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The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969–1991
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
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Jan-Henrik Meyer

The European Public Sphere Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969-1991

Geschichte

SGEI - SHEI - EHIE

Jan-Henrik Meyer The European Public Sphere

STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPAISCHEN INTEGRATION (SGEI) ETUDES SUR L'HISTOIRE DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE (EHIE) STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (SHEI)

Nr.

10

Herausgegeben von/Edited by/ Dirige par Jiirgen Elvert In Verbindung mit! In cooperation with/ En cooperation avec Charles Barthel! Jan-Willem Brouwer / Eric Bussiere/Antonio Costa Pinto/Desmond Dinan/Michel Dumoulin/Michael Gehler/ Brian Girvin/Wolf D. Gruner/Wolfram Kaiser/Laura Kolbe/Johnny Laursen/ Wilfried Loth/Piers Ludlow/Maria Grazia Melchionni/Enrique Moradiellos Garcia/Sylvain Schirmann/Antonio Varsori/Tatiana Zonova

Jan-Henrik Meyer

The European Public Sphere Media and Transnational Communication in European Integration 1969-1991

@

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

2010

Der Druck dieser Dissertation wurde im Rahmen der Bund-Lfinder Exzellenzinitiative durch die Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences gef6rdert.

iOCIA L SCIEN CES

Zugleich: Dissertation der Freien Universtitat Berlin, Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut 2008.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen National­ bibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothekverzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet tiber abrulbar.

Jede Verwertung des Werkes auBerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzuiassig und stralbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fUr Ubersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie fUr die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen.

© 2010 Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart Gedruckt auf saurefreiem, alterungsbestandigem Papier. Redaktion: Sebastian Funk, Kaln Druck: Laupp & Gllbel GmbH, Nehren Printed in Germany

CONTENTS List of tables and figures Abbreviations

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Acknow ledgements

1

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INTRODUCTION

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1.1 An historical inquiry into the European public sphere 1.2 What is the European public sphere? 1.2.1 Democratic quality 1.2.2 European scope...................................................................................... 1.3 What do we empirically know about the European public sphere to date?............................................................................................................. 1.3.1 European polity as a point of reference.............................................. 1.3.2 Synchronicity ......................................................................................... 1.3.3 Mediators' transnational involvement ............................................... 1.3.4 Transnational communication ............................................................. 1.3.5 European self-understanding .............................................................. 1.4 Cases in time and space 1.4.1 Time 1.4.2 Space........................................................................................................ 1.5 Sources ............................................................................................................. 1.6 Organisation of my study .............................................................................. ............................

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11 15 17 19 19 24 25 26 28 34 35 37 38 41 43 43 45 47 49

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE-

51 2.1 Theories of the European public sphere...................................................... 51 2.1.1 The notion of the public sphere ("Offentlichkeit").......................... 51 Levels of the public sphere: encounters, assemblies, media.......... 54 The discursive and the liberal model of the public sphere ............ 55 Functions of the public sphere ........................................................... 56 Implications for empirical research ................................................... 58 2.1.2 What is a European public sphere?................................................... 59 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES.......................

Does the European public sphere require a common language and common media?........................................................................... Does the European public sphere require a European identity?...

59 61

Defining the European scope: what makes the public sphere European?..............................................................................................

64

Terminology: European public sphere( s), Europeanisation, Transnationalisation.............................................................................

2.1.3 Historians' conceptualising of the European public sphere ..........

66 70

Lingering structural traditions of European public communication ..................................................................................... A rhetorically invoked"court of appeal" .........................................

71 73

The utopian traditions of the concept of Europe and the battle about meaning ......................................................................................

74

6

CONTENTS 2.1.4 Conceptualising a historical approach to the European public sphere ..................................................................................................... 2.2 Methods of European public sphere research ............................................ 2.2.1 Historical comparison and the analysis of transfers ....................... Historical comparison.......................................................................... The analysis of transfers ...................................................................... 2.2.2 Content analysis and the analysis of discourses.............................. Content analysis ................................................................................... Discourse analysis ................................................................................ 2.3 Operationalisation.......................................................................................... 2.3.1 European polity as a point of reference ............................................ 2.3.2 Synchronicity ........................................................................................ 2.3.3 Mediators' transnational involvement.............................................. 2.3.4 Transnational communication............................................................ 2.3.5 The construction of European self-understanding..........................

3 THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE IN CONTEXT

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3.1 European integration 1969-1991 .................................................................. 3.1.2 Periodisations of European integration (1969-1991)....................... 3.1.3 A systematic periodisation of European integration 1969-1991 ... The horizontal dimension of integration .......................................... The sectoral dimension of integration............................................... The vertical dimension of integration ............................................... Conclusions: a systematic periodisation of European integration 1969-1991 .......................................................................... 3.2 European summits and the European CounciL ........................................ 3.2.1 Origins and functions .......................................................................... 3.2.2 Preparation, participation and procedure ........................................ 3.2.3 The summits of The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg and Maastricht ...................................................................................... The summit of The Hague 1969 ......................................................... The summit of Paris 1974 .................................................................... The Brussels European Council of 1978 ............................................ The Luxembourg European Council 1985 ........................................ The Maastricht European Council of 1991.. ...................................... 3.3 "The Meaning of Europe". Perceptions of European integration ........... 3.3.1 British perceptions of European integration .................................... 3.3.2 German perceptions of European integration ................................. 3.3.3 French perceptions of European integration .................................... 3.3.4 Comparative summary ........................................................................ 3.4 Media structures and the production of European news ......................... 3.4.1 Quality newspapers in Britain, Germany and France compared .. Quality newspapers in the British, German and French newspaper markets .............................................................................. The traditions, the ownership and the politics of the individual newspapers ........................................................................................... 3.4.2 Reporting European integration and European summits .............. The "Brussels newsbeat" - reporting on European integration ....

76 78 78 80 82 83 83 84 85 85 87 88 89 90 92 93 95 98 98 99 101 102 105 105 107 109 109 111 114 117 119 123 124 128 131 133 134 135 135 140 149 149

CONTENTS

7 Commenting on European integration ............................................. 151 Reporting and commenting on the summits ................................... 152

4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC COMMUNICATION:

.............................. European polity as a point of reference ....................................................... 4.1.1 The uneven growth of EC coverage .................................................. 4.1.2 The similarity of EC coverage ............................................................ 4.1.3 The convergence of EC coverage ....................................................... 4.1.4 Growing transparency about European affairs? .............................. Synchronicity: The same issues at the same time at the same level of relevance ...................................................................................................... 4.2.1 Europe as the most relevant issue: front page headlines and editorials ................................................................................................ The fall and rise of the relevance of EC issues ................................. Similar relevance of EC issues ............................................................ Convergence over time ........................................................................ 4.2.2 Synchronicity of issues in European public discourse.................... Commonality of issues: the same policies discussed at the same time ............................................................................................... Similarity of relevance: the same issues discussed similarly frequently .............................................................................................. Bilateral similarity: the same issues discussed at the same time at the same level of relevance ............................................................. 4.2.3 Summary ............................................................................................... The mediators of European public communication: structural pre­ conditions for transnational communication and societal participation.. 4.3.1 The mediators of European public communication: an overview.. 4.3.2 European correspondents, foreign correspondents and commentators ....................................................................................... EC correspondents: continuity and share of EC reporting and commentary .......................................................................................... Foreign correspondents: geographical scope, continuity and share of EC news and commentary ................................................... Commentators: continuity and share of EC commentary .............. 4.3.3 External authors and interviewees .................................................... Transnational communication ............................................................ Professions ............................................................................................. Representation ...................................................................................... Experience and attitudes ..................................................................... 4.3.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................... Transnational communication ...................................................................... 4.4.1 Horizontal references to the EC member states ............................... 4.4.2 Vertical references to the European institutions .............................. 4.4.3 Societal references ................................................................................ 4.4.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................... European self-understanding: the construction of a transnational sense of community? ......................................................................................

COMPARING THE COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN SUMMITS 1969-1991

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

4.5

155 155 157 159 161 162 163 163 163 165 167 170 170 172 173 175 176 177 181 182 187 192 195 195 196 199 201 205 206 207 212 215 219 220

8

CONTENTS 4.5.1 The Summit of The Hague 1969. Europe as a vision Interest: a community of interest ....................................................... Trust: suspicions but commitment to solidarity .............................. Identification: the heyday of progressive Europeanism ................. Summary: a European sense of community shaped by idealism .. 4.5.2 The Summit of Paris 1974. Europe as an instrument in the face of the oil crisis ....................................................................................... Interest: the need for cooperation ...................................................... Trust: the limits of trust and solidarity .............................................. Identification: Europe vs. the US? Britain in Europe? .................... Summary: separate debates, but community of interest .. 4.5.3 The European Council of Brussels 1978. Europe as an instrument: money Interest: economic ideas and the calculation of interest Trust: the limits of trust and (monetary) solidarity Identification: European unity or confederation? Summary: political and national cleavages 4.5.4 The European Council of Luxembourg 1985. Europe as an instrument: the market Interest: an economic community Trust: scepticism vis-a.-vis governments and solidarity via the market. Identification: a vision revitalised? Summary: permissive consensus? 4.5.5 The European Council of Maastricht 1991. Europe: the threat of the super-state Interest: politicised conflict of interests Trust: cultural clichE's and solidarity beyond the EC Identification: national self-assertion in the face of the super-state Summary: the politicisation of Europe 4.5.6 Conclusions 4.6 Summary of the results .......................

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5 CONCLUSIONS: TRACING THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE ..........................................

5.1 Changes in European public communication 1969-1991 ......................... 5.1.1 European polity as a point of reference 5.1.2 Synchronicity 5.1.3 Mediators' transnational involvement.. 5.1.4 Transnational communication 5.1.5 European self-understanding: a European sense of community? . 5.2 Europe's second generation? European public communication at the summits between 1969 and 1991 .................................................................. 5.3 Explanations: the impact of context.. 5.4 Conclusions: What do these results imply for the debate about the European public sphere and democracy?

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224 225 228 230 232 233 233 235 238 242 243 243 248 251 255 256 256 260 261 265 265 265 272 277 285 286 288 292 292 292 293 294 295 296 298 300 303

CONTENTS

9

SOURCES 1. Newspaper commentary (analysed in chapter 4.5.) 2. News articles on the summits quoted (in chapter 4.3.) ................................ 3. Further Newspaper Sources ............................................................................. 4. Interviews ........................................................................................................... 5. Audiovisual Sources .......................................................................................... 6. Official Documents ............................................................................................ REFERENCES ANNEX DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ........................................................................ RESUME EN FRANc;:AIS ......................................................................................................•..........•.......

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307 307 314 316 316 317 317 319 345 355 358

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4

Circulation of daily newspapers per 1000 inhabitants 1960-1995 .. Number of comment and analysis pieces on EC issues around EC summits 1969-1991 ........................................................... Number of EC articles around EC summits 1969-1991 ................... Number of most prominent front page headlines on EC affairs 1969-1991 Number of editorials on EC affairs 1969-1991 .................................. Indices of similarity: presence and relevance of policies ................. Overview of the types of authors and their share of EC coverage 1969-1991 ............................................................................... Main EC correspondents' share of EC reporting 1969-1991 ........... Main EC correspondents' share of EC commentary 1969-1991 ..... Average share of EC reporting by main Paris, Bonn and London correspondents ........................................................................ Main commentators' share of EC commentary ................................. Foreign and domestic external contributions .................................... Foreign and domestic interviews ........................................................ External authors' professional background ....................................... Interviewees' professional background ............................................. Institutions external contributors represent ...................................... Institutions interviewees represent. .................................................... External authors' experience and attitudes Interviewees' experiences and attitudes Number of horizontal references to EC member states as percentage of comment pieces Share of EC member states discussed in horizontal references 1969-1991 ................................................................................................ Domestic vs. horizontal references to British, German and French actors Vertical references to the respective EC institutions as share of all comment pieces Percentage of comment pieces containing vertical, horizontal and domestic references to non-government actors 1969-1991.. .... Absolute number of references to different types of nongovernment actors References to non-government actors - centre vs. periphery ................................................................................................

Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10 Figure 11 Figure 12 Figure 13 Figure 14 Figure 15 Figure 16 Figure 17 Figure 18 Figure 19 Figure 20

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Figure 21 Figure 22

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Figure 23

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Figure 24 Figure 25

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Figure 26

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136 158 159 164 165 175 179 185 186 191 193 196 197 197 198 199 201 202 204 209 210 211 213 216 217 218

12

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10

Table 11 Table 12

Development of the number of accredited journalists in Brussels 1955-2003 ................................................................................ Important European summit conferences 1969-1991 ...................... Dimensions of political integration .................................................... Periodisation along the horizontal, sectoral, vertical dimensions of integration.......................................................................................... Circulation of the newspapers examined (1969-1991) ..................... Development of total no. of articles 1969-1991: all, foreign, US & EC articles ..................................................................................... EC articles 1969-1991: total, relative to all, foreign, US & EC articles ..................................................................................... No. of EC articles by newspaper: absolute number, share of all & foreign articles .......................................................................... Rank order of newspapers by the number of EC articles 1969-1991 ................................................................................................ Convergence 1969-1991: development of weighed standard deviation - between newspapers and countries based on total EC articles and daily EC articles per summit.. .................................. Front page headlines and editorials on EC issues 1969-1991 (total) .................................................................................... Number of most prominent front page headlines on EC affairs 969-1991 Number of editorials on EC affairs 1969-1991 .................................. Front page headlines and editorials on EC integration by summit and nation ................................................................................ Convergence 1969-1991: development of weighed standard deviation - between newspapers and countries based on total EC front page headlines and editorials per summit... ...................... Synchronicity: On how many days did newspapers simultaneously feature EC front page headlines? ............................ Synchronicity: On how many days did newspapers simultaneously feature EC editorials? ................................................ How many newspapers contained front page headline / editorial on an average day around the summit (12-day average)? .............. Commonality of issues: policies simultaneously present across borders ......................................................................................... Level of commonality of issues: proportion of policies present across borders (relative to total issues discussed in any of the newspaper around the respective summit) ....................................... ..................................................................................................

Table 13 Table 14 Table 15

Table 16 Table 17 Table 18 Table 19 Table 20

38 46 95 103 141 156 157 160 160

161 164 165 166 167

167 168 168 169 171

172

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 21

13

Similarity of relevance: average variance between newspapers of the quantity of coverage of policies in EC commentary 1969-1991 National similarity in the choice of policies? Above average similarity of national dyads (descending order) Mediators of European public communication: overview of types of authors and the quantity and share of their contributions (total figures across all six newspapers) Continuity among European correspondents (including earlier or later contributions) Continuity of assignment among foreign correspondents Continuity of assignment among main commentators Total number of horizontal references in the commentary 1969-1991 ................................................................................................ Total number of vertical references to EC institutions in the commentary 1969-1991 ......................................................................... Total number of references to non-government actors in the commentary 1969-1991 ......................................................................... The discursive construction of a transnational sense of community ............................................................................................. Number of articles "foreign news", "all articles", share of "foreign news" of "all articles" ............................................................ Number of US news-articles: absolute number, share of " all articles" & of "foreign news" ............................................................... Synchronicity of EC front page headlines on a daily basis across newspapers and countries .................................................................... Synchronicity of EC leaders on a daily basis across newspapers and countries .......................................................................................... Index of co-presence of policies ........................................................... Index of shared relevance of policies .................................................. Number of articles and share of all EC articles (commentary and reporting) written by staff and unnamed journalists ............... Number of articles and share of all EC articles (commentary and reporting) written by summit reporters and foreign correspondents ....................................................................................... Number of articles and share of all EC articles (commentary and reporting) sourced by domestic or foreign news agencies ...... Number of articles and share of all EC articles (commentary and reporting) authored by non-staff writers of the same nationality as the newspaper or another nationality ....................... Societal references: groups of actors discussed 1969-1991 .............. ................................................................................................

Table 22

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Table 23

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Table 24

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Table 25 Table 26 Table 27 Table 28 Table 29 Table 30 Table 31 Table 32 Table 33 Table 34 Table 35 Table 36 Table 37 Table 38

Table 39 Table 40

Table 41

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...................

173 174

179 182 190 192 208 213 215 222 347 347 348 349 350 350 351

352 353

353 354

14

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Annexes Annex 1 Annex 2 Annex 3 Annex 4 Annex 5 Annex 6 Annex 7

to chapter 2 Policies: coding categories for chapter 4.2 ................... to chapter 2 Transnational communication: coding categories for chapter 4.4......................................................................................... to chapter 3 Circulation of daily newspapers per 1000 inhabitants 1960-1995 .................................................................. to chapter 4.1 to chapter 4.2 .......................................................................................... to chapter 4.3 .......................................................................................... to chapter 4.4 .......................................................................................... ..........................................................................................

345 346 346 347 348 351 354

ABBREVIATIONS AT

Austria

IRL

Ireland

B

Belgium

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

CAP

Common Agricultural Policy

LF

Le Figaro

LM

Le Monde

Policy

NL

Netherlands

CH

Switzerland

NYT

New York Times

D

Germany

NZZ

Neue Zurcher Zeitung

DK

Denmark

PL

Poland

DT

The Daily Telegraph

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

EC

European Communities

SE

Sweden

ECU

European Currency Unit

SZ

Suddeutsche Zeitung

EEA

European Economic Area

IT

The Times

EEC

European Economic

WP

Washington Post

CFSP Common Foreign and Security

Community EMS

European Monetary System

EMU

Economic and Monetary Union

EPC

European Political Cooperation

EPU

European Political Union

ES

Spain

EU

European Union

EURATOM

European Atomic Energy Community

F

France

FAZ

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

FT

Financial Times

GR

Greece

GU

The Guardian

HU

Hungary

I

Italy

IGC

Intergovernmental Conference

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The completion of this book provides an occasion to express my gratitude for the generous support I received while working on this study, which is based on the ph.D. thesis I defended at Free University Berlin on 16 December 2008. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Jurgen Kocka for his intel­ lectually stimulating discussions and critical remarks, and in particular for his readiness to take over the supervision at the Free University. I am very grateful to Professor Hartmut Kaelble for his constant support of my projects over the years, for his critical and encouraging remarks and for the idea of considering the Euro­ pean public sphere from an historical perspective. Professor Hans-Peter Muller's willingness to devote his time to the discussion of a first outline for this study, to find financial assistance and to critically review this project and further ideas at different points in time, has been of enormous help. I benefited greatly from the opportunity to discuss my work in progress in a number of fora: The research seminars of my supervisors provided much-needed feedback. This interdisciplinary project profited vastly from discussions with so­ cial scientists and lawyers in the excellent seminars of the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS) and its predecessor, the graduate college "The New Eu­ rope" at Humboldt University Berlin. During my stay at at the European Univer­ sity Institute (EUI) in Florence, the EMEDIATE seminar directed by Professor Bo Strath, who has been hugely supportive throughout, provided the perfect forum for testing my ideas. While at the Institute for European History in Mainz, criti­ cisms from an historical perspective helped me to situate my project in the field. The cooperation with Professor Wolfram Kaiser on workshops in Trondheim and Limerick was an invaluable learning experience and a motivation to embark on a new project, studying European environmental policy from a transnational per­ spective. A number of institutions have granted generous financial support: I am greatly indebted to the graduate college "The New Europe" - funded by the German Sci­ ence Foundation (DFG) - and the BGSS at Humboldt University Berlin, in particu­ lar their director Professor Gerd-Joachim GlaefSner, and their academic manager Dr. Martin Nagelschmidt. Last but not least, the BGSS granted a generous printing grant for this volume. I am grateful to the Institute of European History - directed by Professor Heinz Duchhardt - for a residential fellowship in Mainz. An Eras­ mus-Scholarship of the EU allowed me to stay as a visiting student at the EUI in Florence - under the supervision of Professor Heinz-Gerhard Haupt. I benefited greatly from the stimulating international academic atmosphere and the splendid resources for European research. The DFG provided generous support for travel to various conferences, where I had the opportunity to present intermediary results. I am grateful for critical comments and encouragement by the chairs and discus­ sants, in particular to Professors Claus Offe, Ralf Dahrendorf, Karl Otto Hondrich, Dieter Grimm, Klaus Eder, Anne Deighton, Piers Ludlow and Thomas Fetzer, at conferences in Constance, Berlin, Bucharest, Luxembourg, Groningen, Portsmouth, Siena, Limerick, Trondheim, Geneva, Pisa and Lisbon. This is an appropriate occa­ sion to say thank you to all the hosts and organisers for their invitation and hospi­ tality.

18

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Complementing the written sources, interviews with spokespersons and EU correspondents in Brussels have been instrumental in putting my findings in con­ text. Hence I am greatly indebted to the various interlocutors for their time and willingness to speak to me. Finally, without the support and encouragement of my friends and family I would not have been able to complete this study. For their practical help in reading parts of my text and providing feedback, I am grateful to Kathia, Milena, Sebastian, Hagen, Anna, Crist6bal, Michael, Florian, Frauke and Thomas. At different places, Freya, Thomas, Sebastian, Michaela, Marianne, J6rg, Conny, Kathia, Alvaro, Crist6bal, Markus, Thomas and Michael not only shared many working hours with me, but also those necessary moments of distraction. My sister Frauke has always been immensely supportive and generous with her time. Freia's daily encouragement, her cheerfulness, and her thoughtful, prag­ matic ideas have greatly helped me to eventually complete the work. In an attempt to acknowledge their patience and constant support, this work is dedicated to my parents.

1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 An historical inquiry into the European public sphere The idea of a European public sphere emerged and gained greater currency in a Europe-wide debate among intellectuals in the early 1990s as a response to the advances of European integration l As the European Union (EU)2 increasingly adopted state-like features and as the "permissive consensus" among citizens ap­ peared to be waning in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty,3 academic and political observers started to voice their concerns about a growing democratic deficit.4 Crit­ ics tended to judge the EU by the familiar and seemingly self-evident standards of national democratic institutions. Consequently, some of them called for a Euro­ pean constitution that would install the tried and tested institutional instruments of the nation state at the European level, too S However, contrasting Europe to the nation state, many critics questioned the societal preconditions for democracy at the European level: Above all, it was difficult to define Europe's sovereign, the European people. The German constitutional court even argued that there was no European demos 6 The lack of a solid European identity, an active European civil society and a critical European public sphere seemed all too obvious. Accordingly, many of the critics doubted that legitimate democratic governance at the Euro­ pean level was possible? Jiirgen Habermas criticised such essentialist notions of the nation implicitly defined as an ethnic or cultural community and called for a civic identity based on transnational communication instead 8 Similarly, the sociologists Klaus Eder and 1

Most influentially: Dieter Grimm, "Does Europe need a Constitution?," European Law Journal ! (1995), Jiirgen Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe need a constitution?',"

2

For the time period of my study, I will use the historically appropriate term European Commu­ nity / ies (EC). However, for phenomena that continue to be of relevance or mainly relate to the post-Maastricht period, I will use European Union (EU). Cf. e.g. Mark Franklin, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren, "Uncorking the bottle. Popular opposition to European unification in the wake of Maastricht," Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (1994). The concept of the "permissive consensus" was coined by Leon N. Lindberg and Stu­ art A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community (Engle­ wood Cliffs, N.j., 1970). 249-278. For an overview of the post-Maastricht debate see: Joseph H. H. Weiler, Ulrich R. Haltern, and Franz C. Mayer, "European Democracy and its Critique," West European Politics 18 (1995). For the more recent debate d.: Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why There is a Democratic Defi­ " cit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, Journal of Common Market Studies 44

European Law Journal 1 (1995).

3

4

5 6 7

8

(2006). the importance of the the nation state as a model d. John W. Meyer et al., "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 1451. Bundesverlassungsgericht, "Maastricht-Urteil," BVerfGE 89 (12 October, 1993). E.g. Grimm, "Does Europe need a Constitution? ", Peter Graf Kielmansegg, "Integration und Demokratie," in Europiiische Integration, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opla­ den, 1996). Cf. also: Claus Offe, "Gibt es eine europaische Gesellschaft? Kann es sie geben?," Bliitterfor deutsche und internationale Politik 46 (2001): 431, 435. Philip Schlesinger, "Europeanisa­ tion and the Media: national identity and the public sphere," in ARENA Working Paper 7/1995 (Oslo, 1995). Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ,Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306. On

20

INTRODUCTION

Cathleen Kantner warned against the fallacies of "methodological nationalism" 9 They argued that the national model could not simply be transposed to the Euro­ pean level. The notion of an emerging "European society",l0 the specific problems of European democracy and the European public sphere required novel conceptu­ alisations and political solutions l1 Eder and others emphasised that the concept of the European public sphere had to take into account both the specific normative expectations with regard to European democracy and the particular empirical conditions for communication in the context of European integration 12 The trans­ national controversy in respect of the European public sphere triggered a wave of conceptual investigations and empirical research. Thus, from the end of the 1990s onwards, social and political scientists started various research projects in order to gather empirical evidence 13 The concept of the European public sphere is polysemic. At least three differ­ ent meanings can be distinguished. The idea first emerged as a political concept in the specific context of the EU in the post-Maastricht period. Subsequently, the term has been used both as an analytical concept for empirical research and as a descrip­ tive term for the empirical reality of European public communication. When they began to study the European public sphere empirically, social scientists faced the challenge of operationalising a normative political idea. Ever since Habermas in­ troduced his notion of the public sphere in the 1960s, the term had carried strong normative and critical connotations 14 At the same time, researchers had to devise an analytical concept adequate for empirical research at the European level. They assumed that the function of public sphere was to ensure transparency and par­ ticipation and thus buttress democracy. Even scholars critical of Habermas have accepted that the key role of the public sphere was to provide the communicative preconditions for democracy 15 Bernhard Peters argued that the notion of the Eu9

10

11 12

The concept was introduced by Herminio Martins, "Time and Theory in Sociology," in Ap­ proaches to Sociology: an Introduction to major Trends in British Sociology, ed. John Rex, Interna­ tional library of sociology (London, 1974), 276 and popularised by Anthony D. Smith, National­ ism in the Twentieth Century (London, 1979). 191. For the history of the concept and the recent " debate see: Daniel Chernilo, "Methodological nationalism and its critique, in The SAGE Hand­ book ofNations and Nationalism, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London, 2006), 129. E.g. Richard Munch, Das Projekt Europa. Zwischen Nationalstaat, regionaler Autonomic und Weltge­ sellschafi, 2 ed. (Frankfurt, 1995). 13f. On the more recent sociological debate: Ulrich Beck, " Eu­ ropaisierung - Soziologie fur das 21. Jahrhundert," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 52 (2005): 3f, Neil Fligstein, Euroclash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe (Oxford, 2008). If, Hans-Peter Muller, "Auf dem Weg in eine europaische Gesellschaft? Begriffsproblematik und theoretische Perspektiven," Berliner Journal for Soziologie 17 (2007): 23f. Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, " Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik der Rede vom Offentlichkeitsdefizit," in Die Europiiisierung nationaler Gesellschaften, ed. Maurizio Bach (Opladen, 2000), 307. E.g. Ibid, Marianne van de Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe,"

European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2002): 5011.

13

14 15

Hans-Jorg Trenz, " The European public sphere: contradictory findings in a diverse research field," European Political Science 4 (2005): 418. Cf. Habermas' classical study about the decline of the public sphere: Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cam­ bridge, MA, 1989 [1962]). E.g. Jurgen Gerhards, "Politische Offentlichkeit. Ein system- und akteurstheoretischer Bestim­ mungsversuch," in Offentlichkeit, Offentliche Meinung, Soziale Bewegungen. Kolner Zeitschrift for Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie Sonderhefi 34., ed. FriedheIm Neidhardt (Opladen, 1994), 97f.

AN HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE

EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

21

ropean public sphere should serve as the yardstick for assessing the empirical phenomena of European public communication and their democratic "quality" . Inevitably, the empirical phenomena were bound to remain deficient against this standard. However, the degree of deficiency could serve as a measure 16 Finally, like many analytical concepts, the term European public sphere has been conven­ iently used as a generic descriptive term for the empirical reality of European pub­ lic communication. In order to distinguish the theoretical idea and the analytical model from the empirical findings, in this study the latter shall be described as European public communication 17 This historical study seeks to address some important lacunae in the existing body of research on the European public sphere in both the social sciences and contemporary history. While social scientists have made various claims which im­ ply change over time, longer-term perspectives and research covering the time period before Maastricht have largely been lacking. Optimistic observers in the debate frequently claimed that there was an "emerging European public sphere",18 noting that the tacit "permissive consensus" had yielded to a more vivid public debate19 and that the discourse in the media had set in motion the "democratising dynamics of the European public sphere" 20 By contrast, pessimists argued that European public communication remained deficient and largely confined to na­ tional perspectives 21 For instance, Jiirgen Gerhards claimed that the European public sphere has been "lagging behind" the advances of European integration, thus aggravating the democratic deficit22 Even though such claims imply a his­ torical perspective, social science research remained limited to the 1990s and 2000s. Nonetheless, it will be impossible to establish the degree of change and the nov-

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

Bernhard Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," in Der Sinn von Dffentlichkeit, ed. Hartmut Wessler (Frankfurt, 2007 [1994]), 67f. Peters' notion of the public sphere as a "normative ideal­ type" does not exactly match Max Weber's definition of the ideal type. Cf. Max Weber, Gesam­ melte Au[siitze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 3 ed. (Tiibingen, 1968). 191. Communication is about as elusive a term as the public sphere, however, communication does not carry the same normative overtones. For an overview on the concept of communication see " e.g. Roland Burkart, "Kommunikationstheorien, in Dffentliche Kommunikation. Handbuch der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft, ed. Gunter Bentele, Hans-Bernd Brosius, and Otfried Jarren (Wiesbaden, 2003). Erik Oddvar Eriksen, "An Emerging European Public Sphere," European Journal of Social Theory 8 (2005), Thomas Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere. Theoretical clarifications and empirical indicators (Paper presented to the European Union Studies Association EUSA, Nash­ ville, TN, March 27-30, 2003). Reiner GrundmalUl, " The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy," in VIlhose Eu­ rope? The turn towards democracy, ed. Dennis Smith and Sue Wright (Oxford, 1999), 128-132, Mathias Jopp and Mareike Kleine, "Multiplikatoren europaischer Offentlichkeit. Die Rolle der europaischen Institutionen," in Europiiische Dffentlichkeit, ed. Claudio Franzius and Ulrich K. PreuB (Baden-Baden, 2004), 249. Hans-Jorg Trenz and Klaus Eder, "The democratizing dynamics of a European public sphere. Towards a theory of democratic functionalism," European Journal ofSocial Theory 7 (2004). E.g. Jurgen Gerhards, " Europaisierung von Okonomie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entste­ hung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," in Die Europiiisierung nationaler Gesellschaften, ed. Mau­ rizio Bach (Opladen, 2000), 294-296. Ibid, Jurgen Gerhards, "Westeuropaische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," Zeitschrift for Soziologie 22 (1993), Christoph O. Meyer, "Po­ litical Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union's Communica­ tion Deficit," Journal o[Common Market Studies 37 (1999).

22

INTRODUCTION

elty of phenomena under investigation here if information on European public communication in the immediately-preceding period is conspicuously absent. Consequently, this study will enquire into public communication during the time period up to Maastricht, in order to complement the research and the debate in the social sciences. At the same time, this inquiry will make a contribution in two areas historians of postwar Europe have frequently discussed, but where empirical research has remained very limited so far. First, social historians have acknowledged the im­ portance of the question of an emerging European society in the second half of the 20th century,23discussing in particular the role of European civil society24 and the European public sphere 25 Nevertheless, the existing historical works mainly con­ sist of conceptual or historical overviews that rely heavily on secondary litera­ ture 26 A properly systematic historical inquiry into political communication as a reflection of a European public sphere has thus been lacking so far 27 Secondly, historians of European integration have recently started to re-exam­ ine the period from the summit of The Hague in 1969 to the relaunch of European integration from the mid-1980s. While traditional interpretations28 tended to dis­ miss this period as the "dark ages"29 of European integration, a group of histori­ ans led by Franz Knipping and Matthias Sch6nwald have called for a re-evalua­ tion of this approach. According to this view, the political achievements of Eu­ rope's "second generation" in the 1970s and early 1980s deserved more attention 30 They argue that in the wake of the summit of The Hague the Community had es­ tablished its own resources, and that subsequent sectoral expansion into further new policy areas such as the environment and the successive enlargements should 23

24

25

26

27 28 29

30

Hartmut Kaelble, " Eine europaische Gesellschaft," in Europawissenschajt, ed. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Ingolf Pernice, and Ulrich R. Haltern (Baden-Baden, 2005), Hartmut Kaelble, Sozial­ geschichte Europas: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Miinchen, 2007). Hartmut Kaelble, "Gibt es eine europaische Zivilgesellschaft?," in Zivilgesellschajt - national und transnational. WZB-Jahrbuch 2003, ed. Dieter Gosewinkel, et al. (Berlin, 2004), Jiirgen Kocka, "Ci­ vil society from a historical perspective," European Review 12 (2004), Jiirgen Kocka, "Eine stille Zivilgesellschaft entsteht," Neue Gesellschaft/ Frankfurter Hefte 54 (2007). Hartmut Kaelble, " The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," Journal of European Integra­ tion History 8 (2002), Jorg Requate and Martin Schulze-Wessel, eds., Europiiische Offentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, New York, 2002). Hartmut Kaelble, Europiier tiber Europa. Die Entstehung des europiiischen Selbstverstiindnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, 2001), Hartmut Kaelble, "Europaisches Selbstverstandnis und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert," in Selbstverstiindnis und Gesellschaft der Eu­ ropiier. Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europiiisierung im spiiten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch (Frankfurt, 2008). Jan-Henrik Meyer, "Europaische Offentlichkeit aus historischer Sicht," in Europiiische Offentlich­ keit, ed. Ulrich K. PreuB and Claudio Franzius (Baden-Baden, 2004). For the textbook view: Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union. Second Edi­ tion (Oxford, 2006). 138-146. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (Boulder, 1991), 8. Franz Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957: die Einigung Europas (Miinchen, 2004). 156, Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald, "Vorwort," in Aujbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europii­ ische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004), ix. They quote a speech by Gaston Thorn in 1981 for this expression. The term however dates back to " 1969: Pierre Drouin, "Le Nerf de l'Europe, Le Monde, 27 November 1969, Hans-Josef Strick, "In " die zweite Generation, Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 29 November 1969.

AN HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE

EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

23

also be acknowledged as considerable advances in European integration 31 Argu­ ably, the Ee has succeeded in turning itself into a supranational polity with its own institutions and policies 32 How European public communication responded to these changes in European integration during this period remains as yet unex­ plored. Focusing on the period between 1969 and 1991, this study will provide the first systematic historical evidence of European public communication from a longer term perspective. It will thus contribute to current research agendas both in the social sciences and in history. Informed by the interdisciplinary debate on the European public sphere, the first goal of this study is to trace continuity and change in the structure of European public communication between 1969 and 1991, in or­ der to place current research in the social sciences in an historical perspective. How do the findings of the period between 1969 and 1991 relate to the results of re­ search relating to more recent years? The second goal is to provide insight into the previously unexplored history of the European public sphere in the two decades before Maastricht. How did Euro­ pean public communication evolve? Did European public communication actu­ ally lag behind the advances of European integration as Gerhards has claimed? Was media coverage constantly low and even declining during these decades, as he assumed?33 Which conclusions can be drawn with respect to the debate about "Europe's second generation"? Does the evidence of European public communi­ cation in the 1970s and 1980s suggest that these were the "dark ages" of the Euro­ pean public sphere or rather Europe's "second generation"?34 The third goal is trying to make use of one of the core advantages of historical inquiry. Historical research usually places great emphasis on taking various as­ pects of context into account. I will thus be considering the long-term context of European integration, the short-term context of the events that were chosen as case studies, the traditions of national discourses on Europe and the conditions of the media and reporting on European integration. By systematically linking these various aspects of context to the structure and content of European public com­ munication, it will be possible to draw some tentative conclusions as to what ex­ plains the development. The fourth and final goal is to discuss the implications of these findings for the debate on European democracy. In the remaining part of this introduction I shall briefly explain how the concept of the public sphere has been adapted to research on the European public sphere. Furthermore, I will present the main findings of the ever-growing body of research and sketch the main axes of my own research its temporal and spatial scope, the sources I will use and the organisation of my study.

31 32 33

34

Knipping and Sch6nwald, "Vorwort," ix. Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, and Brigitte Leucht, eds., The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72 (London, 2009). Gerhards, "Europaisierung von Okonomie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 294-296. The answer to this question has to remain provisional. A comprehensive treatment would re­ quire a comparison with the period before 1969.

24

INTRODUCTION

1.2 What is the European public sphere? The public sphere is conceived as an arena of communication in respect of all is­ sues of public concern, particularly political and societal affairs. This arena is to be a public one that is visible, audible and accessible to all. It is meant to provide a space independent of the state in which society can discuss its own affairs. At the same time, it is the place where government, civil society and citizens communi­ cate with each other. An independent public sphere is a central precondition for democracy, because it provides a forum in which opinions are formed 35 For ana­ lytical purposes, different levels of the public sphere have been distinguished. Public spheres of encounters, of assemblies and of the media are distinct in their im­ mediacy, their scope and the opportunity for participation they provide. A general rule applies: The wider the potential audience, the more restricted the access to ac­ tive participation and the more institutionalised the procedures for selecting who gets to voice his or her views. Despite such systematic restrictions, the public sphere of the media is the key arena for opinion formation in modern mass socie­ ties, because it manages to reach a large share of the population.36 Consequently, this study focuses on the European public sphere of the media. Nonetheless, me­ dia-based public communication largely takes place as communication between different actors and mediators that is only observed by the public as an audi­ ence.37 The public sphere is the space between state and society in which citizens and policy makers are able to form an opinion on political and societal issues. Opinion formation requires transparency. In order to ensure transparency, access to ideas and for participants must be open and equal. In the debate in the public sphere the relevance of opinions and the advantages and disadvantages of ideas are discussed and evaluated. As a consequence, citizens and policy makers find orientation in relation to various issues, ideas and opinions, and can eventually form their own opinions 38 Furthermore, the public sphere serves to hold political actors account­ able. At the same time, it is the place for debates on the self-understanding of soci­ ety and the legitimacy of the polity. As an "intermediary system"39 between state and society, the public sphere is linked to the polity that makes binding decisions for society.4o I will hence define the European public sphere as the political public sphere41 that links the European citizens in 35

36 37

Jiirgen Gerhards and FriedheIm Neidhardt, "Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Offentlich­ keit. Fragestellungen und Ansatze," in Dffentlichkeit, Kultur, Massenkommunikation. Beitriige zur MedienkommunikationSSDziologie, ed. Stefan Miiller-Dohm and Klaus NeumalUl-Braun (Olden­ burg, 1991), 39-4l. Ibid., 49-56. FriedheIm Neidhardt, "Offentlichkeit, Offentliche Meinung und soziale Bewegungen," in Of­

fentlichkeit, Offentliche Meinung, Soziale Bewegungen. Kalner Zeitschriftfor Soziologie und Sozialpsy­ eh% gie SonderhRft 34., ed. FriedheIm Neidhardt (Opladen, 1994), 7. 38 39 40

41

Ibid., 8f. Gerhards and Neidhardt, " Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Offentlichkeit," 39. Of course, what takes place in the public sphere is also relevant for the realms of the economy, culture and other aspects of society. However, I am focusing on a political public sphere, which discusses issues of political relevance and which takes the political system as its point of reference. Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ,Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306.

WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE?

25

their public communication to the political system of the Eel EU. In other words, it is the sphere of communication in which the European polity is the point of reference, the explicit or implicit addressee of communication.42 The concept of a European public sphere as a political public sphere - juxta­ posed to the emerging European polity - may appear increasingly anachronistic the further back in time we go. Even though the EC only slowly acquired the broader range of powers that turned it into a supranational polity, from its incep­ tion the EC was already more integrated than traditional international intergov­ ernmental organisations. Institutional choices, such as the supranational Commis­ sion, majority decisions in the Council of Ministers as a basic principle and the goal to establish a directly elected European assembly, are cases in point.43 Particu­ larly in light of the creation of its own resources in 1969, the EC can arguably be considered an emerging supranational polity. Even though the apparent absence of a European public sphere was only perceived as a problem in the period after Maastricht, it still makes sense to explore the history of the European public sphere in a longer term perspective. Clearly, the democratic deficit that the European pub­ lic sphere was expected to alleviate mainly arose as a consequence of wider EC competences and the introduction of majority voting with the Single European Act. Nevertheless, only by taking a longer term perspective it is possible to eluci­ date a historical process of emergence44 and elicit those structural patterns of Eu­ ropean public communication that may account for its apparent inertia. Extending the concept of the public sphere to the European level requires the inclusion of two sets of criteria: its democratic quality and its European scope. First, how does Eu­ ropean public communication contribute to European democracy? Secondly, how does European public communication actually ensure the inclusion of the Europe­ ans across national borders and connect them to the emerging European polity? 1.2.1 Democratic quality Various benchmarks for assessing the quality of public communication have been suggested, depending on the underlying normative model of the public sphere. While the liberal-representative model focuses on transparency and accountability, the discursive model is more demanding. In a discursive public sphere, participa­ tion should involve civil society: A rational mode of arguing will ensure the "dis­ cursive quality" of communication.45 In this study I will take note of two norma­ tive principles that Bernhard Peters has suggested as key.46 Together they ensure 42

43 44 45

46

Klaus Eder, "Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Offentlichkeit in Europa. Von der Sprach­ gemeinschaft zur issuespezifischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," Berliner Journal for Soziolo­ gie 10 (2000): 181. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, (Treaty estab­ lishing the European Economic Community and connected documents, 5-183, Publishing Serv­ ices of the European Communities, Luxembourg), articles 138.3 & 148. Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, " Interdiskursivitat in der europaischen Offentlichkeit," Berli­ ner Debatte Initial 13 (2002): 85. Jiirgen Gerhards, "Diskursive versus liberale Offentlichkeit. Eine empirische Auseinanderset­ zung mit Jiirgen Habermas," KaIner Zeitschrift for Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 49 (1997): 412. Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," 67f.

26

INTRODUCTION

transparency and are a necessary precondition for the formation of public opinion. First, the public sphere should be open to a diversity of views and opinions. Sec­ ondly, the principle of equality demands that participation should be as broad and diverse as possible. In the public sphere of the media, there are various limitations to openness and equal participation. Nevertheless, these principles may serve as a normative yardstick for the analysis of public communication.

1.2.2 European scope The European public sphere differs from national and international public spheres with respect to the political space it refers to. Historians who dealt with the Euro­ pean public sphere tended to treat Europe as a geographical concept. Exploring transnational communication, they included countries from Eastern as well as Western Europe.47 In this study, however, I have focused on the political European public sphere. For this reason, the institutional point of reference is the EC as a political entity, rather than as an ensemble of European countries. Two criteria may be used to define the European scope of the public sphere: its contents or its struc­ ture. The first and defining criterion of a political European public sphere is that it is the arena of communication in which the European polity is the point of reference. It is the place where actors address and refer to European institutions and discuss their actions and policies. Eder has argued that the European public sphere emerges at the moment when European institutions are at the origin of public communica­ tion, are the addressees or the object of communication.48 Thus, at the most basic level, the European public sphere encompasses all public communication in rela­ tion to European politics and policy-making in which the institutions of the Euro­ pean polity are explicitly or implicitly addressed or referred to. The European public sphere can hence be defined by its content. A second criterion requires that the structure of communication is also of Euro­ pean scope, including communication across intra-European borders. Two differ­ ent indicators have been used: The synchronicity of issues and evidence of transna­ tional communication.49 First, based on a remark by Habermas,50 Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner argued that the synchronicity of issues across media from differ­ ent European countries demonstrated that the structure of communication was of European scope. A European public sphere hence required that "the same issues [were discussed] at the same time using the same criteria ofrelevance" sl The synchro­ nicity of issues meant a discursive integration of the public sphere across Europe. 47 48 49

50 51

Requate and Schulze-Wessel, eds., Europiiische Offentlichkeit. Eder, "Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Offentlichkeit in Europa," 181. The term transnational refers to interaction between groups, organisations, states and individu­ als across national borders, while the term international exclusively refers to inter-state rela­ tions. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, "Zur Entwicklung " transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung, in Trans­ nationale Offentlichkeiten und ldentitlften im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gemig (Frankfurt, 2002), 9. Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ,Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306. Eder and Kantner, " Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa," 315. Translation by Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere, 6.

WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE?

27

This was intended to ensure that actors and audiences across Europe were not only aware of the motivations of their European partners but were also able to ar­ gue with them about their reasons for action S2 However, other researchers have challenged the assumption that a synchronous debate necessarily meant that there was communication across national borders s3 For Marianne van de Steeg public communication should not only be syn­ chronous, but also involve actual transnational communication. Only a substantial level of actual exchange across borders ensured that the discussion of the same is­ sues did not take place within essentially separate national public spheres. It was thus necessary to examine the evidence of exchange processes and transfers. How­ ever, transnational communication is very difficult to research empirically, because the flow of ideas often remains invisible s4 In order to explore exchanges across borders, it is necessary to inquire into the mediators, such as correspondents and journalists who act as "cultural brokers" ss These are pivotal actors in the enabling of transnational communication.56 Additionally, transnational references, namely those that arise in the discussion of the political views of foreign actors, provide a good indication of the intensity of transnational debate. This is arguably the clos­ est approximation of a transnational debate that can be found when studying the media s7 Finally, the European public sphere is not only a structure of communication, but also a sphere of action. Actors discuss, negotiate, and discursively construct Europe's self-understanding. Various researchers have argued that increased trans­ national communication will have consequences for how the transnational politi­ cal space in Europe is imagined S8 Expecting a shift or an extension of identifica­ tion to the European level, they have treated "European identification" as a crite­ rion that indicates a transnational European public sphere s9 Such assumptions require additional theoretical reconsideration. Still, it remains essential to study the European public sphere " at work" by examining the discursive construction of 52

53 54

55

56 57 58 59

FriedheIm Neidhardt, " Europaische Offentlichkeit als Prozess," in Europiiische Offentlichkeit und medialer Wandel: Eine transdiszipliniire Perspektive, ed. Wolfgang R. Langenbucher and Michael Latzer (Wiesbaden, 2006), 52. Eder and Kantner, " Interdiskursivitat in der europaischen Offentlichkeit," 82-84. MarialUle van de Steeg, " The public sphere in the European Union: a media analysis of public discourse on EU enlargement and on the Haider case" (PhD thesis, European University Insti­ tute, 2005). 27-30. Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnational Nehvork Governance. The Informal Politics of European Inte­ gration," in The History of the European Union. Origins ofa Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, ed. Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, and Brigitte Leucht (London, 2009), J an-Henrik Meyer, "Tracing Transnational Communication in the European public sphere: the Summit of The " Hague 1969, in The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, ed. Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, and Brigitte Leucht (London, 2009). Neidhardt, "Europaische Offentlichkeit als Prozess," 54f. Andreas WImmel, "Transnationale Diskurse. Zur Analyse politischer Kommunikation in der europaischen Medien6ffentlichkeit," Zeitschrift for Internationale Beziehungen 11 (2004). Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gemig, "Zur Enhvicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 10. E.g. Bernhard Peters et al., "National and transnational public spheres. The Case of the EU," in Transformations ofthe state, ed. Stephan Leibfried and Michael Ziirn (Cambridge, 2005), 147, Tho­ mas Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft: Theoretische " Uberlegungen und empirische Evidenz, in Europiiische Offentlichkeit, ed. Ulrich K. PreuB and Claudio Franzius (Baden-Baden, 2004), 148-150.

28

INTRODUCTION

European self-understanding. Based on these definitions I will explore five charac­ teristics of the European public sphere in an analysis of media content during the period between 1969 and 1991. Five research questions for the analysis of European public communication

1. European polity as a point ofreference: Did the European polity increasingly be­ come a point of reference, improving transparency in respect of European affairs ? 2. Synchronicity: Were the same issues increasingly discussed at the same time at the same level of relevance ? 3. Mediators' transnational involvement: Did the structure of mediators change in a way that suggests increased transnational communication and broader participa­ tion? 4. Transnational communication: Is there an indication of growing transnational communication and an increasingly diverse range of actors covered? 5. European self-understanding: Is there evidence of a common conceptualisation of the European political space? Was there growing European identification, a Euro­ pean sense of community? These questions will guide the analysis of European public communication in this study. However, what are the findings of the recent wave of European public sphere research concerning these five issues?

1.3 What do we empirically know about the European public sphere to date? The body of knowledge relating to European public communication has been rap­ idly expanding in recent years. Most research projects limit themselves to the pub­ lic sphere of the media.6o In what follows, I will provide a brief overview of this research, considering the types of media studied, the different designs of the stud­ ies and their temporal scope, before presenting recent findings concerning change over time.61 While there has been occasional research on transnational European media,62 most studies have compared national media across a number of European coun60

Juan Dfez Medrano also attempts to consider the public sphere of encounters. Juan Dfez Me­ drano, Framing Europe: attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (Princeton, N.J., 2003). 16-19. The public sphere of assemblies has been touched upon by protest research and research on European civil society, e.g. Hans-Jorg Trenz, Zur Konstitution politischer

Offentlichkeit in der Europiiischen Union. Zivilgesellschajtliche Subpolitik orier schaupolitische Inszenie­ rung? (Baden-Baden, 2002). 61

62

For a more general overview of the results of European public sphere research d. Marcel Ma­ chill, Markus Beiler, and Corinna Fischer, " Europe-Topics in Europe's Media," European Journal ofCommunication 21 (2006), Jan-Henrik Meyer, "Gibt es eine Europaische Offentlichkeit? Neuere empirische Studien zu Demokratiedefizit, Legitimation und Kontrolle in Europa," Berliner Jour­ nal for Soziologie 14 (2004): 141-148, Hans-Jorg Trenz, "European Dilemmas. The European Pub­ lic Sphere. Contradictory Findings in a diverse Research Field," European Political Science 4 (2005). E.g. Olivier Baisnee and Dominique Marchetti, "La production de l'information "europeelUle". Le cas de la chaine paneuropeelUle d'information Euronews," in En quite d'Europe: medias euro-

WHAT DO WE EMPIRlCALLY KNOW ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE TO DATE?

29

tries. Most research projects have focused on national broadsheet newspapers, which devote ample attention to national and international politics and the econ­ omy. As opinion leaders they are the central point of reference for other media in the national context.63 News magazines,64 regional65 and tabloid newspapers66 have been less frequently considered. Researchers from media studies have con­ tributed some analyses of television 67 A number of studies have also combined various print and audio-visual media in order to arrive at a comprehensive overpeens et mediatisation de ['Europe, ed. Dominique Marchetti (RelUles, 2004), Michael Brtiggemann

63

64

65

66

67

and Hagen Schulz-Forberg, «Spearheads of Transnationalization? Cross-border Media in Eu­ rope,» in The Transnationalization ofPublic Spheres, ed. Bernhard Peters, et al. (Basingstoke, 2008). About their failure: Erik Neveu, "Europe as an 'Un-imaginable Community'. The Failure of the French Newsmagazine L'Europeen," Journal of European Area Studies 10 (2002). For a critique: Trenz, European Dilemmas. The European Public Sphere. Contradictory Find­ " ings in a diverse Research Field,» 410. Holger Sievert, Europiiischer Journalismus. Theorie und Empirie aktueller Medienkommunikation in der Europiiischen Union (Opladen, 1998), Marianne van de Steeg, "Analysis of the Dutch and Spanish Newspaper Debates on EU enlargement with Central and Eastern European Countries. Suggestions for a Transnational European Public Sphere," in Transnational Communication in Eu­ rope. Practice and Research, ed. Barbara Baerns and Juliana Raupp (Berlin, 2000). Verena Boos, Bypassing regional identity: a study of identifications and interests in Scottish " and Catalan press commentary on European integration, 1973-1993" (PhD, European Univer­ sity Institute, 2005), Roselyne Ringoot and Jean-Michel Utard, L'Europe vue par la presse re­ " gionale. Les exemple compares de Ouest-France et des Dernieres Nouvelles d'Alsace," in En quite d'Europe: medias europeens et mediatisation de l'Europe, ed. Dominique Marchetti (Rennes, 2004), Regina Vetters, «Vor Ort in Europa: ein Vergleich der EU-Berichterstattung deutscher Qualitats- und Regionalzeitungen,» Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft 55 (2007). Peter J. Anderson and Tony Weymouth, Insulting the public? The British press and the European Union (London, 1999), Robin B. Hodess, "News Coverage of European Politics. A Comparison of Change in Britain and Germany," in Europapolitische Grundverstiindnisse im Wandel. Analysen und Konsequenzen for die politische Bildung, ed. Mathias JopP, Andreas Maurer, and Heinrich Schneider (BolUl, 1998), Gerlinde Mautner, Der britische Europa-Diskurs. Methodenreflexion und Fallstudien zur Berichterstattung in der Tagespresse CWien, 2000). 57. Baisnee and Marchetti, La production de l'information europeenne". Le cas de la chaine pan­ " " europeenne d'information Euronews.", Eric Darras and Dominique Marchetti, La production " et la circulation des images europeennes". L'exemple des echanges des sujets d'actualite de " l'Union europeenne de radio-television," in En quite d'Europe: medias europeens et mediatisation de l'Europe, ed. Dominique Marchetti (RelUles, 2004), Neil T. Gavin, «Imagining Europe: Political Identity and British Television Coverage of the European Economy,» The British Journal of Poli­ tics and International Relations 2 (2000), Neil T. Gavin, «L'euro, la television et l'espace public europeen: L'exemple britalUlique,» in L'Union europeenne et les medias. Regards croises sur l'infor­ mation europeenne, ed. Guillaume Garcia and Virginie Le Torrec, Cahiers politiques (Paris, 2003), Hodess, «News Coverage of European Politics. A Comparison of Change in Britain and Ger­ many.» , Deirdre Kevin, Europe in the Media. A Comparison of Reporting, Representation, and Rheto­ ric in National Media Systems in Europe (Mahwah, N.J., London, 2003). 55f., 133-165, Edmund Lauf and Jochen Peter, "EU-Reprasentationen in Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse iluer Pra­ senz in 13 EU-Mitgliedstaaten vor der EuropawahI 1999," in Europiiische Union und mediale Of­

fentlichkeit. Theoretische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Rolle der Medien im europiiischen Einigungs­ prozess, ed. Lutz Hagen (Koln, 2004), Jochen Peter, Kaum vorhanden, thematisch homogen und

" eher negativ - Die alltagliche Fernsehberichterstattung tiber die Europaische Union im interna­ tionalen Vergleich," in Europiiische Union und mediale Offentlichkeit. Theoretische Befunde und Per­ spektiven zur Rolle der Medien im europiiischen Einigungsprozess, ed. Lutz Hagen (Koln, 2004), Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg, Framing European politics: a content analysis of press " and television news," Journal ofCommunication 50 (2000),AlUla Triandafyllidou, "Research Note: The Launch of the Euro in the Italian Media: Representations of Political and Economic Integra­ tion," European Journal of Communication 18 (2003).

30

INTRODUCTION

view of "Europe in the media".68 Great hopes had been attached to the internet as a novel transnational medium. Nevertheless, research has demonstrated that the internet has largely reproduced national patterns of conventional media usage 69 Researchers have used three distinct designs for case selection, covering dif­ ferent modes of political communication. While "normal" or "routine" political communication comprises the day-to-day coverage of political affairs, "crisis com­ munication" (Krisenkommunikation) describes exceptionally intense debates that arise whenever major political, societal or moral questions are at stake 70 Studies based on representative samples from a given time period mainly cover routine com­ munication,71 enabling researchers to capture and compare the average level and structure of coverage. Other studies follow the debates on certain (European) is­ sues. If the debates are observed for a longer period of time, this design consists of both routine and crisis communication 72 There has also been research on the de­ bates on Eastern enlargement/3 Turkish accession/4 European security policy/5 68 69

Kevin, Europe in the Media. 54-59. She analyses tabloid, broadsheet and regional press, private and public television. Hagen Schulz-Forberg, " Report on the Role of the Internet as a Medium of Communication with a View to assessing its Contribution in the Development of a European Public Sphere," in

EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics ofa European Public Spherefrom the Treaty ofRome to the 'War on Ter­ ror' (Florence, 2006), 15--19. See also: Ruud Koopmans and Ann Zimmermann, Internet: A New

Potential for European Political Communication? (Discussion Paper. Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung Berlin, 2003), Susan O'Donnell, Analysing the internet and the public sphere. The case of, Womenslink'," Javnost. The Public 8 (2002), Renee van Os and Nicholas W. Jankowski, "An online European Public Sphere? The Web and Europeanization of Political Communication " in the EU, in A European Public Sphere. How much of it do we have and how much do we need?, ed. Claes H. de Vreese and Hermann Schmitt (Mannheim, 2007), AlID Zimmermann, Demokratisie­ rung und Europaisierung Online? Massenmediale politische Offentlichkeit im Internet (PhD thesis, Institut fUr Soziologie, Freie Universitat Berlin, 2006), Ann ZimmermalID, "Online-Of­ " fentlichkeiten als Gegenstand empirischer Forschung, Berliner Journal for Soziologie 17 (2007). Eder and Kantner, " Interdiskursivitat in der europaischen Offentlichkeit," 86. Their distinction is based on Jiirgen Habermas, Faktizitiit und Geltung. Beitriige zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt, 1992). 432f, Bernhard Peters, " Recht, Staat und politische Offentlichkeit als Formen sozialer Selbstorganisation," in Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit, ed. Hart­ mut Wessler (Frankfurt, 2007 [1993]), 48-51. Peters et al., "National and transnational public spheres," 142, Hans-Jorg Trenz, Europa in den Medien. Die europiiische Integration im Spiegel nationaler Offentlichkeit (Frankfurt, 2005). 180-186. The EUROPUB project compared the coverage of different policy areas: Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres. A Research Outline (EUROPUB, 18 February 2002), 19f. Christine Landfried, "Das Entstehen einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," in Europiiische Offent­ lichkeit, ed. Ulrich K. PreuB and Claudio Franzius (Baden-Baden, 2004), 134f, Steeg, "Analysis of the Dutch and Spanish Newspaper Debates on EU enlargement with Central and Eastern Euro­ pean Countries." For the debate in the accession countries see: Markus Poll, 1m Dreieck von Of­ 1/

70

71 72

73

fentlichkeit, Massenkommunikation und politischer Kultur. Die osteuropiiischen Beitrittskandidaten auf dem Weg in die EU (Berlin, 2001). 74

75

Andreas Wimmel, Beyond the Bosphorus. Comparing German, French and British Discourses on Turkey's Application to Join the European Union (IHS Institute for Advanced Studies Vi­ elIDa, 2006), Andreas Wimmel, Transnationale Diskurse in Europa. Der Streit um den Turkei-Beitritt in Deutschland, Frankreich und Grofibritannien (Frankfurt, 2006). Cathleen Kantner and Swantje Renfordt, "Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Inter­ ventions in Europe and the u.s. (199G-2005)" (paper presented at the 4th ECPR General Confe­ rence, 6-8 September 2007, Pisa, 2007), An�e Knorr, Europaische Offentlichkeit und transnatio­ nale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich [PhD thesis] {Freie Universitat Berlin,

WHAT DO WE EMPIRlCALLY KNOW ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE TO DATE?

31

economic policy,76 agricultural policy and institutional reform77 and even the prob­ lems of biotechnology policy and other environmental risks 78 The debates centred around the European Constitutional Convention and the process of Constitution Making in 2001-2003 as well as the ensuing ratification phase have been covered in a vast number of research projects 79 A third type of analysis focuses on crisis communication pure and simple. These studies target debates that follow a singu­ lar event considered to be of the highest European relevance. Cases in point are the

76

77 78

79

2006), Mary Martin, Re-imagining a European public sphere. Discursive constructions of the " ,War on Terrorism' in Britain and Germany, 2001-2002" (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004), Swan�e Renfordt, Auf dem Weg zu einer europiiischen Offentlichkeit? - Eine Mediananalyse europiiischer und amerikanischer Debatten tiber den lrak-Krieg 2003 (Saarbrucken, 2007), Thomas Risse and Jana Katharina Grabowsky, European Identity Formation in the Public Sphere and in Foreign Policy (Recon Online Working Paper 08/04, 2008), Hartmut Wessler et al., Together we " Fight? Piecemeal Europeanization in the Public Discourse on Military Interventions" (paper presented at the First European Communication Conference, Amsterdam, 24-26 November, 2005). Christoph O. Meyer, The Europeanization of Media Discourse: A Study of Quality Press Cov­ " erage of Economic Policy Co-ordination since Amsterdam," Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (2005). Barbara Berkel, Konflikt als Motor europiiischer Offentlichkeit. Eine Inhaltsanalyse von Tageszeitungen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Grofibritannien und Osterreich CWiesbaden, 2006). Irene Neverla, The Birth of a European Public Sphere through European Media Reporting of " Risk Communication," European Societies 9 (2007), Franz Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public. The Case of Biotechnology (Euro­ pean Integration online Papers (EIoP) 10, 2006). Sebastian Esser, Europas Suche nach einer gemeinsamen Offentlichkeit: Eine Inhaltsanalyse der De­ batte tiber eine EU-Verfassung in europiiischen Tageszeitungen (Marburg, 2005), Eric Jentges, Hans­ Jorg Trenz, and Regina Vetters, Von der politischen zur sozialen Konstitutionalisierung Euro­ " pas. Verfassungsgebung als Katalysator europaischer Vergesellschaftung?," Politische Vierteljah­ resschrift 48 (2007), Sebastian Kurpas, Der Europiiische Reformkonvent im Spiegel der Qualitiitspresse. Beispiel einer europiiischen Offentlichkeit? (Baden-Baden, 2008), Amelie Kutter, Petitioner or Part­ " ner? Constructions of European Integration in Polish Print Media Debates on the EU Constitu­ tional Treaty," in Discourse and Contemporary Social Change, ed. Giuseppina Cortese, Norman Fairclough, and Patrizia Ardizzone (Bern, 2007), Landfried, "Das Entstehen einer europaischen Offentlichkeit.", Ulrike Liebert, "Introduction: Structuring political conflict about Europe: Na­ tional media in transnational discourse analysis," Perspectives on European Politics and Society 8 (2007), Christoph O. Meyer, The Constitutional Treaty Debates as Revelatory Mechanisms. In­ sights for Public Sphere Research and Re-Launch Attempts (Recon Online Working Paper 07 j06, 2007), Jan-Henrik Meyer, "(De-)Constmcting legitimacy in the European public sphere. German, French and British newspaper comments on the "Constitution" summit 2004," in Eu­ rope in its Making, ed. Silvia Marton (Bucharest, 2006), Florian Oberhuber, Legitimating the Eu­ ropean Union: The Contested Meanings of an EU Constitution (EUI Working Papers 2007/25, 2007), Florian Oberhuber et al., "Debating the European Constitution: On representations of Europe / the EU in the press," Journal ofLanguage and Politics 4 (2005), Kathrin Packham, "Motor einer europaischen Offentlichkeit. Der Konvent in der Medienberichterstattung der Mitglied­ staaten," in Verfassungsexperiment. Europa auf dem Weg zur transnationalen Demokratie, ed. Ulrike Liebert, et al. (Munster, 2003), Stefan Seidendorf, Geschichtlichkeit und Gemeinschaftsumwelt " - Was strukturiert den Konstitutionalisierungsprozess?," in Die Europiiische Union auf dem Weg in den Verfassungsstaat, ed. Frank SchimmelpfelUlig and Berthold Rittberger, MZES-Jahrbuch 10 (Frankfurt, 2006), Regina Vetters, Konvent + Verfassung Offentlichkeit. Momente europa­ " ischer Offentlichkeit in der Berichterstattung deutscher, britischer und franzosischer Printme­ dien zur Verfassungsdebatte" (PhD, Freie Universitat Berlin, 2007), Regina Vetters, Eric Jentges, and Hans-Jorg Trenz, Exploring the EU's social constituency: Patterns of public claims-making " in constitutional debates in France and Germany," ARENA Working Paper 06 (2006). =

32

INTRODUCTION

BSE scandal in 1996, 80 the "Haider affair", i.e. the "sanctions" against the Austrian government in 2000,81 the "Prodi affair", namely, suspicions as to Commission President Prodi's lack of leadership in 2001,82 or the "Berlusconi-Schulz-case", when Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi compared the German Social Democrat MEP Martin Schulz to a kapo83 in June 2003.84 The singular event of the introduc­ tion of the Euro was also studied85 as were recurrent events such as European Councils86 and European Parliament elections 87 Almost all of the studies focus on the 1990s and early 2000s. Even though re­ searchers like Hans-J6rg Trenz have highlighted that "only a longitudinal survey with systematic time-series data [ J could sustain the thesis of the Europeanisa­ tion of political communication",88 cross-time data remain limited. Only two re­ search projects include cases from the 1980s, namely Robin Hodess' comparison of the summits in the context of the SEA 1985 and Maastricht 1990-91 and Bernhard Peters' project on the "Transnationalisation of the public sphere" project (1982 and . . .

80

81

82 83

84 85

86

87

" Rod Brookes, " Newspapers and national identity: the BSE / CJD crisis and the British press, Media, Culture & Society 21 (1999), Grundmann, liThe European public sphere and the deficit of " democracy, 41f, Christoph O. Meyer, Europiiische Offentlichkeit als Kontrollsphare. Die europiiische Kommission, die Medien und politische Verantwortung (Berlin, 2002). 98-105. Barbara Berkel, " Political Parallelism in News and Commentaries on the Haider Conflict. A " Comparative Analysis of Austrian, British, German, and French Quality Newspapers, Com­ " munications. The European Journal ofCommunication Research 31 (2006), Stefan Seidendorf, Defin­ ing Europe against its Past? - Memory Politics and the Sanctions against Austria in France and " " Germany, German Law Journal 6 (2005), Marianne van de Steeg, Does a public sphere exist in " the EU? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case, European Journal for Politi­ cal Research 45 (2006). Hans-Jorg Trenz, "Ein Rauschen geht durch den Blatterwald. EU-Prasident Prodi und die Ent­ " stehung einer europaischen Publizistik, Berliner Debatte Initial 13 (2002). I.e. a prison guard in a concentration camp. John Downey and Thomas Koenig, " Is There a European Public Sphere?: The Berlusconi-Schulz " Case, European Journal of Communication 21 (2006). " Gavin, "L' euro, la television et l' espace public europeen. , Holli A. Semetko, Claes H. de Vrees, and Jochen Peter, «Europeanised Politics, Europeanised Media? European Integration and Po­ litical Communication,» in Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Sys­ tems, ed. Klaus H. Goetz and Simon Hix (London, 2001), 132-135, Triandafyllidou, " Research " Note: The Launch of the Euro in the Italian Media. " Hodess, "News Coverage of European Politics. , Meyer, ,,(De-)Constructing legitimacy in the " European public sphere. , Semetko and Valkenburg, " Framing European politics: a content " analysis of press and television news, (Amsterdam 1997). Deirdre Kevin, " Coverage of the European Parliament elections of 1999. National public sphe­ " res and European debates, Javnost. The Public 8 (2002), Lauf and Peter, "EU-Reprasentationen in Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse iluer Prasenz in 13 EU-Mitgliedstaaten vor der Europa­ " wahl 1999. , as and Jankowski, "An online European Public Sphere? The Web and Europeani­ " zation of Political Communication in the EU. , Stefan Reiser, Parteienkampagne und Medienbe­

richterstattung im Europa-Wahlkampf1989. Eine Untersuchung zu Dependenz und Autonomieverlust im Verhiiltnis von Massenmedien und Politik (Konstanz, 1994), Claes H. de Vreese et al., ,, The News " Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election in 25 Countries, European Union Politics " 7 (2006), Claes H. de Vreese et al., " How domestic are European Elections, in A European Public Sphere. How much of it do we have and how much do we need?, ed. Claes H. de Vreese and Hermann

88

Schmitt (Mannheim, 2007). " Trenz, "European Dilemmas, 415.Cf. also: Jiirgen Gerhards, "Das Offentlichkeitsdefizit der EU " im Horizont normativer Offentlichkeitstheorien, in Transnationale Offentlichkeiten und Identitii­ ten im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt, New York, 2002), 145.

WHAT DO WE EMPIRlCALLY KNOW ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE TO DATE?

33

1989) 89 Only Jiirgen Gerhards and Juan Diez Medrano analysed data for the entire post-war period (1951-1995 / 1946-1995). However, as they relied on very small samples or on data for just one country, their findings may only be treated as in­ dicative 90 Stefan Seidendorf compared debates on Europe in 1952 and 2000, but deliberately chose years of substantial attention on Europe, thus making it impos­ sible to generalise from his evidence 91 The EMEDIATE project, which applied a broader conceptual history approach towards the European public sphere,92 com­ pared eight crisis events from the 1956 "Hungarian revolution" to the debate on the "Mohammed cartoons" in February 2006 93 This project was also the first to include Eastern Europe 94 Both EMEDIATE and the project of Jens Lucht and David Trefas, who presented the first findings of a time series analysis that at­ tempted to cover the entire period between 1951 and 2005,95 do not focus on the structure of European political communication, but on the content of the discourse, in particular the concept of Europe and European identity. Differences in the underlying theoretical concepts of the European public sphere, in the definition, the operationalisation and measurement of European public communication have produced research results which do not lend them­ selves to drawing clear-cut conclusions % This concerns particularly the level of coverage, which is crucially contingent on the operationalisation 97 Only if studies 89

90

91 92

93 94

95

96 97

Hodess, "News Coverage of European Politics.", Bernhard Peters, "Die Transnationalisierung von Offentlichkeit und ihre Bedeutung fur politische Ordnungen am Beispiel der EU. For­ schungsantrag fur Sib 597 Staatlichkeit im Wandel," (Bremen, 2002), 463f. Dfez Medrano, Framing Europe. 267f, Gerhards, "Das Offentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Offentlichkeitstheorien," 143, Gerhards, " Europaisierung von Okonomie und Poli­ tik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 296. Stefan Seidendorf, Europiiisierung nationaler ldentitiitsdiskurse? Ein Vergleich franzosischer und deutscher Printmedien (Baden-Baden, 2007). Bo Strath and Ruth Wodak, "Europe-Discourse-Politics-Media-History: Constructing ,Crises'," in Europe in Crisis: The ,European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009). Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski, eds., Europe in Crisis: The 'Euro­ pean Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period (Basingstoke, 2009). Only recently Eastern Europe has been included: e.g. Kutter, "Petitioner or Partner? Construc­ tions of European Integration in Polish Print Media Debates on the EU Constitutional Treaty.", Petra Rakusanova, The Constitutional Debate: A One Man Show? Vaclav Klaus and the Consti­ tutional Discourse in the Czech Media (ConstEPS Working Paper No. 2006/2, University of Bremen, 2006), Aleksandra Wyrozumska, Who is Willing to die for the Constitution? The Na­ tional Debate on the Constitutional Treaty in Poland (ConstEPS Working Paper No. 2006/4, University of Bremen, 2006). Jens Lucht and David Trefas, Hat Europa eine Identitat? Eine zeitreihenbasierte Untersuchung der offentlichen europaischen Kommunikation von 1951 bis 2005. (fog discussion paper DI2006-0001, fog-Forschungsbereich Offentlichkeit und Gesellschaft Zurich, 2006). Neidhardt, "Europaische Offentlichkeit als Prozess," 47-49. E.g. Eilders and Voltmer find a similarly low level of commentary on EU affairs in German newspapers in the mid-1990s as Gerhards (around 5.6% vs. Gerhards' 6.9%). Sifft et al., who also analysed commentary, agree with these findings of a level of EU coverage of below 10%. Nevertheless, Kantner and Trenz who analysed the political news sections find substantially higher levels of European coverage in the year 2000 of on average 15.6% of the articles focusing on EU affairs. Christiane Eilders and Katrin Voltmer, "Zwischen Marginalisierung und Kon­ " sens. Europaische Offentlichkeit in Deutschland, in Die Stimme der Medien. Pressekommentare und politische Offentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Christiane Eilders, FriedheIm Neidhardt, and Barbara Pfetsch CWiesbaden, 2004), 372, Gerhards, "Europaisierung von Okono­ mie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 295, Cath-

34

INTRODUCTION

compare data over time - applying the same indicators - will it be possible to ob­ serve a trend or development 98 I will address the five characteristics of the Euro­ pean public sphere in turn.

1.3.1 European polity as a point of reference

Did the European polity increasingly become a point of reference? In 2000, Jiirgen Gerhards became the first to address this question empirically. In a secondary analysis of data on German news coverage for the entire postwar pe­ riod, he found that the share of European coverage actually declined until the end of the 1980s and only increased in the first half of the 1990s. Consequently he con­ cluded that media attention devoted to European politics lagged behind the ad­ vance of European integration.99 Similarly, Seidendorf observed that the debate on Europe was about as extensive in 1952 as in 2000 100 While these results support Gerhards' finding that there was a high level of attention to Europe in the early 1950s, Seidendorf's observations are not exactly comparable because he specifi­ cally selected the year 1952 due to the vivid debate in France and Germany at that time. Most of the studies available by 2008 suggest an increase in media attention on the EU as a point of reference since the 1980s. Sifft et al. noted a "robust and statis­ tically significant trend towards Europeanization" in their analysis of "discursive articles" from FAZ (D), Le Monde (F), The Times (UK), Die Presse (AT) and Politiken (DK) between 1982 and 2003. The average share of articles focusing on European governance steadily grew from 2% in 1982 to 9.2% in 2003. The proportion of arti­ cles mentioning the EU increased from 8.3% in 1982 to 21.8% in 2003 101 Similarly, Koopmans found that European integration had increasingly become a point of reference for political actors' "claims" in the media between 1990 and 2002 102 A growing share of them addressed the EU. Various policy areas were increasingly discussed as policies of European scope. Additionally, the number of claims con­ cerning European integration policy and polity making was higher in 2000-2003

leen Kantner, "Die thematische Verschrankung nationaler Offentlichkeiten in Europa und die Qualitat transnationaler politischer Kommunikation," in Demokratie in der Mediengesellschajt, ed. Kurt Imhof, et al. (Wiesbaden, 2006), 153, Stefanie Sifft et al., " Segmented Europeanization: Ex­ ploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective," Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (2007): 135, Trenz, Europa in den Medien. 197f. 98 Sifft et al., "Segmented Europeanization," 133. 99 Gerhards, "Europaisierung von Okonomie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 295, 294 chart 3. He relies on data produced by: Hans Mathias Kepplinger, Die Demontage der Politik in der Informationsgesellschaft (Freiburg, 1998). 100 Seidendorf, Europiiisierung nationaler ldentitiitsdiskurse? 372. 101 Sifft et al., "Segmented Europeanization," 135 (quote), 140 (table 2, numbers). "Discursive arti­ cles" comprise comment and analysis pieces, external contributions, interviews. 102 Their unit of analysis are not the newspaper articles but " instances of claims making (short­ hand: a claim) as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere". Ruud Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time. Analysis of Political Claims in European Print Media (EUROPUB. The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in Euro­ pean Public Spheres, 2004), 13. On claims: Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, " Political Claims Analysis. Integrating Protest Event and Public Discourse Approaches," Mobilization 4 (1999).

WHAT DO WE EMPIRlCALLY KNOW ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE TO DATE?

35

than it had been in 1990 / 1 995 103 In her analysis of British and German media around four summits in 1985 and 1990/91, Robin Hodess found an increase in European coverage by 167% between the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maas­ tricht negotiations 104 It is more problematic to draw conclusions about change over time from data based on the analysis of debates, because such data are strongly contingent on the content and the context of these debates. However, there is some evidence of grow­ ing attention to the EU. In her media analysis of three international crises, namely the Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo War of 1999 and the 2003 Iraq War, Antje Knorr found an increasing share of references to debates at the EU level between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. During the 1999 Kosovo War, the level was sub­ stantially 10wer lOS Similarly, on the basis of media coverage of all military and humanitarian interventions between 1990 and 2005, Kantner and Renfordt con­ cluded that the "[i]ntensity with which the EC is perceived as an international ac­ tor [is] slightly increas[ing] in European countries" 106 All in all, there is substantial evidence that the EU has increasingly become a point of reference since the 1990s. Evidently, in the wake of Maastricht, transparency in relation to European affairs improved. Still, Sifft et al. essentially agree with Gerhards that public scrutiny has been lagging behind the growing political importance of the EU. The growth of EU coverage did not really keep pace with the increase in EU legislation, they found 107 Information about the development of EC coverage for the 1980s is more limited, while for the decades before that, systematic analyses are entirely lack­ mg.

1.3.2 Synchronicity

Were the same issues increasingly discussed at the same time at the same level of rel­ evance? There is ample evidence that the same (European) issues have frequently been discussed at the same time at roughly the same level of relevance, i.e. receiving a similar level of media coverage. Issue attention cycles frequently ran parallel to each other, such as in the debate on the European constitution, in the debate on enlargement, but even as early as the debate on the ECSC and the Sarre question in 1952 108 Moreover, in her analysis of European Councils in 1985 and 1990 /91,

103 Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time, 4Of, tables 11, 15, 13. 104 Robin B. Hodess, "Media Coverage of European Community Politics in Britain and Germany 1985-1991" (PhD, University of Cambridge, 1997). 126. She erroneously speaks of an increase by 267%. 105 Knorr, Europaische Offentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 222. 106 Kantner and Renfordt, " Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the u.s. (199G-2005)", 2lf. 107 Sifft et al., " Segmented Europeanization," 137f. For their assessment of the impact of the EU in legislation, they relied on problematic quantitative indicators. 108 Seidendorf, Europiiisierung nationaler Identitiitsdiskurse? 160-162 (Sarre, ECSC), 265 (Haider), MarialUle van de Steeg, " Eine europaische Offentlichkeit? Die Diskussion um die Osterweite­ rung der EU," Berliner Debatte Initial 13 (2002): 62f. (enlargement), Vetters, " Konvent + Verfas­ sung Offentlichkeit.". 158 (constitution). =

36

INTRODUCTION

Hodess found that the British and German media covered the specific themes with similar levels of frequencyl09 Generally, events that were considered relevant throughout Europe apparently received similar amounts of attention. Synchro­ nous coverage could also be found in debates on biotechnologyllo and on interna­ tional crises. The synchronous coverage of international crises - at the same level of relevance - was not limited to Europe, but frequently included the US, too. This suggests that the European debate on these issues was indeed part of a broader international public sphere.111 The importance of national differences with regard to the level of attention remained contentious. In his Franco-German comparison of Europe as front page news in the quality newspapers, Nicolas Hubi' found that the German newspa­ pers were more likely to place EU affairs as the lead story on the front page than their French counterparts 112 Similarly, Seifert stressed national differences con­ cerning the presence of "national ensembles of mass-media, actors and symbolic codes" 113 Conversely, Steeg and Risse placed greater emphasis on qualitative in­ dicators such as "meaning structures" in their analyses of the debates on enlarge­ ment and the Haider affair. They highlighted the shared frame of reference, an in­ sider's perspective on common European problems. This, they argued, was what marked the specific difference between EU and non-EU media 114 There are some indications of convergence. In their analysis of actors' claims in the media, Koopmans found that between 1990 and 2002 actors across the Euro­ pean countries increasingly agreed on whether an issue was relevant to the Euro­ pean level or not 11S Hodess observed that by 1990 / 91 the British media's level of EC coverage had become closer to that of the German media 116 Seifert demon­ strated the emergence of a synchronous European debate on biotechnology from 1996 /97 onwards, whereas earlier debates on biotechnology had been limited to individual countries. He attributes this development both to the growth of Euro­ pean competences, but also to international media events such as the first cloned sheep "Dolly".117

109 Hodess, " News Coverage of European Politics. A Comparison of Change in Britain and Ger­ many," 456--458. 110 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Pub­ lic, 9-11, Appendix. 111 Kantner and Renfordt, " Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the u.s. (199G-2005)", 14. 112 Nicolas Hube, "L'Union EuropeelUle a la "Une": Un cadrage difficile d'une actualite peu visi­ ble. Regard compare sur la presse fran�aise et allemande," in L'Union europeenne et les medias. Regards croises sur l'information europeenne, ed. Guillaume Garcia and Virginie Le Torree, Cahiers politiques (Paris, 2003), 731, 76. 113 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Pub­ lic, 11. 114 MarialUle van de Steeg and Thomas Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Com­ munication: Insights from Empirical Research on the Europeanization of Public Spheres (Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy, Free University Berlin, 14 May 2007), 11-13. 115 Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time, own calculations based on table 13, 4l. 116 Hodess, " News Coverage of European Politics," 456--458. 117 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Pub­ lic, 9-11 .

WHAT DO WE EMPIRlCALLY KNOW ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE TO DATE?

37

In the analysis of debates on international politics, which were arguably part of a wider international, rather than a more narrowly circumscribed European public sphere, Kantner found there to be international convergence including the US in the early 2000s. Synchronous coverage clearly varied with the perceived political relevance of the issues in the different countries. Knorr's and Kantner's analyses of debates on international conflict found there to be convergence be­ tween the continental countries Germany and France on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other - in quantitative terms (Kant­ ner) and with regard to the patterns of interpretation in relation to the Iraq war (Knorr). In a situation when a political rift cut across Europe between those in sup­ port and those in opposition to US policy, this result was not surprising 118 All in all, there is evidence that the criterion of synchronous coverage has fre­ quently been met. However, information relating to the 1970s and 1980s is lacking. There has been tentative evidence of convergence in recent years. Not least due to varying operationalisations, researchers arrived at different results with respect to the magnitude of national differences in media coverage. The Eder-Kantner crite­ rion of the public sphere has also been applied to the analysis of the coverage of international politics. Evidence of synchronous coverage beyond Europe, or cut­ ting across Europe, suggests that debates vary in geographical scope according to the perceived relevance for the respective country. Consequently, it is very much to be expected that the coverage of European politics will be similar and synchro­ nous across EC countries that are affected by EC decisions. Synchronous coverage seems an important, however not a sufficient indicator for the analysis of a public sphere. If the European public sphere is not only defined by the coverage of Euro­ pean affairs, but is also conceived as a structure of transnational communication across national boundaries in Europe, will be is necessary to take transnational communication will into account.

1.3.3 Mediators' transnational involvement

Did the structure of mediators change in a way that suggests increased transnational com­ munication and broader participation? There is very little information on the historical development of European journal­ ism 119 Most studies focus on the present. The Brussels correspondents have been the most important transnational mediators of European politics, acting as the main brokers of EU-related information at the central exchange in Brussels. The number of EC/EU correspondents increased with the successive waves of enlarge­ ment from about 150 in the late 1960s to 480 by 1987. While numbers remained almost stable until the 1991, with 520 correspondents, the 1990s saw a boom of Brussels journalism.

118 Kantner and Renfordt, " Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the u.s. (1990-2005)", 14, 17, Knorr, Europiiische Offentlichkeit und transnationale Kom­ munikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 220. 119 A recent publication emerging from the EMEDIATE project addresses this lacuna: Paschal Pres­ ton, Making the News. Journalism and News Cultures in Europe (London, 2008).

38

INTRODUCTION

Table 1: Development of the number of accredited journalists in Brussels 19552003 120

In the early days of European integration, news agencies were the main employers of Brussels correspondents. It is only since the late 1960s that newspapers have increasingly had their own correspondents in Brussels, such as Philippe Lemaitre, who has reported for Le Monde since 1966 121 However, more specific information in respect of Brussels journalism in the 1970s and 1980s is not available. Christoph Meyer's study of Brussels journalism in the 1990s demonstrates changes in the structure of the group of Brussels correspondents and concomitant alterations in their self-understanding, professional norms and transnational cooperation. With the growing influx of Northern European journalists, particularly after the North­ ern enlargement of 1995, and the overall growth and rejuvenation of the press corps, professional norms in Brussels journalism changed: from a self-perception as "fake Eurocrats without the wages" to the ideal of the critical "watchdog" . For the first time transnational cooperation in investigative journalism was so effective that it brought down the Santer Commission in 1999 122 European correspondents' attitudes and their transnational cooperation before the 1990s have so far remained unexplored. Hodess noted that between 1985 and 1990 / 91 the number of Euro­ pean correspondents of British and German newspaper and public service televi­ sion increased. In the German media in particular, a wider group of journalists got involved in the coverage of European affairs. whether this development ultimately led to a different treatment of European news, remains to be explored.

1.3.4 Transnational communication

Is there indication ofgrowing transnational communication and a diversifying range of actors ? Evidence of change in the extent of transnational communication is ambiguous. For the postwar period, the EMEDIATE project and Stefan Seidendorf's analysis of European debates in 1952 showed that there has long been mutual awareness of the European policy of the European neighbours. German and French newspapers observed their neighbours' parliamentary debates on the EDC and the Sarre issue 120 Olivier Baisnee, "La production de l'actualite communautaire. Elements d'une sociologie du

corps de presse accredite aupres de l'Union europeenne (France / Grande Bretagne)" (PhD the­ sis, Institut d' etudes politiques de RelUles, 2003). 112, 115, European Commission, "Annuaire des journalistes accredites aupres des Institutions europeennes (unpublished)," (Brussels, 2003), own count, JHM, Yann de l' Ecotais, Naissance d'um nation (Paris, 1990). 123f, Meyer, Europiiische

Offentlichkeit als Kontrollsphiire. 1221. 121 Baisnee, "La production de l'actualite communautaire./I. 1 07f, 113. 122 Christoph O. Meyer, "Die Wachterfunktion von europaischer Offentlichkeit. Das Briisseler Pressecorps und der Riicktritt der EU-Kommission,/I in BiirgerschaJt, Offentlichkeit und Demokra­ tie in Europa, ed. Ansgar Klein, et a1. (Opladen, 2003), 236-38, Meyer, Europaische Offentlichkeit als Kontrollsphare. 121-149, quote 122.

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39

as early as 1952.123 In the debate around the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, communication and debate crossed the Iron Curtain. East European media and actors were frequently quoted in Western media and vice-versa. Transnational communication in Europe was not limited to European integration, but even per­ sisted amid the situation of mutual hostility during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the specific differences between modes of transnational communication in both contexts require further exploration. Schulz-Forberg noted that Daniel Cohn-Ben­ dies expulsion from France in 1968 triggered a transnational debate in which ac­ tors and media referred to each other across national borders in Western Eu­ rope 124 whether transnational exchange has become more intense with the advance of European integration is contentious among researchers. Information on the period before the 1990s is virtually absent. Gerhards noted that the share of references to actors from European institutions in German newspapers increased slightly in the early 1990S 125 However, both Sifft et al. and Koopmans found essentially stable shares of references to actors from other European countries as participants in the debate between 1982 / 1990 and 2002 /03 126 Only Scherer 's and Vesper's study of references to newspapers from other countries quoted in German newspapers be­ tween 1994 and 2000 observed growing transnational exchange across national borders 127 Not only did the quantity of references grow, but the range of issues also diversified. Increasingly, not only views from large and neighbouring France,

123 Stefan Seidendorf, "Europaisierung nationaler Identitatsdiskurse?". 139. 124 Hagen Schulz-Forberg, "Berlin Wall Crisis. Global Cold War and the Role of Europe," in Europe in Crisis: The 'European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period, ed. AlUla Trian­ dafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009), Hagen Schulz-Forberg, " "Paris in May 1968. Social Conflict, Democracy, and the Role of Europe, in Europe in Crisis: The 'European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009). 125 Gerhards, "Europaisierung von Okonomie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 296. 126 Sifft et al., " Segmented Europeanization," 142f.: Share of discursive references to other Europe­ ans: 1982: 19%, 1989: 18%, 1996: 20%, 2003: 14%; Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time, 22, 39f.:"slight increase" of actors from other European countries in debate on European integration: 1990: 27%, 1995: 33%, 2000: 31%, 2002: 29% (22, 39, table 8); Presence of actors from other European countries in newspapers from EU countries (incl. CH): 1990: 16% (18%), 1995: 18% (19%), 2000: 14% (16%), 2002: 17% (15%) (40, table 10); Presence of addressees from other European countries in EU newspapers (incl. CH): 1990: 13% (14%), 1995: 16% (18%), 2000: 14% (16%), 2002: 13% (14%) (40, table 12) 127 While Scherer and Vesper consider both press reviews and quotes and references within the text, numerous studies have considered press reviews as the most obvious newspaper section for transnational communication. However, only Scherer and Vesper take a longer term per­ spective. Cf. Jessica Erbe, "Integration der politischen Offentlichkeit in Europa durch Vernet­ " zung. Der Fall der grenzuberschreitenden Presseschauen in Deutschland, in Europiiische Of­ fentlichkeit und medialer Wandel: Eine transdiszipliniire Perspektive, ed. Wolfgang R. Langenbucher and Michael Latzer (Wiesbaden, 2006), Christian Le Bart, "L'invention du lecteur europeen. La revue de presse d'Alex Taylor sur France-Inter," in En quete d'Europe: medias europeens et mediati­ sation de l'Europe, ed. Dominique Marchetti (Rennes, 2004), Helmut Scherer and Simone Vesper, «Was schreiben die anderen? Ausliindische Pressestimmen als Vorform paneuropaischer Of­ fentlichkeit - Eine Inhaltsanalyse deutscher Qualitatszeitungen,» in Europiiische Union und medi­

ale Offentlichkeit. Theoretische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Rolle der Medien im europiiischen Eini­ gungsprozess, ed. Lutz Hagen (K6In, 2004).

40

INTRODUCTION

but also from a variety of countries that shared the Euro currency were included 128 Andreas Wimmel found a substantial amount of transnational discursive refer­ ences in the debate on Turkish EU membership since the late 1990s. However, this debate, which had become more intensely transnational between 1999 and 2002, retreated back into a largely national mode in 2004 129 Evidently, the quantity and the scope of transnational references were contingent on the issue and on the phase of the debate. Consequently, with regard to the Haider debate, Steeg and Risse ar­ gued that it was not so much the quantity of transnational references which indi­ cated that public communication was actually of European scope, but the con­ spicuous absence of references to non-Europeans 13o Journalists tend to "domesticate" European affairs by linking them to the views and actions of domestic actors 131 The degree of domestication and transna­ tional openness differed along national lines. British newspapers were found to be the most domestically oriented ones. Pfetsch et al. noted that 72% of the claims by commentators addressed the national government in British newspapers - as against 51% in German newspapers and 42% in the French ones. In the same way, the EU and other European countries featured substantially less prominently in the British newspapers. With respect to the presence of societal actors such as civil society organisations, there were hardly any national differences between newspa­ pers. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the share of references to societal actors hardly changed 132 Hodess, however, notes a decline in attention to governments and a growing presence of experts, interest groups and other civil society organisations in German and British newspapers between the European Councils of 1985 and 1990 /91.133 whether the European partners' views have actually been discussed more fre­ quently, remains unclear. The larger and more comprehensive studies suggest that there was little change. Newspapers from different European countries differed in their openness to views from other European countries. Again, information here is essentially limited to the 1990s and early 2000s. If transnational communication hardly increased, what happened with regard to shifts in identification? Various researchers have assumed that increased transnational communication should lead to the emergence of a European sense of community 134

128 Scherer and Vesper, "Was schreiben die anderen?," 201f., 206f. 129 Andreas Wimmel, "Transnationale Diskurse in der europaischen Medien6ffentlichkeit," Politiscm Vierteljahresschrift 46 (2005).: 2781 130 Steeg and Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Communication, 17. 131 Eilders and Voltmer, "Zwischen Marginalisierung und Konsens," 372. 132 Barbara Pfetsch et al., The Voice of the Media in European Public Sphere: Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Editorials. Integrated Report (EUROPUB. The Transformation of Political Mo­ bilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres, 15 July 2004), 20f, table 10, 11. 133 Hodess, " News Coverage of European Politics," 464. 134 E.g. Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gernig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 10.

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41

1.3.5 European self-understanding

Is there evidence of a common conceptualisation of the European political space? Has there been growing European identification, a European sense of community? With regard to a nascent European sense of community, empirical findings have so far been ambiguous. Journalists' use of "we-references" has frequently been ana­ lysed in order to examine their identification with political communities, such as the nation or the "West", for example. Sifft et al. found an increase of European we-references from 1% in 1982 to 6% in 2003. However, the margin of fluctuation was so wide that they could not elicit a clear trend 135 In their analysis of various European events between 1951 and 2005, Lucht and Trean noted that in the con­ text of the foundation of the EEC in the mid-1950s, European we-references had been more frequent, accounting for 7% of the total. In the following decades, Euro­ pean we-references normally only accounted for less than five per cent, this figure increasing drastically to 28 per cent in the context of the debate on the European constitution in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the share of national we-references has always been larger than that of the European ones 136 In their analysis of the Haider and enlargement debates Steeg and Risse observed a similar predominance of national we-references. However, they were aware of the limitations of this in­ dicator:137 Since the usage of "we" in the newspapers is very much contingent on language and style, it is a problematic indicator in comparative research. Conse­ quently, I shall not be using this in the present study. Research on European identity has demonstrated that the term 'Europe' has evoked numerous associations: Europe has been conceived as a community of law, as a community of peace and prosperity, as a counter-concept to the US, as a com­ munity of shared responsibility, or as a departure from the past. Steeg and Risse argued that a European sense of community was discursively constructed in con­ troversial debates about normative ideals in which visions of Europe played a role. They found that at the core of the Haider debate there was the shared invocation of Europe as a community of law. In the debate on Eastern enlargement, however, various narratives and interpretations of the history of Europe played a role. Fur­ thermore, Europe was associated with "peace, security, prosperity and unity" 138 In the debate on the Iraq war of 2003, Knorr observed that French and German media constructed an image of Europe based on respect for international law in opposition to the US in the debate on the Iraq war. In the face of British support for US intervention, British newspapers did not share such constructions. Similarly, Seifert found mobilisation against US industry in the debate on GM food 139 Kryzanowski and Wodak interpreted the construction of shared European respon­ sibility in the debate on the Mohammad caricatures as a novel phenomenon 140 According to Seidendorf, the reinterpretation of Europe's history in the postwar 135 136 137 138 139

Peters et al., "National and transnational public spheres," 149. Lucht and Trefas, Hat Europa eine Identitat?, 22. Steeg and Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Communication, 17. Ibid., 2G-22. Knorr, Europaische Offentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 230f, Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public. 8. Seifert only mentions this in passing, while stressing the dominance of na­ tional and local identifications. 140 Michal Krzyzanowski and Ruth Wodak, Case Studies of Media Discourse. Introductory Note

42

INTRODUCTION

period had already begun in the 1950s in Germany. The new Europe was to be built in opposition to Europe's past of war and fascism as Europe's "other" 141 Such conceptualisations spread throughout Europe during the postwar period. Similarly, commentators in the European quality newspapers in 2000 engaged in the construction of what Hans-J6rg Trenz described as "progressive European­ ism". They encouraged European identification by associating Europe with progress and the departure from its nationalist past 142 Diez Medrano singled out the common basis of a European imagined community throughout Spain, Ger­ many and the UK that was stable over time. This related to the benefits of the large European market, but also to the downsides of EU integration such as bureauc­ racy and democratic unaccountability. At the same time, Diez Medrano stressed the different associations Europe evoked in different national contexts: fears about sovereignty in the UK, hopes for modernisation and overcoming isolation in Spain and qualms about the demo­ cratic deficit and fears concerning the Labour market in Germany 143 More funda­ mentally, some researchers rejected the expectation of growing European identifi­ cation. Instead they stressed the persistence and preponderance of national identi­ fications and framings of Europe. For instance, Seifert argued that the issue of healthy food elicited sub-national, regional and local, rather than European identi­ fication. Europeans were apparently not aware of their shared rejection of GM food 144 Reporting the results of the EMEDIATE project, Krzyzanowski and Wo­ dak highlighted the fact that instances of European crises in the postwar period were strictly perceived in national terms. European crises had not in fact led to the invocation of European values and the association of Europe with certain values 145 However, two questions remained unexplored: First, to what extent did conceptu­ alisations change? Secondly, which conditions account for shared or differing con­ cepts and identifications? In sum, this review of the state of empirical research demonstrates that it is very difficult to draw clean-cut conclusions from a variety of studies that opera­ tionalise similar research questions in very different ways. Furthermore, research covering the European public sphere from a longer-term perspective is almost en­ tirely absent. Most research results refer to the 1990s and 2000s. During this pe­ riod, the EU increasingly became a point of reference. Essentially, the same issues were discussed at the same time at the same level of relevance. This was increas­ ingly the case, even though in various respects national differences persisted. The number of European correspondents grew. Transnational communication, meas-

141

142 143 144 145

and Comparative Findings (EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Terror', 2006), 36. Stefan Seidendorf, "Verstandigung gegen die Vergangenheit? - Europaisierung von Erinnerung in Frankreich und Deutschland," in Reichweiten der Verstiindigung. Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Nation und Europa, ed. Matthias Sch6ning and Stefan Seidendorf (Heidelberg, 2006), 267, 270f. Trenz, Europa in den Medien. 360-373. Dfez Medrano, Framing Europe. 249. Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Pub­ lic, 16. Michal Krzyzanowski, AlUla Triandafyllidou, and Ruth Wodak, " Conclusions: Europe, Media, Crisis, and the European Public Sphere," in Europe in Crisis: The 'European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzy­ zanowski (Basingstoke, 2009), Krzyzanowski and Wodak, Case Studies of Media Discourse, 37.

CASES IN TIME AND SPACE

43

ured in terms of the debate of opinions from abroad, remained essentially stable. However, in some countries, e.g. in Britain, newspapers were more domestically oriented than in others. In the discourse on European integration, various concep­ tions of Europe were discursively constructed. While some of them were shared, nationally different conceptions continued to persist. To what extent these con­ cepts implied a European identification, requires further research. In many cases, the evidence concerning the five aspects of the European public sphere is ambiva­ lent or sketchy. Due to the absence of a longer-term perspective it is impossible to draw conclusions with regard to the development of European public communi­ cation. In an attempt to address this lacuna, this study will undertake a systematic historical comparison in order to generate reliable time series data for the first time, which will enable conclusions to be drawn in respect of the much-debated emergence of a European public sphere. The remaining part of the introduction will explain the selection of cases and sources.

1.4 Cases in time and space Inquiring into the history of European public communication, this study is com­ parative in two senses: a temporal dimension - considering change over time - and a spatial dimension - involving comparisons between European countries. When choosing cases, two criteria have to be weighed. First, only a limited number of cases can be selected, in order to reduce the amount of data and keep the project man­ ageable 146 Secondly, the cases selected have to be comparable. The goal of case se­ lection is to hold constant as many variables as possible, in order that variation can largely be attributed to change over time or differences between countries or me­ dia 147

1.4.1 Time Two reasons informed the choice of the time period. First, by selecting the period that immediately precedes the well-researched post-Maastricht era, it will be pos­ sible to extend the temporal horizon of current research and allow for a longer­ term assessment of continuity and change. Secondly, by covering the two decades between 1969 and 1991 this study focuses on two decades which differ substan­ tially with regard to the intensity, the pace and the modes of European integration. So far the period between 1969 and 1985 has largely been dismissed as Europe's "dark ages". Only the recent debate on "Europe's second generation" has called for a reassessment of this time 148 By contrast, the period from 1985 until 1991 has been celebrated as the period of European relaunch. Driven by Commission activ­ ism and converging member state interest, European integration made an unprec­ edented leap with the completion of the the Single Market and the move towards 146 Jiirgen Kocka, " Comparison and Beyond," History and Theory 42 (2003): 4l. 147 Markus Haverland, "Does the EU cause domestic developments? Improving case selection in Europeanisation research," West European Politics 29 (2006): 139, Arendt Lijphardt, "Compara­ " tive Politics and Comparative Method, American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 687. 148 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957: die Einigung Europas. 156.

44

INTRODUCTION

the European Union. Juxtaposing these two periods allows for an analysis of the relationship between European integration and the European public sphere. In other words, did more rapid European integration bring about a growth in and a diversification of European public communication? My research design takes an event-based approach. As the newspaper sources for this period are not accessible in electronic format, but only as microfilms, it is impossible to carry out electronic sampling for a debate on a certain topic. An event-based study enables a certain number of issues around a certain date to be covered. A continuous, comprehensive sample of a number of consecutive days can be analysed in a variety of ways. First, patterns of European coverage devel­ oping around the event can be singled out. Since newspapers might not have cov­ ered the same issues on exactly the same day, this ensures completeness. Moreo­ ver, selecting specific events facilitates the historical contextualisation. Finally, since the average level of routine European public communication has long been low,149 I selected some of the most prominent events in European politics, events which are likely to have been focal point of "crisis communication" and to mark the peaks of media attention during the respective time period. European summits of the heads of state and government have taken place more regularly since 1969. They were institutionalised as the European Council at the summit of Paris 1974. As important recurring events, they lend themselves to comparison across time. Summits make particularly suitable cases for study: From the Summit of The Hague in 1969 onwards, European integration in the 1970s was characterised by intergovernmental initiative at European summits. Key decisions were made at meetings at the highest political level. Until the present, EU summits have been the most visible events of the politics of European integration 150 Five summits have been selected for their political relevance 151 At the sum­ mits selected, some of the most important and most consequential political deci­ sions of European Community politics were finalised. From a normative perspec­ tive, this is a valid choice, as important European decisions should have been dis­ cussed in the public sphere. In order to cover the entire period, the events should be evenly spread throughout the two decades. The 1969 summit of The Hague, which opened the door for British membership, marks the beginning of the period studied. The new French president Georges Pompidou set targets "achevement", "approfondissement" and "elargissement", which have determined the trajectory of European integration until the present 152 Among the summits of the mid-1970s, the Paris summit of 1974 produced the most tangible results: The Regional Devel­ opment Fund was set up, and a number of institutional innovations were intro­ duced, such as the European Council and the agreement on direct elections to the European Parliament. In the latter half of the 1970s, the Brussels European Council 149 Gerhards, "Europaisierung von Okonomie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 293--295. 150 Alternatively, European elections could have been considered. However, as the first direct elec­ tions only took place in June 1979, it would not have been possible to cover the entire time pe­ riod. 151 For the selection, I have relied on the historiography of the European integration and the Euro­ pean Council. Clearly, the historical and political relevance that appears in retrospect does not necessarily coincide with contemporary perception. 152 This was highlighted by Sir Ralph Dahrendorf at the " Konstanzer Meisterklasse", directed by Bernhard Giesen, September 2002.

CASES IN TIME AND SPACE

45

of 1978 marks the most important policy innovation during this period, namely introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS). The European Council in Luxembourg 1985 decided upon the Single European Act (SEA), the first treaty revi­ sion in the history of the EC, which kicked off the Single Market Programme. At Maastricht in 1991, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) drastically widened the scope of EC policy-making, notably including Common Foreign and Security Pol­ icy (CFSP) and European Monetary Union (EMU). These summits are also comparable in a formal sense: They all took place on a Monday and Tuesday in early December, thus occurring at the same moment in the weekly and the annual news cycle. I chose to study a period of two weeks around the summit, namely the entire week before the event and the remainder of the week after. I thus covered the preparatory work in the run-up to the summit and the reactions to the meeting, including e.g. the governments' presentation of the summit results to the national parliaments 153 The following table gives an overview of the place and dates of the summits, the main decisions taken, and the period of study.

1.4.2 Space As indicated above, the space that the political European public sphere refers to is that of the European Community. In this study, European integration is limited to the process of EC integration that started with the European Coal and Steel Com­ munity (ECSC) in 1951. This Europe of the Six signed the Rome Treaty in 1957 comprised the European Economic Community (EEC), EURATOM and the origi­ nal ECSC. By many standards, this was the most dynamic and successful attempt at European integration, EC integration having created a multi-level polity, sur­ passing mere intergovernmental cooperation 154 Limiting this study to the EC ex­ cludes other European institutions such as the Council of Europe, which deals mainly with human rights, or defence institutions such as NATO and the WEU 155 It also ignores alternative European institutions such as COMECON during the Cold War, intended to strengthen economic exchange in Communist Eastern Eu­ rope, or EFTA, the free trade agreement Britain encouraged as a response to the founding of the EC 156 Most of their members eventually joined the EU in various waves of enlargement. In the period between 1969 and 1991 the geographical

153 In preliminary research of a longer period of time I found that nearly the entire coverage relat­ ing to the summit was limited to the two-weeks period. 154 Cf. Simon Hix, The political system ofthe European Union. Second edition (New York, 2005). 155 WEU has been integrated into the EU framework only by the Maastricht Treaty: " The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." (Treaty on European Union (TEU), title 5, article J4, 2). For WEU's history see: Anne Deighton, ed., Western European Union 1954-1997: defence, security, integration (Oxford, 1997). 156 Wolfram Kaiser, "Culturally Embedded and Path-Dependent: Peripheral Alternatives to ECSC/ EEC "core Europe" since 1945," Journal of European Integration History, 7 (2001): 14f, Wolfram Kaiser, "The Successes and Limits of Industrial Market Integration: The European Free Trade " Association 1963--1969, in Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969, ed. Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden, 2001).

46

INTRODUCTION

scope of the Ee changed three times: First in 1973 with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, then in 1981, with the inclusion of Greece, and again in 1986 with the so-called Iberian enlargement to Spain and Portugal. In an ideal world, a study of the European public sphere should comprise Eu­ ropean public communication in all member states. However, not even collabora­ tive projects have been able to cover the EU in its entirety. Limiting this study to three countries, I will not be able to draw conclusions in respect of the whole of European public communication. Only including large countries, while ignoring smaller ones, may lead to a systematic distortion. However, choosing three coun­ tries of similar size and political importance will improve the conditions for com­ parison, and will allow this comparison to be situated solidly in its historical con­ text 157 Table 2: Important European summit conferences 1969-1991 Place - Year -

Main results

Date

Period of study

The Hague 1969, NL

F accepts UK membership, agreement on " own resources", completion, deepening, enlargement

Mon. 1 / 12 and Tue. 2/12/ 1969

Mon. 24/ 1 1 / Sat. 6/12/ 1969

Paris 1974, F

Introduction of European Councils, direct EP elections, regional fund, TIndemans-Report commissioned

Mon. 9/12 and Tue. IO/12/ 1974

Mon. 2/12/ Sat. 14/12/1974

Brussels 1978, D

Decision to introduce European Monetary System, commission for the preparation of the institutions for enlargement

Mon. 4/12 and Tue. 5/ 12/1978

Mon. 27/11/ Sat. 9/12/ 1978

Luxembourg 1985, LV

Agreement on Single European Act achievement of the Single Market by 1992

Mon. 2/12 until Wed. 4/12/1985

Mon. 25/ 1 1 / Sat. 7/12/ 1985

Maastricht 1991, NL

Agreement on Maastricht treaty: Economic and Monetary Union, European Union.

Mon. 9/12 and Tue. IO/12/ 1991

Mon. 2/12/ Sat. 14/12/1991

Presidency

157 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "European history as comparative history," Ab Imperio 5 (2004): 116.

CASES IN TIME AND SPACE

47

The United Kingdom, France and (West) Germany158 are comparable cases, be­ cause they are similar in many respects 159 They are the most populous West Euro­ pean countries with roughly similar populations of around 60 million (until Ger­ man reunification) and comprise the largest economies. Between themselves, they accounted for the majority of the population in the Community of the Twelve. Ac­ cordingly they represented a large part of the audience in the European public sphere. These three countries are also the most powerful and politically most visi­ ble member states. At the same time, their historical experiences, particularly in the postwar period, were very different and led to diverging expectations of Euro­ pean integration. Hence, political attitudes towards European integration con­ tinue differ. This accounts for interesting variations in the comparison. Even though the UK only joined the EC in 1973, I have covered Britain from 1969, when the decision to eventually accept Britain as a member was taken in The Hague,16o an event that was closely observed by the British public.

1.5 Sources My study is limited to the public sphere of the media, because in modern mass societies this is where politics are debated and where people learn about European integration 161 Due to the marginal role played by transnational European media,162 I will rely on national media. Despite occasional criticism that public sphere re­ search has focused too much on national quality newspapers,163 they remain the central arena for information and critique not only of national but also of interna­ tional and European politics. Quality newspapers mainly write for an elite audi­ ence of the well-educated and affluent strata of society. Even so, broadsheets have a pivotal role as opinion leaders in national media systems. Their agenda-setting, their coverage and commentary are closely observed by fellow journalists. Hence they can be considered opinion leaders. Assuming that European integration was covered only superficially during the pre-Maastricht period, quality newspapers have been chosen as the "most likely case" for observing European public com­ munication.164

158 In the following, for reasons of readability and convenience, I will frequently use the term Ger­ many also for West Germany before re-unification in 1990. As the German Democratic Republic was not a relevant player in West European integration, this will not lead to ambiguities. Like­ wise, I will use United Kingdom (UK) and (Great) Britain interchangeably, even though the first term is a political one, while the second one is a geographical term that does not include North­ ern Ireland - which is part of the UK. 159 Haverland, "Does the EU cause domestic developments?/I 139. 160 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 152-155. 161 Cf. European Commission, Public opinion in the European Union. Eurobarometer Spring 2004. EB 61. (Eurobarometer, 2004). 162 Cf. Vetters, "Konvent + Verfassung Offentlichkeit./I. 66-73. 163 Trenz, "European Dilemmas./I 410. 164 Cf. Barbara Pfetsch, "Media Opinion in European Public Debate. An Empirical Study of News­ paper Editorials in seven Countries/l (paper presented at the AlUlual Conference of the ICA, 26-30 May 2005, New York, 2005), Sifft et aI., "Segmented Europeanization," 134. =

48

INTRODUCTION

In line with the practice in other comparative media studies I selected two newspapers per country,165 in order to roughly account for political divisions within national national public spheres. For France I selected Le Monde (LM)166 and Le Figaro (LF), for the UK the Guardian (GU) and the Daily Telegraph (DT),167 and for Germany the Suddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei­ tung (FAZ) I 68 Whereas Le Monde, the Guardian and the Suddeutsche Zeitung tend to be left of centre, Le Figaro, the Daily Telegraph and the FAZ represent the conserva­ tive views in the respective countries 169 Some studies additionally include a news­ paper from the USA as an external benchmark. The external comparison enables them to elicit more clearly what European media have in common and what dis­ tinguishes European public communication. Methodologically, this is good prac­ tice 170 However, in my study, I did not include such an external comparison for three reasons: First, Marianne van de Steeg has demonstrated that the debate on EU issues in the non-EU media significantly differs from the one in EU media.l7l Second, it is difficult to find an an appropriate external benchmark.172 The US are distant, large and barely affected by EU decisions. Thus it can be expected that the amount and the mode of coverage of EU news strongly diverge. The role of Swiss media, particularly the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, with its large international coverage and its large audience outside Switzerland, is more ambiguous. Switzerland is po­ litically outside the EU, but it has been connected to the EU and, earlier, to the EC by a great number of political, economic and geographical ties. These links call into question the rigid juxtaposition between inside and outside. Finally and most importantly, as I understand European public sphere as an arena of communica­ tion with a view to the European polity, the European public sphere is limited to the EC by definition. Consequently, an external comparison would only be indis­ pensable when trying to "prove" the existence of the European public sphere as an

165 MarialUle van de Steeg found significant quantitative differences e.g. between SZ and FAZ in her analysis of enlargement. Hence, it is problematic to solely rely on one newspaper per coun­ " try. Steeg, liThe public sphere in the European Union. . 146. 166 Le Momie does not appear on Mondays, but the Sunday issue features as a Sunday-Monday is­ sue. Therefore I count it as the Monday paper. 167 The Daily Telegraph was chosen instead of the traditionally more renowned Times, because the Times did not appear from Dec. 1 1978, for more than one year, due to an industrial dispute. Given that the Brussels summit took place in Dec. 1978, the sample would have been incom­ plete. The archives replace the Times with The Daily Telegraph which might be interpreted as in­ " " terchangeable. The Daily Telegraph - nicknamed Torygraph stands for more pronounced con­ servative views, however, it was used to represent the British quality press along with The Guardian also by Hodess, " News Coverage of European Politics. " " 168 For a similar choice, e.g. Vetters, "Konvent + Verfassung Offentlichkeit. . 148. " 169 Kevin, Europe in the Media. 51. Albrecht Luter, Politische Profilbildung jenseits der Parteien? " Redaktionelle Linien in Kommentaren deutscher Qualitatszeitungen, in Die Stimme der Medien. Pressekommentare und politische Offentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Christiane Ei­ Iders, FriedheIm Neidhardt, and Barbara Pietsch (Wiesbaden, 2004), 181. " 170 Haverland, "Does the EU cause domestic developments? 139, 144. " 171 E.g. Steeg, "Does a public sphere exist in the EU?, 621f, Steeg, "The public sphere in the Euro­ " pean Union. . 141. Knorr's finding that coverage does not differ in the debate on international politics is irrelevant here. Cf. Knorr, Europaische Offentlichkeit und transnationale Kommuni­ kation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 220-225. 172 Cf. for systematic considerations and for Switzerland respectively the US as a comparative case " Haverland, "Does the EU cause domestic developments?, 139-141. =

SOURCES

49

empirical phenomenon through a comparison with other public spheres 173 How­ ever, this study seeks to inquire into structural changes throughout time. The limitation to quality newspapers admittedly implies an elite bias. How­ ever, regional and tabloid newspapers were excluded from this study mainly for methodological reasons. Given the differences in media structures between the three countries, it would have been difficult to find comparable cases. While in Britain and Germany tabloid newspapers are very important, there is no such tra­ dition in France. Conversely, regional newspapers are very important in Germany and France, but rather marginal in the UK, where the London newspapers domi­ nate 174 Even though it is difficult to underestimate the role of television in opinion formation within the public sphere, TV was excluded for methodological and practical reasons. The analysis of audio-visual materials requires a complex meth­ odology and the consideration of additional contexts such as the different tradi­ tions of TV news programming. Finally, access to historical TV sources is prohibi­ tively expensive. Broadcasters' archives are run as profit centres providing serv­ ices for TV production and have to be paid for at commercial rates. Even though public opinion is at the core of the concept of the public sphere, the effect of European public communication will not be examined in this study 175 Reception research is highly complex and near-impossible to undertake in a his­ torical perspective, due to a lack of suitable sources. Using Euro-Barometer poll data could serve as a very rough proxy; however, it is impossible to systematically link these data to the media coverage in a credible way. The focus in this study is on the content and the structure of European public communication in the media instead. In addition to written sources, I conducted interviews in Brussels in July 2004 with the current and occasionally also with the former European correspond­ ents of all the newspapers I have used. Additionally, I spoke with the press repre­ sentatives of the permanent representations of France, the UK and Germany, as well as the retired press officer of the Council of Ministers. Most of the information from the interviews relates to the present. However, some of the interviewees were able to provide information on Brussels and summit news practices and their tra­ ditions. These interviews largely served as background material.

1.6 Organisation of my study This historical study of European public communication takes the theoretical de­ bate on the European public sphere as its point of departure. The second chapter explores the theoretical background in greater detail, to develop hypotheses and guiding questions in a more thorough manner and explain the choice of methods applied. Chapter three will provide the necessary context for the analysis, in par­ ticular an assessment of those factors which are likely to have influenced the de173 This is the approach suggested by: Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Kommunikati­ onsgemeinschaft," 144. 174 Pfetsch et al., The Voice of the Media in European Public Sphere, 11. 175 For a recent example of the kind of research that attempts to assess public opinion in electoral behaviour d. Sarah Hinzer Hobolt, " Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party En­ dorsements in Referendums on European Integration," European Journal ofPolitical Research 46 (2007): 151.

50

INTRODUCTION

velopment of European public communication. Considering the development of European integration from a longer-term perspective, as well as with regard to the short-term context around the summits will allow the link between European inte­ gration and the European public sphere to be examined: Has the latter really lagged behind the former? Specific national ideas on Europe as well as the condi­ tions and traditions of the newspapers are likely to have shaped European public communication. In chapter four, I will present the findings of the comparative analysis of the newspapers, addressing the five research questions in turn. In the final part, I will summarise the development of European public communication and draw conclusions with respect to the history of European integration, the pos­ sible reasons for the development and the implications for the debate on European integration and democracy.

2 AN HIS TORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES How can the European public sphere be studied from an historical perspective - in a way that is adequate to the implications of the concept? This chapter seeks to provide an introduction to the notion of the public sphere, and the specific prob­ lems of the idea of a European public sphere which have recently attracted so much discussion. Specifying the definitions and the research questions presented in the introduction, the goal is to develop a research design amenable for historical re­ search. In the second and third parts of this chapter I will discuss some of the methodological challenges and present the concrete operationalisation of the re­ search questions.

2.1 THEORIES OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE 2.1.1 The notion of the public sphere ("Ojfentlichkeit") The central element of the public sphere is the notion of the "public" (Ojfentlichkeit) 176 What the word "public"177 signifies can best be elicited by juxta­ posing it to its two counter-concepts. First, the adjective public is understood as the opposite of private 178 The public (sphere) accordingly refers to a "sphere of ac­ tion" that involves the collective. It comprises societal issues, issues of common concern, frequently organised under the auspices of the state and administered by public servants. Conversely, the term private denotes those areas of human action which tend to take place behind the closed doors of people's homes. It refers to the sphere of the family, of relatives or close friends. The area of the public is usually expected to be under the control of the collective. However, the boundaries and the extent of public versus individual control - for instance in the area of private ownership of resources - have remained contentious in modern societies. Secondly, public may also mean the opposite of secret. Privacy or secrecy de­ scribes the limitations of what everyone is allowed or entitled to know and talk about. What remains secret and what is to be kept secret are constantly contested. Protection from exposure is an important quality of the private sphere - as debates about the protection of privacy in the age of global terrorism indicate. Govern176 Public sphere (sometimes also: public space or simply the public) is the generally accepted Eng­ lish translation for what in the Habermas' German original reads "Dffentlichkeit" . In French, the concept implies a similar spacial metaphor, e.g. Dominique Wolton, ilLes contradictions de " l'espace public mediatise, Hermes 10 (1991). The German term also suggests the connotation of " openness (" 0f!enheit ), which is part of the normative demands. On the history of the concept see: Peter Uwe Hohendahl et al., Offentlichkeit. Geschichte eines kritischen Begriffs (Stuttgart, 2000), " Lucian Holscher, "Offentlichkeit, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur poli­ tisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Otto BrulUler, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart, 1978). 177 Both as a noun and an adjective. 178 It is this first aspect that Richard Sennett stressed in his famous study. Richard Sennett, The Fall o[Public Man (New York, 1977).

52

AN HISTORlCAL ANALYSIS OF TIIE EUROPEAN PUBUC SPHERE

ment secrecy, by contrast, raises suspicion. The term public refers to the "structure of communication and knowledge" that is legitimately open to all. In fact, the con­ cept of the public sphere comprises both meanings of the term. It describes the sphere that is of public concern, the sphere of the political. The normative expecta­ tion is that issues that are of public concern need to be discussed in public by the public as the relevant collective. This collective consists of an ensemble of actors who discuss, negotiate and intervene in the public, before or after decisions are taken. Accordingly, the public sphere can be described as both a sphere ofaction and a structure of communication. 179 The notion of the public sphere is a modern phenomenon. In his famous and most influential study "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere"l80 first published in 1962 - Habermas shows how the public sphere emerged as part of civil society's emancipation from the absolutist state in early modern Western Europe. Establishing the public sphere, subjects who started to define themselves as citizens demanded changes in the way government was conducted. Tradition­ ally, monarchs used the public sphere for representation. They sought to maintain their legitimacy by demonstrating their power - for instance, through ostentatious display of arms or conspicuous consumption. Political decision-making, however, took place behind closed doors, carefully protected from the inquisitive eyes of the people 181 The Enlightenment called for an end to this practice. Decision-making was now to be subjected to public scrutiny, to an enlightened critique based on the principles of law and reason 182 The designated place for this critique was the pub­ lic sphere, the place where citizens could interact among each other, discussing in public what they deemed to be public affairs. In the process of debate they formed an identifiable public opinion. Thus the "political public sphere" was meant to connect society and the state 183 Habermas claimed that the lSth century public sphere was characterised by intensive rational public reasoning in the new salons and coffee houses. Habermas based his model of the public sphere on an idealised version of this specific environment.184 Against this backdrop he presented a story of the public sphere's decline in the age of mass media and professional public " 179 Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit, 55--59, quote 56. 180 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The English translation of the book in 1989 started an extensive English-language debate on the concept: Craig J. Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the public sphere (Cambridge, MA, 1992), Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, eds., After Habermas: new perspectives on the public sphere (Oxford, 2004), Hans J. Kleinsteuber, " " Habermas and the public sphere. From a German to a European perspective, Javnost. The Public 8 (2002). 181 Jiirgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der burger­ lichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, 1990 [1962]). 58-67. See also: Herfried Miinkler, "Die Visibilitat der " Macht und die Strategien der Machtvisibilisierung, in Macht der Offentlichkeit-Offentlichkeit der Macht, ed. Gerhard Gahler (Baden-Baden, 1995). 182 Writing at about the same time as Habermas, Reinhart Koselleek was less sanguine about the effects of the Enlightenment idea of universal public critique. Reinhart Koselleek, Critique and crisis: Enlightenment and the patlwgenesis of modern society (Oxford, 1988 [1959]), Reinhart Kosel­ leek, Kritik und Krise: eine Studie zur Pathogenese der burgerlichen Welt, 7. ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1992 [1959]). 183 Habermas, StruktUlwandel der Offentlichkeit. 86-90. " " 184 Jiirgen Habermas, Further reflections on the Public Sphere, in Habermas and the public sphere, ed. Craig J. Calhoun (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 422, Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeitt. " 12. For a critique: Craig J. Calhoun, "Introduction. Habermas and the Public Sphere, in Haber­ mas and the public sphere, ed. Craig J. Calhoun (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 39.

THEORIES OF THE EUROPEAN PUBUC SPHERE

53

relations, which increasingly pushed aside the rational public reasoning he cher­ ished 185 Habermas' model was not a neutral one solely devised for analytic pur­ poses: rather, he consciously stressed the normative implications of the public sphere, opposing them to the deficiencies he found in the public sphere in West Germany in the 1950s and early 1960S 186 Bernhard Peters defended this normative concept, recommending utilisation of the normative model as a heuristic tool for the analysis of public communica­ tion. The concept may serve to measure under what conditions, how, and to what extent empirical findings approximate or deviate from key normative principles. These normative principles were necessary for the public sphere to fulfil its role, namely, linking society to the polity, in order to enable democratic self-govern­ ment. To Peters, three normative demands were key: equality and openness with respect to actors' participation, and the presence of issues in the public sphere. Equality and openness ensured transparency in relation to what was at stake in the political process and enabled citizens to make political choices. In line with Habermas' reasoning, Peters defended discursiveness, i.e. the use of rational argu­ ment, as a third normative principle 187 A debate on political issues that is guided by reason and dialogical interaction should contribute to an adequate and enlight­ ened evaluation of the issues at stake as well as to social learning 188 Essentially, the normative principles Peters proposed are indispensable for "opinion forma­ tion", the main function of the public sphere according to Neidhardt and Gerhards:189 Equality and openness are central for transparency in relation to the information entering the public sphere. Discursiveness contributes to the process­ ing and evaluation of information (validation). All three of these normative princi­ ples help to provide orientation to both policy makers and citizens. At the same time, Peters was aware that these normative principles were normally subject to systematic limitations in the practice of public communication l90 The following question may help to grasp the essential aspects of the public sphere as both a sphere of action and an arena of communication: Who communi­ cates with whom in front of whom about what and how ?191 Moreover, what are the ex­ pected consequences ? First, who communicates with whom and in front ofwhom refers to the actors or participants present in the public sphere, their scope of action and in­ teraction. It makes us aware that communication is not necessarily dialogical, but tripartite. In many cases, public communication takes place on a stage in front of an audience. This has important implications for equality and openness. In par­ ticular, the distinction between communicators and audience varies with the level of the public sphere. Secondly, about what and how actors should communicate dif185 Habermas, StruktUlwandel der Offentlichkeit. 223fl., part IV-VI. 186 For a criticial view: Gerhards and Neidhardt, " Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Offentlichkeit," 33. 187 Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," 67f. 188 Ibid., 89-97. 189 Gerhards and Neidhardt, " Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Offentlichkeit.", Neidhardt, "Offentlichkeit, Offentliche Meinung und soziale Bewegungen," 8f. 190 Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," 69-89. 191 Cf. e.g. Ruud Koopmans and Barbara Pfetsch, "Obstacles or Motors of Europeanization? Ger­ man Media and the Transnationalisation of Public Debate," Communications. The European Jour­ nal of Communication Research 31 (2006): 120, Myra Marx Ferree et al., "Four Models of the Public " Sphere in Modern Democracies, Theory and Society 31 (2002): 290.

54

AN HISTORlCAL ANALYSIS OF TIIE EUROPEAN PUBUC SPHERE

fers according to the normative expectation of the theorist. As opposed to the dis­ cursive model suggested by Habermas and Peters, Gerhards' model based on lib­ eral democracy focuses on transparency. Thirdly, with regard to the expected con­ sequences of public communication: it fulfils various functions for society and the polity. I will discuss the different levels, normative models and expected functions in turn.

Levels of the public sphere: Encounters, assemblies, media This study will deal exclusively with the public sphere of the media. However, only by juxtaposing it to the two further levels of the public sphere - namely the public spheres of encounters and assemblies - will the specific advantages of the public sphere of the media, and the constraints to which it is subject, become apparent. The three levels that can be distinguished analytically differ systematically in re­ spect of the broadness of actors' participation, the mode and intensity of their in­ teraction and the size of the audience. There seems to be a fundamental trade-off: The wider the potential audience, the greater are the restrictions to equal, open and active participation 192 The public sphere of encounters is the least structured and hence the most open and equal level of the public sphere. It comprises individuals discussing any issue they can agree on while meeting casually in public places, such as on a city square or in a cafe. There are no formal limitations to participation. Anyone can speak or listen. The mode of communication is direct and dialogical. There is a reasonable chance that communication will be also discursive, involving arguments and rea­ son, even though this depends on the participants and their intentions. However, since encounters involve face-to-face communication, only a small number of peo­ ple can participate and interact at the same time. This also implies that such en­ counters usually do not take place in front of an audience. For this reason, the discussion involved here is likely to remain inconsequentiaJ.193 The public sphere of assemblies is more restrictive with respect to the actors involved in discussions and the issues covered. Assemblies - such as protest ral­ lies or reunions of citizens - tend to be called to discuss a particular issue. As such, only those actors will attend who are interested in this specific issue. Restrictions of membership - in an association holding an assembly or in a parliament - ex­ clude potential participants. Unlike encounters, assemblies are characterised by the distinct roles of speakers and a largely passive audience. Speakers are often selected for their supposedly superior knowledge or the relevance of their views due to their prestige or position of power. Thus there is no equality in respect of who may speak, but rather an asymmetry favouring those with superior resourc­ es l94 This further restricts the openness to further issues, because speakers them­ selves tend to set the agenda. Speakers may or may not argue discursively. De­ pending on the format, dialogue is possible, not only among speakers, but occa­ sionally also with the audience, if the auditorium is allowed to pose questions. 192 For the following argument see: Gerhards and Neidhardt, "Strukturen und Funktionen moder­ nef Offentlichkeit," 50-56. 193 It is only under specific circumstances, e.g. where regimes control the freedom of speech at all other levels that the public sphere of encounters may become a breeding ground of opposition that may later spill over into the other levels of the public sphere. 194 Cf. Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," 73.

THEORIES OF THE EUROPEAN PUBUC SPHERE

55

However, due to the focus on specific issues and the relevance of the speakers, as­ semblies are more likely to be received and further communicated to a larger audi­ ence, triggering additional public communication. This in turn may influence the opinion formation of policy makers. The public sphere of the media is the most restrictive one in terms of openness to issues and the equal participation of actors. Professional journalists select issues they deem interesting to their target audiences on the basis of criteria of (imputed) relevance. They routinely apply professional norms, but also criteria specific to their news organisation or medium. They thus act as gate-keepers and agenda set­ ters at the same time 195 The barriers to participation as a speaker are high. Roles are highly differentiated. Professional communicators, such as journalists, spokes­ persons or PR agents act as speakers, while the audience becomes more abstract. It is no longer physically present, and its reaction no longer directly visible to the speakers. While the speakers may engage in discursive argument, direct dialogue between the audience and the speakers is no longer possible. At the same time however, the media do reach mass audiences, and thus play a crucial role in shap­ ing public opinion. The media themselves voice their own opinions (or the opin­ ions of other speakers found to be relevant to comment upon or analyse) in the editorial pages or other largely discursive formats. Such 'published opinion' re­ ceives considerable attention both as an influence upon and a barometer of public opinion, and will therefore feature prominently in my analysis 196 Not least due to the centrality of the media in public communication, this study focuses on the public sphere of the media. However, despite the systematic restrictions the media are subject to, it remains worthwhile to explore openness and equality with re­ spect to the actors participating and the issues discussed, within the bounds of these systemic constraints. The normative demands for equality, openness and particularly discursiveness that come to the fore in this context ultimately reflect the underlying normative model of the public sphere held by the researchers who highlight them.

The discursive and the liberal model of the public sphere Jiirgen Gerhards distinguished a Habermasian discursive and a liberal-represent­ ative model of the public sphere, which rested on the differing normative expecta­ tions with respect to democracy in each case 197 The discursive model based on the ideas of deliberative democracy198 differed from the liberal model with regard to the process by which democratic decision making was connected to the will of the people. In the discursive model the public sphere was conceived as a space in which discourse and learning were meant to shape new, qualitatively superior, more rational and thus more acceptable political solutions. The liberal model downplayed, if not outright rejected, the expectation that the debate in the public 195 Cf. Ibid., 79. 196 Cf. e.g. FriedheIm Neidhardt, Christiane Eilders, and Katrin Voltmer, "Einleitung. Die Stimme der Medien - Pressekommentare als Gegenstand der Offentlichkeitsforschung," in Die Stimme der Medien. Pressekommentare und politische Offentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Christiane Eilders, FriedheIm Neidhardt, and Barbara Pfetsch (Wiesbaden, 2004), 11-13. 197 Gerhards, "Diskursive versus liberale Offentlichkeit," 3-5. 198 Apart from Habermas, Faktizitlft und Geltung. chapters VII &VIII, see also: Jon Elster, ed., Delib­ erative Democracy (Cambridge, 1998), Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, eds., Democ­ racy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation? (London, 2000).

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AN HISTORlCAL ANALYSIS OF TIIE EUROPEAN PUBUC SPHERE

sphere should transform opinions and achieve consensual solutions. Rather, a per­ sistent pluralism of opinions was to be respected. Decisions were to be taken by compromise or elections. The role of the public sphere was simply to provide transparency in respect of the range of views on a given issue 199 Furthermore, both approaches differed in their normative expectations as to who was to participate and how they were to communicate. In the discursive model, a dominant role in the public sphere for actors from the centre of decision making was regarded with suspicion. Governments epitomised a "public sphere of power" ("vermachtete Offentlichkeit") as opposed to the normatively superior "autochthonous public sphere" ("autochthone Offentlichkeit"). The latter rather comprised actors from the periphery of political decision making, namely civil society and public interest groups. Actors from the periphery were deemed more legitimate as spokespersons for society because they were more closely connected to the "lifeworld"2oo of the citizens. Conversely, in the liberal-representative model, elections were perceived as the central instrument for connecting public decision making to the will of the people. Accordingly, a certain dominance of elected gov­ ernments, parliaments, parties, courts and other actors from the political centre seemed legitimate. In order to make visible a pluralism of opinions within society, the key normative demand was transparency201With respect to the mode of com­ munication, the discursive model of the public sphere not only demanded that communication should be discursive; it also required that actors in the public sphere should in fact interact in a dialogical manner, taking into account each oth­ ers' views and opinions. Arguments should be rational, that is, involving the stat­ ing of reasons. The ideal result of the debate in an autochthonous public sphere should be consensus or at least a majority view. The proponents of the discursive model suspected that governments would not only try to dominate the public sphere, turning it into a "public sphere of power": They also feared that those in power would attempt to avoid rational argument and try to achieve mass loyalty by emotional appeal. The liberal model did not have a preference for a specific mode of communication, as long as debate in the public sphere reflected the range of relevant opinions present in society 202

Functions of the public sphere The central function of the public sphere - and hence also the reason why social scientists became interested in the concept - is that it provides the space for opinion formation. Public opinion, i.e. society's opinion with respect to politics and policy­ making, forms a crucial link between society and the polity that is essential for democracy, i.e. for society's governing of itself 203 Two further functions have fre­ quently been highlighted: First, the public sphere holds political actors accountable.

199 Gerhards, "Diskursive versus liberale Offentlichkeit," 3--5, 9f. For the liberal critique see: Bruce Ackerman, "Why Dialogue?," Journal o[Philosophy 86 (1989): 9. 200 Habermas, Faktizitlft und Geltung. 429. Cf. more extensively on the concept of lifeworld: Jiirgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System. A Critique ofFunctionalist Reason. (Boston, 1989 [1981]). 201 Gerhards, "Diskursive versus liberale Offentlichkeit," 6, 10, 12. 202 Ibid.: 71, 111. 203 Neidhardt, "Offentlichkeit, Offentliche Meinung und soziale Bewegungen," 8f.

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Furthermore, it is the arena in which the public discursively constructs and negoti­ ates its identity 2D4 The public sphere enables society to discuss current affairs, views and opin­ ions. It is in this process that public opinion is formed. Transparency is a key pre­ condition for the effective processing and evaluation of the information in the public sphere. Providing a space in which public opinion is formed, the public sphere provides orientation for both politicians and citizens 20s Through the dis­ cussion of the problems and advantages of political proposals and decisions, through the evaluation of the behaviour of political actors and through the mak­ ing public and denunciation of inappropriate action, the public sphere as a whole fulfils the important function of holding decision makers accountable. The public sphere is not only the space for the critical evaluation of politics and policy making, but also for ongoing reflection on of the foundations of society and the polity. It is in the public sphere that society - as a political community206 - becomes visible to itself207 Consequently, the construction of identity has fre­ quently been highlighted as a function of the public sphere. This notion of identity has been criticised for its essentialist overtones and its elusiveness, however. Building on the critique by Brubaker and Coopers,208 what can be elicited from the debate in the public sphere may more appropriately be described as its self-under­ standing. Self-understanding can be understood as a shared structure of meaning, comprising ideas relating to society and the political space 209 These sets of ideas are constantly discussed and renegotiated in the public sphere. They are of rele­ vance both to the legitimacy, i.e. the social acceptability, of the polity as a political structure, and to the identification of the people with the political community. Identification implies action. Identification denotes the active construction of an imagery that is meant not only to describe the specifics of the respective society, but also, and more importantly, to encourage an affective link between the indi­ vidual and the political community. Actors themselves should not only identify with society, but should encourage others to make this identification as well. Se­ mantically, there are two distinct fundamental logics underlying identification 21o First, identification implies the juxtaposition of the self to the other. In order to cre­ ate identification, actors frequently employ asymmetric counter-concepts211 to de­ scribe their own society in comparison to another society; thus their own society 204 E.g. Meyer, Europiiische Offentlichkeit als Kontrollsphiire. 54f. 205 Gerhards and Neidhardt, "Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Offentlichkeit.", Neidhardt, "Offentlichkeit, Offentliche Meinung und soziale Bewegungen," 8f. 206 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Nationalism and social communication (Cambridge, :rvIA, 1953). 70. 207 Hans-Jorg Trenz, "Europaische Offentlichkeit als Selbstbeschreibungshorizont der europa­ ischen Gesellschaft," in Die europiiische Gesellschajt, ed. Robert Hettlage and Hans-Peter Muller (Konstanz, 2006), 274. 208 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity"," Theory and Society 29 (2000): 1419. 209 It may of course also include ideas about culture, religion and other matters deemed of rele­ vance for the self-understanding of society. 210 Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, "Gibt es eine "europaische Identitat"? Konzeptionelle Uberlegun­ gen uber den Zusammenhang transnationaler Erfahrungsraume, kollektiver Identitaten und offentlicher Diskurse in Westeuropa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," in Diskurse und Entwicklungs­ plade, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Jiirgen Schriewer (Frankfurt, 1999), 1691. 211 Reinhart Koselleck, "Zur historischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegriffe," in Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, ed. Reinhart Koselleck (Frankfurt, 1995 [1979]).

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appears more worthy of identification. Secondly, identification may be based on the invocation of the society's continuity throughout time. It places the present in the tradition of the past, while offering a vision of the future. This is seductive because it promises to provide orientation in an otherwise meaningless present. Images of a glorious past and a promising future evoke strong emotions and an affective link with society 212 The debates on self-understanding also include the evaluation of the legiti­ macy of the respective polity. Like the construction of identity, legitimacy rests on structural patterns of arguments that are present in and resonate well with exist­ ing political discourses. At the same time, actors may support or question the le­ gitimacy of the polity. This process of negotiation takes place in and through the discourses in the public sphere. Legitimacy is a social construction, a mode of be­ lief213 It denotes the acceptability, the "normative justifiability" of the polity in question,214 based on certain widely accepted criteria 215 "Input legitimacy" de­ scribes the procedural link between society as a demos and the polity. A polity can be justified as legitimate if government is based on the will of the people, of the demos. Democratic procedures, respect for the rights and freedoms of the citizens and accountable government provide the usual institutional safeguards for legiti­ mate governance. "Output legitimacy" is based on what government does for so­ ciety. The more effective the government is in providing internal and external se­ curity and prosperity, the more likely it is perceived to be legitimate. A third crite­ rion is identity. Modern democracy is based on the idea that society - usually un­ derstood as equal to a nation - governs itself. This widely held assumption is based on the fundamental nationalist principle that each nation should have its own state 216 Democracy rests on the bond of identity between the ruler and those subject to government. Accordingly, self-perceptions of society and the way they resonate with the characteristics of the polity crucially influence the legitimacy of the polity. The underlying assumption is that citizens who identify with society and the nation are more likely to also identify with the polity, as a consequence of which the legitimacy of the latter is less likely to be challenged. This is particularly relevant and controversial in the case of the European polity.

Implications for empirical research It is important to keep in mind that the public sphere is a highly abstract norma­ tive concept. It describes what public communication should be like in order to ensure democracy. Furthermore, the concept is situated at the macro level of soci­ ety. Hence, it requires a variety of steps to operationalise the idea for empirical re212 Occasionally, these logics have been combined. In that case they advocate a break with the past which appears as the other, such as in the case of the Nazi past. Seidendorf, Defining Europe " against its Past?," 440. 213 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 5. ed. (Tiibingen, 1972). 122-124. "Legitimitntsglaube". 214 David Beetham and Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Essex, 1998). 3, Meyer, "(De-)Con­ structing legitimacy in the European public sphere," 34. 215 Markus Jachtenfuchs, Die Konstruktion Europas. Verfassungsideen und institutionelle Entwicklung (Baden-Baden, 2002). 67. For the distinction between input and output legitimacy: Fritz Wil­ helm Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? (Oxford, New York, 1999). 6. 216 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the origins and the spread ofnationalism. Revised edition. (London, 1991). 6, Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. 2f.

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search. In European public sphere research, the adaptation of the concept to the European level frequently takes precedence over those aspects relevant for its role in European democracy. Therefore the normatively relevant aspects of the public sphere - for instance the principle of equality and openness - will be considered in the model for empirical analysis presented below. However, what are the chal­ lenges that arise when transposing the concept of the public sphere to the Euro­ pean level?

2.1.2 What is a European public sphere? The notion of the public sphere had been developed with a national society and the nation state in mind. The question of whether the concept may conceivably be extended to the European level, has been at the heart of a contentious debate in the social sciences since the mid-1990s. Critics of the idea of a European public sphere have perceived the absence of a common language and common media, as well as the lack of a shared European identity as insurmountable obstacles to the emer­ gence of a European public sphere. This debate has led to a number of conceptual clarifications. Still, a pluralism of terms and different interpretations continues to prevail in the ever-growing academic literature on the European public sphere. Thus conceptual clarification is at the heart of my survey of the debate.

Does the European public sphere require a common language and common media? The problem of the European public sphere became salient in the public political and academic debates, when in the aftermath of Maastricht the critique of the democratic deficit became more strident and the call for a democratic constitution of the EU was more forcefully voiced. A functioning European public sphere was considered one of the preconditions for EU democracy. Judging by the standards of an idealised national model, critical observers argued that there could not be a European public sphere as long are there was no common language and no shared media throughout Europe 217 This view has increasingly been challenged. Cathleen Kantner and Marianne van de Steeg offered three arguments as to why democracy does not necessarily require a shared language. First, they rejected the critics' contention that languages were systems of transmitting meaning in unique ways that contained specific and incommensurable views of the world that could not be reproduced in other languages. Basing their argument on philosophi­ cal hermeneutics, Kantner and Steeg rejected this view as umealistic essentialisa­ tion: Languages were not distinct and impermeable cultural systems. They held that different connotations of terms and concepts did not prevent mutual under­ standing, as long as those who interpreted between languages made an appropri­ ate effort of translation and explanation 218 Secondly, the critics had apparently

217 Grimm, "Does Europe need a Constitution?," 294-296, Peter Graf Kielmansegg, "LaBt sich die Europaische Gemeinschaft demokratisch verfassen?," Europiiische Rundschau 22 (1994): 27f, Schlesinger, "Europeanisation and the Media: national identity and the public sphere," 25f. On the problems of linguistic diversity see also: Peter A. Kraus, "Vielfalt als Herausforderung. Die " Bedeutung von Sprachpolitik im Prozess der Gestaltung europaischer Offentlichkeit, in Euro­ piiische Dffentlichkeit, ed. Claudio Franzius and Ulrich K. PreuB (Baden-Baden, 2004). 218 Ibid. 128f, Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 503.

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identified language with communication when objecting that Europeans could not directly communicate with each other. Steeg however argued that these critics had underestimated the extent to which political communication in modern socie­ ties took place via the media. In most cases, professional communicators in the media performed the task of translation and transnational mediation. Thus mass audiences could still observe and listen to the same actors in the European public sphere without necessarily speaking their language 219 Thirdly, when deploring the absence of a lingua franca that would allow all citizens to use the same European media, the critics ignored the situation in multi­ lingual national democracies, such as Belgium or Canada. The existence of two or more national languages did not preclude the existence of a shared public sphere, Steeg argued. Moreover, even in countries with a single national language, in prac­ tice, only a certain share of citizens used the same media 220 In increasingly differ­ entiated national media systems, citizens did not actually use the same media, even though, in linguistic terms, they would have been able to.221 Conversely, even if countries had the same language in common, for instance Austria and Ger­ many, this did not necessarily mean that they shared the same media. The actual readership across borders was marginal 222 In light of this, Kantner and Steeg ar­ gued that a media system was not necessarily identical with the public sphere. A European public sphere could exist without a European media system. Critics were wrong to assume that a "European public" and "European discourse" re­ quired "newspapers and periodicals, radio and television programmes, offered and demanded on a European market" .223 Kantner and Steeg rejected this assump­ tion as a further fallacy of methodological nationalism 224 Undoubtedly, national media systems mirrored the structures of the nation state, forming part of the in­ stitutional infrastructure of a national public sphere. Nevertheless, the boundaries of media systems, which are circumscribed by the technically or economically de­ termined scope of distribution, did not necessarily have to coincide with the bor­ ders of the public sphere 225 As Eder emphasised, the public sphere was delimited by the issue discussed, the institution it referred to, or by the network of commu­ nicative exchange on a particular issue 226 Because of this, concluded Steeg, the study of European public sphere needed to focus on the content of the media, comparing this across national borders 227 In practical terms, boundaries of language and media do still matter. In most cases interaction and communication are more intense within national borders 219 Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 503f. To be sure, mediators may deliberately misrepresent foreign views by selection or by imprecise, or outright distorting translation. However, this is unlikely to go unchecked in the pluralist, competitive media sys­ tems of most EU countries. 220 The sceptics seem to have in mind the situation in early days of television, when the single ex­ isting programmes integrated the ,TV nation'. 221 Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 504. 222 In any case, mutual media reception seems to be asymmetric. For instance, Austrians tend to use German media more frequently than Germans use Austrian media. 223 Grimm, "Does Europe need a Constitution?," 295. 224 Kantner, Kein modernes Babel. 121-124, Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 502f. 225 Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 502f. 226 Eder, "Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Offentlichkeit in Europa," 171f. 227 Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 502f.

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than across them. And the EU spends vast amounts of money on translation in an attempt to deal with linguistic diversity228 Nevertheless, this debate has clarified that it is problematic to assume that language and media systematically precluded the possibility of a European public sphere.

Does the European public sphere require a European identity? It is widely accepted that the public sphere is the arena where identity construc­ tion takes place. Identity construction features prominently among the functions of the European public sphere. However, two aspects remain contentious among researchers. First, to what extent is a shared identity a precondition for a common public sphere? Secondly, should a European identity be considered a defining cri­ terion and serve as an indicator of a European public sphere? The debate on the issue of identity is particularly controversial, not least because of the implicit es­ sentialist connotations,229 and the general elusiveness of the term. European iden­ tity230 is a particularly problematic idea. The term has been used as a political con­ cept since 1973 in order to invoke European distinctiveness and unity. Indeed, it has arguably served to compensate for and to rhetorically overcome internal divi­ sions within Europe 231 These essentialist connotations are most apparent in the demand that in a Eu­ ropean public sphere European affairs should be viewed from a "European per­ spective" (rather than a national one). The critics of the notion of a European pub­ lic sphere suggested that the lack of a European identity prevented the emergence of a European public sphere. That is, because of the continued prevalence of na­ tional identities, observers would continue to make decisions on the basis of na­ tional rather than European interest 232 The dominance of national perspectives thus implied a distortion of perception. European citizens were unable to perceive European problems in the same way and tended to domesticate these issues differ­ ently according to nationally specific frameworks of meaning 233 As a result of this, it was argued, the absence of a European public sphere would prevent the emer­ gence of a European identity 234 228 Cf. Peter A. Kraus, Europiiische Offentlichkeit und Sprachpolitik: Integration durch Anerkennung (Frankfurt I Main, 2004). 229 Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond "Identity"," 2. 230 Various attempts have been undertaken to define the concept. For the most recent debate see e.g. Klaus Eder, "Europe's Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe," European Journal ofSocial Theory 9 (2006), Cathleen Kantner, "Collective Identity as Shared Ethi­ " cal Self-Understanding. The Case of the Emerging European Identity, European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2006), Thomas Meyer, Die Identitiit Europas (Frankfurt, 2004). 231 "Declaration on European Identity," Bulletin ofthe European Communities. December 1973 (1973), Ine Megens, "The December 1973 Declaration on European Identity as the Result of Team Spirit " among European Diplomats, in Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969-1975, ed. Jan van der Harst (Bruxelles, 2007). For a " critique: Bo Strath, "A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of a Concept, European Jour­ nal of Social Theory 5 (2002): 388. 232 Gerhards, "Westeuropaische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europa­ ischen Offentlichkeit," 99. 233 Grimm, "Does Europe need a Constitution? " 295, Schlesinger, "Europeanisation and the Me­ dia," 27. 234 Gerhards, "Westeuropaische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europa­ ischen Offentlichkeit," 108, Peter Graf Kielmansegg, "Integration und Demokratie (mit Nach-

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Kantner refuted this line of argument on three grounds: First, the argument was circular. There was no way of escaping the determinism of the initial condi­ tion. As long as there was no European identity, there would be no European pub­ lic sphere, and as long as there was no European public sphere, there would be no chance for a European identity. This deterministic argument precluded any possi­ bility of change 235 Secondly, Kantner rejected the expectation that identity neces­ sarily implied a unity of interest and perspectives. National interests and perspec­ tives shaped on the basis of these interests were inevitable and would be there to stay. Yet different perspectives shaped by interests, ideologies, regional identities could also be found within nation states and national public spheres, although the existence of national public spheres was itself never questioned. Against this view, however, Kantner emphasised that a plurality of views was in fact constitutive of democratic public spheres 236 Thirdly, arguing from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, Kantner repudiated the notion that national perspectives distorted the perception of Euro­ pean reality to an extent that it would prevent a meaningful exchange of argu­ ments. The common object of debate and a shared "objective and social world" even across national borders was to ensure that arguments would be mutually understood. The prevalence of differing opinions would not render arguments in­ commensurable by themselves 237 Kantner held that the essentialist equation of interests, perspectives and identity lacked theoretical sophistication and seemed inspired by utopian visions of European unity. Such an ideal of a European per­ spective tacitly implied the expectation of European allegiance. In fact, however, it meant that anything but a uniform pro-EU attitude was illegitimate.238 I agree with Kantner that such a simplistic dichotomy between the nation and Europe is theoretically problematic. It does not take into account that European and national identities may coalesce. Empirically, it is barely possible to elicit any European perspective which is not shaped by national experiences and expecta­ tions. This leads to a variety of different understandings of Europe.239 These per­ spectives have necessarily been shaped by communication in national media. Ulti­ mately, however, this is unlikely to prevent meaningful European public commu­ nication. A European identity understood as a uniform European perspective thus cannot be considered a prerequisite of a European public sphere. Thomas Risse approached the issue of the European public sphere from the vantage point of constructivist International Relations. Risse agreed that the no­ tion of a shared "European perspective" was flawed, highlighting instead, with Kantner, the importance of conflict and debate within a European public sphere as a sphere of discursive action. Identity was not a precondition, but was nonetheless an outcome that was a defining criterion, and could thus be treated as an indicator, of a European public sphere 240 Risse assumed that the European public sphere

235 236 237 238 239 240

wort zur 2. Auflage)," in Europiiische Integration, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler­ Koch (Opladen, 2003), 58. Kantner, Kein modernes Babel. 85 [In. 2401. Ibid. 118-120. Ibid. 871., 1191. Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europiiischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," 146, Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere, 4f. See e.g. Dfez Medrano, Framing Europe. Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," ISOf.

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would lead to the discursive construction of a European "community of commu­ nication". Being affected by the same policies, participants in European debates would start sharing a sense of community. He expected them to increasingly iden­ tify with a European community of fate, being aware that they had a stake in Eu­ ropean policy making, and thus ultimately they were to adopt an insider 's per­ spective on European affairs 241 A European identity would be socially constructed as Europeans started to mutually recognise each other as relevant and legitimate participants in the debate on European affairs. Those included in such a commu­ nity of communication would eventually mark the boundaries of a European pub­ lic sphere 242 Risse argued in the tradition of Karl Deutsch's work. In the 1950s Deutsch as­ sumed that increased transnational interaction would shape expectations and per­ ceptions and slowly bring about a transnational "sense of community" 243 Risse was not the only one who insisted on the causal link between communication in the European public sphere and a shared identity244 It is, however, problematic to assume that public discourse in a European public sphere will necessarily lead to a shared European identity. Processes of identity construction imply the constant renegotiation of both national and European identities in their complex interplay. In certain contexts, such debates could just as easily lead to the reassertion of na­ tional identities 245 Given this fact, I will not accept identification with fellow Eu­ ropeans and the European polity as a defining criterion of a European public sphere. The expectation of a shared identity seems to be based on a principle of (European) nationalism: a polity requires a people, a demos complete with an iden­ tity 246 Similarly, the empirical expectation is based on the analogy of nation state formation and nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries, in which communication is assumed to have played a crucial role in creating national identities. These two expectations are problematic, because they reflect "methodological nationalism", i.e. the implicit "acceptance of nationalist conceptions" as well as the effective re­ inforcement of these conceptions 247 These assumptions thus require critical recon­ sideration, as they may systematically give rise to misleading conclusions in the case of Europe 248 Consequently, I will treat as an open question whether and how 241 Steeg and Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Communication. 242 Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," 148f. 243 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Orga­ nization in the Light ofHistorical Experience (Princeton, 1957) . 5. 244 European identity has been considered a defining criterion in various inquiries into the Euro­ pean public sphere, e.g. Knorr, Europaische Offentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 37, Bernhard Peters and Hartmut Wessler, "Transnationale Offentlichkeiten - analytische Dimensionen, normative Standards, sozialkulturelle Produkti­ onsstrukturen," in Demokratie in der MediengesellschaJt, ed. Kurt Imhof, et al. (Wiesbaden, 2006), 130, 135f, Stefan Tobler, "Deliberation und transnationale Offentlichkeit. Ein Prozessperspek­ tive demokratischer Offentlichkeit," in Demokratie in der MediengesellschaJt, ed. Kurt Imhof, et al. (Wiesbaden, 2006), 167. 245 Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gemig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 24, Kaiser, "Transnational Network Governance." 246 For this basic tenet of nationalism see e.g. Anderson, Imagined Communities. 6, Smith, National­ ism in the Twentieth Century. 2f. 247 Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. 191. 248 Hartmut Kaelble, Wege zur Demokratie. Von der Franzosischen Revolution zur Europiiischen Union

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transnational communication in the European public sphere impacts on European self-understanding.

Defining the European scope: what makes the public sphere European ? Social scientists have proposed three different criteria that have to be fulfilled in order for a public sphere to count as European. First, the public sphere may be defined by its institutional point of reference. Secondly, it may be understood as a structure of communication of European scope, defined by transnational249 com­ munication across Europe. Thirdly, the European public sphere may be conceived as a sphere of action in which European self-understanding is negotiated and dis­ cussed, or where a European identity exists as a consequence of communication, as some researchers assume. I will treat the three definitions in turn. The most simple but also the most self-evident definition of a European public sphere has been suggested by Eder. If the political public sphere was the structure of communication in which political institutions were discussed, the European public sphere can be defined as the arena in which European institutions (and their action) were addressed, discussed and held accountable. In a European public sphere, the European polity was the point of reference. A European public sphere emerged as European institutions were at the origin or were the object of commu­ nication 250 In this study, this is the defining criterion of the European public sphere. Accordingly, the European public sphere comprised all public communi­ cation in relation to European integration, European institutions and European policies. The amount of European public communication thus provides a rough quantitative indicator for how well the European public sphere is able to fulfil its functions. Public communication which refers to EU affairs could possibly take place in only one country, and the issues reported and and discussed may differ substan­ tially between the European countries. Because of this, a second criterion has been emphasised. A European public sphere should be a structure of communication of European scope, integrated by transnational communication. Describing what he ex­ pects of a European public sphere, Habermas has suggested the following require­ ment: "The core is formed by a political public sphere which enables citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance. [ J In short, this entails public communication that transcends the boundaries of the until now limited national public spheres."251 . . .

(Stuttgart, Miinchen, 2001). 133-135. 249 By transnational here is meant "across national borders", 250 Eder, "Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Offentlichkeit in Europa," 181. "Europaische Of­

fentlichkeit entsteht zuniichst dadurch, dass sich die Europiiischen Institutionen als Adressaten fUr of­ fentliche Kommunikation anbieten./I Similarly: Klaus Eder, Cathleen Kantner, and Hans-Jorg Trenz, "Transnationale Offentlichkeit und die Strukturierung politischer Kommunikation in Europa," (2000), 7. "Europiiische Offentlichkeit entsteht, . . . indem sich europiiische Institutionen als Urheber und

Adressaten offentlicher Kommunikationsprozesse anbieten."

251 Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ,Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306. My empha­ sis.

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Elaborating this criterion, Eder and Kantner have suggested a formula that has become widely accepted:252 A shared public sphere requires that the "the same is­ sues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance" be present in public dis­ course.253 In other words, public communication should be synchronous and simi­ lar in content across borders. This would insure that Europe-wide opinion forma­ tion on European affairs254 would take place at the same time on the same political problems. Actors communicating would have to share a minimal common attribu­ tion of relevance to the topics discussed, a necessary condition to allow the audi­ ence to understand and correctly interpret the respective issues 255 The practical advantage of this criterion was that it could easily be applied in comparative re­ search of the contents of the media. However, Steeg has emphasised the limitations of the Eder-Kantner criteri­ on.256 Although Eder, Kantner and Trenz have defended the idea that synchronous coverage indicates a common, transnational European public sphere,257 this is not entirely convincing. Steeg has argued that similarity and synchronicity of cover­ age between public spheres may exist even in the absence of transnational com­ munication - for instance if an event takes place that is independently considered newsworthy in all countries.258 It was thus indispensable to examine transnational communicative exchange. However, transnational communication is very difficult to uncover, because the flow of ideas often remains invisible in the news, taking place by what Habermas termed "osmotic diffusion" 259 Journalists, for example, habitually do not mention their sources 260 Transnational communication is hence more difficult to operationalise 261 252 E.g. Peters and Wessler, "Transnationale Offentlichkeiten," 129, Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," 139f, Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 513. 253 Eder and Kantner, "Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa," 315. "ist entscheidend, ob in einem ananymen Massenpublikum zur gleichen Zeit die gleichen Themen unter gleichen Rele­ vanzgesichtspunkten [ . ] kommuniziert werden". Italics in the original. Translation by Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere, 6. An almost identical definition had been proposed by Grundmann, "The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy," 143 note 1. "By ho­ mogenous I mean a public sphere in which the same issues are debated at the same time with a view to the same political decision process." 254 If this criterion is applied independently of the first one, transnational public communication could apply to any issue, not only to European affairs. 255 Klaus Eder, " Offentlichkeit und Demokratie," in Europiiische Integration, ed. Markus Jachten­ fuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen, 2003), 85. To what extent the same criteria of relevance not only concern the salience of issues, but imply shared interpretations and similar contextu­ alisation, has been subject to controversy. For a critical view: Peters and Wessler, "Transnatio­ nale Offentlichkeiten - analytische Dimensionen, normative Standards, sozialkulturelle Pro­ " duktionsstrukturen, 134, 137. 256 E.g. WImmel, "Transnationale Diskurse," 10f. 257 Eder and Kantner, "Interdiskursivitat in der europaischen Offentlichkeit," 83f, Trenz, Europa in den Medien. 1771. 258 Steeg, ,,The public sphere in the European Union.". 27-30. 259 Jiirgen Habermas, "Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?," in Zeit der Ubergiinge, ed. Jiirgen Haber­ mas (Frankfurt, 2001), 120, Bernhard Peters, "Nationale und transnationale Offentlichkeiten Eine Problemskizze," in Grenzenlose Gesellschaft?, ed. Claudia Honegger, Stefan Hradil, and Franz Traxler (Opladen, 1999), 6621. 260 Steeg, ,, The public sphere in the European Union.". 27-30. 261 For an example see e.g. Wimmel, "Transnationale Diskurse in der europaischen Medienoffent­ lichkeit." . .

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Even though I do not consider the construction of European identity a defin­ ing criterion of the European public sphere, it is worth noting that many research­ ers have considered the European public sphere as a sphere of action in which ac­ tors discursively construct European self-understanding. An analysis of this proc­ ess of construction may provide evidence for or against Risse's expectation that the European public sphere implies the discursive construction of a "community of communication" 262 Most researchers have agreed on such a set of defining cri­ teria of the European public sphere 263 In terms of terminology, though, a perplex­ ing pluralism prevails.

Terminology: European public sphere(s), Europeanisation, Transnationalisation The recent wave of research on the European public sphere has lead to a confusing diversity of terminology. The terminology chosen routinely reflects specific inter­ pretations with regard to three contentious issues: First, should the European pub­ lic sphere be conceptualised as a single entity? Or is it more appropriate to speak of public spheres to account for the existence of a plurality of separate arenas? Sec­ ondly, should the focus be placed on the analysis of the current state of the Euro­ pean public sphere or rather on the process of the Europeanisation of - national ­ public spheres? Thirdly, what are the differences between a European and a trans­ national public sphere? Finally, along the lines of what I have already suggested in the introductory chapter, I will distinguish between the European public sphere as a theoretical concept on the one hand and the empirical reality of European public communication and European public discourse on the other hand. First, whether the term public sphere is used in the singular or plural reflects different levels of analysis and varying interpretations. The concept of the Euro­ pean public sphere is not only a normative term but also a generic one, which is used to denote different areas and arenas of public communication. In this generic sense, the term is used in the singular. Conversely, the usage of the plural 'public spheres' has grown out of the empirical observation that the public sphere appar­ ently consists of a plurality of separate and only partially interlinked spheres of communication 264 "Issue-specific communities of communication"265 and "secto­ ral" or "functional" public spheres" which only involve a narrow group of partici­ pants and may discuss highly specialised issues,266 have been highlighted as char­ acteristic of European public communication. Such a differentiation mirrors the structure of increasingly differentiated societies and political systems. To what ex­ tent such spheres of communication are able to fulfil the functions of the public 262 Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere, If. 263 E.g. Regina Vetters, Konvent + Verfassung Offentlichkeit? Die Verfassungsdebatte der Europiiischen Union in den deutschen, britischen und franzosischen Printmedien (Baden-Baden, 2008). 264 Andreas Beierwaltes, Demokratie und Medien. Der Begriffder Offentlichkeit und seine Bedeutung for die Demokratie in Europa (Baden-Baden, 2000). 208f. " 265 Eder, "Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Offentlichkeit in Europa, 172. " 266 Hans-Jorg Trenz, "Einfuhrung: Auf der Suche nach einer Europaischen Offentlichkeit, in Bilr­ gersclwjt, Offentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa, ed. Ansgar Klein, et a1. (Opladen, 2003), 1621. For an example see: Klaus Eder and Hans-Jorg Trenz, liThe making of the European Public " Space: The case of Justice and Home Affairs, in Linking EU and national governance, ed. Beate " Kohler-Koch (Oxford, 2003), Christian Joerges and Jiirgen Neyer, Transforming strategic inter­ " action into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector, Journal of European Public Policy 4 (1997). =

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sphere remains an open question for empirical research 267 Even though the sphere of communication considered in this study includes more specialised issue-spe­ cific arenas of communication on various aspects of European politics, I will ana­ lyse this as part and parcel of a single comprehensive European public sphere. Nevertheless, various researchers have preferred the usage of the plural "pub_ lic spheres" or "spheres of publics",268 emphasising the pre-eminence of national public spheres and questioning the idea of a European public sphere as a single whole. Researchers with a background in media studies, such as Philip Schlesin­ ger and Deirdre Kevin tended to equate the public sphere with the institutional structures of the media system. From this perspective, only national public spheres have actually existed. Nonetheless, within such a nationally shaped framework, they conceded, a plurality of "European spheres of publics" might emerge 269 Secondly, the concept of the "Europeanisation of public spheres"27o also im­ plicitly takes for granted the prevalence of national public spheres. The concept suggests that national public spheres had merely been subject to a process of change or transformation 271 Applying the idea of Europeanisation in this context requires a clear definition, since the term has been used in a variety of ways 272 What adds to its elusiveness is that Europeanisation is a "territorialised" term 273 Territorialised terms are convenient shorthand terms because they evoke a variety of associations. However, as analytical concepts, they are problematic, because they present complex territorial units as generic causal factors. Rather than relying on the apparently intuitive comprehensibility of such concepts, researchers should specify the particular factors and the causal mechanisms at work. The suffix "-isa­ tion" adds further ambiguity. It implies directional change, referring at the same time both to a process of change and the end state resulting from this process 274

267 For a sceptical view: Heidrun Abromeit, "M6glichkeiten und Ausgestaltung einer europaischen Demokratie," in BiirgerschaJt, Offentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa, ed. Ansgar Klein, et al. (Opladen, 2003), 45. 268 E.g. Peters et al., "National and transnational public spheres.", Trenz, Europa in den Medien. Die europiiische Integration im Spiegel nationaler Offentlichkeit. or Koopmans and Statham, The Trans­ formation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres. 269 Philip Schlesinger and Deirdre Kevin, "Can the European Union become a sphere of publics?," in Democracy in the European Union: integration through deliberation?, ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum (London I New York, 2000), 220, 228 [quote]. 270 Gerhards, "Westeuropaische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europa­ ischen Offentlichkeit," 102, Koopmans and Statham, The Transformation of Political Mobilisa­ tion and Communication in European Public Spheres, 9-12, Trenz, Europa in den Medien. 109. 271 For a critical view see: Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 502. 272 For arguably the clearest conceptual clarification see: Johan P. Olsen, "The Many Faces of Euro­ peanization," Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002). See also: Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble, Conceptualising Europeanisation (ESRC / UACES Series of Seminars on Europeanization of British Politics and Policy-Making (EBPP), Sheffield, 29 November, 2002), Rainer Eising, "Eu­ " ropaisierung und Integration. Konzepte der EU-Forschung, in Europiiische Integration, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen, 2003), Thomas Risse, Maria Green " Cowles, and James A. Caporaso, "Europeanization and domestic change: Introduction, in Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change, ed. Maria Green Cowles, James A. Ca­ poraso, and Thomas Risse (Ithaca, N.Y., 2001). 273 Christian Berndt, "Territorialized Key Words and Methodological Nationalism. Cultural Con­ structions of Institutional Change in Germany," European Urban and Regional Studies 10 (2003): 283, 292f. 274 Peter J. Taylor, "Izations of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization," in

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Europeanisation may mean "being affected by" and / or "becoming like" Europe. The term suggests either the spread of certain European properties, and / or a con­ vergence on a European standard - referring to the process itself or its result 275 More recently, contemporary historians have come to conceive of Europeanisation as a macro-level and multi-dimensional historical process transforming European society or societies and European politics. The emergence of the European public sphere is perceived to be part of this process 276 As early as 1993, Gerhards introduced the concept of the Europeanisation of national public spheres. To Gerhards this simply meant an increase in Europe- or EU-related content as well as an evaluation from a perspective of European rather than national interest. He interpreted European integration as "supranational pol­ ity building" ("supranationale Staatenbildung"). Consequently, from a normative point of view, he argued that European integration should be accompanied by the emergence of a European public sphere, or - something he deemed to be more re­ alistic - at least by the Europeanisation of national public spheres 277 Ruud Koopmans developed a more sophisticated conceptualisation of the dif­ ferent routes the Europeanisation of public spheres could take. His concept essen­ tially describes three modes of communication across borders in Europe. "Supra­ national Europeanisation" meant that EU and European level actors intervened more prominently in public debates in national news media. "Vertical Europeani­ sation" meant that national actors referred (more frequently) to European institu­ tions, European legislation, European-level action and issues. Koopmans uses "horizontal Europeanisation" to describe the increase in transnational communi­ cation with actors from EU member states rather than from the supranational in­ stitutions 278 Peters and his collaborators have used the term transnationalisation almost interchangeably with Europeanisation 279 These terms, however, should be more carefully distinguished. The territorialised term "European(isation) may alternatively refer to the EU, the member states or the elusive political-geographical entity called Europe 28o Conversely, the term transnational(isation) makes us aware of the in-between, the transgression of nation states as bounded territoritorial units 281 Recently, the term Demystifying Globalization, ed. Colin Hay and David Marsh (Basingstoke, 2000), 50. 275 Buller and Gamble, Conceptualising Europeanisation, 10. 276 Cf. Jiirgen Elvert, Die Europiiische Integration (Darmstadt, 2006). 126, Hartmut Kaelble, "Europai­ sierung," in Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Festschriftfor Hannes Siegrist zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Matthias Middell (Leipzig, 2007). 277 Gerhards, "Westeuropaische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europa­ ischen Offentlichkeit," 102, 1061. 278 Ruud Koopmans, "Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised Political Debates," European Journal of Political Research 46 (2007): 186. 279 Peters et al., "National and transnational public spheres," 141. 280 Eder, "Europe's Borders.", Jiirgen Kocka, "Die Grenzen Europas. Ein Essay aus historischer Perspektive," in Europawissenschajt, ed. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Ingolf Pernice, and Ulrich R. Haltem (Baden-Baden, 2005). 281 Not, however, of their dissolution or displacement. Transnational interaction only comple­ ments, but does not supplant whatever territorial level interaction there is. Cf. Walter Reese­ Schafer, " Supranationale oder transnationale Identitat: Zwei Modelle kultureller Integration in " Europa, in Kultur, Identitat, Europa: Uber die Schwierigkeiten und Moglichkeiten einer Konstruktion, ed. Reinhold Viehoff and Rien T. Segers (Frankfurt, 1999), 254.

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transnational has become a fashionable buzzword, loosely applied to any cross­ border phenomena, and almost used synonymously with "international". How­ ever, whereas the term international refers to the relation between nation states, represented by national governments, the term transnational emphasises the per­ meability of the borders of the nation state. Research has focussed on groups, or­ ganisations, both state and non-state actors cooperating or interacting across the borders of nation states 282 As early as 1971, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane al­ ready defined that transnational relations involved at least one non-state actor283 Consequently, a transnational public sphere is in principle unbounded. Its borders can only be established through an analysis of the structures of communicative exchange 284 The focus in this study is on a European public sphere defined by its institutional point of reference, namely the Ee. Thus, I will only use the term trans­ national with regard to the structure of communication across borders, namely transnational communication 285 Finally, in the introduction I already proposed to distinguish between two terms. The European public sphere is a normative and analytical theoretical con­ cept. The term European public communication was introduced to describe the empirical reality of political communication within Europe, which may (in part) or may not conform to normative expectations. Steeg has suggested a similar termi­ nological distinction. However, instead of public communication she used the term " public discourse" 286 Unlike Steeg however, I will distinguish between dif­ ferent modes of communication within the content of the media. Drawing on Pe­ ters' definition of "discursive articles",287 I will define European public discourse as a subset of European public communication, limited to certain genres of media texts. European public discourse in the media can be found in the comment and analysis sections, in external contributions and columns, i.e. in those pieces in which journalists voice opinions, evaluate and discuss - rather than simply report - European issues. I assume that European public discourse, thus defined, com­ prises the sphere of action in which the media raise their own voice as actors in the public sphere, engaging in the discursive construction of Europe's self-under­ standing and legitimacy. I will thus use discourse analysis to examine European public discourse in the newspapers. The debate in the social sciences on the necessary preconditions for a Euro­ pean public sphere has demonstrated that neither a common language, nor com­ mon media nor a shared identity are indispensable preconditions for a European

282 Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gemig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 9, Karl Kaiser, ,, Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics," International Organization 25 (1971): 790, 80lf. 283 Joseph S. Jr. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Intro­ duction," International Organization 25 (1971): 332. 284 Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gemig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 9. Steeg, "The public sphere in the European " Union. . 22. 285 Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gemig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 9. 286 Steeg, "Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," 507. 287 "Discourse, in this sense, ocrurs if opinion statements are supported by some kind of argumen­ tative backing, or by some presentation of evidence." Peters et al., "National and transnational public spheres," 141.

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public sphere. The European public sphere can thus be studied through a com­ parative analysis of national media, applying criteria based on the discussion above. However, apart from the concept of Europeanisation which implies a pro­ cess of change over time, the conceptualisations of the European public sphere do not take into account a temporal dimension. This has largely remained the domain of historians. I will thus consider the debate among historians before developing my own concept for the analysis.

2.1.3 Historians' conceptualising of the European public sphere Remarkably, the history of the European public sphere has so far largely been ig­ nored by historians of European integration. This branch of historiography has tradi­ tionally been dominated by diplomatic historians - many of them organised in the "European Union Liaison Committee of Historians" - who have only slowly opened up to questions of society and democracy 288 Traditionally, they have fo­ cused on international relations, in particular individual countries' and govern­ ments' relations with the Ee. Transnational and societal actors have not been at the forefront of their research agenda. Historians of European integration have focused on the careful analysis of individual national government archives and the Historical Archives of the European Union. Their research agenda has largely been determined by the successive disclosure of government records thirty years after the event 289 At the same time, they have been sceptical about if not ignorant of concepts from the social sciences 290 Filling that void, historians from social and cultural history have increasingly become interested in the question of an emergent European society 291 Being more attentive to debates in neighbouring disciplines, they have started to explore the social preconditions of democracy at the European level, such as European civil society,292 European citizenship293 or European iden­ tity294 They have approached the concept of the European public sphere from 288 Wolfram Kaiser, "From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration," in Pal­ grave Advances in European Studies, ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (Houndmills, 2006), 190f. Only very recently, such issues have been covered: Marie-Therese Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, and Charles Barthel, eds., Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et integration europeenne (Brux­ elles, 2007), Jiirgen Nielsen-Sikora, liThe Ideas of a European Union and a Citizen's Europe: The " 1975 Tmdemans Report and its Impact on Today's Europe, in Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969-1975, ed. Jan van der Harst (Bruxelles, 2007). , 289 For a critique see: Wolfram Kaiser, "A never ending story: Britain in Europe/ British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4 (2002): 160. 290 Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnational Western Europe since 1945. Integration as political society for­ , mation/ in Transnational European Union. Towards a Common Political Space, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie (London, 2005), 20. 291 Kaelble, "Eine europaische Gesellschaft." 292 Thomas Fetzer, "Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen nach 1945. Katalysatoren fUr die Heraus­ bildung transnationaler Identitaten/' in Transnationale Offentlichkeiten und Identitiiten, ed. Hart­ mut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt, 2002), Dieter Gosewin­ kel, ed., Zivilgesellschajt - national und transnational, WZB-Jahrbuch 2003 (Berlin, 2004), Manfred Hildermeier, Jiirgen Kocka, and Conrad Christoph, eds., Europiiische Zivilgesellschajt in Ost und West. Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen (Frankfurt, 2000). 293 Kaelble, Wege zur Demokratie. 180-191. 294 Hartmut Kaelble, "Das europaische Selbstverstandnis und die europaische Offentlichkeit im 19.

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three different angles. First, Hartmut Kaelble developed his approach on the basis of social science concepts in the context of his research on Europe's changing self­ understanding 295 Conversely, J6rg Requate and Martin Schulze-Wessel derived their concept of the European public sphere inductively on the basis of the rhetoric they found in their sources 2% The third analytical approach was proposed by Bo Strath and Hagen Schulz-Forberg and elaborated further upon both conceptualisations,297 by adding ideas from critical discourse analysis298 and from conceptual history299

Lingering structural traditions of European public communication Kaelble has explored the "historical rise of the European public sphere" from a longer-term perspective, focussing on key structural continuities and proposing a periodisation of the development during the past two centuries. When adopting such a longer-term view, it is impossible to simply define the European public sphere in the same narrow political sense as most social scientists have done 30o European institutions have only existed since the 1950s. Hence, it is only since that time that the European public sphere can be understood as a sphere of communi­ cation with the EC as its institutional point of reference. For this reason, Kaelble distinguished between two definitions, which differ with respect to their temporal scope301 A European public sphere in the broader, more generic sense of a "Euro­ pean space of communication"302 - he argued - has existed for a long time, pre­ dating the creation of a "European power centre". Kaelble defined this "soft" (weiche) public sphere as a European structure of communication of transnational European scope, in which Europeans debated on a broad range of issues of com­ mon concern, such as cultural, societal, legal, religious or economic issues, utopian visions or nostalgic glorifications of the past. Conversely, since the 1950s a Euro­ pean public sphere in a more narrow political sense has emerged, defined by refer-

295 296 297

298 299 300 301 302

und 20. Jahrhundert," in Transnationale Offentlichkeiten und Identitiiten, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt, 2002), Jiirgen Kocka, "Wo liegst du, Europa? Europaische Identitat als Konstrukt," in Der Irak-Krieg und die Zukunjt Europas, ed. Hel­ mut Konig and Manfred Sicking (Bielefeld, 2004), Kiran Klaus Patel, "Europas Symbole. Inte­ grationsgeschichte und Identitatssuche seit 1945," Internationale Politik 59 (2004). Kaelble, Europiier tiber Europa. 255f. Requate and Schulze-Wessel, eds., Europiiische Offentlichkeit. For a more comprehensive discus­ sion of the first two approaches see Meyer, "Europaische Offentlichkeit aus historischer Sicht." Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Strath, The Political History of European Integration. The Hypocrisy of Democracy-Through-Market (London, 2010), Strath and Wodak, "Europe-Discourse-Politics­ Media-History: Constructing 'Crises'." See e.g. Ruth Wodak, Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identitiit. Part Two, (Frankfurt, 1998). Reinhart Koselleck and Todd Samuel Presner, The practice of conceptual history: timing history, spacing concepts (Stanford, 2002). Eder, "Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Offentlichkeit in Europa," 181. Kaelble, Europiier tiber Europa. 255f, Kaelble, "The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 10, 13. Kaelble, ,, The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 13. The concept of the "space / sphere of communication" (Kommunikationsraum) played a more important role in the 1990s in com­ munication studies, referring to the institutional and legal structures of the media, e.g.: Lutz Erbring, ed., Kommunikationsraum Europa (Konstanz, 1995), Hans J. Kleinsteuber and Torsten Rossmann, eds., Europa als Kommunikationsraum: Akteure, Strukturen und Konfliktpotentiale in der europiiischen Medienpolitik (Opladen, 1994).

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ence to the European institutions. It was only from this time that a public sphere developed in which European authorities represented themselves. Only then did the public discuss current politics and seek to influence decision makers and to hold them accountable 303 Accordingly, Kaelble understood the soft "uninstitu­ tionalised" European space of communication as the precursor of the more recent political European public sphere.304 Kaelble emphasised that they both shared a number of apparently persistent structural characteristics. The European public sphere had been integrated by transnational interaction, which interconnected national public spheres. It had thus always been "composite" in character. Frequently, the relations between the national public spheres had been hierarchical and exchange processes asymmetric. Central public spheres in the large Western European countries had tended to receive more attention and be more widely and intensely taken note of than peripheral ones of Southern and Eastern Europe 30s Furthermore, the European public sphere had always been mul­ tilingual. Despite the existence of the successive linguae francae such as Latin, French and English, as well as other languages in certain regions of Europe - Eu­ ropean debates on European affairs had always been conducted in the respective vernacular. Consequently, transnational exchange had been strongly reliant on translation and translators meaning that participation in a European debate across borders required foreign language skills. The participants themselves frequently acted as translators. This contributed as much to the elitist character as did the na­ ture of the issues debated. Only a narrow elite of intellectuals, experts, business­ men and politicians shared an interest in (European) affairs beyond national bor­ ders. Finally, the European public sphere thus relied heavily on individuals, and on intellectuals in particular. Common media and other common institutions or­ ganising communicative exchange had long been absent. For a considerable pe­ riod of time, then, - in fact until today - the European public sphere had thus been "unstructured" and "uninstitutionalised". Only since the creation of European insti­ tututions there had been an institutional political point of reference 306 Following Habermas, Kaelble treated the public sphere as a modern phenom­ enon that had emerged for the first time in the age of Enlightenment. Kaelble dis­ tinguished four periods of the European public sphere since the 18th century. The first phase comprised the emerging public sphere of the 18th and early 19th centu­ ries. It was elitist but powerless, however internationally well-connected. In a sec­ ond period from the mid-1800s until World War II, national publics had grown to become mass publics, their involvement in and influence on (national) politics in­ creasing significantly. However, the transnational debate on Europe remained within the narrow circles of elites. Largely national public spheres were linked in more organised forms, for example, in the guise of international congresses. In­ creasingly, the scope of transnational interaction was global rather than solely Eu­ ropean. However, after World War I, attention was redirected to Europe. Civil so303 Kaelble, ,, The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 9-13, Kaelble, Wege zur Demokratie. 1631. 304 Kaelble, Europaer tiber Europa. 256, Kaelble, liThe Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 12. 305 On similar asymmetries within public spheres d. Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," 70f. 306 Kaelble, ,,The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 9-13, Kaelble, Wege zur Demokratie. 16G-179.

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ciety associations started promoting the idea of European unity and debate on the founding of common European institutions began to take place. A third period covers the era from after World War II until the early 1980s. These decades were characterised by growing interconnections within Western Europe and the grow­ ing influence of the public sphere with respect to national governments. With the founding of European institutions, a political European public sphere found its counterpart in an emerging European power centre for the first time. Despite this, the debate on European political affairs was not very extensive. Once again, only an elite participated in the debate. According to Kaelble, the second half of the 1980s marked the beginning of a new area of the European public sphere. Struc­ tural continuities remained, such as the prevalence of elites, the limited amount of transnational exchange and the absence of shared media structures. A broader and more differentiated elite of experts got involved in the debate. Furthermore, the range of issues widened as the powers of the EU extended to comprise a broader range of policies. The increasingly conflictual nature of EU decisions also brought about more controversial debates. In the public sphere actors started to directly address the European power centre 307 This study provides some evidence in sup­ port of Kaelble's idea of a turning point in the mid-1980s.

A rhetorically invoked "court of appeal" J6rg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel's point of departure was the rhetorical invocation of Europe or the European public sphere as an imaginary "court of ap­ peal" in public debates. Actors launched such appeals to a European public sphere in the media, or at public events for instance when calls for intervention emerged as a response to the atrocities of the Yugoslav war in the early 1990s. Requate's and Schulze Wessel's goal was not simply to analyse how an imaginary European pub­ lic sphere was rhetorically constructed. They also sought to identify the conditions under which such an appeal actually initiated transnational communication. Re­ quate and Schulze-Wessels found that actors who tried to compensate for their lack power and visibility in their own country did so by appealing to Europe. Fre­ quently, actors from the Southern and Eastern periphery of Europe voiced their claims in the (Western) European metropoles. Their appeal reversed the usual asymmetry of communication from the centre to the periphery of Europe. In tak­ ing a detour via the European centres of communication these actors intended to make an impact on the situation in their home countries. Representing opposition groups, they sought to strengthen the solidarity and identity of their groups 308 The notion of Europe actors appealed to was not necessarily a geographic and ac­ tually existing political entity; rather their appeal invoked a system of values and ideas that Europe was perceived to stand for. Requate and Schulze Wessel empha­ sised that both the Christian-conservative ideas of the Occident (Abendland) and the Enlightenment-inspired ideas of universal values based on natural law had been associated with Europe 309 Actors had applied three strategies to evoke reso­ nance. They lobbied the media and opinion leaders to promote their ideas. They 307 Kaelble, ,, The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 14-19. 308 Jorg Requate and Martin Schulze-Wessel, "Europaische Offentlichkeit. Realitat und Imagina­ tion einer appellativen Instanz," in Europiiische Offentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Jorg Requate and Martin Schulze-Wessel (Frankfurt, 2002), 11-17. 309 Ibid., 17-22.

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organised congresses, or resorted to violence, even to terrorism raise publicity for their cause 310 Along with Kaelble, Requate and Schulze Wessels argued that the sphere of communication had structurally "de-Europeanised" since the lSth cen­ tury. Communication within the national territory intensified, leading to the prevalence of national perspectives. Launching their appeal within the largely na­ tionally organised structures of public communication, they stimulated a tempo­ rary, issue-specific sphere of communication which was transnational in scope and universal in its appeal to values and actors. In principle, such a European public sphere was not necessarily limited to the physical boundaries of Europe 311 Requate's and Schulze Wessel's approach throws important light on the mech­ anism of the appeal that may give rise to transnational communication. Further­ more, their concept points to the importance of agency as well as the issue-specific and event-based nature of the European public sphere. The importance of events is also reflected in the design of my study. The semantic traditions of the concept of Europe that Requate and Schulze Wessel point to is also central to the concep­ tual history approach to the European public sphere.

The utopian traditions of the concept of Europe and the battle about meaning Three elements are distinctive in Bo Strath's and Hagen Schulz-Forberg' s approach to the European public sphere. First, while Kaelble distinguished between the longer-term soft "unstitutionalised" European sphere of communication and a po­ litical European public sphere referring to the European institutions created since the 1950s, Strath and Schulz-Forberg argued that the European public sphere should be defined more broadly as a sphere of transnational communication of European scope 312 This is remarkable, since their project only covered the post­ war period. However, they analysed political communication on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Their point of departure was to attempt to understand the European public sphere as a soft public sphere, an "uninstitutionalised" arena of communi­ cation that was not limited to debates directly relevant to politics and the polity313 The point of reference might equally have been "a discourse", "a market" or "a political or legal control mechanism" 314 Similar to Requate and Schulze Wessel, Schulz-Forberg stressed that transnational European communication was based on shared issues that emerged as issues of common concern and on networks of communication, given the lack of an institutional infrastructure of common me­ dia 315

310 Ibid., 30. 311 Ibid., 37. 312 Hagen Schulz-Forberg, Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere (EMEDI­ ATE: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Ter­ ror', 2005), 26. See also: Stdth and Wodak, "Europe-Discourse-Politics-Media-History: Con­ structing 'Crises'." Their definition draws on: Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, "Scenarios of Eu­ rope's future - Western future studies of the the sixties and seventies as an example of a tran­ snational public sphere of experts," Journal ofEuropean Integration History 8 (2002): 69-71. 313 Schulz-Forberg, Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere, 9. See also: Ha­ gen Schulz-Forberg, liThe European Public Sphere and the Transnational History of the Notion " of Europe after 1945, in Europe in the Eastern Bloc. Imaginations and Discourses (1945-1991), ed. Jose M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulifiska-Jurgiel, and Christian Domnitz (Cologne, 2008), 43-48. 314 Schulz-Forberg, Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere, 26. 315 Ibid., 361.

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Secondly, as opposed to Habermasian deliberative understanding of the pub­ lic sphere, Schulz Forberg emphasised the role of the European public sphere as a sphere of action, as a discursive battleground, a space in which meaning is negoti­ ated. Inspired by critical discourse theory,316 they considered the European public sphere as the "arena where political, cultural and economic actors discuss, distrib­ ute, negate and negotiate ideas". Accordingly, they explored the interplay and the overlaps between strong and soft public spheres 317 Thirdly, building on Kaelble's research on the origins of Europe's self-understanding and earlier research by Strath and others on the "Meaning of Europe",318 Schulz-Forberg focused on the conceptual history of the idea of Europe. Taking as their points of departure the lingering utopian tradition of the concept of Europe,319 and current attempts to charge the notion of Europe with ethical and cultural values,32o their collaborative project "Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Terror'" (EMEDIATE) studied how and to what extent the concept of Europe had been charged with meaning and associated with values during the postwar period. Broadly in line with the Habermasian idea of crisis communication,321 they hypothesised that during periods of international crises the debate about Europe and values should have become more active, drawing on the utopian and ethically charged tradition of the concept and calling for further integration 322 They have not, however, been able to confirm this assumption em­ pirically323 All in all, historical approaches to the European public sphere raise awareness of structural continuities and the need to adapt terminology to different historical contexts. First, longer term traditions have shaped the meaning of Europe as well as transnational structures of communication. Secondly, more strongly than most social scientists, social and conceptual historians stress the importance of agency, of communicative action and of the conflictual negotiation of ideas. They also em316 Ruth Wodak, ,,'Doing Europe': the Discursive Construction of European Identities," in Discur­ sive Constructions ofIdentity in European Politics, ed. Richard CM. Mole (Basingstoke, 2007), Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton, A new Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis, Revised 2nd ed. (Amster­ dam, 2007). 317 Schulz-Forberg, Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere, 26. Italics in the original. 318 Kaelble, Europlier tiber Europa, Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Strath, eds., The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations (Oxford, 2002), Bo Strath, ed., Europe and the other and Europe as the other (Brussels, 2000). 319 Kaelble, ,,The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 12, Hagen Schulz-Forberg, Euro­ " pas post-nationale Legitimation. Uberlegungen gegen eine Essentialisierung von Kultur und Identitat," in Reichweiten der Verstlindigung. Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Nation und Europa, ed. Matthias Sch6ning and Stefan Seidendorf (Heidelberg, 2006), 216, Strath, A European Iden­ " tity," 388, 39lf. 320 Schulz-Forberg, "Europas post-nationale Legitimation," 216, Strath, "A European Identity.," 388, 396f. They are implicitly critical of the current academic discourse on European values, e.g. Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt, eds., Die kulturellen Werte Europas (Frankfurt, 2005), Kantner, "Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding. The Case of the Emerging European Identity." 321 Habermas, Faktizitlit und Geltung. 432f. 322 Schulz-Forberg, Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere, 30. He however refers to Koselleck, Critique and crisis. 323 Krzyzanowski and Wodak, Case Studies of Media Discourse. Introductory Note and Compara­ tive Findings.

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phasise peculiar traditions of meaning which may continue to influence the politi­ cal debate. Thirdly, some of their propositions will be considered in this study: What evidence is there of continued De-Europeanisation of the structures of com­ munication in Europe that Requate and Schulze Wessel suggest? Is there a poten­ tial turning point towards Re-Europeanisation, which Kaelble situated in the mid1980s?

2.1.4 Conceptualising a historical approach to the European public sphere From this review of the interdisciplinary theoretical and conceptual literature on the European public sphere, a number of conclusions can be drawn with respect to the research design of this study. First, the concept of the public sphere has strong normative implications. What distinguishes an inquiry into the public sphere from the study of the media or communication324 is the underlying normative question. It is relevant to study the public sphere, because it is the sphere of action and the structure of communication which enables democracy. Therefore, I will not limit myself to the analysis of the European scope of the public sphere, but also con­ sider the normative principles of equality and openness. These principles are rel­ evant for how well the public sphere will be able to fulfil its functions, most nota­ bly, facilitating opinion formation within society and holding policy makers ac­ countable. Even though I am in agreement with Peters on the advantages of dis­ cursiveness as a third normative principle,325 there are other forms of public com­ munication that contribute to the workings of democracy. Emotional appeals, for instance, may motivate citizens to reconsider their views and stimulate opinion formation. Furthermore, the principle is extremely difficult to operationalise. Pe­ ters' attempts to "measure" discursiveness are not entirely convincing 326 For this reason, in this study I will only consider the normative principles of equality and openness. Secondly, since intellectuals proclaimed the necessity to extend the concept of the public sphere to Europe in the 1990s, the possibility and the adequacy of a Eu­ ropean public sphere have been challenged 327 Responding to this challenge, social and political scientists have suggested different definitions and requirements for a public sphere to count as European. I will base my study on the most simple defi­ nition, which Eder has proposed, namely: A European public sphere is the public sphere in which the European polity is the point of reference, the addressee or originator of public communication. Hence, the European public sphere can be defined by its content, namely the polity it refers to. Further criteria shall be examined to assess to what ex324 Cf. Heinz Bonfadelli, "Medieninhalte," in Offentliche Kommunikation. Handbuch der Kommunika­ tions- und Medienwissenschajt, ed. Gunter Bentele, Hans-Bernd Brosius, and Otfried Jarren CWies­ baden, 2003), Burkart, "Kommunikationstheorien./I 325 Peters, "Der Sinn von Offentlichkeit," 89-97. 326 E.g. Bernhard Peters, Tanjev Schultz, and Andreas WImmel, "Publizistische Beitrage zu einer diskursiven Offentlichkeit," in Der Sinn von Dffentlichkeit, ed. Hartmut Wessler (Frankfurt, 2007), 2041., 227. 327 For the most recent critical views: Olivier Baisnee, "The European Public Sphere Does Not Exist (At Least It's Worth Wondering . . . )," European Journal of Communication 22 (2007), Sophia Kai­ tatzi-Whitlock, liThe missing European Public Sphere and the Absence of imagined European " Citizenship, European Societies 9 (2007).

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tent such a European public sphere is also European in its structure, i.e. transna­ tionally integrated. Both the synchronicity of issues present across borders in Eu­ ropean public communication - the presence of the same issues at the same time at the same level of relevance -, as well as evidence concerning the structural precon­ ditions and actual structures of transnational communication will be considered. While these criteria concern the structure of European public communication, I will also examine the European public sphere as a sphere of action in which actors construct and negotiate a European self-understanding and potentially even a Eu­ ropean sense of community. Five research questions for the analysis of European public communication

1. European polity as apoint ofreference: Did the European polity increasingly become a point of reference, improving transparency in relation to European affairs ? 2. Synchronicity: Were the same issues increasingly discussed at the same time at the same level of relevance? 3. Mediators' transnational involvement: Did the structure of mediators change in a way that suggests increased transnational communication and broader participation? 4. Transnational communication: Is there indication ofgrowing transnational communi­ cation and an increasingly diverse range ofactors covered? 5. European self-understanding: Is there evidence of a common conceptualisation of the European political space? Was there growing European identification, a European sense of community? In addressing these questions, I will be able to describe and assess aspects of Euro­ pean public communication that are relevant with respect to the ideal of the Euro­ pean public sphere. By pragmatically defining the European public sphere by its point of reference, i.e. by its content, I will not engage in the futile question whether it exists or not. The goal of this study is to examine qualitative changes with re­ spect to these criteria over time. This may or may not provide evidence for the emergence of a pattern of European public communication which develops in the direction of a European public sphere. This marks the distinctive historical per­ spective, namely, studying a process of change over time, without a assuming in advance what its direction may be. Adding a temporal dimension, historians have suggested that the emergence of a European public sphere is embedded in longer-term historical processes. Given that I will be studying public communication from 1969 to 1991, it makes sense to apply a narrow definition of the European public sphere. The longer-term structural characteristics of what Kaelble called a European space of communica­ tion will still need to be taken into account, however - both with respect to the structure of communication and to those structures of meaning that may have a lingering effect on public discourse. Some of these aspects will more extensively explored in chapter three dealing with various contexts.

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At a more general level, the emergence of the European public sphere has been understood as part of a process of the emergence of a European society. The un­ derlying expectation is that European political and legal institutions (i.e. the EU) have an impact on the scope of societal integration. Kaelble and Kirsch have sug­ gested various effects of such a process of "Europeanisation" in the past decades: the convergence of economies, of societal structures, law, politics and culture, more frequent and more regular transnational interaction, entanglement and transfers, as well as a potentially new experience of the European (political, societal or geo­ graphical) space, reflected in changes in European self-understanding 328 Some of these elements of change are included in this study. Three methods lend them­ selves to the analysis of such changes - namely comparison, the analysis of tran­ snational interaction and transfers, and the analysis of discourses.

2.2 Methods of European public sphere research At the different stages of the analysis different methods will be applied. Two meth­ ods relate to the general design of the study. First, the comparative method enables the eliciting of similarities and possible convergence over time, for instance in the coverage of European affairs and regarding the synchronicity of issues. Secondly, transnational communication will be explored by drawing on insights from the debate on methods of the analysis of transfers and transnational exchange. For the analysis of the sources, namely the content of public communication, I will apply two further methods. Content analysis serves to generate data in a format that can be subsequently compared and used for the analysis of transnational communica­ tion. Discourse analysis is a powerful tool for the study of the discursive construc­ tion and negotiation of European self-understanding. I will explicate why and how I will apply them against the backdrop of the recent debate on comparison and transnational history - favouring the analysis of transfers.

2.2.1 Historical comparison and the analysis of transfers Historical comparison, namely the systematic juxtaposition of (aspects of) socie­ ties, in order to establish commonalities and differences, has been among the pre­ ferred methods of social historians at least since the 1970s. In recent years, the method of comparison has increasingly come under attack, for two reasons: First, with the rise of cultural history, the methodological limits of comparison have been criticised by the proponents of transferts culturels and histoire croisee. Secondly, the advocates of transnational and global history have emphasised the geographical limits of established historiography and criticised its national parochialism. In an increasingly global age, the proponents of entangled or shared histories argued, the global entanglements of the history of Europe should no longer be ignored. The recent debate on methodology has raised awareness of the limits of certain re328 Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch, "Einleitung: Zur Europaisierung des Selbstverstandnisses und der Gesellschaft der Europaer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in Selbstverstiindnis und Gesell­

schaft der Europaer. Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europiiisierung im spiiten 19. und 20. Jahrhun­ dut, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch (Frankfurt, 2008), 14-18.

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search designs and established approaches. However, the critique of comparison also reflected shifting research interests, a phenomenon which made a different set of methods appear to be more suitable. The proponents of transferts culturels objected to the tendency of historical comparisons to treat their units of comparison as distinct, stable and unrelated. Such analytical reductionism329 - they held - led researchers to over-emphasise differences and overlook convergence. International comparison - practised by so­ cial historians - was suspected of reinforcing methodological nationalism, because it treated the national level as the quasi-natural unit of analysis 330 However, the main thrust of the critique was that comparative research systematically ignored how the objects of study developed over time, how they were interlinked within and across societies and subject to processes of acculturation 331 Conversely, the approaches of transferts culturels and of histoire croisee empha­ sised the linkages between societies. They focused on the networks and intermedi­ aries that connect societies. These approaches inquired into the complex processes of the reception of people, ideas or institutions into new contexts. Histoire croisee sought to make researchers aware that acculturation and may involve a thorough transformation of the original concepts within and through the contexte d'accueil Such entirely transformed ideas or structures might therefore even become invisi­ ble to the comparative researcher.332 Histoire croisee called for reflexivity regarding the heuristic limitations of the perspective of the observer, their viewpoints and terminology. One way of overcoming these limitations was to attempt to take into account a multiplicity of perspectives, for instance, by considering a plurality of sources.333 The proponents of transnational,334 global335 and entangled history336 have shared a similar agenda. Criticising the Eurocentrism and national parochialism of U

".

329 Kocka rightly highlights that any analysis requires reduction and that the strength of the com­ parative method is that it is explicit about its selection of cases. Kocka, "Comparison and Be­ yond," 43. 330 For a similar critique from the perspective of transnational history d.: Sebastian Conrad, "Dop­ pelte Marginalisierung. Pladoyer fUr eine transnationale Perspektive auf die deutsche Ge­ " schichte, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002): 146. For a thoughtful critique of how internation­ alism in fact strengthened nationalism d: Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. l84f. 331 Michel Espagne, "Sur les limites du comparatisme en histoire culturelle," Geneses 17 (1994): 112-116, 118-12l. 332 Michel Espagne and Michael Werner, "La construction d'une reference culturelle allemande en France. Genese et histoire (175G-1914),» Annales HSS 42 (1987): 988, Michael Werner and Bene­ " dicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisee and the Challenge of Reflexivity, History and Theory 45 (2006): 38. 333 Werner and Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison," 36, 4Of. 334 Cf. e.g. Sebastian Conrad and Jiirgen Osterhammel, eds., Das Kaiserreich transnational (G6ttin­ gen, 2004), Kaiser, "Transnational Western Europe since 1945. Integration as political society formation.", Jurgen Osterhammel, "Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001), Kiran Klaus Patel, "Transatlantische Per­ spektiven transnationaler Geschichte," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 29 (2003), Kiran Klaus Patel, "Uberlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte," Zeitschrift for Geschichtswissenschaft 52 (2004), Albert Wirz, "Fur eine transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte," Geschichte und Gesell­ sclwft 27 (2001). 335 For an overview see e.g. Dominic Sachsenmaier, Global History, Global Debates (geschichte. transnational, 3 March 2005). 336 Cf. JohalUles Paulmann, "Intemationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer. Zwei For-

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established historiography, they called for the broadening the range of perspec­ tives. In an increasingly global era, historians should be aware of the history of Europe's global entanglement. Influenced by postcolonial studies and conceptions of "shared" history,337 advocates of transnational history are interested in mutual - two-way - influences338 in global relations, for instance in the history of colonial­ ism 339 More recently, the transnational approach34o - which takes interaction, link­ ages, exchange processes, mutual perception across national boundaries into ac­ count- has been applied in the history of a European (political) society and in the history of European integration 341 The debate seems to have led to a reconciliation of the comparative and trans­ national approaches. Prominent proponents of comparative social history have pointed to the advantages of combining comparative analyses with the study of transnational exchanges across and beyond Europe, focusing on one or the other, depending on the research question 342 Against the backdrop of this debate, I will combine the comparative analysis of newspapers and country cases with the in­ quiry into transnational communication.

Historical comparison "Historical comparison", as Hartmut Kaelble defined it, consists of "a systematic juxtaposition of two or more historical societies". In practice, researchers compare specific aspects of societies 343 Such a systematic juxtaposition serves to examine similarities and differences between them - either at one point in time or of the same society over time. Taking the temporal dimension into account, historians may use comparison to trace "processes of convergence or divergence" 344 This usually re­ quires a comparison along two dimensions. The findings of various synchronous comparisons of different societies will subsequently be compared throughout

337

338

339 340

341

schungsansatze zur europaischen Geschichte des 18. - 20. Jahrhunderts," Historische Zeitschrift 267 (1998). Cf. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, "Geteilte Geschichten. Europa in einer postkoloni­ alen Welt," in Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kultur­ wissenschaften, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria (Frankfurt, 2002), 10. The study of two-way-interaction requires a consideration of sources written by non-Europeans - often in non-European languages, which poses a major obstacle. See: Margrit Fernau, Global history. Wegbereiter fur einen neuen Kolonialismus? (geschichte.transnational, 17 December 2004), 4. Conrad, "Doppelte Marginalisierung," 147, 150. See e.g.: Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., Transnationale Geschichte. The­ men, Tendenzen und Theorien (Gottingen, 2006). For a critical view: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Trans­ nationale Geschichte - der neue Konigsweg historischer Forschung," in Transnationale Ge­ schichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Gottingen, 2006). Kaiser, "From State to Society?" 205f. See also: Thomas Fetzer, "Europiiische Gewerkschaften und multinationale Unternehmen nach 1945: Ein Forschungsvorschlag," in Selbstverstiindnis

und Gesellschaft der Europiier. Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europiiisierung im spiiten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch (Frankfurt, 2008). 342 Haupt, "European history as comparative history," 125, Hartmut Kaelble, Der historische Ver­ gleich. Eine Einfiihrung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, 1999). 20f, Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," 44. 343 Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. 12f. My translation. 344 Ibid. My translation and emphasis.

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time. In inquiring into the extent of convergence in the development of European public communication, I will also apply such a two-step procedure. Even though comparison is essentially a neutral heuristic tool which makes visible both differences and commonalities, researchers tend to choose to focus on the one or on the other, according to their research interest. Hence, two types of comparison can be distinguished. While individualising comparison searches for differences, general ising comparison focuses on similarities between societies 345 Comparison applied in the study of the European public sphere is usually closer to the generalising type,346 which attempts to demonstrate that public communi­ cation shares many common features 347 A comparative analysis of European pub­ lic communication bears resemblance to what Charles Tilly has described as "en_ compassing comparison". Comparison is usually based on the assumption that the units of comparison are sufficiently distinct that they can be treated as individual cases 348 Encompassing comparison takes into account that units of comparison do not necessarily exist in isolation. In the case of encompassing comparison, the re­ searcher is aware that the units juxtaposed share a common point of reference. These units have in common that they are part of a "system". However, their role or position within the system marks the difference that encompassing comparison sets out to explain. The guiding hypothesis is that differences are "a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole" 349 Thus, encompassing com­ parison is interested in differences within a system.350 Tilly developed his concept with a view to global centre-periphery relations, e.g. the commonalities and differ­ ences between different colonies and dominions of the British empire. This con­ cept could be used to study the European public sphere in a similar way, since it raises awareness for the relatedness and the structural embeddedness of the cases. Such an approach suggests that European integration is likely to have had a dif­ ferentiated impact on the development of European public communication. The goal of comparative analyses is both to describe and to explain 351 One way of systematically capturing differences and similarities is to develop typolo­ gies. Historians use periodisation as a typology along the temporal dimension 352 Periodisation subdivides time on the basis of the presence or absence of the phe­ nomenon of interest, or its change over time 353 Even though it is impossible on the 345 Ibid. 3lf. 346 Cf. Haupt, European history as comparative history," 118f. " 347 Even for the critics of the notion of a European public sphere, the point of departure is that con­

348

349 350

351 352

353

tents and structures of public communication should be shared. See e.g. Gerhards, "Westeuro­ paische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlich­ keit." Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," 41. The methodological problems posed by comparing in­ terrelated units has long been known as "Galtons problem". See e.g. Harald Kleinschmidt, "Galtons Problem. Bemerkungen zur Theorie der transkulturell vergleichenden Geschichtsfor­ sehung," ZeitschriftfUr Geschichtswissenschaft 39 (1991). Charles Tilly, Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons (New York, 1984). 81-83. Ibid. 1461. Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. 12f, Kocka, Comparison and Beyond," 40. " Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. 12f., 100-103, Kocka, Comparison and Beyond," 40. " Even in theoretically-minded journals such as History and Theory", there is a conspicuous " absence of theoretical and methodological reflection on the concept and the practice of periodi­ sation. For a critique: Prasenjit Duara, Why is History Antitheoretical?," Modern China 24 " (1998): 1121.

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basis of five case studies to establish a robustly based periodisation, I will at least be able discuss the implications of my findings for existing periodisations, such as Kaelble's suggestion of a turning point in the mid-1980s in the history of the Euro­ pean public sphere and Knipping's and Sch6nwald's notion of "Europe's second generation" in the 1970s and early 1980s 354 The design of this study also does not allow for a systematic analysis of causal factors. Nevertheless, in the third chapter below various aspects of context will be explored comparatively as potential causal factors. The most relevant context is the macro-level process of European integration. The concern that the emergence of the European public sphere lags behind the development of European integration, thus aggravating the European democratic deficit,355 suggests both a normative and a causal link. The European public sphere is expected to be a function of European integration. Accordingly, the "long-term structural conditions" of European integration are as important as the "short-term context of action" around the summits 356 The impact of European integration on the European public sphere is not a direct one. It is mediated by fac­ tors such as news values and mediatisation 357 Therefore, some aspects of the pro­ duction of the sources as well as the traditions of discourses of Europe in the dif­ ferent countries require further consideration. On the basis of these context varia­ bles, I will suggest some tentative explanations of the findings 358 The model of encompassing comparison hence marks the broader framework of this study. Ele­ ments of the analysis of transfers are more relevant for the analysis of transna­ tional communication.

The analysis of transfers As a relational approach that cuts across the units of comparison, the analysis of transfers is interested in how ideas, institutions and people move across borders and how they are integrated into a new context. The process of acculturation may lead to a complete transformation or an adaptation to a new, frequently very dif­ ferent environment. In order to trace transfers and examine the conditions under which they take place, the analysis of transfers focuses on the mediators, on trans­ national networks of exchange and interaction. The active role of the receiving society has been emphasised in particular in recent years 359 In the study of the European public sphere, aspects of and insights from these approaches may be used in the study of transnational communication. However, 354 Kaelble, ,, The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," 9-13, Knipping and Schonwald, "VOfwort," ix.

355 Gerhards, "Europaisierung von Okonomie und Politik und die Tragheit der Entstehung einer europaischen Offentlichkeit," 280-286. 356 Werner and ZimmermalUl, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisee and the Challenge of Reflexiv­ ity," 48. 357 Cf. Christiane Eilders, Nachrichtenfaktoren und Rezeption. Eine empirische Analyse zur Auswahl und Verarbeitung politischer Informationen (Opladen, 1997), Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, liThe Structure of Foreign News," Journal of Peace Research 2 (1965), Winfried Schulz, "Recon­ structing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept," European Journal of Communication 19 (2004). 358 For earlier attempts at explanation: Jan-Henrik Meyer, "The Fall and Rise of the European Pub­ lic Sphere. Path dependent responses to European Integration," in Europa vicina e lontana. Idee e percorsi dell'integrazione europea, ed. Federica Di Sarcina, Laura Grazi, and Laura Scichilone (Florence, 2008). 359 Espagne and Werner, "La construction d'une reference culturelle allemande en France," 970, 988.

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the aim of European public sphere research is more simple than the complex ana­ lysis of transfers. The goal is to demonstrate that transnational communication has taken place at all and to assess its extent. Accordingly, I will examine to what ex­ tent views and opinions from other countries have been rendered in newspapers and - where this is possible - how they were integrated, repeated and evaluated in the receiving context. Furthermore, as research on transfers emphasises the role of the mediators,360 I will examine their socio-cultural characteristics and to what extent they are transnationally embedded such that they are more likely to en­ hance transnational communication within Europe.

2.2.2 Content analysis and the analysis of discourses Before a comparison and the analysis of transnational exchange can be made, a large amount of source material, namely newspaper articles on European affairs, will have to be analysed in a systematic way. In order to reduce the amount of in­ formation and in order to create units of information which can be compared, I will apply two methods for the analysis of content: First, content analysis attempts to code the information from the articles and thus enables quantification. Secondly, aspects of discourse analysis were used, which is a more complex method for studying the discursive construction of meaning. I will present both methods in turn, focusing on those elements I will apply in this study 361

Content analysis Content analysis enables researchers to deal with large bodies of text, allowing them to reduce the amount of information in a systematic way. This reduction is achieved by selecting information and classifying it in different categories, i.e. by "coding" the information. Coding is a systematic procedure. The rules for allocat­ ing categories to certain parts or patterns of information are explicit. Even though when processing more complex information, coders need to apply their specific context knowledge, it should be possible in principle to reproduce the procedure. In most cases, classification is not based on formal criteria, but on an understand­ ing of the meaning of language. Coding categories that are applied to classify in­ formation are developed with a view to the respective research question. Codes are rooted in theory, even if they have been generated in an inductive manner, 360 Michel Espagne, Les transferts culturels (geschichte.transnational, 19 January 2005), 2. 361 A third method, namely "frame analysis" has frequently been applied in the study of the Euro­

pean public sphere (e.g. Kantner, "Die thematische Verschrankung nationaler Offentlichkeiten in Europa und die Qualitat transnationaler politischer Kommunikation," 156.), has not been used in this study, for theoretical and methodological reasons. From a theoretical point of view, it is problematic to assume that transnationally shared frames are an indication of a shared transnational debate sphere. As frames are bearers of opinions and interpretations (Robert Ent­ " man, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, Journal of Communication 43 (1993): 52.), shared frames rather suggest shared opinions, whereas the public sphere should be characterised by a diversity of opinions. As regards methodology, highly abstract or themati­ cally specific frames have frequently been used. There is a great amount of arbitrariness as to what forms the distinctive element in a frame. Hence, it is very difficult to compare the results of framing analyses. Moreover, there is no theoretically safe argument, at which level of abstrac­ tion, the framing of issues should be shared or distinct in a European public sphere.

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such as in an exploratory study. They serve as (variables of) empirical indicators for theoretically specified concepts. The challenge of designing categories is to en­ sure that they are actually commensurate to what they are supposed to elicit, de­ scribe and "measure" . Coding allows information not only to be summarised, but also to be quantified, so that information from or about the texts can be measured or analysed in numerical terms, applying statistics. Thus the structure of public communication can be made visible, e.g. by presenting the distribution of certain categories 362 The results of content analyses lend themselves to comparison and a further analysis of convergence and divergence over time. In this study, content analysis is only used in a very limited manner, classifying types of issues and ac­ tors. I will further specify this in the section on operationalisation below.

Discourse analysis Unlike content analysis proper, which grew out of a positivist tradition, (critical) discourse analysis is particularly interested in the social construction of reality through language. Discourse analysis understands communication as a process that is as much a product of society as one that constructs reality and thus impacts on society. "It is socially constitutive as much as it is socially conditioned."363 Dis­ course analysis can be understood as a particular way of studying social phenom­ ena through their representation in language. Discourse analysis combines the analysis of structure and agency. It focuses on structures of, and agents within so­ ciety that impact upon and / or are reproduced, defended or transformed, as ac­ tors reiterate or renegotiate interpretations of society364 Discourse analysis may focus on eliciting structures of knowledge, e.g. those rules that govern discourses and delimit what can be said, and which utterances are off limits.365 Discourse analysts may find regular patterns structuring the dis­ course and be able to describe its "unity and coherence" from which the rules of the discourse may be inferred 366 However, these rules are rarely stable. Rather, they are constantly reproduced and renegotiated, and subject to change. Thus dis­ course analysts have to study discursive action as social action. Actors' strategic (inter)action needs to be understood as the pursuit of political or societal goals through discourse. Actors negotiate, discuss and construct arguments, intended to retain and defend, to transform or to challenge social reality367 Accordingly, dis-

362 Peter Atteslander, Metlwden empirischer Sozialjorschung, 8 ed. (Berlin, 1995). 235-247, Werner Friih, Inhaltsanalyse. TheDrie und Praxis, S. Auf!. ed. (Konstanz, 2001). 119-132, Philipp Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken, 8 ed. (Weinheim, 2003). 11-15. 363 Wodak, Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler ldentitiit. 42. My translation, similarly: Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis," in Introduction to Discourse Studies, ed. T.A. van Dijk (London, 1997), 258. More specifically, Wodak refers to her branch of discourse 364 365

366 367

analysis, namely, "critical discourse analysis". However, this statement holds true for most ap­ proaches. Ruth Wodak, "Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis," in Handbook of Pragmatics, ed. Jel Verschueren and Jan-Ola Ostman (Amsterdam, 2006), 21. Achim Landwehr, Geschichte des Sagbaren. Einfiihrung in die Historische Diskursanalyse (Tiibingen, 2001). 7, Ole Waever, "Identity, communities and foreign policy. Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory," in European integration and national identity. The challenge of the Nordic states, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Waever (London, New York, 2002), 29. Waever, "Identity, communities and foreign policy," 29. Wodak, Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identitiit. 43.

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course analysis proceeds to study patterns of arguments, their spread, but also their function when they are strategically applied 368 The socially constructed nature of discourse, preconditioned on tacit, lasting rules and traditions of meaning, but shaped by strategic action of the agents of discourse - these basic assumptions of discourse analysis are well in line with an interpretation of the public sphere as a sphere of discursive action. I will thus ap­ ply discourse analysis to elicit how the participants in public discourse construct European self-understanding and lobby for identification with Europe. Based on theoretically informed research questions, I will elicit topical patterns of argu­ ments that can be found in newspaper articles. At the same time, I will take the context into account. Critical discourse analysis, Wodak argued, is conscious of historical context and interested in studying change. The problem-oriented ap­ proach of critical discourse analysis - guided by theoretically informed research questions and the "abductive" methodology of category building, which moves back and forth between theory and empirical data369 - largely overlaps with the practice of historical source analysis. Increasingly, historians engaging in the analysis of debates or discourses are more methodologically reflected and theo­ retically informed 37o Precisely how these four methodological traditions have been integrated in the analysis will be demonstrated subsequently.

2.3 Operationalisation In this analysis of European public communication around major European sum­ mits between 1969 and 1991, I will explore five characteristics of the European public sphere. Besides the defining criterion of the European public sphere, namely (1) its reference to the European polity, I will examine further characteristics of European public communication, in order to assess its development. I will estab­ lish (2) to what extent there is a synchronicity of issues, (3) a structure of mediators that is likely to enhance transnational communication, as well as (4) actual evi­ dence of transnational communication. Finally, I will study the European public sphere "at work", examining the (5) discursive construction of European self-un­ derstanding and the potential emergence of a European sense of community. I will treat all of the five questions in turn, explaining which empirical indicators I de­ veloped and how I will analyse the sources.

2.3.1 European polity as a point of reference

1. Did the European polity increasingly become a point of reference, improving transpar­ ency in relation to European affairs ?

368 Ibid. 71. 369 Wodak, "Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis," 2f. 370 E.g. Maximilian Muller-Harlin, Nation und Europa in Parlamentsdebatten zur Europiiischen Integra­ tion. Integrationsmuster in Deutschland, Frankreich und Grofibritannien nach 1950 {Baden-Baden, 2008). 34-40.

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In order to establish to what extent the EC was a point of reference around the time of the summits, to what extent this changed, and whether this was similar between countries and newspapers, I assessed the quantity of EC coverage. The indicator I used was the number of newspaper articles371 that covered EC issues. Since over time the number of articles in the respective sections of the newspapers varied, this had to be accounted for by putting the number of EC articles into pro­ portion of the coverage in those sections of the newspapers from which it was drawn. For this purpose I counted the entire coverage in the politics and econom­ ics section of all of the six newspapers during two weeks around the five summits between 1969 and 1991. In this quantitative analysis I distinguished between four different types of articles, according to their content. Since articles on European politics and policy making usually appeared in the politics and economics sections of the newspapers, including the opinion pages,372 the number of articles in this section served as an appropriate base. By placing EC coverage in proportion to the entire politics and economics coverage, I attained an indicator that was comparable between newspapers and over time. Hence I counted all articles in the politics and economics section, and coded them as "all articlesu. As newspapers tended to cover European affairs mainly in their foreign and international news sections - a pattern that has only recently been changing - I controlled for the varying "foreign news" coverage between newspapers. This cat­ egory of articles was a subset of "all articles" and comprised only those articles that treated foreign affairs and international news. Many newspapers (such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine) did not distinguish in their politics section between their domestic and international news pages. Hence articles had to be classified on an individual basis. Coding was based on the information from the headline, inter­ mediate headlines and the first paragraph 373 The coding criterion was that the events or issues treated took place abroad, related to international politics or for­ eign, non-residenP74 actors. 371 Articles are individual texts consisting - generally - of a headline and a text of varying length, putting forth an argument and / or rendering information. Articles lend themselves to be counted, because they are easily distinguished empirically and can be considered individual units of information for both the researcher and the reader. Articles are of course of different size, and appear in different formats, which also differ across countries and media. For the simple quantitative analysis, these differences had to be ignored. 372 This excludes regional or local news, culture, sports and all sorts of service pages. Included are the entire front page, opinion pages and the "last page", which is a mixed news page in most papers. The culture sections of the newspapers were not included, because it is only in recent times that they have occasionally contained articles on European integration. Moreover, the culture sections - such as the German "Feuilleton" - pose a problem of international comparabil­ ity, because they are much more diverse in content and treatment than the politics and econom­ ics sections, which are less shaped by national cultural traditions and peculiarities. Cf. Trenz, Europa in den Medien. 207. Due to the limitation to certain subsections of the newspaper, this study relies on a base that differs slightly from the one generated by electronic keyword searches of databases. 373 In order to avoid the blind spots of an overly formal condition, an additional criterion was con­ ceded. If reference is made to foreign or international issues (respectively: EC policy, polity or integration) neither in the headlines, nor in the first paragraph, but visibly throughout a sub­ stantial part of the text, the text was also included. 374 This criterion excludes immigrants as actors or immigration as a problem, factors which are ar­ guably part of domestic politics.

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These two categories of articles essentially form the base from which EC cov­ erage was drawn. Additionally, I sought to assess the level of EC coverage in rela­ tion to the coverage of the most important individual foreign country in the news 375 Hence, I coded "US news", namely those pieces which treated events tak­ ing place in the USA, US policies, institutions or actors from the United States. In a similar way, I coded those articles, in which the point of reference was the EC I defined as "EC articles" those newspaper articles which covered the institutions, policies, politics and political actors of the EC, or dealt with European integration as a process or problem. The "EC articles" thus defined formed the basis for all the analyses in the subsequent sections. The analysis of these data consisted of three steps: First, I examined whether the EU increasingly became a point of reference by assessing the level of EC cover­ age in relation to "all", "foreign" and "US" articles, and considered change over time. Secondly, I established to what extent the level of EC coverage was similar between newspapers and countries, and thirdly, whether there was convergence over time. For a conclusion, I considered the implications for transparency about EC affairs. Nevertheless, a caveat remains. Given the case selection, the data generated through an operationalisation of this kind must be treated as indicative rather than representative in the strict sense of the term. As these figures were selected from brief periods of two consecutive weeks, chosen precisely because the European summits were assumed to have played an important role in the news, these num­ bers give only a rough indication of relevant phenomena. They are by no means representative of the news distribution during the entire year. The probability of selective bias is highest in the case of US news. US news only referred to a single country that may or may not have featured prominently in the news - this being largely determined by events. For instance, in 1969, US news was extensively present, due to the second landing on the moon and the My Lai massacre in Viet­ nam that was publicised during that period. Conversely, in 1991, the coincidence of Maastricht with the collapse of the Soviet Union directed attention to Europe rather than the US. Consequently, the comparison with US news has to be consid­ ered in terms of the respective news context and has to be treated with great care.

2.3.2 Synchronicity 2.

Were the same issues increasingly discussed at the same time at the same level of rele­ vance?

Given that I deliberately chose and examined periods of the highest attention to European affairs around the summits, a substantial level of EC coverage was highly expectable. Hence, it is not the presence, but the extent and the develop­ ment of synchronicity that are of interest. Of course, the co-presence of "EC arti­ cles" explored in the first step of the analysis is already by itself a simple, tentative indicator of synchronicity. Two further criteria were applied to assess whether the same issues are discussed applying the same criticeria of relevance. First, I exam375 Peters and Wessler, "Transnationale Offentlichkeiten," 141, Sifft et al., "Segmented Europeani­ zation," 144.

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ined the most prominent front page headlines376 and editorial comment, in order to assess to what extent the EC was considered an issue of the highest relevance. In order to be able to establish a comparison, I selected the three most prominently placed front page headlines and the (up to) three main editorials. I measured the level of synchronicity in the attribution of the highest relevance to EC affairs and considered convergence over time. For this purpose I examined synchronicity both on a daily basis and at the aggregate level of the two-week period. Secondly, establishing to what extent the same policies were discussed in the commentary will allow us to determine whether really was the same issues that were considered simultaneously at the same level of relevance. The different pol­ icy areas the EC dealt with may serve as an appropriate - even if generic - opera­ tionalisation of the theoretically unspecified concept of "issues". Discussion of the same policy areas should be sufficiently predetermined by the political problems at hand that it actually referred to similar problems. Not all of the policies have existed at all points in time 377 Often the appeal to introduce certain new policies or competences also gave rise to discussion 378 Hence, besides the actual policies laid down in the treaties or developed in the meantime, I additionally considered enlargement, institutional reform and the frequently more philosophically con­ ducted debate on Europe's finalite. I coded the issues discussed in the commentary according to this list of policies 379 The presence of issues in the commentary pro­ vides evidence of a conscious attribution of relevance by the commentator and - in the case of editorials - the newspaper as a whole. Based on these data, I examined the degree of similarity of the issues discussed across borders in three different ways: How many and what share of the policies discussed at all were actually dis­ cussed across borders provides evidence of the similarity of presence. Similar fre­ quency in the discussion of the same issues provides a measure of the similarity of relevance. Comparing pairs (dyads) of newspapers with respect to the co-presence and the similar attribution of relevance served as a measure of overall similarity and convergence. 2.3.3 Mediators' transnational involvement 3.

Did the structure of mediators change in a way that suggests increased transnational communication and broader participation?

Journalists were the main mediators in a European public sphere. They were the central actors both with respect to transnational communication and to opinion formation on European issues. In their daily routines, they communicated across borders transferring their views and opinions transnationally via their newspa­ pers. Three groups in particular played and continue to play a pivotal role in the arena of communication on European politics: First, the Brussels correspondents are not only most knowledgeable on European affairs, but are also part of the in­ creasingly transnationally-collaborating Brussels press corps. Secondly, the for-

376 377 378 379

Cf. also: Hube, "L'Union Europeenne a la "Une"." This problem will have to be taken note of in a quantitative analysis. For the list of policies, I drew on the EC treaties. The list of policies can be found in the Annex.

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eign correspondents report on international affairs but also on EC-related affairs from the European capitals and from overseas. Finally the commentators, editori­ alists and columnists play a key role in shaping media opinion. Secondly, increas­ ingly external commentators and interviewees were invited to voice their views. Studying the structure of those who write about European affairs allows for con­ clusions to be drawn about the openness and equality of participation and the degree of mediators' transnational involvement. This can be considered a precon­ dition of transnational communication that integrates a European public sphere. The analysis consists of three parts. After providing a quantitative overview of the share different groups of authors have in European news production, I ana­ lysed in greater detail the extent to which these three groups of elite journalists dominate reporting and commentary on EU affairs - at the individual summits and through continuous presence over time. Finally, I took into consideration ex­ ternal authors and interviewees, who have become increasingly more important, particularly as transnational contributors. By classifying authors by their profes­ sion, the institutions they represent and their previous transnational experiences, it was possible to examine their propensity for transnational involvement and the elite nature of this group. Such analyses serve to assess both transnational integra­ tion and the democratic quality of the European public sphere 380

2.3.4 Transnational Communication

4. Is there an indication of growing transnational communication and a diversifying range of actors covered? Transnational communication is difficult to trace, because it is frequently invisible. Accordingly, transnational communication requires a somewhat indirect opera­ tionalisation in media research. Based on the idea that transnational discourse in the media takes place whenever writers in newspapers discuss views from abroad, Andreas Wimmel suggested that "discursive references" be studied. He defined "discursive references" as incidences when writers (of opinion pieces) presented actors' views and positions and subsequently discussed these views - voicing a positive, negative or inconclusive opinion.381 In a similar way, for the analysis of transnational communication and the inclusion of the views of societal actors in the commentary, I considered the question of whose views and positions were discussed in the commentary. Different kinds of discursive references were distinguished, in order to map the pattern of communication 382 Slightly modifying Koopman's terminology,383 I distinguished between two kinds of transnational references: While in horizontal references, commentators mentioned and discussed the views of actors from other nation states - effectively mainly government actors - vertical references discussed the positions of the supranational institutions, - such as the Commission or the European Parliament. Societal references provide evidence of the extent to which

380 381 382 383

Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte Europa. 270. " WImmel, "Transnationale Diskurse, 14-16. For an overview of the categories used for coding references, see the AlUlex. " " Koopmans, Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere?, 186.

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societal views were considered relevant and worthy of comment. Societal refer­ ences comprised all references to non-government actors. This category was fur­ ther subdivided in an attempt to operationalise Habermas' juxtaposition of centre and periphery as discussed above. Distinguishing between actors of the political centre (central banks, parliaments, courts and parties) and of those of the periph­ ery, that is, those not directly involved in decision-making (civil society, business, media, experts, public opinion384), the goal was to establish if changes in the struc­ ture of public communication with regard to the involvement of the views of soci­ etal actors had taken place. 2.3.5 The construction of European self-understanding

5. Is there evidence of a common conceptualisation of the European political space? Was there growing European identification, a European sense of community? Since the 1950s researchers such as Karl W. Deutsch have argued that intensified transnational communication, increased interaction and collaboration across na­ tional borders triggered processes of social learning that ultimately led to scepti­ cism towards the view that the nation was the only conceivable political commu­ nity. A transnational "sense of community"385 that went beyond societal and po­ litical boundaries was expected to emerge 386 Based on such assumptions, students of the European public sphere have complemented the inquiry into the structures of European public communication with the study of discourses on Europe's self­ understanding, in their search for traces of European identification. Risse, for in­ stance, contended that in the wake of increasingly transnational European debates, participants in the public sphere can be expected to perceive Europe as the rele­ vant political community and the fellow Europeans as relevant participants 387 While I am critical of European identity as a necessary criterion of the European public sphere, and of the expectation of a linear development towards a European sense of community,388 it should be acknowledged that the study of discourses on identity and legitimacy does provide evidence of the European public sphere "at work" as a sphere of discursive action. I examined the discursive construction of European self-understanding, namely the conceptualisation of, and the identification with, the political space which includes the lobbying for identification with Europe. How did commenta384 Public opinion is of course not an actor. However, commentators tend to treat public opinion reified by opinion polls - as if it was an actor.

385 Karl W. Deutsch et al. developed the notion of a "sense of community" in the 19508, in the con­ text of a large scale comparative historical research project. They tried to work out the condi­ tions that induce political communities to commit themselves indefinitely to the peaceful reso­ lution of conflict. What the authors call "sense of community", is the necessary software of ideas and beliefs besides the hardware of institutions and practices. Both aspects enable the in­ tegration of people into a political community that refrains from violent conflict resolution. Most basically, therefore, a sense of community is the belief "that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ,peaceful change'll, i.e. via institutions and procedures. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 3-5. 386 Ibid. 37. 387 Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," 149-151. 388 Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gemig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Offentlichkeiten und Identitaten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 10.

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tors describe the relations between the different levels of politics (societal, national, European) and juxtapose them to each other? The emphasis on conflict or commo­ nality provides evidence of their self-understanding and the construction of a sense of community. Deutsch et al. argued that a "sense of community" rested on a "partial identification in terms of self-images and interest" . This had to be com­ plemented by values that instilled trust, such as "mutual sympathy and loyalty", and "mutual consideration" and reliability. Trust was based on "mutually success­ ful predictions of behavior" 389 The perception that all participants shared such values eventually committed people to continuous fruitful cooperation. If every­ one adhered to such values, people would not have to fear that they might fall prey to an intolerable "tyranny of the majority" 390 Drawing on Deutsch's arguments, my analysis of European self understand­ ing and the possible construction of a European sense of community focused on three main indicators of the sense of community: First, interest as an indicator draws on commentators' discussion of shared and conflicting interests. Secondly, trusp91 as an indicator was based on the commentators' perception that the Euro­ pean partners and the European institutions seemed trustworthy. Commentators also examined to what extent national actors made an effort to build relations of trust with their partners. Thirdly, commentators constructed, professed and lob­ bied for identification with Europe or the nation. Before presenting the results of this programme of research, it is important to consider the context which shaped the development of public communication as well as the specific situation of pub­ lic communication at the specific moments studied.

389 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 36. 390 Cf. Claus Offe, "Demokratie und Vertrauen," in Herausforderungen der Demokratie: zur Integrati­ ons- und Leistungsfiihigkeit politischer Institutionen, ed. Claus Offe (Frankfurt, New York, 2003), 238. 391 The relational concept of trust is more comprehensive than simply the reference to values. Cf. Jan Delhey, "Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? An Analysis of Trust Between EU Nationalities," Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (2007): 2551. For a thoughtful exposition of the concept of trust in a historical perspective, see: Ute Frevert, "Vertrauen: eine " historische Spurensuche, in Vertrauen: historische Anniiherungen, ed. Ute Frevert (Gottingen,

2003), 20-48.

3 THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE IN CONTEXT The development of a European public sphere between 1969 and 1991 was embed­ ded in, and influenced by, various context conditions. These context conditions can be understood as causal factors shaping European public communication as observed in this study. Four aspects of context deserve particular attention: First, European integration as a comprehensive process, second, the summits as events, third, traditional perceptions and ways of interpreting Europe and European inte­ gration, and finally the structure of the media and news production. European integration as a longer term political process has brought about changes in the constitution of the emerging European polity, in European politics and policy making. European integration is a pre-eminently important context for three reasons: First, European integration is the object of reporting and debate in the European public sphere. Secondly, political events and structural changes in the process of European integration have stimulated coverage and debate in the European public sphere. This causal link is not a direct one, however. The media themselves are important actors in selecting issues for news coverage and debate, and in the setting of agendas results from this 392 At the same time, research has demonstrated that journalists apply a certain set of professional criteria that act as a filter when selecting information. News values describe perceived properties of events or issues that make them appear relevant and newsworthy from the point of view of the media. For instance, the involvement of "elite nations", namely powerful or influential states, and the cultural, political or economic proximity of the country or actors, contribute to the perceived relevance of the issue. The conti­ nuity of stories, but also the unexpectedness of events tend to make a story appear more newsworthy. Influential or prominent actors are more likely to be covered. Personification - giving a human touch to the story, negativism and conflict tend to provide more emotional appeaJ.393 Hence, such news values need to be taken into consideration when trying to explain the coverage of European integration and European summits in particular. Thirdly, there is a normative link between integration and the European public sphere. The growing scope of European pol­ icy-making, the shift of competences and the abolition of national vetoes in par­ ticular have increased the so-called "democratic deficit". The main preoccupation of critical observers was that growing Ee level competences were not accompa­ nied by a commensurate improvement of democratic decision making powers and control mechanisms. Since the early 1990s, the European public sphere has been discussed as a means of reducing this apparent democratic deficit. While the process of European integration shaped the "long-term structural conditions" for the emergence of the European public sphere, the European sum­ mits selected as case studies are embedded in a "short-term context of action" 394 The institutional set-up, the politics and the issues at stake all have an impact on 392 Hans-Jorg Trenz, "Mediatisation and Democratisation in the EU," ARENA Working Paper 06 (2006): 3. 393 Christiane Eilders, "News Factors and News Decisions. Theoretical and Methodological Ad­ " vances in Germany, Communications. The European Journal of Communication Research 31 (2006): 8. 394 Cf. Werner and ZimmermalUl, "Beyond Comparison," 48.

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media attention. News values also act as an important filter, here. Nationally spe­ cific perceptions of "Europe" as a political problem marked the "longer-term structural conditions" that strongly influenced the contents of European public communication. Research has emphasised persistent differences in the "meaning of Europe" between Britain, France and Germany. Finally, the conditions of news production shaped the content of European public communication. The structural conditions of the media market and the editorial traditions of the respective news­ papers required particular consideration. In this context, the concrete conditions under which journalists had access to information at the summit, and the organi­ sation of comment production were taken into account. For a conclusion, some suggestions are made with regard to the potential impact of these conditions on European public communication.

3.1 European integration 1969-1991 In the period between 1969 and 1991, the European Community changed drasti­ cally - in size, and in terms of its policies and institutions. This change has usually been understood as part of a process of European integration. What is European integration? Frequently, historians shied away from defining European integra­ tion395 or suggested very broad definitions in order to treat European integration from a longue-duree perspective 396 Nevertheless, being clear about terminology is crucial, not least since integration is both an analytical and a political concept. The term "European integration" was originally introduced into political discourse in the 1940s by American economists who sought to lobby for multilateral free trade. The attraction of the concept was due not least to its ambiguity. Similar to other procedural terms such as globalisation, the concept may denote a process, the re­ spective state of affairs at certain point in time within this process, or the final goal of the process, its telos 397 European Federalists hijacked the term in the context of the Schuman Plan. Because of this, integration acquired a teleological connotation, de­ noting an ongoing and inevitably advancing progress towards a European federa­ tion 398 Since the Enlightenment, history has increasingly been interpreted in terms of progress 399 As progress carried strong positive connotations, political ideas and concepts such as European integration have frequently been associated with progress in order to strengthen their persuasive power.400 German and French

395 E.g. Elvert, Die Europiiische Integration. 3. 396 Peter Kruger, Das unberechenbare Europa. Epochen des Integrationsprozesses vom spiiten 18. Jahrhun­ dert bis zur Europiiischen Union (Stuttgart, 2005). 13, 16. 397 See the discussion of "Europeanisation" above. 398 Ludolf Herbst, "Die zeitgen6ssische Integrationstheorie und die AnHinge der europiiischen Ei­ nigung," Vierteljahreshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte 34 (1986): 163, 197. 399 Since the 19th century the so-called Whig interpretation of history presented the past as a devel­ opment in which the positive forces of progress were to eventually win over the forces of back­ wardness. For a critique: Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation ofHistory, Reprint ed. (Lon­ don, 1950 [1931]). '1', 11-13. 400 Reinhart Koselleck, ,,"Fortschritt" und "Niedergang" - Nachtrag zur Geschichte zweier Be­ griffe," in Niedergang. Studien zu einem geschichtlichen Thema, ed. Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart,

1980), 226.

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equivalents of integration, namely "Einigung"401 (unification) or "construction eu­ ropeenne" or "construction de l'Europe" similarly carry federalist expectations of an advance towards the completion of the European edifice.402 Given such political usage and connotations, defining European integration as an analytical concept becomes all the more critical. In the context of this study, I will thus rely on a more concrete and closely de­ limited definition of European integration. Political scientists Berthold Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig proposed a systematic model of "political integration" . Integration meant the "transfer of competences from the national to the suprana­ tional level" .403 The result of integration was that political decisions were no longer exclusively subject to national sovereignty. Rittberger and Schimmelfennig distin­ guished three different dimensions along which the EC had undergone change.404 1. 2.

3.

The sectoral dimension describes the scope of EC policy-making, i.e. which policy areas have been included. The vertical dimension assesses the depth of integration, namely the extent to which competences have been ceded to the European institutions. The depth of integration varied between mere intergovernmental coordination of a pol­ icy area - such as presently in the Open Method of Coordination405 - and full integration into the Community framework. In the latter case, this normally involved legislation based on a Commission proposal, and the approval of the Council of Ministers and has increasingly also involved the European Parlia­ ment. The horizontal dimension refers to enlargement, i.e. the widening of the territo­ rial scope of European integration, and to the variable geometry of European integration. Not all member states have accepted the same level of integration on the vertical dimension in the same policy areas. Variable geometry applied e.g. to Schengen, EMU, or the social chapter. The following table summarises this model:

401 E.g. Gerhard Brunn, Die europiiische Einigung (Stuttgart, 2002), Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957, Franz Knipping and Matthias Sch6nwald, eds., Aujbruch zum Europa cler zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984 (Trier, 2004). 402 E.g. Marie-Therese Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europeenne de 1945 i1 nos jours, 4 ed. (Bruxelles, 2004), Pierre Gerbet, La construction de l'Europe (Paris, 1999). 403 Integration only adopted this meaning by the early 1950s. Herbst, "Die zeitgen6ssische Integra­ tionstheorie und die Anfange der europaischen Einigung," 174. 404 Berthold Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Integrationstheorien. Entstehung und Ent­ wicklung der EU," in Die Europiiische Union. Theorien und Analysekonzepte, ed. Katharina Holz­ inger, et a1. (Paderborn, 2005), 19-2l. 405 Cf. Milena Buchs, New Governance in European Social Policy: the Open Metlwd of Coordination (Bas­ ingstoke, 2007).

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1969-1991

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Table 3: Dimensions of political integration406 1. sectoral

2. vertical

3. horizontal

Object

Policy area

Allocation of competences

Territory

Increase in integration by . . .

Integration of new policy areas (broadening the scope of policies)

Transfer of national competences (deepening)

Widening the territorial scope (enlargement, variable geometry)

The process of integration has generally been understood to be directional. This assumption matches the experience during the postwar period.407 An increase in integration could only be established by comparing the state of affairs over time. Unlike earlier normative theories of integration, which emphasised the deficien­ cies in comparison to the ideal of a European federal state,408 Rittberger 's and Schimmelfennig's concept of "political integration" was open-ended and descrip­ tive, rather than prescriptive. Integration would not advance incessantly, but oc­ casionally stop, or even move backwards. Their model provides a comprehensive framework for an assessment of European integration. Which stages of develop­ ment have been distinguished in the historiography of European integration so far? More specifically, with regard to the period of study 1969-1991, which perio­ disations have been suggested, and why?

3.1.2 Periodisations of European integration (1969-1991) Periodisation is an important exercise in historical analysis. Providing explanation and suggesting interpretations, periodisation structures the narrative rendering of the past. The division of time into distinct periods serves to impose some interpre­ tative order onto the otherwise meaningless flow of time.409 Periodisation may differentiate between periods characterised by different properties. In practice, historians tend to emphasise turning points which mark change, separating peri­ ods that differ in their characteristics. Periodisation is necessarily based on priori­ ties, values and an understanding of continuity and change.410 Since any subdivi­ sion of time privileges certain criteria over others, the criteria of periodisation should be made explicit.411 However, the literary logic of narratives412 and the tra-

406 Based on: Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, "Integrationstheorien. Entstehung und Entwicklung der EU," 22. (Table 1.1., my translation). 407 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "European Union?," West European Politics 31 (2008): 115. 408 Cf. Michael Burgess, "Federalism and Federation," in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Cini (Oxford, 2003). For a critique: Wolfgang Merkel, "Die Europaische Integration und das Elend " der Theorie, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25 (1999): 3041., 338. 409 Ursula A. J. Becher, "Periodisierung," in Lexikon Geschichtswissenschaft. Hundert Grundbegriffe, ed. Stefan Jordan (Stuttgart, 2002), 234f, Ursula A. J. Becher, "Periodisierung," in Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik, ed. Klaus Bergmann (Seelze-Velber, 1997), 127. 410 William A. Green, "Periodizing World History," History and Theory 34 (1995): 99. 411 Duara, "Why is History Antitheoretical?," 112. 412 Cf. Hayden V. White, Metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe (Balti­ more, 1973).

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ditions of professional practice413 seem to have militated against such a systematic treatment. Criteria have rarely been made explicit and reflected upon. Many French,414 German and Anglo-American historians of European integration415 have relied on the rather formal subdivision of time into decades416 or by events.417 Other accounts present a phase model of foundation, construction and (further) perfection.418 This mirrors the medieval distinction of the natural "ages of man" from birth, youth, maturity, to final degeneration and death.419 The notion of "Eu_ rope's second generation" similarly draws on a suggestive analogy taken from the human life cycle. However, in the modern narrative, progress is without limit; de­ cay and death have no role in this tale. Historians essentially agreed that 1969 and 1985 were the main turning points of the period between the late 1960s and the early 1990s. The summit of The Hague meant "a new start for Europe", overcoming the Gaullist deadlock, opening the door for enlargement, the completion of the Community budget and deepening.42o Even Bino Olivi and Marie-Therese Bitsch, who considered the first enlargement in 1973 as the main watershed, discussed the importance of The Hague for the period to come.421 The year 1985 - when a more pro-active Commission president Delors took office, the Single Market programme was devised and the Single Eu­ ropean Act (SEA) decided at the eve of Southern enlargement - was generally con-

413 For an example of the surprising resilience of the traditions of history writing d. Paul Nolte, "Darstellungsweisen deutscher Geschichte. Erziihlstrukturen und 'master narratives' bei Nip­ " perdey und Wehler, in Die Nation schreiben. Geschichtswissenschaft im internationalen Vergleich, ed. Christoph Conrad and Sebastian Conrad (Gottingen, 2002). 414 BinD Olivi/s account originally appeared in Italian: BinD Olivi, L'Europe difficiZe: histoire politique de l'integration europeenne, Nouvelle ed. (Paris, 2001). 415 In this overview I only include works that cover the whole period from 1969-1991, and only such works that provide a more general overview, since I am interested in the periodisation, evaluation and the choice of issues covered. History is defined here in a broad sense that does not exclude the important contributions of political scientists, whose texts on European integra­ tion at times contain quite extensive historical overviews with clear periodisations. 416 E.g. Brunn, Die europiiische Einigung, Mark Gilbert, Surpassing realism: the politics of European inte­ gration since 1945 (Lanham, 2003), John Gillingham, European integration, 1950-2003. Superstate or new market economy? (Cambridge, 2003), Peter M. R. Stirk, A history of European integration since 1914 (London, 1996). Gillingham and Stirk however do not end in 1989, but with Maas­ tricht in 1993. Dinan treats only the 1970s together in one chapter, Bitsch only the 1980s: Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours, Desmond Dinan, Europe recast: a history of European Union (Boulder, London, 2004), Desmond Dinan, Ever closer union? An introduction to the European Community (Basingstoke, 1994). 417 Olivi, L·Europe difficile. 418 E.g. Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours, Elvert, Die Europiiische Integra­ tion, Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 419 Donald R. Kelley, "Periodization," in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (Detroit, 2005), 1730. 420 Jan van der Harst, "The 1969 Hague Summit: a new start for Europe?," Journal of European Inte­ gration History 9 (2003): 5. Marie-Therese Bitsch, "Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la " relance de 1969, in Crises and compromises: the European Project 1963-1969, ed. Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden, Bruxelles, 2001). Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 1561, Jiirgen Mittag and Wolf­ gang Wessels, "Die Gipfelkonferenzen von Den Haag (1969) und Paris (1972): Meilensteine fUr Enhvicklungstrends der Europaischen Union?," in Aujbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004), 4. 421 Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours. 173. Olivi, L'Europe difficile. 154159. Olivi acknowledged the new attitude of the French government at The Hague.

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sidered as the starting point of a new period of European relaunch.422 Conse­ quently, a majority of narratives did not divide time into decades, but rather dis­ tinguished the period from 1969 until 1984 from the one between 1985 and 1993.423 However, the evaluation of the earlier of the two periods has been contentious. In 2004, Franz Knipping and Matthias Sch6nwald and the contributors to their edited volume called for a reconsideration of the advances of European integra­ tion during what they considered a period of "Europe's second generation" be­ tween 1969 and 1984. They refuted the claim that the entire period from the "empty chair crisis"424 in 1965 until the SEA in 1985 was a phase of deadlock in European integration.425 They rather interpreted these years as the second major phase ("Groflphase") of European integration. This phase was characterised by intergov­ ernmental leadership by a younger generation of statesmen - such as Brandt and Pompidou and later Giscard d'Estaing and Schmidt - and by notable advances in sectoral and horizontal integration. A first round of enlargement was completed by 1973. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as European Political Co­ operation (EPC) were placed on the agenda. Intergovernmental leadership was institutionalised with the founding of the European Council in 1975. Democracy was strengthened when direct elections were held at the end of the decade. Exter­ nal crises, however, hampered more ambitious advances.426 Even the failure of national responses to the economic crises was interpreted as an important learning experience. Governments came to realise the necessity of common policies in a common market, a realisation they subsequently turned into practice in the 1980s.427 Furthermore, the Commission managed to retain its role as a "catalyst" of European integration. It pioneered consequential new patterns of policy making and learned how to advance common policies through a creative interpretation of the Treaty, by brokering alliances and by attempting not to offend the govern­ ments.428

422 E.g. Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours. 219-237, BrmUl, Die europii­ ische Einigung. 228-253, Dinan, Europe recast. 167-202, Gilbert, Surpassing realism. 7. For Dinan, 1979-1984 needs to be seen as a distinct period of "Turning the Corner". 423 Gerbet, La construction de l'Europe, Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957, Andrew Moravcsik, The cJwice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998), Frank R. Pfetsch, Die europiiische Union. Eine Einfiihrung. Geschichte, Institutionen, Prozesse, 3rd ed. (Stutt­ gart, 2005). 45-68, Ingeborg T6mmel, Das politische System der EU (Miinchen, 2003). 17-55, Derek W. Urwin, The community of Europe: a history of European integration since 1945, 2nd ed. (London, 1995), Derek W. Urwin, "The European Community: 1945 to 1985," in European Union politics, ed. Michelle eini (Oxford, 2003). 424 See e.g. Heiner Timmermann, "Die "Politik des leeren Stuhls" und der Luxemburger Kompro­ milS," in Die Europiiische Union und ihre Krisen, ed. Romain Kirt (Baden-Baden, 2001). Contribu­ tions in: Wilfried Loth, ed., Crises and compromises: the European Project 1963-1969 (Baden-Baden, 2001). 425 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 156, Knipping and Sch6nwald, "Vorwort," ix. Also: Mittag and Wessels, "Die Gipfelkonferenzen von Den Haag (1969) und Paris (1972): Meilensteine fUr Ent­ wicklungstrends der Europiiischen Union?," 3. 426 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 156, Knipping and SchOnwald, "Vorwort." 427 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, "Learning interdependence the hard way. The Nether­ lands, European Political Cooperation and the Oil Crisis, 1967-1977," in Aujbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Sch6nwald, Europiiische und internationale Studien (Trier, 2004). 428 Ingeborg T6mmel, "Die EG in den Jahren 1970-1984: Neue Politikmuster als Katalysator der

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Accordingly, in Knipping et aJ.'s history the glass is half-full rather than half­ empty. Similar to Whig interpretations of history, judging from the point of view of the present, they deliberately highlighted the precursors of progress that was to come.429 Traditionally, authors had preferred to juxtapose the failures of the 1970s and particularly of the first half of the 1980s to the unprecedented "progress" of European integration from 1985 onwards. Here, EP activism in the early 1980s and the proposals for European Union appeared at best as a humble foreshadowing of what was to follow,43o or even a cathartic crisis which made European advance all the more necessary.431 In this older interpretation, the glass had apparently already been half-empty in the 1970s and more obviously so in the early 1980s. However, in their actual selection and treatment of the evidence, the two interpretations are less different than they appear. Even though Knipping was the most vocal propo­ nent of acknowledging the achievements of the period between 1969 and 1984, he had little to say in relation to what happened in the early 1980s.432 Hence, the dis­ tinction is more clear-cut at a rhetorical level than it is in the historical narratives themselves. Essentially, the historiography suggests two phases, which differ with respect to the intensity and "speed" of European integration. The first phase between 1969 and 1984 may be further subdivided between the early 1970s, which were more conducive to integration, and the more crisis-ridden later years. The second pe­ riod between 1985 until Maastricht 1991 has been unanimously interpreted as a period of unprecedented intensification and acceleration of European integration. However, attempts at periodisation in the historical narratives reviewed here never systematically attempted to assess European integration on the basis of a coherent set of criteria.

3.1.3 A systematic periodisation of European integration 1969-1991 The European Community between 1969 and 1991 has been a "moving target"433 - changing in geographical scope, both with respect to its range of policies and to the distribution of decision-making powers. With a systematic periodisation along the three dimensions of European integration, this chapter seeks to systematically present the shifting state of the European Community that reporters and commen­ tators referred to at the respective summits.

The horizontal dimension of integration Considering the horizontal dimension of integration, periodisation is relatively straightforward. After all the member states had agreed upon enlargement in principle at The Hague in 1969 for the first time,434 three rounds of enlargement took place until 1991 - in 1973, 1981 and 1986. The first Northern enlargement in

429

430 431

432 433 434

Integration," in Aujbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004), 282-284. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation o[History. v, 11-13. E.g. Bitsch, Histoire de Ia construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours. 219f., 223f. E.g. Gilbert, Surpassing realism. 155f. Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 214-223. Hooghe and Marks, "European Union?," 108. Dinan, Europe recast. 129.

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1973 included Denmark, the UK and Ireland.435 British membership was called into question again soon after accession, when a Labour government took office in 1974. In the election campaign, Labour had promised the renegotiation of the terms of entry and a popular vote on the results. In the course of renegotiation, the other member states made certain financial concessions to Britain, including the introduction of a regional policy that was to benefit British regions that had been hit by de-industrialisation. On 5 June 1975, a substantial majority of 67.2% the Brit­ ish electorate voted for staying with the Community.436 Having shaken off their dictatorial regimes by the mid-1970s, three Mediterranean countries filed applica­ tions for membership, namely Greece in 1975, and Portugal and Spain in 1977. Negotiations started in 1976, respectively 1978/79. All three countries suffered from weak economies. Additionally, their large agricultural sectors produced es­ sentially the same products as France and Italy. While Greece got a head start, en­ tering in 1981, Iberian enlargement was delayed until 1 January 1986.437 By the time of the summit of Maastricht in 1991, Austria and Sweden had already filed an application. Finland and Norway were to follow with applications in 1992. Thus, another round of enlargement was already on the agenda in 1991. Negotiations, however, only started in 1993.438 Arguably, "variable geometry" dates back to 1978, when Britain opted out of the EMS - which in technical terms was an intergovernmental agreement, not a Community policy in the legal sense. At Maastricht, the UK and subsequently also Denmark achieved an opt-out of EMU. Britain had already refused to accept the Social Charter in 1989 and opted out of the Social Chapter of the TEU in 1991. The UK, Ireland and Denmark equally remained outside the Schengen agreement of abolishing border controls that had been started in 1985 as an intergovernmental initiative by France, Germany and the Benelux countries. The Southern EC coun­ tries joined by 1992.439 Periodisation along the horizontal dimension emphasises 1969 as a major turning point. In the 1980s, Southern enlargement was also ap­ proximately in line with the 1985 watershed.

The sectoral dimension of integration The original Treaty of Rome440 - which formed the legal basis together with the Euratom and the older Coal and Steel Community - was intended to establish a Common Market. This included a common commercial policy, competition policy and a common transport policy.441 The CAp, as well as the Social Fund and the 435 Even though Norway had signed the accession treaty on 22 January, 1972, too, the country eventually did not join. With a majority of 53.5%, the Norwegians rejected accession in a refer­ endum on 25 November 1972. 436 David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (Basingstoke, 1976). 21-53, 263-278, jan­ Henrik Meyer, The 1975 Referendum on Britain's continued membership in the EEC (European Navigator, 2006). 437 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 19G-194. In 1981, the Greek Socialist PASOK party attempted to

438 439 440 441

emulate the strategy of the British Labour Party, after a similar change of government. They called for a referendum and additional financial aid. This added to the delay for Spain and Por­ tugal. Date of the applications: Austria 17 june, 1989, Sweden I june, 1991, Finland 18 March, 1992, Norway 25 Nov., 1992. Ibid. 268-27l. Dinan, Europe recast. 220. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957. Bitsch, Histoire de Ia construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours. 154-156, Dinan, Europe recast.

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European Investment Bank provided an element of "European solidarity" for those negatively affected by the market or unable to compete. The association with overseas countries would maintain ties to former colonies.442 Following the agenda of deepening announced at The Hague in 1969, in the 1970s and 1980s new policies were introduced that went beyond the framework of the original treaty. Three periods can be distinguished: a period of policy expan­ sion in the early 1970s, a period of further evolution of these policies until 1985, and finally a period of a more rapid expansion of the scope of policies in the run­ up to Maastricht. At the summit of The Hague, new policies had been placed on the agenda, including European Monetary Union (EMU), European Political Co­ operation (EPC) and regional policy. The early 1970s also saw the introduction of a Common Fisheries Policy on the eve of Northern enlargement and the introduc­ tion of environmental policy with the First Environmental Action Programme in 1973.443 Regional and social policies were introduced from 1975 onwards. The sec­ ond half of the 1970s has been described as the "Golden Age" of social policy. A change to a Conservative government in the UK in 1979 put a halt to social legisla­ tion.444 Cooperation in foreign policy was first developed in the early 1970s in the wake of the Davignon report of 1970. Further integration in this area came to a halt in 1976, when the far-reaching proposals of the Tindemans report were rejected. Despite this, member states still managed to speak with one voice in the Helsinki negotiations of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Cooperation in foreign policy found a more continuous forum with the introduc­ tion of the European Council from 1975 onwards, and was made more effective through the proposals of the London report of 1981. However, EPC remained strictly intergovernmental.445 The European Monetary System (EMS) agreed upon in 1978 was formally established outside the Treaty framework, but meant an im­ portant step towards monetary integration. With the Single European Act in 1985,446 the policies developed intermittently - such as environmental policy, social policy and research and technology447 114-117. 442 The conventions of Yaounde (1962) and Lome (1975) granted aid and market access to African, Caribbean and Pacific former colonies. Kurt Diiwell, "Die Entwicklungspolitik der Europa­ ischen Gemeinschaft zwischen Jaunde und Lome (1963--1984)," in Aujbruch zum Europa der zwei­ ten Generation. Die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004). 443 Cf. Pamela M. Barnes and Ian G. Barnes, Environmental Policy in the European Union (Chelten­ ham, 1999). 24-57, Laura Scichilone, L'Europa e Ia sfida ecologica. Storia della politica ambientale eu­ ropea 1969-1998 (Milan, 2009). 444 Wolfgang Daubler, "Die Europaische Union als Wirtschafts- und Solidargemeinschaft," in Eur­ opa-Handbuch: Bd. 1 Politisches System und Politikbereiche, ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Giitersloh, 2004), 2741, Dinan, Europe recast. ISH. 445 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 194-196, 198-201, Frank R. Pietsch, "Die Entwicklung der Euro­ paischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit. Zwischen Identitat und Handlungsfahigkeit," in Auf­ bruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004), 115-122, "Report on European Political Cooperation (London, 13 October 1981)," Bulletin of the European Communities (1981), Angela Romano, "The Nine and Conference of Helsinki: A Challenging Game with the Soviets," in Beyond the Customs

Union: The European Community's Quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969-1975, ed. Jan van der Harst (Bruxelles, 2007). 446 Single European Act, (Official Journal of the European Communities L 169, 29 June 1987). 447 Dinan, Europe recast. 193.

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were formally included into the Treaty. Other policies - notably the realisation of the Single Market - that had been discussed intensely in the early 1980s - were subsequently implemented. The Maastricht Treaty448 brought a further extension in the scope of the EC policy-making, including e.g. culture and education, health, consumer protection, tourism, energy and trans-European networks, and making EMU a definite objective. Moreover, the addition of the two pillars of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), replacing the EPC, and Justice and Home Af­ fairs turned the EU into a near-complete polity. Even though the development of policies was more of a process, a periodisation along the sectoral dimension broadly also agrees with the two suggested turning points. Both the kick-off of a slow implementation of deepening from 1969 onwards, and the more rapid policy development from 1985 onwards, confirm such a division of time.

The vertical dimension of integration Whenever new areas were added to the scope of EC policy making, this meant further integration along the vertical dimension, challenging the sole national competence in the respective policy area. The most sensitive issues with regard to vertical integration relate to core competences of the emerging polity, namely deci­ sion making, in particular concerning the budget, as well as popular representa­ tion.449 Three dates mark different phases of development: the introduction of the Community's own resources in 1970, direct elections to the EP in 1979 and the changes in decision-making rules in 1985 and 1991. At the summit of The Hague, agreement was reached to replace member states' contributions and provide the EC with its own resources.450 The exact de­ tails were worked out in Council in mid-December 1969, and codified in the "Treaty of Luxembourg" in April 1970.451 While discretion largely remained with the Council, the EP was now also to vote on the budget. Not least on the grounds of the received principle of "no taxation without representation",452 demands for direct elections to the EP had been on the agenda at least since the summit of The Hague. The summit of Paris in 1974 accepted direct elections in principle. The EP's role was further strengthened in a small treaty amendment, the "Brussels Treaty of 1975".453 However, direct elections were only held for the first time on 7-10 June 1979. Election systems remained nationally specific and the distribution of seats, fixed in September 1976 by the foreign ministers in the European Elections Act, was not proportional to population size. Small countries were over-represented.454 " 448 "Treaty on European Union, Official Journal ofthe European Communities (OJEC) 35 (1992). 449 The growing powers and the self-assertion of the European Court of Justice also contributed to a shift of power on the vertical dimension. However, as I am dealing with politics, and for the sake of brevity, I will not discuss this aspect at greater length. 450 Own resources consisted of tariffs, agricultural levies and a share of the VAT receipts. 451 The Treaty amending certain budgetary Provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities, signed in Luxembourg, 22 April 1970 (Official Journal of the European Communities L 2, 2 January 1971). 452 On the normative power of this principle, d. Berthold Rittberger, ,,'No integration without rep­ resentation!' Parlamentarische Demokratie, Europaische Integration und die beiden vergesse­ " nen Gemeinschaften, in Die Europiiische Union auf dem Weg in den Verfassungsstaat, ed. Berthold Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig (Frankfurt, 2006). 453 Dinan, Europe recast. 128f. 454 Gilbert, Surpassing realism. 148f.

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In any case, direct elections implied a direct democratic link between the EC and the citizens. Critics particularly in France and the UK interpreted direct elections as an assault on national sovereignty.455 The concomitant boost of legitimacy led a majority of MEPs to pursue a strat­ egy of self-assertion, which saw them voting against the budgetary proposal in 1979. The EP presented itself as a "constituante", and prepared a proposal for a "Treaty on European Union", which it approved by an overwhelming majority on February 14, 1984. While this treaty was never ratified or implemented, it set the agenda for subsequent treaty reforms.456 The Dooge report on the future of the Community of March 1985 - named after the committee's chairman former Irish foreign minister John Dooge - similarly advocated greater use of Qualified Major­ ity Voting (QMV) in the Council and extending the legislative role of the EP. QMV had originally been foreseen for decision-making already in the Treaty of Rome. However, in the wake of the Luxembourg compromise, the procedure had been suspended. In the face of the large amount of legislation necessary for the realisa­ tion of the Single Market Programme, even those who were opposed to QMV in principle, such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, eventually accepted decision making by qualified majority.457 In principle, QMV poses a serious problem both of national sovereignty and of democracy. First, if national governments can be outvoted in Council, but still have to accept and implement the respective legislation, voters at the national level are effectively overruled with regard to the choice of policy in their country. Second, QMV limits accountability. National governments can no longer be held accountable at the national level for decisions they had not supported at the Euro­ pean level. Voters have no possibility to censure those other European govern­ ments that are responsible for the decision. Hence, the notion of indirect legitima­ tion of European decisions via the governments acting in Council had increasingly become questionable.458 The solution suggested in the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and later reforms of decision-making was the extension of the powers of the EP. The introduction of the cooperation procedure of the SEA and the co-decision pro­ cedure in the Maastricht Treaty provided the EP with a stronger role in decision making.459 Again, the summit of The Hague, with the subsequent introduction of the Ee s own resources, and the SEA mark the main turning points.

Conclusions: A systematic periodisation of European integration 1969-1991 A systematic periodisation of European integration confirms the juxtaposition of a first period between 1969 and 1984 and a second period between 1985 and 1991. However, within the first period, three sub-periods should be distinguished, a first 455 Ibid. 149. 456 Ibid. 159f., 173, Daniela Freda, "L'action de Spinelli au Parlement europeen et Ie projet d'union europeelUle (1979-1984)," in La gouvernance supranationale dans Ia construction europeenne, ed. Wilfried Loth (Bruxelles, 2005), 193, 197-199. 457 Dinan, Europe recast. 210, Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 225f. 458 Christopher Lord and Paul Magnette, "E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about legiti­ macy in the EU," Journal o[Common Market Studies 42 (2004): pp. 184-188. In practice this prob­ lem may be less grave than in principle, given that realistically, very few voters hold national governments accountable with respect to technical norms, which account for much of the Com­ mon Market legislation. Moreover, voting in the very consensus-oriented Council is rare. 459 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 228, 26lf.

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one from 1969-1974, a second one from 1975-1979 and a third one from 1980-1984. They differ according to the dynamics of integration along the three dimensions. The following table provides an overview of the basis of what has been discussed in the previous sections. Table 4: Periodisation along the horizontal, sectoral, vertical dimensions of integration

The first sub-period of the between 1969 and 1974 saw Northern enlargement along the horizontal dimension, and the initiative for new policies along the secto­ ral one, most notably EPC. Reports studied EMU, regional and social policy. The Community's own resources, the agreement on the European Council and direct elections to the EP meant a shift on the vertical dimension. In the following sub­ period from 1975 until 1978, many of the initiatives of the first period were imple­ mented, such as EP elections, the European Council, regional, environmental and social policy. Others failed to evolve such as energy policy, or were developed fur­ ther through intergovernmental leadership such as the EMS which substituted the ambitious goal of EMU. In a third sub-period from 1979 / 80 onwards this evolu­ tion of policies almost ground to a halt. However, with the London report of 1981,

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the EPC was strengthened. On the horizontal dimension, the problems in the wake of Greek accession delayed further enlargement. After direct elections, the EP pushed for a reform of the Ee s constitution. Against the backdrop of these obser­ vations, the period of Europe's second generation, proposed by Knipping et ai., should be limited to the 1970s, since the early 1980s were characterised by a lack of movement on any of the axes of integration. The period from 1985 until 1991 was more continuous in its expansionary thrust. With the SEA and the Single Market Programme, policy development started again, such as in the areas of social and regional policy - e.g. the Integrated Mediterranean Programme -, the inclusion of EMS and the EPC into the Treaty. Enlargement to Spain and Portugal was eventually completed. On the vertical di­ mension, the move to QMV and the cooperation procedure marked an important change. Soon after the ratification of the SEA by 1987, the EC not only implement the Single Market Programme and prepare for EMU, but also developed a comple­ mentary social policy and regional policy. However, Maastricht also epitomised that integration was no longer a uniform process of progress. Britain and Den­ mark refused to enter into EMU. Likewise, the British Conservative government had no intentions to subscribe to social policy. The problems of democracy posed by QMV could not convincingly be solved by the introduction of the co-decision procedure. The ratification crises and the debate about the democratic deficit in the aftermath of Maastricht demonstrated that the problems of democratic partici­ pation and control of European integration had not been resolved convincingly. From this periodisation of European integration, very tentative conclusions can be drawn with respect to integration as a factor shaping European public com­ munication. It is possible - and in line with the news values discussed above - that periods of new policy initiatives and more intensive integration - such as in the early 1970s, and from 1985 onwards - should also have received more extensive media attention. From a normative perspective, particularly those decisions that implied an increase in vertical integration - such as the decision on the Commu­ nity's own resources, direct elections, QMV and the reforms of decision making procedures in the 1980s should have been accompanied by increased media cover­ age and a European debate.

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3.2 European summits and the European Council The European Council was the most important institutional innovation in the EC since the Treaty of Rome. It emerged from a series of intergovernmental summits in the early 1970s. Increasingly setting the agenda of the EC, the collective of the heads of state and governments became "the most politically authoritative institu­ tion of the Ee' .460 At the same time, the European Council raised the visibility of the European institutions. Regular meetings of Europe's national leaders, their re­ current rows and hard-nosed bargaining generated ample media attention.461 As I argued in the introduction, if there was European public communication in the media in the 1970s and 1980s at all, it was most likely to be found around the Eu­ ropean summits. In order to understand what journalists referred to, when they discussed the politics of the European Council, three issues require closer consid­ eration: First, what is the European Council? How, that is, did it emerge and what has been its role in EC policy-making? Secondly, how does this institution function and what are its procedures? Thirdly, what happened at the five summits specifi­ cally considered in this study?

3.2.1 Origins and functions Despite the prominence it has achieved in European integration politics since the 1970s, the intergovernmental European Council was not among the European in­ stitutions of the original Treaty of Rome. It was created by a simple declaration attached to the communique of the Paris summit of 1974.462 The heads of state and government and the foreign ministers committed to meeting at least three times a year from 1975 onwards.463 For a long time there was an overt discrepancy be­ tween the European Council's political importance and the lack of legal recogni­ tion.464 It has only been fully acknowledged as one of the seven institutions of the EU in the failed European Constitution of 2004 respectively in the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007.465

460 Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council: Decision-Making in European Politics (London, 1987). 2. 461 Cf. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council ofMinisters (New York, 1997). 158. 462 Final Communique of the Meeting of Heads of Government of the Community, Paris, 10th " December 1974," Bulletin ofthe European Communities December (1974): 7f, paragraphs 1-7. 463 This was reduced to twice a year from 1986, the Constitution provides for meeting quarterly. Cf. Horst Reichenbach et al., Integration: Wanderung tiber europiiische Gipfel (Baden-Baden, 1999). 21f, Martin Westlake and David Galloway, The Council of the European Union. Third Edition (London, 2004). 184. 464 This was first mentioned in the Treaties by the SEA in 1985. In the Maastricht Treaty, it only ap­ peared as an institution in the context of CFSP. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, The Council of Ministers. 159-162, Single European Act, art. 2, "Treaty on European Union," art. 4, D (func­ tions) & )8 (CFSP). 465 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe," Official Journal of the European Union 47 (2004): " art. 1-19f., 1-30f, "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty estab­ lishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007," Official Journal of the European Union 50 (2007): art. 9.1.

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In the beginning was Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle was critical of the strong supranational elements in the Treaty of Rome which had been ratified before he became president on 8 January 1959. Favouring an intergovernmental "Europe des patries" instead, he invited the heads of state and government to summits in Paris and Bonn in 1961. After the Fouchet Plan of intergovernmental political coopera­ tion had foundered by 1963, the practice of summits was not continued, 466 with the exception of 1967, when the heads of state and government met in Rome to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Rome Treaty.467 After de Gaulle had left office, his successor Georges Pompidou took the initiative for a summit to be held at The Hague in 1969. He intended to relaunch European integration focusing on com­ pletion, deepening and widening. A series of summits followed: the summit in Paris in October 1972, which dealt in particular with EMU and the summit of Co­ penhagen in 1973, which issued the declaration on European identity, defining Europe's role vis-a.-vis the outside world.468 Due to its Gaullist beginnings, the governments of the smaller member states in particular long held suspicions that the summits were intended to weaken the supranational institutions. They contin­ ued to resist Pompidou's proposal to institutionalise the practice of summitry. Nevertheless, at the � summit by this count, the Paris summit of 1974,469 the new French president Giscard d'Estaing managed to attain approval for the introduc­ tion of the European Counci1.47o The European Council was intended to provide the leadership the Commis­ sion had failed to supply after being weakened in the wake of the Luxembourg compromise.471 Essentially, the European Council has been fulfilling three main functions in European politics, policy-making and polity-building: First, it served as a forum for an (informal) exchange of views among the Ee s governments. Sec­ ondly, it provided political leadership with respect to the politics of integration in 466 Cf. e.g. Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 127-135. 467 Annette Morgan, From Summit to Council. Evolution ofthe EEe (London, 1976). 10f, Reichenbach et al., Integration 29, 37. 468 "Declaration on European Identity." Brunn, Die europaische Einigung. 197-199, Morgan, From Summit to Council. 12-22. 469 Giscard held a brief informal summit, the so-called "picnic summit", in Paris on 14 September 1974 to prepare the summit later in the year. Cf. Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council. 42f, Westlake and Galloway, The Council of the European Union. 175. 470 Westlake and Galloway, The Council of the European Union. 174-177. 471 Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council. 75, 100. The introduction of the European Council gave rise to a lengthy controversy as to whether it undermined the role of the Commission and of supranationalism in general. Cf. Simon Bulmer, liThe European Council's First Decade: Be­ " tween Interdependence and Domestic Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies 24 (1985), Bul­ mer and Wessels, The European Council: Decision-Making in European Politics. 3f., 36--41 , Juliet " Lodge, liThe role of EEC summit conferences, Journal of Common Market Studies 12 (1974), Wolf­ gang Wessels, Der Europiiische Rnt. Stabilisierung statt Integration? Geschichte, Entwicklung und Zukunfi der EG-Gipfelkonferenzen (Bonn, 1980), Wolfgang Wessels, "The EC Council: The Com­ " munity's Decisionmaking Centre, in The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institu­ tional Change, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (Boulder, 1991), Wolfgang Wessels, liThe European Council: A Denaturing of the Community or Indispensible Decision-Making " Body, in The European Council 1974-1986. Evaluation and Prospects, ed. Jean-Marc Hoscheit and Wolfgang Wessels (Maastricht, 1988). More recently, Peter Ludlow has questioned the European " Council's ability to continue to provide political leadership. Cf. Peter Ludlow, Die Fiihrung " der europiiischen Union durch den Europiiischen Rat: Ubergang oder Krise, Integration 28

(2006).

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general, to substantive policy-making and concerning foreign policy, where pol­ icy-making remained intergovernmental. Thirdly, the European Council has acted as a decision-maker of last resort.472 When eventually establishing the European Council, French president Gis­ card d'Estaing and German chancellor Schmidt in particular intended to provide a forum for an informal exchange of views among the Ees leaders. They sought to replicate the example of the "Library Group" of finance ministers, in which both of them had participated earlier in their careers. Accordingly, participation at the meetings was to be limited to the leaders, in order to ensure the sort of confidenti­ ality that allowed an open and honest debate and provided the opportunity for compromise and agreements.473 As a consequence of the growing number of ad­ visers necessary to deal with the ever more complex policy issues, only the "fire­ side chat" that was usually held on the evening of the first day of the European Council has been a meeting with more restricted participation.474 The European Council served to provide leadership in three main areas: First, it initiated and decided upon new policies and political projects such as the Single Market Programme, as well as the reform of the institutions by setting up study groups or IGCS.475 Secondly, the European Council has coordinated and moni­ tored the conduct and the implementation of the substantive policies.476 Thirdly, given that EPC and the CFSP largely remained intergovernmental, the European Council has spent a large part of its time on the coordination of foreign policy.477 Finally, the European Council has frequently acted as a decision-maker of last re­ sort and a court of appeal, whenever the Council of Ministers was unable to agree. The European Council usually decided upon issues with large-scale financial and distributive implications such as the multi-annual financial perspectives (starting with the Delors I package in 1988). Furthermore, it also selected core personnel such as the Commission President and the head of the European Central Bank.478

3.2.2 Preparation, participation and procedure "The first rule of successful summitry is that everything bar the dotting of the i's and the crossings of the t's should be fixed in advance."479 The European Council has introduced into European integration a firm structura­ tion of time. The rhythm of regular meetings at the highest political level created deadlines, a sense of urgency, but also of continuity for the working of the other 472 Nine different functions are distinguished by Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council. 75--102. Westlake and Galloway mention three functions "forum, policy-initiator and a decision-maker", but they add "providing impetus" and "guidelines". Westlake and Galloway, The Council of the European Union. 188. Similarly: Reichenbach et al., Integration. 24. 473 Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council. 76, 80-85, Westlake and Galloway, The Council of the European Union. 174f. 474 Bulmer and Wessels, The European Council. 81-83. 475 Ibid. 85-90. 476 Ibid. 76-100. 477 Ibid. 66, 77f., 95f. 478 Ibid. 67, 78, 96-99, Reichenbach et aI., Integration. 27f. After Maastricht, the role of the EP in these decisions has been strengthened. 479 Peter Jenkins, Wilson off the fence," The Guardian, 6 December 1974. "

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institutions. Topics no longer waned away as easily as they did before the mid1970s.48o The Brussels institutions and the respective Council Presidency,481 which usually started with the preparations up to a year in advance, carefully prepared the European Council meetings.482 Holding a European Council in one's own country provided a unique opportunity to present the governments' negotiation skills and leadership qualities at the European level.483 Consequently there has been a substantial incentive to make "one's own" summit a success. Besides all the organisational preparations as a host, the Presidency has been responsible for pre­ paring the agenda and for consensus-seeking well in advance. This normally in­ volved numerous bilateral contacts and meetings with national governments up until the meeting itself. Routinely, a framework agenda emerged out of the day-to­ day conduct of the Community business and leftovers from previous European Councils. This framework agenda was prepared by Coreper and - during the pe­ riod covered in this study - the national political directors on EPC. Suggestions from the Commission, member states, specialised Council formations, and further discussions in the Council of (foreign) Ministers usually complemented the list of items. On this basis, the Council Presidency drew up a draft agenda that was sent to the national governments. The President-in-office thus wielded substantial in­ fluence over what was to be discussed at the summit.484 Preparations normally continued in the Council of Ministers held one or two weeks before the summit.485 Participation at the European Council itself has been limited to the heads of government and the French President as the only head of state, the foreign minis­ ters, the President of the Commission and a further member of the Commission (from 1975 onwards). The political leaders were accompanied by a sizeable entou­ rage of experts and personal advisers. Access to the conference room, however, has been limited to the personal advisers of the premiers and foreign ministers, to the Permanent Representative, the Political Directors and the so-called "agents de liaison" or - in the Brussels jargon - "Antici" .486 These diplomats - deputy Perma­ nent Representatives - were usually posted in a room next door to the meeting room. They served as messengers in two directions. They delivered information from the Presidency and the Council Secretariat, in particular the note-takers, to their delegations, or information from the experts and advisers to the conference room. Moreover, based on the Antici's notes, delegations regularly and informally informed the press waiting outside.487

480 481 482 483

Hans Peter Ipsen, "Marginalien zum Europaischen Rat," Europarecht 4 (1981): 319. National governments hold the Council Presidency for six months. Jan Werts, The European Council (Amsterdam, 1992). 85. At the time covered in this study, moreover, European Councils tended to be held in the capital or in another city in the country that held the Presidency. Since Eastern enlargement in 2004, all regular summits have been held in Brussels. " Treaty of Nice," Official Journal of the European Communities (DIEC) 44 (2001): declaration no. 22. 484 Werts, The European Council. 78. 485 Ibid. 87. 486 Apart from this role at the European Council, the Antici group - named after its first chairman Paolo Massimo Antici in 1975 - consists of members of the permanent representation, who usu­ ally meet one day before a Coreper meeting, in order to prepare the agenda. Antici, (Europa­ Digital, Das Glossar der EU-Fachbegriffe), Westlake and Galloway, The Council of the European

Union. Third Edition. 2101, 3181. 487 Werts, The European Council. 98f. Interviews with EU correspondents in Brussels, June 2004.

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The meetings followed a recurrent schedule. They commenced with a work­ ing lunch on the first day, which provided the opportunity for an informal ex­ change of views. At the beginning of the meeting, the President sometimes pro­ posed discussing the most controversial issues, in order to assess what basis there was for possible compromise. A group of experts was sometimes set up to work out a framework agreement. Generally, the actual business started with a debate on Community matters, economic and social affairs. After the discussions in the afternoon, the head of state of the host country usually invited his guests to a for­ mal dinner. Later in the evening, time was set aside for the above-mentioned "fire­ side chat", of which no notes were taken. This usually focused on issues of foreign policy or of general Community concern. At the same time, the foreign ministers and a second member of the Commission met separately. On the second day, po­ tentially after informal bilateral working breakfasts, meetings normally continued until lunchtime. Only in exceptional cases, for instance at the Luxembourg Euro­ pean Council of 1985, did the conference last well into the night until agreement was reached.488 Summarising the results of the conference, the Presidency issued "Conclu­ sions of the Presidency" and various sets of " declarations" on Community issues or foreign policy. Besides the Presidency and the Commission, all of the national governments held their own separate press conferences. Due to the absence of of­ ficial minutes and the non-binding nature of the Presidency's conclusions as well as the often very diplomatic wording, the different players essentially offered their own interpretations.489 How journalists dealt with this challenge will be discussed below.

3.2.3 The summits of The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg and Maastricht European public communication around the five events selected for this study was shaped by the specific short-term political context, the issues negotiated and the respective results of the summits. In what follows, I will "zoom in" on each of them in turn.

The summit of The Hague 1969 The summit of The Hague took place in the wake of an important change of per­ sonnel in the two most influential member states of the Ee. In Germany former foreign minister Brandt became the first Social-Democratic Chancellor. De Gaulle's retreat from the French presidency also marked a watershed in history. De Gaulle had not only opposed British EC membership, but also pronounced his contempt for the institutions in Brussels. His departure was thus expected to improve the politics of European integration. "Europe's second generation", a group of younger political leaders in key member states, was more open to new political projects at the EC leve1.49o Already as a presidential candidate in June 1969, Georges Pompi­ dou had proposed a European summit conference to discuss completion, deepen488 Ibid. 80, IOJ. 489 Ibid. 100f. Interviews with EU correspondents in Brussels, June 2004. 490 Bitsch, "Le sommet de la Haye," 539, 564f, Harst, ,, The 1969 Hague Summit," 5--7, Knipping and Sch6nwald, "Vorwort," IX.

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ing and enlargement.491 At his first official press conference as a president on 10 July, he repeated his proposal, indicating that he no longer opposed enlargement in principle. When at the Council of Ministers on 22 July, French foreign minister Maurice Schumann formally proposed to hold a summit conference at The Hague towards the end of 1969, his five colleagues supported the goals of linking enlarge­ ment and strengthening the Ee. Nevertheless, they insisted on detailed prepara­ tion by the Community institutions.492 During the preparations differences between France and her partners became apparent. The new German government placed great emphasis on political union and enlargement. By contrast, the French president's priority was the completion of the financial arrangement, namely, the introduction of the Community's own resources. His goal was to put the financing of the CAP firmly in place before the accession of CAP-sceptical Britain. The German government however intended to link the completion of the financial regulation to limiting the cost of surplus pro­ duction in agriculture. All of the member states apart from France, as well as the Commission itself, insisted on the participation of the Commission president at the summit. The Commission President was eventually allowed to participate in at least one of the three sessions. The summit took place on 1 and 2 December 1969 in the medieval Hall of Knights (Ridderzaal) in The Hague. This building, a verita­ ble European lieu de memoire,493 had already served as the venue of the European Congress of The Hague in May 1948, chaired by Winston Churchill.494 During the summit in 1969, the European Movement held large demonstrations outside the building.495 After two days of negotiations, the heads of state and government had reached agreement on each of the three areas that had been suggested by Pompidou.4% As regards completion, the governments agreed on a financial arrangement to be final­ ised by the Council of Ministers by the end of 1969. The Community's own re­ sources were to replace member state contributions. The communique noted the goal of strengthening the EP in the budgetary procedure and of studying the pos­ sibility of direct elections. Both the German demand to limit surplus production and French insistence on permanently fixing the central principles of the financial arrangement made their way into the final communique. The summit commissioned studies on monetary and political union, the main areas of deepening, due to be submitted in the following year. The communique indicated the conflicting priorities concerning monetary union that the Werner plan was intended to reconcile. Reflecting German concerns, monetary union was 491 Bitsch, "Le sommet de la Haye," 540. 492 Ibid., 5441. 493 For the attempt to extend Pierre Nora's concept (Pierre Nora, Les lieux de memoires. 3 vol. (Paris, 1984-1992).) to Europe: Gunther Lottes, "Europaische Eritmerung und europaische Erinne­ rungsorte?," Jahrbuch for europiiische Geschichte 3 (2002), Henry Rousso, Das Dilemma eines eu­ ropaischen Gedachtnisses (Zeithistorische Forschungen, 2004). 494 In fact, the choice of The Hague was deliberate and symbolic. The summit to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in Rome had suggested The Hague for the next meeting. " Bitsch, "Le sommet de la Haye, 544. 495 Ibid., 546-550, 552-558. 496 "Communique of the meeting of Heads of State or Government of the Member States at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969," in Membership of the European Communities: Implications for Ireland, Laid by the Government before each House of the Oireachtas, April 1970 (Dublin, 1970).

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to be conditional on the convergence of economic policies. A European reserve fund was subject to further study. Unlike the Werner plan, which was never imple­ mented, the Davignon plan, named after the Belgian chairman of the committee of foreign ministers, eventually served as the basis for EPC from October 1970 on­ wards.497 The communique suggested further policy areas for deepening, how­ ever, without making any firm commitments: the coordination of industrial re­ search, the more effective of use of EURATOM's Research Centre,498 the reform of the European Social Fund (ESF) and the interest in a European university. The final communique also noted the goal of enlargement. However, newcom­ ers would have to accept both the acquis communautaire and the political finality of the treaties. Even though enlargement had been part of his initial proposal, the French president hesitated to set a date for the opening of negotiations. This led the Dutch foreign minister and the acting Council President to issue a separate "interpretative declaration" . Preparations for enlargement would commence in the first half of 1970 and negotiations immediately thereafter.499 The summit of The Hague sanctioned changes in horizontal integration, by opening up the EC for enlargement. Plans for further sectoral integration, how­ ever, particularly EMU and EPC, remained rather vague. In any case, the summit reinforced vertical integration through the introduction of the Community's own resources. At the same time, it marked a step on the way towards a directly elected EP. Intergovernmental initiative and decision making at the highest political level meant a push for integration, even though it shifted the institutional balance soo This problem was key to the agenda of the summit of Paris, which discussed the institutionalisation of the European Council.

The summit of Paris 1974 Similar to the situation at The Hague, at the Paris summit of 9 and 10 December 1974, new leaders had recently arrived in the major EC member states. However, the new heads of state and government were familiar with the conduct of Euro­ pean affairs. Giscard d'Estaing replaced Pompidou as French president. Both Ger­ man chancellor SchmidpOl and Giscard d'Estaing had previously been ministers of finance. Harold Wilson, who had been British prime minister at the time of The Hague, returned to office in 1974, after having been in opposition during the years of British entry negotiations with the EC The international economic situation af­ ter the oil crisis of 1973, as well as British domestic politics, namely Wilson's call for the "renegotiation" of the terms of entry, shaped the context in which this last summit took place. Even though he was personally a supporter of EC membership, Wilson had attacked his Conservative predecessor Edward Heath's conduct of the entry nego­ tiations. Eventually Wilson even backed Labour Eurosceptics' demand for a refer­ endum on EC membership. He promised to renegotiate what he claimed to be 497 Mittag and Wessels, "Die Gipfelkonferenzen von Den Haag (1969) und Paris (1972)," 15. 498 For the intracacies of Euratom's troubles see: Paul Bahr, "Was wird aus Euratom? Die Europa" ische Atomgemeinschaft in der Krisenzone., Europa-Archiv 25 (1970): 89f. 499 Bitsch, "Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969," 562. 500 Cf. Ibid., 539. 501 Cf. for this continuity: Paul Friedrich, " The SPD and the Politics of Europe. From Willy Brandt to Helmut Schmidt," Journal of Common Market Studies 13 (1975): 434.

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unacceptable terms of entry demanding that British citizens should be able to voice their opinion on whether they wanted to stay in the EC in a referendum s02 The core issue to be renegotiated was Britain's net contribution to the budget. By the end of the 1970s when the transitory measures were to be phased out, Britain stood to become the Community' largest net contributor. The British government considered this unfair since at the time the UK was one of the less prosperous members of the EC Britain's budget contribution was higher than its share of the Community GDp, because it imported more agricultural products from overseas and had a higher level of consumer spending s03 However, the Community's budget was largely spent on the CAP. Consequently Britain, with her relatively small farming sector, benefited much less from EC spending. The introduction of regional policy to help Britain's rapidly de-industrialising North was one possible way of channelling money back to Britain in order to reduce her net contribu­ tion.504 The international economic downturn in the aftermath of the oil crisis and the end of monetary stability following the demise of the Bretton Woods System ag­ gravated the conflict over resources and policy priorities at the summit. The tran­ sition to floating exchange rates had negative implications for the CAp, which was based on single prices,50S and effectively killed plans for EMU. An attempt at joint floating by means of the "snake in the tunnel" had largely failed so6 The oil crisis that started in October 1973 pushed the EC countries into recession. Due to drasti­ cally rising oil prices, inflation and unemployment soared at the same time. EC member states resorted to different strategies to rekindle their economies. Moreo­ ver, differing ideas of how to respond to the oil crisis led to intra-European and transatlantic tensions about energy policy. The French government insisted on di­ rect negotiations with the oil-rich Arab countries and managed to convince the EC member states to take first steps towards Euro-Arab dialogue. By contrast, the US administration proposed to set up an American-led consumers' cartel, the Interna­ tional Energy Agency (lEA), in advance of any negotiations with the oil-produc­ ers. Within the EC, energy policy remained a divisive issue. While all other EC countries eventually joined the lEA, the French government refused to sign. This conflict overshadowed the summit, not least because directly after the event, Pres-

502 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum. 13--20, Peter Byrd, liThe Labour Party and the Euro­ " pean Community 1970-1975, Journal o[Common Market Studies 13 (1975): 474-477, Meyer, The 1975 Referendum on Britain's continued membership in the EEC. 503 The Community's own resources consisted of agricultural levies, tariff revenues and one per­ " centage point of the VAT. John R. Dodsworth, European Community Financing. An Analysis " of the Dublin Amendment, Journal o[ Common Market Studies 14 (1975): 129f. " 504 J. van Doorn, "European Regional Policy. An Evaluation of Recent Developments, Journal of Common Market Studies 13 (1975): 391f, Stephen George, An Awkward Partner. Britain and the Eu­ ropean Community, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1998). 80-88. 505 Cf. e.g. Leonhardt GIeske, "Wahrungspolitik und Agrarmarkt in der Europaischen Wirtschafts­ " gemeinschaft, Europa-Archiv 25 (1970): 17f, Klaus Otto Nass, "Weder Tunnelbau noch Briicken­ " schlag? Anmerkungen zum europaisch-britischen Verhaltnis, Europa-Archiv 30 (1975): 334. 506 Ulrich Everling, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft nach der zweiten Pariser Konferenz. Zu den " Ergebnissen der Konferenz der Regierungschefs vom Dezember 1974, Europa-Archiv 30 (1975): " 59, Guido Miiller, " Folgen der Olkrise fUr den europaischen EinigungsprozeB nach 1973, in Aujbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knip­ ping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004), 85.

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ident Giscard d'Estaing was scheduled to meet the American president in Marti­ nique 507 Already in the summer, the new French president had invited the heads of government to an informal so-called "summit picnic" in Paris in September 1974. Inspired by Jean Monnet,508 he attempted to convince his partners to take greater responsibility in Community affairs by strengthening intergovernmental leader­ ship. Subsequently, in November, the Council of Ministers agreed in principle to hold regular summit meetings. While the French president had proposed a sepa­ rate secretariat for the new European Council, the other member states intended to integrate this new intergovernmental institution as closely as possible with the existing institutions in Brussels 509 The creation of the European Council was one of the main results of the sum­ mit of Paris in December 1974. According to the final communique of the summit, the European Council would ensure "consistency" and "continuity". The heads of state and government were to act as "initiators and co-ordinators", meeting "in the Council of the Communities and in the context of political cooperation" 510 Ac­ cordingly, the European Council brought EPC closer to the Community frame­ work 511 The question of a separate secretariat was left open, but the communique pointed to the existing practices and procedures, which involved the Council Sec­ retariat General and Coreper 512 As if intending to balance the institutionalisation of the intergovernmental European Council, the summit indicated its willingness to expand the EP's competences in legislation and to prepare proposals for direct elections to be decided upon by 1976, so that direct elections could take place in 1978 or thereafter. Nevertheless, with a view to renegotiation, Britain and Den­ mark reserved a right to review their position on the issue of direct elections 513 Furthermore, the summit agreed on concrete figures for the distribution of re­ sources from the European Regional Development Fund. The fund was to come into operation in January 1975, as part of the renegotiation package for Britain. Besides Italy, which received 40% of the total, the UK (28%) and Ireland (6%, plus 6 million Units of AccounP14) were to be the main beneficiaries. Additionally, the Council and the Commission were to develop a "correction mechanism" for the system of own resources, in order to reduce Britain's contribution 515 This highly 507 Everling, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft nach der zweiten Pariser Konferenz," 67, Miiller, "Folgen der Olkrise fur den europaischen EinigungsprozeB nach 1973," 82-91. 508 WIlfried Loth, "Deutsche Europapolitik von Helmut Schmidt bis Helmut Kohl," in AuJbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europiiische Einigung 1969-1984, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schonwald (Trier, 2004), 476. 509 Everling, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft nach der zweiten Pariser Konferenz. Zu den Ergeb­ nissen der Konferenz der Regierungschefs vom Dezember 1974," 60f, Emile Noel, " Quelques reflexions sur la preparation, Ie deroulement et les repercussions de la reunion tenue a Paris par les Chefs de Gouvernement (9-10 Decembre 1974)," Cahiers de Droit europeen 11 (1975), Werts, The European Council. 52-54. 510 For the following paragraphs: "Final Communique of the Meeting of Heads of Government of the Community, Paris, 10th December 1974." 511 Werts, The European Council. 55. 512 Everling, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft nach der zweiten Pariser Konferenz," 61f. 513 Ibid.: 64. 514 Before the introduction of the ECU and later the Euro, the so-called "unit of account" was the currency unit of reference in EC affairs. Originally it was equivalent to the US dollar. 515 Everling, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft nach der zweiten Pariser Konferenz," 66f.

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complex instrument was subsequently agreed upon at the Dublin European Coun­ cil in the spring of 1975, in good time before the British referendum in June 1975 516 The summit devoted a large part of its time to the international economic situa­ tion. The governments declared their intention to coordinate economic policies. Those countries with trade surpluses were expected to boost growth by deficit spending. The communique declared the attachment to the goal of EMU, but pointed to the economic difficulties that prevented progress. A target date was no longer envisaged 517 Declarations about the harmonisation of social security and the increase of the European Social Fund's resources "when time is ripe" remained similarly vague. Despite the urgency of the issue, discussions on energy policy did not lead to any tangible results 518 The Paris summit brought about institutional change that intensified vertical integration. The intention to hold direct direct elections to the EP and expand its legislative competences strengthened the supranational institutions. The introduc­ tion of the European Council seemed to put the national governments in the driv­ er's seat. At the same time, it made it easier for governments to accept shifting re­ sponsibility for certain policies to the European level, since the arrangement en­ sured their continued control. The creation of the European Regional Develop­ ment Fund was an important element of sectoral integration 519

The Brussels European Council of1978 The Brussels European Council of 4 and 5 December 1978 marked an important step towards European monetary integration. The heads of state and government agreed on the introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS), due to start 1 January 1979 520 The EMS emerged from a Franco-German initiative at the Euro­ pean Council of Copenhagen on 7 and 8 April 1978. Chancellor Schmidt and Pres­ ident Giscard d'Estaing proposed a plan for the closer alignment of currencies in the EC Only a few months earlier, at the European Council of 5 and 6 December 1977, a similar proposal by Commission president Roy Jenkins had only received lacklustre support 521 Schmidt changed his opinion in the early months of 1978 in the face of a dramatic fall of the value of the dollar. The concomitant surge of the Deutschmark reduced the competitiveness of German exporters internationally and within Europe, because the German currency revalued more sharply than the currencies of the European neighbours. The German government's goal was to ensure monetary stability in Europe and to limit the effects of exchange rate vola­ tility on the German economy522 Moreover, European monetary integration predicated on the principle of stability - offered a potential way to relieve interna­ tional pressures for reflation. As Germany and Japan had weathered the oil crisis 516 Henri Deheyn, "Das Gipleltreffen von Dublin," Europa-Archiv 30 (1975): 2481, Dodsworth, " European Community Financing," 131f. 517 Everling, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft nach der zweiten Pariser Konferenz," 59. 518 Ibid.: 64-67. 519 Dinan, Europe recast. 151. 520 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System. A Case Study of the Politics of the Euro­ pean Community (London, 1982). 2701.,279-283. 521 Kenneth H. F. Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (New York, 1999). 2981, Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System. 431, 59-6l. 522 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System. 69-73.

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comparatively well, the US administration pushed these two countries to increase public spending and act as a "locomotive" for the international economy. Schmidt feared that such a policy would erode Germany's economic stability s23 Conversely, James Callaghan, the British Labour prime minister had put forth a five point plan for international economic recovery of the spring of 1978. Along the lines of US preferences, it involved a coordinated programme of deficit spend­ ing. Even though both were politicians of the left, the gulf between Schmidt's and Callaghan's policy priorities was difficult to bridge. The French government of the political right pursued a policy of monetary stability. Accordingly, Giscard d'Estaing was more enthusiastic about Schmidt's ideas. The two leaders closely cooperated in the preparation of the plan for the EMS that they unveiled at the European Council in Copenhagen. The proposal received positive responses, ex­ cept by Callaghan S24 In the course of the following months, experts from national ministries, various committees of the EC and central bankers resolved a plethora of highly complex technical and political details. The summit of Bremen in July 1978 saw agreement on the goal of finalising the negotiations at the Brussels Euro­ pean Council scheduled for December. The goal of the EMS was to limit domestic inflation and reduce the volatility of exchange rates S25 This goal was to be achieved by measures that went well be­ yond the earlier attempts of the "snake". At the core of the scheme was the crea­ tion of a virtual European currency, the European Currency Unit (ECU) S26 As a basket currency, the ECU reflected the value of its component currencies, weighted by their share of GDP and trade. The ECU was intended to serve as a means for European currency operations, as a denominator for the newly established Ex­ change Rate Mechanism (ERM) and as the basis of a divergence indicator. The ERM provided a measure of currency fluctuation - based on a grid of bilateral ex­ change rates. Currencies were allowed to fluctuate within the bounds of 2.25 per cent of their central rate. Countries such as Italy that saw themselves unable to maintain such a close range were allowed to opt for a wider margin of six per cent. When a country's currency crossed the "threshold of divergence", the central banks in question had to intervene. However, the respective government was also obliged to change domestic monetary and economic policies. Particularly the Ger­ man government had resisted the prospect of having to bail out countries with inflationary economic policies. If they failed to act, governments had to justify their policies in front of their partners S27 For the purposes of intervention, na­ tional central banks received ECUs from the newly established European Mone­ tary Cooperation Fund, in exchange for twenty per cent of their dollar and gold reserves, which they had to deposit with the fund. The establishment of such a large fund and a number of short and medium term credit facilities were meant to discourage currency speculation. Still, if necessary, the central rates could be ad-

523 524 525 526 527

Ibid. 69-77. Ibid. 81-93. George, An Awkward Partner. 128. The English acronym conveniently happened to be the name of a medieval French coin. This anticipates the principles of mutual supervision that are characteristic of the Open Method of Coordination today. Cf. Biichs, New Governance in European Social Policy: the Open Method of Coordination.

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THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE IN CONTEXT

justed in a mutually agreed manner 528 A number of such realignments took place during the roughly twenty years of the system's existence 529 Two main issues remained to be be finalised at the European Council. First, the governments had to agree on the level of financial assistance to be allocated to relieve the burden of adjustment for Italy and Ireland. The French president re­ sisted any selective aid through the Regional Fund, from which France would also not benefit. After lengthy negotiations, the summit ended with a final offer of loans and interest-rate subsidies that the Irish and Italian governments did not im­ mediately accept. Hence, at the end of the summit, its achievements appeared much smaller than had been anticipated. Only six member states seemed to be able to join the EMS immediately. However, by mid-December the Irish govern­ ment had been persuaded by further promises, whereas Italy joined without any improvement of conditions 530 Secondly, even though the French president had co-initiated the EMS, Giscard d'Estaing made his assent conditional on the abolition of the Monetary Compen­ satory Amounts (MCA). The MCAs compensated those farmers who had lost in­ come due to the revaluation of their national currencies. The French government suspected these selective payments of distorting the market in favour of German agriculture. Governments agreed to introduce a correcting factor 531 However, in late December, after the summit, the French finance minister demanded phasing out the MCAs completely, before the EMS could start. Eventually, after further negotiations, the EMS entered into operation on 13 March 1979. Giscard's intransigence at the summit was largely a response to French do­ mestic politics. Farmers protested in December. Despite the "truce" between the two conservative parties that Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac had promised in Oc­ tober, Giscard's coalition partners flexed their nationalist muscle, making an early start to the European election campaign. At the RPR Congress on 12 November the Gaullists called upon the French president to ensure that direct elections would not lead to any concession of further competences to the EP. On 30 November, the Gaullists voted with the opposition against the legislation implementing the Value Added Tax directive. They argued that this legislation eroded national preroga­ tives in tax policy. From his hospital bed on 6 December, Chirac fiercely and scath­ ingly attacked the French president's European policy. The EMS, he claimed, emasculated France and subjected it to foreign domination 532

528 "Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council of 4-5 December in Brussels," in The making of the European monetary system. A case study of the politics of the European community, ed. Peter Ludlow (London, 1982), liThe European Council. Outcome and Follow-Up [includes: Resolu­ tion of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the Establishment of the European Mone­ tary System and related Matters]," Bulletin of the European Communities (1978). See also: Bitsch, Histoire de la construction europeenne de 1945 a nos jours. 213f, Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 173f., Horst Ungerer, A concise history of European monetary integration:from EPU to EMU, 3 ed. (West­ port, 1997). 157-164. 529 Gerhard Michael Ambrosi, "Wahrungskrisen als Wegbereiter der Europaischen Wahrungsunion," in Die Europiiische Union und ihre Krisen, ed. Romain Kirt (Baden-Baden, 2001), 181-186. 530 Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System. 262-273. 531 Ibid. 2631., 279-283. 532 Dyson and Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht. 117f, Ludlow, The Making of the European Mone­ tary System. 198-205, 279-283.

EUROPEAN SUMMITS AND mE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

117

The British government had already made clear in October that it was impos­ sible for Britain to join right from the start, not least because of fierce opposition within the governing Labour Party. However, the goal of Callaghan's "half-way house" policy was to stay as close to the scheme as possible, in order to have a say in future negotiations and to be able to join after the 1979 elections. The British government intended to manage the exchange rate of sterling as if it were within the system, and wanted to participate in the pooling of gold and dollar reserves S33 The results of the European Council of Brussels meant a great leap forward in sectoral integration. The agreement regarding monetary policy was an example of intergovernmental, "second generation", "realist" European policy-making S34 Even though the original plans had been devised by the Commission president, the EMS emerged from the action of national policy entrepreneurs who used the European Council as a forum.535 The EMS involved a substantial vertical transfer of sovereignty, including the partial pooling of monetary reserves and promises to adjust economic policies. On the horizontal dimension, the EMS marks a first in­ stance of variable geometry, of a "two-speed Europe", an aspect also discussed by contemporary observers s36

The Luxembourg European Council 1985 The European Council in Luxembourg in December 1985 took final decisions on the results of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) that had prepared the Single European Act (SEA), the first major amendment of the Rome Treaties. Contempo­ rary observers largely underestimated the implications of the SEA.537 In the early 1980s, a number of proposals - the "Genscher-Colombo-Initiative of 1981, watered down by the European Council as the Stuttgart "Solemn Declaration" of 1983, and the EP's "European Union Treaty" of 1984 - had put institutional reform on the Ees agenda S38 533 George, An Awkward Partner. 129f, Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System. 244246, 2621. 534 This was acknowledged in contemporary commentary, too. Maurice Duverger, "Le presidium de la communite," Le Momie, 7 December 1978. «La seconde generation d'europeistes a pris consciences de ces problemes [that a supranational executive would be unacceptable], que la pre­ miere avait negliges. M. Giscard d'Estaing a joue un role essen tiel dans ce domaine. Sa foi communau­ taire n'est certes pas moindre que celIe de Jean Monnet. Mais elle tient compte de l'evolution des clwses et des esprits dans les trente ans qui ont suivi l'initiative de la CECA. Le president de la Republique fran9aise souhaite certainement l'avenement d'une Europe supranationale. Mais avec Ie meme realisme que Ie pape Jean Paul II esperant l'avenement du royaume de Dieu sur la terre. En distinguant lefutur lointain, Ie point omega de l'evolution, et l'entre-deux ou nous vivons, ou vivront nos enfants . . . » 535 Dinan, Europe recast. 175. 536 E.g. DT: Alan Osborn, "As the workhouse door shuts behind Mr Callaghan," The Daily Tele­ graph, 8 December 1978. SZ: Hans D. Barbier, "Die Eintrittspreise sind nun bekalUlt," Silddeut­ sche Zeitung, 7 December 1978. FAZ: Heinz Stadlmann, "Schmidts Verdienst," Frankfurter Allge­ meine Zeitung, 6 December 1978. LF: Alain Vernay, "Sentiments et chiffres," Le Figaro, 7 Decem­ ber 1978. 537 Knipping, Rom, 25. Miirz 1957. 218, 226, Werts, The European Council. 281f. Guardian editorialist

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ANNEX Annex 1 to chapter 2 Policies: Coding categories for chapter 4.2 Number

Policy area - issue

1

CFSP-EPC-Political Union

2

JHA-Schengen-policy I border control etc.

3

EMU, economic and monetary union

4

Commercial policy, external trade, WTO

5

Agriculture

6

Fisheries

7

Transport

8

Competition

9

Markt

10

Social Policy

11

Cohesion / Regional policy

12

Environment

13

Industry

14

Research

15

Health

16

Education, Culture

17

Development

18

Association of other countries

19

Consumer protection

20

Energy

21

Euratom / nuclear projects

22

ECSC

23

Budget

24

Enlargement

25

Institutional affairs, institutional reform

26

Finalite

346

ANNEX

Annex 2 to chapter 2 Transnational communication: coding categories for chapter 4.4 Horizontal

Vertical

Societal

Horizontal vs. domestic: member states

European level: European institutions

Horizontal, vertical, domestic: Both member states and European level

Centre-periphery

D

Council (incl. European

central banks

centre

F

Council / summits)

parliaments (not EP)

European Commission

courts (not ECJ)

B

European Parliament

Lux

European Court of Justice

civil society

NL

business

UK

media

IRL

experts

DK

public opinion

periphery

GR E P

Annex 3 to chapter 3 Circulation of daily newspapers per 1000 inhabitants 196019951432 1960

1970

1979

1990

1995

UK

514

463

426

393

317

Germany

307

326

323

343

314

France

252

238

196

155

156

1432 Albert, La presse franr;aise. Nouvelle edition. 42, Tableau 3 Nombre d'exemplaire de quotidiens pour 1000 habitants (I96G-2000), sources: UNESCO 196G-1979, World Association of Newspa­ pers (WAN) 199G-1995.

ANNEX

347

Annex 4 to chapter 4.1. Table 31: Number of articles foreign news", all articles", share of ,,foreign news" " " of all articles" "

Table 32: Number of US news-articles: absolute number, share of "all articles" & of Uforeign newsU

348

ANNEX

Annex 5 to chapter 4.2 Table 33: Synchronicity of Ee front page headlines on a daily basis across newspa­ pers and countries 1969

1974

1978

1985

1991

1969

1974

1978

1985

1991

papers

papers

papers

papers

papers

coun tnes

coun tnes

coun tnes

COWl-

trIes

countnes

Monday I

1

3

1

0

4

1

2

1

0

3

Tuesday I

1

4

1

0

3

1

3

1

0

2

Wednesday I

1

3

0

2

4

1

3

0

2

3

Thursday I

3

0

1

2

2

2

0

1

1

2

Friday 1

0

1

2

0

3

0

1

2

0

2

Saturday I

2

1

1

1

5

1

1

1

1

3

Monday II

6

5

4

3

5

3

3

2

2

3

Tuesday II

6

5

4

2

6

3

3

3

1

3

Wednesday 11

6

6

6

4

6

3

3

3

3

3

Thursday II

5

4

5

4

5

3

2

3

2

3

Friday II

1

0

1

2

2

1

0

1

1

2

Saturday II

1

0

0

0

3

1

0

0

0

2

12-day average

2.75

2.67

2.17

1.67

4.00

1.67

1.75

1.50

1.08

2.58 7

no. of all

3

1

1

0

2

4

5

3

1

no. of all-l

1

2

1

0

3

1

2

2

3

5

at least all-l

4

3

2

0

5

5

7

5

4

12

ANNEX

349

Table 34: Synchronicity of Ee leaders on a daily basis across newspapers and coun­ tries 1969

1974

1978

1985

1991

1969

1974

1978

1985

1991

papers

papers

papers

papers

papers

coun tnes

coun tnes

coun trIes

coun tnes

coun tnes

Monday I

0

2

1

0

2

0

1

1

0

1

Tuesday I

2

1

0

0

3

2

1

0

0

2

Wednesday I

0

2

2

0

4

0

2

1

0

2

Thursday I

3

4

1

2

1

2

3

1

1

1

Friday I

1

1

2

0

2

1

1

1

0

2

Saturday I

1

1

2

0

5

1

1

2

0

3

Monday II

4

2

1

4

6

2

2

1

3

3

Tuesday II

3

2

1

0

1

2

2

1

0

1

Wednesday II

5

4

2

1

1

3

2

1

1

1

Thursday II

4

5

4

4

6

2

3

3

3

3

Friday II

3

0

4

0

3

3

0

2

0

2

Saturday II

1

3

0

0

4

1

3

0

0

3

12 dayaverage

2.25

2.25

1.67

0.92

3.17

1.58

1.75

1.17

0.67

2.00

no. of all

0

0

0

0

2

2

3

1

2

4

no. of all-l

1

1

0

0

1

5

4

2

0

4

at least all-l

1

1

0

0

3

7

7

3

2

8

350

ANNEX

Table 35: Index of co-presence of policies1433

Table 36: Index of shared relevance of policies

1433 Shading: dark grey newspapers from the same country, light grey political affiliation (left-right). =

=

newspapers of the same

ANNEX

351

Annex 6 to chapter 4.3 Table 37: Number of articles and share of all Ee articles (commentary and report­ ing) written by staff and unnamed journalists

352

ANNEX

Table 38: Number of articles and share of all Ee articles (commentary and report­ ing) written by summit reporters and foreign correspondents

1978

15

38%

10

29%

14

19%

22

28%

17

12 %

15

1 9%

93

21 %

5

13%

7

20%

10

14%

13

17%

8

6%

9

11 %

52

12%

16

37%

12

26%

12

20%

23

43%

7

1 0%

7

12%

77

23%

Foreign correspondents

4

9%

2

4%

7

11 %

10

19%

8

12%

2

3%

33

10%

summit reporters

12

19%

14

16%

11

12%

12

14%

13

1 0%

10

13%

72

14%

8

13%

13

15%

25

27%

20

23%

11

8%

5

6%

82

15%

11

35%

14

36%

11

17%

11

24%

10

26%

8

1 9%

65

25%

1

3%

3

8%

3

5%

9

20%

1

3%

1

2%

18

7%

32

16%

33

20%

25

19%

38

20%

24

1 6%

22

9%

174

16%

19

9%

13

8%

6

5%

40

21 %

27

18%

26

11 %

131

12%

86

29%

83

25%

73

17%

106

26%

71

15%

62

14%

481

20%

37

9%

38

11 %

51

12%

92

20%

55

9%

43

7%

316

11 %

Foreign corre1985

1991 Foreign corretotal

summit reporters Foreign corre-

ANNEX

353

Table 39: Number of articles and share of all EC articles (commentary and report­ ing) sourced by domestic or foreign news agencies

news

2

5%

0

0%

12

16%

6

8%

9

6%

7

9%

36

8%

0

0%

0

0%

10

14%

2

3%

0

0%

0

0%

12

3%

0

0%

1

2%

21

34%

5

9%

3

4%

0

0%

30

9%

1

2%

0

0%

0

0%

2

4%

0

0%

0

0%

3

1%

1

2%

0

0%

22

23%

5

6%

5

4%

1

1%

34

6%

0

0%

0

0%

6

6%

8

9%

1

1%

0

0%

15

3%

0

0%

0

0%

16

25%

4

9%

1

3%

1

2%

22

8%

0

0%

0

0%

14

22%

3

7%

0

0%

0

0%

17

7%

1

0%

2

1%

22

17%

13

7%

4

3%

8

3%

50

5%

0

0%

0

0%

23

18%

11

6%

0

0%

5

2%

39

4%

Table 40: Number of articles and share of all EC articles (commentary and reporting) authored by non-staff writers of the same nationality as the newspaper or another nationality

nonnational 1974 nonnational 1978 nonnational 1985 nonnational 1991 nonnational

3

1,5%

0

0.,0.%

0

0.,0.%

0

0.,0.%

2

1,4%

6

2,5%

11

0.,9%

354

ANNEX

Annex 7 to chapter 4.4 Table 41: Societal references: groups of actors discussed 1969-1991 1969

1974

1978

1985

1991

1

D parliament

D parliament

D central bank

D business: industry

B parliament

2

D civil society

D civil society: church

D party

D individual: Schmidt

D central bank

3

EC civil society

EC journalists

EC party

F business: industry

D parliament

4

EC media

F civil society: church

EC public opinion

F individual: Giscard

D party

5

EC individual: Hallstein

UK parliament

F parliament

UK parliament

D civil society

6

EC public opinion

UK parties

F court

UK party

D business

7

F party

UK civil society

F parties

D media

8

F civil society: farmers

UK public opinion

F media

D public opinion

9

F media

F public opinon

EC parliament

10

F individual

I parties

EC civil society

11

F public opinion

NL central bank

EC business

12

UK party

NL civil society

EC media

13

UK business

UK parliament

F parliament

14

UK public opinion

UK party

F parties

15

UK civil society

F civil society

16

UK business

F business

17

UK media

F media

18

UK individual

I parliament

19

NL civil society

20

UK central bank

21

UK parliament

22

UK court

23

UK parties

24

UK civil society

25

UK business

26

UK media

27

UK individuals

28

UK public opinion

DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE ZUS AMMENFASSUNG Dieses Buch legt erstmals eine historische Untersuchung zum im Rahmen der De­ batte urn das Demokratiedefizit der EU viel diskutierten Problem europiiischer Offentlichkeit vor. Damit schliefSt es eine wichtige Forschungshicke. Gerade die Frage nach Entstehung und Entwicklung einer europiiischen politischen Offent­ lichkeit wurde zwar hiiufig diskutiert, konnte bisher aber nicht hinreichend beant­ wortet werden, da sich die sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung auf die 1990er und 2000er Jahre beschriinkte. Der Blick auf die Zeit vom Haager Gipfel 1969 bis Maas­ tricht 1991 leistet zudem einen Beitrag zur Debatte unter Integrationshistorikern urn eine positive Neubewertung der 1970er Jahre und ergiinzt sie urn neue Erkenntnisse tiber Europiiischen Offentlichkeit als wichtigem Teil der Sozialge­ schichte europiiischer Integration. Vor dem Hintergrund normativer Offentlichkeitstheorien wird europiiische Offentlichkeit als eine politische Offentlichkeit verstanden, die sich auf die Politik der Europiiischen Institutionen der EG bzw. der spiiteren EU bezieht. Wichtige Kriterien sind zudem, inwieweit sie durch Strukturen transnationaler Kommuni­ kation in Europa gekennzeichnet ist, Transparenz tiber europiiische Politik sicher­ stellt und offen fur Stimmen aus der Gesellschaft ist. Die Untersuchung basiert auf einer Analyse der Berichterstattung und Kommentierung zur EG-Politik in einem zweiwochigen Zeitraum urn funf ausgewiihlten EG-Gipfel bzw. Europiiischen Riite zwischen 1969 und 1991 in je zwei britischen, franzosischen und deutschen Qualitiitszeitungen. Die Ereignisse eignen sich fur den Vergleich durch die Zeit, nicht zuletzt weil jeweils sehr bedeutsame integrationspolitische Entscheidungen gefiillt wurden: die erste Erweiterung 1969 in Den Haag, die Einfiihrung des Euro­ piiischen Rates 1974 in Paris, das Europiiische Wiihrungssystem 1978 in Brtissel, die Einheitliche Europiiische Akte (EEA) 1985 in Luxemburg und der Vertrag tiber die Europiiische Union 1991 in Maastricht. Zwar war es unmoglich, aile Mitglieds­ staaten einzubeziehen, zumindest aber wurden die grofSten und politisch bedeu­ tendsten Mitgliedsstaaten, sowie die parteipolitische Links-Rechts-Dimension der jeweiligen Zeitungslandschaften erfasst. In drei einfiihrenden Kapiteln werden der bisherige Forschungsstand, die normativ-theoretische Debatte tiber europiiische Offentlichkeit sowie verschie­ dene Aspekte des historischen Kontext und der Entstehungsbedingungen der un­ tersuchten Medien diskutiert. Die Studie untersucht ftinf Aspekte europiiischer Offentlichkeit und kommt zu folgenden Ergebnissen: Erstens, wenn man europiiische Offentlichkeit zuniichst ganz einfach als Dis­ kussion tiber die EG-Politik definiert, so zeigt sich, dass die EG zunehmend ein Bezugspunkt offentlicher Kommunikation wurde. Zwischen Den Haag und Maas­ tricht stieg die EG-Berichterstattung auf mehr als das Doppelte. Allerdings han­ delte es sich nicht urn einen linearen Aufwiirtstrend, sondern entscheidend war offenbar die empfundenen Relevanz der Ereignisse. 1974 war der Umfang der Be­ richterstattung leicht niedriger, 1978, als das europiiische Wiihrungssystem be­ schlossen wurde, allerdings hoher als 1969. Trotz der wichtigen Entscheidungen tiber die EEA 1985 war der Umfang der Berichterstattung weit niedriger als zu den anderen Gipfeln. Vor dem Hintergrund der Erfahrung der Vorjahre, begegne­ ten die Journalisten den Ereignissen mit grofSer Skepsis. Daher hatte die EG in

356

DEUTSrnSPRAGnGE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Luxemburg - aus heutiger Sicht - ganz klar ein Transparenzproblem. Dagegen widmeten sich die Medien dem Maastrichter Gipfel mit ausfiihrlicher Berichter­ stattung und umfangreicher Debatte. Zweitens, wenn man das von Klaus Eder und Cathleen Kantner entwickelte Kriterium zur Einschiitzung transnationaler Kommunikation anwendet, so zeigt sich, dass die Zeitungen gleichzeitig die gleichen europiiischen Themen im grofSen und ganzen als iihnlich relevant auffassten. Verschiedene Untersuchungsverfah­ ren ergaben allerdings etwas unterschiedliche Ergebnisse. Europa als Thema auf Titelseiten und in den Leitartikeln - also als Thema h6chster Relevanz - wurde zwischen Den Haag und Maastricht zunehmend iihnlich behandelt. Nationale Un­ terschiede wiederholten sich nicht systematisch und verschwanden 1991. Wenn man dagegen die Diskussion der verschiedenen Politikfelder betrachtet, blieb der Grad der Ahnlichkeit zwischen den Zeitungen nach anfiinglicher Konvergenz 1974 nach dem britischen Beitritt stabil. 1991 wurden die nationalen Unterschiede in der Behandlung der Politikfelder sogar gr6fSer. Dies deutet auf eine stiirkere nationale Differenzierung in der Maastricht-Debatte hin. Drittens, urn die Bedingungen fur transnationale Kommunikation zu erarbei­ ten, wurde untersucht, welche Gruppen von Journalisten als mediale Mittler wel­ chen Anteil an der EG-Berichterstattung hatten. Drei interessante Schlussfolgerun­ gen lassen sich ziehen. Erstens zeigt sich an den Gipfeln von 1978 und 1991, die von besonders umfangreicher Berichterstattung begleitet waren, eine Domestizie­ rung. Der Anteil der Journalisten aus der heimischen Hauptredaktion an der Be­ richterstattung war weit h6her. Zweitens wurde gleichzeitig die transnationale Kommunikation in die Hauptstiidte gestiirkt. Der Anteil der Auslandskorrespon­ denten in den verschiedenen Liindern an der Berichterstattung war h6her, zulas­ ten des Anteils der Europakorrespondenten. Dies reflektiert eine gestiegene Be­ deutung nationaler Debatten tiber EG-Politik, aber auch gestiegene Aufmerksam­ keit fur die Verhandlungspartner in den intergouvernementalen Verhandlungen. Drittens liefS sich besonders am Gipfel von Maastricht ein gr6fSerer Pluralismus und eine Differenzierung der Autorenschaft beobachten. Offenbar entwickelte sich europiiische 6ffentliche Kommunikation in Richtung gr6fSerer Offenheit. In einem vierten Schritt wurde ausgewertet, wie hiiufig Kommentatoren auf die Ansichten und Positionen von staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Akteuren Be­ zug nahmen. Damit liisst sich der Grad der transnationalen und gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung erfassen. Die Ergebnisse sind wiederum iihnlich: die grofSe Bedeutung einheimische nationale Akteure und ein h6herer Anteil von transnati­ onalen Bezugnahmen auf ausliindische nationale Akteure an den Gipfeln von 1978 und 1991, die sich durch umfangreicherer EG-Berichterstattung auszeichneten. Die umfassendere Diskussion der Ansichten zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure 1991 deutet auf eine wachsende Offenheit hin. Der fiinfte Untersuchungsschritt spricht eine hiiufig geiiufSerte Erwartung tiber transnationale Kommunikation an, niimlich, dass diese zu Identitiitswandel fiihre. Aus der Diskursanalyse der Kommentare im Hinblick auf ein europiiisches Selbstverstiindnis liefSen sich wenig Anzeichen dafur finden, dass im Gefolge in­ tensivierter europiiischer Integration ein europiiisches Gemeinschaftsgefuhl ent­ stand. 1m Gegenteil, gerade auf dem Haager Gipfel 1969 identifizierten sich die meisten Kommentatoren mit der europiiischen Integration. Sie feierten diese als historischen Fortschritt zur Uberwindung des Nationalstaats und vertraten die

DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

357

Idee europiiischer Solidaritiit. 1991 dagegen versuchten viele Kommentatoren, den Nationalstaat gegen Europa zu verteidigen, beziehungsweise Europa nach dem nationalen Bilde zu gestalten. Allerdings wurde Europa auch als Vorbild fur nationale Politik ins nationale Selbstverstiindnis integriert. In den 1970er Jahren und 1985 dagegen bezog sich das europiiische Selbstverstiindnis pragmatisch auf eine Interessengemeinschaft zur Uberwindung der kriselnden Wirtschaft. In der Struktur der Debatte zeigt sich die Zweideutigkeit der 6ffentlichen po­ litischen Kommunikation tiber Europa. Zwar bestanden nationale Debatten tiber national spezifisch wahrgenommene Probleme mit Europa fort, allerdings gab es ebenfalls eine transnationale Offnung. Kommentatoren verwandten tiber Grenzen hinweg iihnliche Argumente, v.a. in der pluralistischen und politischen Debatte tiber Wiihrung und Sozialstaat 1991, in der sich ein transnationaler Rechts-Links­ Cleavage zeigte. Zudem waren sich die Kommentatoren der Argumente der ande­ ren bewusst und antizipierten die Ansichten von jenseits der Grenzen in der eige­ nen nationalen Debatte. In einigen Fiillen intervenierten auch Kommentatoren von jenseits der Grenzen, und bezogen sich kenntnisreich auf die Argumente der anderen. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass europiiische 6ffentliche Kommunikation tiber wichtige europapolitische Ereignisse bereits Ende der 1960er Jahre die Kriterien europiiischer Offentlichkeit erfullte. In der Debatte urn Maastricht findet sich dann allerdings eine nunmehr ausdifferenzierte und pluralisierte Struktur der Kommu­ nikation. Dies deutet auf eine, wenn auch begrenzte, Entwicklung in Richtung der normativen Erwartungen an Europiiische Offentlichkeit. Allerdings veriinderte sich europiiische politische Kommunikation nicht einfach von national nach trans­ national, sondern nationale und transnationale Kommunikation existierten ne­ beneinander bzw. durchdrangen sich gegenseitig. Ein europiiisches Gemein­ schaftsgefuhl entstand dabei nicht, sondern lediglich eine Debatte tiber ein sol­ ches, in der nationale Identifikation und die Integration nationaler und europiii­ scher Identifikation eine stiirkere Rolle spielten. Zwei zentrale Schlussfolgerungen lassen sich ziehen: Die tiberraschend um­ fangreiche politische Kommunikation tiber die EG in den 1970er Jahren, die zu­ dem gerade 1978 auch die intergouvernementale Ausrichtung der EG-Politik wi­ derspiegelt, deutet darauf, dass diese Zeit weder fur die EG-Politik noch fur die Europiiische Offentlichkeit ein dunkles Zeitalter" war, sondern eine positive " Neubewertung verdient. Ftir die Debatte tiber europiiische Demokratie zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie, dass sich 6ffentliche Kommunikation tiber EG Politik zumindest zu wichtigen europiiischen Ereignissen - bereits bis Maastricht in Rich­ tung europiiischer Offentlichkeit entwickelt hatte. Sie wurde umfangreicher, war tiber Grenzen hinweg sehr iihnlich und umfasste zunehmend transnationale Kom­ munikation. Auch 6ffnete sie sich fur eine gr6fSere Vielfalt von Meinungen. Insge­ samt reagierte das Mediensystem viel stiirker als bisher erwartet auf die Veriinde­ rungen im Prozess der europiiischen Integration. So bezogen die Medien iihnlich wie in nationalen Debatten die relevanten gesellschaftlichen Akteure mit ein. Die zunehmende Politisierung zeigt ebenfalls, wie sich europiiische und nationale De­ batte in ihrer Struktur anniiherten. Offentliche Kommunikation stellte daher viel stiirker als bisher angenommen Transparenz und Offenheit fur europiiische De­ mokratie bereit.

RESUME EN FRAN