The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership : The Barcelona Process since 1995 [1 ed.] 9783836621953, 9783836671958

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Markus Hahn

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The Barcelona Process since 1995

Diplomica Verlag

Markus Hahn The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership The Barcelona Process since 1995 ISBN: 978-3-8366-2195-3 Herstellung: Diplomica® Verlag GmbH, Hamburg, 2009

Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Dieses Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Die dadurch begründeten Rechte, insbesondere die der Übersetzung, des Nachdrucks, des Vortrags, der Entnahme von Abbildungen und Tabellen, der Funksendung, der Mikroverfilmung oder der Vervielfältigung auf anderen Wegen und der Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen, bleiben, auch bei nur auszugsweiser Verwertung, vorbehalten. Eine Vervielfältigung dieses Werkes oder von Teilen dieses Werkes ist auch im Einzelfall nur in den Grenzen der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der jeweils geltenden Fassung zulässig. Sie ist grundsätzlich vergütungspflichtig. Zuwiderhandlungen unterliegen den Strafbestimmungen des Urheberrechtes. Die Wiedergabe von Gebrauchsnamen, Handelsnamen, Warenbezeichnungen usw. in diesem Werk berechtigt auch ohne besondere Kennzeichnung nicht zu der Annahme, dass solche Namen im Sinne der Warenzeichen- und Markenschutz-Gesetzgebung als frei zu betrachten wären und daher von jedermann benutzt werden dürften. Die Informationen in diesem Werk wurden mit Sorgfalt erarbeitet. Dennoch können Fehler nicht vollständig ausgeschlossen werden und der Verlag, die Autoren oder Übersetzer übernehmen keine juristische Verantwortung oder irgendeine Haftung für evtl. verbliebene fehlerhafte Angaben und deren Folgen. © Diplomica Verlag GmbH http://www.diplomica.de, Hamburg 2009

Abstract In 1995, the EU 15 and twelve Mediterranean states concluded the EuroMediterranean Partnership. This agreement involves cooperation in political, economic and cultural matters. It aims at creating a common area of peace, stability and prosperity. This study discusses the concept of the EU as a ‘normative’ actor and questions its validity. In doing so, it relies on a neo-realist analysis. Democracy promotion, Euro-Mediterranean trade relations and migration are policy areas which, each for its own reasons, deserve special attention in the framework of the Barcelona process. This paper reviews the reality of Euro-Mediterranean relations and compares them with official EU documentation to demonstrate that the concept of the EU as a benign ‘normative’ actor suffers from severe shortcomings.

Zusammenfassung Im Jahr 1995 beschlossen die EU sowie zwölf ihrer südlichen Nachbarn in Barcelona die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, den sogenannten Barcelona Prozess. Diese Vereinbarung beinhaltet Zusammenarbeit in politischer und wirtschaftlicher sowie in kultureller Hinsicht. Ziel war die Schaffung eines gemeinsamen Raumes des Friedens, der Stabilität und des Wohlstands im gesamten Mittelmeerraum. Die vorliegende Arbeit diskutiert anhand des Barcelona Prozesses das Konzept der EU als

‚normative

Kraft’

und

hinterfragt

dessen

Gültigkeit

anhand

einiger

Grundannahmen der Theorie des Politischen Neorealismus. Demokratieförderung, Euro-Mediterrane Handelsbeziehungen und Migration sind Politikfelder, die im Rahmen dieser Arbeit näher beleuchtet werden sollen. Das Konzept der EU als Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

normative Kraft des Guten nimmt tatsächlich eine wichtige Rolle im Rahmen des offiziellen EU-Sprachgebrauchs ein, deckt sich jedoch nicht mit der Realität der Beziehungen der EU zu ihren südlichen Nachbarn.

i

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2. List of Abbreviations AA

Association Agreement

ACP

African Caribbean and Pacific countries

ASEM

Asia-Europe Meeting

BOND

British Overseas NGOs for Development

CEE

Central and Eastern Europe

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

EC

European Community

ECU

European Currency Unit

EFP

European Foreign Policy

EIDHR EMFTA

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area

EMP

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENP

European Neighbourhood Policy

ESS

European Security Strategy

EU

European Union

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

MEDA MED-countries

Financial and technical accompanying measures European Mediterranean countries

MENA

Middle East North Africa

OJ

Official Journal of the European Union

SEM

Single European Market

TEC

Treaty Establishing the European Community

iii

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3. Contents

1. Abstract

I

2. List of Abbreviations

iii

3. Contents

v

I. Introduction

1

II. The concept of ‘normative’ power

7

III. A neo-realist critique

11

IV. Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean

14

V. Trade Relations

24

VI. Migration

36

VII. Conclusion

43

Appendix - The Euro-Mediterranean partners

44

References

45

v

I. Introduction ‘At present political, economic and social conditions in a number of these countries [of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean] are sources of instability leading to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime. They have a harmful effect both on the region itself and on the Union’.1 The

1995

Barcelona

Declaration

formally

initiated

the

Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership (EMP). It was adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held at Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995 and presently has 37 signatories (see Appendix). It was the European Union’s (EU’s)2 official objective to create in the Mediterranean an area of ‘peace, stability and prosperity’.3 There are huge differences between the European states north of the Mediterranean and their southern neighbours. Furthermore, the non-European Mediterranean countries (MED-countries) participating in the Barcelona process4 differ enormously between each other (see Table 1). Their populations range from just above 4 million in the Palestinian Authorities to more than 70 million in Turkey. Small economies like Jordan are partners in the same way as larger economies such as Egypt. More notable is the difference in GDP per capita, varying from only US$ 1,464 in Syria to US$ 17,800 in Israel. Finally, as regards political rights and civil freedoms, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean are hardly comparable: while within mainland Israel those fundamental rights are widely respected, the Syrian government, for example, continues to oppress those rights and to persecute regime critics.5 It is this heterogeneity

which

makes

the

EMP

distinctive

from

other

inter-regional

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arrangements like the EU-Mercosur partnership or ASEM.

1

European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, 1994, COM (94) 427 final. 2 Although it must be noted that the European Union is merely an umbrella without legal personality, the author will only differentiate between the European Community and the European Union where this is necessary in reference to differing competences. Otherwise, I will use the term ‘EU’ when I generally speak about the EU’s external relations. 3 COM (94) 427 final. 4 ‘Barcelona process’ and EMP will be used synonymously in this paper. 5 According to ‘Freedom House’, , (13 August 2007).

1

Table 1: Heterogeneity and characteristics of the Non-EU MED-countries Population

GDP in billion US$ (year)

Per capita income in US$ (year)

Algeria

32,500,000

92.22 (2006)

7,189 (2005)

Egypt

75,400,000

303.0 (2005)

4,282 (2005)

Israel

7,200,000

140.1 (2005)

17,800

Jordan

5,600,000

14.3 (2006)

2,533 (2005)

Lebanon

3,900,000

21.5 (2006)

5,500 (2006)

Morocco

31,700,000

51.9 (2005)

1,725 (2005)

Syria

19,500,000

27.3 (2005)

1,464 (2005)

Tunisia

10,100,000

25.5 (2006)

8,898 (2006)

Turkey

73,700,000

390.4 (2006)

5,349 (2006)

Palestinian Authority

4,018,000

n/a

n/a

(2005)

Government type6

Freedom score7 (Political Rights/ Civil Liberties)

Not Free (6/5) Not Free Republic (6/5) Parliamentary Free democracy (1/2) Constitutional Partly Free monarchy (5/4) Partly Free Republic (5/4) Constitutional Partly Free monarchy (5/4) Not Free Republic (7/6) Not Free Republic (6/5) Partly Free Republic (3/3) Partly Free n/a (4/6) Republic

*** The Barcelona Declaration has three main chapters: a political & security partnership; an economic & financial partnership; and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. These partnerships are also known as the EMP’s three ‘baskets’. However, the wording of the declaration is significant in this regard as terms such as ‘the promotion of partnerships’ in different policy fields, ‘inter-cultural dialogue’ and ‘cooperation’ are used frequently. At first glance, the Barcelona declaration appears to be a bridge-building instrument of European foreign policy, emphasising the Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

commonalities of all states in the north and the south of the Mediterranean basin. From a cursory consideration of the agreed text one might gain the impression that the European Union places considerable emphasis on the common features shared by the countries of the north and the south. 6

Source for GDP, per capita income, population and Government type: US Department of State, , (3 August 2007). 7 Freedom House evaluates annually the state of freedom in 192 countries. The survey includes political rights, for example, the right to free vote and civil liberties like the freedom of expression, the rule of law or the freedom of belief, for the year 2007, , (3 August 2007).

2

According to the official text, the participants of the Barcelona process ‘recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other’.8 Moreover, they highlight ‘sustainable and balanced economic and social development’ in order to create ‘an area of shared prosperity’.9 The first chapter of the Barcelona declaration is devoted to a ‘political & security partnership’, and it states: ‘[t]he participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal’.10 *** The 1992 Maastricht Treaty set up a European Union. Besides the supranational level which now is the Union’s so-called first pillar, second and a third pillars were established: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). It is important to make clear that the second and third pillars are purely intergovernmental: that is, the member states’ sovereignty over the respective policy areas is not pooled on a supranational EU level. Even though cooperation takes place with respect to both external and internal security issues, the member state still pursues its own national foreign policies. However, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty integrated into the Community’s pillar two policy areas which are closely related to security, thereby giving the European Commission the full right of launching policy proposals in the areas of immigration and asylum. In other words, immigration and asylum are JHA matters although they have now been ‘communitarised’. It is therefore important to bear in mind that European foreign policy (EFP) is not only made through the channels of the CFSP. Trade policyCopyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

making, for example, has been part of the Community’s institutional framework since the 1958 Treaty of Rome. Today, international trade relations are a policy area where the Commission acts on behalf of the member states.

8

Barcelona Declaration, 1995, , (1 June 2007). 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.

3

As early as 1992, the European Council emphasised ‘the importance it attributes to its general relations with the Mediterranean countries’.11 The heads of state and government underlined with respect to the Maghreb and the Middle East that the EU ‘has strong interests both in terms of security and social stability’.12 In 1994, the Commission launched a communication bearing the title ‘Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’.13 From the beginning, as Tanner notes, the EMP has been mainly driven by the Commission.14 One could be tempted to assume that the heads of state, on the one hand, were mainly interested in Europe’s (external) security whereas the Commission, on the other, presented an extended project of building up a partnership. However, the quotation from the 1994 communication cited at the beginning of this paper provides a clear demonstration of the Commission’s concerns about the Union’s security. Where the Community has legislative power, it is the Commission which initiates legislation and which makes proposals to the Council. The situation is similar with respect to international treaties to be concluded by the European Community: According to Art. 5 TEC, the Community only has the powers which were conferred upon it while Article 300 TEC lays down the procedure to be followed. Again, the Commission makes a proposal to the Council which will then decide whether negotiations are to be started or not. If it does so, it is the Council which lays down the relevant negotiating mandate.15 The Commission then conducts the negotiations and, according to Article 300(2) TEC, the Council finally ‘concludes’ the agreements. This clearly shows the linkages and interdependencies between member states represented in the Council and the Commission as the supranational actor. Without elaborating on the process of negotiation here, it is worth noting that the EMP is just such a European ‘creature’. It was negotiated between the Commission and the Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

MED-countries and was subsequently adopted by the Council. Being a so-called 11

European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 26-27 June 1992, , (8 June 2007). 12 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 26-27 June 1992, Annex I, , (8 June 2007). 13 COM (94) 427 final. 14 Fred Tanner, ‘North Africa: partnership, exceptionalism and neglect’, in: Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy. Towards a neighbourhood strategy, Routledge, London, 2004, 135-150,139. 15 Trevor C Hartley, European Union Law in a Global Context, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, 219.

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‘mixed competence’ agreement, the EMP covers matters falling under EC and national competence and, therefore, had to be ratified by all parties including all EU members. *** In the sphere of international politics, the EU is often described as a ‘normative’ actor – as a benign ‘force for good’. However, this paper identifies weaknesses of this often unchallenged concept. This work investigates how neo-realist analysis can be used to demonstrate the weaknesses of the EU as a ‘normative’ power. While the study of EU documents certainly suggests a value driven European foreign policy, the policies subsequently implemented appear to be quite different. This paper will demonstrate that although fundamentally different, both approaches co-exist on two different levels. The concepts of ‘commonalities’ and ‘partnership’ dominate the rhetoric espoused by the EU. Indeed, the EU often contradicts itself by acting in a manner which is different from or antithetical to what its official policy. The EFP is strongly value based as regards official statements and papers, but on closer inspection, the EU’s external relations may be rightly described as a ‘normative cloak increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of external polices’.16 This dissertation will proceed as follows. I will first contrast two fundamentally opposing concepts of how and why foreign policy is made. The EMP will be presented from a constructivist perspective, and then from a neo-realist perspective. From this contrast, it will become clear that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in extremis, is either an instrument of foreign policy which is value-driven and which intends to create a new common identity around the Mediterranean basin or, according to neo-realist thought, a cloak to cover the power interests of the strongest

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European states. Given that the text of the Barcelona Declaration explicitly states that the participants ‘will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions’17 the following chapter of this dissertation will examine the question of how seriously the EU takes the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean. This is particularly interesting because 16

See Richard Youngs, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, 2004, 415-435, 421. 17 Barcelona Declaration, ‘Political and Security Partnership’.

5

the countries in North Africa and the Middle East are widely seen as ‘hard cases’ for EU democratisation efforts.18 Moreover, ‘democracy’ is one of the five core European values identified by Ian Manners’ in his concept of normative power Europe. The fourth chapter will therefore shed light on the importance which European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean really attaches to the promotion of democratic values. In the following chapter, I will examine the EMP’s economic programme, the socalled ‘Financial and Economic Partnership’. Trade liberalisation can be seen as both, a value, and a reflection of European economic interests. I will argue that although the EU encourages its Mediterranean partners to become economically more liberal the way how it aims to pursue its policy goals is inconsistent with the idea of a norm promoter. In the final chapter, I will address Euro-Mediterranean migration issues. This matter is covered by the EMP’s third chapter, the ‘Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs’. The partners are ‘aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures […] in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation’.19 Illegal immigration, at present, is a huge problem for the European Union. This last chapter will show that the concept of ‘normative’ power Europe comes to its limits where European security interests are concerned. I will conclude this dissertation by reiterating the argument that the concept of Europe as a benign ‘normative’ power may well chine with the EU’s official rhetoric but when its actual policies are examined, it is a concept which cannot remain unchallenged. Neo-realism therefore offers valuable insights into Europe’s external relations to the

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Mediterranean region.

18

Andreas Stahn/Vera van Hüllen, ‘Different actors, different tools? Approaching EU and US democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent States’, prepared for the BiAnnual Conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Montreal, Canada, May 1719, 2007, , (7 July 2007). 19 Barcelona Declaration, ‘Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs’.

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II. The concept of ‘normative’ power This paper aims to add to the recent discussions about European foreign policy. More precisely, it wants to find out whether the EU acts in the way it officially declares in its documents and by the means of its rhetoric. In the widest sense, the concept of normative power concerns the promotion of values beyond national boundaries. I will base the concept of normative power within the wider framework of social constructivism because social constructivism currently plays the dominant role in explaining the EU as an actor in international relations and because social constructivists place the role of norms in the centre of their analysis.20 *** Social constructivism sees states as the main players in international politics. Differing from neo-realism, mainstream constructivism argues that the identity of the state and its particular interests are endogenous and not predetermined.21 According to Alexander Wendt, ‘social interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests’.22 Pace argues that ‘the constructed instability in the Mediterranean is perceived as a source of establishing the European Union member states’ collective identity’.23 Cultural and normative factors, in the eyes of constructivists, are crucial for the improvement of international cooperation. Thus, real cooperation and integration on both the European and international levels are possible. Adler and Crawford say that ‘peaceful change may depend on the development of mutual trust and shared identities’.24 Social constructivists would argue that the EFP in general and the EU’s Mediterranean policies in particular are targeted towards building up a collective identity between the partners.25 Partnership-building, common values, trust and shared identity are the essential elements for a constructivist explanation of the EMP.

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20

Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.33, no.3, 2005, 613-636. 21 Said Haddadi, Beyond Securitisation – Western Mediterranean International Relations from a Security Perspective 1989-2002, Doctoral Thesis, Aston University, 2002, 14. 22 Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, 384-396, 384. 23 Michelle Pace, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Common Mediterranean Strategy? European Union Policy from a Discursive Perspective’, Democratization, vol. 9, no.1, 2002, 292-309, 297. 24 Emanuel Adler/Beverly Crawford, ‘Constructing a Mediterranean Region: A Cultural Approach’, Paper presented at the Conference on ‘The Convergence of Civilisations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region’, Lisbon, 6-9 June 2002, 3, , (30 July 2007). 25 See Pace, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, 297, 300.

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Within this context one might add that theorists of regionalism state that interactions between cultures can create or better ‘construct’ a new regional ‘identity’.26 Even where the respective countries do not have much in common, cultural interaction might form such a new identity of the states adjoining to the Mediterranean. *** The concept of ‘normative power’ was introduced in 2002 by Ian Manners. His ideas are built on Duchêne who argued that ‘Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics’.27 Duchêne’s analysis centres on the contrast of civilian-military power of states. In contrast, Manners’ concept of normative power conceives of the European Union as an international actor and, for that reason, his concept is being used in this dissertation. He claims that the EU has identified certain norms that it has placed at the centre of its internal and external relations28 and that it has identified five core values within its acquis which the Union intends to promote and export: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.29 In 1993, the European Council set up the standards for EU applicants to become members of the Union. The so-called Copenhagen Accession criteria ‘spelled out what the EU is (or is supposed to be) and therefore what candidate countries should become’.30 Politically, the applicants must show their commitment for the respect for, inter alia, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.31 Within the ‘Political & security chapter’ of the Barcelona declaration, the contracting parties ‘express their conviction that the peace’ is a ‘common asset which they pledge to promote’. Moreover, they undertake to ‘develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems’. Finally, the parties agree to ‘respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and

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26

Young J Choi/James A Caporaso, ‘Comparative Regional Integration’, in: Walter Carlsnaes/ Thomas Risse/Beth A Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Sage, London, 2001, 480-499. 27 François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s role in world peace’, in: Richard J Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, Fontana, London, 1972, 32-47, 43. 28 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, 235-258, 241. 29 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 242. 30 Kalypso Nicolaïdis/Robert Howse, ‘‘This is my EUtopia…’: Narrative as Power’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, 767-792, 774. 31 European Commission, Enlargement – Accession Criteria, (5 July 2007).

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guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms’.32 All these core ideas which Manners recognised within the EU’s own set of rules and principles have been transferred into the EMP. He stresses that ‘because of its particular historical evolution, its hybrid polity, and its constitutional configuration, the EU has a normatively different basis for its relations with the world’.33

*** But why are these norms exported to others? Manners suggests that the EU has the ability ‘to shape conceptions of ‘normal’’.34 According to Bretherton and Vogler, ‘identity is crucial to shape the EU’s external actions’. They go on to argue that ‘the content of the Union’s collective identity matters’.35 This means that the endogenous identity determines exogenous actions. According to social constructivists, internal European discourse ‘constructs a particular self of the EU’. At the same time the EU ‘attempts to change others through the spread of particular norms’.36 Diez postulates that the ‘discourse on ‘normative power Europe’ is an important practice of European identity construction.37 Manners argues that the concept of ‘normative power’ is ‘an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constituted on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics’.38 Börzel and Risse add that (big) powers tend to construct the world around them according to their own set of norms.39 Moreover, the export of certain values to other parts of the world without pursuing material gains suggests that the EU is a benign actor.40 It shows that, according to this concept, the EU is different from other actors in world politics. 32

Barcelona Declaration. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 252. 34 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 239. 35 Charlotte Bretherton/John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd edn., Routledge, London/ New York, 2006, 40. 36 Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 614. 37 Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 635. 38 Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, 252. 39 Tanja A. Börzel/Thomas Risse, ‘Venus Approaching Mars? The EU as an Emerging Civilian World Power’, prepared for the Bi-Annual Conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Montreal, Canada, May 17-19, 2007, (5 July 2007). 40 Federica Bicchi, ‘‘Our size fits all’: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, 286-303, 299; Hiski Haukkala, ‘A normative power or a normative hegemon? The EU and its European Neighbourhood Policy’, prepared for the Bi-Annual

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33

9

*** However, the text of the Barcelona Declaration is not only about values: security, stability, economic prosperity and trade relations are also part of the agreement. From a constructivist perspective, security, stability and economic prosperity go hand in hand with the spread of values as enshrined in the Declaration. Reconsidering European post-war history, peace, stability as well as economic prosperity could only be achieved after democracy, the rule of law and other core values had all been accepted by the European states. The concept of normative power assumes that Europe differs from other international actors with respect to the way how it acts in the field of international politics. In other words, the European approach is founded on persuasion and partnership building and not on the imposition of European ideas and interests through material power. The concept of normative power draws this assumption from the idealist presumption that European post-war cooperation was a process of integration on the basis of mutual understanding. To conclude, the social constructivist concept of identity-building does not rule out European interests and its pursuit but it suggests an integrated approach to European foreign policy. However, it is crucial to highlight again that according to the concept of ‘normative power’, value promotion itself is in the EU’s interest. Security, stability and economic growth are goals which are favoured within the scope of the

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Barcelona process. But they will follow as a ‘by-product’.

Conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May, 2007, < http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/haukkala-h-09i.pdf>, (1 August 2007).

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III. A neo-realist critique The concept of the EU as an integrator promoting the ‘good’ and reforming the Middle East and North Africa cannot remain unchallenged. Dannreuther articulated in a 2004 interview with Al Jazeera that the ‘EMP represented an ambitious and rather idealistic attempt’ to integrate the Middle East.41 In the eyes of many observers and scholars, the Barcelona process has to be seen as rather unsuccessful. They argue that the European Union has not been able to promote democracy and the rule of law towards the southern shore of the Mediterranean.42 Moreover, North Africa and the Middle East are falling behind in terms of economic growth, and the aim of establishing a Free Trade Area by 2010 appears to be rather unrealistic. Given that the success or failure of the Barcelona Process has been analysed extensively elsewhere43, I am focussing in this dissertation on questioning the EU’s role as a benign normative actor. Therefore, I will contrast the constructivist concept of shaping a common Euro-Mediterranean identity with a neo-realist understanding of the EMP. I will now turn to a brief explanation of how a neo-realist would see and understand the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. According to neo-realist thought, the international system lacks any hierarchical order. Instead the ordering principle is anarchy, and states are seen as equally functioning units. For Kenneth Waltz, they are merely Träger of the international political structure as the only determining variable of international politics.44 However, their main interest is the state’s own survival. For Waltz, ‘the survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured’.45 Self-

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41

Roland Dannreuther, ‘Is there room for Europe?’, ALJAZEERA.NET, 19 December 2004, , (30 July 2007). 42 see for example Richard Youngs, ‘European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean, Middle East Journal, vol. 57, no. 3, 414-431; Ana Echagüe/Richard Youngs, ‘Democracy and Human Rights in the Barcelona Process’, Conclusions of a Workshop at FRIDE, Madrid, 14-16 January 2005, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 10, no. 2, 233-237. 43 This is done for example by Sophie Bessis, ‘Dix ans après Barcelone: état des lieux du partenariat euro-méditerranéen’, La Revue Internationale et Stratégique, vol. 59, 2005, 129-138; Carlo Massala, Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, Geschichte – Struktur – Prozeß, Center for European Integration Studies, 2000, 3-31; Irene Weipert, ‘Neue Reformdynamik durch neue Strategien? Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik im südlichen Mittelmeerraum’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Discussion Paper, 2006, (24 July 2007). 44 John M Hobson, The State and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 17-19. 45 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Random House, New York, 1979, 92.

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help, Waltz says ‘is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order’.46 In order to guarantee their survival, however, states must maximise their power capabilities. And it is the power capabilities what differentiates states from each other.47 This explains, according to Waltz, the actual differences between weak and strong states and the power that strong states can execute with respect to weaker ones. Relative gains can be acquired through internal and external balancing. The maximisation of power capabilities through the formation of alliances is not generally excluded from neo-realist thought. It is this element of neo-realism which is of particular relevance to this paper: as security, and in the extreme case, the survival of a state is not guaranteed, a shift of power capabilities provides the state with a higher degree of security and improves its chances of survival. Security and survival are thus closely linked as security is a necessary element of the state’s survival. States therefore do everything they can to increase their power and hence their security. They even might agree on an alliance with others. Crawford, for example, notes that ‘states often build regional partnerships in order to balance against the overwhelming power of another state’.48 France, Spain and Italy, partly because of their former colonial ties to North Africa, already had close bilateral relations with the southern Mediterranean long before the EC even adopted a Common Foreign Policy in the early 1970s. Vasconcelos argues that the Mediterranean is a high foreign policy priority for EU members such as France, Spain and Italy.49 According to a neorealist analysis, this is because their external security is threatened by instabilities around the Mediterranean: illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism being but three areas where their potential interest in the MED-countries springs from. But how would neo-realism explain the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? At first, it may appear that neo-realists would not devote much attention to the concept of a Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

partnership.

Neo-realism explains the process of European integration as a

(instable) alliance of European states as a means of counter-balancing the overwhelming power of another actor: the USA. The maximisation of power 46

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102 Hobson, The State and International Relations, 23. 48 Beverly Crawford, ‘Why the Euro-Med Partnership? European Strategies in the Mediterranean Region’, in: Vinod K Aggarwal/Edward A Fogarty, eds., EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, 11. 49 Alvaro de Vasconcelos, ‘Disintegration and Integration in the Mediterranean’, The International Spectator, vol. 28, no. 3, 1993, 67-78. 47

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capabilities is in no way limited to military power. The European internal market makes Europe, and in particular its strongest states, more competitive towards American or Asian rivals. Consequently, a neo-realist would see the EMP as a strategic alliance with two goals: to control the Mediterranean and to roll back American influence in Europe’s periphery.

These aims are not predicated on a

disinterested European interest in a Euro-Mediterranean partnership or in the formation of a common identity in the Mediterranean. Europe must not be seen as a true union but as a coalition of states who deliberately decided to join forces. Therefore, the EMP would have to be seen as a strategic alliance to expand European power. To sum up, the EMP, according to a neo-realist view, could be described as an instrument of European foreign policy with an aim of expanding European influence in the Mediterranean as a means of, firstly, counter-balancing American power in the region, and secondly, tying the MED-countries more closely to Europe, thereby bringing about an asymmetrical dependency.50 The overall rationale therefore is the idea of survival, or in less radical terms: greater European security. At this point, it suffices to say that our understanding and analysis of the EMP depends greatly on the theoretical underpinning one adopts. The Leitmotiv of the following chapters will be identifying the weaknesses inherent to the concept of the EU as a normative actor. In doing so, I will rely on a neo-realist understanding of

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international politics.

50

Crawford, ‘Why the Euro-Med Partnership?’, 12.

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IV. Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean ‘The EU now has a comprehensive strategy for the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and “good governance” in place covering the entire globe. […] The EU is making an explicit effort to project its own identity of a democratic polity into its relations with third countries’.51 It can be argued that Europe considers liberal democracies as the one and only legitimate political regime. According to Schmitter and Brouwer, Europe is convinced that its positive post-war experience of democracy in pluralist societies is a ‘model’ for the rest of the world.52 With respect to its Mediterranean neighbours, with very few exceptions, the EU is surrounded by authoritarian regimes. The EMP could therefore be seen as the instrument par excellence by which to export the European model of democracy. This chapter introduces the concept of democracy promotion as a means of European foreign policy and examines how it is applied within the EMP framework. In its rhetoric, the EU links the donation of aid and development assistance, amongst other things, to democracy. I will introduce the concept of ‘conditionality’ describing its different characteristics and whether and how it is applied in EFP. This chapter does not aim to evaluate the success achieved in the field of European democracy promotion. Rather, it asks whether it is indeed a centrepiece of the EU’s Middle East and North African relations. The fundamentally conflicting approaches of neo-realism and social constructivism were deliberately presented in the previous chapters to test which approach can best explain European foreign policy in this realm.

*** The ‘Treaty Establishing the European Community’ (TEC) is the primary legal source Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

of the Community. In its present version adopted at the Nice European Council, a new chapter XXI was included regulating the ‘economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries’. Article 181a(1) TEC states that the policy of the 51

Tanja A Börzel/Thomas Risse, ‘One size fits all! EU policies for the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’. Paper presented at the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, 4–5 October 2004, 2005, , (1 August 2007). 52 Philippe Schmitter/Imco Brouwer, ‘Conceptualizing, researching and evaluating democracy promotion and protection’, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 99/9. European University Institute, Florence, 1999, (1 June 200).

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Community shall, inter alia, ‘contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy […]’.53 The same reference is made in Article 177(2) TEC with regard to the field of development cooperation. With respect to the CFSP, Article 11 of the ‘Treaty on European Union’ prescribes that, inter alia, it is the objective of the common foreign and security policy ‘to develop and consolidate democracy […]’.54 In 1999, the Council adopted a regulation setting the legal basis for human rights and democratisation activities in third countries.55 According to Article 1 of that regulation, the EU’s foreign policy as a whole shall ‘contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Moreover, a ‘Human Rights and Democracy Committee’ was set up by the Council in order to assist the Commission in its work.56 While this instrument formerly has been known as the ‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ since 2007, it was replaced by the ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights’ (EIDHR).57 While the MEDA58 regulations59 had been the financial instrument to establish the goals of the Barcelona process from 1996 until 2006, the EIDHR now is the relevant financial tool to promote democracy and human rights in the MED-countries. Together with promoting human rights issues, it is the official goal of the new instrument to spread democracy.60 To conclude, the European Union demonstrates its official interest in the promotion of democracy by means of its legal documents. However, this chapter seeks to look behind the curtain and questions that initial impression. It asks whether the EU does in fact intend to implement its declared aim. According to Manners, there are other universal values which the EU aims to spread internationally. Those are, for example, the rule of law, human rights issues, or good governance in

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53

‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community’, in the version of the Treaty of Nice, in force from 1 February 2003, incorporating the amendments made by the Treaty of Athens, signed on 16 April 2003, OJ, 2006, C 321. 54 ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’, OJ, 2006, C 321. 55 Council Regulation (EC) No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999, OJ, 1999, L120. 56 Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999, OJ, 1999, L120; Council Regulation (EC) No 976/1999. 57 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006 of 20 December 2006, OJ 2006, L 386. 58 MEDA stands for ‘MEsures D’Accompagnement financières et techniques’ (‘Financial and technical accompanying measures’. 59 Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 (MEDA I) of 23 July 1996, OJ, 1996, L 189; Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 (MEDA II), OJ, 2000, L 311. 60 For further information regarding the EIDHR, consult the internet platform of the ‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’, , (24 July 2007).

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general. As the MED-countries are nearly exclusively governed by authoritarian .

regimes, it appears to be ideal to focus only on democracy promotion. *** What is meant by the term ‘democracy promotion’? Schmitter and Brouwer define it as all ‘voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, [or the] democratization of autocratic regimes […]’.61 Democracy assistance, in other words, involves all measures explicitly requested by a state or at least tolerated by the governing regime. Clandestine measures in order to overthrow the government, therefore, are not part of the concept of ‘democracy promotion’. The 1990-2000 Lomé IV agreement governing the trade and aid relations between Europe and the African Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) was the first international treaty formally incorporating clauses of economic and political conditionality with democratisation as a priority area:62 Article 5 of the convention states that ‘development policy and cooperation shall be closely linked […] to the recognition and application of democratic principles’.63 From a constructivist standpoint, democracy will only be spread ‘through an institutionalized process within which mutual trust had accumulated and genuine ‘consent’ to the normative value of political pluralism could be generated’.64 Moreover, the notion of trust through discourse requires the EU to not impose any ‘punitive conditionality’ even in those cases in which the MED-countries do not meet the agreed commitments.65 However, Article 3 of the MEDA regulation emphasises, inter alia, the respect for democratic principles and that the violation of such Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

principles ‘will justify the adoption of appropriate measures’. Negative conditionality is, therefore, present in the EU’s official language. It is worth noting, however, that 61

Schmitter/Brouwer, ‘Conceptualizing, researching and evaluating democracy promotion’. Börzel/Risse, ‘Venus Approaching Mars’. 63 Lomé IV Convention as revised by the agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995, retrieved 1 June 2007, 64 Richard Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?', Democratization, vol. 9, no.1, 2002, 40-62, 47. 65 Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion’, 47; Elena Baracani, ‘From the EMP to the ENP: New European pressure for democratisation?’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 1, no. 2, 2005, 54-66, 64. 62

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the EU has never implemented any of these measures, such as suspending association agreements or financial assistance. And, if one were to believe in the idea of the EU as a normative actor, the Union should rather follow its goals through discourse given that coercive elements have no place in a policy which intends to persuade the other of acting in a certain way. Nevertheless, many scholars see the concept of ‘democratic conditionality’ as lying at the heart of the European strategy which aims to motivate non-member countries to adopt the same values of state-organisation, i.e. pluralism and democracy in contrast to authoritarianism.66 Conditionality therefore operates in the same way that ‘a social actor uses the mechanism of reinforcement to change the behaviour of another actor’.67 However, reinforcement can be used in two ways. If a southern EMP partner acts in the way that is desired by the EU, it will be compensated for its efforts. But not achieving certain goals could also involve the imposition of penalties on the respective actor.68 Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel argue that the EU does not apply punitive conditionality but merely ‘reinforcement by reward’.69 This reflects the notion of the European Union acting as partner to its Mediterranean neighbours. According to constructivist thought, democratic progress should not be enforced by the EU which again forbids the implementation of punitive conditionality. Instead, the EU, where it operates as a normative actor, must rely on negotiation in order to agree on measures to be implemented in the respective countries. Rewards are used as means of motivation, so-called ‘carrots’. If progress in democratic issues is noticeable, the partner receives a reward, mostly in the form of donation of European aid.70 But if the partners do not meet their bilaterally agreed goals, no sanctions follow. It can be noted here that the greatest reward for European non-EU countries has been EU membership71, often described as the ‘golden carrot’. Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

And programmes of external assistance like PHARE72 certainly facilitated the process of democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Within less than 20 66

Frank Schimmelfennig/Stefan Engert/Heiko Knobel, ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, 495-518, 495. 67 Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel, ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance’, 496. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.; Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion’, 47. 70 Schmitter/Brouwer, 1999. 71 Schmitter/Brouwer, 1999. 72 PHARE stands for ‘Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies’

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years these states have transformed themselves into democratic states and became EU members in 2004 and 2007.73 It can be argued that positive conditionality was a successful EU instrument of transforming the CEE states. Apart from Turkey, this ‘golden carrot’ cannot be dangled in front of non-European, non EU members such as the MED-countries. So how can the EU practically pursue its declared goal of promoting democracy in the Mediterranean countries? Is the EU willing to pay for the required rewards? The previously mentioned MEDA regulations have been the financial instrument established within the framework of the Barcelona process. Between 1996 and 1999 (MEDA I) € 3,435 million and between 2000 and 2006 (MEDA II) € 5,350 million were allocated by the EU for the 12 southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries.74 However, in the course of MEDA I, 27 million ECU/Euro75 were allocated to programmes aiming to promote democracy. Youngs describes these programmes (which were managed by the Commission) as ‘bottom-up’ programmes which placed an emphasis on the support for NGOs, grassroots organisations and other non governmental networks.76 Comparing these two figures, it appears that the European Union allocated only 0.5 % of an overall budget of nearly 3.5 billion Euros to programmes aiming to assist or promote democracy.77 He further argues that ‘over two hundred times more money was given under the main MEDA budget for assisting the process of economic restructuring’.78 It is important to note that at least from a financial point of view, the MEDA budget puts no priority in assisting non governmental organisations to develop their capacity to challenge authoritarian regimes. In my view, Europe is concerned with the effects which a more fundamental democratic change might cause. According to Commission officials, ‘the problem with allocating aid to local NGOs is that some of

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them are linked to Islamist movements’.79 From this point of view, the hypothesis that 73

Baracani, ‘From the EMP to the ENP’, 54. Commission of the European Communities, Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, , (7 June 2007). 75 From 1 January 1999 the European Currency Unit – ECU has been replaced by the Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 1 ECU, , (7 June 2007). 76 Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion’, 55. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Phone interviews conducted by Federica Bicchi, as quoted in ‘Want funding? Don’t Mention Islam: EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean’, CFSP Forum, vol. 4, no. 2, 2006, 10-12, 12, , (9 July 2007). 74

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democracy promotion in the southern Mediterranean is a ‘centrepiece’ EFP in the Mediterranean turns out to be not very convincing. It is important to know that the largest shares of the EU’s MEDA budget are financial ‘means to accompany the reform of economic and social structures’80 in the EMP framework. This money aims to help alleviate the effects of economic and social change and has no direct link to democratisation. However, the little money which the EU actually devoted for programmes directly linked to democracy assistance can only help to promote changes on the grassroots level. This money is in no case a reward for any progress. We can therefore sum up by saying that the concept of ‘reinforcement by reward’ as argued by Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel has not been applied in the Mediterranean region. Firstly, the EU’s (financial) efforts to advocate democracy as an allegedly European core value have been kept to a minimum.

Figures have

shown that the funds allocated were surely too meagre to make any difference with respect to the governance of MED-countries. Yet, this does not admittedly prove that democratisation or more general ‘norm advocacy’ is not in the European interest at all. However, the distribution of European spending shows that other policy areas are ranked with higher priority. *** What, therefore, are the reasons for this apparent discrepancy between, on the one hand, the EU’s insistent emphasis in its own statements on the importance of democracy and pluralism and, on the other, the policies it actually implements on the ground? It is noteworthy that the financial means allocated by the European Union for democracy assistance are at higher levels in other partner regions. From the whole budget for the respective regions, 21 per cent in the ACP states and 17 per cent in Latin America were spent for democracy assistance.81 The explanation for these figures cannot be that Latin America and the ACP are less democratic than the Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

MSCs: according to the Freedom House report for 2007, only one MENA country (Israel) is to be considered as ‘free’ but 61 per cent are classified as ‘not free’. In contrast, 72 per cent of the Asian Pacific countries are ‘free’ or ‘partly free’. In America, from 35 countries, only one (Cuba) is classified as ‘not free’.82

80

Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 (MEDA I). Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion’, 55. 82 According to Freedom House, the ratings display international occasions from 1 December 2005 until 31 December 2006, , (7 June 2007). 81

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It is possible to argue in Europe’s defence that it simply has not been particularly successful as a normative actor in promoting and spreading democratic values. In my view, however, it is more appropriate to question the idea of the EU being a thorough normative actor. From a neo-realist perspective the aspect of ‘security’ is pivotal to explain an actor’s behaviour. The promotion of values is either irrelevant or a cloak to cover material interests. Dannreuther argues that ‘the maintenance of stability and security’ in Middle Eastern and North African states was considered to be more important in European foreign policy ‘than encouraging uncertain and destabilising political change’.83 Therefore, urging MED-countries to become more democratic would at the same time, and particularly in the short run, destabilise these countries and potentially the whole region. Recent developments in Palestine demonstrate the destabilising effects of democratic rule. The January 2006 elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council led to the surprising victory of the radical Islamist Hamas whose ‘Change and Reform Platform’ won the absolute majority.84 Despite being free and fair, the elections produced a government which does not accept the right of existence of Israel and which cannot be considered an attractive partner for peace negotiations. Overall, these democratic elections led to increased levels of instability in the Levant and decreased the chance for a final peace accord between Israel and Palestine. In other words, the declared European goal of peace and stability was not furthered through a democratic election. Thus, the promotion of democracy was in this case counterproductive as regards European security. I argue that the EU does not use its power as an allegedly normative actor because it fears the destabilising effects on the entire region that such approach might cause. This assumption is difficult to prove particularly given that because, as I have already demonstrated, the EU’s rhetoric gives the opposite indication. One piece of evidence which can be laid, however, is the minuscule budget for democratisation. Even Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

stronger evidence is the fact that the EU does use its strength in policy areas where it has a strong interest. Illegal immigration from North Africa, for example, is a top priority for EFP in which the EU consequently follows its goals. This issue, however, will be dealt with in a following chapter of this dissertation.85 For now it suffices to 83

Roland Dannreuther, ‘Is there room for Europe?’, ALJAZEERA.NET, 19 December 2004, , (30 July 2007). 84 For the facts see Nathalie Tocci, ‘Has the EU Promoted Democracy in Palestine…and Does it Still?’, CFSP Forum, vol. 4, no. 2, 2006, 7-10, 7, (9 July 2007). 85 See pp. 36-42.

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note that no real effort can be identified in European foreign policy to spread democracy in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region. I would suggest that the EU is a rationalistic actor which understands that instability in neighbouring countries would threaten its own external security. Any wholehearted efforts in the field of democratisation would be counterproductive to the overall goal of maintaining European security and stability.

*** Does this mean that the notion of the EU as a normative actor does not reflect reality of European foreign policy at all or at least with respect to the Mediterranean? The answer is twofold. Haddadi argues that ‘at the heart of the security discourse lies the need to ensure political stability and promote democracy as vectors for building a security partnership in the region’.86 At least with respect to the documentation, the EU does indeed recognise the necessity of democratic change in neighbouring countries and would therefore like to be a normative actor. This is clearly expressed in a variety of EU papers, some of which were cited above.87 However, the reality of what happens is that the EU emphasises the importance of security issues. It cooperates with existing regimes and indeed minimises its efforts in democracy promotion. The situation is a paradox. It might be conveniently recalled that the declared goal of the Barcelona process is to turn the Mediterranean into a region of ‘peace, stability and prosperity’. In this respect, the EU, operating as an allegedly ‘normative’ actor, appears to be convinced that this triangle of peace, stability and prosperity can only be guaranteed through democratic rule. Such a conviction may well be rooted in the Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

successful post-war transformation of the EU/EC member states. Furthermore, the process of European integration was built on values of which ‘democracy’ has been a core element. It would be wrong to assume that democratic assistance is merely

86

Said Haddadi, ‘Political Securitization and Democratization in the Maghreb: Ambiguous Discourse and Fine-Tuning Practices for a Security Partnership, in: Emanuel Adler/Federica Bicchi/Beverly Crawford/Raffaela A del Sarto (eds.), The Convergence of Civilizations – Constructing a Mediterranean Region,University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006, 168-190, 168. 87 See pp. 14-16.

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irrelevant or to use Youngs words a ‘disingenuous strategy’.88 Europe’s rhetoric suggests that it wants to promote its own values in other regions. However, when it comes to the MED-countries and the EMP, Europe is directly confronted with security issues that impede any wholehearted promotion of democracy. To argue that ‘[o]ne of the most pronounced priorities’ of the EMP ‘has been the development of the rule of law and democracy in Mediterranean Partner Countries’89 in my view does not reflect actual European foreign policy. *** In order to emphasise the need for democratic change in the south, critics might still wish to focus on the strong words which the EU uses in order to emphasise the need for democratic change in the south. They might not be impressed by the size of the MEDA budget for democracy promotion and not be convinced by EFP examples from related policy areas. They might consider the words in the documents as the compelling pieces of evidence which prove the EU’s normative actor status. However, the quotation given before the introductory chapter already highlighted the Commission’s concerns about European security.90 The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) stresses that ‘[t]he best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’. In the same breath, the EU considers the Mediterranean to be a ‘troubled area’. The ESS noted that it is an area which ‘generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts’.91 The EU is confronted with a paradox situation. The EU fears instabilities in the Mediterranean region as short term consequences while it has at the same time identified ‘well-governed democratic states’ as a guarantee for Europe’s security. Indeed, the Commission still acknowledges that “[t]he South and East Mediterranean […] is an area of vital Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

strategic importance to the European Union’.92 From this point of view, we may conclude that the promotion of democracy as a core European value meshes well 88

Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion’. Andreas Marchetti, ‘Promoting Good Governance. The Keystone to a Sustainable Mediterranean Policy’ in Andreas Marchetti (ed.), Ten Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Defining European Interests for the Next Decade, Center for European Integration Studies, ZEI, Bonn, 2005, 47-58, 48. 90 COM (94) 427 final. 91 European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a better World – European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003, , (14 August 2007). 92 European Commission, ‘The EU’s Mediterranean and Middle East Policy’ , (7 June 2007). 89

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with the EU’s rhetoric. EU documents stress both European security and the promotion of values as being the Union’s chief objectives, and the ESS expressly links both of these. The reality, however, appears to be rather different: Dillman notes that the EU favours stability and fears potentially democratic but Islamic governments.93 The desire to see short-term stability appears to have won out over the desire to foster long-term change. *** Youngs concludes that ‘the new democracy promotion agenda was deliberated on as a ‘bolt-on’ to existing policy, rather than the overall objective to which the whole range of instruments and commitments was to be harnessed’.94 The ESS as well as the Commission’s own statements clearly demonstrate that the EU considers the Mediterranean region to be a troubled and potentially dangerous area in its own backyard. Such geographical proximity might also help to explain why much more money is spent on projects in democratisation in partner regions far away from the European continent. The promotion of democratic values through financial assistance, for example, is more widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa maybe because the EU does not fear instabilities in regions more distant from Europe. However, the persistent fear of instability impedes any wholehearted value-driven policies in the Mediterranean states. Real democratisation efforts actually would run contrary to the aim of turning the Mediterranean into a peaceful and stable region, at least in the short term. All that appears to be left, therefore, from the ‘normative’ power ideology

Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

is the EU’s rhetoric.

93

Bradford Dillman, ‘The EU and democratization in Morocco’, in Paul J Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and democratization, Routledge, London, 2003, 174-197, 175. 94 Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion’, 51.

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V. Trade Relations ‘Trade policy is […] not a stand-alone policy, it contributes to the achievement of the Union’s overall objectives. […] Trade policy has also to promote sustainable development, or to respect and promote cultural diversity’.95

Although the Barcelona Declaration has three dimensions, for most scholars the ‘Economic and financial partnership’ is the core of the EMP.96 According to Schlumberger, 75 per cent of the MEDA funds were allocated to economic transition in the MED-countries.97 In other words, the EU seems to have turned its attention on the second basket of the Barcelona Declaration. A recent World Bank report states that ‘[s]trong oil revenues and oil-related wealth […] provide the momentum for continued robust growth in the MENA region over the short term. Over the longer term, however, MENA economies will have to make comprehensive structural changes to deliver the strong growth needed to meet the region’s employment challenge’.98 It is important to stress that this World Bank report focuses on all Middle Eastern countries, including all oil exporters from the Arabian Peninsula. But with the exception of Algeria and Syria, all other southern members of the EMP are poor in natural resources.

Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

95

Pascal Lamy, ‘The Convention and trade policy: concrete steps to enhance the EU’s international profile’, speech by Pascal Lamy, 5 February 2002, Brussels, , (4 July 2007). 96 See for example: Annette Jünemann, ‘Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel’, in Wulfdiether Zippel (ed.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU, Nomos, Baden Baden, 1999, 29-64; Federica Bicchi, ‘From Security to Economy and back’, European University Institute, ; Sheila Carapico, ‘Euro-Med – European Ambitions in the Mediterranean’, Middle East Report, no. 220, autumn 2001, 24-28, 25; Alfred Tovias, ‘The Political Economy of the Partnership in Comparative Perspective’, Paper presented at the Conference on ‘The Convergence of Civilisations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region’, Lisbon, 6-9 June 2002, 1, , (15 August 2007). 97 Oliver Schlumberger, ‘Arab Political Economy and the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy: What Prospects for Development?’, New Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 2, 2000, 247-268, 266, fn 45. 98 The World Bank, ‘Middle East and North Africa Region – Economic Developments and Prospects’, 2007, , (21 June 2007).

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Table 2: Real GDP growth in the Mediterranean 1996 – 200699 in % 1996-1999

2000-2003

2004

2005

2006 (estimated)

Selected countries

Algeria

3.1

4.1

5.2

5.3

1.4

Egypt

5.2

3.8

4.2

4.6

6.9

Morocco

4.2

4.0

4.2

1.7

7.3

Syria

4.1

3.4

3.9

4.5

5.1

Maghreb

3.2

4.2

5.8

5.1

5.0

Mashrek

3.2

3.7

5.7

3.7

1.4

4.0

4.5

7.3

6.6

6.9

5.7

5.1

8.0

8.1

8.2

Subregions

(excl Iraq and PAL)

Comparator regions

all developing countries South Asia

Egypt, Syria and Morocco have all experienced relatively high growth rates during the past decade (see table 2). But while the Mashrek and Maghreb states developed in relatively similar ways between 1996 and 1999, it was the Maghreb which did better over the past six years. Despite this, comparing these figures with all other developing countries, the performance of the Mediterranean states with respect to GDP growth was below the average. Within the whole period from 1996 to 2006, all other developing countries could document higher GDP growth than the Maghreb and the Mashrek states. Compared to the situation in South Asia, the gap is even wider. While South Asian economies grew by estimated 8.2 per cent in 2006, it was

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only 5 per cent in the Maghreb and 1.4 per cent in the Mashrek states.

99

The World Bank, ‘Middle East and North Africa Region – Economic Developments and Prospects’, 2007, , (21 June 2007).

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Table 3: Economic Freedom Scores for the MED-countries in 2007100 Economic Freedom Regional Rank**

World Rank

in per cent* Southern Mediterranean countries

Algeria

52.2

14

134

Egypt

53.2

13

127

Israel

68.4

1

37

Jordan

64.0

3

53

Lebanon

60.3

9

77

Morocco

57.4

11

96

Syria

48.2

15

142

Tunisia

61.0

6

69

Turkey***

59.3

n/a

83

Average

58.2

Comparative figures

EU 27

70.3

1-36

6-94

EU 15

72.7

1-36

6-94

World

60.6

* The ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ ranks 161 countries. It displays an average of ten different freedoms: trade, business, fiscal, monetary, investment, financial, labour, freedom from government, property rights and freedom from corruption. ** The index counts 17 Middle Eastern and North African States. *** Turkey is classified as a European state and is ranked number 34 of 41 European states.

It was previously noted that compared with other regions in the world, the MEDcountries are mostly ‘not-free’ with respect to political and civil liberties. Furthermore, table 3 allows some insights into the lack of economic freedom in the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The figures displayed in table 3 clearly demonstrate that Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

with the exception of Israel and, in part, Jordan, economic freedom is not particularly widespread throughout the Mediterranean region. The average economic freedom score (which is only available for nine MED-countries) is 58.2 per cent. Firstly, this figure sits below the European average of 72.7 for the EU 15 or 70.3 for the EU 27. More importantly, this economic freedom index is below the world average of 60.6 per cent. Tim Kane states that with certain exceptions, the economies in the 100

Tim Kane/Kim R Holmes/Mary A O’Grady, 2007 Index of Economic Freedom: The Link Between Economic Opportunity and Prosperity, 13th edn, The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., 2007.

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Mediterranean are ‘not free’.101 Kane argues that GDP growth and economic freedom are linked. He emphasises a ‘positive relationship between high levels of economic freedom and high GDP per capita’.102 This understanding is supported by the European Commission. When it launched its proposals for the implementation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it stated that the ‘move towards the market economy in the Mediterranean region is a precondition for sustained economic growth’.103 In that 1995 paper, the Commission postulated that only open market economies can attract sufficient foreign direct investment to generate more jobs and opportunities for young people living in the Mediterranean region.104 Brach explains the nexus between economic liberalisation and stability in the Mediterranean region relying on economic growth theory: economies that integrate themselves into the global market will benefit from foreign direct investment and the transfer of modern technology. Ideally, these liberalised economies will be able to produce more competitively and will be able to sell more products on the international market. This leads to higher GDP growth rates, more jobs, higher salaries and better living conditions. In the longer term, one would expect that sustainable growth and prosperity would make the Mediterranean region more stable and peaceful.105 For example, Brach argues that the EMP is ‘based on the anticipation that trade functions as an anchor of regional integration and economic cooperation as the necessary catalyst’.106 If one considers the fact that the European post-war history of integration was based predominantly on economic cooperation and liberalisation, the notion of the EU as a normative actor becomes strikingly obvious. With respect to the MEDcountries, we would expect the EU to promote the idea of free trade and economic integration given that the economic integration which Europe enjoyed post-War led to a sustained period of peace and stability on the continent. It is, however, not necessarily an argument against the concept of normative power Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

to say that sustainable growth and stability are no ends in themselves but also lead to greater stability and security for Europe. However, this chapter will demonstrate 101

Ibid. Ibid. 103 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, 1995, COM (95) 72 final., 6. 104 Ibid. 105 Juliane Brach, ‘Ten years after: Achievements and Challenges of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic and Financial Partnership’, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2006, 8. (20 July 2007). 106 Ibid. 102

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that the EU’s actual trade policies are not value-based in the sense of Europe aiming to promote free trade and regional integration. On the contrary, Europe pursues its interests through the exclusion of agricultural products from free trade and the implementation of segmented Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Areas (EMFTA). Through such actions, the EU impedes regional integration and sustained development in the MED-countries. *** The EMP’s economic and financial partnership contains about 80 lines of text. The words ‘cooperation’ or ‘cooperate’ are used 16 times. ‘Partnership’ appears 5 times, ‘promoting’ or ‘promotion’ 12 times and ‘development’ or ‘develop’ 23 times. Discourse theory studies and analyses language use and attaches considerable importance to such counting of words. Here, the words quoted serve as another illustration how the EU officially intends to approach its southern neighbourhood. There is no need to rehearse the constructivist analysis already set out in the previous chapters. Within the framework of the economic partnership, the EU once more aims to pursue a suite of different goals. For example, the declaration states that the partners ‘emphasize the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development’ in order to reach the primary objective of ‘creating an area of shared prosperity’.107 Schlumberger questions ‘whether the goals made public in EU statements and official documents really reflect European interests or whether, for example, Europe might be competing with the hegemonic US presence in the region […] to gain privileged access to potentially huge export markets’.108 This view appears to be backed up by the Barcelona Declaration itself which states that the EMFTA ‘will [only] cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the WTO’ (emphasis added).109

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While the 1995 Barcelona Declaration only set the goal of establishing a EMFTA, the free circulation of goods is meant to be achieved through the so-called EuroMediterranean Association Agreements (AAs). As these agreements involve not only trade matters, they are considered to be ‘mixed-type’ competence and must be

107

Barcelona Declaration, ‘Economic & financial partnership’. Schlumberger, ‘Arab Political Economy’, 260. 109 Barcelona Declaration, ‘Economic & financial partnership’. 108

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ratified not only by the third state but also by each EU member state.110 Such agreements tend to focus on three fields of engagement: ‘political dialogue, economic relations, and co-operation in social and cultural affairs’.111 Currently, association agreements are in force with Egypt (2004), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Morocco (2000), the Palestinian Authority (1997), Tunisia (1998) and Turkey (1995). With Algeria, Lebanon and Syria, either negotiations have already been concluded or the agreements are in the process of ratification.112 Taking the example of the existing EC-Moroccan AA, the parties have agreed to move gradually towards the establishment of a free trade area.113 However, agreement was only reached to permit by 2012 the free circulation of manufactured goods without tariffs and non tariff barriers. With respect to agricultural goods, the EU and Morocco agreed to ‘gradually implement greater liberalisation of their reciprocal trade in agricultural and fishery products’. Article 18(2) of the AA’s text stresses the ‘particular sensitivity’ of agricultural goods. The parties agreed to ‘examine on a regular basis in the Association Council, product by product and on a reciprocal basis, the possibilities of granting each other further concessions’. This essentially means that the EU may protect its agricultural sector ad infinitum if no further understanding is achieved.114 With a 13 per cent share of the whole GDP, the agricultural sector is still an important industry in Morocco and with 71.5 per cent of the whole trade the European Union is by far Morocco’s largest trading partner.115 This demonstrates that while industrial goods are to be traded without tariffs and exported to Morocco, Morocco still faces restrictions when it comes to exporting its agricultural products to the EU. Some MED-countries export a high quantity of raw materials to the EU or, as in the case of Algeria, mostly petroleum and natural gas. Biscop adds that the southern Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Mediterranean is to be seen as a big European export market not only for industrial 110

European Commission, ‘Association Agreements’, , (29 June 2007). 111 Jan Niessen, ‘Five years of EU migration and asylum policymaking under the Amsterdam and Tampere mandates’, Paper prepared for the German Council of Experts for Immigration and Integration (Immigration Council), May 2004, , (25 June 2007), 39. 112 European Commission, ‘Association Agreements’. 113 EC-Morocco Association Agreement, OJ, 2000, L 70, Article 6. 114 EC-Morocco Association Agreement, Article 16. 115 US Department of State, country information on Morocco, figures from 2005, , (25 June 2007).

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but also for agricultural goods.116 It must be recognised, however, that even if the EMFTA is limited to trade in manufactured goods, it opens up new possibilities not only for Europeans but also for the Mediterranean economies. Between 1994 and 2004, exports from the MED-countries to the EU grew by 10.3 per cent a year as against 7.7 per cent from the EU to the MED-countries.117 By all accounts, free trade of manufactured goods helps the MED-countries to develop their own industry and to attract further foreign investment which will ideally lead to greater prosperity in the region. In this sense, the EMFTA indeed is beneficial for the Mediterranean partners. On the other hand, the exclusion of agriculture from the EMFTA shows that Europe is not willing to accept entering into full competition with its agricultural sector. Although one might consider Morocco’s tertiary sector with 13 per cent surprisingly small, the country is nevertheless very much dependent on the export of agricultural products.118 Morocco’s third sector would certainly prosper further if it were granted free access to the European market. The future EMFTA between Morocco and the EU therefore reflects an uneven distribution of power between the European Union on the one side and Morocco on the other. Ultimately, the weaker partner had to accept what was offered by the EU.

*** Being Europe’s most recent foreign policy instrument, it is important at this point to introduce the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2003.119 It is aimed at linking the European neighbours closer to the EU. This will be achieved by establishing a ‘privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values’.120 The Commission says that ‘[t]he ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and economic integration’.121 Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

While the ENP again is only a political framework, the so-called ENP Action Plans put 116

Sven Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security – A Search for Partnership, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003, 17. 117 Brach, ‘Ten years after: Achievements and Challenges’, 10. 118 Brach, ‘Ten years after: Achievements and Challenges’, 20. 119 The ENP does neither replace the EMP nor the Association Agreements. It is an instrument which covers all immediate neighbours and therefore must be seen as an addition to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which remains the EU’s main policy instrument towards the Mediterranean region. 120 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, , (21.7.2007). 121 Ibid.

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the guidelines into practice. Like the Association Agreements, the ENP Action Plans are negotiated and concluded between the Community and each partner state.122 While the AA will lead to the gradual establishment of an EMFTA between a MEDcountry and the EU, the ENP Action Plans promote further reforms. In particular, the partner states are encouraged to adopt EU legislation. They have agreed, inter alia, to adopt EU environmental and social standards; basic technical standards; and rules in the EU competition policy. As a result, these states are bound ever closer to the EU. According to Martín, the Commission plays a central role in ‘supervising the implementation of the required legal, institutional, political and economic reforms […]’.123 The AAs which laid down general rules are set in stone by the Action Plans. The regulatory role established by way of Article 38 of the EU-Morocco AA, with regard to public enterprise, ensures that ‘no measure which disturbs trade between the Community and Morocco [… shall be …] adopted or maintained’. The effect of such adaptation to EU legislation is described by Escribano as ‘Europeanisation without Europe’.124 Partner states are offered a ‘stake in the EU’s Internal Market’125 without being able to participate in the process of promulgating the relevant legislation. Escribano argues that the ENP is an ‘EU strategy consisting of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the economic rules of the game’ in the MED-countries.126 The participation in the Single European Market (SEM) without being a full member is already a well known reality for non-EU EFTA states like Switzerland or Norway. Those states also have to comply with EU legislation without being part in the process of legislation. In this policy field, it is not simple to establish whether normative action is in the EU’s interest or if the EU rather deliberately increases its international influence by binding

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third states closer to Europe. Surely, the EU exercises its superior power if non122

Action Plans have been adopted with the following MED-countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority and Tunisia (July 2007). 123 Iván Martín, ‘In Search of Development along the Southern Border: The Economic Models Underlying the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy’, University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) workshop, 22 May 2006, , (21 July 2007). 124 Gonzalo Escribano, ‘Europeanisation without Europe? A Critical reflection on the Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean’, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, 2005, , (21 July 2007). 125 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, COM (2004) 373 final., 3. 126 Ibid.

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members simply have to adopt EU legislation in order to being able to get access to the SEM. One can go as far as to argue that non-members loose parts of their sovereignty. On the other hand, however, third states are expected to adopt rules that the EU has made for itself, legislation that it considers as right for itself and others. The SEM, moreover, involves legislation in the economic area which deals with the free movement of goods, capital, services and people (the four freedoms). If MED-countries adopt such regulations in future, the EU will have been successful in exporting its own model to another region. This would certainly reinforce a view of the EU as a normative actor. Whether strategic or normative considerations prevail in this field is hard to discern. One additional reason for this is the fact that the ENP is a relatively new policy instrument, and whether the MED-countries will in fact be able to take a stake in the SEM remains an open question. *** I will now turn to the way how the EMFTA which is supposed to be completed by 2010, will be realised.127 As previously stated, each MED-country has concluded an individual AA with the EC. This means that it is not accurate to talk about one EMFTA between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. As each country negotiated a bilateral AA with slightly different provisions, the free trade arrangements will only have bilateral effects. As soon as all free trade agreements between the EU and the MED-countries have entered into force, there will be ten EMFTA’s each one with slightly different provisions. It would therefore appear to be more appropriate to talk about the future existence of various free trade zones between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours rather than only one EMFTA. This situation, according to Nienhaus, impedes the development of North African regional integration. He notes that existing instruments Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

like the Maghreb Union or the Arab Common Market remain weak.128 Perhaps surprisingly, it is the EU with its policy of bilateral agreements, which hampers further integration within the North African market: an industrial product, for example, which is partly manufactured in MED-country A and then completed in MED-country B

127

The following lines build on Volker Nienhaus, ‘Promoting Development and Stability through a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 4, 1999, 501-518. 128 Nienhaus, ‘Promoting Development and Stability’, 513; Brach, ‘Ten years after: Achievements and Challenges’, 22; Bicchi, ‘Our size fits all’, 294.

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might not be exported into the European market free of duties if the value added from country A was too high. According to Brach, 60 per cent of the product’s value must originate from the exporting country.129 The consequence of the bilateral nature of the AAs is that only goods from the exporting country are entitled to duty-free access to the European market.130 The underlying rationale is certainly comprehensible and common currency in free-trade arrangements. Yet the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric and actions still remains considerable. The following statement with respect to the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement can be found on the Commission’s external relations website: ‘As well as bilateral "vertical" trade liberalisation with Europe, the Mediterranean Partners are committed to implement free trade among themselves ("horizontal" or South-South integration)’.131 It must be stressed that the new EMFTA will be segmented and purely bilateral in nature. Horizontal (i.e. southsouth trade liberalisation) is not really on the EU’s agenda and appears to be strong on rhetoric but short on substance. Trade liberalisation among European states has been at the core of the process of European integration.132 Meunier states that Europeans ‘[deliberately] chose to centralize trade policymaking in order to insulate the process from protectionist pressures and, as a result, promote trade liberalization’.133 According to this ‘collusive delegation argument’, the independence from national protectionist pressures was exploited as a means of formulating ‘good’ trade policy, in particular with respect to cutting tariffs and abolishing non tariff-barriers.134 If this concept is true then the promotion of regional integration in other parts of the world would be an interest of the EU as a normative actor. We have seen that the Commission emphasises the links between free trade and economic integration, on the one hand, and prosperity on the other. Free trade and economic integration would generate higher GDP

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growth rates, and in the long run, make the MED-countries’ economies internationally

129

Brach, ‘Ten years after: Achievements and Challenges’, 21. Ibid. 131 European Commission, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area’, , (29 June 2007). 132 It is important to bear in mind that until today, the SEM is not complete and rather distorted because of different EU member states preferences. ‘Free-trade’, therefore, must be seen as an idea or approach which the EU has identified as a core value. 133 Sophie Meunier, Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005, 8. 134 Dür, ‘Economic Interests’, 2. 130

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more competitive.135 While the EU’s rhetoric is very serious about building a common Mediterranean region, its policy of negotiating bilateral free-trade arrangements surely impedes the very same development. From a more strategic point of view, it could be argued, however, that the EU’s actions make more sense. After all, why should the EU deliberately further the development of an integrated region comparable to the EU? At present, Europe can engage with each MED-country individually. European interests and preferences are surely better achieved by the way of bilateral negotiations where one strong partner the European Commission - represents 27 member states. The need for compromise would clearly be greater if the EU was confronted with an equally powerful counterpart. *** According to a neo-realist explanation of international relations, states aim to preserve or increase their relative power. Hyde-Price argues that if states ‘can strengthen their position relative to others, so much the better’.136 In an interview, former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten was asked whether Free Trade Areas do not imply ‘an enormous burden and considerable sacrifices for the non EU Mediterranean partners. Dramatic policy reforms, a drastic structural adjustment, a painful economic transition etc. Plus they will be flooded by EU industrial exports, which will accentuate the problems of unemployment [...]’. Patten replied: ‘That may be true [...] but only up to a point. Non-EU Mediterranean partners will need to go through the free trade process with or without the Euro-Mediterranean partnership [...]‘.137 This quotation demonstrates how deeply convinced the Commission is about the validity of trade liberalisation.

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The conclusion to this chapter must be that the EU does indeed encourage the liberalisation of Mediterranean markets. It not only espouses rhetoric about lifting trade restrictions between the EU and individual Mediterranean partners. However, the way in which the EU acts in the field of trade relations is not consistent with the 135

Nienhaus, ‘Promoting Development and Stability’, 513. Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, 217-234, 221. 137 Quoted by Michael Hindley, ‘The MEDA Programme – a strategic evaluation’, , (29 June 2007). 136

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idea of Europe as a norm promoter. Bretherton and Vogler describe the EU’s actions as an ‘aggressive pursuit of market opening’.138 Liberalisation is both a value and a reflection of European economic interests. A reconsideration of the aspects dealt with in this chapter demonstrates that while European industrial products will be allowed duty-free access in the MED-countries, agricultural products will be excluded from the free trade arrangements. The EMFTA is not a single comprehensive approach but segmented and bilateral in nature. Moreover, new developments in the ENP framework show that MED-countries sell parts of their sovereignty in order to get limited access to the SEM. The way in which the EU approaches its so-called partners better reflects the notion of the EU as a big power rather than a norm promoter. The MED-countries are the periphery bound closely to the European core. Relations between the EU and the southern Mediterranean region therefore appear

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to be based on the notion of hierarchy rather than on the notion of partnership.

138

Bretherton/Vogler, The EU as a Global Actor’, 88.

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VI. Migration ‘The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states […]’.139 Approximately 500,000 people enter the European Union every year as illegal immigrants. A report produced by Eurostat and the ‘Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute’ found out that economic and family-related reasons are the two dominant motives driving potential migrants to leave their home countries.140 However, illegal or irregular immigrants from Muslim countries are predominantly young men who emigrate for economic reasons.141 Europol views ‘as being of special concern’ ‘the extensive use of the southern coasts of Spain, Greece and Italy as entry points’ for illegal immigrants into the European Union.142 Bicchi states that from the 1990s, the principal issues which have been caused the EU severe problems (i.e. migration, Islamism and terrorism) have emerged primarily from the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. She claims in fact that ‘migration was a key issue in European perceptions of the Mediterranean in the early 1990s’.143 The Barcelona Declaration devotes one paragraph to the issues of illegal immigration. Interestingly, this is done in the third chapter, the ‘Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs’. The partners emphasise the need for closer cooperation in this field and state that being ‘aware of their responsibility for readmission, [they] agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures […] in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation’.144 The Barcelona Declaration again focuses on closer cooperation between the partners but in this case it is surprisingly precise Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

139

European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, Tampere, SN 200/99, 15-16 October 1999, , (15 August 2007). 140 NIDI/EUROSTAT, ‘Push and Pull Factors of international migration’, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, 60, 74, , (15 August 2007). 141 Ibid. 142 Willy Bruggemann, ‘Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings seen as a security problem for EUROPE’, EUROPOL, 19 September 2002, (16 July 2007). 143 Federica Bicchi, ‘From Security to Economy and back?’. 144 Barcelona Declaration, ‘Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs’.

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about one particular aspect: readmission agreements. Although illegal immigration causes severe problems for both the southern and the northern EMP states, it is a ‘one-way’ phenomenon. Would-be immigrants aim to cross the Mediterranean from the south in order to find better living conditions in Europe. To negotiate and conclude readmission agreements, therefore, is an entirely European goal. This chapter can only present one aspect of the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. It focuses on migration issues because the problem of illegal immigration is still as relevant today as when the Barcelona Declaration was signed in 1995. Indeed, it is possibly even more relevant. I will focus here on EuroMediterranean readmission agreements as this subject allows me to demonstrate that the European attempt to negotiate these agreements (which also include the readmission of third-country nationals) does not exemplify closer cooperation between the Mediterranean partners in the field of migration. Even though migration issues form part of the ‘Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs’, I will demonstrate that the idea of Europe as a benign ‘normative’ actor appears to be inappropriate when explaining European foreign relations with the Mediterranean in a policy area where Europe has its own strong interests. *** In a 2002 communication to the Council and the European Parliament addressing migration and development issues, the Commission stated that the main reasons for migration into the EU are, inter alia, bad economic performance; high unemployment rates; bad governance; human rights abuses; and armed conflicts.145 The Commission holds the view that these push factors can be effectively addressed through European development assistance which may help to reduce migration flows in the longer term.146 The notion of the EU as a value-based actor is well illustrated in Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

the following statement: ‘Providing and securing jobs in developing countries is the most effective way to address the number one push factor of international migration: unemployment and lack of economic prospects. To contribute to the objectives of the Community migration policy the Community should therefore continue to promote the 145

European Commission, ‘Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries’, 2002, COM (02) 703 final., 10. 146 COM (02) 703 final., 21.

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improvement of effective market access of developing countries […]. As EU history has taught, regional integration and cooperation is the best recipe against war and violent conflict. Likewise, the promotion of regional integration in developing countries is a structural contribution to avoid refugee-producing conflicts. […] Ill-functioning democratic structures, weak institutions, the absence of the rule of law and bad governance are all major push factors for forced migration. The Community development policy addresses these challenges and will continue to do so, also in the context of refugee flows’.147 This quotation underlines once again the value of Ian Manner’s concept of normative power when explaining how the EU sees itself and the ‘other’. However, my two preceding chapters have already revealed some considerable shortcomings to this concept with respect to the policies implemented in the Mediterranean region. The above given quotation, for example, describes lack of economic prospects as being the ‘number one push factor of international migration’, regional integration and democratisation are seen as ‘recipes’ to prevent conflicts and therefore forced migration. One therefore would expect the EU to follow its own outspoken intentions. On an official or theoretical level, the EU presents itself as a foresighted actor focusing on the root causes of migration. The actual measures taken to fight illegal immigration, however, centre on keeping immigrants in their home countries or on focussing on attempts to ensure that irregular immigrants can be returned to their places of origin.148

*** ‘Migration is at the heart of the political debate in Europe and is one of the strategic priorities in the external relations of the Union’149 (emphasis added). Besides common European border controls150 in the Mediterranean Sea area, the emphasis of the EU’s external migration policies was placed on the repatriation of irregular

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migrants to their countries of destination.151 As early as 1992, the EU made clear its intention in the Edinburgh European Council communiqué to ‘work for bilateral or 147

COM (02) 703 final., 21-22. Christina Boswell, ‘The ‘external dimension’ of EU immigration and asylum policy’, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, 2003, 619-638, 630. 149 European Commission, ‘Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum’, 2006, COM (06) 26 final. 150 The issue of Joint Border Patrols is for example covered by Sandra Lavenex, ‘Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’, West European Politics, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, 329-350, 340-341. 151 Ibid. 148

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multilateral agreements with countries of origin or transit to ensure that illegal immigrants can be returned to their home countries’.152 While illegal immigration into the European Union was already considered to be a serious problem in the 1990s, the problem has increased considerably more recently. Spain and Italy estimated the numbers of illegal immigrants arriving on their shores were of 29,000 in 2004. This number had reportedly risen to 34,000 in 2005 and more than 57,000 in 2006.153 Moreover, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, illegal immigration from Muslim countries has increasingly been seen as a problem for European security.154 Despite the rhetoric advocating a long-term strategy to tackle illegal immigration, the 2002 Seville European Council urged that future cooperation or association agreements with any third state ‘should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration’.155 Most interestingly, the heads of state continued to argue that ‘[i]nsufficient cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union’.156 According to Lavenex, these repatriation clauses are compulsory preconditions for any further cooperation or association between the whole EU and any third country.157 The 1998 Austrian presidency stated that the EU ‘must use its economic and political muscle to achieve readmission agreements’.158 I argue that this is precisely what the EU does in order to achieve its goals. As was mentioned earlier, illegal immigration is not only seen as a burden on European states, since the 1990s, it has increasingly been considered a security problem.159 After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, immigration was progressively perceived as a potential threat for a country’s security. Whether

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152

European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council, 11-12 December 1992 (Declaration on principles of governing external aspects of migration policy) SN 456/92, Annex 5, 4, , (15 August 2007). 153 The Times of Malta, ‘Illegal Immigration’, 8 July 2007, , (16 July 2007). 154 Ben Hayes/Tony Bunyan, ‘Migration, development and the EU security agenda’ in, Europe in the World - Essays on EU foreign, security and development policies, BOND, London, 2003, 71-80, 71. 155 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21-22 June 2002, 13463/02 POLGEN 53, , (18.7.2007). 156 Ibid. 157 Lavenex, ‘The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’, 342. 158 As quoted in Hayes/Bunyan, ‘Migration, development and the EU security agenda’, 73. 159 For ‘Migration as a Security Issue’ see: Roland Dannreuther, International Security – The Contemporary Agenda, Polity, Cambridge, 2007, 100-117.

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immigrants are really a burden or whether the ‘security threat’ is real might be doubted but the notion of immigration being a potential security threat helps us better understand the intentions of EFP with respect to migration. In any case, it is worth repeating that the repatriation of illegal immigrants is an important EFP goal. Otherwise, the European Council would surely not link cooperation in this issue with closer bilateral relations between the EU and any third country. Furthermore, it is clear that these new readmission agreements are not only repatriation arrangements but shall also cover the removal of any third country national to the transit state from which the emigrant departed.160 I argue that the EU wants to divest itself of an issue which it considers as a threat to its security. A neo-realist analysis would suggest then that the EU is not willing to tolerate even a potential security threat. The EU aims to solve the problem of irregular migration by relocating it to its ‘EuroMediterranean partners’. In doing so, the EU does not lessen the problem of migration nor does it demonstrate its willingness to tackle the problem by means of mutual cooperation.

*** Critics of this interpretation could argue that the EU allocates large sums of European aid to the Mediterranean states which are particularly affected by migration either as transit or sending countries. Indeed, in 2004, the Council adopted a new programme of financial and technical assistance for non-EU countries particularly affected by migration. 161 The ‘AENEAS programme’ has a remarkable budget of € 250 million for the period 2004 to 2008.162 Its objectives are laid down in Article 1 of the regulation which makes clear that AENEAS is ‘intended for those third countries actively engaged in preparing or implementing a readmission agreement.” Prima facie, one could get the impression that the EU provides this financial assistance because it Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

merely intends to support North African states with its struggle against the problems caused by illegal immigration. North Africa, in particular the Maghreb, is not only affected by migration as a region where migration originates but also as a south to north and also east to west transit 160

Lavenex, ‘The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’, 341. Regulation (EC) No 491/2004, OJ, 2004, L 80. 162 COM (06) 26 final., 5. 161

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region. It is estimated that about 100,000 people from Sub-Saharan Africa cross North African Maghrebian states every year. While this figure is likely to rise further in the near future, migrants sometimes stay in these countries for a considerable length of time before continuing their journey towards Europe.163 This practise represents a great economic, social and political challenge for North African states whose available infrastructure is often inadequate to manage these migration flows effectively.164 Although European financial and technical assistance surely is welcomed by the respective MED-countries, it is worth questioning the reasons behind this particular European foreign aid programme. Rarely is an underlying objective of a foreign policy instrument so plainly stated as it is in the AENEAS regulation. According to Article 1(2), the programme is ‘intended for those third countries actively engaged in preparing or implementing a readmission agreement’. European financial assistance, amongst other objectives, aims to support third-party countries in the readmission of individuals who have entered the European Union illegally (see Article 2(1) lit. e). The donation of European aid aims to motivate thirdparty countries to negotiate readmission agreements with the European Union.165 It is also not surprising that states from which particularly large numbers of emigrants depart towards Europe receive the largest shares of the funds dispensed through the AENEAS programme. The Commission explicitly links its interest in the successful negotiation of readmission agreements and the AENEAS programme when it states: ‘On the Community’s behalf, the Commission is currently negotiating a readmission agreement with Morocco and has negotiating directives for Algeria. This gives these two countries priority as regards their eligibility under the Aeneas programme’ (emphasis added).166 As the Commission has stated, the successful conclusion of readmission agreements ‘depends very much of the ‘leverage’ at the Commission's disposal’.167

Financial assistance is therefore quite openly manipulated as an

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instrument to reach a European goal.

163

Information is taken from the Europe Aid Co-Operation Office, ‘2004 Annual Work Programme for Grants under Article 19 02 03 of the budget of the European Union’, Annex 2: ‘Reference document concerning financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum AENEAS programme 2004 – 2006’, , (19 July 2007). 164 COM (2006) 26 final., 4. 165 Boswell, ‘The ‘external dimension’ of EU immigration and asylum policy’, 635. 166 Europe Aid Co-Operation Office, ‘Reference document concerning financial and technical assistance to third countries’. 167 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on illegal residents’, 2002, COM (02) 175 final., 23.

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We may conclude and argue that even though the EU continues to purport that its relations with the MED-countries are based on mutual partnership, the evidence set out in this chapter demonstrates that the EU’s actions are motivated primarily by material interests. The creation and deepening of a long term partnership with the Mediterranean region appears to be little more than superficial rhetoric. In any case where Europe’s security, either actually or allegedly, is in danger, the notion of the EU as a benign promoter of values is not suitable to explain its role in international

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politics.

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VII. Conclusion I have argued in this paper that the concept of normative power with its flavour of the EU being a force for good is not consistent with the policies which it ultimately implements. The question appears not to be whether the EU was unsuccessful in implementing its Mediterranean strategies; rather it must be whether the EU actually wished to achieve what it declared in the Barcelona Declaration. We may ask again why has no substantial progress been made with respect to democratisation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean even though democracy officially is a declared core objective of the EU’s external relations. Why, on the other hand, is the EU so keen to see the liberalisation of the economies of the MEDcountries while it continues to protect its own agricultural markets? Finally, why does the EU set so much store by negotiating readmission agreements with its Southern neighbours? The answer is surely the same for all three questions. Although the EU does not threaten its southern neighbours with coercion, it is building and intensifying with them a highly asymmetrical relationship.168 In this dissertation, I have examined three areas: firstly democracy promotion, which forms part of the political and security cooperation basket of the Declaration; secondly, the Free-Trade Area(s) which fall into the economic and financial partnership basked; and thirdly, migration issues which are part of the third basket on social, cultural and human cooperation. I have selected these three issues in order to shed light on the extent to which the EU’s motivating force in improving EuroMediterranean relations was the promotion of ‘peace, stability and prosperity’. It seems clear from my analysis that these three catchwords better represent the European process of integration than the EU’s foreign policy towards the MEDcountries and that the promotion of European values (the ostensible reason for the Copyright © 2009. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

agreement) has been subordinated to European interests in stability. All in all, Europe’s own material interests dominate its external trade relations with the MEDcountries while the EU’s reaction to the fear of uncontrolled illegal immigration from the Mediterranean undermines the idea of Europe as a norm-promoting power.

168

Asymmetrical relationships between the EU and other third states including prospective new members are examined by: Haukkala, ‘A normative power or a normative hegemon?’.

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Appendix

The Euro-Mediterranean partners

EMP signatories 1995 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Algeria Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark Egypt Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Israel Italy Jordan Lebanon Luxembourg Malta Morocco Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Syria Tunisia Turkey United Kingdom Palestinian Authority

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EMP signatories since 2004 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia EMP signatories since 2007

36 37

Bulgaria Romania

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Official documents: Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28 November 1995, . Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/1996 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, 1996, OJ L 189. Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, 1999, OJ L 120. Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of development cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries, 1999, OJ L 120. Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, 2000, OJ L 311. Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), 2004, OJ L 80.

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Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, 2006, OJ L 386. Europe Aid Co-Operation Office, ‘2004 Annual Work Programme for Grants under Article 19 02 03 of the budget of the European Union’, Annex 2: ‘Reference document concerning financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum AENEAS programme 2004 – 2006’, . European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, 1994, COM (94) 427 final.

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European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 26-27 June 1992, . European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 26-27 June 1992, Annex I, . European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21-22 June 2002, 13463/02 POLGEN 53, . European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 1516 October 1999, SN 200/99, .

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Autorenprofil

Markus Hahn, geboren 1980, Studium der Rechtswissenschaften und der Europäischen und Internationalen Politik an den Universitäten Passau, Genf und Edinburgh, Abschluss 2006 als Diplom-Jurist an der Universität Passau und 2007 als Master of Science in International and European Politics an der Universität

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Edinburgh, derzeit beim Landgericht Duisburg beschäftigt als Rechtsreferendar.

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