Cross gathered some information, and from time to time lists were published in the Burma Nadu. The first List of Internees shocked people when it was published in February 1944. Volume 1, no. 4 of Burma Nadu contained the names and ages of 95

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internees.51 There were 66 males, 28 females and 13 children aged 16 or under. The average age of the internees was 40. Ten of them were aged between 61 and 70 and three were aged between 1 and 10. Seven members of one family (the Holdens) were among the internees. Thomas Holden (a hotel proprietor) and his wife Mary had five children aged 6 to 16. Sixteen of the internees (including four prison officers and five wireless operators) were captured in the Andaman Islands. They had been unable to escape when the Japanese landed there. There were three Burma Railway employees, two Burma Frontier Service officers, two senior police officers and a quartermaster-sergeant. They had been captured while assisting other evacuees to escape to safety. Nine Roman Catholic nuns, three Roman Catholic priests and a Salvation Army brigadier were among the internees listed (see Table 9.1), and other occupations included, two senior Indian Civil Servants, a customs official, an accountant, a racecourse clerk, a hotel proprietor, a coconut plantation manager, the secretary to the Rangoon Turf Club, a doctor, a dentist, a rubber planter, a rice mill manager, a baker, a candle maker, a typist and several engineers, housewives and waitresses. The second list appeared in Burma Nadu in June 1945. It recorded details of 85 priests and nuns (many of them unnamed) who were interned in Mandalay. They were ‘released’ when Major General T. W. Rees’s Nineteenth Indian Division regained Mandalay in 1945. The 25 priests and 60 nuns had been living alongside 250 lepers in the St John’s Catholic Leper Asylum since 1942. The most senior of the clerics was Bishop Falières (Vicar Apostolic of Mandalay), and other senior figures included Mother Gustave (Mother Superior of St Joseph’s Convent in Maymyo), Father Ghier and Father Mandin. Most of them were Irish, Italian or French nationals but there were also some Australians, Americans, English, Scots, Canadians, Spanish, German, Dutch, Bulgarian, Belgian, Burmese and New Zealanders. All the priests had been working in Upper Burma at the time of the Japanese invasion, but the nuns came from all over Burma – some from as far afield as Moulmein. At first the Japanese had allowed them to carry on working as normal, but in the end they were interned for their own safety. Some suggested that it was at the missionaries’ own request. In 1942, half of the 600 lepers normally in the Asylum had returned to their own villages, which had freed up sufficient accommodation for the missionaries.52 The arrangement set some tongues wagging, for they were reasonably well treated.53 They were allowed to move freely around Mandalay, and the Society for the Propagation of the Faith paid the Japanese authorities for the missionaries’ food. They lived at least as well as Japanese soldiers. They also received free inoculations and vaccinations and were provided with quinine tablets. Most

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Table 9.1 Civilian internees held in camps in Burma The following list has been received from the International Red Cross. It includes only the names of those held in internment camps. There may be other European civilians who are not being held in a camp. 1. C. W. Arendt (26): deputy jailor, Andamans 2. R. C. Allison (34): wireless operator, Andamans 3. Albert Edward Ambrey (51): Burma Railways, Burma 4. U. P. Aleen (67): customs official 5. Mary Arden (34): nun 6. Mother Mary Abra (50): nun 7. J. C. Bolsover (36): mining engineer, High Speed Alloys, Tavoy, Burma 8. Sister M. F. Beetay (48): nun 9. Thomas Brendle (57): Burma Railways, Burma 10. William Baliford (26): department store clerk 11. E. D. Burn (28): 12. Mother Mary Camilas (34): nun 13. G. H. U. Dewsbury (38): accountant, Tavoy, Burma 14. G. Dockerty (46): deputy jailor, Andamans 15. J. J. Delaney (56): jailor, Andamans 16. Arthur Davies (30): assistant superintendent, Burma Frontier Service 17. E. J. Demares (39) Catholic priest 18. Lorna Linda Donaldson (16) 19. T. I. L. Dawes (52) (female) 20. Mrs D. Dover (28): waitress 21. David Fishwick (37): ICS, Burma 22. Brigadier W. Francis (61): Salvation Army, Andamans 23. E. J. Francis (39): wireless operator, Andamans 24. C. A. Fisher (53), deputy superintendent of police, Burma 25. William Ford (25): department store clerk 26. M. D. Fell (28): nun 27. W. Gardner (54) 28. George (12) 29. Scott Gray (37): racecourse clerk 30. Bessie Scott Gray (37): waitress 31. Kenneth Gamblyn (28): quartermaster-sergeant 32. Mother Mary Gonnaly (38): nun 33. J. V. Hardless (39): wireless operator, Andamans 34. Thomas Holden (45): hotel proprietor, 35. Mary Holden (45): housewife 36. Harold Holden (16) 37. Anield Holden (13) 38. Sidney Holden (10) 39. Henry Holden (8) 40. Maureen Holden (6) 41. Mother Mary Humphreys (35): nun 42. H. A. Hampton (42) 43. R. Hoster (45) 44. Harding (67): female, proprietor 45. E. A. Johnson (30): Burma Frontier Service, Burma 46. G. D. Jardine (42): Survey department 47. V. N. Kemp (65): priest, Andamans Continued

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Table 9.1 Continued 48. Sister Mary St Kayson (31): nun 49. R. W. Lindsay (57): executive engineer, Andamans 50. Alexander Luty: wireless engineer, Andamans 51. G. E. McDonald (43): Indian Medical Service, Andamans 52. C. R. J. McMullen (43): jailor, Andamans 53. E. M. Monin (51): coconut plantation proprietor 54. G. A. MacDonald (54): secretary to the Rangoon Turf Club 55. C. F. Mobill (62): clerk 56. C. F. Morby (51): clerk 57. A. B. Pyianyski (40): police chief 58. A. M. Pakit (66): Roman Catholic priest 59. John Rees (21) 60. F. Ryan (36) 61. H. R. Swingler (43): Indian Medical Service, Andamans 62. K. J. R. Smith: Burma Railways 63. W. C. Smith (69): candlemaker 64. H. E. Steward (26) 65. A. T. A. Stanley (56): baker 66. Alice Stanley (50): housewife 67. Heldas Stanley (15) 68. Fulre Stanley (14) 69. E. G. Stanley (53): Surveyor 70. W. R. Smith (68): employee of the Oil Stratum Searching Company 71. H. G. Stanlin (56): Confectioner 72. I. Stanlin (40): housewife 73. H. Stanlin (14): daughter 74. F. Stanlin (13): daughter 75. William Clarke Toms (60): mining engineer, Tavoy, Burma 76. Heralbie Tenton (35): housewife 77. Toare Thorne (20) 78. Jack Taylor (38): rubber planter 79. W. B. Tarleton (59): clerk 80. M. Tarleton (58): housewife 81. C. L. Tarleton (35): clerk 82. I. Tarleton (24): waitress 83. N. R. Y. Uriel (51): nun 84. C. F. Waterfall (56): ICS Andamans 85. R. B. Wilson (32): wireless operator, Andamans 86. R. T. Wiggins (38): wireless operator, Andamans 87. R. C. Webb (22): oil refinery employee 88. A. E. Worland (66): rice mill manager 89. Whiton (48): rice mill operator 90. S. H. Williams (45): dentist 91. M. M. Williams (41): housewife 92. Mrs E. Walmsley (40): stenotypist 93. Sylvia Walmsley (17): waitress (daughter) 94. E. Walmsley (12): (son) 95. Wright: (no details) Source: Burma Nadu, Vol. 1, No. 1 Madras, Thursday 27 May 1943 (ed. B. R. Pearn, Government of Burma, Simla).

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people admired their courage and were impressed when some missionaries (including Bishop Falières) volunteered to stay on to help out in the Leper Asylum after the war. Others were more sceptical, wondering whether the missionaries might have become too close to the Japanese. Suspicions deepened when the Roman Catholic missionaries refused to be interviewed about their treatment by the Japanese. They said that it was to avoid endangering the lives of other missionaries who were still in internment elsewhere in South-East Asia.54 Vorley never doubted their courage and goodness. The Bishop had told him how he had been put through 6 to 8 hours of third-degree questioning every day for a fortnight before the Allies retook Mandalay in 1945. The Japanese military police would turn up every day and insist that all the cupboards, including the patients’ small bedside cupboards, were turned out. When one of Vorley’s officials visited the Bishop a day or two after Mandalay had been retaken, the ‘grand old priest’ had opened a bottle of fine wine he had kept for three years.55 The Burma Nadu lists do not tell the whole story. They expose some of the bones of history but none of the flesh. We can assume that there were many more than the two hundred internees in Burma than those included in Van Waterford’s notional calculation. But how many more internees there were is not known. There certainly seemed to be no sprawling gulag archipelago in Burma. On the other hand several more internees and camps undoubtedly existed. Unfortunately there is little information to lead historians beyond the statistics. *

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Hilda Corpe was one of the very few people to write about conditions in a big internment camp in Burma.56 She had married a Burman, Ko Tun Tin the son of an influential Burmese politician in Hanthawaddy.57 When Rangoon fell Hilda and Ko Tun Tin evacuated to Mandalay. They arrived shortly before the city was destroyed on 3 April 1942. Hilda was almost certainly the last Englishwoman in the city.58 A Buddhist monk named U Pandita befriended them and provided them with a zayat in the grounds of his monastery in Sagaing. Hilda hid there for five months and during that time hundreds of Japanese troops arrived by train in Sagaing. Many of them wandered past her zayat in the monastery. Her luck finally ran out in September 1942 when a Kempeitai officer, Lieutenant Katsuma, stumbled upon her. He accused her of being a spy and took her to a small internment camp in the Muslim School in Sagaing. Ko Tun Tin had to report there every day. Often Hilda was interrogated, and on one occasion she was forced to watch as two men were brutally tortured in front of her. One, a

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Karen, had helped British evacuees to escape and the other, an Indian, had been found in possession of a piece of telegraph wire! For some mysterious reason, Hilda was suddenly released, and she and Ko Tun Tin, were told to return to Hanthawaddy. U Pandita accompanied them. They were provided with travel documents and inoculated against smallpox and plague.59 In Hanthawaddy, Hilda discovered that half the villagers were collaborating with the Japanese while the other half were being arrested for no apparent reason. Hilda’s in-laws were not pleased to see her. At 2.00 a.m. one morning the Kempeitai arrested Hilda and took her off to Rangoon Central Gaol, where internees and POWs were incarcerated side-by-side. Hilda was ushered into the section of the Gaol reserved for civilian internees. She met priests and nuns of various nationalities, some Englishmen and two Englishwomen who, like Hilda, were married to Burmans. A group of elderly civilians arrived from the Andaman Islands. It included a man named Smith, who had been a prison officer in Port Blair, the Chief Commissioner, an Anglican padre named Black and a Salvation Army officer named Francis.60 The Japanese guards did not ill-treat the civilian internees in Rangoon Central Gaol, but nevertheless it was a very dangerous place. There were no air-raid shelters and Allied planes frequently bombed the area around the Gaol. Many of the nuns and priests were classified as ‘neutrals’, and they were gradually released. The other internees were moved into an empty block of houses in Forty-third Street, where the road had been barricaded off so they could walk up and down in the evenings. One day the internees were marched off to Rangoon Railway Station and packed like sardines into a train. Hilda shared a small compartment with several nuns, eight American priests, an Anglo-Burmese woman with five children and a group of very senior but extremely pale and emaciated senior India Civil Service officers. The guards delighted in humiliating the latter by stringing old tin cans around their waists and mockingly pinning big identity cards on their chests. At every station along the way, crowds of Burmans gathered to gawp in astonishment at the pathetic sight of the British internees. The guards always played to the gallery by strutting around self-importantly, counting heads and barking orders. They passed through Pegu and at the Sittang Bridge (which had been completely destroyed) the internees were ferried across the river in leaky canoes. They continued their journey on flat-bedded goods wagons and spent the first night locked in small and stiflingly hot wooden huts. The next day they continued through Thaton to Moulmein where a steamer took them across the Gulf of Martaban. For the next two days they lurched along in a convoy of army

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trucks, passing the junction of the Burma–Siam Railway at Thanbyuzayat.61 At Tavoy they were transferred into buses that went through the centre of the town before finally grinding to a halt on the edge of the jungle. Facing them was a 30-foot high, split-bamboo wall. This was the notorious Tavoy Concentration Camp. They would be interned here for the next two years. They were bundled into the camp’s main square, where they waited, dishevelled, dirty and demoralized. Eventually the commandant drew up in a big American car. He told them that if they behaved themselves they would be treated well, but warned that any disobedience would be punished very severely. He particularly warned that anyone attempting to contact the outside world would be shot. Then the women and children were marched off to their camp in the former Tavoy Wireless Station. Their first task was to dig air-raid trenches. The sleeping quarters were in dingy brick buildings. The male prisoners in the adjacent compound cooked all their meals. It was always the same menu, boiled onion grass, rice and sweet potatoes. The latrines were planks over shallow pits and the stench was unbearable. Dysentery, beri-beri and malaria were rife and the internees were given no medicines. Many of them died during the next few months. Discipline was very strict. Each day began at 7.00 a.m. with a roll call and the internees were spied upon constantly. No contact was allowed between men and women internees. Minor transgressions were punished by face slapping, standing in the sun and deprivation of food and water. The internees always had to bow, stiff-backed at an angle of 15° whenever a Japanese (of any rank) approached. Initially the guards were fairly decent men, but the situation deteriorated in December 1943, when the Commandant and officers were transferred to Imphal. They were replaced by a detachment of stocky, brutish men who had been transferred from Java. The Assistant Commandant was the real power in the camp. He was a sadistic bully named Taki, who imposed horrific punishments for the most trivial of offences. Once, Hilda was forced to stand in the sun all day while guards punched and kicked her every time she moved. In the end she collapsed with heatstroke. On another occasion Taki ordered a 17-year-old boy to slap his mother’s face, and when the boy refused, Taki hit the woman with immense force.62 Without warning Hilda was released from the camp in December 1944. It later transpired that Thakin Nu had ordered her release.63 Hilda Corpe’s experience of internment was more like that of internees in the NEI or Singapore. It was unlike the relatively benign experiences of Cherie Crowley and Helen Rodriguez. Sadistic guards like Taki were to be found in camps throughout South-East Asia. Hilda also encountered the peculiar

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phenomenon of Burmese cronyism – for somehow, Ko Tun Tin’s friend, Thakin Nu, was able to pull levers. Hilda Corpe also revealed the humiliating plight of senior British officials interned in Occupied Burma. It would have befallen Dorman-Smith had he been interned in Burma. *

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Finally, POWs in Burma were not treated in the same way as internees. Col K. P. McKenzie was one of those imprisoned cheek by jowl with internees in Rangoon Central Gaol.64 He had arrived on 26 June 1942, and was immediately placed in solitary confinement for 77 days, deprived of sleep, beaten, kicked and forced to stand upright in the sun for very long periods. He was not alone. For example, a rifleman, Hugh McNeill, was forced to stand on his head for 5 hours and others were made to hold 150 lb bags of rice or planks above their heads for hours on end while they stood in the sun. McKenzie was the camp Medical Officer. He had very few drugs, instruments, dressings or sterile needles at his disposal. Dental treatment was almost totally non-existent. The Japanese did inoculate the prisoners against plague, typhoid and cholera, although one minor epidemic of cholera caused ten deaths. McKenzie burned the corpses and insisted that outside working parties were suspended. Malaria, dysentery and beri-beri were the main killers and McKenzie always kept in reserve two ampules of morphine in case of emergency. He frequently performed operations with blunt instruments and improvised anaesthetics. POWs were not allowed to listen to the BBC, and most of them had no communication with their families. McKenzie received his first letter from home three years after he first went into captivity. His wife had been informed that he was missing on 22 February 1942 and the next she heard was when he walked into her flat in London on 7 June 1945. The Japanese POW authorities deliberately disguised the number of deaths among POWs by altering prisoner identity numbers. American planes regularly bombed Rangoon from the beginning of 1944 and one direct hit on the Gaol resulted in the deaths of about twelve Indians and five British prisoners. In mid-April 1944 the guards began to burn incriminating records and issued the POWs with ‘marching kits’. These consisted of soft cap, khaki shorts, a ration bag and a cake of soap. The 400 able-bodied prisoners were divided into two groups and marched out of the Gaol in double-quick time flanked by columns of sentries. Major MacLeod stayed behind to look after the sick and wounded. Bystanders gasped in amazement at the sight of the columns of emaciated POWs. Suddenly, near Pegu, the Japanese Commandant

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announced that the prisoners were free to go. He turned his own troops round and marched them back towards Rangoon. Almost immediately, an Allied plane attacked the POWs, mistaking them for Japanese troops. Several POWs were killed, including the senior British Officer, Brigadier Hobson. The casualties were flown to Barrackpore, and McKenzie, who was suffering from beri-beri, was taken by plane to the British General Hospital in Calcutta. *

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Although the experiences of Burma internees were widely divergent, few of them had to endure the sort of sustained brutality inflicted on inmates in Changi, Santo Tomas or other camps in South-East Asia. Of course, individual experiences were sometimes truly awful, but for most it was unpleasant, rather than brutal. Most internment camps in Burma were relatively small and treatment was inconsistent. Yet it had been the fear of internment and the determination to avoid it that had driven so many civilians into superhuman efforts to evacuate from Burma in 1942.

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10

Counting the Cost

It is impossible to put a total price on the damages to civilian property in Burma during the war. In July 1949 a supplementary claim of £21,338,894 for civilian war damages was submitted to the British Parliament; losses in Burma accounted for over half of this amount (the equivalent of about £2.4 billion at current values).1 British companies in Burma were by far the biggest claimants and the most significant individual item was the IFC’s loss estimated at £1¼M. The Economist of 9 July 1949 was at pains to point out that the sums represented in the claim were a mere fraction of the losses as a whole. For example, the vast sums lost by the BOC and Steel Brothers & Co in the 1942 denial programme did not appear in the claim because oil and timber were specifically excluded from the Burma War Risks Insurance Scheme and neither the British nor the Burmese Government offered to ride to their aid. The implications of this will be discussed later in the chapter. In a letter published in The Times on 25 May 1942, J. K. Michie – Chairman of the Burma Chamber of Commerce Home Committee and Managing Director of Steel Brothers (Burma’s largest teak exporter) – acknowledged that Burma could not possibly compensate companies for their colossal losses in Burma. However, he argued that in order to avoid ‘injustices of a catastrophic kind’ the British Empire as a whole – not Burma in particular – should be responsible for compensating war damages. Michie pointed out that Churchill had laid down a marker when he promised to ‘share responsibility for the repair of devastation’ in France. However, little progress has been made five years later. Michie had to tell shareholders at the Steel Brothers AGM on 29 May 1947 that only one payment of £75,000, a drop in the ocean, had been received under the Burma War Risks Insurance Scheme. Otherwise, he said, the question of compensation was still unresolved. A Financial Times report of 22 May 1947 stressed that Steel Brothers’

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predicament was not unique. To a greater or lesser extent all British companies trading in Burma were in the same boat and hundreds of private individuals were still waiting for compensation amounting to about £70,000,000. A much more contentious issue was that of the British Government’s steadfast refusal to compensate Burmese nationals for wartime losses of property. In March 1948, U Ba Thi and U Tin Tut (the Burmese Foreign Minister) tabled a private members resolution in the Burmese Parliament calling upon the British Government to accept liability for these losses. The Manchester Guardian of 27 March 1948 hinted that justice was on their side in that the losses were incurred when Burma was a subject country within the British Empire and had resulted from Britain’s ‘failure to defend Burma’. It was all to no avail. *

*

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The relationship between civilian evacuees, commercial organizations and government has been a continuous theme in this book. ‘Last ditchers’ brought up the rear at each stage of the evacuation, and denial programmes were bound up with evacuation plans. Dorman-Smith described the losses as calamitous. He calculated that the closure of the Port of Rangoon alone had led to lost export opportunities amounting to 3 million tons of rice, 300,000 tons of teak, 1 million tons of oil, 6,400 tons of tin, 5,400 tons of wolfram and 1,500 tons of rubber.2 How much it cost altogether, who it was that called the tune and how much the pipers were paid will probably never be known. Very few people have dared put a price on war losses incurred in Burma. The cost was usually more readily described in narrative than in figures. Captain H. J. Chubb’s grim survey of scuttled IFC vessels is a fitting epitaph to the civilian evacuation (see Table 10.1). He ticked them off his list one by one as he saw them lying half-submerged in the muddy waters of the Irrawaddy in May 1942. Each one was a grim memorial to a once proud company. Chubb’s list provides a mere snapshot of the sacrifice made by just one company in the evacuation. In fact Chubb and Duckworth provided an even fuller list of all IFC vessels destroyed in 1942 and from it can be calculated a total of 394 IFC vessels scuttled, bombed or sunk. The number included 44 steamships scuttled at Katha on 4 May 1942. *

*

*

Between them Tables 10.1 and 10.2 hint at the grizzly scale of commercial sacrifice implicit in the events of 1942. However, it is not possible to draw up

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Table 10.1 Names of IFC vessels sunk, abandoned or last sighted, May 1942 Vessel

Place

Note

Date Last Seen

Ningpo Gallio Haingyi Waikato Kalaw Kalaw Kansi Ceylon Talifoo Panthay Punjab Mindoon Ananda Mingyi Hebe Hlegu Gambo Larel Larong Weeno Leven Haifa Siam Mysore Java Japan Nepaul Assam Sinkan Kandaw Samalouk Sawbwa Maha Mintha Kotah Kobe Kadeik Amo Panhlaing Kamakyi

Myimoo Myimoo Myimoo Myimoo Sagaing Sagaing Mandalay Mandalay Mingoon Mingoon Mingoon Kyaukmyaung Mingoon Kyaukmyaung Mandalay Mandalay Mandalay Mandalay Myanaung Akyab Prome Semicone Katha Katha Katha Katha Katha Bhamo Katha Tigyaung Tigyaung Bhamo Katha Inywa Kyaukmyaung Katha Khattin Myitkyina Calcutta Calcutta

Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk On fire Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Sunk Last seen Last seen Last seen Last seen Last seen Last seen Last seen Last seen Last seen Reported to be sunk Last seen Passed below Last seen Last seen Overtaken Last seen Arrived Arrived

4 May 4 May 4 May 4 May 4 May 4 May 4 May 3 May 3 May 3 May 4 May 3 May 1 May 4 May 30 April 5 May 15 May 15 May

Source: H. J. Chubb and C. L. D. Duckworth, compiled from information extracted from, Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Limited, National Maritime Museum, 1973. In fact Chubb and Duckworth provided an even fuller list of all IFC vessels destroyed in 1942 and from it can be calculated a total of 394 IFC vessels scuttled, bombed or sunk. The number included 44 steamships scuttled at Katha on 4 May 1942.

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Table 10.2 Total number of IFC vessels scuttled, bombed or sunk during 1942 Category

Number

Paddle steamers Paddle steamers used as feeder vessels Paddle steamers ‘M’ Class Stern wheel and quarter wheel steamers Twin screw steamers Double decked twin screw steamers Double decked motor vessels Single deck creek steamers and launches Petrol engined creek and harbour launches Steam-powered pilot launches Self-propelled steam-powered and motor barges Tugs Miscellaneous steamers Non-self-propelled flats Hulks Total

15 18 6 13 3 111 11 7 12 18 31 7 4 124 14 394

Source: Based on Chubb and Duckworth, Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Limited, Appendix 1, ‘Fleet List’, National Maritime Museum No. 7, 1973.

a profit and loss account for the civilian evacuation of 1942 – save to say that the losses were huge and there were no profits. The full picture will probably never be painted. The best that can be done is to provide a sketchy analysis of commercial activities at the time. We must begin at the end – in Myitkyina in April 1942. By this time evacuees, aircraft and pilots were inextricably bound together and the whole civilian evacuation depended on a few young men in their flying machines. Between 8 April and 5 May CNAC alone evacuated 2,400 people and flew 50 tons of cargo from Myitkyina. The CNAC pilots took enormous risks. On one celebrated flight on 5 May, CNAC’s only Chinese pilot, Moon Chin carried a record of 72 passengers in an aircraft with an approved payload of 24 passengers. On 29 April, Chuck Sharp had flown out many evacuees in his damaged so-called DC2½. He carried 1 metric ton more than the Civilian Aeronautics Board would allow. Setting up such an operation had been a long and complex business. It required the cooperation of British, American, Chinese and Indian authorities. Preparations had begun in 25 January 1939, when General Chiang Kai-Shek persuaded CNAC to open a service from Chungking to Mingladon, stopping to refuel either in Lashio or Myitkyina. Weekly commercial flights began on

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15 July 1940.3 Agreements in principle were reached between the Chinese Government, which agreed to operate airfreight services from Yunnan to Myitkyina, and from Sinchang to Dinjan; the Government of Burma, which agreed to build an aerodrome with a metalled runway; the United States, which agreed to provide 20 Douglas DC3 planes and the Indian Government, which agreed to make available an airport in Assam. Agreeing all this in principle was one thing, putting it into practice was another.4 Despite these problems construction work did begin in 1940 on the airstrip at Myitkyina to enable CNAC to open its Myitkyina to Yunnan freight service.5 The construction project depended on the availability of sufficient Chinese labour. It was also hoped that the Chinese would bear the costs.6 All this had to be put on ice on 8 December 1941 when many CNAC planes were destroyed on the ground in Hong Kong, but by January 1942 the project was back on course. The American Military Mission began building hangars at Myitkyina and Dinjan and in February 1942 freight services began to operate between Dinjan, Myitkyina and Yunnan. The air route over the Patkai Mountain Range between Dinjan, Myitkyina and Kunming, was nicknamed ‘the Hump’. As the military situation deteriorated, CNAC was forced to withdraw from Rangoon (on 8 March 1942), from Magwe (on 21 March), from Shwebo (during April) and finally from Lashio (on 29 April). Planes, equipment and mechanics were removed first to Myitkyina and then to Dinjan. The situation had become even more desperate by 4 May 1942 and the military authorities ordered CNAC to apply all its resources to the evacuation. It was impertinent, for as Gregory Crouch pointed out, CNAC was a private company and its involvement in four-and-a-half years of war had cost the Company in the region of $13M, not including lost business opportunities. The British Government frantically urged the Americans and CNAC to transcend mere commercial considerations by flying out civilian evacuees as well as military passengers. On 30 March Dorman-Smith pointed out to the American Secretary of State that planes were needed to fly out 70,000 refugees who remained in the Mandalay area alone. He explained that many of them were women and elderly people who could not travel by road.7 On 6 April 1942 the US Army Corps announced that it intended to operate air ferry services between Dinjan and Myitkyina. It would start on 16 April, and five or six C47 aircraft were being made available immediately. By October it was hoped to increase this number to 75. Each plane would be capable of carrying about 25 passengers. It was hoped that from 11 April, CNAC and Indian National Airways would also carry 150 evacuees per day.8 Even this was not good enough for the British

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Government, and W. Annan badgered Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington for exact dates and exact numbers of planes. It was with some irritation that General Brereton, reminded Annan that 1,951 refugees and wounded had already been evacuated from Burma in American planes.9 Towards the end of April 1942 a Parliamentary Minute Paper circulating in Westminster revealed how anxious MPs had become about the refugee crisis in Burma. The figure of 70,000 was repeated, and it was again emphasized that many of the refugees were women, children, elderly and infirm. The Paper complained that transport planes were still not being made available for civilian refugees and that 100 transport planes were urgently needed to carry the refugees to India. It warned of the serious military and political consequences of leaving large numbers of evacuees behind in Burma.10 *

*

*

As far as the oil industry was concerned, the posting of the ‘D’ Notice in Rangoon on 7 March signalled the immediate destruction of the great oil installations at Syriam (BOC), Seikkyi (Indo-Burma Petroleum) and Thilawa (Bombay Burma Petroleum). The implications of these demolitions were awe-inspiring. H. E. W. Braund described the Syriam plant as a collection of ‘monstrous, costly conglomerations of tanks and towers, pumps, and power houses, with all their diversely ordered banks and swathes of pipelines’. He also painted a breath-taking picture of their destruction. ‘Promptly at noon’, he wrote, ‘the first of hundreds of storage tanks suddenly erupted under the compulsion of a vast ball of fire that soared and mushroomed into the sky from its bowels. Before the pursuing surge of black smoke engulfed them, I could see fragments of the tank shell that must have weighed tons, floating earthward through the heat like sycamore leaves. . . . I was stupefied by the succeeding eruptions and soon was deafened by the roar of flames and the rapid crump of succeeding detonations. Down river I could see Seikkyi and Thilawa leaping into self-destruction’.11 T. A. B. Corley described in graphic detail how the denial programme involved filling miles of pipelines with water and the disabling of some 3,000 separate oil wells. He describes how demolition squads in Yenangyaung and Chauk had to work in daytime temperatures of 115° in which some of them died from heat exhaustion.12 The sheer scale and complexity of the oil business in Burma is illustrated by the fact that the Yunan Mines Company owned oilfields at Padaukpin and Yenanma, near Thayetmyo, the Indo-Burma Petroleum Company had natural gas wells at Pyaye. The Burma Cement Company had oil interests in Thayetmyo, the BOC, the British Burma Petroleum Company (BBPC), the

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Table 10.3 Indian employees of BOC Installation

Indian Workers Number of Arrivals Percentage of Arrivals in India in India

Syriam Dunnedaw Yenangyaung Chauk Pipelines, etc. Total

3,700 1,500 2,500 1,550 550 9,800

2,860 1,285 1,355 1,035 115 6,650

77 86 54 66 21 67

Source: T. A. B. Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company 1926–1966, (London, Heinemann, 1967), Vol. 2, p. 101.

Moolla Oil Company and the Irrawaddy Petroleum Oil Syndicate, and Upper Burma Refineries Ltd, all had interests in Minbu District. The main BOC and BBPC oilfields were at Yenangyaung and Chauk, where the Nathsingh Oil Company and the Pyinma Development Company also had installations. There were also important BOC and BBPC installations at Lanywa and Yenangyat. It was not just oil, production figures and balance sheets. As Table 10.3 shows, BOC also kept careful statistical records of its employees after they had evacuated. It is a reminder that the costs to a company did not only relate to lost revenue, lost plant and lost production. Every company had to respond to the human implications of the evacuation as well. *

*

*

Other industries too, bore heavy losses. Alister McCrae points out that in six short months the IFC had deliberately destroyed its whole business and flotilla, and that other companies had demolished their rice mills, saw mills, factories and engineering works. Indeed, they demolished anything and everything that might be useful to the Japanese. It was a colossal operation, and McCrae looked back ‘with dismay, almost disbelief ’ because it had all happened so suddenly and so quickly.13 The BBTC also played a very important role both in the evacuation and in the government’s scorched earth programme. In a concerted operation on 20 February 1942, it immobilized the machinery in all its sawmills and powerhouses.14 BBTC also took particular pride in the way it treated its Indian employees – shepherding them and their families from the saw mills in Dunnedaw via Mandalay all the way to India, some by road and others by river-launch. The Corporation continued to care for its employees after they reached India.15

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While many of BBTC’s European forest staff escaped to India, others stayed on to join the British Army. Because they knew the terrain so well, many of them joined special service units. Some were killed while on secret operations – men like G. G. Evans – and A. H. Grigson died in a bombing raid on Shwebo. *

*

*

Every organization involved in the civilian evacuation had to grapple with similar sets of ethical, commercial and practical dilemmas as old-fashioned altruism replaced commercial common sense. Firm after firm demonstrated a willingness to fall on its sword and many of them did not survive the war. Huge losses, accelerated depreciation, bad debts, scuttling operations, demolition squads, damaged infrastructure, loss by enemy action, arsonists, dacoits, neglect, sabotage and lack of compensation became facts of life. At the same time, directors of companies were preoccupied with other, more human and less financial considerations. For example, they had to decide what risks they could legitimately expect their employees to take, and what responsibility they had for the safe evacuation of their labour forces. In the course of these deliberations the lives of managers, engineers, boat captains, rednecks and coolies often seemed frighteningly fragile and expendable. These activities cost firms in Burma vast sums of money and they were always very keen to remind British Government officials that they had been required to shut down their refineries and to destroy other key installations. In October 1942 a delegation of leading companies in Burma raised the question of compensation for their scorched earth losses with the Burma Office. The response from the Secretary of State (L. S. Amery) was not at all encouraging. In private, however, Amery admitted that if compensation was not available from other sources by the end of the war, the government might be forced to consider replacing the destroyed property.16 As Amery pointed out it was not a simple matter of the government offering compensation to British firms. If it did, he argued, it would appear to grant the firms a favoured position in postwar Burma. This would undoubtedly raise the hackles of Burmese nationalist politicians. Amery added forlornly that he hoped British firms would, ‘approach the subject from the point of view [of Burma’s interest] and not merely from that of their own’. He even suspected that the firms might be more worried about the possibility of independence in postwar Burma than about recovering their material losses.17 This was not entirely the case, for as Nicholas Tarling explained, the matter did not go away. Indeed the labyrinthine negotiations continued into February 1943, when James Kilgour Michie, representing Steel Brothers led a delegation of the

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biggest corporations in Burma – those most involved in the denial programme and the civilian evacuation. The delegation included representatives of BOC, the Burma Corporation, IFC, Wallace Brothers and R.E.T.S. Co. among others. Discussions again revolved around the British Government’s financial difficulties, its sensitivities about Burmese nationalist politicians, postwar possibilities in Burma (including self-government) and the companies’ expectations of receiving compensation in some form or another. After all, they faced financial ruin. A Cabinet Paper of 29 March outlined the businessmen’s concerns, but the Cabinet meeting of 14 April 1943 could offer no further assurances that compensation would be forthcoming.18 After 20 February 1942 the Government of Burma assumed responsibility for oil production, crude stocks and evacuation expenses. Between January and April 1942 the costs of lost revenue alone had cost three oil companies £915,000 even before the cost of demolitions were taken into account. The BOC’s share of this sum was calculated at £656,000.19 The oil companies were unhappy that the government’s war risk insurance scheme omitted to provide cover for damage to oil installations. So, as the bombs fell in Rangoon and as evacuees streamed out of the city, Head Office in London was urging the Managing Director of BOC in Burma, Mr Roper, to secure written instructions from the ‘competent authority’ for any scorched earth action that might become necessary. BBTC’s shares fell to a record low on the Bombay Stock Exchange in April 1942, and as has already been indicated, CNAC estimated that it had lost $13m in four-and-a- half years of war. All organizations, not just commercial companies, had to grapple with similar problems. The Methodist Missionary Society was a case in point. The wholesale destruction of its schools, mission houses and church buildings had broken their hearts, particularly as the buildings had initially been paid for by thousands of small donations from Wesleyan congregations in places like Leeds, Manchester, Bristol.20 The missionaries faced some big moral dilemmas. One was whether they should stay and face the Japanese alongside their Burmese congregations. Another was whether they should allow their missionaries to join British Army special units behind Japanese lines in Burma. After all, they spoke Burmese and knew the country. After considerable disagreement and long debate the Methodist Synod resisted this proposal on moral grounds. Despite this, several missionaries joined the Chindits and other army units. War was a great leveller, and the civilian evacuation caused similar moral and commercial debates in every organization in Burma.21 *

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*

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The Burma Handing-Over Commission was set up in 1945 to assess the extent of the damage.22 It reported on colossal destruction, much of it inflicted as part of the government’s so-called denial scheme. The whole Port of Rangoon was derelict, approach channels were silted up, pontoon landing stages sunk, bridges unseated, transit sheds wrecked, cranes destroyed, berths unusable and moorings sunk. The Sule Pagoda Wharf was devastated, underwater items obstructed the navigation channels and the hydraulic power station had been demolished. Two thousand miles of road throughout Burma had been seriously damaged, 1,000 road bridges had to be rebuilt and the pre-war all-weather airstrips at Mingladon and Myitkyina had been destroyed. During the demolition of 1942, 9,000,000 tons of BOC’s fuel tankage at Syriam had been set on fire, and the water supply and electricity infrastructure in Rangoon had been irreparably damaged. About 720 miles of track on the railway system (including the entire Myingyan–Paleik section) had to be replaced, involving the movement of over 1,000 tons of building materials from Myingyan per day. The Rangoon–Mandalay main line remained closed for many months. Forty railway bridges had to be replaced. The Madras Sappers and Miners constructed an 800-foot overhead bailey bridge (the longest in South-East Asia) across the Myitnge River, 10 miles south of Mandalay. Mandalay Station and the locomotive sheds at Malagon had been completely destroyed, as had all the signalling equipment on the network. Everything in the railway workshops at Insein and Myitnge was badly damaged. One hundred twenty-nine locomotives and 4,578 items of rolling stock had been damaged beyond repair. All this was over and above the destruction of BISN Co. and IFC vessels and CNAC and Indian Airways planes during the evacuation. The fact was that most private companies and public services suffered huge losses. How much will never be known, but clearly it was a very far cry from the exploits of small bands of plucky evacuees hacking their way through ‘jungles of death’.23

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There are two sides to every argument. Frank Reynolds has been mentioned before. He was Deputy Superintendent of Police in Lashio. He had stayed at his post to the bitter end, and left only as the Japanese closed in. On 29 April, Reynolds drove off to Myitkyina. It was a short drive he had done many times before. This time the road was jammed with hundreds of evacuees and vehicles. Horns blared, people shouted and arms gesticulated. Reynolds gave up in disgust, abandoned his car and started walking towards India muttering that the evacuation had been ‘a story of incompetence, panic and chaos; of treachery, cowardice and murder; of tragedy; suffering and misery’ that had ‘deprived us of the blessing that was Burma’. He looked back on the ‘ruined momento of the bungling and incompetence of the people responsible for her defence – the civil authorities and the military’.1 By contrast, Sister Mary of St Euphrasia was serene and generous. She could not have been more impressed by the civil authorities, the British military and everyone else. She had taken a party of 15 sisters and 80 young ‘penitents’ from Rangoon to Myitkyina. All 95 of them had been flown from Myitkyina to Chittagong without a hitch. The huge bombers on which they flew were marvels of modern technology. Each of them carried 50 evacuees, and they soared effortlessly to heights of 12,000 feet on their 10½ hours flights. The nuns and penitents in Sister Mary’s party were enchanted. They were even allowed to carry umbrellas and blankets on their arms in addition to their 33 lbs baggage allowances. It was all organized so perfectly.2 Who was right? A straw poll at the time would have revealed that many more civilians shared Reynolds’ view than that of Sister Mary of Euphrasia. They might have had six good reasons for doing so. In the first place the civilian evacuation had destroyed the collective élan that had been so characteristic of

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British colonial society in Burma. The thread of this mythical golden age would never be picked up again. Second, Burmans had watched in astonishment as the symbols of colonial coercion and commercial wealth traipsed by in a never-ending procession. Toffs, swells, the high and mighty, judges, governors, civil servants, politicians, missionaries, prison officers, senior policemen and businessmen were all there. The genie could surely never be put back in the bottle. Third, the evacuation had driven a wedge between Indians and Europeans as accusations of discrimination flew around and rifts widened. Fourth, the events of 1942 completed ten years of domestic discord. The Saya San Rebellion in December 1930 had ripped Burma apart, and a general strike led by oil workers and students in 1939 completed a decade of conflict.3 Student disturbances had continued to rumble on in Mandalay, Rangoon, Prome and elsewhere for a year or more, leaving bitter memories. Many young nationalists encouraged Japanese troops to finish off what they had begun. Fifth, events in Myitkyina in May 1942 had political consequences. Military defeat by the Japanese was one thing. It could be undone and indeed it was undone. Within three years the British XIV Army had reconquered Burma. But the political clock could not be put back. The moment when the Governor flew off from Myitkyina at dawn on 4 May 1942 marked the end of colonial rule in Burma, and sixth, the scale of destruction, death, suffering and chaos left behind was monumentally awful. There had been a great deal of incompetence and stupidity along the way, and absolutely nothing was neat, clean, engineered or wholesome about what had just happened in Burma. *

*

*

It should not be thought that Sister Mary of Euphrasia’s view was entirely without merit. This was an age of total war and total disaster. It was a miracle therefore that vast numbers of people had been evacuated in such a short space of time. The evacuation had inflicted huge commercial losses and had cost large sums of public money and had stretched a substantial organization to breaking point. More than anything the civilian evacuation had depended on people. It had needed determined officials and businessmen, hard-working managers, and a phalanx of foot soldiers – train drivers, lorry drivers, mechanics, pilots, riverboat skippers, ocean-going sea captains, coolies, stokers, signalmen, serangs, lascars, firemen, engineers, and many more besides. Unsung heroes had risked death and sacrificed themselves to the very end. *

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*

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There were two distinct civilian evacuations from Burma. The first has been described in this book. It might be called the ‘mass phase’ or the ‘Burma phase’. Either way, the British authorities in Burma oversaw it. The evacuees had partial protection from British forces in this phase. It had the unreserved support of industrial and transport corporations in Burma. As we know this part of the evacuation ended abruptly on 7 May 1942. Far fewer evacuees took part in the second phase of evacuation. Those who did operated in small, independent groups and survived hand-to-mouth by food parcels dropped from the air. The Burma Government had collapsed. It no longer existed. The evacuees were beyond the reach of Japanese forces but beyond the protection of British forces too. It might be called the ‘jungles of death’ or the ‘India phase’ of the evacuation. It began precisely on 8 May immediately after the fall of Myitkyina. In this second phase the Indian authorities and the fabled Indian Tea Planters Association stepped in. They assumed responsibility for the evacuees. The story of this phase has been told in part many times over. But it has always been told in part, never in full. One day the whole story should be re-examined and analysed, for it raises many questions – questions that need answers. But this is another task for another occasion. *

*

*

By the beginning of May only those evacuees who were already in the north of Burma had any chance of escaping. Most of them were still in Burma and were trekking through the Hukawng and the Chaukkan Pass and by other routes into India. They went through the mountainous region north of Myitkyina and were almost entirely on their own. They were the plucky Englishmen Indians and Anglo-Indians who hacked their way through ‘jungles of death’, about whom so much has been heard. Disaster was never far away, logistical problems were enormous and there were children as well as elderly, infirm and wounded evacuees among them. From time to time the RAF dropped food parcels and the Indian Tea Association (ITA) was everywhere. The ITA had no equivalent in Burma. It was a vast commercial organization representing the owners and senior managers of tea estates across India. Unhindered by unnecessary bureaucratic constraints, the Assam tea planters (or more particularly the ‘tea garden’ section) found themselves on the front line of the evacuation.4 They had already provided a huge workforce to construct, strengthen and repair the 134 stretch of the Manipur Road between Dimapur and Imphal. At the end of February 1942 they assisted with the evacuation arrangements as well. Strict rules of engagement

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were drawn up. The ITA remained under the control of British planters but each labour force was self-contained, all services were voluntary and recruitment was increased or decreased according to demand. The ITA established a Special Projects Subcommittee to coordinate responses to wartime requests. Directives were issued and quotas allocated among the members who provided supervisors, labour, tools, transport, doctors, medical supplies and stores to the evacuation effort. The size of the ITA labour force involved in the war effort was estimated to have been the equivalent of several military divisions and it required a reliable and substantial supply chain to provide its food and equipment needs. The Indian Tea Planters Association was by far the largest of the commercial organizations involved in the evacuation on either side of the India–Burma border. Many rumours flew around about the refugees at this time but none more bizarre than a gruesome discovery made high up on a remote and bleak mountainside where Naga tribesmen stumbled upon the frozen bodies of several highborn European women. They were clad only in flimsy evening dresses and festooned in jewellery. Surely such a story could not have been invented, but it remains a mystery to this day.5 However, three facts are beyond doubt. The second phase of the evacuation was an extraordinary event. It saw columns of unconnected people scrambling across rugged terrain – Europeans and Indians, young and old, rich and poor, powerful and weak, Brahmin and untouchable, high court judge and Indian sweeper, company director and coolie, wealthy merchant and humble houseservant, schoolgirl and senior civil servant, nightclub durwan and missionary. Second many evacuees (or at least the Europeans among them) wrote letters, notes, diaries pamphlets and books describing their experiences. The accounts were moving, harrowing and sometimes funny. They conveyed the anxiety that comes of not knowing how the story will end. Some were mere scraps of paper signed by unknown people – ‘Collie’, ‘Gilbert’, ‘Elsie’, ‘Ross’, ‘Flux’, ‘Agnes’, ‘Freda’ and ‘Oswald’. A few of the children who escaped with their parents, wrote later cathartic accounts. Distinguished civil servants, lawyers and businessmen – men like Sir John Rowland, Maurice Maybury, Reginald Clark and Captain H. J. Chubb wrote austere accounts of their experiences Third, common strands ran through most of these stories – disorientation, anger, exhaustion, sadness, bitterness and humiliation were common. A few of them hinted at something deeper – shame, remorse, compassion and regret perhaps. Others bear witness to desperate struggles for dignity in the midst of

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squalor.6 Some stories have told and been told and retold. However, many more remain to be pored over in the future. *

*

*

The tragic story of one plucky young Englishwoman, Mrs Wilby, must serve as a memorial to countless other victims, many of them unknown. In May 1942 she shepherded a bedraggled little flock along a trail towards India. It consisted of a 12-year-old boy, four little girls and a couple of elderly men. On her back, Mrs Wilby carried her 2-month-old baby. The party walked non-stop for a week, until suddenly one of the men died. A little later, the other man ‘went off his head and rushed into the forest to perish’. It was a nasty shock but the woman was determined to keep going. She chivvied along her dispirited and diminishing little flock. Tragedy struck again a few miles along the track. The baby died first, and then within a short space of time, the boy died next. There was little time for tears. The woman placed their bodies in open graves by the roadside and then, gritting her teeth, she struggled on with the little girls. Finally, Mrs Wilby herself collapsed. She died from exhaustion and a broken heart, leaving behind the four little girls. They had no food and, utterly bewildered, they lay down beside the dead woman and one by one they died too.7 Like so many of the stories that emerged from the evacuation, it is told so matter-of-factly. It was in a brief, sad note. It was unremittingly bleak, but there were few happy endings and none was free of pain.

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Notes Introduction 1 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign 1941–1942, Simla, Government of India Press, 1943, p. 1. 2 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, GBE (1899–1977) was born in County Cavan, Ireland. He was educated at Harrow, Sandhurst and Cambridge University. He served in the Indian Army and volunteer battalion of Queen’s Royal Regiment, became President of the National Farmers Union at the age of 32 and was elected as an MP in 1935. He was appointed Minister of Agriculture by Chamberlain in 1939 and instigated the Dig for Victory Campaign in 1940. He was Governor-General of Burma from 1941–6, but spent most of that time in exile at Simla. After the war he fell out with the British Establishment. His brother became an Irish Nationalist sympathizer and changed his name to Dorman O’Gowan. 3 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, 23 February 1941. The tiny bundle that he took onto the plane with him was in marked contrast to the 45 cases the Dorman-Smiths had packed to take to Burma. The entry for Tuesday 6 May describes the ceremony held in the ballroom at Government House. Dorman-Smith wore his Privy Council uniform and 350 guests watched as a Guard of Honour formed of the Gloster Regiment led 3 processions. One of them was composed of the judges wearing full wigs and cloaks (despite the sweltering heat). The Lord Chief Justice, Sir Ernest Goodman Roberts administered the oath. 4 At various times Sir Charles Crosthwaite’s pacification campaign had been under the command of Sir George White, ‘the warrior whom every man in arms would wish to be’, Colonel Prothero, ‘who worked day and night without turning a hair’, Sir Herbert Macpherson and Sir Frederick Roberts. 5 The entourage included General Sir Henry Brackenbury, PC, GCB, KCSI, RA, the Military Member of Council, Sir John Ardagh, his Private Secretary, Sir William John Cunningham, KCSI, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord William Beresford who was Military Secretary. 6 Sir Herbert Thirkell White KCIE CSI, A Civil Servant in Burma, London, E. Arnold, 1913, p. 245. A Gilbert and Sullivan feeling descended upon proceedings when, as they left Bhamo, the Viceroy and his fellow celebrities got stuck in the middle of the Irrawaddy and were forced to spend the night hugger-mugger on a tiny island.

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7 Initially a purely cultural organization (modelled on the YMCA), YMBA was taken over by radicals. The demonstrations were against foreigners who wore shoes in pagodas. 8 See U Lu Pe Win, History of the 1920 University Boycott, Rangoon, U Lu Pe Win, 1970. 9 Ian Brown, A Colonial Economy in Crisis: Burma’s Rice Cultivators and the World Depression of the 1930s, London, Routledge Curzon, 2005. In his extraordinarily authoritative work, Brown analyses the economics, rise and fall of capitalist rice production in Burma and its impact on Burmese society. 10 See Patricia Herbert, The Hsaya San Rebellion (1930–32) Reappraised, Victoria, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1982. 11 See Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma, London, C. Hurst, 1987. 12 See Daw Khin Yi, The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930–1938), Ithaca, SEAP, Cornell University, 1988. The title of the leaders, that is, thakin (master) was a laconic play on the term by which Burmans addressed Europeans in colonial Burma. The term Dobama Asiayone is translated as ‘we Burmans’. 13 Ma Ma Lay (Ma Tin Hlaing), Not Out of Hate: A Novel of Burma, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1991, p. 19. 14 There were very few verifiable instances of attacks by Burmese, although there was evidence that Indian evacuees were more vulnerable than Europeans. 15 Michael D. Leigh, Conflict, Politics and Proselytism: Methodist Missionaries in Colonial and Postcolonial Upper Burma 1887–1966, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011, pp. 102–6. 16 The phrase is borrowed from Nicholas Tarling, A Sudden Rampage, The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941–1945, London, Hurst, 2001. 17 Dorman-Smith, Report of the Burma Campaign, p. 1. 18 Alan Warren, Burma 1942: The Road from Rangoon to Mandalay, London, Continuum, 2011; Graham Dunlop, Military Economics, Culture and Logistics in the Burma Campaign, London, Pickering and Chatto, 2009; and Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia 1941–1945, London, Allen Lane, 2004. 19 James Lunt, Retreat from Burma 1941–1942, Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1986, p. 218; Raymond Callahan, Burma 1942–1945, London, Davis-Poynter, p. 32. 20 In August 1940, Burma was removed from India Command and placed under Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham at Far East Command HQ in Singapore. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Archibald Wavell (1883–1950) Commander-inChief, British Forces in India described it as a ‘cardinal mistake’. Responsibility was transferred to Wavell, who became Supreme Commander of ABDACOM (American–British–Dutch–Australian Command) in December 1941–January 1942 with headquarters in Java. He resumed his command in India on 28 February. 21 The invasion of Burma was just one in a series of Western military defeats at the hands of the Japanese. Within a space of 12 months Hong Kong, Singapore,

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Malaya, Borneo, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China had all fallen and Thailand was under Japanese control. It should also be emphasized that the strategic significance of Burma was that it was all that lay between the Japanese and the main prize of India. After the Japanese occupation of northern French Indo-China, and particularly the port of Haiphong in September 1940, the overland route from Rangoon to Kunming became the only supply route into China. Following separation from India in 1937, operational command of the Burma Garrison was retained by the Commander-in-Chief in India, while the War Office in London handled the administration. In 1940, operational responsibility was transferred to the Commander-in-Chief Far East in Singapore. It reverted once again to India Command in December 1941. From January to 25 February 1942 it transferred to ABDACOM, when it reverted once again to the Commander-inChief India. A detailed and compelling account of the early stages of the Japanese invasion of Burma is provided in Graham Dunlop, Military Economics, pp. 17–30. The AVG had 21 modern P40 fighters and the RAF had 16 obsolete Buffalo fighter planes. The only radar unit was removed to India in February 1942. Long before that it was estimated that the Japanese had 600 fighter planes at their disposal in Burma alone. Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, ‘Civil Government Under Invasion Conditions’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 73 (an address given in Simla in 1943). Although Dorman-Smith admitted to supporting the idea of the military intervention in Siam to cut the railway to Malaya, he had also pointed out the difficulties of Wavell functioning as Commander-in-Chief from Java. But he categorically denied trying to interfere over the pay of British troops, other than securing a rise of Rs 5 per month for indigenous troops and averting a threatened reduction in pay for British airmen and troops when they reached India, which would have meant Indian allowances falling below British rates of pay. Smyth had ordered the withdrawal of the Seventeenth Indian Infantry Division to the Sittang River. It was the last barrier before Rangoon. The difficult retreat was not helped when the RAF attacked the marching columns. The Japanese arrived on the east bank before two-thirds of the British forces had crossed to the west bank. At 5.30 p.m. on 23 February Smyth ordered the bridge to be destroyed. Sixty per cent of the men and weapons were trapped and the division was finished as a fighting force. It was a major blunder. On Wavell’s orders Brigadier D. T. Cowan replaced Smyth. See Won Zoon Yoon, ‘Japan’s Occupation of Burma, 1941–1945’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1971. The decision to retreat from Burma was made by Alexander, Slim and Stilwell when they met at Kyaukse on 25 April.

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31 The situation was very complex. Wavell dismissed McLeod (GOC Burma) on his first visit to Rangoon 21–22 December 1941. McLeod was in any case nearing retirement. Hutton was Wavell’s Chief of Staff at the time and he had a bitter disagreement with Brigadier J. G. Smyth CO of the Seventeenth Indian Division. Wavell was trying to supervise the defence of Burma from Lembang in Java. The argument between Hutton and Smyth centred around the fact that First Burma Division was held in the Shan States to cut off a possible invasion route through Thailand, leaving Smyth to deal with the Japanese on his own. 32 While he was in Java, Wavell was only in intermittent radio contact with Burma. Many felt that he consistently underestimated the Japanese. On 1 March 1942, he publicly berated Hutton at Magwe airfield in front of Dorman-Smith and he frequently countermanded orders. For example, he intervened to delay the evacuation of Rangoon for a week, with near fatal consequences. 33 Anon., Music hall song of the 1920s, quoted in Lunt, The Retreat from Burma, p. 50. 34 See Chapter 3: Three personalities were at the centre of this dispute – the Governor, R. de Graaf Hunter and J. S. Vorley. 35 See Reginald Clarke Unpublished Correspondence 1941–2: (Courtesy of Mrs Diana Kennedy), letter from Clarke to his wife 1941. Clarke was a respected lawyer who lived in the highly desirable Windermere Park. He had just been to a dinner party at a neighbour’s house where he had met the new Commissioner for Defence, de Graf Hunter. He described him as quite young, very pleasant and a Home civil servant who specialized in air-raid precautions. Although he was too discreet to mention much more, it was clear that the political fallout so current at the time would have been discussed. 36 Joseph Kennedy, British Civilians and the Japanese War in Malaya and Singapore, 1941–45, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1987, pp. 22–3. 37 R. H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966, p. 77. 38 BL/IOR/M/41/3/955–B270/4: Postal & Telegraphic Censorship, BL/IOR/HOL/ PO/978/43: letter from W. H. R. Mennie, Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Abadan, Iran, to Mr and Mrs Erskine, Glasgow. Mennie was working in the Yenangyaung oil fields when the Japanese invaded and wrote, ‘The evacuation was a pretty horrid mess.’ Dorman-Smith described the invasion of Burma as a ‘tragic incident . . . suffered at the hands of the Mikado’s forces’. 39 J. S. and H. M. Vorley, The Road from Mandalay, Windsor, Wilton 65, 2002, p. 126, offers an insiders’ view and is somewhat partial, but this is not the only book on the subject. Others include the previously mentioned Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Armies (authoritative scholarly and wide-ranging). Geoffrey Tyson, Forgotten Frontier, Calcutta, W. H. Targett, 1945, is a marvellously immediate account.

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Chapter 1 1 BL/IOR/W2058/25/26/27: Census of India: Burma, Rangoon, 1931, Superintendent, Government Printing, Delhi. 2 The enumerators were instructed that Anglo-Indians were persons of partly European and partly Indian or Burmese descent. 3 He based this estimate partly on the numbers of Europeans who had said they were born in India. 4 In the 1911 Census there were 13,443 of European stock, and in the 1921 Census, 8,665. 5 The British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia, Burma: Register of European Deaths and Burials (and Supplement), London, BACSA, 1987. 6 They are mainly civilians (and should not be confused with war graves). However, they include records of soldiers who died in the service of the colonial project and maintenance of internal law and order. 7 Europeans tended to go to Maymyo to give birth, but also to die. 8 In each case the calculation is based only on cases where ages are given. Not all ages were recorded. 9 Clark, Unpublished Correspondence, Letter, 14 January 1943, the Punjab Club in Lahore, from Reginald Clark to his wife. 10 There were European cemeteries in Myingyan, Bhamo, Fort White, Haka, Homalin, Falam, Pakokku, Magwe, Kyaukse, Meiktila, Yamethin, Myitkyina, Shwebo, Sagaing, Katha, Mawlaik, Kalewa, Kindat, Northern Shan States, Taunggyi, Kalaw, Pegu, Prome, Akyab, Kyaukpyu, Bassein, Amherst, Mergui, Salween District, Thayetmyo, Papun and Toungoo. 11 O’Dowd Gallagher, Retreat in the East, London, George G. Harrap, 1942, p. 65. 12 BL/IOR/3.955/0421 (or 1/555): Reuters Telegram, 17 April 1942. 13 The Indian Overseas Department was under considerable pressure from Indian Nationalist politicians at the time. 14 BL/IOR/3.955/0389 (or 1/512): Telegram number 12458, 1 May 1942 from the Governor General of India to the Secretary of State for Burma. 15 BL/IOR/3.955/0359: Overseas Publicity Telegram from Ministry of Information London, 5 May 1942. 16 BL/IOR/MSS/330: Telegram no 12592, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 June 1942. 17 Stephen Brookes, Through the Jungle of Death: A Boy’s Escape from Wartime Burma, London, John Murray, 2000, p. 10. 18 BL/IOR/Mss/3.955/363: Memo from Fell to Joyce, 15 May, and BL/IOR/ Mss/3.955/474: Memo from Fell to Sir John Walton, 16 May.

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19 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/323: Written answer from the Secretary of State to Sir Ralph Glyn’s non-oral question, ‘How many British subjects have now been evacuated to India and elsewhere? What steps are being taken to provide them with financial and other aid?’ 20 BL/IOR/MSS/330: Telegram no. 12592, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 June 1942. 21 BL/IOR/MSS/330: Telegram no. 12592, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 June 1942. Such was the tension in Delhi that the Viceroy’s mathematics let him down. He had wrongly totalled it to 14,354. A civil servant rather smugly drew attention to the mistake and pencilled the correct number in a marginal note. See also BL/IOR/1/470: Governor of Burma to Secretary of State Burma, 23 May 1942. The Governor of Burma was equally precise in explaining that of this number, 2,195 Indians, 2,516 Anglo-Indians, 100 Burmans, 408 Anglo-Burmans, 291 Europeans and 362 ‘Others’ (a total of 5,872 evacuees) had been flown from Myitkyina between 8 April and 5 May 1942 – an amazing achievement in the circumstances. 22 BL/IOR/MSS/330: Telegram no. 12592, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 June 1942. 23 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/975/1: Langham Carter Diary, p. 15. 24 Hilary St George Saunders, Valiant Voyaging: A Short History of the British Steam Navigation Company in the Second World War 1939–1945, London, Faber & Faber, 1948. 25 BL/IOR/MSS/330: Telegram no. 12592, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 June 1942. 26 BL/IOR: L/MIL/17/7/50: Major General E. Wood, CIE, MC, Report on the Evacuation of Refugees from Burma to India (Assam) January–February 1942, Calcutta, Government of India, 1 October 1942, p. 8. 27 Register of Evacuees from Burma (in three volumes), Calcutta, Evacuee Enquiry Bureau, July 1943. This document, which was assembled under the direction of Kathleen K. Sharpe, is wonderfully informative. 28 BL/IOR: L/MIL/17/7/50: Wood, Report on the Evacuation, p. 21. 29 The list of European children who died between the ages of 0 and 12 years included Wendy Aganoor, Grace and Harry Antrims, Poppy Bennett, Elizabeth Bowen, Lavender Davis, Daphne Dominick, Elizabeth Doupe, Patricia Ann D’Rozario. Miss Durham, Master Garraty, Ronnie Gilbert, Lucy Gomes, Ivan Maurice Govan, June Grant, Amy Johnston, Susie Kennedy, Blossom and James Kruse, Kenneth Morris, George Munro, Phyllis, Camille, Clive, Shirley, and Dawn Newman, Patrick Paul, Patricia Perry, Violet Richardson, Norman and Richardson Ripps, Andre Shaw, Edward, Walter, Phillip, Mary and Joyce Smith, John Swan, Jennifer Taylor, Edward and Dudley Thompson and Barbara White. Loretta Desmier, Pamela and Betty Snadden, Iris and Elley Tingley also died.

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Chapter 2 1 He was speaking in an emergency debate on the evacuation from Burma in the Indian Council of State on 18 March 1942. 2 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, ‘Civil Government Under Invasion Conditions’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 73 (an address given in Simla in 1943), in which Dorman-Smith insisted that the Japanese invasion brought the military and civilian authorities closer together and had increased mutual confidence between the two. 3 Many colonials living in Rangoon and Mandalay commented on the normality of life. The clubs and bars bustled as usual, and streets, which had recently been the scene of political demonstrations and violence, had suddenly become very peaceful and relaxed. 4 India Office and Burma office List 1939: Wilfred Marsh, India Police, born 20 July 1906, joined the Burma Police Force as an Assistant District Superintendent of Police, November 1925, appointed Officiating District Superintendent April 1934 and to his present post by Sir Archibald Cochrane, Dorman-Smith’s predecessor. 5 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Wednesday 12 February 1941. In what Lady Dorman-Smith described as ‘the first entry of our Burma career’, she and her husband went to Buckingham Palace. The King had the previous day’s bomb fragments brought in. They ‘roared with laughter’ when Dorman-Smith told the Queen about a Burmese minister called U Pe Po. They sailed from Liverpool aboard SS City of Paris on Friday 28 February 1941. Dorman-Smith replaced Sir Archibald Cochrane. 6 Remarkably little personal information is to be found about de Graaf Hunter. 7 It was a recurrent charge against de Graaf Hunter, picked up and perhaps perpetuated by Colonel J. S. Vorley. 8 BL/IOR/M/3/955 (B70/4): J. S. Vorley, Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma, p. 66. 9 The nickname may have been dreamed up by American journalists or may have been in circulation in Burma at the time. 10 J. S. Vorley CBE arrived in Burma in 1923. He was a Forestry Officer in Toungoo, a job that involved frequent and lengthy forest tours. In 1945 he was commissioned as a full Colonel and appointed to the Military Administration. Helen Vorley was honoured with Kaiser-i-Hind (silver medal). 11 The bombing raid on 23 December 1941 is estimated to have killed 2,000 civilians and wounded 2,500. It prompted a great exodus of about 100,000 Indian workers from Rangoon. 12 Dorman-Smith flew from Myitkyina on 4 May 1942. Vorley walked out from Naba on 5 May 1942, arriving in India on 22 May. It is not known how de Graaf Hunter escaped.

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13 But apparently not by the Indian authorities. See BL/IOR/L/MIL/17/7/50: General Ernest Wood (Administrator General of Eastern Frontier Communications), Report on the Evacuation. 14 Vorley and Vorley, The Road from Mandalay, Introduction by Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. 15 Leo Amery was Secretary of State for India and Burma. Sir David T. Monteath KCB, KCSI, KCMG, CVO, OBE, Permanent Under-Secretary in the India and Burma Office from 1941–7, A. E. Morley, Robert Niven Gilchrist and William Craig Annan (who wrote the briefing note) were all fully conversant with Vorley’s Report. 16 For example, as late as Thursday 2 February 1943, Mr Ridley MP asked what arrangements had been made for evacuees from Burma. The Secretary of State for Burma, Mr Amery told the House that the evacuees were spread all over India, that officers had been appointed to tour the districts where evacuees were located. The maintenance of the thousands of Government servants, mostly non-Europeans, was the responsibility of the Government of Burma, but the problem was that personal and Government records had been lost, so it was difficult to know where evacuees had settled down. By the end of October 1943, however, most had received either provisional payments or a final settlement of their claims. 17 Dorman-Smith was still vigorously defending de Graaf Hunter as late as November 1943. 18 Dorman-Smith Report, p. 162. 19 BL/OIR/M/955/6: Frank A. A. Reynolds, letter to his mother, 29 May 1942. 20 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, ‘Civil Government Under Invasion Conditions’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 73, An address given in Simla. 21 In particular he might have had in mind the case of the Commissioner of Akyab, which is discussed in a later chapter. 22 The Journal of the United Service Institution of India, July 1942. 23 These were reserved to the Governor, who also retained certain powers of veto but seldom used them. 24 Dorman-Smith, ‘Civil Government Under Invasion Conditions’. 25 Bombay Times of India, 14 February 1942, ‘Concentrate on War Effort’, Speech given in Rangoon, 13 February 1942. 26 MSS.Eur.E.215/60: Random Thoughts, Sir Paw Tun, 26 April 1942, Text of a broadcast. 27 For example, Gallagher, Retreat in the East, p. 66: ‘Why doesn’t the Governor declare martial law? Perhaps it was pressure of work, or perhaps he did not think of it.’ 28 A ‘completely untrue’ rumour had been circulating that the military intended to take over Rangoon on 15 February. 29 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/5: ‘Eddy’ to Mrs Rossiter, Dublin, 26 February 1943.

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30 Gallagher, Retreat in the East, criticized ‘Burra Sahibs’, demolitions and the conduct of the evacuation. He claimed to be on the spot at the time but Dorman-Smith accused him of being many hundreds of miles away. Wagg’s complex role is discussed elsewhere. Dorman-Smith especially abhorred one of his regular critics – Leland Stowe of the Chicago Tribune and William O. Douglas repeated his personal diatribe against Dorman-Smith in North from Malaya, London, Victor Gollancz, 1954, pp. 219–20, p. 255. 31 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/206: Letter from Murphy to Miss McDaniels (USA), censored by Major F T Coulton, Censor Station Bombay, 10 September 1942. 32 Alfred Wagg (US War Correspondent, Far East), A Million Died, London, Nicholson & Watson, 1943, Conversations in Delhi between Alfred Wagg and de Graaf Hunter, pp. 178–86. 33 Lady Dorman Smith records in her diary that on the evening of Friday 6 March, de Graaf Hunter visited them in Maymyo and talked about returning to Rangoon to help medical staff there with cholera victims. Talk is cheap. He did not return, but visited them again on 8 April when after dinner Dorman-Smith and de Graaf Hunter talked late into the night. De Graaf Hunter continued to visit them in India. He had lunch with them on 30 December 1942, when he and DormanSmith discussed strategies to deal with the adverse press they had both been receiving. On the following night (New Year’s Eve 1942) Lady Dorman-Smith records that de Graaf Hunter accompanied the Dorman-Smith’s daughter, Pat, to a New Year Eve dance. 34 Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, 4 May 1942. Lady Dorman-Smith confirms that the attacks on her husband’s reputation hung over his head and that when he flew into India from Burma on 4 May 1942 he looked so depressed that Lady Dorman-Smith had pressed him to go to London to present his case. She was supported by Jordan of The Times. The entry for Tuesday 30 June 1942 refers to a letter dated 1 June from Jack McLean, which said that ‘Winston had presented Reg. with a very big bouquet for his work in Burma’. 35 BL/IORR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished memoirs; DormanSmith described war correspondents as ‘vultures’ who wanted ‘sensation first and last’ and let ‘personal spleen creep into their reports’ (p. 10). Wagg told DormanSmith that he was ‘the most unpopular man in Burma’ and that the Military Public Relations Department had scapegoated of him. On one occasion Wagg was talking in derogatory terms about Dorman-Smith in the bar of a Delhi hotel, when an, ‘immense American officer and a small, but belligerent British Major’ threatened to rough him up if he spoke like that about the Governor. Later Wagg revised his opinion of Dorman-Smith but explained that his reports would not get past the military censors ‘if he said that Dorman-Smith had really done quite a good job’ because ‘the military public relations department felt it incumbent upon them to find a scapegoat for our defeat in Burma and the Governor and his officials

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would serve that purpose’. Lady Dorman-Smith corroborates this in her diary entry of Friday 18 December 1942. She describes how Wagg recounted numerous fabrications that were being spread about her husband in Delhi and in America. Wagg assured her that he wanted to put all this right. This explains a curious inconsistency in A Million Died. The first part of the book contains vicious attacks on Dorman-Smith, while the last chapter provides a vigorous defence of him. 36 Dorman-Smith, ‘Civil Government Under Invasion Conditions’, an address given in Simla.

Chapter 3 1 Hugh Tinker, ‘A Forgotten Long March: The Indian Exodus from Burma’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume 6, No. 1, 1975. 2 See particularly, Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Armies; Tyson, Forgotten Frontier; and Felicity Goodall, Exodus Burma: The British Escape through the Jungles of Death 1942, Stroud, History Press, 2011. 3 The most comprehensive and varied collection of letters, memoirs and diaries is deposited in the British Library (India Office Collection, especially BL/IOR/MSS/ M/3/955). The there are many published accounts. Through the Jungle of Death is the title of Stephen Brookes’ book about his escape in 1942 and the phrase is used again in the subtitle for Felicity Goodall’s recent publication. 4 Tinker, ‘A Forgotten Long March’. 5 Alfred Wagg (War Correspondent, Allied Newspapers). In July 1942, Wagg began his report thus, ‘Some weeks ago I saw with my own eyes that unending stream.’ 6 The circumstances of these journeys are described in later chapters. 7 See Chapter 2. 8 Eileen K. Sharpe, Register of Evacuees from Burma: Indian Evacuees, A–L and M–Z, Calcutta, Evacuee Enquiry Bureau, Government of India, 1943. 9 The fullest account of the struggle is found in Nalini Ranjan Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline of an Immigrant Community, London, Oxford University Press, 1971. See also B. R. Pearn, The Indian in Burma: Racial Relations: Studies in Conflict and Co-operation No. 4, Ledbury, Le Play House Press, 1947. 10 Pearn points out that Indians were enticed by cheaper passenger-steamer rates and the introduction in 1873 of fortnightly sailings by BISN (the British India Steam Navigation Company). 11 It was an estimate because the unprocessed data for the 1941 Census was destroyed during the Japanese invasion. 12 See Brown, A Colonial Economy in Crisis, p. 14. Maistries recruited most Indian labourer. They were Indian labour contractors who would offer a cash advance,

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cover the cost of the sea passage and provide food and lodgings on arrival in Burma. These charges were repaid with interest from the labourers’ wages. Brown’s is the most authoritative analysis of the pre-war Burmese rice industry. Pearn cites a house in Twenty-ninth Street where inspectors found 23 Indian labourers occupying a single room (p. 16). See Leigh, Conflict, Politics and Proselytism; Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press; 1965 and E. Michael Mendelson (ed.), Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianship and Leadership, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1975. These were the dirtiest and least palatable occupations of all, and domestic sanitary arrangements utterly depended on them. For example, Indians formed 73.1 per cent of the Burma Railways workforce. The Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1930 estimated that Chettyars were owed as much as £55M per year in unpaid loans. Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma. Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma, p. 172. Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma, p. 172. BL/IOR/M/3/955/83/452 and 454: Telegrams from Governor of Burma to Secretary of State for Burma, dated 4, 7 and 8 February 1942. BL/IOR/M/3/955/81: Telegram from Governor of Burma to Secretary of State for Burma, 2 February 1942. BL/IOR/M/3/955/413: Memo from Annan to Johnston, 20 April 1942; and BL/ IOR/M/3/955/549: Mrs Freda Cook, Brunswick Square, London to Winston Churchill, 9 April 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/535: Telegram from the Secretary of State for India (Pol. 3477/42) to Governor-General, 1 May 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/551: Telegram from Governor of Burma to Viceroy. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/368: Telegram 12351, Dorman-Smith (via GovernorGeneral) to Secretary of State, 14 May 1942 – ‘Owing to the complete loss of records and absence of officers immediately concerned with the evacuation, it is impossible to give more than a general picture of the problem as we had to face it.’ BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/373: Telegram 12309, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 9 May 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/373: Telegram 12309, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 9 May 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/330: Telegram 12592, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 June 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/308: Telegram 12703, Governor General to Secretary of State, 11 June 1942. On 5 June 1942, Nehru justified Congress’s policy of noncooperation by referring to ‘the bad differential treatment of Indian evacuees in Burma . . . continuing arrests . . . repression’ and the attitude of Stafford Cripps.

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Notes The Secretary of State commented (somewhat forlornly) that it would help a great deal if only Mr Aney was ‘able to state that he is satisfied that no avoidable discrimination had occurred’. The premature release of convicts became a cause célèbre for critics of the Government. Dorman-Smith argued that it was inevitable and that its consequences were unfairly inflated. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/288: Correspondence between S. T. Da and Mrs Kapila (Da’s sister), 21 February 1942. Mrs Kapila was about to evacuate and he wrote to explain that ‘an Indian lady of your status, whose husband holds high rank and is in the front line’ would be classified as ‘unfit to travel with Anglo-Indian people of the same class’. He urged his sister to write to the Deputy Commissioner, Monywa (who was responsible for the road) to complain about this ‘rotten state of affairs’ and to demand that she ‘be sent with the European and Anglo-Indian group’. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/395: Telegram 12222, Government of India (External Affairs Department) to Secretary of State for India, 1 May 1942. In fact, it transpired that the Associated Press of India had already submitted the text of the Congress resolutions for clearance. BL/OR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/409: Telegram 11476, Pol. 3472/42 Government of India (External Affairs Department) to Secretary of State. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/396: Telegram 12221, Government of India (Home Department) to Secretary of State for India, 1 May 1942. The text of the first two resolutions of the Congress Working Committee, published 28 April 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/304: Press Note, ‘Evacuation of Indians’, Indian Overseas Department, 4 May 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/363: Internal memo from Fell to Joyce, 15 May 1942, Fell was referring to a telegram from the Viceroy (dated 5 May), which reported some of Dorman-Smith’s responses. Sharpe was responsible for the arrangements for refugees after they had arrived in Delhi. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/474: Memo from Fell to Sir John Walton. The matter had come to a head when a sweeper employed in the Magwe police court had been allowed on a flight and had been charged only Rs 25. The rich Indians had been charged much more to compensate. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/269 and 269: Official Report of the Indian Council of State Debates of 26 February 1942, pp. 138–9 and 10 March 1942, p. 274 and Report of Legislative Assembly Debate, 17 March 1942, pp. 1206–7. The questioners at this stage included the Hon. Mr G. S. Motilal, the Hon. Raja Yuveraj Dutta Singh and the Nawab Siddique Ali Khan. Bozman was able to divulge, for example, that the Swiss and Argentine Governments had agreed to look after Indian interests, that

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Mr B. G. Marathey had been appointed to oversee the arrangements for Indian refugees who had returned. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/269: Official Report of the Indian Legislative Assembly Debates, 17 March. The tone was set by the Hon. Manilyi Muhammed Abdul Ghani, who asked ‘Is it a fact that on the road by which Europeans had to pass, special facilities regarding amenities of life and protection of life were given, and in the road that is assigned to Indians no proper arrangements have been made for the safety of their lives and other amenities of life?’ Bozman let his guard slip, and in reply he asked whether it was being suggested that ‘the whole of the land route from Burma to India should be lined by police?’ BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/257: Official Report of the Indian Council of State Debates, 18 March 1942 (pp. 300–1, 320–44). Haji Syed Muhammed Husain described the treatment meted out to Indians as ‘inhuman’. He could not understand why the criminals had not been removed to Upper Burma earlier. He maintained that because under martial law, General Wavell (the Commanderin-Chief India) was responsible for the security of Rangoon after 25 February, in effect, the Indian Government was responsible for security of Burma. This had implications as far as blame, insurance and compensation were concerned. He claimed that caterers were paid Rs 5 per day, per head (a considerable sum) to feed high-class Indians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/257: Official Report of the Indian Council of State Debates, 18 March 1942 (pp. 300–1, 320–44). BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/257: Official Report of the Indian Council of State Debates, 18 March 1942 (pp. 300–1, 320–44). Mr M. S. Aney was a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1942, and Leader in the Legislature of Indians Overseas. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/256: Official Report of the Indian Legislative Debates, 2 April 1942 (pp. 1694–5). The allegation had been published in an Indian newspaper on 19 March 1942. It concerned the same episode that had been reported in the Council of State on 18 March in which Hutchings was alleged to have used a whip to restrain Indian evacuees from boarding a steamer. On that occasion, of course, the charge had been made under parliamentary privilege. The only reply that Aney had since received from the Member concerned (Hon. Mr P. N. Sapru) was that the two anonymous gentlemen had heard the story from an equally anonymous relative, ‘who claimed to be an eyewitness’. Hutchins had categorically denied the allegation. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/55: Official Report of the Indian Council of State and Legislative Debates, 2 April 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/13: Official Report of the Indian Council of State and Legislative Debates, 21 September 1942.

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49 K. M. Pannikar, The Future of South-East Asia, n.p., 1943. 50 Pearn, The Indian in Burma, pp. 33 and 35, also Dr N B Khare (Council for Commonwealth Relations), National Call, 14 September 1945. 51 Hindustan Times Weekly, 18 December 1944. 52 Hindustan Times Weekly, 18 December 1944. 53 Pearn, The Indian in Burma, p. 34. 54 Quoted in Pearn, The Indian in Burma, p. 34. 55 Pearn, The Indian in Burma, p. 35.

Chapter 4 1 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Wednesday 29 October. Wavell was accompanied by his staff officers, Peter Coates, Colonel PriceWilliams, Colonel Jehu and Col Turner. They returned from Singapore on Sunday 2 November and left Rangoon on Friday 7 November 1941. See also entry for 5 November 1941. 2 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, 22 November 1941. She was the wife of Sir Henry Robert Moore Brooke-Popham, GCVO, KCB, CMG, DSO, AFC, who had been Governor of Kenya in the late 1930s and was now Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command, based in Singapore. 3 An earthquake erupted in the middle of the Durbar on 3 December and caused considerable damage in Government House. The film showing on 4 December was Gone West. 4 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s diary entries for 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19 and 20 November bear witness to unremitting arguments in the BWCA between Mrs Norris, Mrs Webster, Mrs Roper, Mrs Cowie, Mrs Strang, Mrs Craw, Mrs Blagden, Mrs Hutchins, Mrs Jeejelly and even Lady Paw Tun. A ceasefire was agreed on 1 December 1941 and the BWCA story ended happily on Monday 22 December 1941 when 3,000 hand-knitted balaclavas were handed over to the Army. The meeting on 5 December was organized by Mrs Brewitt and Mrs McGreen. 5 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Monday 8 December 1941. 6 HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were modern ships and the first of their size to be sunk by aircraft in open water. Eight hundred and forty sailors were lost, 513 in Repulse and 327 in Prince of Wales, including Admiral Phillips and Captain John Leach. They were sunk on 10 December 1941 in open water off Kuantang, Malaya. 7 The Japanese invaded Burma at Myawaddy on 19–20 January 1942. 8 It was feared that enemy patrols might cross the frontier and capture the telegraph installation.

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9 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D1080/7/7: Papers of Maurice Maybury ICS (Class 1), Sub Divisional Officer, Kawkareik. 10 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/640: Helen Mary Hughes, No Business in Camp, p. 58. H. M. Hughes’ husband was Thomas Lewis Hughes, formerly Political Secretary to the Burma Chamber of Commerce and Secretary to the Government of Burma (1942–6). She wrote her account in Simla in 1943. 11 Miss Hardy was on duty at the Diocesan Hospital. 12 At the same time 60 planes were bombing Moulmein. 13 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Thursday 25 December 1941. 14 A news bulletin from Rome or Berlin reported that Wavell had been caught in the air raid on Christmas Day. It tempted Lady Dorman-Smith to put up a notice saying ‘Walls Have Ears’. 15 Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Friday 26 December 1941. 16 Dorman-Smith, Report on the Evacuation, p. 62. 17 Sybil and Blanche Le Fleur and Derek Flory, Torn Apart, Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2008; Sybil and her twin sister Blanche were just 21 at the time. 18 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Thursday 25 December 1941. 19 The complete lack of sweepers was especially awkward because Government House was full of important guests such as General Wavell’s party, General Brett and his staff, John Keswick and General Hutton. Malis were garden boys. 20 Captain Hallet RN had to move from the Strand Hotel to Government House because there was no service, and a group of Australians including Air ViceMarshal Rettby and three brigadiers had to cook and fend for themselves in the hotel. 21 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Wednesday 31 December 1941. 22 In his Official Report, Dorman-Smith estimates that about 5,000 were ‘camping’ outside at the Royal Lake on Christmas Day. They were forcibly moved after a few days for reasons of hygiene. 23 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Thursday 25, Tuesday 30 and Wednesday 31 December 1941. 24 Gallagher, Retreat in the East (reprinted by Viking Press, London), pp. 181–2. Gallagher was quick to point out, that poverty and wealth determined the evacuees’ chances of survival too. He described how ‘Thousands of people without money or influence trekked the long road north, suffering great privations.’ 25 Thomas and Eva Gill had both come from Nelson in Lancashire. He studied at Manchester University. They were married in Colombo, and had one son, Peter Gill. 26 The Southport Guardian and South-West Lancashire Chronicle of 29 March 1944 carried an article on Reginald Clark who was a Birkdale man. In 1942 he was

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Notes a 47-year-old barrister, a partner in chambers with Sir Lionel Leach and North Surridge. He based his figure on the official report that 21 Japanese planes had been shot down ‘for certain’, there were 6 ‘probables’ and 19 were badly damaged. He mentioned in his letter of Thursday 1 January 1942 that the New Year Honours List included General McLeod (KCIE), Hugh Cross Craw (KCBE) and the Governor’s Burmese Counsellor, U Maung Gyi (a knighthood). He studied the 1943 New Years Honours noting that the list included several of his friends. Robert Bruce had a KBE. Lionel Leach and John Francis Sheehy had knighthoods and John Wise a KCMG. In 1944 Clark was appointed as an Indian High Court judge in Madras. Letter, Thursday 8 January 1942, Clark explained that he was leaving Surridge to look after the law firm in his absence. His friends Alec and Isabel Stewart, of the BBTC had been bombed out of their house. They were ‘his refugees’. In his letters home he mentioned over 150 different friends and acquaintances, among them were de Graaf Hunter, James Baxter, the Governor’s Adviser, John Wise, the Governor’s Counsellor, Otto Niemeyer, the British Treasury expert, Litvinoff, the Soviet Ambassador, Sir Godfrey Davies, Chief Justice of the Karachi High Court, General Sir J. G. Jolly, Major General Freddie Pearce and Sir John Rowland. Clark cultivated these people very carefully. Characteristically, Clark said little about his trek out of Burma in 1942. In a letter dated 19 June 1942 he explained that he had left Myitkyina with 5 friends on 3 June. They had trekked out through the Hukawng Valley to Margherita, a distance, he said of ‘about 440 miles’. They did the first 100 miles by car and had ‘walked the rest!’ It took 24 days and ‘was a hell of a journey along a mule track’ in unexplored territory, over mountain ranges and through mud and slime in malarial jungles. He had lost two stones in weight and had a septic sore on his left leg. He had arrived in Margherita with a blanket, shorts, shirt, wristwatch and a ring. Otherwise the Clarks had lost everything in Burma. The Southport Guardian and South-West Lancashire Chronicle of 29 March 1944 added that on one occasion he was ‘saved from almost certain death by an Indian peasant’ and that at one point he was so exhausted that he begged his companions to go on and leave him. Later he was waist deep in treacherous swamp and would have perished but for an Indian peasant and his wife who used their bullock to rescue him. They insisted on sharing their food with him. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Saturday 14 February 1942. Even the faithful old cooks, Ba Shwe and ‘Robin’ went on ‘so-called’ leave. There was a shortage of dock labour to load and unload it. On 24 January, Dorman-Smith issued orders restricting the number of evacuees/passengers each ship could carry to the number of places on its lifeboats.

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34 Estimates varied between 7,000 and 10,000. 35 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Sunday 15 February 1942. Almost as a symbolic act she went to the hospital the very next day to give blood. 36 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Monday 26 January 1942. Of the 500 or so women in the St John’s Ambulance only 50 now remained in Rangoon. 37 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Monday 2 February and Thursday 12 February 1942. On the 2nd she had heard that her friends Mrs Wilkie and Mrs Buchanan had moved to Upper Burma, and that overnight on 12th Mrs Cowie (second-in-command at St John’s Ambulance) had gone to Mandalay. On 11 February she had learned that Mrs Blagden was going up to Katha with her husband, as part of the High Court move. 38 Indian Civil Servants were the crème de la crème of administrators in Burma and in February the Governor complained that the ‘too rapid disappearance of government officers is contributing to the decline of public morale’. 39 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D975/1: Langham Carter Diary, p. 15. To make the move work, rooms were being partitioned and air-raid trenches dug. 40 Several younger men left to join the army or to evacuate for India. One of those drafted in was a High Court Judge Mr Justice Murphy. Langham-Carter was reassured because he never was a particularly ‘judicial’ judge. 41 For example, on 11 February the last consignment of salt from the Moulmein saltfields arrived in Rangoon and was loaded straight onto railway trucks bound for Mandalay and Sagaing. 42 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D975/1: Langham Carter Diary, chapter 3, Rangoon is Evacuated. 43 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D750: Half-Yearly Report of Rangoon Evacuation Office, Chartered Bank of India, account written by unnamed senior banker. 44 Later, as the situation deteriorated, the Imperial bank had to airlift everything on from Lashio to Calcutta. It chartered a plane at the enormous cost of Rs 25,000. 45 Mr Browning (CBI Senior Accountant) managed to ‘hitch a lift’ on the convoy, together with two of his clerks and considerable quantities of stationery. 46 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D750: Half-Yearly Report, Rangoon Evacuation Office, Chartered Bank of India. 47 There was uncertainty about the precise moment when martial law was declared. Bozman explained that because the evacuation of Rangoon was ordered on 20 February, the civilian Government’s authority and legal liabilities technically ceased 48 hours later on 22 February. 48 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 11. 49 All this had to be done within 72 hours 50 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 12. 51 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, 20 February 1942.

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52 The incident led directly to the death by suicide of the official concerned, J. Fielding-Hall. 53 Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, pp. 112–13. 54 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 5. 55 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 5. 56 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D975/1: Langham Carter Diary, Chapter 3. 57 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D/1223/3: Philip Arthur Watson Howe, Diaries, Retreat from Burma January to May 1942, 1949. 58 The colleagues were Lindop (Mrs Lindop was one of the women who were sailing), Edmeades, Polglase and Cruickshank. He had to collect some equipment from Cruickshank, which was also to be loaded onto the Hmattaing. 59 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D/1223/3: Howe, Retreat from Burma, p. 7. 60 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D/1223/3: Howe, Retreat from Burma, p. 10. They paid the serang (Boatswain) a ‘backhander’ of Rs 60. 61 The convoy was expected to bring in 160 tanks to form the Armoured Brigade. It arrived early in the morning, disembarked and by nightfall was in the field of battle near Sittang Bridge. 62 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D/1223/3: Howe, Retreat from Burma, pp. 5–12. 63 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 1. 64 BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 1; Wally Richmond, the Governor’s Military Liaison Officer was with him at the time, and he murmured, ‘Discretion, HE’. 65 Gallagher, Retreat in the East, pp. 175–6. 66 Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, Sunday 1 March 1942. ‘G was very annoyed when Reg. announced that he wasn’t going to burn Government House.’ 67 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 11–12. They flew to Magwe and went on from there. 68 Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company. They did such an effective job that a flywheel ended up a quarter of a mile away in the grounds of Government House. 69 Never to be outdone, O’Dowd Gallagher estimated it to be 18,000 feet. 70 R. B. G. Prescott, CMG, OBE, IP, Commissioner of Police. 71 Gallagher, Retreat in the East, pp. 181–2. 72 Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, pp. 115–16. 73 Of the 4,797 points of departure listed by European, Anglo-Indian and AngloBurmese households in the Evacuation Registers, 3,046 (63%) gave Rangoon addresses. Indian respondents seemed to interpret ‘address at departure’, not as home address, but as the point of departure. Hence many Indian evacuees specified places like Akyab, Myitkyina, Homalin or Shwebo. Only 3,717 out of 17,556 (21%) households gave Rangoon as their address. This may have been the number that sailed from Rangoon.

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Chapter 5 1 Vorley and Dorman-Smith seemed to have a difference of opinion as to whether it was a reminder or new information. 2 Vorley, Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma, Introduction, p. 18. Fogarty was appointed Chief Liaison Officer in December 1941. 3 In February 1942, P. C. Fogarty was killed when his plane crashed at Kunming aerodrome in China. Initially Mr H. G. Wilkie ICS replaced Fogarty, but then T. L. Hughes CBE, ICS, took over as Chief Liaison Officer. 4 Vorley cited one disagreement with Fogarty over a decision to charter an IFC vessel to take 500 coolies up-country and another over a rule to limit the ratio of unattached Indian males to females on vessels leaving the Port of Rangoon. 5 Vorley, Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma, Introduction, p. ii. 6 There were two air raids on Sunday 18 January, one on Wednesday 21, two on Thursday 22 and one on Friday 23. A ferocious air battle too place over Rangoon on Saturday 24 January, followed by heavy raids on Sunday 25, Monday 26 and Tuesday 27 January. The month ended with a bang with two more raids on Wednesday 28, three on Thursday 29, one on Friday 30 and at least three on Saturday 31 January. February came in with an even bigger bang. There were four raids on 1 February, two on Monday 2, two on Tuesday 3 February, and three or four raids took place every night between Wednesday 4 and Monday 9 February. 7 They lived in cramped jerry built ghettoes and had no air-raid shelters 8 Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Report on Civil Evacuation, Appendix V to Report on the Burma Campaign, pp. 19–20. 9 Cholera is common in areas where there are poor living conditions and overcrowding. It is caused by the bacterium vibrio cholera, which is transmitted by water contaminated with faeces and also through unwashed or undercooked foods. It releases toxins in the small intestine causing watery diarrhoea, vomiting, dehydration, sunken eyes, wrinkled skin, fatigue, muscle cramps. The symptoms appear 7 to 10 days after the initial infection and without immediate treatment the disease is likely to be fatal. Treatment includes the application of simple glucose water to rehydrate the body or intravenous fluids. Today single doses of antibiotics like azithromycin or doxycycline are prescribed. In 1942 the main antidote was boiling drinking water and frequent washing of hands. 10 Dorman-Smith, Report on Civil Evacuation, Appendix V, p. 21. 11 They were located 16 and 40 miles respectively from Padaung. 12 BL/OIR/EUR/MSS/M/3/955: Appendix 3 to Vorley’s Report on Civil Evacuation: Evacuation by the Taungup Pass, Arakan Division Report by Mr P Burnside, Divisional Forest Officer, Arakan (Margherita, 12 July 1943). Although forest work had come to a standstill during February and March 1942, Burnside was still involved in winding up in the collecting stations and plantation centres. After

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Notes supervising the evacuation, Burnside finally sailed from Arakan to Chittagong on 27 March on the SS Sir Harvey Adamson with the Madras Medical Mission and Mr Orr, DSP. He returned to evacuation duties on 6 May – this time on the Ledo– Mogaung road. He set up his headquarters at Kyauktaw in the Kaladan Hills. U Kantaya’s task was to feed the poor, tend to the sick and dispose of the dead. U Po Choe was responsible for rice distribution and camp security. Mg Tha Tun, Mg Chit Maung and Mg Mi supervised burial parties. Mg Saw, Mg Tun Pe and Yein Fan had general duties in Taungup. Burnside arrived in Taungup on 5 February 1942. Each of these reservoirs was 6 cubic feet. His wife and children were sailing to India. He had gone to see them off and to close up the family home. U Kyin Lynn was Inspector of Schools and U An was Superintendent Telegraphs of Excise. It was organized by Mr Hilton the Posts and Area Engineer. Burnside escaped from Akyab for the first time in March 1942. He spent a week or so with his family in India before returning to Upper Burma to help with the evacuation organization. He escaped from Burma for the second time, on this occasion overland through the Hukawng Valley. He wrote his Report in difficult circumstances in Margherita, and had to do it very quickly in order to meet Vorley’s deadline. It was completed in July 1943. He can be forgiven for a few minor inexactitudes. BL/OIR/EUR/MSS/M/3/955: Appendix 3 to Vorley’s Report on Civil Evacuation. Akyab stands on an island at the mouth of the Kaladan River. In 1942 it had a population of about 40,000. Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, p. 118. Oo Kyaw Khine, ICS, Deputy Commissioner, who did not leave with Abigail, was left to attempt to resolve these issues. The actual date on which they left is open to some doubt. Burnside says that they boarded the last boat on 16 March. Dorman-Smith says that he arrived in Kyaukpyu on 26 March. The latter date sounds more likely. Dorman-Smith estimates that 21,000 of these were from Kyaukpyu and 14,000 from Akyab.

Chapter 6 1 They were sunk on 10 December 1941. 2 Shipping companies would not allow Indian males to travel as deck passengers. However, Indian women would not travel unless chaperoned by a male, which

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meant that neither men nor women could travel as deck passengers. This hit the poorest classes the hardest. The Agent of the Government of India eventually permitted several women to travel if accompanied by a single male. Vorley claimed to have obtained this undertaking after chasing Robert Hutchins’ yacht in Rangoon bay, clinching the deal as they sailed back side-by-side. Vorley and Vorley, The Road from Mandalay, p. 15. Ian D’Mello, Private Papers, 2012. Ian D’Mello was born in Rangoon in 1933, and was 8 years old when the city was bombed. He escaped to India with his mother on one of the last passenger boats to leave Rangoon (his father walked out to Imphal and succumbed to TB on the way), D’Mello ‘spent the entire journey crammed on top-deck . . . zigzagging to avoid submarine attack – all tremendous fun for an eight year old boy’. BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/608 (10382): Telegram from Governor of Burma to Secretary of State, 14 January 1942 (48). BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/608 (10422): Secret Telegram from Governor-General of India (New Delhi) to Secretary of State for India, 15 January 1942, (60S). BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/604 (10422): War Cabinet Chief of Staff Committee COS (42): Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting, 16 January 1942. Present: General Sir Alan F. Brooke (Chief of the General Staff ), Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred R. Freeman (Vice-Chief of the Air Staff ), Vice-Admiral H. R. Moore (Vice-Chief of Naval Staff ). Saunders, Valiant Voyaging. William Mackinnon and Robert Mackenzie founded the Burmah Steam Navigation Co. in 1854. It was renamed BISN Co. in 1862. Its most distinguished Chairman was James Lyle, Earl Inchcape. BISN had carried supplies in the Boer War and 120 of the Company’s vessels were involved in the First World War. Twenty-one of them were sunk by enemy action. In 1931, the Company agreed to allow the Admiralty to requisition four BISN passenger vessels in the event of national emergency. In 1936, this agreement was extended to requisitioning the whole fleet if necessary. The Baroda (gross tonnage 3,205) was destroyed by fire at sea on 14 April 1944. The SS Ellenga made three trips to Rangoon, the last of which was just before the Port was closed. Saunders, Valiant Voyaging, p. 126; Saunders quotes Mr J. S. King, the Chief Engineer. Saunders, Valiant Voyaging, p. 126. The Neuralia was mined off the coast of Italy on 1 May 1945 (the eve of VE Day). Tony Hobson, manager of Mackinnon Mackenzies (BISN’s principal Agent), accompanied them. Vorley and Vorley, The Road to Mandalay, pp. 22–3. Vorley, Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma. Dorman-Smith, Report on the Civil Evacuation, p. 19.

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18 See Dorman-Smith, Report on the Civil Evacuation, Appendix V, p. 44; Planes belonging to Indian National Airways, the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharajah of Mayerbhang were also used. 19 Initially, Kemp used two Beechcroft 3/4 seaters and one Dacota 25-seater aircraft. 20 BL/IOR/MSS/Eur/C341: Janet Humble, Out of Burma and Back Again 1942–46, 1980. 21 BL/IOR/EUR/MMS/C561: Gerald Bourne, ICS, Exit from Burma: A Wartime Journey from Rangoon to Simla, 1943, p. 12. Bourne drove two women to the airport in Magwe in his large Buick convertible (the Queen Mary). They were Nell Hughes, her small baby, Indian Ayah and Deirdre Carmichael with her dachshund. Magwe is 150 miles south of Mandalay. 22 See Dorman-Smith, Report on Civil Evacuation, p 33. 23 Shwebo is 120 miles north-west of Maymyo and 80 miles from Mandalay. 24 Dorman-Smith was always keen to break down evacuees into ethnic categories. Here he claims that ‘20% were Europeans and Anglo-Indians, 40% Indians and 40% military families of whom many were Indians’. One suspects that he exaggerated the number of Indians for political reasons, in order to reassure critics in India. 25 Dorman-Smith suggests that 1,600 of this number were Indians. 26 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D975/1: Reginald Langham-Carter Diary, 1943. After evacuating the Food Department up to Sagaing, Langham-Carter (a senior colonial civil servant) was looking for a fresh challenge. 27 The first women passengers arrived to find that the runway was still being cleared. They had to occupy a former police barracks without proper food, beds or toilets. 28 Hay had been an irrigation officer. Colonel Wright of the Maymyo Evacuation Office appointed Langham-Carter. Wright had previously been in charge of the Burmese branch of the Survey of India and Geoffrey Bostock had just resigned as Air Evacuation Officer in Shwebo. 29 Occasionally a CNAC Dakota flew direct from Shwebo to Calcutta (instead of Chittagong). 11 March was one such occasion. Wright had flown to Calcutta because the Army had lost most of its maps and Wright was collecting a supply of Burma maps from the HQ in Calcutta. 30 Mr Kennedy of Steel Bros was in charge of transport arrangements from Mandalay to Shwebo. Rev. Firth (a Methodist missionary) assisted him. 31 They were also given large square gin bottles full of water to take with them, much to the consternation of the Methodist missionaries. 32 PAA-Africa pilots participating in the CNAC flights from Myitkyina airfield included: Captains – Dallas Sherman, Robert Carstensen, Wayne Eveland, Grover Furr, John Heninger, James Hubbard, Vernon Kerns, George Lanning, Victor Looney, John Ohlinger, John Passage, Donald Stoeger, Jean Ziegler; First Officers – Samuel Beleiff, Charles Hammell, Charles McClelland, Millard K. Nasholds,

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Raymond Sylvester, Leo Viens, Doron Warren, William Zeng; Flight Engineers – Richard O’Keefe, Joseph Patrick; Radio Operators – Peter Kravchenok, Arthur White, Jack Winn. Bostock was asked to keep operations going in Shwebo for as long as possible. Dorman-Smith claims that only 30 of the 200 were Europeans. The Salween was also a very important river, but for the most part it was not navigable. This was an idyllic spot where reportedly, ‘birds sang, the water peacefully lapped [and] monkeys scrambled on the nearby beach’. The SS Sir Harvey Adamson completed many evacuation voyages. It struck a mine on 18 April 1947 and sank with all hands (see p. 16). It was attended by Burch, the Army CO and the RAF Commanding Officer. He had to cut his plans short on 20 February, when he was misinformed that Rangoon had to be evacuated within 48 hours. Either the order was premature or Saunders had confused the date. Rangoon was not actually evacuated until 7th March. Nevertheless, Reddish arranged for all the launches to rendezvous in Yandoon – with the exception of the Ailsa, which sailed 500 miles by sea to Akyab via Bassein and the Hunka, which towed a ‘flat’ with 200 persons on board 263 miles up the Irrawaddy to Prome. The passengers were instructed to bring 3 days’ rations with them. They were not allowed to bring furniture and only a limited number of prams and bicycles. The Hunka, Kayan, Maymyo and Salona had already set off. Saunders, Valiant Voyaging, p. 126. The IFC and Burmese Steam Navigation Company, was established in Glasgow and Messrs Todd, Findlay & Co. were its managing agents in Rangoon. It was incorporated as the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Ltd in 1875. Its fleet of 24 steamers and 23 flats was requisitioned in 1885 to transport 9,467 troops and 77 guns up to Mandalay. It prospered because of the paddy and rice trade and IFC steamers also towed oil flats from the oilfields to the refinery in Syriam before BOC laid its pipeline in 1906. The largest paddle steamers were 326 feet in length. Caird & Co., Bow McLachlan, Rankin & Blackmore, Chalmers & McKivet, McKie & Baxter, Russell & Co., Alley & McLennan, R. Duncan & Co., J & G Ingles, Maudslay & Field and Yarrow Ship Yards, all built steamers for IFC, as did Indian yards such as the Garden Reach Dockyard, the Indian General Steam Navigation Co. and Burn & Co. of Calcutta. The daily ‘ferry’ service of 400 miles between Prome and Mandalay called at Yenangyaung. Others included the overnight service between Rangoon and Bassein, and a sternwheeler service between Pakokku on the Irrawaddy and Homalin on the Chindwin – a distance of 420 miles. The rules governing employment were relaxed in the 1930s, when (of necessity) the Company recruited several local Anglo-Burmese engineers. However, only

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Notes Europeans could become commanders and officers on Express Steamers. Deck and engine-room crews (serangs, sukanis, tindels, cassabs, lascars, etc.) were almost all Chittagonians. Cooks and saloon staffs were invariably Burma-domiciled Indians, and most of the clerks were Burmans or Karens. Of course at the bottom of the heap, the ships’ sweepers were always low-caste Madrassis. N. K. S. Adam, Superintendent, Captain John Reid, Marine Superintendent and Mr H. B. McAuslan Fleet Engineer, were among the other senior IFC officers. See BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/375/11 and BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/375/2/20: May 1942, Irrawaddy Flotilla Company: Personal Accounts of the 1942 Retreat (2) Chubb’s Memoir. Chubb abandoned the Siam at Katha on 4 May, boarded a hospital train to Myitkyina and arrived 30 hours later. He flew out in an RAF plane just before Myitkyina airport was bombed. He sailed by the river-steamer, Sikh, to Tejpur and on to Calcutta, reporting to Brodie on 12 May 1942. On 30 April he saw Miller, MacAuslan and Paterson on the Mingalay; on 1 May at Kyaukmyaung he met Morton (Manager), Dry (Assistant Manager), Reid (Marine Superintendent), McLure, Smith (Chief Engineer) and S. MacDonald on the Kotah. On 4 May he met G. A. MacDonald on the hospital train between Katha and Myitkyina. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/375/11: Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, Personal Accounts of the 1942 Retreat. They joined a party of 12 soldiers led by Major Davis. He travelled with several other IFC men, McAuley, Stark, Innes, Lees and Cassidy (Dalla Dockyard), Findlay (Rangoon Foundry) and Greenaway (Sales Dept). The water was too low at the bar of the Chindwin, so they loaded two lorries onto an IFC sternwheeler and landed at Monywa later that evening. They arrived in Calcutta on 9 May, and reported to Brodie. Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, p. 174. Philip Achard was one of many faithful IFC employees involved in the scuttling project and in blowing up fuel storage tanks. He was eventually flown out to Dinjan. Myitkyina is 722 miles from Rangoon, and it was the most northerly point on the network. The line was virtually closed after the Sittang Bridge disaster, although for a short while freight trains continued to supply the Seventeenth Army Division and to transport the 63 Indian Brigade to Pegu. There was always the danger of Japanese infiltration because every station was unmanned between Rangoon and Pegu. The Ava Bridge was completed in 1934 and the Gotkeik Viaduct was 2,260 feet long and 870 feet above river level. Other areas not on the railway network included Southern Tenasserim, the Arakan coast, the Chin Hills and the Shan States east of Taunggyi and Lashio. John Leroy Christian, Burma and the Japanese Invader, Bombay, Thacker & Co., 1945, p. 211.

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59 From Rs 51M in 1927–8 to Rs 35.5M in 1932–3. 60 According to the 1931 Census Report. 61 A. A. Mains, Soldier with Railways, Chippenham, Picton, 1994; Mains attributed his interest in railways to his paternal grandfather, who was Deputy Solicitor on the London and North Western Railway Board. His father was a barrister. Mains himself was educated at Malvern. Commissioned in a Gurkha Regiment in 1934, he sailed to Bombay on the SS Nevasa. In 1941, was posted to Iraq, and in January 1942 he flew to Rangoon in a Tata Air Lines DC 2. 62 Mains and his immediate superior, Lieutenant Colonel Philip Gwyn, landed at Mingladon in the middle of an air raid. 63 In peacetime, McGilp had been a field worker with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 64 Burma Railways had been militarized by this stage. Hence, Mr C. P. Brewitt CBE was able to use the rank of ‘Colonel’. 65 Mackley Papers: Recollections 1939–45: SOAS/MMS/Uncatalogued/MRP/2. 66 David Reed, The Trek from Mandalay, London, Minerva Press, 1996, pp. 23–6. 67 The two towns were of strategic importance. The river port of Monywa on the Chindwin was a key entrepôt for both military and civilian evacuees. Hundreds of wounded soldiers and, European women and children and elderly men and women were being flown to India from Shwebo airfield. Shwebo was on the Myitkyina line and the Second Echelon of the Burma Army (responsible for the documentation of officers and soldiers) was also based there. 68 Ywataung was the Burma Railways District Headquarters and base of the District Traffic and Locomotive Superintendents. 69 The explosion was caused after a wagonload of RAF bombs caught fire. 70 OIR/MSS/EUR/3/955/251: Pascal to Finch, Escape from Burma. The journey took from 17 to 22 April. The passenger was Miss Pascal. 71 Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart. 72 It was further complicated because between the two trains lay a station with a short stretch of double-line track. Two other trains stood at the station, one on each line. 73 Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, p. 172. 74 Bourne was a senior civil servant, attached to the High Court in Rangoon. 75 BL/IOR/EUR/MMS/C561, Gerald Bourne, ICS, Exit from Burma, p. 10. 76 SOAS/MMS/Un-catalogued/MRP/6D23/(d): Firth Papers, Diary 1942, Mr Mitchell, a Corporation Director was escaping to the Indian border with boxes of Rangoon Corporation records. The three missionaries were the Revs Firth, Chapman and Reed. They got as far as Mawlaik. 77 Rose was Manager of T. D. Findlay & Sons Ltd. 78 OIR/MSS/EUR/C581, A Short History of T D Findlay & Son Ltd; Alister Rose: Account of the Evacuation of Burma, January–June 1942. 79 Some of the Departments demanded 60 lorries to move their items.

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Chapter 7 1 The narrative in this chapter has been pieced together from the following documents: Vorley, Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma; Vorley and Vorley, The Road from Mandalay; Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, Simla, Government of India Press, November 1943; Dorman-Smith, Report on Civil Evacuation, Appendix V. The weighty Appendix V is a distinct document in its own right. Each of them borrows from the others so there is much common information. Vorley’s Report was the ‘proto-document’ as it was compiled closer to the action and it ‘got its retaliation in first’. However, Dorman-Smith’s Report is the most comprehensive. Each document contributes unique facts and distinctive observations. 2 There is little evidence that at this stage the Japanese strategy included taking Mandalay or advancing on India. 3 Several evacuees were taken to Singu and Kyaukmyaung. 4 It was a very complex operation. The Superintendent of Police had issued passes to all essential workers; 1,000 prisoners had been released earlier and instructions were given to release the remaining 400. Surplus police stores, firearms and treasury funds had to be loaded onto the steamer. 5 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C341: Janet Humble, Out of Burma and Back Again. Janet Humble (Lindop) had lived in Burma for ten years. Recently she had entertained in the District Commissioner’s House in Magwe many of the hundreds of evacuees who were passing through the town. Her guests included Indian coolies, senior British officers and a Chinese General with his two mistresses. 6 The first installations to be destroyed were the Burma Cement Company factory in Thayetmyo, gas containers at Pyaye and oil wells in Padaukpin and Yenanma. 7 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C800: Geoffrey A. F. Grindle, Fun Is Where You Find It. 8 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/M/3/955/185: W. H. R. Mennie to Mr & Mrs Erskine, 28 February 1942. 9 On the other hand the civilian officials who stayed to the end flew out from Shwebo and a day or so later the ‘last ditchers’ left for Tamu. 10 Leigh, Conflict, Politics and Proselytism, p. 112. Also SOAS/MMS/Un-catalogued/ MRP/6C: Willans Papers: Recollections, June 1942. 11 An additional reason was that the authorities in India would allow only 500 evacuees into the country each day. 12 Dorman-Smith, Report on Civil Evacuation, Appendix V, pp. 36–7. There appear to have been serious disagreements between the Sagaing and Mandalay Commissioners over the issue of sharing the load. 13 For example, J. S. and Mrs Vorley and Mr Raymond (the Chief Censor) and his wife had moved into a house on South Moat Road.

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14 There were wide divergences of opinion as to the date of Vorley’s promotion. Some put it in early April. Dorman-Smith is insistent that the appointment was made on 13 March. It rankled with Vorley that he was not made responsible for air evacuation arrangements. 15 Andrewartha, Forrest, Booth-Russell and Bott (a newcomer) were rubber planters. Bott had escaped by canoe across the Sittang before acting as a guide to allied troops. He later died of malaria when he returned to look for his Burmese wife and child. Mr L. A. Crain had been in charge of the ABM Press in Rangoon. T. C. D. Ricketts had been a Forest Officer. Condie was Chief Engineer at the Rangoon Corporation Water Works. Walter Voehringer was an American businessman and Dr Jury had been Principal of Judson College. The Friends Ambulance Unit men had earned their spurs just before Rangoon fell by ingeniously salvaging discarded vehicle parts from crates in the docks. They assembled them into two trucks, which they drove up to Mandalay. Forbes-Mitchell was an accountant and Marjory Murray was a Rangoon Turf Club stenographer. They were both AngloIndians. Mrs Lindop was wife of the Deputy Commissioner in Magwe and Pughe was ex-Indian Cavalry and Burma Military Police Officer. He had been steward of the Rangoon Turf Club, had a gammy leg and was too proud to evacuate to India. 16 Vorley and Vorley, The Road from Mandalay, pp. 76–7. 17 Rev. Chapman had allowed them to stay in a house previously occupied by Rev. Sewell and his family. 18 The Chinese soldiers had been staying in the nearby Wesley Boys High School, which was being used as a military hospital. 19 BL/IOR/M/41/3/955–B270/4: M. Dabey, 21 March 1943. 20 Leigh, Conflict, Politics and Proselytism, pp. 117–18. Also SOAS/Un-catalogued/ MRP/6D/23(d): Firth Papers, Diary, 1942. 21 BL/IOR/M/41/3/955/179: Mrs Turner to Hastings, 29 November 1942. 22 BL/IOR/M/41/3/955–B270/4: M. Dabey, 21 March 1943. The Dabeys flew out to India on 16 April. 23 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C341: Janet Humble, Out of Burma and Back Again. 24 See Reed, The Trek from Mandalay. 25 Vorley and Vorley, The Road to Mandalay, pp. 75–80. 26 The children arrived in Myitkyina too late to be airlifted out. Acting on some almost criminally mad advice, the lady in charge decided to walk with about 40 of the elder girls via the Hukawng Valley to India. Only one girl survived. The younger orphans were taken north to Sumperabum where two ABM ladies cared for them. During the occupation a Japanese officer moved the girls up to Fort Hertz. They were then flown to India. 27 The ‘last ditchers’ on this occasion included Colonel Clarke (Commissioner), District Police Officer, McLean (Agricultural Department), McAughtrie

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Notes (Zeyawaddy Sugar Factory), McLelland (Mandalay Brewery) and Morton (IFC Agent). He sent Rs 5,000 to his wife, distributed Rs 5,000 to each of his senior officers and Rs 3,000 to each of the junior officers. Vorley and Vorley, The Road from Mandalay. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C561: Gerald Bourne ICS, Exit from Burma, pp. 10–17. Including 500 Europeans, 2,000 Anglo-Indians, 5,000 Indians and 2,500 dependents of mainly Indian military personnel. BL/IOR/M/41/3/955–B270/4: Gerald Bourne ICS, Exit from Burma. The bulk of the Army had already moved to the new military Headquarters in Shwebo. Vorley had provided Clarke with ten lorries specifically for the purpose. He explained that this was because of the sudden collapse of the Chinese Third Army in the Shan States.

Chapter 8 1 Dien Bien Phu decided the future of French Indo-China. Vietminh forces under General Vo Nguyen Giap laid siege to the citadel in November 1953. The French garrison under General Navarre surrendered on 7 May 1954. 2 E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs. The other passengers were two elderly Europeans – long-term residents in Burma whom Dorman-Smith claimed not to know, a sick Indian clerk and a Punjabi servant. 3 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/215/40: Lady Dorman-Smith’s Diary, 1941. The entry for Tuesday 6 May describes the ceremony held in the ballroom at Government House. 4 It belonged to the Bathgates. 5 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955: Telegram 12151, Governor of Burma to Secretary of State for Burma, 25 April 1942. 6 E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs. 7 BL/IOR/EUR/553: Telegram 12151, 25 April 1942; note that he refers to each stopping place as a ‘camp’. One assumes that for security reasons, each camp was numbered non-sequentially so, for example, he moves from camp 393 to 399 to 318. 8 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/532: Telegram12213, Governor of Burma to Secretary of State for Burma, 2 May 1942. 9 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/532: Telegram/12212, Prime Minister, Hon. Winston Churchill to Governor of Burma, 2 May 1942. 10 BL/IOR/EUR/MSS/E/215/326: Dorman-Smith, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 166. 11 Sir William Carr, President of the Burma Refugee Association, writing in Burma Nadu.

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12 Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart; see also BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/251: Pascal to Finch, Escape from Burma, in which she explained that Rs 100 was the standard charge for the train and flight for women who were in work. Those who were destitute were put on a ‘free list’ and ‘people of means’ were charged Rs 280. Miss Pascal was shocked to discover how many people ‘took advantage and cried poverty’. 13 OIR/MSS/EUR/1028: Alwyn Henry Seppings, Memoir 1932–46, pp. 18–19. Seppings was a senior PWD engineer. 14 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/375/7: Note by T. F. Musgrave (Temporary Bhamo Agent), 18 May 1942. See also BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C581: A Short History of T. D. Findlay & Son Ltd and Alister Rose, Account of the Evacuation of Burma, January–June 1942. 15 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/1028: Seppings, Memoir, pp. 18–19. 16 Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart, p. 96. 17 Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart, p. 96. 18 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/272: Mary Mack to Miss Short, 5 July 1942. 19 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/251: Pascal to Finch, Escape from Burma. 20 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/272: Mary Mack to Miss Short, 5 July 1942. 21 Tom Culbert and Andy Dawson, Pan Africa: Across the Sahara in 1941 with Pan Am, Virginia, Paladwr Press, McLean, 2001, p. 121. 22 Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart. 23 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/375/2: Note by Captain H. J. Chubb, 20 May 1942. 24 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E/375: Note by Musgrave, 18 May 1942. 25 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/27: Mrs Z. N. Gilbert to Miss Lou Beale, in which was included a letter from Mrs Oakley. 26 Kentish Express, 20 November 1942; Escape from Burma: ‘Ashford man hears from brother’. 27 Culbert and Dawson, Pan Africa: Across the Sahara, p. 122. It was calculated that CNAC carried 3,564 evacuees out of Burma to Dinjan in this operation. 28 BL/IOR/MSS EUR D975/4: Reginald Langham-Carter, Account of My Trek from Burma to India, 1 November 1942. 29 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/259: Letter from Cecil Smith to Mrs Smith, 3 August 1942. 30 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/D975/4: Langham Carter, Account. 31 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C554: R. S. Wilkie, Diary of a Journey from Myitkyina to Margherita. 32 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/1028: Seppings, Memoir, pp. 18–19. 33 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/1028: Seppings, Memoir, pp. 18–19. 34 Since 1939 Alistair Rose had been Manager of T. D. Findlay & Sons Ltd, Burma’s leading teak extractor with 186 working elephants. Rose lived and worked in Moulmein at the Company’s HQ, where the Company also had its main mill. When Moulmein fell in mid-January he moved TDF’s assets northwards to Nyaunglebin

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and then to Kalaw. When Kalaw was evacuated on 18 April, Rose drove up towards Myitkyina in his Hillman car. He crossed the Irrawaddy in a country boat on either 6 or 7 May. 35 BL/IOIR/MSS/EUR/C581: A Short History of Findlay & Sons Ltd. 36 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/494/12280: Governor General to Secretary of State for India, 8 May 1942.

Chapter 9 1 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/E215/65: Burma Nadu, a newsletter published during the war and distributed to British Burma-exiles living in India. 2 By an annex to the Red Cross Convention, drawn up in Tokyo under the auspices of Prince Iyetsato Tokugawa, the parties agreed that enemy civilians should not be subjected to punishment of a physical nature or interned in camps (unless they posed a risk to security) and that they should not be held in unhealthy areas. 3 In 1933, the Japanese Military Academy published the Study of Ways to Fight the Chinese Army. 4 Hideki Tojo: born Tokyo, 30 December 1884. After military service in Switzerland and Germany, Major General in 1933, advocated pre-emptive air strikes on China and the Soviet Union. He was convinced that peace negotiations with United States would fail. He ordered the pre-emptive attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. 5 Soldiers who surrendered should be treated with contempt: the War Ministry (Rikugunsho). Record p. 1348. 6 R. J. Pritchard and S. Zaide (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, London, Garland 1981, vol. 16, p. 40,537. 7 This number includes 45,000 Philippine troops, 60,000 Indian soldiers of the Indian National Army as well as many Gurkhas and Malays. 8 See Ronald Hastain, White Coolie, London, 1947: Bernard Schoonenberg, De Poorten der Hel, Netherlands, Bossum, 1978. 9 See Won Zoon Yoon, ‘Japan’s Occupation of Burma, 1941–1945’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1971, pp. 50–2. The phenomenon of gekokujo reached its zenith in the sixteenth century when vassals betrayed their lords for so-called moral ends. During the 1930s in Manchuria junior military officers applied gekokujo by mounting a principled campaign to justify the seizure of territory from China. On the Japanese mainland ultranationalist military officers assassinated political and business leaders, in order to ‘purify’ Japanese society from the corporate and political party influences. There was widespread popular support when junior naval officers and army cadets assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on 15 May 1932 and for a coup attempt by 1,500 troops

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on 26 February 1936, although the leaders were subjected to secret trials and executions. BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/C828: Correspondence from Cherie Crowley to ‘Stanley’, 28 November 1996, 14 April 1997 and 14 April 1997. Cherie was born in 1926. Her mother worked for Mr C. E. Clark, a Civil Engineer in Rangoon and her late father had worked for BOC in Yenangyaung. Cherie had just finished her school leaving examination when she was injured in the bombing raid of 23 December 1941. In March 1942, Cherie, her mother and brother travelled up to Mandalay in a Red Cross convoy, but then lost everything when the city was bombed on 3 April. She was accused of helping a British Army officer called John Forsythe. He was separated from his regiment and had joined the evacuees in Myitkyina. The Japanese tortured him and beat him brutally in front of the evacuees. He was thrown half-dead into the back of a lorry and was never heard of again. Rev. Stanley V. Vincent, Out of Great Tribulation, London, Cargate Press, 1946, p. 42. Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart, Blanche’s story (December 1941–March 1942). Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart, pp. 120–1. Dhiresh and Amaresh Chakravarty, Private correspondence, 2012: Dhiresh Chakravarty was born in Maymyo in 1935. In 1946, Dhiresh joined his father who had returned to Rangoon. When the war ended three years later, the most urgent priority was to get the boys into a school. After independence in 1948, Dhiresh’s father decided to retire from the Civil Service and in 1949 he took his family back to India. D. N. Keyes, Marja and the Brown Butterfly, London, Freudian Scripts Publishing House, 2012. The Lopez family was among the thousands whose deaths were not recorded in the Evacuation Register. Marjorie was born with a cleft palate. Austin had seen General Sakurai on horseback leading the triumphal victory march of Japanese troops through Rangoon. General Sakurai had set up his headquarters by Victoria Lake. The Sailing Clubhouse became a Japanese soldiers’ convalescent home and the University campus was the strategic headquarters for the Japanese Army in Burma commanded by Lieutenant General Masakazu Kawabe. They stayed in a bamboo shed in the garden of Mrs Innes, an Anglo-Indian friend. Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart, pp. 136–7. Le Fleur, Le Fleur and Flory, Torn Apart, p. 141, He had been educated in America and his father was a shishaku (nobleman). A formal ceremony took place at the Judson Baptist College. General Heitaro Kimura (Commander-in-Chief Burma Area Army) and his senior officers surrendered to Lieutenant General Montagu Stopford of SEAC. On 12 September General Seishiro Itagaki surrendered the Japanese southern army in Singapore.

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23 Cherie’s sister (Sylvia) was having a baby. 24 Helen Rodriguez, Helen of Burma, London, Collins, 1983; Helen’s Portuguese father, Lambert Kenneth Rodriguez was the Civil Surgeon in Taunggyi and her mother was Scottis. 25 She was suspicious when he asked her to work in a dubious operating theatre. 26 Mr King left behind four frightened and half-starving children, Doris, Marina, Richard and Snookey. 27 The Pugh girls’ mother had died after failing to get on a flight in Myitkyina. Their father was a Burman, U Pu. Rosalind’s father was the owner of the Minto Mansions Hotel in Rangoon. Mrs Anderson, Rosalind and her sister, Patricia had been trapped in Myitkyina when the runway was strafed. All except Rosalind had died. 28 On another occasion British planes bombed a refugee settlement near Maymyo. It housed ‘better-off ’ Hindus, Mohammedans, Chinese and Burmans. Many of them were killed or badly burned. As Helen said, incensed, ‘this was how their unswerving loyalty had been rewarded’. 29 Rodriguez, Helen of Burma; Helen knocked one of his teeth out in the process. 30 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/F621: Diary of Walter Cecil Sherman of Meiktila April 1942– March 1945. 31 Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack, Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. 32 A. L. Fischer coined the phrase ‘barbed-wire disease’. 33 In ‘Hide and Seek’ (Hack), Buchheim suggests that Japanese commandants were not as powerful as they seemed, nor Dutch internees as powerless. She explores the difficulties faced by the children of Indisch women and Japanese men. Estimates of the numbers of children vary between 200 and 8,000. 34 Christine Twomey, ‘Remembering War and Forgetting Civilians: The Place of Civilian Internees in Australian Commemorations of the Pacific War’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 215. 35 Twomey, ‘Remembering War’, pp. 217–18. 36 Bernice Archer, ‘Internee Voices: Women and Children’s Experiences of Being Japanese Captives’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 224–42. 37 Paul Krakoska suggests that there was a combined total of 270 million indigenous peoples plus an additional 132 million in the so-called Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. See Krakoska (ed.), Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, New York, Eastgate, 2005. 38 J. G. Ballard, Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1991. 39 Archer, ‘Internee Voice’, pp. 224–42. 40 Wanrooy was born in the former Dutch East Indies and was a POW for 3½ years during the War.

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41 Eveline Buchheim, ‘Hide and Seek, Children of Japanese-Indisch Parents’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 260–75. 42 Remco Raben, ‘Dutch Memories of Captivity in the Pacific War’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 94. Raben points out that in 1940 there were 70 million inhabitants living in the NEI compared with only 9 million in the Netherlands itself. Dutch civilians had been settling in Indonesia (especially in Java) for centuries. The decision to confer ‘European status’ on the offspring of Dutch fathers and Indonesian mothers resulted in large numbers of Oosterse Nederlanders (Indo-Europeans classified as ‘Dutch nationals’). Compare this with fewer than 5,000 British civilians who were captured in Singapore in 1942. 43 Joseph Kennedy, British Civilians and the Japanese War in Malaya and Singapore, 1941–45, London, Macmillan, 1987, pp. 19–39. 44 Mary Thomas (Shadow of the Rising Sun, London, Marshall Cavendish, 2009) described how the European Transport Manager at the Singapore General Hospital ‘slunk’ away with the keys to all the ambulances and hospital cars. He was never seen again. 45 Thomas describes the harrowing situation in Singapore General Hospital where she worked before being interned. 46 Thomas, Shadow of the Rising Sun. 47 Thomas, Shadow of the Rising Sun, p. 52, describes Dr Eleanor Hopkins as English ‘in voice, manner and outlook’. Some internees found her very irritating. Her able ‘lieutenants’ were Mrs (Dr) Robbie Worth and Dr Cicely Williams, a brilliant Oxford graduate. 48 Thomas, Shadow of the Rising Sun, pp. 45–7. 49 Freddy Bloom, Dear Philip: A Diary of Captivity, Changi, 1942–5, London, Bodley Head, 1980. 50 P. Scott Corbett, ‘In the Eye of the Hurricane: Americans in Japanese Custody during World War II’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 111–24. 51 BL/IOR/Mss/Eur/E215/65: Burma Nadu, February 1944. 52 BL/IOR/Mss/Eur/E215/66: Burma Nadu, June 1945, ‘Internees in Mandalay’. 53 BL/IOR/Mss/Eur/C341: Janet Humble, Out of Burma and Back Again. Mrs Lindop (nee Janet Humble) described how she visited the nuns before Mandalay fell. They said that they did not expect the Japanese to touch them because they were neutrals, mainly of Italian nationality. 54 Leigh, Conflict, Politics and Proselytism, pp. 137–8. 55 Vorley and Vorley, The Road from Mandalay. 56 Hilda R. Corpe, Prisoner beyond the Chindwin, London, Arthur Barke, 1955.

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57 They were undergraduates at Oxford together before the war and arrived in Burma towards the end of 1941. Hilda met her in-laws for the first time. 58 Hilda was trapped. She refused to leave her husband; he refused to leave his parents; and they resented Hilda. 59 The reason behind this compassionate gesture is not entirely clear. 60 K. P. MacKenzie, RAMC, Operation Rangoon Jail, Bournemouth, Christopher Johnson, 1954. 61 That is, the junction of the infamous Burma–Thailand Railway. Hilda saw Dutch POWs working there. 62 Hilda was held to be responsible for the poor behaviour of children who had not bowed properly to the guards. 63 Thakin Nu was Head of the Foreign Office during the Occupation, and he was a friend of Ko Tun Tin. 64 MacKenzie, Operation Rangoon Jail; MacKenzie was educated at Aberdeen Grammar School and the University of Aberdeen. A doctor, he had joined the RAMC in 1914. He was posted to the Seventeenth Indian Division Headquarters in Moulmein in January 1942. He served under Maj. Gen. J. G. Smyth and was one of the hundreds of British troops stranded on the far side of the Sittang River when the Bridge was blown up. He was taken Prisoner of War either on 22 or 23 February 1942, and was taken to Moulmein Jail. On 25 June, the prisoners were crammed into the after-hold of a cargo boat and sent to Rangoon.

Chapter 10 1 This approximation is calculated using the House of Commons Research Paper Index, 99/20 of 22 February 1999 (Robert Twigger, Economic Policy and Statistics Section, House of Commons Library). The formula suggests that values increased by an aggregate of about 22-fold between 1945 and 1999. 2 Dorman-Smith, Report on the Burma Campaign, pp. 115–16. 3 Leroy Christian, Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Economic Development, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1942, p. 229. 4 BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/558: India-China Freight Service. 5 Gregory Crouch, China’s Wings, New York, Bantam Books, 2012. 6 BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/3/955/558: India–China Freight Service. 7 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/583/11835: Telegram from Governor of Burma (camp 209) to Secretary of State for Burma, 30 March 1942. BL/IOR/MSS/ EUR/3/955/437/672 (camp 245): Telegram from Governor of Burma to Secretary of State for Burma, 4 April 1942. 8 BL/OIR/MSS/EUR/3/955/564/2476: Telegram from Governor General to Secretary of State India.

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9 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/564/12280: Viscount Halifax, Ambassador in Washington to Governor of Burma, 7 April 1942. Brereton was OC US Army Air Forces in India. He was based in Dinjan. 10 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/564: Minute Paper 11999, Supply of Transport Aircraft for Burma (signed by Sir D. Monteath), 24 April 1942. 11 H. E. W. Braund, Calling to Mind: An Account of the First Hundred Years of Steel Brothers and Company Limited, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1975, pp. 67–8. 12 T. A. B. Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company 1926–1966, London, Heinemann, Vol. 2, 1967, pp. 89–100. 13 Alister McCrae, Scots in Burma: Golden Times in a Golden Land, Edinburgh, Kinsale Publications, 1990, p. 104. 14 A. C. Pointon, The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited 1863–1963, Southampton, Millbrook Press, 1963, pp. 89–90. 15 See J. H. Williams, Elephant Bill, London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958. Susan Williams, The Footprints of Elephant Bill, London, William Kimber, 1962. 16 Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, pp. 85–6. 17 Maurice Collis, Last and First in Burma (1941–1948), London, Faber & Faber, 1956, pp. 191–2. 18 Nicholas Tarling, ‘A New and Better Cunning: British Wartime Planning for Post-war Burma, 1942–43’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume 13, No. 1, 1982, pp. 33–59. 19 Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, p. 82. 20 The church buildings in Mandalay, Monywa, Kyaukse and Pakokku were very badly damaged and those in Hmangyo and Myobaw were completely destroyed, as were the dispensaries in Lonpo, Tahan and Aungban. The Wesley Boys and Girls schools Thetkegyin and Lezin were completely destroyed, as were the mission houses in Chauk, Mawlaik. Few buildings were unscathed. 21 Leigh, Politics, Conflict and Proselytism, pp. 110–27. 22 The Commission’s members were Major General H. E. Rance, H. G. Wilkie, T. L. Hughes, D. B. Petch and Brigadier A. K. Potter. It reported on 1 January 1946. 23 Report: Burma Handing-over Commission, 1 January 1946, and Restoring Burma’s Shattered Railway System, Burma Nadu, 1945.

Chapter 11 1 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/6: Letter from Frank Reynolds to his mother, 29 May 1942. 2 BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/3/955/277/230: Sister Mary of St Euphrasia to Mother Visitor Missouri, 21 August 1942. 3 Between 1930 and 1939 there were YMBA boycotts and religious disturbances in 1936 and 1937, protests orchestrated for and against proposed Separation

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Notes from India, communal riots in 1938 (in which scores of Indians were killed) and disturbances led by the Marxist-dominated All Burma Student Union (ABSU) and the nationalist Dobama Asiayone in 1938 under the charismatic leadership of Thakin Aung San. The ITA headquarters in Calcutta was linked to the ITA in London, which in turn represented the large sterling tea companies. The tea garden members produced 90 per cent of Assam’s tea and 60 per cent of India’s total crop. They had more than 600 square miles under tea production, yielding an average annual crop of 280 million lbs and employing a diverse labour force of more than 1 million people. Circle committees were organized in districts. If true, the most likely explanation was that these were the bodies of women who had expected to fly from Myitkyina. As evacuees travelling by plane were allowed only 16 lbs of luggage, it was not uncommon for them to leave their everyday clothing behind and to wear only their most valuable items. It may have been that the flights of these unfortunates had been cancelled at the last minute, and they had set off horribly ill-clad for the conditions that lay ahead of them. Who knows? British Library, OIR Private Papers: Many of the evacuees’ letters are here. Others are found in unpublished (or privately published) pamphlets, for example, Janet Roberts (ed.), The Long Way Home: An Account of Florence Cleaver’s Journey Out of Burma in 1942, Matlock, Aubrex, 1993; and S. Farrant Russell, Muddy Exodus, A Story of the Evacuation from Burma, Through the Jungle of Death: A Boy’s Escape from Wartime Burma May 1942, London, Epworth Press, 1943. Examples of childhood memoirs include, Brookes, Through the Jungle of Death; and Reed, The Trek from Mandalay. Examples of civil servants’ memoirs include, Maurice Maybury, Heaven-Born in Burma: Flight of the Heaven-born, Castle Cary, Folio Hadspen, 1984; and Sir John Rowland, Letter to His Wife (also in British Library IOR). BL/IOR/M/41/3/955–B270/4: Undated Letter from Miss Z. N. Gilbert in Quebec, to Miss Lou Beale in East Preston, Sussex, containing letters from Mrs Oakley [Submission number Lon/14243/43]. It is the story of the Wilby family. The older men were Fred Thompson and Mr Davidson. Mr Wilby managed to reach Assam and immediately returned to Burma to discover what had happened to his wife and family. Accounts such as these were often unauthenticated and usually came to Britain via friends and family in Canada, Ireland, and so on.

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Glossary Charpoys Bed frame strung with rope or tapes Chaukidar Nightwatchman Chettiar Indian bankers and moneylenders ‘D’ Notice Final notice issued in evacuation of town, indicating that demolition is about to begin Dobama Asiayone ‘We Burmans’, Nationalist political organization started in 1930s Doolies Hammock slung across poles carried by porters Durwan Caretaker or janito ‘E’ Signal First notice posted in evacuation of a town, indicating that all ‘non-essential’ inhabitants must leave immediately Gekokujo Principle of delegating authority and decision-making power to the most junior officers Godown Warehouse Haldi, kadha, masala, etc. Spices and herbs used in cooking Havildar Rank in Indian Army equivalent to sergeant Kempeitai Japanese military police Khalasi Dockworker or deckhand Lathi Cane used by police in colonial Burma Londwins Canoes usually constructed from hollowed-out logs Maistry Indian labour recruiters Mali Garden boy Marwari Ethnic group from Rajasthan Paddy Unmilled rice Peon Office boy or other general worker Serang Boatswain, in charge of crew under First Officer Sweeper Apart from sweeping labourers responsible for removing human excrement from buildings without sewage systems Thakin ‘Master’ title used by European colonialists and adopted by Burmese nationalists Tilaka Mark on forehead Thupatti Traditional Indian scarf Zayat A simple hut

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Bibliography Unpublished primary sources British Library, India Office Records (IOR).

Telegrams (1942), MSS/EUR/3/955 2476. Governor-General to Secretary-of-State, undated. 11476. External Affairs Department to Secretary-of-State (Pol. 3472/42), undated. 10382. Governor to Secretary-of-State, 14/1. 10422. Governor-General to Secretary-of-State, 15/1. Unnumbered. Governor to Secretary-of-State, 2/2. 452–4. Governor to Secretary-of-State, 4/2, 7/2, 8/2. 11835. Governor (camp 209) to Secretary-of-State, 30/3. 0672. Governor (camp 245) to Secretary-of-State, 4/4. 12280. Viscount Halifax to Governor, 7/4. 0421. Reuters telegram, 17/4. 12151. Governor to Secretary-of-State, 25/4. 0359. Governor-General to Secretary-of-State, 1/5. 0535. Secretary-of-State to Governor-General (Pol. 3477/42), 1/5. 12221. Government of India (Home Department) to Secretary-of-State, 1/5. 12222. Government of India (External Affairs Department) to Secretary-of-State, 1/5. 12213. Governor (Myitkyina) to Secretary-of-State, 2/5. 12212. Prime Minister to Governor, 2/5. Unnumbered. Publicity telegram from Ministry of Information, 5/5. 12280. Governor-General to Secretary-of-State, 8/5. 12351. Governor (via Governor-General) to Secretary-of-State, 14/5. 0470. Governor to Secretary-of-State, 23/5. 12592. Viceroy to Secretary-of-State, 9/6. 12703. Governor-General to Secretary-of-State, 11/6.

Correspondence (1942), MSS/EUR/M/41/3/955 B270/4. Gilbert to Beale, undated (enclosing letter from Oakley, Lon/14243/43). B270/4. Mennie to Erskine, undated.

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0549. Cook to Prime Minister, undated. 0288. Da to Kapila, 21/2. 0185. Mennie to Erskine, 28/2. B270/4. Reynolds to Mrs Reynolds, 29/5. 0272. Mack to Short, 5/7. 0259. Smith to Mrs Smith, 3/8. 0277. Sister Mary to Mother Visitor Missouri, 21/8. 0206. Murphy to McDaniels, 10/9. 0179. Turner to Hastings, 29/11. 05. Eddy to Rossiter, 26/2/43. B270/4. Dabey to anon., 21/3/43.

Reports Census of India: Burma, 1931, Rangoon, Superintendent, Government Printing, IOR/ W2058/25/26/27. Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald, ‘Civil Government Under Invasion Conditions’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 73. Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald, Report on the Burma Campaign 1941–1942, Simla, Government of India Press, 1943, MSS/EUR/ORW/199369. Government of India (Overseas Department) Report, 4 May 1942, MSS/EUR/ M/41/3/955/0392. Half-Yearly Report of Rangoon Evacuation Office, Chartered Bank of India, MSS/EUR/ D750. Report of Burma Handing-Over Commission, 1 January 1946. Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1930. Vorley, J. S., Evacuation of Indians and Europeans from Burma: The Work of the Civilian Evacuation Department, Burma, including Appendix 3, Evacuation by the Taungup Pass, Arakan Division. Report by Mr P. Burnside (Divisional Forest Officer, Arakan), MSS/EUR/M/3/955 (B70/4). Wood, E., Major General, CIE, MC, Report on the Evacuation of Refugees from Burma to India (Assam) January–July 1942, Calcutta, Government of India, 1 October 1942 (L/MIL/17/7/50).

Newspapers Bombay Times of India, 14 February 1942. Burma Nadu, 1945. Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1991. Hindustan Times Weekly, 18 December 1944.

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Kentish Express, 20 November 1942. The News Chronicle, 9 April 1942. The News Chronicle, 2 February 1943. Press Note, ‘Evacuation of Indians’, Indian Overseas Department, 4 May 1942, MSS/ EUR/M/3/955/304.

Diaries and Memoirs Bourne, Gerald, ICS, Exit from Burma: A Wartime Journey from Rangoon to Simla, 1943, MSS/EUR/C561. Captain Chubb’s Memoir, 20 May 1942, MSS/EUR/E/375/2/20. Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald, Unpublished memoirs, MSS/EUR/E/215/326. Howe, Philip Arthur Watson, Diaries, Retreat from Burma, January to May 1942, MSS/ EUR/D/1223/3. Humble, Janet, Out of Burma and Back Again 1942–46, 1980, MSS/EUR/C341. Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, Personal Accounts of the 1942 Retreat, MSS/EUR/ E/375/11. Lady Dorman-Smith Diary, 1941–2, MSS/EUR/215/40. Langham-Carter, Reginald, Account of My Trek from Burma to India, 1 November 1942, MSS/EUR/D/975/4. Letters from Cherie Crowley, to ‘Stanley’, 28 November 1996, 14 April 1997 and 14 April 1997, MSS/EUR/C828. Maurice Maybury, Papers, MSS/EUR/D1080/7/7. Musgrave, T. F. (Temporary Bhamo Agent), 18 May 1942, MSS/EUR/E/375/7. Reginald Langham-Carter Diary, MSS/EUR/975/1. Rose, Alister, Account of the Evacuation of Burma, January–June 1942, MSS/EUR/C581. Seppings, Alwyn Henry, Memoir 1932–46, MSS/EUR/1028. Tun, Sir Paw, Text of a broadcast 26 April 1942, MSS/EUR/E/215/60. Wilkie, R. S., Diary of a journey from Myitkyina to Margherita, MSS/EUR/C554.

Parliamentary papers, minutes and memos Internal memo from Annan to Johnston, 20 April 1942, BL/IOR/MSS/EUR/0413. Internal memo from Fell to Joyce, 15 May 1942, MSS/EUR/M/3/955/363. Internal memo from Fell to Sir John Walton, 15 May 1942, MSS/EUR/M/3/955/474. Internal memo from Fell to Sir John Walton, 16 May 1942, MSS/3/955/474. Minute Paper 11999, Supply of Transport Aircraft for Burma, 24 April 1942, EUR/3/955/564. Report of the Indian Council of State and Legislative Debates, 21 September 1942, MSS/ EUR/M/3/955/13.

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Report of the Indian Council of State Debates of 26 February, 10 March, 18 March and 2 April 1942, MSS/EUR/M/3/955/269/257. Report of the Indian Legislative Assembly Debate, 17 March, 2 April 1942, MSS/EUR/ M/3/955/256. Secretary-of-State to Sir Ralph Glyn, MSS/EUR/323. War Cabinet Chief of Staff Committee COS (42): Minutes of 17th Meeting, 16 January 1942, MSS/EUR/M/3/955/604/(10422).

SOAS archives: Methodist Missionary Society Collection Miss Dorothy Mackley Recollections 1939–45, MMS/Uncatalogued/MRP/2. Rev. Eric Firth Diary 1942, MMS/Uncatalogued/MRP/6D/23(d). Rev. H. C. Willans, Recollections June 1942, MMS/Uncatalogued/MRP/6C.

Private papers Achard Family Papers (Courtesy of Mrs Colleen Goddard). Dhiresh and Amaresh Chakravarty correspondence (2012). Gill Family Papers (Courtesy of Mr Peter Gill). Mr Ian D’Mello, correspondence 2012. Reginald Clarke Papers (Courtesy of Mrs Diana Kennedy). Rodriguez Family Papers (Courtesy of Mrs Jill Pearson).

Unpublished theses Guyot, Dorothy Hess, ‘The Political Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Burma’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1966. Won Zoon Yoon, ‘Japan’s Occupation of Burma, 1941–1945’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1971.

Published primary and secondary sources Archer, Bernice, ‘Internee Voices: Women and Children’s Experiences of Being Japanese Captives’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. Bayly, Christopher and Harper, Tim, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941– 1945, London, Allen Lane, 2004.

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Becka, Jan, The National Liberation Movement in Burma during the Japanese Occupation Period (1941–1945), Prague, Oriental Institute in Academia, 1983. Blackburn, Kevin and Hack, Karl, Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. Bloom, Freddy, Dear Philip: A Diary of Captivity, Changi 1942–5, London, Bodley Head, 1980. Braund, Harold Ernest Wilton, Calling to Mind: An Account of the First Hundred Years of Steel Brothers and Company Limited, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1975. Brookes, Stephen, Through the Jungle of Death: A Boy’s Escape from Wartime Burma, London, John Murray, 2000. Brown, Ian, A Colonial Economy in Crisis: Burma’s Rice Cultivators and the World Depression of the 1930s, London, Routledge Curzon, 2005. Buchheim, Eveline, ‘Hide and Seek, Children of Japanese-Indisch Parents’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. Callahan, Raymond, Burma 1942–1945, London, Davis-Poynter, 1978. Chakravarti, Nalini Ranjan, The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline of an Immigrant Community, London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Charney, Michael W., A History of Modern Burma, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Christian, John Leroy, Burma and the Japanese Invader, Bombay, Thacker & Co., 1945. Chubb, H. J. and Duckworth, C. L. D., Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Limited 1865–1950, Maritime Monographs and Reports No. 7, Greenwich, National Maritime Museum, 1973. Collis, Maurice, Last and First in Burma (1941–1948), London, Faber and Faber, 1956. Corbett, P. Scott, In the Eye of the Hurricane: Americans in Japanese Custody during World War II, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. Corley, T. A. B., A History of the Burmah Oil Company 1926–1966, London, Heinemann, Vol. 2, 1967. Corpe, Hilda R., Prisoner beyond the Chindwin, London, Arthur Barker, 1955. Culbert, Tom and Dawson, Andy, Pan Africa: Across the Sahara in 1941 with Pan Am, McLean, Virginia, Paladwr Press, 2001. Douglas, William O., North from Malaya: Adventure on Five Fronts, London, Victor Gollanncz, 1954. Dunlop, Graham, Military Economics, Culture and Logistics in the Burma Campaign, London, Pickering and Chatto, 2009. Duus, Peter (ed.), Myers, Rarmon H. and Peattie, Mark R., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945: Problems and Issues, New Jersey, CT, Princeton University Press, 1996. Fieldhouse, David Kenneth, Colonialism 1870–1945, An Introduction, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981.

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Gallagher, O’Dowd, Retreat in the East, London, George G. Harrap, 1942. (Reprinted by Viking Press, London.) Goodall, Felicity, Exodus Burma: The British Escape through the Jungles of Death 1942, Stroud, History Press, 2011. Gregory Crouch, China’s Wings, New York, Bantam Books, 2012. Hall, D. G. E., Burma, London, Hutchinson’s University Library, 1950. Hastain, Ronald, White Coolie, London, 1947, and Bernard Schoonenberg, De Poorten der Hel, Netherlands, Bossum, 1978. Herbert, Patricia, The Hsaya San Rebellion (1930–32) Reappraised, Victoria, Centre for Southeaster Studies, Monash University, 1982. Kennedy, Joseph, British Civilians and the Japanese War in Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1945, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1987. Keyes, Dawn N., Marja and the Brown Butterfly, London, Freudian Scripts Publishing House, 2012. Khin Yi, Daw, The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930–1938), Ithaca, SEAP, Cornell University, 1988. Krakoska, Paul H. (ed.), Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, New York, Eastgate, 2005. Le Fleur, Sybil and Blanche and Flory, Derek, Torn Apart, Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2008. Leigh, Michael D., Conflict, Politics and Proselytism: Methodist Missionaries in Colonial and Post-colonial Burma, 1887–1966, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011. Lunt, James, The Retreat from Burma 1941–1942, Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1986. McCrae, Alister, Scots in Burma: Golden Times in a Golden Land, Edinburgh, Kinsale Publications, 1990. McCrae, A. and Prentice, A., Irrawaddy Flotilla, Paisley, James Paton, 1978. MacKenzie, Kenneth Pirie, Operation Rangoon Jail, Bournemouth, Christopher Johnson, 1954. Ma Ma Lay (Ma Tin Hlaing), Not Out of Hate: A Novel of Burma, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1991. Maybury, Maurice, Heaven-Born in Burma: Flight of the Heaven-born, Castle Cary, Folio Hadspen, 1984. Mendelson, E. Michael (ed.), Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianship and Leadership, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1975. Mi Mi Khaing, Daw, Burmese Family, Burmese Family, Bombay, Longmans, Green, 1946. Pearn, Bertie Reginald, The Indian in Burma: Racial Relations: Studies in Conflict and Co-operation, No. 4, Ledbury, Le Play House Press, 1947. Pointon, Arnold Cecil, The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Limited, 1863–1963, Southampton, Millbrook Press, 1963.

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Porter, Andrew N. and Stockwell, Anthony J., British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation, 1938–64, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1987. Pritchard, R. John and Zaide, Sonia M. (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, London, Garland, 1981. Raben, Remco, ‘Dutch Memories of Captivity in the Pacific War’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. Reed, David, The Trek from Mandalay, London, Minerva Press, 1996. Roberts, Janet. The Long Way Home: An Account of Florence Cleaver’s Journey Out of Burma in 1942, Matlock, Aubrex, 1993. Rodriguez, Helen, Helen of Burma, London, Collins, 1983. Russell, S. Farrant, Muddy Exodus, A Story of the Evacuation from Burma, May 1942, London, Epworth Press, 1943. Saunders, Hilary St George, Valiant Voyaging: A Short History of the British Steam Navigation Company in the Second World War 1939–1945, London, Faber & Faber, 1948. Smith, Donald Eugene, Religion and Politics in Burma, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965. Tarling, Nicholas, A Sudden Rampage, The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941–1945, London, Hurst, 2001. —, ‘A New and Better Cunning: British Wartime Planning for Post-war Burma, 1942–43’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 13.1 (1982), 33–59. Taylor, Robert H., The State in Burma, London, C. Hurst, 1987. —, ‘Politics in Late Colonial Burma: The Case of U Saw’, Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976), 161–93. Tawney, Richard Henry, Land and Labour in China, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966. Theippan Maung Wa (U Sein Tin), Wartime in Burma: A Diary, January to June 1942, ed. and trans. L. E. Bagshawe and Anna J. Allott, Athens, Ohio University Research in International Studies, 2009. Thirkell-White, Sir Herbert, A Civil Servant in Burma, London, Arnold, 1913. Tinker, Hugh, ‘A Forgotten Long March: The Indian Exodus from Burma’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 6.1 (1975), 1–15. Thomas, Mary. In the Shadow of the Rising Sun, London, Marshall-Cavendish, 2009. Twomey, Christine, ‘Remembering War and Forgetting Civilians: The Place of Civilian Internees in Australian Commemorations of the Pacific War’, in Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (eds), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, London, Routledge, 2008. Tyson, Geoffrey, Forgotten Frontier: Being an Account of the Part Played by the Tea Planters of North-East India in the Civilian Evacuation of Burma, Calcutta, W. H. Targett, 1945. Van Velden, D., De Japanse Interneringskampen voor Burgers Gudurende de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1963.

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Vorley, J. S. and H. M., The Road from Mandalay, Windsor, Wilton 65, 2002. Wagg Alfred, A Million Died: A Story of War in the Far East, London, Nicolson & Watson, 1943. Warren, Alan, Burma 1942: The Road from Rangoon to Mandalay, London, Continuum, 2011. Waterford, Van. Prisoners of the Japanese in World War II, London, McFarland, 1994. Who’s Who in Burma 1926, Rangoon, Indo-Burma Publishing Agency, 1927. Williams, James Howard, Elephant Bill, London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958. Williams, Susan, The Footprints of Elephant Bill, London, William Kimber, 1962.

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Index Abigail, R. P. 120–1 Achard, Philip 250n. 53 Adam, N. K. S. 138, 140 Adkins 138 Aiko, Utsumi 195 Ailsa 25, 249n. 39 air-raid shelters 84 Alexander, Harold 6, 7, 47, 99, 173 All Burma Student Union (ABSU) 262n. 3 American Military Mission 215 American Voluntary Group 6 Amery, Leo 62–3, 66, 218, 234nn. 15–16 An, U 246n. 18 Andrewartha 156, 158, 253n. 15 Andrus, J. Russell 74 Aney, M. S. 71, 238n. 31, 239n. 45 Annan, William Craig 43–4, 63, 216, 234n. 15 Apedaile, Gordon 180 Aratoon, Pete 146 Atkinson 138 Aung Thein, Maung 147 Ayengar, R. R. 74 Ba Pe, U 107 Ba Thaw, U 107 Ba Thi, U 212 Ba, U 40 Ball, G. F. 21 Ballard, James 197 Banks, P. R. S. 21 Baroda 126, 127–8, 247n. 10 Battersby, Eric 180 Baxter, James 90, 91 Bayly, Christopher 5 Beale, Lou 262n. 7 Bengal Mission 116 Bengal National Chamber of Commerce 73 Bestall, F. G. 143 Blackburn, Kevin 196 Blaney, Thomas 77

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Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation (BBTC) 12, 88, 133, 217–19 Booth-Russell 156, 253n. 15 Bostock, Geoffrey 248n. 28, 249n. 33 Bott 156, 158, 253n. 15 Bourne, Gerald 131, 146, 166, 167, 248n. 21, 251n. 74 Bozman, G. S. 67, 70–1, 238n. 40, 239n. 41, 243n. 47 Braund, H. E. W. 216 Brentnall, C. H. 138 Brereton, General 216 Brewitt, C. P. 142, 143, 144, 147, 251n. 64 British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia (BACSA) 20, 22 Register of Deaths and Burials 18 British Burma Petroleum Company (BBPC) 216 British India Steam Navigation Company (BISN Co.) vessels 25, 126, 127, 129, 130, 247nn. 8–9, 249n. 41 river launches of 135–7 Broatch, Sandy 157 Brooke-Popham, Lady 77, 240n. 2 Brooke-Popham, Robert 228n. 20 Brookes, Stephen Through the Jungle of Death 236n. 3 Brown, Ian 228n. 9, 237n. 13 Brown, H. C. G. 103 Browning 243n. 45 Bruce, Robert 242n. 28 Buchheim, Eveline 197, 258n. 33 Burch, R. 135–6, 147 Burgess, F. G. 177–8 Burma Cement Company 216, 252n. 6 Burma Corporation 219 Burma Handing-Over Commission 220 Burmah Steam Navigation Co., see British India Steam Navigation Company (BISN Co.) vessels Burma Independence Army (BIA) 4 Burma Nadu 201–2, 205

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Burma Oil Company (BOC) 12, 58, 99, 131, 147, 150, 153, 158, 168, 211, 216, 217, 219 Burma Railways 141, 142, 251n. 64 Burma War Comforts Association 77 Burma War Risks Insurance Scheme 211 Burnside, P. 26, 103, 107–17, 121–2, 245–6n. 12, 246nn. 20, 25 Callahan, Raymond 5 Calogreedy, Mrs. 192 Carmichael, Deirdre 248n. 21 Chakravarti, Nalini Ranjan 55, 60, 236n. 9 Chakravarty, Amaresh 189, 257n. 15 Chakravarty, Dhiresh 189, 257n. 15 Chapman, Clement 160, 253n. 17 Che’en, Mien Wu 9 Chennault, Claire Lee 6 Chettyar, Annamalai 73 Chettyar, Vellayan 73 Chilka 125 Chin, Moon 214 China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) 12, 131–5, 137, 138, 172, 177–8, 214, 215, 219, 248n. 32, 255n. 27 Choe, U Po 103, 107, 109, 246n. 14 Choudhury 109 Chubb, H. J. 138, 177, 212, 224, 250n. 47 Churchill, Winston 63, 78, 173, 181, 200, 211 Clamp, Charles M. 90, 91 Clark, C. E. 257n. 10 Clark, Reginald 224, 241n. 26, 242nn. 28–31 Clarke, Matthew John 131, 132–3, 153, 155 Clarke, Reginald 20, 85–6, 230n. 35, 254n. 34 Condie 156, 253n. 15 Cook, Freda 63 Cook, J. 21 Corley, T. A. B. 216 Corpe, Hilda 205–8, 260nn. 57–8, 61–2 Coulton F. T. 48 Coutts, C. 138 Cowan, D. T. 229n. 28 Crain, L. A. 157, 162, 166, 168 Craw, Hugh Cross 242n. 28 Cripps, Stafford 237n. 31 Crosthwaite, Charles 227n. 4 Crowley, Cherie 187–8, 192, 207, 257n. 10

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Cruickshank 137, 244n. 58 Curzon, Lord 141 D’Mello, Ian 247n. 4 Da, S. T. 64, 65, 238n. 33 Dabey couple 159–60, 163, 175 Dalal, M. N. 68 Darvill, Air-Marshall 77 Davidson 262n. 7 de Graaf Hunter, Richard 13, 39, 40–5, 48, 51, 80, 230n. 35, 233nn. 6–7, 234n. 17, 235nn. 32–3 criticism against 43–4, 50 defence of 48–9 Department of Indians Overseas (Indian Government) Register of Evacuees from Burma 27–36, 54, 100 dispersion camps 41–2, 46 Dobama Asiayone 3, 228n. 12, 262n. 3 Dorman-Smith, Lady Doreen 77, 79–84, 87–8, 93, 159, 171–2, 227n. 3, 233n. 5, 235nn. 33–4, 236n. 35, 241n. 14 Dorman-Smith, Reginald 2–6, 9, 11–13, 21, 23, 39, 42–7, 66, 78–82, 87, 92–4, 102, 115, 121, 126, 128, 130, 140, 155, 169, 171–2, 180, 182, 200, 208, 212, 215, 227n. 3, 229n. 27, 230nn. 32, 38, 233nn. 2, 12, 234n. 17, 235nn. 30, 35, 237n. 27, 238n. 32, 241n. 22, 242n. 33, 245n. 1, 246nn. 25–6, 248nn. 24–5, 249n. 34, 252n. 1, 253n. 14, 254n. 2 criticism against 46–9, 51 in defence of his actions 44–6 details of 227n. 2 evacuating Rangoon 97–9 and exchange of telegrams with Amery 62–3 inglorious retreat to 172–4 as sacrificial lamb 51–2 Douglas, William O. 48, 235n. 30 Duckworth, C. I. D. 212 Dunlop, Graham 5, 229n. 24 Dutt 79 Dutta 116 Eadon, A. T. E. 133, 147 Economist 211 Edge, Dorothy 192

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Index Edmunds 180 Ellenga 126, 247n. 10 European civilians, evacuation of 86 Evans, G. G. 21, 218 Eveland, Wayne 178 Falières, Bishop 202, 205 Fernie, W. A. 140 Fforde, T. P. F. 130 Fielding-Hall, J. G. 21, 94 Financial Times 211 Firth, Eric 160, 248n. 30 Fischer, A. L. 258n. 32 Flux, John 132 Fogarty, P. C. 102–3, 245nn. 3–5 Forbes-Mitchell, W. G. 156, 158, 253n. 15 Forrest, Bob 156, 158, 253n. 15 Forsythe, John 257n. 11 Frain 138 Gallagher, O’Dowd 23, 83, 98, 235n. 30, 241n. 24 Galloway, Robert 138 Garrad, W. R. 21–2 Garrett 141 Garstin, G. 140 Garven, George 140 gekokujo (rule from below) principle 7, 187–8, 256n. 9 Geneva Convention 185–6, 193 Ghani, Manilyi Muhammed Abdul 239n. 41 Ghier, Father 202 Giap, Vo Nguyen 254n. 1 Gibson 130 Gilbert, Z. N. 262n. 7 Gilchrist, Robert Niven 234n. 15 Gill, Eva 84–5, 241n. 25 Gill, Thomas 84–5, 241n. 25 Gilleson 138 Glyn, Ralph 24 Goddard, Eric Norman 155, 168 Green 147, 156, 162–4, 169 Grigson, A. H. 218 Guha 116 Gustave, Mother 202 Gwyn, Philip 251n. 62 Gyaw, Htoon Aung 172 Gyi, U Mang 242n. 28

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275

Hack, Karl 195, 196 Haji, S. N. 74 Halifax, Viscount 216 Hall, Raymond 21 Hallet, R. N. 241n. 20 Halliday 138 Harper, Tim 5 Harris 138 Hata, Ikuhiko 186 Hay, Trevor 132, 248n. 28 Heriff, Naik 180 Hlaing, Ma Tin Not out of Hate 3 HMS Prince of Wales 125, 240n. 6 HMS Repulse 125, 240n. 6 Hobson, Brigadier 209 Holden, Thomas 202 Hopkins, Eleanor 199, 259n. 47 Horrocks, Muriel 20 Howe, Philip Arthur 95–6 Hsaya San Rebellion 3 Hughes, Billie 20 Hughes, Helen 80, 242n. 10 Hughes, Nell 248n. 21 Hughes, Thomas Lewis 241n. 10, 245n. 3 Humble, Janet 163, 252n. 5, 259n. 53 Hunka 25, 136, 137, 249n. 39 Husain, Syed Muhammed 37, 67–8, 71, 239n. 42 Hutchings, Robert 68, 69, 70, 71, 125, 126, 130, 157, 239n. 46 Hutchins, Robert 25, 247n. 3 Hutchinson, D. H. 21 Hutton, T. J. 5, 6, 7, 48, 92, 97, 99, 155, 230nn. 31–2 Ichida, Jiro 191 Iida, Shojiro 6 Imperial Bank 243n. 44 Inchcape, Earl 247n. 8 Indian National Airways 215 Indian Survey and Transport Department 131 Indian Tea Association (ITA) 223–4, 262n. 4 Indian Tea Planters Association 224 Indo-Burma Petroleum Company 99, 216 International Red Cross 201

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276

Index

Irrawaddy Flotilla Company (IFC) 12, 21–14, 58, 111, 135–40, 149, 150, 164, 165, 168, 177, 217, 219, 249n. 41 Itagaki, Seishiro 257n. 22 Jalligopal 128 James, F. E. 67, 71 Japanese approach to European civilians as internees 195–208 to gekokujo (rule from below) principle 187–8 to Prisoners of War (POWs) 185–9, 191, 208–9 repercussions for evacuees due to 189–95 Japanese Military Academy 256n. 3 Japanese War Institute 7 Jenkin, C. P. M. 91 Johnson 136 Jordan, Philip 63 Jumpei, Shinobe 186 Juna 25, 135 Jury, G. S. 156, 157, 253n. 15 Kaing, Sett 180 Kai-Shek, Chiang 181, 214 Kaliker, V. V. 68 Kantaya, U 103, 107, 109, 115, 246n. 14 Kapila, Mrs. 238n. 33 Katsuma, Lieutenant 205 Kawabe, Masakazu 257n. 18 Kay, A. A. 128 Kayan 25, 137, 249n. 39 Kemp, R. C. 131, 147 Kempeitai 188, 190–3, 200, 205, 206 Kennedy, Joseph 248n. 30 Keyes, Dawn N. 190 Khan, Nawab Siddique Ali 67 Khare, N. B. 73 Khine, Oo Kyaw 103, 121 Kimura, Heitaro 257n. 22 King, J A 193 King, S. J. 127 Kinnear, Arthur 140 Ko Tun Tin 205, 206, 260n. 63 Krakoska, Paul H. 258n. 37 Kunzru, Pandit Hirday Nath 68 Kyaukpyu Municipal Committee 120

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Langham-Carter, Reginald 25, 88–91, 94–5, 132–4, 147, 179, 180, 243n. 40, 248nn. 26–7 Lansdowne, Henry 2 ‘last ditchers’ 150, 151, 165, 212, 253n. 27 Leach, Lionel 86, 242nn. 26, 28 Le Fleur, Austin 191, 257n. 18 Le Fleur, Blanche 188, 191 Le Fleur, Sybil 80, 175–7 Leigh, M. D. Evacuation Register 57–8 Lindop, Janet 131, 150, 253n. 15, 259n. 53 Lindop, Jim 150 Lopez, Marjorie 190, 257n. 17 Lunt, James 5 Lusk, James Wallace 157, 165 Lyle, James 247n. 8 Lynn, U Kyin 246n. 18 MacAllum 138 MacColl, Eric Gordon 22 McCrae, Alister 217 McCrea, Captain 140 McGilp 142, 143, 251n. 63 McGrindle, E. 21 MacGuire, R. E. 180 Mack, Mary 175–6 McKenzie, K. P. 208, 209, 260n. 64 MacKay, J. H. 21 Mackenzie, Robert 247n. 8 Mackinnon, William 247n. 8 McKinstry 138 Mackley, Dorothy 144 McLeod, D. K. 7, 77, 208, 230n. 31, 242n. 28 McNaughton 140 McNeill, Hugh 208 Macpherson, Herbert 227n. 4 McWatt 138 MacWhite, Mrs. 20 Madras Medical Mission 116, 246n. 12 Mains, A. A. 141–5, 147, 251nn. 61–2 Maitri, Lakshmi Kania 71 Mallet 141 Manchester Guardian 212 Mandalay, Maymo, and oil fields 150 cholera and small pox epidemic and 156–7 Japanese attack and 158–61, 164–7 need for petroleum and 150–3 Mandin, Father 202

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Index Marathey, B. G. 239n. 40 Marsden-Ranger, Mrs. 20 Marsh, Wilfred 38–40, 42, 45, 46, 49, 51, 233n. 4 ‘Marsh Plan’ 38–9 Martin, Jules 21 Mary, Sister 221, 222, 261n. 2 Maskell, Captain 136–7 mass transportation 123 thorugh air 131–5 through domestic means 135–7 through IFC 137–41 through road 146–7 through ship vessels 123, 125–31 through train 141–6 Maung Maung Hla 147 Maung Maung Chit 107, 246n. 14 Maybury, Maurice 224 Maymyo 25, 137, 249n. 39 Mennie, W. H. R. 151, 230n. 38 Methodist Missionary Society 219 Mi, Maung 107 Mi, Mg 246n. 14 Michie, J. K. 211 Michie, James Kilgour 218 Milligan, D. K. 21 Mills, Major 21 Mitchell 138, 251n. 76 Mobsby 157 Monteath, David T. 234n. 15 moral ambiguity 4, 189 Morley, A. E. 234n. 15 Morton, J. 138 Murano, Captain 193–4 Murata, Takaiki 192 Murphy, Justice 243n. 40 Murray, Marjory 156, 158, 253n. 15 Musgrave, T. F. 174, 175, 177 Myitkyina 171–2 cholera and dysentery among evacuees in 175–6 flight travel from 176–8 Governor’s inglorious retreat to 172–4 Japanese attack in 179, 181–2, 187–8 ordeal of evacuees travelling to 174–5 Nagumo, Chuichi 5 Nehru, Jawaharlal 237n. 31 Nell 180 Neuralia 126, 128, 247n. 13

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277

New, U 147 News Chronicle, The 44, 62 Ngaman 138 Nicholas, George 193 Nimmo, William 21 Nu, Thakin 207, 208, 260n. 63 Oakley, Mrs G.. 177 Orr 112, 246n. 12 Ozawa, Jisaburo 5 Padshah, Saiyed Mohamed 69–70 Pai, A. V. 72 Pandita, U 205, 206 Pangkor 199 Parry, Mrs Beryl 20 Pascal, Miss 175, 177, 255n. 12 Patrick 138 Paw Tun, U 47, 172 Pearce, Charles Frederick Byrde 9 Pearn, Bertie Reginald 55–6, 72, 236n. 10, 237n. 14 Peebles, R. W. H. 21 Phayre, Arthur 3 Po Tun, U 160 Potter, Arthur Kingscote 180 Prescott, R. B. G. 99, 143 President 126 Prothero, Colonel 227n. 4 public shelters 84 Puddin 147 Pughe 156, 164, 253n. 15 Punyananda, Swami 130 Queen Mary, The 146 R.E.T.S. Co. 219 Raben, Remco 259n. 42 Railston, H. 138 Ramakrishna Mission 116, 130 Rance, H. E. 52, 261n. 22 Rangoon, during evacuation period 77 banks in 90–1 ‘D’ signal in 99–100, 216 ‘E’ signal in 92–7, 105 evacuation in 82–8 food supply in 88–90 Japanese attack in 78–82, 97 martial law in 91–3 ‘W’ signal in 97–9

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278

Index

Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company 244n. 68 Red Cross Convention 256n. 2 Reddish, Captain 136, 137, 147, 249n. 39 Reed, David 144 Reed, Denis 160 Reed, John Ten Days That Shook the World 171 Rees, T. W. 202 Regulations for Handling Prisoners 186 Reynolds, Frank 221, 261n. 1 Reynolds, Frank A. A. 46 Ricketts, T. C. D. 156, 253n. 15 Roberts, Ernest Goodman 227n. 3 Roberts, Frederick 227n. 4 Robertson, Joan 20 Rodriguez, Helen 192–4, 207, 258n. 24 Roper, Harold 219 Rose, Alistair 146, 174–5, 181–2, 251n. 77, 255–6n. 34 Rossington, Maurice 13, 171 Roughton, F. A. G. 21 Rover 140 Rowland, John 147, 224 Rowley, H. 138 Royal Air Force (RAF) 6, 79, 131, 134, 145, 159, 173, 178, 179, 181, 223, 229nn. 25, 28, 249n. 38, 250n. 47, 251n. 69 Sakurai, Shozo 257n. 18 Salona 25, 137, 249n. 39 Sapru, P. N. 69, 239n. 46 Saunders, Hilary St George 25, 249n. 39 Saw, Mg 246n. 14 Saw, U 4 Saw Yein Fan, Maung 107, 246n.14 Saya San Rebellion 222 Scindia Steam Navigation Company 126 Sen, S. S. 103, 106 Seppings, Alwyn Henry 174, 176, 180–1 Sharp, Chuck 214 Sharpe, Eileen K. 26 Sharpe, Justice 24, 66 Sharpe, Kathleen K. 232n. 27, 238n. 38 Sheehy, John Francis 242n. 28 Sherman, Dallas B. 176 Sherman, Walter 194 Shortt, Henry Edward 26 Siam 138, 139–40

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Simms, Lieutenant 192 Singapore General Hospital 259nn. 44–5 Singh, Raja Yuveraj Dutta 72 Sir Harvey Adamson 25, 126, 127, 130, 131, 135, 246n. 12, 249n. 37 Sittang River Bridge disaster (1942) 6 Smith, Cecil 179 Smyth, J. G. 7, 46, 229n. 28, 230n. 31, 260n. 64 Society for the Propagation of the Faith 202 Steel Brothers & Co 12, 95, 211, 218, 248n. 30 Stevenson, Donald Fasken 6, 173 Stilwell, Joseph 9 Stopford, Montagu 257n. 22 Stowe, Leland 235n. 30 Surridge, North 241n. 26 Suzuki 192 Szechuen 25, 126 T. D. Findlay & Sons Ltd 255n. 34 Tait 140 Talbot, Bill 142 Tamadaw 140 Tarling, Nicholas 218, 228n. 16 Taungup Pass, cholera and thirst and 101, 118–22 Arakan evacuation and 102–4 and Burnside helping refugees 107–17 Tawney, Richard Henry 11 Terauchi, Field Marshall 6 Thibaw, King 3, 5 Thein Tun, U 147 ‘39 Comrades’ 4 Thomas, Lady Lucy Marguerite 199 Thomas, Mary 259nn. 44–8 Thomas, Shenton 199–200 Thompson, Fred 262n. 7 Thomsett 120 Times, The 211 Tinker, Hugh 53 Tojo, Hideki 186, 200, 256n. 4 Tokugawa, Iyetsato 256n. 2 Tokyo War Crimes Trials 187 Tsuyoshi, Inukai 256n. 9 Tun Pe, Maung 107, 246n. 14 Tun Tha, Maung 107, 246n. 14 Tun Tin, U 212

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Index Turner, J. S. 161 Twomey, Christine 195 Tyabji, S. A. S. 130, 157 van Velden, D 198 Van Wyck, William Michael 21 Voehringer, Walter 156, 253n. 15 Vorley, Helen 165, 233n. 10 The Road from Mandalay 43 Vorley, J. S. 13, 40–4, 49, 50–1, 102–3, 125, 128–30, 146–7, 155–7, 160–1, 163–5, 168, 205, 233nn. 7, 10, 12, 245nn. 1–2, 4, 247n. 3, 252n. 1, 253n. 14, 254n. 34 Evacuations of Indians and Europeans from Burma Report 27 as refugee 169 Report on the Evacuation 43 The Road from Mandalay 43 Wagg, Alfred 48, 49, 235nn. 30, 32, 235–6n. 35, 236n. 5 Waikato 140 Wallace Brothers 219 Wanrooy, Willem F., see Waterford, Van Ward, Captain 193 Warialda 25, 126 War Institute in Tokyo 187

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Warren, Alan 5 Waterford, Van 197–8, 200, 205, 258n. 40 Watts 138 Wavell, Archibald 5, 6, 7, 77, 99, 172, 228n. 20, 229n. 28, 230nn. 31–2, 239n. 42, 241n. 14 Wedderspoon 39 White, George 227n. 4 Whiting, John 192 Wilby 262n. 7 Wilby, Mrs. Alice 225 Wilkie, H. G. 13, 180, 182, 245n. 3, 261n. 22 Willans, H. Crowther 152 Williams, Cicely 259n. 47 Wise, John 13, 171 Wm Denny & Bros 137–8 Wood, E. 26, 71, 169 Worth, Robbie 259n. 47 Wright, Colonel 248nn. 28–9 Yengyua 25, 135, 136 Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) 3, 228n. 7, 261n. 3 Yunan Mines Company 216 Ziegler, Jean 178

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